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COMMENTARIES

OX THE

LAWS OF ENGLAND;

IN FOUR BOOKS.

By SIR WILLIAMJJLACKSTONE, Knight,

ONE OF THE JUSTICES op His MAJESTY'S COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

TOGETHER WITH

SUCH NOTES OF ENDURING VALUE AS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED IN

THE SEVERAL ENGLISH EDITIONS.

AND ALSO

A COPIOUS ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS;

And Additional Notes with References to English and- Asierjcan- Decisions and Statutes,

to date, which Illustrate or Change the.Law of the Text < also, a

Full Table of

SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING' TfaH STUDY OF THE LAW.

BY THOMAS M. COOLEY,

JAY PROFESSOR OF LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, AND AUTHOR OF

" CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS."

VOL, 1, INCLUDING BOOKS I & II,

SECOND EDITION—REVISED.

CHICAGO.

CALLAGHAN AND COMPANY.
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TO TH«

ALUMNI

Of THE

LAW DEPARTMENT OP MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

THIS EDITION OF A WOBK WHOSE CAREFUL AND FREQUENT PEBUSAL

•L

CANNOT FAIL TO STRENGTHEN THEIR'lOTO,'OF THE LAW AS A

SCIENCE, AND TO STIMULATE .A .GfcilBKOVS AMBiTIO pf

•'.. :••>' ..'-i

FOB PROFESSIONAL SUCOBSB,
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BESPECTFULLT INSCRIBED.

SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THE STUDY OF THE LAW.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE Commentaries of Mr. Justice Blackstone have now for more than a

century been the wonder and delight of persons whose curiosity or interest

have led them to investigate the constitution and laws of Great Britain, the

condition of things from which they grew, and the reasons upon which they

rest Lapse of time does not seem to diminish the attractions, or to lessen

SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THE STUDY OF THE LAW.

materially the practical value of these Commentaries. Large as is the proportion

BY THB EDITOR..

of the rules and usages here defined and described which have been modified

by statute, or have become obsolete in the changes and habits and modes of

thought among the people, the best book in which to take a comprehensive

view of the rudiments of English and American law is still the work now

before us of this eminent jurist. It is true that of late many short and easy

highways to a knowledge of the law have been planned by different writers,

along which the student might saunter with little hard labor and less hard

thought, arriving at his goal at last with a vague impression of having surveyed

a vast field of curious and irreconcilable contradictions, where confusion was

the leading principle, and chance the arbiter of controversy; but the thoughtful

student, the earnest seeker after knowledge, ambitions to fit himself for the

practical duties of life,, and for the stations to which the partiality or discern-

ment of his fellows might summon him, has shunned these deceptive ways, and

by the aid of vigorous thinkers, like the author before us, has delighted to

trace the plain law running through the apparent confusion, and to discover
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and contemplate the sound reasons out of which rules apparently arbitrary have

sprung. Such minds soon perceive that the field of legal knowledge is too vast

and diversified to be understood from a superficial survey of its principal objects

and features, and that it must be carefully explored through all its mazes and

intricacies, and with the aid of the men who, having studied the law with an

intimate knowledge of the habits and customs of the people over whom it was

established, were prepared to say why this rule was prescribed, and how and

under what circumstances that custom sprung up. And so it happens, that

while year by year hundreds of superficial workers are preparing themselves to

glean in the fields of legal controversy, the true laborers in that field, the men

who are to reap its substantial harvests, and to bear away its tempting prizes,

do not spare themselves the labor of an intimate acquaintance with the work

of this great jurist, nor fail to explore the abundant stores of legal learning to

which he gives us such agreeable introduction.

Nor, although there are many things in Blackstone which have ceased to be

important in the practical administration of the law, can we with prudence or

propriety omit to make ourselves acquainted with them. Things which are

abolished or obsolete may, nevertheless, have furnished the reasons for the

things which remain: and to study rules while ignoring their reasons would be

like studying the animal anatomy while ignoring the principle of life which

animated it. And it is noticeable, also, that though in England, where the

THE Commentaries of Mr. Justice Blackstone have now for more than a
century been the wonder and delight of persons whose curiosity or interest
have led them to investigate the constitution and laws of Great Britain, the
condition of things from which they grew, and the reasons upon which they
rest.. Lapse of time does not seem to diminish the attractions, or to lessen
materially the practical value of these Commentaries. Large as is the proportion
of the rules and usages here defined and described which have been modified
by statute, or have become obsolete in the changes and habits and modes of
thought among the people, the best book in which to take a comprehensive
view of the rudiments of English and American law is still the work now
before us of this eminent jurist. It is true that of late many short and easy
highways to a knowledge of the law have been planned by different writers,
along which the student might saunter with little hard labor and less hard
thought, arriving at his goal at last with a vague impression of having surveyed
a vast field of curious and irreconcilable contradictions, where confusion was
the leading principle, and chance the arbiter of controversy; but the thoughtful
student, the earnest seeker after knowledge, ambitious to fit himself for the
practical duties of life,. and for the stations to which the partiality or discernment of his fellows might summon him, has shunned these deceptive ways, and
by the aid of vigorous thinkers, like the author before us, baa delighted to
trace the plain law running through the apparent confusion, and to discover
and contemplate the sound reasons out of which rules apparently arbitrary have
sprung. Such minds soon perceive that the field of legal knowledge is too vast
and diversified to be understood from a superficial survey of its principal objects
and features, and that it must be carefully explored through all its mazes and
intricacies, and with the aid of the men who, having studied the law with an
intimate knowledge of the habits and customs of the people over whom it was
established, were prepared to say why this rule was prescribed, and how and
under what circumstances that custom sprung up. And so it happens, that
while year by year hundreds of superficial workers are preparing themselves to
glean in the fields of legal controversy, the true laborers in that field, the men
who are to reap its substantial harvests, and to bear away its tempting prizes,
do not spare themselves the labor of an intimate acquaintance with the work
of this great jurist, nor fail to explore the abundant stores of legal learning to
which he gives us such agreeable introduction.
Nor, although there are many things in Blackstone which have ceased to be
important in the practical administration of the law, can we with prudence or
propriety omit to make ourselves acquainted with them. 'l'hings which are
abolished or obsolete may, nevertheless, have furnished the reasons for the
things which remain: and to study rules while ignoring their reasons would be
like studying the animal anatomy while ignoring the principle of life which
animated it. And it is noticeable, also, that though in England, where the
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i.vmmon law and the statutes mentioned by this author have been so greatly

'•hanged by recent legislation, new works adapted to the present condition of

i Mugs may, to a considerable extent, supersede the one before us, in America

w'..2re many of these changes have never been made, and where much of the

rf.ent English legislation has no importance, even by way of explanation or

illustration, the original work of Blackstone is much the most useful, as pre-

sto ting us the law in something near the condition in which our ancestors

brought it to America, leaving us to trace in our statutes and decisions its

iiMjucnt changes here, unembarrassed by irrelevant information about

].ui liamentary legislation which in no way concerns us.

I a the preparation of the present edition it has not been thought unimpor-

tant to call attention from time to time to the differences which exist between

the constitutions of Great Britain and of the United States. Some of those

differences, however, are too subtle to be put upon paper, and spring from

differences in society which are sensibly felt but difficult of description or

explanation. To speak of the one government as monarchical and the other

as republican is naturally to convey the idea that in the one the element of

executive strength and power is predominant, while in the other the influence

of the people in the government is more direct and controlling; and the

student of politics, who comes to this subject without previous familiarity with

English constitutional history, is apt to be surprised when he finds that the

personal influence and authority of the American Executive are much the more
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potent, and that while the popular branch of the American legislature is at

most but the peer of the upper, the commons house of parliament lays down

the law for both the monarch and the house of lords, permitting neither of

those branches of the legislative department to oppose its settled determina-

tions. But it would be idle from thence to draw general conclusions, unless

we go beyond the theory of the British constitution, and take into considera-

tion the aristocratic nature of British society, and that strong conservative

sentiment and tendency which preserves to the privileged classes the real

control of the government, notwithstanding the house of the legislature,

which nominally represents them, has been stripped in a measure of its power,

and the government brought into more intimate sympathy with the prevailing

popular sentiment. We cannot understand a political system, and judge of its

value and probable influence and permanency, without a knowledge of the

people who have adopted it, and of the manner in which they are likely to give

its theories practical effect; for nothing is more evident than that what will

conduct one people to ruin, may lead another, which has had a different

history and training, and whose natural and acquired tendencies are different,

on the high road to national greatness and prosperity. The necessity of

checks and balances in government, and of a careful distribution of govern-

mental functions, is obviotasly greatest where the conservative sentiment is

weakest, and it is consequently entirely possible that a concentration of power

in a single house of the legislature may be safe and even useful in one country,

while justly condemned by all thinking men as likely to lead to commotions,

anarchy and revolutions in another. All history teaches us that different

peoples, or even the same people in different stages of advancement, are not to

be governed by the like modes and forms; and while we all concede this as a

general rule, we are too apt, perhaps, when we compare with our own the

tl

.. · J1mon law and the statutes mentioned by this author have boon so greatly
nged by recent legislation, new works adapted to the present condition of
, · i:igs may, to a. considerable extent, supersede the one before us, in America
.. · re many of these changes have never been made, and where much of the
: . · .,: nt English legislation has no importance, even by way of explanation or
i ihi i!tration, the original work of Blackstone is much the most useful, as pre..
~· '. •ing us the law in something near the condition in which our ancestors
u1 ,,.1ght it to America, leaving us to trace in our statutes and decisions it.a
~1': .'lequent changes here, unembarrassed by irrelevant information about
·iamentary legislation which in no way concerns us.
'. i the preparation of the present edition it has not been thought unimportant to call attention from time to time to the differences which exist between
the constitutions of Great Brita.in and of the United States. Some of those
differences, however, a.re too subtle to be put upon paper, and spring from
differences in society which are sensibly felt but difficult of description or
explanation. To speak of the one government as monarchical and the other
as republican is naturally to convey the idea that in the one the element of
executive strength and power is predominant, while in the other the influence
of the people in the government is more direct and controlling; and the
student of politics, who comes to this subject without previous familiarity with
English constitutional history, is apt to be surprised when he finds that the
personal influence and authority of the American Executive a.re much the more
potent, and that while the popular branch of the American legislature is at
most but the peer of the upper, the commons house of parliament lays down
the law for both the monarch and the house of lords, permitting neither of
those branches of the legislative department to oppose its settled determinations. But it would be idle from thence to draw general conclusions, unless
we go beyond the theory of the British constitution, and take into consideration the aristocratic nature of British society, and that strong conservative
sentiment a.nd tendency which preserves to the privileged classes the real
control of the government, notwithstanding the house of the legislature,
which nominally represents them, has been stripped in a measure of its power,
and the government brought into more intimate sympathy with the prevailing
popular sentiment. We cannot understand a political system, a.nd judge of its
value and probable influence and permanency, without a knowledge of the
people who have adopted it, and of the manner in which they are likely to give
its theories practical effect; for nothing is more evident than that what will
conduct one people to ruin, may lead another, which has had a different
history and training, and whose natural and acquired tendencies a.re different.
on the high road to national greatness and prosperity. The necessity of
checks and balances in government, and of a careful distribution of governmental functions, is obviously greatest where the conservative sentiment is
weakest, and it is consequently entirely possible that a. concentration of power
in a single house of the legislature may be safe and even useful in one country,
while justly condemned by all thinking men as likely to lead to commotions,
anarchy and revolutions in another. All history teaches us that different
peoples, or even the same people in difl'erent stages of advancement, are not to
be governed by the like modes and forms; and while we all concede this as a
general rule, we are too apt, perhaps, when we compare with our own the
1
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system which prevails in the country from which we have mainly derived our

ideas of government and law, to forget that we erected our structure on

foundation ideas of democracy which never pervaded the governing classes in

Great Britain, and that the aristocratic sentiment, which is there controlling,

is here in a political point of view, insignificant.

We have tried in America the system of setting hounds to the authority of

government, by written constitutions which prescribe limits and furnish the

means of restraint when a disposition is evinced to overstep them. It is

possible that, while we have thus the letter of the law in black and white

before us, we become less regardful of its spirit than we should be if its

maxims were left to the watchful care and reverential guardianship of the

people. It is very likely that those who frame the laws would be more careful

at all times to keep within due bounds, if the responsibility of final decision

upon questions regarding their own power was to rest with them rather than

with some other authority. It is quite certain that enactments of doubtful

constitutional validity are sometimes adopted by legislators who waive the

question of doubt, and leave it to be settled by the courts when the true theory

of our government requires that they should consider it carefully and con-

scientiously, and make their action depend upon its solution. But, on the

other hand, there are advantages in our system which more than compensate

for the drawbacks referred to; and the evident tendency in this country is to

add to constitutional restrictions rather than to diminish their number. "We
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discover this in the proceedings of every constitutional convention which is

held; in the restraint imposed upon private and class legislation; in the

increased particularity in the specification of personal rights; and in the

securities devised to prevent hasty and improvident action in legislative bodies.

This tendency cannot be overlooked in our consideration of the constitutional

system of the American states, and, whether we regard it as wise or unwise, we

have only to bow to the popular will, expressed as it is in the most solemn and

authoritative manner that could possibly be devised.

It scarcely seems necessary to remark that the student of American law

ought to be well grounded in English history, and to have studied the develop-

ment of constitutional principles in the struggles and revolutions of the

English people. It is idle to come to an examination of American con-

stitutions without some familiarity with that from which they have sprung,

and impossible to understand the full force and meaning of the maxims of

personal liberty, which are so important a part of our law, without first

learning how and why it was that they became incorporated in the legal

system. An abstract consideration of rights may answer the purpose of the

mere theorist, but it is not sufficient for the lawyer; he must deal with princi-

ples as they have found recognition in the legal system, with all the limitations

which state necessity of policy may have imposed. A recent thoughtful an«"

philosphical writer has well said that " rights are and can be real, only as they

are established in the civil and political organization. They are slowly and

only with toil and endeavor enacted in laws and moulded in institutions. It is

only with care and steadiness and tenacity of purpose that those guaranties

are forged which are the securance of freedom, and they are to be Clinched and

riveted to be strong for defence and against assault. The rhetoric which holds

the loftier abstract conception avails nothing, until in the constructive grasp

,••

system which prevails in the country from which we have mainly derived our
ideas of government and law, to forget that we erected our structure on
foundation ideas of democracy which never pervaded the governing cl&SSes in
Great Britain, and that the aristocratic sentiment, which is there controlling,
is here in a political point of view, insignificant.
We have tried in America the system of setting bounds to the authority of
government, by written constitutions which prescribe limits and furnish the
means of restraint when a disposition is evinced to overstep them. It is
possible that, while we have thus the letter of the law in black and white
before us, we become less regardful of its spirit than we should be if its
maxims were left to the watchful care and reverential guardianship of the
people. It is very likely that those who frame the laws would be more careful
at all times to keep within due bounds, if the responsibility of final decision
upon questions regarding their own power was to rest with them rather than
with some other authority. It is quite cert.sin that enactments of doubtful
constitutional validity are sometimes adopted by legislators who waive the
question of doubt, and leave it to be settled by the courts when the true theory
of our government requires that they should consider it carefully and conscientiously, and make their action depend upon its solution. But, on the
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discover this in the proceedings of every constitutional convention which is
held; in the restraint imposed upon private and class legislation; in the
increased particularity in the specification of personal rights ; and in the
securities devised to prevent hasty and improvident action in legislative bodies.
This tendency cannot be overlooked in our consideration of the constitutional
system of the American states, and, whether we regard it as wise or unwise, we
have only to bow to the popular will, expressed as it is in the most solemn and
authoritative manner that could possibly be devised.
It scarcely seems necessary to remark that the student of American law
ought to be well grounded in English history, and to have studied the development of constitutional principles in the struggles and revolutions of the
English people. It is idle to come to an examination of American constitntions without some familiarity with that from which they have sprung,
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personal liberty, which are so important a part of our law, without first
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system. An abstract consideration of rights may answer the purpose of the
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and tentative skill of those who apprehend the conditions of positive rights, it

is shaped and formed in the process of the state. The former is often the

quality of some individual thinker, whose ideal is cold also in its distant

elevation, and who, regarding in events only the conflict of ideas, is indifferent

to the real life of men and nations; and this indifference may become, when

his own ideal is unrecognized, the ground only of the scorn of an unsympathiz-

ing imagination—not the nobleness but the weakness of disdain: the latter is

the work of the statesman who alone knows how patient and vigilant is the

toil which is the condition of the institution of rights, and how wary and

bitter is the antagonism of the forces from whose selfish grasp the ampler field

of rights is wrested, and who forgets in no immediate end the long result to be

attained, nor in the exultation of momentary success, or the discouragement

of momentary failure, how firmly and how broadly rights, to be secure must

be enacted in the laws and moulded in the institutions of the state." (a)

It is not our meaning that the student should read history with a view alone

to the law, or that he should confine his investigations to the history of a

single race: in this particular his culture cannot be too broad or too liberal;

what we mean is, that to the lawyer English history possesses a value that

renders its careful study quite indispensable, and that the student of law must

pursue it as the beginning and foundation of his legal course if he aspires to

respectable attainments. His particular and careful attention should be

directed to the history of the English constitution as traced in the works
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of writers like Hallam and May; and from the speeches of Burke and Erskine,

and other eminent statemen of modern times, as well as from some of the

leading state trials, he will derive abundant illustration of a pertinent and

forcible character, that will tend to make more vivid and permanent the

impression which the facts of the history leave upon the mind.(J)

From these sources he will not only derive increased love of liberty, and

strengthened attachment to the institutions under which he lives, but he will

be taught, also, to discern in the dry rule of law the principle which underlies

and vivifies it, and he will discern how to apply correctly that principle, in

(a) " The Nation," by E. Mulford, p. 83. As this book has but recently appeared, attention

ia called to it as a work which nobly fulfills the purpose announced by the author in his pref-

ace, " to ascertain and define the being of the nation in its unity and continuity."

(6) The leading cases on constitutional law, it would be useful to read in the same connection.

Those regarded as such have been recently published, with notes, by Mr. Herbert Broom, but

his work has not been republished in America. The following are the cases of most interest

and importance in this country, with references to the reports or other publications where they

may be found: Sommerset's Case, 20 State Trials. 1, and Loffl, Ij the right to personal liberty;

and tentative skill of those who apprehend the conditions of positive rights, it
is shaped and formed in the process of the state. The former is often the
quality of some individual thinker, whose ideal is cold also in its distant
elevation, and who, regarding in events only the con.flict of ideas, is indifferent
to the real life of men and nations; and this indifference may become, when
his own ideal is unrecognized, the ground only of the scorn of an unsympathizing imagination-not the nobleness but the weakness of disdain; the latter is
the work of the stat.esman who alone knows how patient and vigilant is the
toil which is the condition of the institution of rights, and how wary and
bitt.er is the antagonism of the forces from whose selfish grasp the ampler field
of rights is wrested, and who forgets in no immediate end the long result to be
attained, nor in the exultation of momentary success, or the discouragement
of momentary failure, how firmly and how broadly rights, to be secure must
be enacted in the laws and moulded in the institutions of the state." (a)
It is not oar meaning that the student should read history with a view alone
to the law, or that he should confine his investigations to the history of a
single race: in this particular his culture cannot be too broad or too liberal;
what we mean is, that to the lawyer English history possesses a value that
renders ite careful study quite indispensable, and that the student of law must
pursue it as the beginning and foundation of his legal course if he aspires to
respectable attainments. His particular and careful attention should be
directed to the history of the English constitution as traced in the works
of writers like Hallam and May; and from the speeches of Burke and Erskine,
and other eminent statemen of modem times, as well as from some of the
leading state trials, he will derive abundant illustration of a pertinent and
forcible character, that will tend to make more vivid and permanent the
impression which the facts of the history leave upon the mind.(b)
From these sources he will not only derive increased love of liberty, and
strengthened attachment to the institutions under which he lives, but he will
be taught, also, to discern in the dry rule of law the principle which underlies
and vivifies it, and he will discern how to apply correctly that principle, in

slavery the creature of positive law : Busbnell's Case, 6 State Trials, 999; Vaughan, 136;

Freeman, 1; 2 Jones. 18; jurors not to be coerced in their verdict, or called to account for it

afterwards : Darnell's Case, 3 State Trials, 1; illegality of arrest without cause shown; right

to habeas corpus: The Banker's Case, 14 State Trials, 1, and 6 Mod. 29; Skinner, 601; 1 Free-

man, 331; the right to private property : Leach v. Mooney, 19 State Trials, 1001; Burr. 1692; 1

W. Bla. 555; Wilkes r. Wood, 19 State Trials, 1153; Entick t>. Carrington, id. 1080; 2 Wilson,

275; illegality of general warrants; right to protection against unreasonable searches and

seizures: Stockdale e. Hansard, 9 Ad. and El. 1; 11 id. 253; parliamentary privilege of

publication; protection of individuals against libellous aspersions in legislative documents;

Bamardiston j>. Soame, 6 State Trials. 1063; 2 Lev. 114; Pollexf. 470; 1 Freeman. 880;

8 Keb. 366; legislative powers and privileges. Other cases of historical value, and particularly

the great cases of Shipmoney and of the Seven Bishops, are included in the collection, and all

are enriched with copious notes. It may here be mentioned, also, that Todd's Parliamentary

Government in England—a recent work—is more full in its collection of facts than the Con-

stitutional History by May; and is a convenient and useful work.

r.

(a) "The Nation," by E. Mulford, p. 88. As this book has but recently appeared, attention
is called to it u a work which nobly rulfllls the purpose announced by the author in his preface, "to ascertain and define the being of the nation in its unity and continuity."
(b) The leading cases on constitutional Jaw, it would be useful to read in the same connection.
Those regarded as such have been recently published, with notes, by Mr. Herbert Broom, but
his work bu not been republished in America. The following are the cases of most intereBt
and importance in this country, with references to the reports or other publication9 where they
may be found : Sommert1et's Case, 20 State Trials. 1, and Lofft, 1; the right to personal liberty;
slavery the creature of poeitive law: Bushnell's Case, 6 State Trials, 999; Vaughan, 136;
Freeman, 1; 2 Jones, ta; jurors not to be coerced in tht>ir verdict, or called to account for it
afterwards : Darnell's Case, 3 State Trials, 1; illegality of arreBt without cause shown; right
to habeas corpus: The Banker's Case, 14 State Trials, 1, and Ii Mod. 29; Skinner, 601; 1 Freeman, 331; the right to private property: Leach 11. Mooney, 19 State Trials, 1001; Burr. 1692; 1
W. Bia. lioo; Wilkes 11. Wood, 19 State Trials, 1163; Entick ,,, Carrington, id. 1030; 2 Wilson,
2i5; illegality of general warrant~; right to protection against unreasonable Sl'arches and
seizures: Stockdale 11. Hansard, 9 Ad. and El. 1; 11 Id. 268; parliamentary privilege of
publication; protection of individuals against libt:-llous aspersions in legislath·e documents;
Barnardiston ,,, Soame, 6 State Trials. 1063; 2 Lev. 114; Pollexf. 470; 1 Freeman. 380;
8 Keb. 865; legislative powera and privileges. Other cases of historical value, and particularly
the great cases of Shlpmoncy and of the Seven Bishops. are included in the collection. and all
are enriched with copious notes. It may here be mentioned, also, that Todd's Parliamentary
Government In England- a recent work-ls more f\111 In Its collection of facta than the Conllt.ltutlonal Hlatory by May; and is a convenient and useful work.
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new cases as they arise, by noting how it has been applied by the great minds

which thus become his preceptors.

He cannot fail, also, to have it fully impressed upon his mind in the course

of these investigations, that there are some bounds to the authority of govern-

ment, which exist in the very nature of our organized society, and do not need

to be pointed out by positive law. It is possible that he may sometimes

encounter a vague impression that government may rightfully do whatever it

has the power to do; and that whenever a particular department of govern-

ment, or officer of any department, has not been made responsible to any other

for the proper exercise of authority, the determination of such department or

officer to do a particular act, must be accepted as satisfactory and conclusive

evidence that the act itself is rightful and legal. Such is not the theory of the

American constitutions, or of any government where rights are recognized and

respected. The sovereignty with us is in the people, and they have delegated

to the agencies of their creation only so much of the powers of government as

they deemed safe, proper, and expedient. The power exercised must be

within the grant made, and if it be not, it is usurpation, whether the means

of restraint are provided or not. The people even proceed deliberately and

from a conviction of the absolute necessity for such action, to impose restric-

tions upon their own authority; and they preclude themselves from the

exercise of sovereign powers except under the conditions of caution and

deliberation, which they have previously, by their written constitution, im-
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posed. It is not, therefore, to be readily inferred that they designed any

department of the government to exercise arbitrary authority. It is another

common error to which our author gives no countenance, that constitutions in

free states are established mainly for -the purpose of giving effect to the voice

of the majority, and that that voice, whenever expressed in due form, is and

should be of absolute force. The student will soon perceive that this is true

only in a general sense, and that in various ways the majority are curbed and

controlled to restrain passion and prevent injustice. To deal arbitrarily with

the rights of the minority, even though that minority be so small as to embrace

a single person only, is not within the province of any free government, and the

power cannot be rightfully conferred, because on no admissible theory of

organized society does the sovereignty itself possess it.(c)

We must discard alike the idea of a divine origin for government, and

the theoretical social compact, and acknowledge rightful authority in the

physical power of the stronger to subject the weaker to his will, before we can

accede to the doctrine that the greater number of voters is necessarily to hold

absolute sway, or that the voice of the people is always to be accepted as the

voice of Deity. Even when convened to consider what shall be the terms

of their compact of government the people are not without law, and are not at

liberty to regard themselves as under no restraints. The law of God precedes

their action; the immutable principles of right and justice are over and about

(c) " Sovereignty," says Dr. Liebef, (Civil Liberty and Self-government, c. 14) " is not

absolutism." And again, he says, speaking of the despotism which is founded upon pre-

existing popular absolutism : " the process [by which it is reached] is of no importance; the

facts are simply these, the power thus acquired is despotic, and hostile to self-government) the

power is claimed on the ground of absolute popular power; a ml it becomes the more uncompromit-

tng- became it ii claimed on the ground of popular power}'—Ibid. c. 31.
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new cases as they arise, by noting how it has been applied by the great minds
which thus become his preceptors.
He cannot fail, also, to have it fully impressed upon his mind in the course
of these investigations, that there are some bounds to the authority of government, which exist in the very nature of our organized society, and do not need
to be pointed out by positive law. It is possible that he may sometimes
encount,er a vague impression that government may rightfully do whatever it
bas the p01oer to do; and that whenever a particular department of government, or officer of any department, has not been made responsible to any other
for the proper exercise of authority, the determination of such department or
officer to do a particular act, must be accepted as satisfactory and conclusive
evidence that the act itself is rightful and legal. Such is not the theory of the
American constitutions, or of any government where rights are recognized and
respected. The sovereignty with us is in the people, and they have delegated
to the agencies of their creation only so much of the powers of government as
they deemed safe, proper, and expedient. The power exercised must be
within the grant made, and if it be not, it is usurpation, whether the means
of restraint are provided or not. 'fhe people even proceed deliberately and
from a conviction of the absolute necessity for such action, to impose restrictions upon their own authority; and they preclude themselves from the
exercise of sovereign powers except under the conditions of caution and
deliberation, which they have previously, by their written 9onstitution, imposed. It is not, therefore, to be readily inferred that they designed any
department of the government to exercise arbitrary authority. It is another
common error to which our author gives no countenance, that constitutions in
free states are established mainly for ·the purpose of giving effect to the voice
of the majority, and that that voice, whenever expressed in due form, is and
should be of absolute force. The student will soon perceive that this is true
only in a general seuse, and that in various ways the majority are curbed and
controlled to restrain passion and prevent injustice. To deal arbitrarily with
the rights of the minority, even though that minority be so small as to embrace
a single person only, is not within the province of any free government, and the
power cannot be rightfully conferred, because on no admissible theory of
organized society does the sovereignty itself possess it.(c)
We must discard alike the idea of a divine origin for government, and
the theoretical social compact, and acknowledge rightful authority in the
physical power of the stronger to subject the weaker to his will, before we can
accede to the doctrine that the greater number of voters is necessarily to hold
absolute sway, or that the voice of the people is always to be accepted as the
voice of Deity. Even when convened to consider what shall be the terms
of their compact of government the people are not without law, and are not at
liberty to regard themselves as under no restraints. The law of God precedes
their action; the immutable principles of right and justice are over and about
(c) "80\"erelgnty," 11ays Dr. Llebet, (Civil tiberty and Self-government, c. 14) "Is not.
absolutism." And again, he says, speaking of the deapotism which is founded npon preexisting popular abRolutism : " the proceea [by which it is reached] is of no importance; the
facts are simply these, the power thu8 acquired is despotic, and hostile to self-~vernment 1 the
power Is claimed on the ground of absolute popular power;, and it become., the more uncompromiling 'becauae it ia claimed on tlu ground of popular power."-Ihid. c. SL
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them, and cannot rightfully be ignored; the life and the liberty of the

individual and the fruits of his labor are not more sacred after they have been

declared by a written law to be inviolable than they were before, and the

legitimate province of constitutions is to furnish them with due and adequate

protection instead of providing the means by which the individual may be

robbed by the organized society he enters, of either or all. The eloquent

denunciation by Burke of the doctrine of arbitrary power, delivered on the

trial of Warren Hastings, is worthy of being repeated often, and thoughtfully

dwelt upon by those who frame laws for a free people. " He have arbitrary

power! My lords, the East India Company have not arbitrary power to give

him; the king has no arbitrary power to give him; your lordships have not;

nor the commons; nor the whole legislature. We have no arbitrary power to

give, because arbitrary power is a thing which neither any man can hold nor

any man can give. No man can lawfully govern himself according to his own

will, much less can one person be governed by the will of another. We are all

born in subjection, all born equally, high and low, governors and governed, in

subjection to one great, immutable, pre-existent law, prior to all our devices,

and prior to all our contrivances, paramount to all our ideas and all our

sensations, antecedent to our very existence, by which we are knit and

connected in the eternal frame of the universe, out of which we cannot stir.

This great law does not arise from our conventions or compacts; on the

contrary it gives to our conventions and compacts all the force and sanction
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they can have; it does not arise from our vain institutions. Every good gift

is of God; and he who has given the power, and from whom alone it originates,

will never suffer the exercise of it to be practiced upon any less solid founda-

tion than the power itself. If, then, all dominion of man over man is the

effect of the divine disposition, it is bound by the eternal laws of him that gave

it, with which no human authority can dispense; neither he that exercises it,

nor those who are subject to it; and if they were mad enough to make an

express contract that should release their magistrate from his duty, and should

declare their lives, liberties and properties dependent upon, not rules and laws,

but his mere capricious will, that Covenant would be void. The acceptor

of it has not his authority increased, but he has his crime doubled."(<f)

What has been said does not at all call in question the correctness of those

rules which have been laid down by courts and law writers for the construction

of written constitutions, and for the guidance of legislative bodies or judicial

tribunals in passing upon the disputes which arise under them. What is right,

what is expedient, what is proper, what constitute the inalienable rights of

individuals, and what is necessary to be inserted in their constitution

of government to protect them, the people who frame it must judge, and not

generally he who, under it, is vested with executive or judicial functions.

But in all our inquiries concerning what the law is, and how the written

constitution affects the rights of individuals, we are in danger of being led to

(d) And again, he says in the same speech : " Law and arbitrary power are in eternal enmity.

Name me a magistrate, and I will name property; nnme me power and I will name protection.

It is a contradiction in terms; it is blasphemy in religion; it is wickedness in politics, to say that

any man can have arbitrary power. In every patent of office the duty is included. For what

else does a magistrate exist? To suppose for power is an absurdity in idea. Jndges are

guided and governed by the eternal laws of justice to which we are all subject." See Prior's

life of Burke, ch. ix; Works, (Little & Brown's Ed.) ix, 455.

them, and cannot rightfully be ignored; the life and the liberty of the
individual and the fruits of his labor are not more sacred after they have been
declared by a written law to be inviolable than they were before, and the
legitimate province of constitutions is to furnish them with due and adequate
protection instead of providing the means by which the individual may be
robbed by the organized society he enters, of either or all. The eloquent
denunciation by Burke of the doctrine of arbitrary power, delivered on the
trial of Warren Hastings, is worthy of being repeated often, and thoughtfully
dwelt upon by those who frame laws for a free people. "He have arbitrary
power! My lords, the East India Company have not arbitrary power to give
him; the king has no arbitrary power to give him; your lordships have not;
nor the commons ; nor the whole legislature. We have no arbitrary power to
give, because arbitrary power is a thing which neither any man can hold nor
any man can give. No man can lawfully govern himself according to his own
will, much less can one person be governed by the will of another. We a.re all
born in subjection, all born equally, high and low, governors and governed, in
subjection to one great, immutable, pre-existent law, prior to all our devices,
and prior to all our contrivances, para.mount to all our ideas and all our
senaa.tions, antecedent to our very existence, by which we a.re knit and
connected in the eternal frame of the universe, out of which we cannot stir.
This great law does not arise from our cohventions or compacts; on the
contrary it gives to our conventions and compacts all the force and sanction
they can have; it does not arise from our vain institutions. Every good gift
is of God; and he who has given the power, and from whom alone it originates,
will never suffer the exercise of it to be practiced upon any less solid foundation than the power itself. If, then, a.11 dominion of man over man is the
effect of the divine disposition, it is bouhd by the eternal laws of him that gave
it, with which no human authority can dispense; neither he that exercises it,
nor those who a.re subject to it; and if they were mad enough to make an
express contra.ct that should release their magistrate from his duty, and should
declare their lives, liberties and properties dependent upon, not rules and laws,
but his mere capricious will, that covenant would be void. 'fhe acceptor
of it has not his authority increased, but he has his crime doubled."(d)
What has been said does not at all call in question the correctness of those
rules which have been laid down by courts and law writers for the construction
of written constitutions, and for the guidance of legislative bodies or judicial
tribunals in passing upon the disputes which arise under them. What is right,
what is expedient, what is proper, what constitute the inalienable rights of
individuals, and what is hecessary to be inserted in their constitution
of government to protect them, the people who frame it must judge, and not
generally he who, under it, is vested with executive or judicial functions.
But in all our inquiries concerning what the law ie, and how the written
constitution affects the rights of individuals, we a.re in danger of being led to
(d) And again, he says in the same speech: "Law and arbitrary power are In eternal enmity.
Name me a magi11trate, and I will name pruperty; name me power and I will name protection.
It 111 a contradict.ton in terms; it i11 blMphemy in religion; it Is wickedness in politic11, to toay that
any man can have arbitrary power. In e\'ery patent or office the duty is included. For what
else does a magistrate e:otist 1 To 11uppo11e for power is an absurdity in idea. Judges are
guided and governed by the eternal law~ of justice to which we are all subject." See Prlor'11
life of Burke, ch. Ix; Worb 1 (Litll!.! k Brown's Ed.) ix, 455.
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false conclusions if we do not keep in mind the primary and fundamental fact,

that "written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles, but the

latter are prior in existence to the former."(e) Those instruments have

for one of their chief ends the protection of the rights of minorities: they seek

the establishment of a government of laws which shall be restrained in its

operation within the proper sphere of government, and shall protect the pre-

existent rights, not take them away.(/)

The best aid to a proper understanding and interpretation of the law, where

one's previous reading has fitted him for its consideration, is a thoughtful and

patient examination of the purpose of its enactment. If one shall enter upon

the study of the law under the impression that the extent of his advancement

must necessarily bear some relation to the number of hours consumed in

reading, and the number of pages devoured, and shall, in consequence of that

mistaken impression, hurry over ground where he should proceed slowly, cau-

tiously, and with much pains-taking, he must be brought at last face to face

with the fact that he is reading to little purpose, and catching but surface

views. For it is as true with the mental as it is with the physical life, that, to

nourish and strengthen the powers, there must be time and opportunity for

digestion; and this process demands consideration, reflection, and patient and

laborious thought. "All knowledge," says Sir William Hamilton, " is only for

the sake of energy;" and, again, " The paramount end of liberal study is the

development of the student's mind; and knowledge is principally useful as a
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means of determining the faculties to that exercise through which this

development is accomplished."^) The study of the law must be with active

mind and receptive understanding; for otherwise the student, however patient

his reading, will be forced to confess in the end that, in the "nice, sharp

quillets of the law," with which his memory is burdened, he is, like Shak-

speare's clown, " no wiser than a daw." That lawyer, however able, who rises

in court to discuss great questions with no better or more thoughtful prepara-

tion than a great collection of precedents, from which he may read what this

judge has said, or what deduction that writer has made, has generally no right

to expect that he is rendering valuable assistance to the court, or that he is

advancing essentially the cause of his client. Every litigated case has an

(e) 2 Webster's works, 892. See also, per Bates, arguendo, in Hamilton v. St. Louis Connty

Court, 15 Mo. 13, quoted in Coo. Const. Lim. 86. " The principal aim of society is to protect

individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights which were vested in them by the immut-

able laws of nature, bat which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance

and intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence

it follows that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these

absolute rights of individuals." Post, book 1, p. 124.

(/) "All endeavors to throw more and more unarticulated power into the hands of the pri-

false conclusions if we do not keep in mind the primary and fun<lamental fact,
that "written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles, but the
latter are prior in existence to the former."(e) Those instruments have
for one of their chief ends the protection of the rights of minorities: they seek
the establishment of a government of laws which shall be restrained in its
operation within the proper sphere of government, and shall protect the preexistent rights, not take them away.(/)
The best aid to a proper understanding and interpretation of the law, where
one's previous reading has fitted him for its consideration, is a. thoughtful and
patient examination of the purpose of its enactment. If one shall enter upon
the study of the law under the impression that the extent of his advancement
must neceBSarily bear some relation to the number of hours consumed in
reading, and the number of pages devoured, and shall, in consequence of that
mistaken impression, hurry over ground where he should proceed slowly, cautiously, and with much pains-taking~ he must be brought at last face to face
with the fact that he is reading to little purpose, and catching but surface
views. For it is 88 true with the mental as it is with the physical life, that, to
nourish and strengthen the powers, there must be time and opportunity for
digestion; and this process demands consideration, reflection, and patient and
labo1ious thought. "All knowledge," says Sir William Hamilton, "is only for
the sake of energy;" and, again, "The paramount end of liberal study is the
development of the student's mind; and knowledge is principally useful 88 a.
means of determining the faculties to that exercise through which this
development is accomplished."(g) The study of the law must be with active
mind and receptive understanding; for otherwise the student, howeTer patient
his reading, will be forced to confess in the end that, in the " nice, sharp
quillets of the law," with which his memory is burdened, he is, like Shakspeare's clown, "no wiser than a daw." That lawyer, however able, who rises
in court to discuss great questions with no better or more thoughtful preparation than a great collection of precedents, from which he may read what this
judge has said, or what deduction that writer has made, has generally no right
to expect that he is rendering valuable 888istance to the court, or that he is
advancing essentially the ca.use of his client. Every litigated case has a.n

mary masses, to deprive a country more and more of a gradually evolving character; in one

word, to introduce an ever-increasing, direct, unmodified popular power, amount to an aban-

donment of self-government, and an approach to imperatonal sovereignty, whether there be

actually a Csesar or not—to popular absolutism, whether the absolutism remain for any length

of time in the hands of a sweeping majority, subject of course to a skillful leader, as in Athens

after the Peloponesian war. or whether it rapidly pass over into the hands of a broadly named

Cesar. Imperatonal sovereignty may be at a certain period more plausible than the sover-

eignty founded upon divine right, but they are both equally hostile to self-government, and the

only means to resist the inroads of power is, under the guidance of Providence and a liberty-

wedded people, the same means which in so many cases have withstood the inroads of the

barbarians, namely, the institution, the self-sustaining and organic system of laws." Lieber

Civ. Lib. and Self Gov. ch. 33.

(;) Metaphysics. §§ 1. 2.

(•) 2 Webster's works, 892. See also, per Bates, arglltndo, in Hamilton"· St. Louis County
Court, 15 Mo. 13, quoted in Coo. Const. Lim. 86. " The principal aim of society Is to protect
individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights which were vested in them by the Immutable laws of nature, but which could not be presel'\·ed in peace without that mutual assistance
and interoourae which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence
it follows that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these
absolute rigbta of individuals.'' Post, book 1, p. 124.
(f) "All endeavors to throw more and more unartlcrtlat~d power into the hands of the primary masses, to deprive a country more and more of a gradually evolving character; in one
word, to introduce an ever-increasing, direct, unmodified popular power, amount to an aban·
donment of self-government, and an approach to imperator1al sovereignty, whether there be
actually a Ciesar or not-to popular absolutism, whether the absolutism remain for any length
of time in the bands of a sweeping majority, subject of course to a skillful leader, as in Athens
after the Peloponesian war, or whether it rapidly pass over into the bands of a broadly named
Ciesar. lmperatorial sovereignty may be at a certain period more plausible than the sovereignty founded upon divine right, but they are both equally hostile to self-government. and the
only means to resist the inroads of power is, under the guidance of Providence and a libertywedded people, the same means which in 80 many cases have withstood the inroads of the
barbarians, namely, the institution, the self-sustaining aud organic system of laws." Lieber
Civ. Lib. and Self Gov. ch. 33.
(g) Metaphysics. §§ 1. 2.
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aspect of its own, and is supposed to present some new combination which

renders it doubtful what principle should be applied, or what circumstance

should be controlling; and what the court needs is, to have the principle

pointed out, and the why and the how of its applicability explained. Judges

may read books and hunt up precedents for themselves; bnt they have not

always the leisure to devote to each case that thought and reflection which the

counsel is employed to give, and which may be essential to insure its being

grounded on the proper basis. This is the duty of the counsel; and when he

has read what he supposes to bear upon the case, and has carefully arranged

and digested his learning, he has a right to feel confident in his preparation,

and in his ability to present a more forcible and convincing argument to the

court—applying it, as he will, to the precise facts of the controversy—than any

he can read from the authorities. Indeed, much reading of undigested cases,

or even text-books, at the bar, is usually a waste of time, or at best only

answers the purpose of directing the attention of the court to a great number

of decisions which might, with equal profit, be specified in a written list to be

handed up to the judges for their subsequent investigation. For such reading

will often leave only a vague and imperfect idea that the authorities read from

have some sort of bearing upon the question under consideration, but precisely

what, the judge must satisfy himself afterward by making that study of them

which the counsel has failed to make.

The caution which involves thorough preparation for practice is more need-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ful in cases regarding fundamental rights, than in any others. The tempta-

tion is too great in America for practitioners to open offices and tender their

assistance in legal causes without any such examination of the institutions

under which they live as will entitle them to be heard on questions of con-

stitutional authority. It is too often—indeed, it is usually—the case, that law

reading is directed mainly to preparation for an early entry into practice, in

simple cases and in the lower courts, and that works on contracts and on torts

are allowed to occupy the attention to the exclusion of the works on govern-

ment. Something of politics the student will be inclined to learn; and it will

not be suprising if the temptations of political life shall beset him early, and

lead him away into excitements that are fatal to regular and dispassionate

investigations; for, in politics, one reads not so much to form judgments as to

gather arguments in support of pre-existing notions; and notoriety in that

field is quite consistent with great ignorance on constitutional subjects. The

leaders of the political party will be read; while the jurists, whose business it

has been to treat constitutional subjects from a judicial stand-point, are over-

looked ; and the training which one obtains in that way> while it may fit him

for making an effective stump speech, goes bnt a little way in the preparation

for undertaking such great questions of governineht as the lawyer of reputed

ability is liable at any time to be called upon to grapple with.

What sort of an argument, for instance, would have been made by Mr. Har-

grave in the great case of Sommersett, had his reading and reflection been

confined within the narrow bounds which many law students of the present

day seem willing to accept as furnishing sufficient scope for their powers ?

Would that eminent judge, who is admitted to have made, with reluctance, a

decision, which, in the law of personal liberty, will be a landmark for all time,

have been brought to the point of conviction which would insure its being

aspect of it.s own, and is suppoeed to present some new combination which
renders it doubtful what principle should be applied, or what circumstance
should be controlling; and what the court needs is, to have the principle
pointed out, and the why and the how of its applicability explained. Judges
may read books and hunt up precedent.a for themselves; but they have not
al ways the leisure to devote to each case that thought and reflection which the
counsel is employed to give, and which may be essential to insure it.a being
grounded on the proper basis. This is the duty of the counsel; and when he
has read what he supposes to bear upon the case, and has carefully arranged
and digested his learning, he has a right to feel confident in his preparation,
and in his ability to present a more forcible and convincing argument to the
court-applying it, as he will, to the precise facts of the controversy-than any
he can read from the authorities. Indeed, much reading of undigested cases,
or even text-books, at the bar, is usually a waste of time, or at best only
answers the purpose of directing the attention of the court to a great number
of decisions which might, with equal profit, be specified in a written list to be
handed up to the judges for their subsequent investigation. For such reading
will often leave only a vague and imperfect idea that the authorities read from
have some sort of bearing upon the question under consideration, but precisely
what, the judge must satisfy himself afterward by making that study of them
which the counsel has failed to make.
- The caution which involves thorough preparation for practice is more needful in ca.sea regarding fundamental rights, than in any others. The tempta\
tion is too great in America for practitioners to open offices and tender their
: assistance in legal causes without any such examination of the institutions
under which they live as will entitle them to be heard on questions of constitutional authority. It is too often-indeed, it is usually-the case, that law
reading is directed mainly to preparation for an early entry into practice, in
simple cases and in the lower courts, and that works on contracts and on torts
are allowed to occupy the attention to the exclusion of the works on government. Something of politics the student will be inclined to learn; and it will
not be suprising if the temptations of political life shall beset him early, and
lead him away into excitements that are fatal to regular and dispassionate
investigations; for, in politics, one reads not so much to form judgment.a as to
gather arguments in support of pre-existing notions; and notoriety in that
field is quite consistent with great ignorance on ~onatitutional subjects. The
leaders of the political party will be read; while the jurists, whose business it
has been to treat constitutional subjects from a judicial stand-point, are overlooked; and the training which one obtains in that way, while it may fit him
for ma.king an effective stump speech, goes but a little way in the preparation
for undertaking such great questions of govern'metlt as the lawyer of reputed
ability is liable at any time to be calied. upon to grapple with.
What sort of an argument, for instance, would have been made by Mr. Hargrave in the great case of Sommersett, had his reading and reflection been
confined within the narrow bounds which many law students of the present
day seem willing to accept as furnishing sufficient scope for their powers~
Would that eminent judge, who is admitted to have ma.de, with reluctance, a
decision, which, in the law of personal liberty, will be a. landmark for all time,
have been brought to the point of ~rtvh~tion which wo'uld insure its being
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made at all ? Nor are we to suppose that all the great questions regarding

individual liberty have been disposed of by the decisions of Lord Mansfield and

Lord Camden; or, to pass to questions peculiar to our own country, that all

doubts concerning the proper limits of federal authority were settled by the

decisions of Chief Justice Marshall, so that nothing is left to the lawyer of to-

day but to apply the principles that he laid down to the new cases which from

time to time arise. Cases have arisen in our own time quite as important as

McCulloch v. Maryland, or any of the other great controversies to which Judge

Marshall brought his matchless logic and pre-eminent wisdom. The question

of the proper bounds of martial law ;(A) of the right of the federal government

to make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in the payment of

debts;(»') of the meaning of the term " bills of attainder," and the power of the

states to impose test-oaths in order to exclude from office or professional

employment those who may have taken part against the government;(/) have

recently demanded authoritative decision, and have moved the nation as

profoundly as did any of the earlier cases. But there are many questions

lying along the border line between federal and state authority which still

remain to be discussed and settled. Whether, for instance, the government

of the nation may rightfully impose stamp duties upon contracts permitted by

the states, and declare the contracts invalid as a penalty for neglect to affix the

stamp ;(k) whether it has constitutional authority to tax the salary or other

compensation which a state officer receives from the state for his official
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services ;(l) whether the states may constitutionally bargain away the power

of taxation in any given case, and whether, if they do, the federal courts are to

enforce the bargain under that clause of the constitution of the United States

which forbids the states passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts;

(m) how far the grant of exclusive privileges is enforceable against a state;

and many others of the like importance, are not yet transferred beyond the

region of controversy, and are to be pondered, perhaps discussed and settled, by

the young men who shall hereafter come upon the stage.

And passing beyond the province of the federal power, we do not find that

all is plain in the constitutional law of the individual states, and that the

functions of government are in every case clearly defined, and its limits

definitely marked out The great question of the right of the state to teach

(h) Ex parte Mulligan, 4 Wai. 2.

(t) Hepburn t>. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603.

(/) Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wai. 277; Ex parte Garland, id. 883.

(k) The right has been questioned. See Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 462 ; Clemens v.

Conrad, 19 Mich. 170; Craig r. Dimock, 47 111.470; Griffin v. Ranney, 35 Conn. 239; Haight

r. Grist, 64 N. C. 789; Green o. Holway. 101 Mass. 250; People v. Gates, 48 N. Y. 40; Sporrer

r. Eider, 1 Heiskell ; Hunter r. Cobb, 1 Bush, 289; Summons v. Halloway, 21 Mich. 162.

(Q This question must now be regarded as put at rest by the denial of the power by the

Supreme Court of the United States in Buffington c. Day, 11 Wai.

made a.tall? Nor a.re we to suppose that all the great questions regarding
individual liberty have been disposed of by the decisions of Lord Mansfield a.nd
Lord Camden; or, to pass to questions peculiar to our own country, that all
doubts concerning the proper limits of federal authority were settled by the
decisions of Chief Justice Marshall, so that nothing is left to the lawyer of today but to apply the principles that he laid down to the new cases which from
time to time arise. Cases have arisen in our own time quite as important as
McCulloch v. Maryland, or any of the other great controversies to which Judge
Marshall brought his matchless logic and pre-eminent wisdom. The question
of the proper bounds of martial law ;(h) of the right of the federal government
to make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in the payment of
debts;(i) of the meaning of the term "bills of attainder," and the power of the
states to impose test-oaths in order to exclude from office or professional
employment those who may have taken part against the government ;(j) have
recently demanded authoritative decision, a.nd have moved the nation as
profoundly as did any of the earlier cases. But there are many questions
lying along the border line between federal and state authority which still
remain to be discussed and settled. Whether, for instance, the government
of the nation may rightfully impose stamp duties upon contracts permitted by
the states, and declare the contracts invalid as a penalty for neglect to affix the
stamp ;(k) whether it has constitutional authority to tax the salary or other
compensation which a state officer receives from the state for his official
services ;(2) whether the states may constitutionally bargain away the power
of taxation in any given case, and whether, if they do, the federal courts are to
enforce the bargain under that clause of the constitution of the United States
which forbids the states passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts;
(m) how far the grant of exclusive privileges is enforceable against a state;
and many others of the like importance, are not yet transferred beyond the
region of controversy, and are to be pondered, perhaps discussed and settled, by
the young men who shall hereafter come upon the stage.
And passing beyond the province of the federal power, we do not find that
all is plain in the constitutional law of the individual states, and that the
functions of government are in every case clearly defined, and its limits
definitely marked out. The great question of the right of the state to teach

(m) On this subject see the cases collected In Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 280,

note. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, concurred in by the chief justice

and Mr. Justice Field, in Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 441. One must be con-

vinced, on reading this case, that the law upon the subject must still receive further examina-

tion In the tribunal of last resort, and that the doctrine of previous decisions is not entirely

satisfactory.

In illustration of another question lying along the border line between federal and state

authority, and threatening to breed difficulty and danger, the reader is referred to the case of

Fenton v. Farley, 9 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 401, and the forcible note of Judge Redfleld appended

thereto.

(A) Ex parlAI Hulligan, 4 Wal. 2.
(i) Hepburn"· Griswold, 8 Wall. 603.
(i) Cummings"· :Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Ex parte Garland, Id. 888.
(k) The right has been questioned. See Carpent~r "· Snelling, 97 M&M. 452 ; Clemens "·
Conrad, 19 Mich. 170; Craig"· Dimock, 47 Ill. 470; Griffin"· Ranney, 85 Conn. 239; Haight
"·Grist, 64 N. C. 789; Green"· Holway, 101 Mass. 250; People"· Gates, 48 N. Y. 40; Sporrer
"· El.fter, 1 Heiskell
; Hunter"· Cobb, 1 Bush, 239; Sammons "·Halloway, 21 Mich. 162.
(l) Thia question must now be regarded u put at rest by the denial of the power by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Buffington"· Day, 11 Wal.
(m) On this subject aee the cases collected iu Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 280,
note. See also the di88enting opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, concurred in by the chief justice
and Hr. Justice Field, In Washington University "· Rouse, 8 Wall. 441. One must be convinced, on reading this cue, that the law npon the subject must still receive further examina"
tion in the tribunal of last resort, and that the doctrine of previous deciaiona ls not entirely
lllltiafactory.
In illuatratlon ot another question lying along the border line between federal and state
authority, and threatening to breed difficulty and danger, tbe reader is referred to the cue of
Fenton"· Farley, 9 .Am. Law Beg. N. S. 401 1 and the forcible note of Judge Redfield appended
thereto.
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religion in its schools, or of its duty to abstain from such teaching, and what

precisely is meant by the doctrine of religious liberty and equality as we have

engrafted it in our constitution, are still, it appears, open questions, and

threaten violent and angry controversy.(«)

The limits of local self-government—what it properly embraces, in what

directions and how far it may be extended, and in what degree the state may

limit and control it—are still demanding the attention of both the lawyer

and the legislator, and questions concerning them become at times of universal

importance.(o)

Not less difficult and important are the questions regarding the proper

division of governmental powers between the three departments created for

their exercise. We have endeavored so to frame our constitutions that " the

legislative department shall never exercise the executive or judicial powers,

or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative or

judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the

legislative or executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a

government of laws, and not of men"(y) But what is legislative and what is

executive, and what is judicial power, and who shall say when either is seized

into usurping hands ?

The attention of the student is called to a few of these questions for the

purpose of indicating the broad fields which still await the laborer who shall

fit himself to enter them. The foundation for due preparation must be laid in
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student life if ever, and he who lays it broad and deep may find himself called

upon to take part in the struggles of the giants which some day will be had

over these questions. No small share of this preparation will be made when

(n) Attention is directed to the thorough examination which this general subject underwent

In the cage of Minor r. The Board of Education, in the superior court of Cincinnati (published

by R. Clarke St Co., Cincinnati), and to the masterly arguments made at the bar. The case

shows how important it is that the investigations of a lawyer, especially on constitutional

questions, should take a wide and liberal range, and that he should make himself thoroughly

familiar with the fundamental principles of the government under which he lives. The

arguments of counsel are deserving, for their ability and research, as well as for the importance

religion in its schools, or of its duty to abstain from such teaching, and what
precisely is meant by the doctrine of religious liberty and equality as we have
engrafted it in our constitution, are still, it appears, open questions, and
threaten violent and angry controversy.(n)
The limits of local self-government-what it properly embraces, in what
directions and how far it may be extended, and in what degree the state may
limit and control ilr-are still demanding the attention of both the lawyer
and the legislator, and questions concerning them become at times of universal
importance.(o)
Not less difficult and important are the questions regarding the proper
division of governmental powers between the three departments created for
their exercise. We have endeavored so to frame our constitutions that "the
legislative department shall never exercise the executive or judicial powers,
or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative or
judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative or executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a
government of laws, and not of men."(p) But what is legislative and what is
executive, and what is judicial power, and who shall say when either is seized
into usurping hands?
The attention of the student is called to a few of these questions for the
purpose of indicating the broad fields which still await the laborer who shall
fit himself to enter them. The foundation for due preparation must be laid in
student life if ever, and he who lays it broad and deep may find himself called
upon to take part in the struggles of the giants which some day will be had
over these questions. No small share of this preparation will be made when

of the subject discussed, of the most careful and thoughtful examination. It is well with any

lawyer when he is so full of his subject that he can truthfully say, as was said by the honorable

Stanley Mathews, at the close of a long and masterly argument, replete with learning, and

glowing with apt illustration: " There is a world of things crowding upon me to tay; but I

must forbear."

(o) The question of the right of a state to require or empower its municipalities to aid, by

loans or donations, the private corporations who are engaged in constructing works of internal

improvement, is certainly one of the most important now before the American people. There

are many who question the right, on the same ground, substantially, on which patents

of monopoly were declared unlawful in the time of Queen Elizabeth. " For the end of all that

monopolies is for the private gain of the patentees:" not for the benefit of the public. Darcy ».

Allain, 11 Rep. 84. Of late there has been a decided disposition in some states for the

legislature to take to itself a large share in the government of its cities, and even the appoint-

ment of mnnicipal officers. This is supposed to be justified by local abuses and to be within

that supreme control which the state is said to have of its municipal subdivisions when not

restrained by positive provisions of its constitution. But it is worthy of some reflection

whether the people in enacting their constitution ever understand that they are conferring such

supreme power. Local self-government is the most conspicuous and important fact in our political

history; and it cannot be doubted that every state constitution has been framed in the expecta-

tion that such government is to continue as an unquestioned right. It may be seriously

questioned whether the power to take away or seriously abridge this right can be considered as

fairly within any general grant of legislative power, and whether express constitutional guaranties

can be needed to secure that which has always been enjoyed from the very earliest history of the

country, and which is understood to be the birthright of American citizens.

(f>) This is an extract from the constitution of Massachusetts.

(n) Attention is directed to the thorough examination which this general subject underwent
In the case of Minor 11. The Board of Education, in the superior oourt of Cincinnati (published
by R. Clarke &. Co., Cincinnati), and to the masterly arguments made at the bar. The case
shows how important it is that the investigations of a lawyer, especially on constitutional
questions, should take a wide and liberal range, and that he should make himself thoroughly
familiar with the fundamental principles of the government under which he lives. The
arguments of counsel are deserving, for their ability and research, as well as for the importance
of the subject discussed, of t.he most careful and thoughtful examination. It is well with any
lawyer when he is so full of hie subject that he can truthfully say, as was said by the honorable
Stanley Mathews, at the close of a long and masterly argument, replete with learning, and
glowing with apt illustration: "There is 11 TDOrld of things mnoding upon me to «JY; but I
must forbear."
(o) The question of the right of a state to require or empower its municipalities to aid, by
loans or donations, the private corporations who are engaged in constructing works of internal
improvement, is certainly one of the most important now before the American people. There
are many who question the right, on the same ground, substantially, on which patents
of monopoly were declared unlawful in the time of Queen Elizabeth. "!"or the md of all thue
morwpoliei is for the private gain of the patenteei :" not for the benefit of the public. Darcy 11.
Allain, 11 Rep. 84. Of late there has been a decided disposition in &0me states for the
legislature to take to itself a large share in the government of its cities, and even the appointment of municipal officers. This is supposed to be justified by local abuses and to be within
that supreme control which the state is said to have of lta municipal subdivisions_ when not
restrained by positive provisions of its constitution. But it is worthy of some reflection
whether the people in enacting their constitution ever understand that they are conferring such
supreme power. Local iielf-government is the moat conspicuous and important fact in our political
hi8tory; and it cannot be doubted that every state constitution has been framed in the expectation that such government is to continue as an unquestioned right. It may be seriously
questioned whether the power to take away or seriously abridge this right can be considered as
fairly within any general grant of legislative power, and whether express constitutional guaranties
can be needed to secure that which has always been enjoyed from the very earliest history of the
count11·, and which is understood to be the birthright of American citize121.
(p) Tl/.is is an extract from the constitution of Massachusetts.
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the author before us is carefully read and understood, but the standard

American writers on government ought also to be familiar, and what is

peculiar in our system should be made the subject of special study and

examination. In this field of his inquiries the student will meet with much

that is crude, and with many decisions made under circumstances precluding

due deliberation, and perhaps presenting to the mind only vague and indefinite

notions of constitutional right; but it is not essential that he should follow

blindly the leading of any man or any court; the light is always attainable

if he will but strive for it, and the greater the confusion of authority, the

greater is his credit if he can succeed in pointing out clearly the principle that

should govern.(g')

The admirable lectures of Chancellor Kent every student is expected to

master after he has made himself familiar with the Commentaries of Mr.

Justice Blackstone. Those lectures give us a pleasant, though very much

condensed, view of the general principles of the law of nations; of American

constitutional law, of the sources of the municipal law of the several states,

and of the absolute and relative rights of individuals. The law of corporations

next engages attention. Students who read by themselves usually complete

the reading of this work before passing to any other, but if, instead of so doing,

they should adopt the course, after mastering the lecture upon a particular

subject—as for instance the subject of corporations—of taking up one or more

of the leading treatises upon the same subject, they would make more sure
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of their ground as they progressed, and be likely to acquire a knowledge more

precise and accurate. The clear and lucid presentations of the leading

principles of all these subjects made by Kent will prepare one to master the

details of the more extended work.(r) Passing then to the law of personal

property and of contracts in Kent the student will find it useful in like

manner to follow with the works of text writers devoted to these branches

of the law.(s) Works upon particular divisions of the law of contracts, such as

bailments, agency, partnership, and mercantile law generally may usefully be

read in immediate sequence. Upon all these extended and exhaustive treatises

will be met with, and as the subjects are of every-day importance in the

lawyer's practice, it is likely that these treatises, or others of equal value, will

be presented in new editions from time to time as accumulating decisions or

new circumstances shall render important, so that the student may at any

(y) Upon the subject of the federal constitution, no work as yet supersedes the elaborate

treatise of Mr. Justice Story; though if it were re-written in view of recent events and

authorities, it might be made much more valuable, and be largely increased in interest to those

who shall hereafter read it. Some very convenient little hand-books, presenting analyses of the

constitution, and some of them giving the decisions of the courts under its several clauses, are

readily attainable. The foundations of federal constitutional law may be traced very satis-

factorily in the pages of the Federalist, and Elliot's Debates will be useful for reference. Upon

International law Mr. Wheaton's treatise still retains the first rank.

(r) Upon corporationi, the best now in use is the treatise by Angell & Ames. It seems,

the author before us is carefully read and understood, but the standard
American writers on government ought also to be familiar, and what is
peculiar in our system should be made the subject of special study and
examination. In this field of his inquiries the student wi11 meet with much
that is crude, and with many decisions made under circumstances precluding
due deliberation, and perhaps presenting to the mind only vague and indefinite
notions of constitutional right; but it is not essential that he should follow
blindly the leading of any man or any court; the light is always attainable
if he will but strive for it, and the greater the confusion of authority, the
greater is his credit if he can succeed in pointing out clearly the principle that
should govern.(q)
The s.dmirable lectures of Chancellor Kent every student is expected to
master after he has made himself familiar with the Commentaries of Mr.
Justice Blackstone. Those lectures give us a pleasant, though very much
condensed, view of the general principles of the law of nations; of American
constitutional law, of the sources of the municipal law of the several states,
and of the absolute and relative rights of individuals. The law of corporations
next engages attention. Students who read by themselves usually complete
the reading of this work before passing to any other, but if, instead of so doing,
they should adopt the course, after mastering the lecture upon a particular
subject-as for instance the subject of corporations-of taking up one or more
of the leading treatises upon the same subject, they would make more sure
of their ground as they progressed, and be likely to acquire a knowledge more
precise and accurate. The clear and lucid presentations of the leading
principles of all these subjects made by Kent will prepare one to master the
details of the more extended work.(r} Passing then t-0 the law of personal
property and of contracts in Kent the student will find it useful in like
manner to follow with the works of text writers devoted to these branches
of the law.(s) Works upon particular divisions of the law of contracts, such as
bailments, agency, partnership, and mercantile law generally may usefully be
read in immediate sequence. Upon all these extended and exhaustive treatises
will be met with, and as the subjects are of every-day importance in the
lawyer's practice, it is likely that these treatises, or others of equal value; will
be presented in new editions from time to time as accumulating decisions or
new circumstances shall render important, so that the student may at any

however, to prove repulsive to students, though almost indispensable to the practicing lawyer.

Grant on Corporations is also a good work, and the law on the same subject is also set forth

very fully and clearly by Mr. Redfleld in his work on railways.

(«) Williams on Personal Property is an excellent work. Metcalf s Principles of the Law

of Contracts is a good introduction to this subject, bnt the student must not content himself

with that There are several elaborate treatises on contracts now in use; that by Mr. Parsons

being the general favorite. Browne on the Statute of Frauds is valuable in the same con-

nection.

(q) Upon the subject of the federal constitution, no work as yet supersedes the elaborate
treatise of Mr. Justice Story; though if It were re-written in view of recent events and
authorities, it might be made much more valuable, and be largely increased in Interest to those
who shall hereafter read it. Some very convenient little hand-books, presenting analyses of the
coD.lltitution, and some of them giving the decisions of the courts under its several clauses, are
readily attainable. The foundations of federal constitutional law may be traced very satisfactorily in the pages of the Federalist, and Elliot's Debates will be useful for reference. Upon
International law Kr. Wheaton's treatise still retains the first rank.
(r) Upon corporations, the beat now in use is the treatise by Angell & Ames. It seems,
however, to prove repulsive to 11tudent11, though almost indispensable to the practicing lawyer.
Grant on Corporations 11 also a good work, and the law on the same 1ubject is also set forth
very fullr. and clearly by Kr. Redfield In his work on railways.
(•) W11llam11 on Personal Property ia an excellent work. Ketcalf's Principles of the Law
of Contract.a ia a good introduction to this subject, but the student must not oontent himself
with that There are several elaborate treatises on contracts now in use; tbai by Kr. Parsons
being the g9neral favorite. Browne on the Statute of Frauds ia valuable In '11e same con.,
oectlon.
·'
·
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time have in some one or more of them a satisfactory and reliable view of the

existing law. (f)

When the student, in pursuing this course, shall reach the law of real estate,

it would be well for him to pause for a moment, to consider some of the

circumstances which are apt to render its study superficial. There is no lack

here of abundant and safe guides, for the works upon real estate law are

numerous, profound and exhaustive; but that they do not prove attractive

must be confessed, and that they fail to receive that attention which the

importance of the subject demands is evident. The student who has studied

the law of contracts faithfully and with interest will not unfrequently suppose

he may safely slight the law of real estate, and, after acquainting himself with

the ordinary forms of conveyancing, and a few of its familiar rules, will

pass on to other subjects in which his interest is more readily engaged.

Upon no other branch of the law has so much patient thought and so much

profound learning been expended as upon the law of real estate. Some of the'

treatises in this department have been the admiration and delight of the ablest

cotemporary lawyers, and are never read without leaving profoundly impressed

upon the mind their wonderful erudition and thoroughness. For this very

reason, and because their proper study tasks the mind so severely, they have

been shunned by the student. Works like Littleton's Tenures, Fearne on

Contingent Remainders, Saunders on Uses and Trusts, and Sugden on Powers,

will not willingly be selected by the beginner as his text-books, if he can make
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himself believe that, after reading Blackstone and Kent, he will attain the

same practical end by familiarizing himself with the common forms of con-

veyancing, and with the questions which most often arise between vendor and

purchaser. And the whole tendency of modern legislation concerning real

estate has been to lull the student into a false security, and to incline him

more and more to rely upon such superficial knowledge as might answer the

purpose of the conveyancer, but which fails to embrace the questions of nicety

and difficulty. In both England and America the attention of some of the

ablest minds has been directed to a reform in the law of real estate, with a

view to relieving it of unnecessary and cumbrous forms, useless technicalities,

and fictions which answer no useful purpose. The changes they have intro-

duced have been great; in some respects very radical: and their influence has

been to impress us with the belief that the ancient learning in real estate law

has become obsolete and useless, and that time can be more profitably spent in

acquiring a practical knowledge of the manner in which business is now done,

than in poring over the musty books which were the vade mecums of a past

age, but which have now become mainly matters of antiquarian interest

Other important circumstances, which have operated mainly in the newer

states, have had a tendency in the same direction. Eeal estate has been cheap;

we have been near the source of title; conveyances of any particular parcel

have not generally been numerous, nor the title complicated; the modes of

transfer have been tolerably uniform and well understood; we have a general

(0 Edwards on Bailments, and the work by the same author on Bills and Notes are careful

and judicious treatises, and are always read with satisfaction. The works by Mr. Parsons on

Notes and Bills, and on Partnership are also valuable. Collyer on Partnership is preferable to

Story. Mr. Smith's treatise on Mercantile Law is an excellent one, and Mr. Parsons baa

written acceptably on the same subject.

time have in some one or more of them a. satisfactory and reliable view of the
existing law. (t)
When the student, in pursuing this course, shall reach the law of real estate,
it would be well for him to pause for a. moment, to consider some of the
circumstances which a.re apt to render its study superficial. There is no la.ck
here of abundant and safe guides, for the works upon real estate law are
numerous, profound and exhaustive; but that they do not prove attractive
must be confessed, and that they fail to receive that attention which the
importance of the subject demands is evident. The student who has studied
the law of contracts faithfully and with interest will not unfrequently suppose
he may safely slight the law of real estate, and, after acquainting himself with
the ordinary forms of conveyancing, and a. few of its familiar rules, will
pass on to other subjects in which his interest is more readily engaged.
Upon no other branch of the law has so much patient thought and so much
profound learning been expended as upon the law of real estate. Some of the ·
treatises in this department have been the admiration and delight of the ablest
cotemporary lawyers, and a.re never read without leaving profoundly impressed
upon the mind their wonderful erudition and thoroughness. For this very
reason, and because their proper study tasks the mind so severely, they have
been shunned by the student. Works like Littleton's Tenures, Fea.rne on
Contingent Remainders, Saunders on U sea and Trusts, and Sugden on Powers,
will not willingly be selected by the beginner as his text-books, if he can make
himself believe that, after reading Blackstone and Kent, he will attain the
sa.nte practical end by familiarizing himself with the common forms of conveyancing, and with the questions which most often a.rise between vendor and
purchaser. And the whole tendency of modern legislation concerning real
estate has been to lull the student into a false security, and to incline him
more and more to rely upon such superficial knowledge as might answer the
purpose of the conveyancer, but which fails to embrace the questions of nicety
and difficulty. In both England and America the attention of some of the
ablest minds has been directed to a reform in thi law of real estate, with a
view to relieving it of unnecessary and cumbrous forms, useless technicalities,
and fictions which answer no useful purpose. The changes they have introduced have been great; in some respects very radical: and their influence has
been to impress us with the belief that the ancient learnmg in real estate law
has become obsolete and useless, and that time can be more profitably spent in
acquiring a practical knowledge of the manner in which business is now done,
than in poring over the musty books which were the vade mecums of a past
age, but which have now become mainly matters of antiquarian interest.
Other important circumstances, which have operated mainly in the newer
states, have had a tendency in the same direction. Real estate has been cheap;
we have been near the source of title; conveyances of any particular pa.reel
have not generally been numerous, nor the title complicated; the modes of
transfer have been tolerably uniform and well understood; we have a genera.I
(t) Edwards on Ballmenta, and the work by the 11&me author on Bflls and Notes are careful
and judicious treath1es, and are always read with satisfaction. The works by Mr. Parsons on
Notes and Bills, and on Partnership are also valuable. Collyer on PartDerahlp 111 preferable to
Story. Mr. Smith's treatlae on Mercantile Law is an excellent oJle, and Kr. Paraons bu
written acceptably on the ~e subject.
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system of registry designed to give purchasers information concerning the

conveyances which have been made; and, as every man of plain common sense

is able to understand all these, one naturally comes to think that the nearest

justice of the peace is competent to transact the business connected with his

purchases and sales, and that his own good sense is sufficient to protect him

against flaws in titles, or against being entrapped through the means of

inadequate conveyances of the land he buys. Unfortunately he sometimes

discovers, when too late, that unaided good sense is not always an infallible

guide in matters of law, and that one who relies upon it implicitly is in the

proper condition of mind to be made the victim of misplaced confidence.

Many a man has lost his all by assuming the sufficiency of his own knowledge

and judgment in real estate matters, and by resting satisfied with his own

examination, or that of his county register of deeds, where he ought to have

called in the best legal advice that was attainable. Sharp schemers do not

overlook this fact, and many of them thrive by it; but we should be obliged to

confess, if interrogated on that point, that many legal practitioners also do not

properly appreciate the nature of their task when called upon to advise

regarding titles, and that the assistance they assume to render is admirably

calculated to lead astray.(w)

(u) Of this there could not possibly be a better illustration than the Implicit reliance which

is apt to be placed upon the county records of deeds as a means of ascertaining precisely the

situation of the title to a particular parcel of land. A little reflection will convince us that
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these records cannot give all the information requisite: that it is entirely possible for perfect

titles not to appear upon them at all, and that often they will indicate an indefeasible right in

system of registry designed to give purchasers information concerning the
conveyances which have been made; and, as every man of plain common sense
is able to understand all these, one naturally comes to think that the nearest
justice of the peace is competent to transact the business connected with hie
purchases and sales, and that his own good sense is sufficient to protect him
against flaws in titles, or against being entrapp1i1d through the means of
inadequate conveyances of the land he buys. Unfortunately he sometimes~
discovers, when too late, that unaided good sense is not always an infallible
guide in matters of law, and that one who relies upon it implicitly is in the
proper condition of mind to be made the victim of misplaced confidence.
Many a man has lost hil!I all by assuming the sufficiency of his own knowledge
and judgment in real estate matters, and by resting satisfied with his own
examination, or that of his county register of deeds, where he ought to have
called in the best legal advice that was attainable. Sharp schemers do not
overlook this fact, and many of them thrive by it; but we should be obliged to
confess, if interrogated on that point, that many legal practitioners also do not
properly appreciate the nature of their task when called upon to advise
regarding titles, and that the assistance they assume to render is admirably
calculated to lead astray.( u)

one who, in fact, has no title whatever. Indeed, in many cases, the nature of perfect titles is

such that they cannot be spread upon the records, and in all cases there are important facts

concerning which the record is silent, and which must necessarily be determined by extrinsic

inquiries.

To illustrate this, let us suppose that a lawyer's client brings him an abstract from the

county recorder's office, and requests his opinion as to the title which it describes. Let this

abstract be in the following form :

" Southwest quarter of section 12. town 9 south, range 2 east, Ohio.

1. Entered by John Hemingway and patented by U. S. to him August 1, 1836.

2. John Hemingway to William Jackson, warranty deed; dated September 10, 1836;

recorded March 18, 1838, in liber B of deeds,, page 80. Duly witnessed and acknowledged.

3. William Jackson to Richard Benson, warranty deed; dated March 18, 1838; recorded

same day in liber B of deeds, page 81, Duly witnessed and acknowledged.

4. Richard Benson and Harriet, his wife, to James Byles; quitclaim deed; dated October

1, 1862; recorded same day in liber Y of deeds, page 292. Executed in the state of New York

and properly certified.

5. James Byles, by William Smith, his attorney in fact, to Edgar Bennett; warranty deed;

dated July 15, 1868; recorded October 12, 1868. In due form of law.

The records of this office show no mortgages or other liens upon the land, and the title

appears to be perfect in Edgar Bennett. John Doe, register of deeds."

Nothing apparently could be more straightforward and business-like than this document,

and one is probably safe in saying that the majority of purchasers would rely upon it im-

plicitly, and would receive and pay for Mr. Bennett's conveyance without suspicion that it

could possibly prove defective. But a prudent conveyancer would feel no such reliance, but

would treat this document as an assistance merely in the necessary investigations; as a guide

in his inquiries, and not aa in and of itself presenting the needed information. He would,

therefore, inform his client that further investigation would be necessary; that a register

of deeds could not make a title good by certifying to its correctness, and, indeed, could not

properly give such a certificate at all, and that all the facts which are stated in this abstract are

not inconsistent with a worthless claim in the party here stated to have a perfect title. And

he would thereupon proceed to obtain from other sources the information which the record

could not give.

1. By inquiries of his client, of the present claimant, and of othei sources, he would endeavor

to ascertain as much as possible concerning the several grantors mentioned in the abstract

of title, where they lived, and what was their connection with the possession of the land,

and their identity with the grantees of the same name. Also, whether other parties have

(u) Of this there could not possibly be a better Illustration than the Implicit reliance which
is apt to be placed upon the county records of deeds as a means of ascertaining precisely the

situation of the title to a particular parcel of land. A little reflection will convince us that
these records cannot give all the information requisite: that it is entirely po~sible for perfect
titles not to appear upon them at all, and that often they will indicate an indefeasible right in
one who, in fact, haa no title whatever. Indeed, in many cases, the nature of perfect titles is
such that they cannot be 11pread upon the records, and in all cases there are important facts
concerning which the record is silent, and which must necessarily be determined by extri~ic
iuquirie11.
,'J.'o illustrate this. let us suppose that a lawyer's client brings him an abstract from the
eounty recorder's office, and requests his opinion as to the title which it describes. Let this
abstract be in the following form :
" Southwest quarter of section 12. town 9 south, range 2 east, Ohio.
1. Entered by John Hemingway and patented by U. S. to him August 1 1 1836.
2. John Hemingway to William Jackson, warranty deed; dated September 10, 1880;
recorded March 18, 1838, in liber B of deeds, .page 80. Duly witnessed and acknowledged.
3. William Jackson to Richard Benson, warranty deed; dated March 18, 1838; recorded
same day in liber B of deeds, page 81. Duly witnessed and acknowledged.
4. Richard Benson and Harriet, his wife, to James Byles; quitclaim deed; dated October
1, 1862; recorde.d same day in liber Y of deeds, page 292. Executed in the state of New York
and properly certified.
6. James Byles, by William Smith, his attorney in fact, to Edgar Bennett; warranty deed;
dated July 15, 1868; recorded October 12, 1868. In due form of law.
The records of this office show no mortgages or other liens upon the land, and the title
appears to be perfect in Edgar Bennett. John Doe, register of deeds.''
Nothing apparently could be more straightforward and business-like than this document,
and one is probably safe in saying that the majority of purchasers would rely upon it implicitly, and would receive and pay for Mr. Bennett's conveyance without suspicion that it
could poBBibly prove defective. But a prudent conveyancer would feel no such reliance, but
would treat this document as an assistance merely in the necessary investigations; as a guide
in his inquiries, and not aa in and of itself presenting the needed Information. He would,
therefore, inform his client that further investigation would be necessary; that a register
of deeds could not make a title good by certifying to its correctness, and, indeed , could not
properly give such a certificate at all, and that all the facts which are stated in this abstract are
not incc.nsistent with a worthleBB claim in the party here stated to have a perfect title. And
he would thereupon proceed to obtain from other sources the information which the record
could not give.
1. By inquiries of his client, of the present claimant, and of other 11ource11, be would endeavor
to ascertain as much aa posalble concerning the several grantors mentioned in the abstract
of title, where they lived, and what was their connection with the poBSession of the land,
and their identity with the grantees of tbe same name. Also, whether other parties have
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There are not many things in the old law of real estate which the lawyer

will find it without importance to know, and his knowledge will sometimes be

called into requisition under circumstances which preclude a resort to the

at any time been in possession of the land, and if so, for bow long and under what claim

of right. All these inquiries may be of the utmost importance, as we shall soon perceive,

and aided by them he will proceed to consider the successive steps in the chain of conveyances.

2. The patent by the United States to any one may generally be assumed to convey the

title, the United States having been the original owner of all the region in which this land is

situated. Still, it is possible for such a patent to be void. The government may, previously,

have patented the same lands, and the second patent may have issued through mistake, in which

case it would of course be void. Or the government after having once parted with its title

may have acquired some right again—as sometimes happens in enforcing its demands

against public debtors—and, in this case, its subsequent conveyance could give no better title

than the government had acquired by its purchase. It would be necessary, therefore, in such a

case to scrutinize the title of the government with the same care that would be requisite in the

case of any other proprietor.

3. Coming to the conveyance by Hemingway, the first inquiry which suggests itself is,

whether he be the same person to whom the government conveyed f Identity of name is no

more than prima facie evidence of this fact, and may not be even so much, if his residence,

us given in his conveyance, appears to be different. Let us say here, once for all, that a record

can never identify parties: outside inquiries are absolutely essential for this purpose, and when

it is so easy for one man to personate another, and when besides there are often many persons
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of the same name, these inquiries cannot be too particular. A conveyance by any other John

Hemingway than the one to whom the government conveyed, or by any person falsely assum-

ing bis name, would of course be void; and no title apparently good of record could protect a

purchaser against the claim of the real patentee.

4. Suppose the inquirer to have satisfied himself of the identity of the patentee with the

grantor of Jackson, a further question is, whether he had made any other conveyance, or any

mortgage of the lands previous to the recording of the deed to Jackson. And this brings us

to notice the principal object of the registry laws, which is, to give notice to purchasers of any

previous conveyances or liens by the person of whom they buy. A purchaser who examines the

records and finds no conveyance by his vendor has a right to assume that none exists; and

if he then receives a conveyance in good faith and for value paid, and places it upon record

at once, he is protected by it, even though there be a prior conveyance also obtained for value.

As between two bonafide purchasers, the registry law gives protection to him who was suffi-

ciently diligent and prudent to have his deed immediately recorded, and the deed of the other,

even though prior in point of time, is void as to him, provided he had no notice of it when he

bought, received the conveyance and paid the consideration.

5. As no wife appears to have joined in Hemingway's deed, it will be necessary to inquire

whether he was at the time a married man, and if so, whether his wife is still living. If she

is, she has or may have a right of dower; and the facts regarding this will need investigation.

6. In the case of this and also every subsequent deed, it is important not to be satisfied

with the simple statement that it is a " warranty deed." but to examine its terms and see what

the covenants are, and also whether it gives any intimation of any fact which qualifies in any

way the title of the grantor to the possible prejudice of a purchaser Although there are no

mortgages of record, there may be some in existence, and the deeds may give information

concerning them. Such information the purchaser is bound by, for it is a general rule that

a man it regarded as notified of whatever appears in the instruments which constitute his chain

of title; and whether he actually reads them or not he is equally chargeable with knowledge

of their contents. Jackson v. Neely, 10 Johns. 874; Brush ». Ware, IB Pet 98. Daughaday

v. Paine, 6 Minn. 452 ; Reeder v. Barr, 4 Ohio, 446. If therefore a deed refers to an unrecorded

mortgage, or to any other outstanding claim, it becomes necessary to ascertain its present

condition and validity; for a purchaser will take subject to the rights under it of which he is

constructively notified. It is important also to see that the deeds contain the proper words

of inheritance. See post, book 2, page 1Q7, and notes.

7. The attestation and acknowledgment of the deed are to be compared with the statute in

force at the date of execution, to see if they constitute a compliance. And it is always to be

borne in mind that the record of a deed not executed as required by the recording laws is a

mere nullity, and cannot be used as an instrument of evidence. Clark r. Graham, 6 Wheat.

577; Choteau v. Jones, 11 III. 800; Pope c. Henry, 24 Vt. 560; Galpin v. Abbott, 6 Mich. 17;

Work v. Harper, 24 Miss. 517; Patterson ». Pease, 6 Ohio, 190. If there is any defect in this

particular, the original deed should be obtained for the purposes of having the proper correction

and a new record made.

8. Coming to the deed from Jackson to Benson, the same questions regarding identity are

to be asked, and the same precautions observed in other respects which have already been

pointed out.
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books for careful investigation. The man who in extremis sends for his legal

adviser to draft a complicated will may be blamable for delaying so important

a business until the immediate urgency is so great, but in this regard he is

only equally negligent with a great many of his fellows, and the lawyer must

9. The deed from Benson to Byles is by quitclaim. A deed without covenants is as effectual

to convey the vendor's title as any other, but the fact that the vendor declines to insert cov-

books for careful investigation. The man who hi extremis St!uds for his legal
adviser to draft a complicated will may be blamable for delaying so important
a business until the immediate urgency is so great, but in this regard he is
only equally negligent with a great many of his fellows, and the lawyer must

enants in his deed when his title is apparently perfect, is a circumstance which always sug-

gests doubt in respect to the title, and renders additional caution important. Generally the

vendor who has tio doubt regarding his title will not hesitate to give the ordinary deed of

warranty, and the purchaser, if he is buying for full value, will insist upon having it. It is a

reasonable inference when a mere quitclaim is given, that both parties supposed the title

might prove defective, and that the purchaser has bought at a discount in consideration of the

risk he assumed. And it may prove, on inquiry in this case, that the William Jackson who

conveys was not the purchaser from Hemingway, but only one of several heirs at law who

had sold and quitclaimed his undivided interest. In such case the interest of the other heirs

would not be affected by his conveyance, and the right which could be claimed by his grantee,

though apparently good to the whole land, would in reality be valid for his undivided

interest only.

10. And this leads us to remark, that the title derived by descent or devise from a deceased

person does not usually appear on the records of the office of the recorder of deeds, and in some

states there is no provision of law by which it can be made to appear. When a person dies

leaving no will, the title to his real property vests at once in his heirs at law, subject to be
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divested in case it should become necessary, in the course of administration, to resort to it as

assets for the payment of debts. The heirs may sell their right, and no other steps are

essential for the purpose than would be required if their title had come by purchase. One who

should buy of them must take subject to the following contingencies :

A will of the ancestor may be discovered and probated, which shall devise the estate to

other parties.

Administration may be taken on the estate, and debts proved to an amount exceeding the

personal assets, and then it may be necessary to sell the real estate in order to pay them.

Each heir can convey his undivided interest only, and the purchaser at Ins peril must ascer-

tain the number and identity of the heirs, and the extent of their respective interests. Even

where an estate is being duly settled under the statute, the probnte records are not conclusive

upon these subjects, at least before the final decree of distribution. The purchaser must also,

at his peril, ascertain that the heirs from whom he buys are of the proper age to make con-

veyances.

11. As the Benson deed appears to have been executed in the state of New York, it is im-

portant to ascertain what provision was made by the law of Ohio for the record of such deeds.

The law of the jurisdiction where the land is—the lex ret siia—is the law which must govern

such conveyances; and a deed, perfectly good in New York, where it is executed, may prove

insufficient, under the law of Ohio, where the land lies. The statutes of the several states will

be found to provide in what manner deeds of lands therein, when made abroad, shall be

executed; and the deed must, therefore, be compared with the statute, to see if there has been

a compliance. And. as there Is no common law on this subject to help out a defective con-

veyance, nothing short of a substantial compliance with the statute will avail. A defective

deed may amount to a valid contract of tale, the specific performance of which may be enforced;

but a purchaser wants the titlu, and not a lawsuit.

12. Benson's deed to Byles appears to have been executed more than twenty years after he

obtained his title. It is possible that in this interval his right may have been extinguished by

an adverse possession. This consideration is, of itself, sufficient to demonstrate the importance

of making inquiries regarding the occupation of the land; but they would also be important,

though in a less degree, where sufficient time had not elupsed for the statute of limitations to

attach. It is a rule, generally, though not universally, recognized, that, whtre one buys land

in the potiettion of another, he takes it subject to the rights of the possessor, whatever they may be.

Lea P. Polk Copper Co., 21 How. 493; Hughes p. United States, 4 Wai. 232; Morrison p.

Kelly, 22 111. 610; Coleman r. Barklew, 3 Dutch. 357; Helms v. May, 29 Geo. 121; McKee p.

Wilcox, 11 Mich. 358. The exception to this principle is where the possessor sets up a claim

in opposition to his own conveyance. Scott v. Gallagher, 14 S. and R. 333; Newhall ». Pierce,

6 Pick. 450; Bloomer v. Henderson, 8 Mich. 395. Or where possession by him is consistent

with the title appearing of record: Patten p. Moore. 32 N. H. 884; Truesdale p. Ford, 87 111.

210; Elly p. Wilcox, 24 Wis. 531. See further, McKinzie p. Perrill, 15 Ohio St. 168; Crassen

v. Swoveland, 22 Ind. 434. A man, therefore, who is in possession under a lease or an un-

9. Tho deed from Benson to Byles is by quitclaim. A deed without covenants is as effectual
to convey the vendor's title as any other, but the fact that the vendor declines to insert covenants in his deed when his title is apparently perfect, is a circumstance which always suggests doubt in respect to the title, and renders additional caution important. Generally the
vendor who htl.8 uo doubt regarding his title will not hesitate to give the ordinary deed of
warranty, aud the purchaser, if he is buying for fall value, will insist upon having it. It is a
reMonable inference when a mere quitclaim is given, that both parties supposed the title
might prove defective, and that the purchaser bas bought at a discount in consideraUon of the
risk he assumed. And it may prove, on inquiry in this case, that the William Jackson who
conveys was not the purchaser from Hemingway, but only one of several heirs at law who
bad sold and quitclaimed his undivided interest. In such case the interest of the other heir11
would not be affected by his conveyance, and the right which could be claimed by his grant-0e,
though apparently good to the whole land, would in reality be valid for his undivided
interest only.
10. And this leads us to remark, that the title derived by descent or devise from a deceased
person does not usually appear on the records of the office of the recorder of deeds, and in some
states there is no provision of law by which it can be made to appear. When a person dies
leaving no will, the title to his real property vests at once in his heirs at law, subject to be
divested in case it should become necessary, in the course of administration, to resort to it as
asaets for the paymeot of debts. The heirs may sell their right, and nu other steps are
essential for the purpose than would be required if their title had come by pnrchase. One who
should buy of them must take subject to the following contingencies:
A will of the ancestor may be 4iscovered and probatOO, which shall dcYl&e the estate to
other parties.
Administration may be taken Oil the estate, and debts pri:wed to an amount exceeding the
personal assets, and then it may be nooessary to sell the real estate in order to pay them.
Each heir can convey his undivided intere11t only, and the purchaser at hi11 peril must ascertain the number and identity of the heirs, and the extent of their re11pectil'e interests. Even
where an estate is being duly settled under the statute. the probate records are not conclusive
upon these subjects, at least before the final decree of distribution. The purchaser must also,
at bis peril, ascertain that the heirs from whom he buys arc of the proper age to make conveyances.
11. As the Benson deed appears to have been executed in the state of New York, It is important to ascertain what provision was made by the law of Ohio for the record of 11uch deeds.
The law of the jurisdiction where the land is-the lex rci sitce-is the law which must govern
such conveyances; and a deed, perfectly good in New York, where it iti executed, may proYe
insufficient, under the law of Ohio, where the lend lies. The statutes of the sernral states will
be found to provide in what manner deeds of lamls therein, when made abroad, 11hall be
executed; and the deed must, therefore, be compared with the statute, to sec if there has been
a compliance. And, as there Is no common law on this subject to help out a defoctive conveyance, nothing short of a substantial compliance with the statute will avail. A defecth·c
deed may amount to a valid contmct qf .ale, the 11pecific performance of which may be enforced;
but a purchaser wants the title, and not a lawsuit.
12. Benson's deed to Byles appears to have been executed more than twenty years after he
obtained his title. It is possible that in this inten·al his right may have been extinguished by
an adveree possession. This consideration is, of itself, sufficient to demonstrate the importance
of making inquiries regarding the occupation of the land; but they would also be important,
though in a less degree, where sufficient time had not ehLpsed for the statute of limitations to
attach. It is a rule, generally, though not universally, recognized, that, wlure one buya land
in tlu pos1tanon of aoother, Ju taku it subject to the rights of the posseaaor, wlw.tertr they may In.
Lea"· Polk Copper Co,, 21 How. 498; Hughes "· United States, 4 Wal. 282; Morrison "·
Kelly, 22 Ill. 610; Colemllll "· Barklew, 3 Dutch. 857; Helms"· May, 29 Geo. 121; McKee"·
Wilcox, 11 Mich. 858. The exception to this principle is where the pos.'lcssor sets up a claim
in opposition to his own com·ey11nce. Scott v. Gallagher, 14 S. and R. 338; Newball v. Pierce,
6 Pick. 460; Bloomer "· Henderson, 8 Mich. 895. Or where possession by him is consistent
with the title appearing of record : Patten v . Moore. 32 N. H. 884; Truesdale 1'· Ford, 87 Ill.
210; Elly"· Wilcox, 24 Wis. 681. Sec further, McKinzie "·Perrill, 15 Ohio St. 168; Crassen
11. Swoveland, 22 Ind. 484. A man, therefore, who is in possession under a lease or an unrecorded deed i11 protected by his possession, and other persons cannot acquire equities as
against him, where they buy without taking the trouble to Inquire into the natul'I} of his claims..
13. Benson's wife appears to have united in bis deed, for the purpose of releasing her righ'
of dower. As to this, it ls important to know.

recorded deed is protected by his possession, and other persons cannot acquire equities as

against him, where they buy without taking the trouble to inquire into the nature of his claims,

13. Benson's wife appears to have united in his deed, for the purpose of releasing her right

of dower. As to this, it is important to know.
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be prepared for calls of this character, and ready to respond to them. The

most difficult and intricate questions he is ever compelled to grapple with will

sometimes present themselves when the proposed testator states his wishes

regarding the settlement of his property, and in many cases they must be met

promptly and settled without delay. To enable a lawyer to enter upon such a

task without misgivings, he must have fitted himself by a thorough study of

the elementary rules as presented and discussed in the leading treatises; and

if he has contented himself with a smattering of real estate law—such as may

enable him to buy and sell real estate and draft common conveyances, he has

no right to jeopard the interests of those he assumes to aid, by drafting an

Whether the execution and acknowledgment of the deed by her were in due form, as required

by the statute; for, if not, they are void. A married woman has no general power to release

her contingent right of dower during coverture; and can only do so in the manner the slatute

has prescribed. The strictness with which statutory forms are required to be observed

be prepared for calls of this character, and ready to respond to them. The
most difficult and intricate questions he is ever compelled to grapple with will
sometimes present themselves when the proposed testator states his wishes
regarding the settlement of his property, and in many cases they must be met
promptly and settled without delay. 'fo enable a lawyer to enter upon such a
task without misgivings, he must have fitted himself by a thorough study of
the elementary rules a.s presented and discussed in the leading treatises; and
if he has contented himself with a smattering of real estate law-such as may
enable him to buy and sell real estate and draft common conveyances, he has
no right to jeopard the interests of those he assumes to aid, by drafting an

may be seen in some of the cases which If r. Washburne has collected. 1 Washb. Real Prop.

200, et seq.

Also whether the wife was of lawful age at the time of executing the release. The statute

which authorizes the wife to release her contingent right of dower does not reliev* her of any

other disability which she may be under, besides coverture; and, therefore, if she be, in law,

an infant, her deed is void. Hughes v. Watson, 10 Ohio, 127; Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend.

617, and 20 id. 338; Jones v. Todd, 2 J. J. Marsh. 859. Some of the states, however, it is

believed, have changed this rule.
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14. The deed from Byles to Bennett appears to have been executed by attorney. Was this

attorney duly authorized ? To answer this question intelligently, we must have the power of

attorney before us. It must be under seal, and its terms must be such as to empower this

particular deed to be executed. If the examination is satisfactory on this point, the purchaser

would need to go still farther, and ascertain whether or not it remained unrevoked when the

deed was made. Byles, in the mean time, may have died or gone into bankruptcy, or he may

have expressly revoked his letter of attorney by an instrument for the purpose, duly executed

and recorded.. If satisfied that the power remained in force, the next question Is, whether it

has been duly executed. The deed made under it should be executed and acknowledged in the

name and as the deed of the principal by William Smith, his attorney, and not in the name

and as the deed of the attorney himself. Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42; Barger v. Miller, 4

Wash. G. C. 280; Thurman v. Cameron, 24 Wend. 90; Harper v. Hampton, 1 Harr. aud J.

709. If defective in this particular, extrinsic evidence cannot be resorted to for the purpose of

showing that the attorney designed to make the proper conveyance which he had failed to

execute. Wilkinson v. Getty, 13 Iowa, 167.

15. As James Byles executes the deed alone, inquiry must be made whether at the time he

was a married man, and if so, whether his wife is still living. And this may be important for a

further purpose than to ascertain whether a dower right exists. The land may have been the

homestead of Byles; and if occupied as such, it may be found that, at the date of this deed, the

statute of the state forbade its alienation except by a deed in which the wife joined.

16. When satisfied upon all these points there are still others which present themselves for

Investigation. There maybe tax titles upon the land; It may have been sold in judicial pro-

ceedings against any of the several owners; any of them may have gone Into bankruptcy and

lost his title thereby; any of the deeds in the chain of title may be forged, and therefore void;

any one of the grantors may have been an infant, insane or idiotic; there may be suits

pending in chancery which affect the land; and the prudent lawyer who is employed to

investigate the title will never rest satisfied until ho has made his inquiries cover all theso

points.

The title here supposed is one of the most simple character, and presents none of the

abstruse or difficult questions which are constantly arising in real estate transactions. If one

link in the chain of title happens to be a will, new :uid more difficult questions will arise. It

may then become important to know whether the rule in Shelley's case is in force in the state

or not; for the nature of a devisee's estate, whether a fee or not, may depend upon it. And in

any case of a devise it will be important to ascertain whether the will has been duly probated

and the estate duly settled; for until then, the title of the devisee is subject to contingencies.

If one link is a judicial sale, or a sale by executor, administrator or guardian, or a tax title, the

lawyer ought to examine every step in the proceedings carefully; to take nothing for granted,

hut satisfy himself from his own inspection that every thing Is substantially correct and regular.

If an examination is being made for the purposes of a suit, it ought to be equally particular

and careful, and the lawyer ought to see not only that the title is good, but that it is capable

Whether the execution and acknowledgment of the deed by her were in due form. as required
by the statute; for, if not, they are void. A married woman has no general power to release
her contingent right of dower during coverture; and can only do so in the manner the statute
has prescribed. The strictness with which statutory forms are required to be .observed
may be eeen in eome of the cues which Mr. Washburne has collected. 1 Washb. Real Prop.
200, et seq.
Also whether the wife was of lawful age at the time of executing the release. The statute
which authorizes the wife to release her contingent right of dower does not relieve her of any
other diaability which she may be under, besides coverture; and, therefore, If she be, in law,
an infant, her deed Is void. Hughes v. Watson, IO Ohio, 127; Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend.
617, and 20 id. 338; Jones v. Todd, :,! J. J. Marsh. 869. Some of the states, however, it is
believed, have changed this rule.
14. The deed from Byles to Bennett appears to have been executed by attorney. Was this
attorney duly authorized 1 To answer thl11 queation intelligently, we must have the power of
attorney before us. It must be under seal, and it& terms must be such as to empower this
particular deed to be executed. If the examination is satisfactory on ~js point. the purchaser
would need to go still farther, and ascertain whether or not it remaTned . unrevoked when the
deed was made. Byles, in the mean time, may have died or gone Into tiankruptcy, or he may
have expressly revoked his letter of attorney by an instrument for the purpose, duly executed
and recorded, If satisfied that the power remained in force, the next question Is, whether it.
has been duly executed. The deed made under it should be executed and acknowledged in the
name and as the deed of the principal by William Smith, hi11 attorney, and not in the name
and as the deed of the attorney himself. Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42; Barger v. Miller, 4
Wash. C. C. 280; Thurman v. Cameron, 24 Wend. 00; Harper v. Hampton, 1 Harr. aud J.
709. If defective in this particular, extrinsic evidence cannot be resorted to for the purpose of
showing that the attorney designed to make the proper conveyance which he bad failed to
execute. Wilkinson v. Getty, 13 Iowa, 107.
16. As James Byles executes the deed alone, inquiry must be made whether at the time be
was a married man, and if so, whether bis wife is still living. And this may be important for a
further purpose than to ascertain whether a dower right exists. The land may have been the
homcdead of Byles; and if occupied as such, it may be found that, at the date of this deed, the
statute of the state forbade its alienation except by a deed in wbicb the wife joined.
16. When satisfied upon all these points there are still others which present themselves for
Investigation. There may be tax titles upon the land; it may have been sold In judicial proceedings agaiost any of the ~verl!J owners; any of them may have gone into bankruptcy and
lost his title thereby; any of the deeds in the chain of title may be forged, and therefore void;
any one of the grantors may have been an infant, insane or idiotic; there may be suits
pending in chancery which atfect the land; and the prudent lawyer who is employed to
investigatt: the title will never rnst satisfied until he baa made his i11quiries cover all theso
points.
The title here supposed is one of the most simple character, and presents none of the
abstruse or difficult question• which are constantly arising in real estate transactions. If one
link in the chain of title happens to be a will, new ana more ditficult questions will arise. It
may then become important to ~ow wbet~er the rule lq Shelley's case is In force In the state
or not; for the nature of a devisee'1 es~ate, wh~ther a fee or not, Qlay depeJl(i upon it. And in
any case of a devise it will be ill!portant to ascertain whether the will baa been duly probated
and the estate duly settled; for until then, the title of the devisee i11 subject to contingencies.
If one liqk is a judicial sale, or a sale by executor, administrator or guardian, or a tax title, the
lawyer ought to examine every step in the proceedings carefully; to take nothing for granted,
but aati~fy himself from his own inspection that every thing Is substantially correct and regular.
If an examination is being made for the purposes of a suit, it ought to be equally particular
and careful, and the lawyer ought to see not only that the title is good, but that it is capable
of being prO\'"ed. Sometimes be may be convinced by his inq.uiries, and yet not supplied with
the mel!M of proof. He should remember that it ls one thing to satisfy himself, and another to

of being proved. Sometimes he may be convinced by his inquiries, and yet not supplied with

the means of proof. He should remember that it is one thing to satisfy himself, and another to
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instrument, the legal effect of which he can only guess at. A layman would

be even less likely to mislead, for he would generally abstain from the use of

technical language, which, in the hands of persons who are employing it

without sufficient knowledge, is always liable to express a meaning which is

not in the mind of him who uses it It is impossible to urge too strongly

upon the young men who are hereafter to come to the bar, the importance of

thorough preparation in the law of real estate; and it may tend to their en-

couragement in so doing to add, that as lands become more valuable and

wealth increases, in no other branch of the law is real preparation and

genuine attainment likely to be better appreciated or better rewarded.(?;)

There is a class of real estate questions which is peculiar to this country, and

in handling which the student will not be greatly aided by the old text-books

or old decisions. They are, nevertheless, questions which arise often, and which,

hereafter, there will from year to year be still more frequent occasion to deal

with. We refer to those which relate to the validity of sales of lands for the

non-payment of the taxes assessed upon them. We do not know how the law-

yer, who is disposed both to labor and to think, could well be called into a more

tempting field than the examination of these questions. Large as has been the

number of decisions regarding these sales, and varied as have been the questions

passed upon, almost every new case that now arises presents some unusual com-

bination of facts and circumstances which enables some new and perhaps

difficult question to be raised. The difficulties are enhanced,by the different
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views which different classes of minds are disposed to take of this species of

title, and of the maxims of law by which they should be governed. If we look

only to the interest of the state, and regard the collection of the tax at all haz-

ards as the prime object to be attained, we may be disposed to press governmental

power to an extreme which would deprive the individual of the benefit of those

principles which have been shields for the protection of private property from

before the time of Magna Charta. If, on the other hand, we look mainly to the

interest of the individual, bearing in mind the great variety of causes which

prevent the prompt payment of taxes—causes most often operating in the cases

of minors and other persons incapable or unaccustomed to business, and remem-

bering also the merely nominal price usually paid for lands at tax sales, we may

be disposed to look upon these sales as a species of state robbery, to disappoint

and defeat which, the courts should be vigilant to seize upon every reasonable

supply legal evidence which can be laid before a jury, f he memorandum of his investigations

which he makes, as they progress, ought to give full information, not only for his own present use,

but for the purposes of a trial if any should be had, or for the information of any subsequent

purchaser from his client who may have occasion to go over the same ground. A lawyer is

inexcusable who trusts the results of such investigations to memory alone.

These few hints will suffice to show how utterly insufficient and misleading are the ordinary

abstracts of title upon which so many purchasers rely; how impossible it is that the records

should give completely the information regarding the true state of titles, and how important

that one who would examine titles should not only have some knowledge of law, but should

make his investigations with his mind awake to all the numerous and diversified circumstances

which may affect the title, even in the cases which upon the surface appear the simplest. And

this note is inserted, not as indicating all the points to be borne in mind in these cases, but as

illustrating the necessity of caution and thoughtful vigilance.

(r) Mr. Williams's little work on Real Property is an admirable assistant to the student, and

an agreeable introduction to the Digest of Cruise. Our appreciation of Mr. Washburn's Trea-

tise is shown by the frequent references to it in the following work: No brink is more reliable;

and the same may be said of the treatise by the same author on Easements. Jarman on Wills,

is the best English work on that subject at the present time, but is nearly superseded in this

country by the treatise of Judge Redfield.

instrument, the legal effect of which he can only guess at. A layman would
be even less likely to mislead, for he would generally abstain from the use of
technical language, which, in the hands of persons who are employing it
without sufficient knowledge, is always liable to express a meaning which is
not in the mind of him who uses it. It is impossible to urge too strongly
upon the young men who are hereafter to come to the bar, the importance of
thorough preparation in the law of real estate; and it may tend to their encouragement in so doing to add, that as lands become more valuable and
wealth increases, in no other branch of the law is real preparation and
genuine attainment likely to be better appreciated or better rewarded.(v)
There is a class of real estate questions which is peculiar to this country, and
in handling which the student will not be greatly aided by the old text-books
or old decisions. They are, nevertheless, questions which arise often, and which,
hereafter, there will from year to year be still more frequent occasion to deal
with. We refer to those which relate to the validity of sales of lands for the
non-payment of the taxes assessed upon them. We do not know how the lawyer, who is disposed both to labor and to think, could well be called into a more
tempting field than the examination of these questions. Large has been the
number of decisions regarding these sales, and varied as have been the questions
passed upon, almost every new case that now a.rises presents some unusual combination of facts and circumstances which enables some new and perhaps
difficult question to be raised. The difficulties are enhanced. by the different
views which different classes of minds are disposed to take of this species of
title, .and of the maxims of law by which they should be governed. If we look
only to the interest of the state, and regard the collection of the tax at all hazards as the prime object to be attained, we may be disposed to press governmental
power to an extreme which would deprive the individual of the benefit of those
principles which have been shields for the protection of private property from
before the time of Magna Chart.a. If, on the other hand, we look mainly to the
interest of the individual, bearing in mind the great variety of causes which
prevent the prompt payment of taxes-causes most often operating in the cases
of minors and other persons incapable or unaccustomed to business, and remembering also the merely nominal price usually paid for lands at tax sales, we may
be disposed to look upon these sales as a species of state robbery, to disappoint
and defeat which, the courts should be vigilant to seize upon every reasonable

as

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~

supply legal evidence which can be laid before a jury. 'rhe memorandum of his investigations
which he makes, as they progress, ought to give full information, not only for his own present use,
but for the purposes of a trial if any should be had, or for the information of any subsequent
purchaser from bis client who may have occasion to go over the same ground. A lawyer is
inexcusable who trusts the results of such investigations to memory alone.
These few hints will suffice to show how utterly insufficient and misleading are the ordinary
abstracts of title upon which so many purchasers rely; how impossible it is that the records
should give completely the infom!ation regarding the true state of titles, and how important
that one who would examine title!! should not only have some knowledge or law, but should
make his in,·estigations wiih bis mind awake to all the numerous and diversified circumstances
which may affect the title, even in the caaes which upon the surfaee appear the simplest. And
this note is inserted, not as indicating all the poin's to be borne in mind in these cases, but as
illustrating the necessity of caution and thoughtful vigilance.
.
(v) Mr. Wiliiams's little work on Real PropE'rty is an admirable assistant to the student, and
an agreeable introduction to the Digest of Cruise. Our appreciation of Mr. Washburn's Treatise is shown by the frequent references to it in the following work; No book Is more reliable;
and the same may be said of the treatise by the same author on Easements. Jarman on Wills,
is the best English work on that subject at the present time, but is nearly superseded in tbi1
country by the treati86 of Judge Redfle1d.
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pretext. These diverse views find able representatives in the legal profession,

who press them upon all occasions; but the lawyer who is ready to accept tin 'in

as extreme views, and to examine tax titles with the same unbiased mind which

he would bring to the consideration of a mortgage or of a conveyance by bar-

gain and sale, will not fail to find that there is ample opportunity for the display

of legal ingenuity and acumen, and for the satisfactory application of funda-

mental legal maxims as the new and peculiar circumstances, which these cases

so often exhibit, present themselves. The thoughtful lawyer cannot doubt that

the old and well-settled principles of law are to be applied in these as in all

other cases, nor that they are sufficient, if rightly applied, for the protection

alike of the interest of the state and of the individual rights of the citizen; and

if he enters upon his investigations with these points conceded in his own

mind, much of the difficulty supposed to be inseparable from this species of

conveyance will disappear, as he comes fully prepared to encounter it The

maxims of individual right are all limited, restrained and qualified by others

which regard public duty and state necessity; each and all, when properly

understood, supply light for the guidance of the lawyer in his examination of

the numerous and often informal and imperfect records which constitute the

evidences of title in these cases, and if he possesses the necessary industry and

perseverance to make a complete and careful examination of each case in which

his services may be required, the questions of law involved will not often fail

of a satisfactory-solution under his intelligent and persevering attempts to mas-
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ter them, (w)

If the law of real estate proves generally unattractive, criminal law, on the

other hand, is likely to excite the imagination and enlist the interest of the

student, who will look forward to its practice as the field of his most striking

and inspiring triumphs. Yet as these triumphs are popularly supposed to be

achieved mainly by the power of eloquence, and by appeals to the sympathies

(w) To illustrate the manner in which the principles of law which are applicable to these cases

affect and qualify each other, the following may be mentioned :

That the state has an undoubted right to compel every species of property within its limits to

sustain its proper proportion of the burden of supporting the government, and to that end, if

necessary, to divest the owner's title by a public sale.

That the owner has an equal right to have the proceedings for levying a tax upon his prop-

erty prescribed in advance by law, so that he may understand what is his duty regarding its

payment, and how he may comply with that duty : and he is not to be dispossessed of his prop-

pretext. These diverse views find able representatives in the legal profession7
who press them upon all occasions; but the lawyer who is ready to accept them
as extreme views, and to examine tax titles with the same unbiased mind which
he would bring to the consideration of a mortgage or of a conveyance by bargain and sale, will not fail to find that there is ample opportunity for the display
of legal ingenuity and acumen, and for the satisfactory application of fundamental legal maxims as the new and peculiar circumstances, which these cases
so often exhibit, present themselves. The thoughtful lawyer cannot doubt that
the old and well-settled principles of law are to be applied in these as in all
other cases, nor that they are sufficient, if rightly applied, for the protection
alike of the interest of the state and of the individual rights of the citizen; and
if he enters upon his investigations with these points conceded in his own
mind, much of the difficulty supposed to be inseparable from this species of
conveyance will disappear, as he comes fully prepared to encounter it. The
maxims of individual right are all limited, restrained and qualified by others
which regard public duty and state hecessity; each and all, when properly
understood, s11pply light for the guidance of the lawyer in his examination of
the numerous and often informal and imperfect records which constitute the
evidences of title in these cases, and if he possesses the necessary industry and
perseverance to make a complete and careful examination of each case in which
his services may be required, the questions of law involved will not often fail
of a satisfactory-solution under his intelligent and persevering attempts to master them. (w)
If the law of real estate proves generally unattractive, criminal law, on the
other band, is likely to excite the imagination and enlist the interest of the
student, who will look forward to ib! practice as the field of his most striking
and inspiring triumphs. Yet as these triumphs are popularly supposed to be
achieved mainly by the power of eloquence, and by appeals to the sympathies

erty until he is in default for failure to perform his obligations to the state.

That statutes for the assessment and collection of taxes are to be construed like other statutes;

not with a strictness that shall defeat their purpose, nor with a liberality that shall enlarge their

terms; the object to be attained being to ascertain the meaning of the legislature in their several

provisions, and then to give them effect.

That whatever securities the legislature has provided for the protection of the interest of the

taxpayer, are to be understood as thrown around his property to prevent its being appropriated

improperly, and they therefore constitute walls of protection which the other departments of the

government cannot throw down or leap over.

That the letter of the law is not to be regarded rather than its spirit: and as a strict and

literal compliance with provisions which are unimportant to the individual assessed is extremely

hnprobable in proceedings of this description, where the steps to be taken are numerous and the

persons who are to take them generally unlearned in the law. the legislature, it is to be assumed,

did not intend to make such literal compliance a condition precedent to the collection of the

public revenue, and the immaterial variations may be disregarded or cured retrospectively.

Other rules might be specified, but it is not important to our present purpose; the chief diffi-

culty in these cases being after all in the proper application of these, and in determining what

regulations of statute are to be regarded as directory, and what, being prescribed for the pro-

tection of the rights of the citizen, are to be treated as imperative. Mr. Blackwell's Treatise

on Tax Titles is a very useful one, to both the student and the practicing lawyer.

(w) To Illustrate the manner in whlch the principles of law which are applicable to these cues
affect and qualify each other, the following may be mentioned:
That the state has an undoubted right to compel every species of property within its limits to
sustain its proper proportion of the burden of supporting the government, and to that end, if
necessary, to divest the owner's title by a public sale.
That the owner has an equal right to have the proceedings for levying a tax upon his property prescribed in advance by law, so that he may understand what ls his duty regarding its
payment, and how he may comply with that duty : and he is not to be dispossessed of his property until he is in default for failure to perform his obligations to the stat<".
That statutes for the assessment and collection of taxes are to be construed like other statutes;
not with a strictness that shall defeat their purpose, no'r with a liberality that shall enlarge their
terms; the object to be attained being to ascertain the meaning of the legislature in their several
provisions, and then to give them effect.
That whatever securities the legisintllte ha11 provided for the protection of the interest of the
taxpayer, are to be understood as thrown around his property to pre\·ent its being appropriated
improperly, and they therefore constitute walls of proteetion which the other departments of the
guvernmcnt cannct throw down or leap over.
That the letter of the law is not to be regarded rather than its spirit: and as a strict and
literal compliance with provisions which are unimportant to the individual assesRed is extremely
hnprobablc in proceedings or this description, where the steps to be taken are numerous and the
persons who are to take them generally unlearned in the 111.w. the legislature, it is to be &.'ISnmed,
did not Intend to make such lit~ral compliance a condition precedent to the collection of the
public revenue, and the immaterial variations may be di11regarded or cured retro~pectively.
Other rules might be specified, but it is not important to our pre11cnt purpose; the chief diflicnlty in these cases being after all in the proper application of t.hese, and In determining what
regulations of statute arc to be regarded as directory, and what. being prescribed for the protection of the rights of the citizen, ar~ to be trented
imperative. Mr. Blackwell's Treatise
on Tax Titlea la a very useful one, to both the studeoi and the practicing lawyer.
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and the passions of men rather than by the force of dry legal logic, or the

careful mastery of the rules of law, the embryo advocate needs to guard his

inclinations carefully, lest he may find himself in his preparation relying too

exclusively upon showy attainments, and neglecting that solid foundation in

the law without which the most shining natural abilities, and the most careful

and elaborate training in elocution, will at times prove of no avail.

If the leading principles of criminal law are plain and easily mastered, if the

pleadings are simple and the practice without complication, there is nevertheless

a continual possibility that some unexpected and difficult question may arise

for which the works on criminal law state no precedent and furnish no solution.

What criminal lawyer in large practice can tell whether the fate of his client in

the next case in which his services may be demanded is to turn upon mere

questions of fact, or on the other hand to depend upon some important princi-

ple of constitutional right, some difficult question regarding the right to

property, or some point in medical jurisprudence, involving not only some

knowledge of medicine and of physiology, but an intimate acquaintance, also,

with human nature, and with the peculiarities and vagaries of the human

mind?

Lord Erskine, in building up that splendid reputation as an advocate of which

he was justly so proud, did not shrink from any labor or spare himself any

exertion which could make more complete and' ample his ability to grapple with

the questions of law and of fact which he could anticipate as likely to arise in

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the cases he was to undertake. At this distance of time, and when it cannot

be expected that our feelings should be enlisted to any considerable degree, in

the questions he discussed, we read his speeches with delight, and study them

as models of forensic eloquence. But we discover that they are very far from

being mere appeals to the sympathies, the feelings or the passions of the men

to whom they were addressed. On the contrary they were pervaded with such

knowledge of the laws and constitution of his country, and he discussed the

qnestions involved with such fullness and readiness of information, and such force

of logic, that our wonder is as we read them, not that their effect was so power-

ful and their force of conviction so great, but that, in cases where he made the

right appear so clear, it should ever have been seriously contested. We take

np, for instance, the trial of Hardy, and note in what a masterly manner he

handled the successive questions as they arose, and we are irresistibly impressed

that the great advocate was an orator in the highest and best sense, whose aim

was to come to the discussion of such great causes with his mind well stored

with all the materials of attack and defense which study or labor could gather,

and who so far accomplished the end sought, that he was enabled to teach a

government then tending strongly toward despotic authority, a salutary and

much needed lesson regarding the freedom of thought and freedom of discus-

sion, and one which will never be unlearned while free institutions continue to

be the heritage of the people of England, (x)

(i) Lord Campbell said of Erskine's speech in support of the right of juries in the Dean of

Asaph's case, that it displayed, " beyond all comparison, the most perfect union of argument

and eloquence ever exhibited in Westminster hall. So thoroughly had he mastered the subject,

and so clear did he make It, that he captivated, alike, old black letter lawyers and statesmen of

taste and refinement.'1

Quintilian, who lived in an age and under a system of forensic pleading, in which oratorical

powers, without solid attainments, might be made much more available than now under our gys-

and the passions of men rather than by the force of dry legal logic, or the
careful mastery of the rules of law, the embryo advocate needs to guard his
inclinations carefully, lest he may find himself in his preparation relying too
exclusively upon showy attainments, and neglecting that solid foundation in
the law without which the most shining natural abilities, and the most careful
and elaborate training in elocution, will at times prove of no avail.
If the leading principles of criminal law are plain and easily mastered, if the
pleadings are simple and the practice without complication, there is nevertheless
a continual possibility that some unexpected and difficult question may arise
for which the works on criminal law state no precedent and furnish no solution.
What criminal lawyer in large practice can tell whether the fate of his client in
the next case in which his services may be demanded is to turn upon mere
questions of fact, or on the other hand to depend upon some important principle of constitutional right, some difficult question regarding the right to
property, or some point in medical jurisprudence, involving not only some
knowledge of medicine and of physiology, but an intimate acquaintance, also,
with human nature, and with the peculiarities and vagaries of the human
mind?
Lord Erskine, in building up that splendid reputation as an advocate of which
he was justly so proud, did not shrink from any: labor or spare himself any
exertion which could make more complete ancl: ample his ability to grapple ~ith
the questions of law and of fact which he could anticipate as likely to arise in
the cases he was to undertake. At this distance of time, and when it cannot
be expected that our feelings should be enlisted to any considerable degree, in
the questions he discussed, we read his speeches with delight, and study them
as models of forensic eloquence. But we discover that they are very far from
being mere appeals to the sympathies, the feelings or the passions of the men
to whom they were addressed. On the contrary they were pervaded with such
knowledge of the laws and constitution of his country, and he discussed the
questions involved with such fullness and readiness of information, and such force
of logic, that our wonder is as we read them, not that their effect was so powerful and their force of conviction so great, but that, in cases where he made the
right appear so clear, it should ever have been seriously contested. We take
up, for instance, the trial of Hardy, and note in what a masterly manner he
handled the successive questions as they arose, and we are irresistibly impressed
that the great adTocate was an orator in the highest and best sense, whose aim
was to come to the discussion of such great causes with his mind well stored
with all the materials of attack and defense which study or labor could gather,
and who so far accomplished the end sought, that he was enabled to teach a
government then tending strongly toward despotic authority, a salutary and
much needed lesson regarding the freedom of thought and freedom of discussion, and one which will never be unlearned while free institutions continue to
be the heritage of the people of England. (x)
(z) Lord Campbell said of Erskine"s speech in support of the right of juries in the Dean of
Asaph's case, that it displayed, "beyond all comparison, the most perfect union of argument.
and eloquence ever exhibited in Westminster hall. So thoroughly had he mastered the subject,
and so clear did he make It, that he captivated, alike, old black letter lawyers and statesmen of
taste and reOnement.''
Quintilian, who lived in an age and under a system of forensic pleading, in which oratorical
powers, ";tbout solid attainments, might be made much more available than now under our 1ys-
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It will be interesting to quote in this connection what was said of Alexander

Hamilton by one of his gifted cotemporaries: " It is rare that a man, who

•owes so much to nature, descends to seek more from industry; bat he seemed to

depend on industry, as if nature had done nothing for him. His habits of

investigation were very remarkable; his mind seemed to cling to his subject till

he had exhausted it Hence the uncommon superiority of his reasoning

powers, a superiority that seemed to be augmented from every source, and to

be fortified by every auxiliary; learning, taste, wit, imagination and eloquence.

These were embellished and enforced by his temper and manners, by his fame

and his virtues. It is difficult, in the midst of such various excellence, to say

in what particular the effect of his greatness was most manifest. No man

more promptly discerned truth; no man more clearly displayed it; it was not

merely made visible, it seemed to come bright with illumination from his lips.

But prompt and clear as he was, fervid as Demosthenes, like Cicero, full of

resource, he was not less remarkable for the copiousness and completeness

of his argument, that left little for cavil and nothing for doubt. Some men

take their strongest argument as a weapon, and use no other; but he left

nothing to be inquired for more, nothing to be answered. He not only

disarmed his adversaries of their pretexts and objections, but he stripped them

of all excuse for having urged them; he confounded and subdued as well as

convinced. He indemnified them, however, by making his discussion a

complete map of his subject, so that his opponents might indeed, feel ashamed
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of their mistakes, but they could not repeat them. In fact it was no common

effort that could preserve a really able antagonist from becoming his convert;

for the truth, which his researches so distinctly presented to the understand-

ing of others, was rendered almost irresistibly commanding and impressive by

tern, justly ranks thorough preparation among the flrst and highest requisites of the advocate;

or, as he expresses it, as " constituting the foundation of pleading." " Very few orators," he

truly remarks, " take sufficient trouble in this respect; for, to say nothing of those who are

utterly careless, and who give themselves no concern on what the success of a cause depends,

if there be but points which, though wholly unconnected with the case, but relating to char-

acters involved in it, and leading to the usual flourishes on common-place topics, may afford

them an opportunity for noisy declamation) there are some also whom vanity perverts, and who

It will be interesting to quote in this connection what was said of Alexander
Hamilton by one of his gifted cotemporaries: " It is rare that a man, woo
·owes so much to nature, descends to seek more from industry; but he seemed to
depend on industry, as if nature had done nothing for him. His habits oC
investigation were very remarkable; his mind seemed to cling to his subject till
he had exhausted it. Hence the uncommon superiority of his reasoning
powers, a superiority that seemed to be augmented from every source, and to
be fortified by every auxiliary; learning, taste, wit, imagination and eloquence.
These were embellished and enforced by his temper and manners, by his fame
and his virtues. It is difficult, in the midst of such various excellence, to say
in what particular the effect of hie greatneSB was most manifest. No man
more promptly discerned truth; no man more clearly displayed it; it was not
merely made visible, it seemed to come bright with illumination from his lips.
But prompt and clear as he was, fervid as Demosthenes, like Cicero, full of
resource, he was not less remarkable for the copiousness and completenees
of his argument, that left little for cavil and nothing for doubt. Some men
take their strongest argument as a weapon, and nee no other; but he le~
nothing to be inquired for more, nothing to be answered. He not only
disarmed hie adversaries of their pretexts and objections, but he stripped them
of all excuse for having urged them; he confounded and subdued as well aa
convinced. He indemnified them, however, by making his discuBBion a
complete map of his subject, so that his opponents might indeed, feel ashamed
of their mistakes, but they could not repeat them. In fact it was no common
effort that could preserve a really able antagonist from becoming his convert;
for the truth, which his researches so distinctly presented to the understanding of others, was rendered almost irresistibly commanding and impressive by

(partly pretending that they are constantly occupied, and have always something which they

must first dispatch, tell their client to come to them the day or the very morning before the

trial, and sometimes even boast that they received their instructions while the court was sitting;

or, partly assuming a show of extraordinary ability, that they may be thought to understand

things in a moment, making believe that they conceive and comprehend almost before they hear),

after they have chanted forth, with wonderful eloquence, and the loudest clamors of applause

from their partisans, much that has no reference either to the judge or to their client, are con-

ducted back in a thorough perspiration, and with long train of attendants, through the forum."

How vivid is this picture of some advocates, still to be met with, whose endeavor is to try the

parties and witnesses rather than the cause, and to display themselves rather than exhibit the

rights of their clients! The applause of an unthinking crowd may be easily and cheaply excited

in this manner, but sensible men estimate such advocates at their true value, and juries are

seldom much influenced by them, while courts only endure them. On the other hand, com-

mendation like that which Lord Mansfield gave the counsel in Sommersett's case is worth

striving for; not for the compliment merely, but because he who has once earned it may rely

afterward upon having the ear of the court, and upon being looked to by the judges for

instruction and assistance when the mere declaiiner would be heard but not heeded. " I can-

not omit," said he, " to express particular happiness in seeing young men, just called to the

bar, have been able to profit so much by their reading." It wai a different class of practitioner!

that Chief Justice Gibson was listening to when he congratulated himself on having achieved a

great judicial triumph, inasmuch as he was able to keep his eye upon a dull advocate while his

mind was occupied with more agreeable objects!

tem, juatly ranks thorough preparation among the fil'lt and highest requisites of the advocate;
or, as he expresses it, as" constituting the foundation of pleading." "Very few orators," he
truly remarks, "take sufficient trouble in this respect; for, to say nothing of thoee who are
utterly careleu, and who give themselves no concern on what the succelll of a cause depends,
if there be but points which, though wholly unconnect~ with the case, but relating to char·
acters involved in it, and leading to the usual flourishes on common·place topics, may afford
them an opportunity for noisy declamation I there are some also whom nnlty perverts, and who
(partly pretending that they are constantly occupied, and hare always llOmethiog which they
must first dispatch, tell their client to come to them the day or the very morning before the
trial, and sometimes even boast that they received their !nstrnctfons while the court wa1111!tting;
or, partly 111Jsnmlng a show of extraordinary ability, that they may be thought to understand
things in a moment, making believe that they conceive and comprehend almost before they hear),
after they have chanted forth, with wonderful eloquence, and the loudeat clamors of applause
from their partisans, much that hns no l't'ference either to the judge or to their client, are con·
ducted back in a thorough perspiration, and with long train of attendants, through the forum."
How vivid is tbi11 picture of some advocates, still to be met with, whose endeavor is to try the
parties and witnesses rather than the cauae, and to display themselves rather than exhibit the
rights of their clients ! The applause of' an unthinking crowd may be easily and cheaply excited
In this manner, but sensible men estimate such advocates at their true value, and juries are
seldom much influenced by them, while courts only endure them. On the other hand, com·
mendation like that which Lord Mansfield gave t.he counsel in Sommersett's cue is worth
strMng for; not for the compliment merely, but because be who has once earned it may rely
afterward upon ha\"lng the ear of the court, and upon being looked to by the judges for
instruction and assistance when the mere declaimer would be heard but not heeded. " I cannot omit," 11&id he, "to express particular happiness in seeing young men, just called to the
bar, have been able to profit so much by their reading." It wn1 a different class ofpractitionera
that Chief Justice Gibson was listening to when he .:ongratnlated himself on having achieved a
great judicial triumph, inasmuch &.'I he was able to keep his eye upon a dull advocate while his
mind was occupied with more agiieeable objects !
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the, love and reverence which, it was ever apparent, he profoundly cherished

for it in his own."(y)

In America we meet with few cases of lawyers of high standing and eminent

ability who give themselves exclusively to the defense of criminal cases, and

few of that class would find employment sufficiently steady and remunerative

if they desired to do so. The criminal lawyer is too apt to be a man who is

tainted somewhat by his associations, and who fits himself for defending vile

characters by imbibing more or less of their vicious tastes and habits. But the

ablest counsel may be called sometimes to step from the highest tribunal in the

land into the criminal court; as Daniel Webster was called in to assist in

bringing a criminal to justice, and William H. Seward to save a demented

negro from the punishment of a criminal. And while we say of the prepara-

tion for such cases, that it must be begun early, on broad and deep foundations,

we should add also, that mere rhetoric, in the lower and more common

acceptation of that term,—the power to control the voice, to use readily

beautiful or ingenious figures of speech, and to accompany them with

appropriate gestures—constitutes but a small part of this preparation.

The most perfect address in point of oratorical accuracy may fall dead and

lifeless, or even be the subject of ridicule, in an important criminal cause,

when a plain and straight-forward argument, made upon full preparation, but

without attempt at display, will lead the minds of court and jury irresistibly to

the advocate's conclusions. (2) The caution above all others which the student
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needs, when he feels himself gifted with fine oratorical ability, is to beware lest

he find himself relying upon it too exclusively, and neglecting that hard labor

which the less gifted would be compelled to perform, but the benefit of which

is always in proportion to the natural powers which it supplements, (a)

The innovations which have been made in criminal procedure in modern

times have been so great that a trial on a charge of crime now bears as little

resemblance to one in the time of the Stuarts, as the service in a Christian church

does to the heathen sacrifice to idols. We have at last, we think, so moulded

and shaped the criminal practice as to give the prisoner the full benefit of the

maxim that he shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty; which in

former times was but a mockery. But some of the new protections devised for

innocence need to be carefully guarded to prevent their proving delusive

(y) Works of Fisher Ames, vol. 2, p. 260.

(z) Luther specified among the requisites for a good preacher: " First, he should teach sys-

tematicallyj secondly, ho should have a ready witj thirdly, he should be eloquent; fourthly,

he should have a good voice; fifthly, a good memory; sixthly, he should know when to make

an end; seventhly, he should make sure of his doctrine; eighthly, he should venture and

engage body and blood, wealth and honor, in the word; ninthly, he should suffer himself to

be mocked and jeered of every one." Every one of these is equally important in the criminal

lawyer, and some of them are indispensable. He must "make sure of his doctrine!" "he

the, love and reverence which, it was ever apparent, he profoundly cherished
for it in his own."(y)
In America we meet with few ca.see of lawyers of high standing and eminent
ability who give themselves exclusively to the defense of criminal cases, and
few of that class would find employment sufficiently steady and remunerative
if they desired to do so. 'fhe criminal lawyer is too apt to be a man who is
tainted somewhat by his associations, and who fits himself for defending vile
characters by imbibing more or less of their vicious tastes and habits. But the
ablest counsel may be called sometimes to step from the highest tribune.I in the
land into the criminal court; as Daniel Webster was called in to assist in
bringing a criminal to justice, and William H. Seward to save a demented
negro from the punishment of a criminal. And while we say of the preparation for such cases, that it must be begun early, on broad and deep foundations,
we should add also, that mere rhetoric, in the lower and more common
acceptation of that term,-the power to control the voice, to use l'eadily
beautiful or ingenious figures of speec,h, and to accompany them with
appropriate gestures-constitutes but a small part of this preparation.
The most perfect address in point of oratorical accuracy may fall dead and
lifeless, or even be the subject of ridicule, in an important criminal cause,
when a plain and straight-forward argument, made upon full preparation, but
_ without attempt at display, will lead the minds of court and jury irresistibly to
the advocate's conclusions. (z) The caution above all others which the student
needs, when he feels himself gifted with fine oratorical ability, is to beware lest
he find himself relying upon it too exclusively, and neglecting that hard labor
which the less gifted would be compelled to perform, but the benefit of which
is always in proportion to the natural powers which it supplements. (a)
The innovations which have been made in criminal procedure in modern
times have been so great that a trial on a charge of crime now bears as little
resemblance to one in the time of the Stuarts, as the service in a Christian church
does to the heathen sacrifice to ido1s. We have at last, we think, so moulded
and shaped the criminal practice as to give the prisoner the full benefit of the
maxim that he shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty; which in
former times was but a mockery. But some of the new protections devised tor
innocence need to be carefully guarded to prevent their proving delusive

should know when to ttlake an end;" he should enlist heart and soul in the cause; and if public

opinion runs strong and fierce against his client, he must •' suffer himself to be mocked and

jeered of every one," rather than allow to be sacrificed the interests of one who has confided

reputation, liberty, perhaps life, to his protection. The calm future must be trusted to set

him right, and if he never quails before the clamor, the trust will not be disappointed.

(a) All of Sheridan's speeches, which so glow and sparkle now as if they were the spontane-

ous outbursts of genius, were in reality the results of the most persevering labor. The won*

derful power of extemporizing on the part of the elder Pitt, is said to have been the result of

severe training at Oxford, and after he.entered parliament, he was content to delay address-

ing the house until after he1 had thoroughly studied it, and understood the audience he was to

speak to.

Vol. I.-

-

(y) Works or Fisher Ames, vol. 2, p. 260.
Luther specifies among the requisites for a good preacher: "First, be should teach systematically; secondly1 be should have a ready wit; thirdly. he should be eloquent; fourthly,
he should have a goO<l voice; fifthly, a good memory; sixthly, he should know when to make
an end; seventhly. he should make sure of his doctrine; eighthly, he should venture and
engage body and blood, wealth and honor, in the word; ninthly, he should suffer himself to
be mocked and jeered of every one." Every one of these Is equally important in the criminal
lawyer, and some of them are indispensable . . He must "make sure of his doctrine:" "he
should know when to tttake an end;" he should enlirt heart .and aoul in the cause; and if public
opinion runs strong and fierce against bis client, be must ••suffer himself to be mocked and
jeered of every one," rather than allow to be sacrificed the interests of one who has confided
reputation, liberty, perhaps life, t-0 his protection. The calm future mu1t be trusted to set
him right, and if he ne11tt' quaill bifure llu clamor, the tru11t will not be disappointed.
(a) All of Sheridan's speeches, which so glow and sparkle now as if they were the iipontaneons outbursts of genius, were in reality the results of the most persevering labor. The won•
derful power of extemporizing on the part of the elder Pitt, is said to have been the result ot
severe training at Oxford, and after he.entered parliament, be . waa content to delay addressing the house until after he had thoroughly studied it; and understood the audience be wu to
(z)

•peak to.

Vol. I.-!.
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snares. It has been thought—for an instance—that the old practice under

which the accuser's story could be heard by the jury, but not that of the

prisoner, was unphilosophical and even barbarous, and in some of the states the

rule has been established by statute, that whoever possesses knowledge of the

facts shall be heard, and the jury shall judge of the reasonableness of his story,

and to what extent any interest he may have in the result ought to affect his

credibility. This innovation has been opposed on two grounds, 1. As dangerous

to public justice, inasmuch as every accused party will exonerate himself by

his evidence, however falsely; 2. As dangerous to the prisoner, inasmuch as

the permission to give evidence is equivalent to a command, because if he fails

to testify his conduct will be subject to the worst construction; and in this

way we in effect establish an inquisitorial trial, and deprive accused parties

of the benefit of the constitutional maxim that no man shall be compelled to

give evidence against himself, (b) To deal properly with such changes, the

lawyer ought to be familiar, not only with the old law, and with the reasons on

which it rested, but also, with the concurrent principles incidentally affected

by the change, that he may know how to administer the new law so as to

save to his client all the old rights while giving him the benefit of the new

privilege. Suppose—to illustrate again—the accused party takes the stand

and makes his statement, and then refuses to be cross-examined upon it; has

he a right to stop where he pleases, and to claim his constitutional right not to

he coerced to give evidence against himself? If not, Avhat remedy has the
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prosecution ? Shall the court strike out the evidence given, or punish the

party as it might an ordinary witness, for refusing to testify further ? Upon

such a question precedents might be of little service, but one man rising

to discuss it would be full of valuable thoughts and suggestions tending to

lead the court to a correct conclusion, when another who, however much he

might have read, had never troubled himself with thoughtful preparation for

such questions, might flounder through a long speech, the only effect of which

would be to make that darker which was dark enough before.

The criminal lawyer needs to be specially familiar with the rules of evidence.

In criminal cases, much more than in civil, it is important that he prevent

improper evidence being put in against his client The party defeated in a

civil suit, through an erroneous ruling of the judge, has generally his full

remedy when a new trial is awarded him; but a new trial to one who has

unjustly been subjected to the stigma of conviction of crime is far from being

a complete vindication; while to the prosecution after a wrongful acquittal,

though brought about by a mistake in law on the part of the judge, there is

generally no remedy. Fortunately there are good treatises on the rules of

evidence, and their main and leading principles can easily be made familiar.(e)

(6) This view has been pat forth in one of the Magazines by Mr. Francis Wharton. It is

believed, however, that, where the new law has been tried, the result has generally proved

satisfactory, and that many men, wrongfully or mistakenly accused, have been enabled under

these statutes to give to the jury such explanations as removed all suspicions, when, had their

mouths been closed, their condemnation would have been inevitable. There are unquestiona-

bly some difficulties in the case; but the rule of the common law, which permitted the accuser

to be heard but not the defendant, resulted sometimes, beyond any question, in the conviction

and punishment of the wrong party, because the party really guilty had been allowed, or been

able, to make the first complaint.

(c) There is, of course, much upon the subject of evidence in the treatises on criminal law,

snares. It has been thought-for an instance-that the old practice under
which the accuser's story could be heard by the jury, but not that of the
prisoner, was unphilosophical and even barbarous, and in B<?me of the states the
mle has been established by statute, that whoever possesses knowledge of the
facts shall be heard, and the jury shall judge of the reasonableness of his story,
and to what extent any interest he may have in the result ought to affect his
credibility. This innovation has been opposed on two grounds, 1. As dangerous
to public justice, inasmuch as every accused party will exonerate himself by
his evidence, however falsely; 2. As dangerous to the prisoner, inasmuch as
the permission to give evidence is equivalent to a command, because if he fails
to testify his conduct will be subject to the worst construction; and in this
way we in effect establish an inquisitorial trial, and deprive accused parties
of the benefit of the constitutional maxim that no man shall be compelled to
give evidence against himself. (b) To deal properly with such changes, the
lawyer ought to be familiar, not only with the old law, and with the reasons on
which it rested, but also, with the concurrent principles incidentally affected
by the change, that he may know how to administer the new law so as to
save to his client all the old rights while giving him the benefit of the new
privilege. Suppose-to illustrate again-the accused party takes the stand
and makes his statement, and then refuses to be cross-examined upon it; has
he a right to stop where he pleases, and to claim his constitutional right not to
be coerced to give evidence against himself? If not, what remedy has the
prosecution? Shall the court strike out the evidence given, or punish the
party as it might an ordinary witness, for refusing to testify further? Upon
such a question precedents might be of little service, but one man rising
to discuss it would be full of valuable thoughts and suggestions tending to
lead the court to a correct conclusion, when another who, however much he
might have read, had never troubled himself with thoughtful preparation for
such questions, might flounder through a long speech, the only effect of which
would be to make that darker which was dark enough before.
'rhe criminal lawyer needs to be specially familiar with the rules of evidence.
In criminal cases, much more than in civil, it is important that he prevent
improper evidence being put in against his client. The party defeated in a
civil suit, through an erroneous ruling of the judge, has generally his full
remedy when a new trial is awarded him; but a new trial to one who has
unjustly been subjected to the stigma of conviction of crime is far from being
a complete vindication; while to the prosecution after a wrongful acquittal,
though brought about by a mistake in law on the part of the judge, there is
generally no remedy. Fortunately thete are good treatises on the rules of
evidence, and their main and leading principles can easily be made familiar.(c)

and Roseau's Criminal Evidence is a useful work. Of the treatises on evidence, Grecnleaf is,

(b) This view baa been put forth in one of the magazines by Mr. Francis Wharton. It is
believed, however, that, where the new law h8!! been tried, the result bas generally proved
satisfactory, and that many men, wrongfully or mistakenly accused, have been enabled under
these statute11 to give to the jury such explanations as removed all auspicions, when, had their
mouths been closed, their condemnation would have been inevitable. There are unquestionably some difficultieR in the case; but the rule of the common law, which pt.onnitted the accuser
to be heard but not the defendant, resulted sometimes, be~·ond any question, in the conviction
and punishment of the wrong party, becau11e the party reallr guilty bad been allowed, or been
able, to make I.be 6rst complaint.
(c) There i~ of cour11e, much upon the subject of evidence in the treati11e1 on criminal law,
and Rol!C06's \.irimlnal Evidence is a useful work. Of the treatiaes on evidence, Greenleaf is,
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Equity law is a great stumbling block to many students, and there are not

wanting those who have supposed it might be legislated out of existence. But

although the division lines between law and equity have been broken down in

some states, so far as concerns procedure, yet the codes which abolish

distinctions of form do not do away with the principles, for the administration

of which the old forms were designed; and consequently works like Jeremy on

Equity, Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction, Adams's Doctrine of Equity, and

Story's Equity Jurisprudence, are as important and indispensable now, in all

the states, as they ever were. Whether or not, therefore, he expects to practice

in a state where the old forms are retained, the student must read equity, and

if he finds it prove unattractive, there is all the greater reason why he should

attack it with energy and perseverance. But if approached in that manner it

will not prove unattractive. On the contrary, the student will soon find him-

self reading, with admiration and pleasure, what at first appeared a confused

collection of arbitrary rules, as he perceives how admirably equity supplements

the law, and how peculiar is the adaptation of its remedies to the wrongs to be

prevented, or the evils to be redressed.

Nor are the works on common law pleading superseded by the new codes

which have been introduced in so many of the states, (d) A careful study of

those works is the very best preparation for the pleader, as well where a code is

in force as where the old common law forms are still adhered to. Any expecta-

tion which may have existed, that the code was to banish technicality and
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substitute such simplicity that any man of common understanding was to be

competent, without legal training, to present his case in due form of law, has

not been realized. After a trial of the code system for many years, its friends

must confess that there is something more than form in the old system of plead-

ing, and that the lawyer who has learned to state his case in logical manner,

after the rules laid down by Stephen and Gould, is better prepared to draw a

pleading under the code which will stand the test on demurrer, than the man

who, without that training, undertakes to tell his story to the court as he might

tell it to a neighbor, but who, never having accustomed himself to a strict and

logical presentation of the precise facts which constitute the legal cause of

action or the legal defense, is in danger of stating so much or so little, or of

presenting the facts so inaccurately, as to leave his rights in doubt on his own

showing. Let the common-law rules be mastered, and the work under the

code will prove easy and simple, and it will speedily be seen that no time has

been lost or labor wasted in coming to the new practice by the old road.

A large and increasing proportion of those who come to the bar in America

do so by way of the law schools. There is an advantage in that course in the

fact that an esprit du corps is cultivated among those who gather there, which

tends to a high code-of professional ethics, and at the same time to a more

careful study of the law as a science than is apt to be made in the law offices,

perhaps, most used, the first volume being especially valuable. Starkio's is also an excellent

work, and a new edition of the first volume, which gives the general principles, has recently

been issued in this country. Pbillips'a Evidence, including the notes by Cowen, Hill, and Ed-

wards, is much more full in its references to cases than either of the others, though not so

satisfactory for the student.

(d) An excellent discussion of the science of pleading not less practical than philosophical,

will be found in the introduction to the new edition of Stephen on Pleading by Prof. Samuel

Tyler.

Equity law is a great stumbling block to many students, and there are not
wanting those who have supposed it might be legislared out of existence. But
although the division lines between law and equity have been broken down in
some states, so far as concerns procedure, yet the codes which abolish
distinctions of form do not do away with the principles, for the administration
of which the old forms were designed; and consequently works like Jeremy on
Equity, Spence's Equitable Jurisdiction, Adams's Doctrine of Equity, and
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, are as important and indispensable now, in all
the stares, as they ever were. Whether or not, therefore, he expects to practice
in a stare where the old forms are retained, the student must read equity, and
if he finds it prove unattractive, there is all the greater reason why he should
attack it with energy and perseverance. But if approached in that manner it
will not prove unattractive. On the contrary, the student will soon find himself reading, with admiration and pleasure, what at first appeared a confused
collection of arbitrary rules, as he perceives how admirably equity supplements
the law, and how peculiar is the adaptation of its remedies to the wrongs to be
prevented, or the evils to be redressed.
Nor are the works on common law pleading superseded by the new codes
which have been introduced in so many of the states. (d) A careful study of
those works is the very best preparation for the pleader, as well where a code is
in force a.a where the old common law forms are still adhered to. Any expectation which may have exisred, that the code was to banish technicality and
substitute such simplicity that any man of common understanding was to be
comperent, without legal training, to present his case in due form of law, has
not been realized. After a trial of the code system for many years, its friends
must confess that there is something more than form in the old system of pleading, and that the lawyer who has learned to state his case in logical manner,
after the rules laid down by Stephen and Gould, is better prepared to draw a
pleading under the code which will stand the test on demurrer, than the man
who, without that training, undertakes t-0 tell his story to the court as he might
tell it to a neighbor, but who, never having accustomed himself to a strict and
logical presentation of the precise facts which constitute the legal cause of
action or the legal defense, is in danger of stating so much or so little, or of
presenting the facts so inaccurately, as to leave his rights in doubt on his own
showing. Let the common-law rules be mastered, and the work under the
code will prove easy and simple, and it will speedily be seen that no time has
been lost or labor wasted in coming to the new practice by the old road.
A large and increasing proportion of those who come to the bar in America
do so by way of the law schools. There is an advantage in that course in the
fact that an esprit du corps is cultivated among those who gather there, which
tends to a high code . of professional ethics, and at the same time to a more
careful study of the law as a science than is apt to be made in the law offices,
perhaps, most used, the first volume being especially valuable. Starkle'a is also an excellent
work, and a new edition of the first volume, which gives the general principles, has recently
been issued in this country. Phillip11's Evidence, including the notes by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, is much more full in its references to cases than either of the others, though not so
satisfactory for the student.
(d) An excellent discn~sion of the science of pleading;, not less practical than philosophical,
will be found in the introduction to the new edition of ::;tephen on Pleading by Prof. Samuel
Tyler.
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where each particular question is investigated with some reference to the com-

pensation which should follow. The advice of Gridley to John Adams was,

" to pursue the study of the law rather than the gain of it: pursue the gain

of it enough to keep out of the briers, but give your main attention to the

study of it"(e) Fisher Ames said of Hamilton: "As a lawyer, his comprehen-

sive genius reached the principles of his profession; he compassed its extent,

he fathomed its profound, perhaps even more familiarly and easily than the

ordinary, rules of its practice. With most men law is a trade; with him it

was a science." (/) The same was true also of Pinkney and of Choate; the

two greatest advocates perhaps that America has yet known. The industry

of Choate was wonderful, but it was directed, not to the acquisition of money,

but to the mastery of the law; and of Pinkney it was said that his speeches

always " smelled of the lamp," but, nevertheless, they were a perpetual delight

to those who heard them. The learned man cannot well be dull when speak-

ing of the science he has mastered. All men, said Socrates, are eloquent in

that which they understand. Another advantage derived from the law

schools is, that students are enabled to form themselves into clubs for the

discussion of moot cases. Such clubs, well managed, afford the best possible

school for the cultivation of forensic eloquence. Some experience in extem-

pore speaking every young man ought to have before coming to the bar, and

if he begins his practice without the discipline it would give, he cannot be

certain that timidity and embarrassment will not overcome him at the outset
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of his career. Few men are Erskines and Patrick Henrys, gifted with powers

which make their first essay a triumph; the first efforts are, almost necessarily,

mortifying failures, and unless they are made in these little societies, and the

difficulties mastered before the public become the audience, a man must have

great native strength of purpose and power to endure scoffing and ridicule, or

shame and mortification may draw their veil around him, and shut off forever

his ambitious hopes and bright visions of professional eminence. Now and

then a Demosthenes or a Curran will come, who will brave the ridicule and

endure the mortification until repeated efforts have enabled him to conquer

his natural defects and natural timidity; but every young man is not enabled

to feel with the same confidence that they did, " it is in me, and it shall come

out;" and one mortifying failure, not in the presence of a select company of

friends, but before a public audience, a part of which is adversary in feeling,

and includes rivals interested to make the most of the embarrassment, is

sometimes sufficient to destroy the hopes of a life. Self-confidence the advo-

cate must acquire; and, in order that he may possess it, he must first have the

necessary knowledge, and secondly, he must have tried his powers until he is

certain of them.

There is also an advantage in these societies, in that they enable their mem-

bers to practice in the preparation of pleadings. The discussion of moot cases

ought to be preceded by as careful an issue as would be formed in an actual

suit at law; and the benefit of this discipline is so great that it should never be

(«) Works of John Adams. It. 46. "Bis advice," says Mr. Adams, "made so deep an

impression on my mind, that I believe no lawyer in America ever did so much business as I did

afterward, in the seventeen years that I passed in the practice at the bar for so little profit."

Pecuniary profit he means; for this study and practice were the foundation of his immortality

(/) Works of Fisher Am«s, vol. 2. page 260.

where each particular question is investigated with some reference to the compensation which should follow. The advice of Gridley to John .Adami! w~
"to pursue the study of the law rather than the gain of it: pursue the gain
of it enough to keep out of the briers, but give your main attention to the
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he fathomed its profound, perhaps even more familiarly and easily than the
ordinary, rules of its practice. With most men law ia a trade; with him it
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certain of them.
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suit at law; and the benefit of this discipline is so great that it should never be
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neglected. It accustoms one to a critical and accurate use of language; and it

gives one an insight into the application of the rules of pleading not easily

acquired except by practice. The same care which one would expend in the

preparation of the brief, ought to be employed on this preliminary proceeding;

the purpose being the same in both cases—to give the mind a needful discipline.

The briefs draw up for the argument ought to receive an equally conscientious

attention. They ought to be logical and accurate, neat and lawyer-like. It is

impossible to make a logical argument based upon a brief in which the points

are stated with a slovenly want of precision, and the authorities arranged with-

out logical order. Slovenly habits, whether pertaining to person, to study or

to practice, are most dangerous in student life, because they tend to grow

upon one until they obtain the mastery. In the argument of these cases, pre-

cision of language, especially in the statement of legal definitions and princi-

ples, is of far more importance than beautiful figures of speech, and is to be

cultivated rather than a showy style. A legal point well-stated is half argued.

These societies are useful, also, as inducing a taste for investigations in fields a

little aside from technical law, and yet having an important purpose in con-

nection with its study. Political and international questions enlarge the mind

and open the understanding of the lawyer, and fit him for the discussion of

the great questions with which it will be his ambition afterward to become

connected. What a field was opened before the student in the new questions

of law and government growing out of the recent civil war! What questions
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in domestic politics, as well as in international law, still remain to be discussed,

sifted, tested and settled! We do not mean the questions of party politics,

which are so often questions of low political strategy; for these, to the young

lawyer, are a delusion and a snare, when he allows his mind to be possessed by

them, and his taste to be perverted to a longing for party positions and honors.

John Adams has well said that party is a tyrant. "At the bar * * is the

scene of independence. Integrity and skill at the bar are better supporters

of independence than any fortune, talents or eloquence elsewhere. A inan

of genius, talents, eloquence, integrity and judgment, at the bar, is the most

independent man in society. Presidents, governors, senators, judges, have not

so much honest liberty; but it ought always to be regulated by prudence, and

never abused." (g) High attainments are essential to this independence; and

political positions are never of real honor, and always contemptible when,

instead of being an award to eminent fitness, they are acquired by self-seeking,

by becoming a party hack, and by imbibing and displaying all the party

bigotry and party animosities of the day. This bigotry and these animosities

are not generally strong in such societies; and, with proper views of the true

province and value of parties, they will be frowned upon and discouraged, and

the feelings kept under control, so that questions can be discussed upon their

merits, instead of being viewed from the stand-point of prejudice. These

societies, also, become associations of friends, who, if chosen with prudence,

and with due regard to their acquirements, habits and tastes, are able to be

of service to each other in many ways, besides the drill they give in the contact

of mind with mind in these set discussions. Mr. Warren, in his Law Studies,

(A) has emphasized the importance to a student of being prudent in the selec-

(g) Works of John Adams, X, 21.

(h) A new edition of this work, adapted to the needs of the law student in America, has

neglected. It accustoms one to a critical and accurate use of language; and it
gives one an insight into the application of the rules of pleading not easily
acquired except by practice. The same care which one would expend in the
preparation of the brief, ought to be employed on this preliminary proceeding;
the purpose being the same in both cases-to give the mind a needful discipline.
The briefs draw up for the argument ought to receive an equally conscientious
attention. They ought to be logical and accurate, neat and lawyer-like. It is
impossible to make a logical ar~ment based upon a brief in which the points
are stated with a slovenly want of precision, and the authorities arranged without logical order. Slovenly habits, whether pertaining to person, to study or
to practice, are most dangerous in student life, because they tend to grow
upon one until they obtain the mastery. In the argument of these cases, precision of language, especially in the statement of legal definitions and principles, is of far more importance than beautiful figures of speech, and is to be
cultivat.ed rather than a showy style. A legal point well-stated is half argued.
These societies are useful, also, as inducing a taste for investigations in fields a
little aside from technical law, and yet having an important purpose in connection with its study. Political and international questions enlarge the mind
and open the understanding of the lawyer, and fit him for the discussion of
the great questions with which it will be his ambition afterward to become
connect.eel. What a field was opened before the student in the new questions
of law and government growing out of the recent civil war I What questions
in domestic politics, as well as in international law, still remain to be discussed,
sifted, teared and settled ! We do not mean the questions of party politics,
which are so often questions of low political strategy; for these, to the young
lawyer, are a delusion and a snare, when he allows his mind to be possessed by
them, and bis ta.are to be perverted to a longing for party positions and honors.
John Adams has well said that party is a tyrant. "At the bar • • i~ the
scene of independence. Integrity and skill at the bar are better suppoiters
of independence than any fortune, talents or eloquence elsewhere. A inan
of genius, talents, eloquence, integrity and judgment, at the bar, is the most
independent man in society. Presidents, governors, senators, judges, have not
so much honest liberty; but it ought always to be regulated by prudence, and
never abused." (g) High attainments are essintial to this independence; and
political positions a.re never of real honor, and always contemptible when,
inst.ead of being an award to eminent fitneBS, they are acquired by self-seeking,
by becoming a party ha.ck, and by imbibing and displaying all the party
bigotry and party animosities of the day. This bigotry and these animosities
are not generally strong in such societies; and, with proper views of the true
province and value of parties, they will be frowned upon and discouraged, and
the feelings kept under control, so that questions can be discussed upon their
merits, instead of being viewed from the stand-point of prejudice. These
societies, also, become associations of friends, who, if chosen with prudence,
and with due regard to their acquirements, habits and tastes, are able to be
of service to each other in many ways, besides the drill they give in the contact
of mind with mind in these set discussions. Mr. Warren, in his Law Studies,
(h) has emphasized the importance f;o a student of being pntdent in the seleo(g) Works of John Adams, X, 21.
(h) A new edition of this work, adapted to the needa of the law student in America, has
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tion of his associates, and quotes Roger North, that " a student of the law hath

more than ordinary reason to be curious in his conversation, and to get such

as are of his own pretension, that is, to study and improvement; and I will be

bold to say, that they shall improve one another by discourse as much as all

their other study without it could improve them" This may be thought

somewhat extravagant; but the statement could be easily fortified by the

opinions of many other men of eminence, if space would admit, and if exam-

ples were deemed necessary to impress upon the mind the importance of

suitable and intelligent associates. But, whatever may be his associations, or

wherever he may pursue his studies—whether in the law school or in the

office of the practitioner—the great fact to be borne in mind by the student is,

that he is to become a lawyer, if at all, not so much by committing to memory

the technical terms and rules of the science, as by mastering its philosophy,

whereby alone he can fit himself to give its principles practical application.

It has not been our purpose in these preliminary pages to mark out a full

course of law reading, or to prescribe a list of law books which should or

should not be read by the student. There are difficulties in doing so which

seem to render the attempt, in a work of this character, undesirable. New

treatises upon different branches of the law are being constantly published, and

the latest, if prepared with equal ability, is generally the best, because it gives

us the result of the latest cases, and the changes in the common law which

new inventions and new modes of transacting business are constantly introduc-
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ing. A list of books to be read soon becomes imperfect, and needs revision.

Moreover, a full course of law reading is one which cannot be completed in

the time usually taken by the student before admission to the bar, and to

present him with such a course without indicating which portion he must read

while a student, and which he may postpone till he comes to the bar, is to

render him but little assistance. Every student is supposed to have some

preceptor who is competent to give the proper information regarding text-

books, and upon whose advice he can depend in their selection. In these

prefatory remarks, our aim has been only, first, to impress upon the mind of

the young gentleman about to enter this noble but very laborious profession,

the importance of thoroughly mastering the rudiments of the law before he

undertakes to assist in its administration, and second, to give him a few hints

that shall induce him to employ properly his reason and reflection, and not

make useless expenditure of time and energies in his pursuit of legal attain-

ments. (/)

Any advice which prescribes a course of labor for students is imperfect if it

recently been published under the editorship of I. G. Thompson, Esq. In the same connection,

attention is called to the First Book of the Law, by Mr. Bishop, and to lectures on the study

of the law, recently published by Prof. Washburn.

(i) Mr. Jefferson marked out a course of reading for students of the law, which is worthy

of attention, as the result of the reflections of a great mind, and because, also, it was the course

followed by his two distinguished friends, Madison and Monroe. Having laid the proper

groundwork—in which he included a knowledge of mathematics and the natural sciences—he

says to the student: " You may enter regularly on the study of the law, taking with it such

of the kindred sciences as will contribute to eminence in its attainment. The principal of these

tion of bis associates, and quotes Roger North, that" a student of the law hath
more than ordinary reason to be curious in his conversation, and t.o get such
as are of his own pretension, that is, to study and improvement; and I will be
bold to say, that tliey sltall improve one another by discourse as muck as all
tlieir other study without it could improve them." This may be thought
somewhat extravagant; but the statement could be easily fortified by the
opinions of many other men of eminence, if space would admit, and if examples were deemed necessary to impress upon the ~ind the importance of
suitable and intelligent associates. But, whatever may be his associations, or
wherever he may pursue his studies-whether in the law school or in the
office of the practitioner-the great fact t.o be borne in mind by the student is,
that he is to become a lawyer, if at all, not so much by committing to memory
the technical terms and rules of the science, as by mastering its philosophy,
whereby alone he can fit himself to give its principles practical application.
It has not been our purpose in these preliminary pages to mark out a full
course of law reading, or t.o prescribe a list of law books which should or
should not be read by the student. There are difficulties in doing so which
seem t.o render the attempt, in a work of this character, undesirable. New
treatises upon different branches of the law are being constantly published, and
the latest, if prepared with equal ability, is generally the best, because it gives
us the result of the latest cases, and the changes in the common law which
new inventions and new modes of transacting business are constantly introducing. A list of books to be read soon becomes imperfect, and needs revision.
Moreover, a full course of law reading is one which cannot be completed in
the time usually taken by the student before admission to the bar, and to
present him with such a course without indicating which portion he must read
while a student, and which he may postpone till he comes to the bar, is to
render him but little assistance. Every student is supposed to have some
preceptor who is competent to give the proper information regarding textbooks, and upon whose advice he can depend in their selecti'on. In these
prefatory remarks, our aim has been only, first, to impress upon the mind of
the young gentleman about to enter this noble but very laborious profession,
the importance of thoroughly mastering the rudiments of the law before he
undertakes to assist in its administration, and second, to give him a fow hints
that shall induce him to employ properly his reason and reflection, and not
make useless expenditure of time and energies in his pursuit of legal attainments. (i)
Any advice which prescribes a. course of labor for students is imperfect if it

are physics, ethics, religion, natural law. belle lettres, criticism, rhetoric and oratory. The

carrying on several studies at a time is attended with advantage. Variety relieves the mind as

well as the eye, palled with too long attention to a single object, but with both, transitions

from one object to another may be so frequent and transitory as to leave no impression. The

mean is therefore to be steered, and a competent space of time allotted to each branch of study.

recently been published under the editorship of I. G. Thompson, Esq. In the same connection,
attention is called to the First Book of the Law, by Mr. Bishop, and to lectures on the atudy
of the law, recently publiRhed by Prof. Washburn.
(i) Mr. Jefferson marked out a course of reading for students of the law, which is worthy
of attention, u tbe result of th!! reflections ofa great mind. and because, also, it was the course
followed by his two distingub1hed friends, Madison and Monroe. Having laid the proper
groundwork-in which he Included a knowledge of mathematic~ and the natural ~ciences-he
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fails to inculcate the importance of seasonable rest. The rest is equally need-

ful with the labor, and it is not uncommon to find it more difficult to convince

the person requiring it of his need. It is a law of nature not less than of

revelation that for a seventh part of the time the ordinary avocations of life

shall be suspended, and no man is more certain to be visited with the penalties

for a breach of this law than he who is engaged in intellectual pursuits. Every

man is held in " the manacles of this all-binding law." If he persists in his

labors for seven days in the week instead of taking the commanded rest, he is

doubly punished; first in the weariness and loss of physical and intellectual

strength and vigor which must follow; and second, in discovering at length

that the seven days labor are not so productive as the six would have been

with the proper rest. But constant attention for six days in the week to a

single pursuit will soon prove exhausting. We have seen that Mr. Jefferson

advised that only four hours a day should be given to technical law, and that

the remaining hours should be devoted to other studies calculated to improve

and strengthen the understanding. Mr. Choate recommended students to

give six hours each day to the law; four to reading, and two to thought and

reflection. It is easy to injure the health by incessant application, and easier

still to keep the mind in that state of jaded and listless indifference in which

half the labor of study will be expended in fixing the attention. History and

belle lettres learning, and the natural and abstract sciences are an agreeable

and healthful relief from the continuous study and contemplation of the
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principles, proceedings and forms of law, and they become a relaxation and an

enjoyment, at the same time that their pursuit is storing the mind with

abundant and available resources for the great occasions which now and then

will test to the full the advocate's capacity. The best industry is that which

divides most judiciously the time to be appropriated, so that the labor in each

portion will be performed with alacrity and ardor, and without any waste of

energy. But even a variety of studies should not occupy the attention beyond

reason. Physical exercise and physical and mental rest must be provided.

if one would have either physical or mental strength. A due allowance for

sleep, a due attention to social intercourse and current intelligence, are as

needful to round out and complete the perfect lawyer as the patient labor

which he must devote to the sages of his profession.

And in all his studies the law student must not forget that he is fitting

himself to be a minister of justice; and that he owes it to himself, to those

who shall be his clients, to the courts he shall practice in, and to society at

large, that he cultivate carefully his moral nature to fit it for the high and

responsible trust he is to assume. The temptations of dishonest gain and the

allurements of dissipation are all the time leading to shame and ruin, from the

Again, a great inequality ts observable in the vigor of the mind at different periods of the day.

Its powers at these periods should therefore be attended to, in marshaling the business of tho

day." He therefore recommended that the student appropriate his time each day as follows:

Till eight o'clock to the natural sciences, ethics, religion and natural law.

From eight to twelve to technical law.

From twelve to one to government, general politics, and political economy.

In the afternoon to history.

From dark to bed time to belle lettres, criticism, rhetoric and oratory. [Randall's Life of

Jefferson, I, 63.]

An admirable coarse in its general outlines, though the books he recommends are in great

fuila to inculcate the importance of seasonable rest. The rest is equally needful with the labor, and it is not uncommon to find it morn difficult to convince
the person requiring it of his need. It is a law of nature not less than of
revelation that for a seventh part of the time the ordinary avocations of life
shall be suspended, and no man is more certain to be visited with the penalties
for a breach of this law than he who is engaged in intellectual pursuits. Every
man is held in "the manacles of this all-binding law." If he persists in his
labors for seven days in the week instead of taking the commanded rest, he is
doubly punished; first in the weariness and loss of physical and intellectual
strength and vigor which must follow; and second, in discovering at length
that the seven days labor are not so productive as the six would have been
with the proper rest. But constant attention for six days in the week to a
single pursuit will soon prove exhausting. We have seen that Mr. Jefferson
advised that only four hours a day should be given to technical law, and that
the remaining hours should be devoted to other studies calculated to improve
and strengthen the understanding. Mr. Choate recommended students to
give six hours each day to the law; four to reading, and two to thought and
reflection. It is easy to injure the health by incessant application, and easier
still to keep the mind in that state of jaded and listless indifference in which
half the labor of study will be expended in fixing the attention. History and
belle lettres learning, and the natural and abstract sciences are an agreeable
and healthful relief from the continuous study and contemplation of the
principles, proceedings and forms of law, and they become a relaxation and an
enjoyment, at the same time that their pursuit is storing the mind with
abundant and available resources for the great occasions which now and then
will test to the full the advocate's capacity. The best industry is that which
divides most judiciously the time to be appropriated, so that the labor in each
portion will be performed with alacrity and ardor, and without any waste of
energy. But even a variety of studies should not occupy the attention beyond
reason. Physical exercise and physical and mental rest must be provided.
if one would have either physical or mental strength. A due allowance for
sleep, a due attention to social intercourse and current intelligence, are as
needful to round out and complete the perfect lawyer as the patient labor
which he must devote to the sages of his profession.
And in all his studies the law student must not forget that he is fitting
himself to be a minister of justice ; and that he owes it to himself, to those
who shall be his clients, to the courts he shall practice in, and to society at
large, that he cultivate carefully his moral nature to fit it for the high and
l"eilponsible trust he is to assume. The temptations of dishonest gain and the
allurements of dissipation are all the time leading to shame and ruin, from the

part superseded now by later publications.

Again, a great Inequality ls obaervable in the vigor of the mind at dift'erent periods of the dny.
lt.1!1 powers at theBe periods should therefore be attended to, in marBhaling the buBiness of tho

day." He therefore recommended that the studeut appropriate his time each day as follows:
Till eight o'clock to the natural sciences, ethics, religion and natural law.
From eight to twelve to teohnlcal law.
From twelve to one to government, general politics, and political economy.
In the aflernoon to history.
From dark to bed time to belle lettrea, criticism, rhetoric and oratory. [Randall's Life ot
Jefferson, I, 68.]
An admirable course In Its general outlines, though the book.a be recommends are in great
part supel'88ded now by later publications.
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ranks of our profession, a long and melancholy train of men once hopeful,

perhaps gifted; but the true lawyer is pure in life, courteous to his associates,

faithful to his clients, just to all; and the student must keep this true ideal

before him, observe temperance, be master of his actions, and seek in all things

the approval of his own conscience, if he would attain the highest possible

benefit from the STUDY OF THE LAW.

The main purpose in giving to the public a new edition of the Commentaries

of Blackstone, was to present the changes in the law which had taken place

ranks of our profession, a long and melancholy train of men once hoperni
perhaps gifted; but the true lawyer is pure in life, courteous to hie associates,
faithful to his client.a, just to all; and the student must keep this true ideal
before him, observe temperance, be master of his actions, and seek in all things
the approval of his own conscience, if he would attain the highest po~sible
benefit from the STUDY OP THE LAW.

since the last preceding edition appeared, that the reader, while informing

himself concerning the law of England of a century since, might not be mis-

led in respect to its present condition. With this object before him, while

avoiding the detail which might be useful to the English practitioner, but

which would merely cumber the pages for American use, the editor has

sought to indicate the statutory changes sufficiently to give a general idea

of the advancement made in the English law since our commentator's time,

and also to enable the American student to compare the law of his own

country with the system from which it was derived, as modified by the

experience of another land enjoying free institutions under circumstances and

with a state of society considerably differing from our own.

How far it was desirable to preserve the notes to the previous English

editions, or to add thereto, was a question not easy of proper solution. The

editor is fully aware that in some previous editions the proper province of an
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editor was exceeded, and that the additions made, instead of being suitable

notes to the text, were in the nature of digests of the law upon very many

of the questions which the text had discussed or alluded to. This was

especially the case with the edition of that voluminous and industrious writer,

Mr. Chitty, some of whose notes are a mine of information, almost making the

work a library in itself, and which, nevertheless, were not more peculiarly

appropriate to these Commentaries than they would have been to any other

legal treatise which made general reference to the same subject-matter. Some

of these notes, moreover, have wholly, or in part, become obsolete, and others

related to branches of the law, or to questions, with which the lawyer in

America has no occasion to deal.

The editor was of opinion, however, that there was too much in Mr. Chitty's

annotations of substantial and permanent value to warrant their being entirely

discarded, and that while the student, or the gentleman who reads only for

general or political information, may have little occasion to employ himself

with them, the practicing lawyer, who shall make use of the work, will be

gratified to find so much retained that is convenient and useful in his practice.

But whatever has become obsolete, whatever, like most of the notes upon the

law of tithes and of copyholds, is unimportant in America, has been cut away

with unsparing hand, that time and attention might not be uselessly occupied

in exploring it The quantity of matter thus rejected was very large, and

those who have occasion to make much use of the work will be thankful to

get rid of it.

What is new -in this edition has been added in the same spirit that has

governed the selections from the English notes. As students make more use

The main purpose in giving to the public a new edition of the Commentaries
of Blackstone, was to present the changes in the law which bed taken place
since the last preceding edition appeared, that the reeder, while informing
himself concerning the law of England of a century since, might not be misled in respect to its present condition. With this object before him, while
avoiding the detail which might be useful to the English practitioner, but
which would merely cumber the pages for American use, the editor has
sought to indicate the statutory changes sufficiently to give a general idea
of the advancement made in the English law since our commentator's time,
and &180 to enable the American student to compare the law of his own
country with the system from which it was derived, a.a modified by the
experience of another land enjoying free institutions under circumstances &nd
with a state of society considerably differing from our own.
How far it was desirable to preserve the notes to the previous English
editions, or to add thereto, was a question not easy of proper solution. The
editor is fully aware that in some previous editions the proper province of an
editor was exceeded, and that the additions me.de, instead of b1ting suitable
notes to the text, were in the nature of digests of the law upon very many
of the questions which the text bed discussed or alluded to. This was
especially the case with the edition of that voluminous and industrious writer,
Mr. Chitty, some of whose notes are a mine of information, almost making the
work a library in itself, and which, nevertheless, were not more peculiarly
appropriate to these Commentaries than they would have been to any other
legal treatise which made general reference to the same subject-matter. Some
of these notes, moreover, have wholly, or in part, become obsolete, and others
related to branches of the law, or to questions, with which the lawyer in
America has no occasion to deal
The editor was of opinion, however, that there was too much in Mr. Chitty's
annotations of substantial and permanent Vff.lue to warrant their being entirely
discarded, and that while the student, or the gentleman who reads only for
general or political information, may have little occasion to employ himself
with them, the practicing lawyer, who shall make use of the work, will be
gratified to find so much retained that is convenient and useful in his practice.
But whatever has become obsolete, whatever, like most of the notes upon the
law of tithes ancl of copyholds, is unimportant in America, has been cut away
with unsparing hand, that time and attention might not be uselessly occupied
in exploring it. The quantity of matter thns reject~d was very large, and
those who have occasion to make much use of the work will be thankful to
get rid of it.
What is new ·in this edition has been added in the same spirit that has
governed the selections frolll the English notes. As students make more use
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of the work than practicing lawyers, their information and benefit have been

kept mainly in view, but references have been made to the judicial decisions

on many practical questions, and it is hoped they will be found not without

their convenience to the profession generally.

The English notes which have been retained are inclosed in brackets to

distinguish them from the new additions. The names of their authors are

given in some cases where individual opinions are expressed, but generally it

has not been thought important to distinguish their sources, and in some

cases where editors have combined with their own the labors of their

predecessors, it would have been difficult to do so.

The analysis given of the contents is a considerable enlargement of that

of Baron Field, and it is believed that, if judiciously used, it will answer the

purpose for interrogating students better than the lists of questions sometimes

given, which require the memory to be burdened equally with matter

important and unimportant.

The table of abbreviations embraces the legal authorities, and also other

books which the reader might possibly desire to refer to» and which are not

sufficiently described or indicated by the context

THOMAS M. COOLEY.

ANK ABBOR, Sept., 1870.

A new edition of this work having become necessary, the editor has made

some changes and additions, but not such as will call for special notice here.
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They consist in the main of references to new cases, though some new notes

of the work than practicing lawyers, their information and benefit liave been
kept mainly in view, but references have been made to the judicinl decis10ns
on many practical questions, and it is hoped they will be found not without
their convenience to the profession generally.
The English not~s which have been retained are inclose<l in brackets to
distinguish them from the new additions. The names of their authors are
given in some cases where individual opinions are expressed, but generally it
ha.a not been thought important to distinguish their 80Urces, and in some
cases where editors have combined with their own the labors of their
predecessors, it would have been difficult to do so.
The analysis given of the contents is a considerable enlargement of that
of Baron Field, and it is believed that, if judiciously nsed, it will answer the
purpose for interrogating students better than the list~ of questions sometimes
given, which require the memory to be burdened equally with matter
important and unimportant.
The table of abbreviations embraces the legal authorities, and also other
books which the reader might possibly desire to refer to,. and which are not
sufficiently described or indicated by the context.

have been added which may prove of practical value.

T. M. COOLEY.

ABBOH, Jan., 1872.

Vol. I.—5.

ANN ARBOR,

&pt., 187().

THOMAS M. COOLEY.

A new edition of this work having become necessary, the editor has made.
some changes and additions, but not such as will call for special notice here.
They consist in the ma.in of references to. new cases, though some new notes
have been added which may prove of pnwtical value.

ANN ARBOR, Jan .• 1872.
Vol, I.-5.
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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE following sheets contain the substance of a course of lectures on the

Laws of England, which were read by the author in the university of OXFORD.

His original plan took its rise in the year 1753; and, notwithstanding the

novelty of such an attempt in this age and country, and the prejudices usually

conceived against any innovations in the established mode of education, he had.

AUTHOR'S PREF ACE.

the satisfaction to find, and he acknowledges it with a mixture of pride and

gratitude, that his endeavours were encouraged and patronised by those, both

in the university and out of it. whose good opinion and esteem he was

principally desirous to obtain.

The death of Mr. VINEK in 1756, and his ample benefaction to the uni-

versity for promoting the study of the law, produced about two years after-

wards a regular and public establishment of what the author had privately

undertaken. The knowledge of our laws and constitution was adopted as a

liberal science by general academical authority; competent endowments were

decreed for the support of a lecturer, and the perpetual encouragement of

students; and the compiler of the ensuing Commentaries had the honor to be

elected the first Vinerian professor.

In this situation he was led, both by duty and inclination, to investigate the

elements of the law, and the grounds of our civil polity, with greater assiduity

and attention than many have thought it necessary to do. And yet all, who

of late years have attended the public administration of justice, must be

sensible that a masterly acquaintance with the general spirit of laws and
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principles of universal jurisprudence, combined with an accurate knowledge

of our own municipal constitutions, their original, reason, and history, hath

given a beauty and energy to many modern judicial decisions, with which our

ancestors were wholly unacquainted. If, in the pursuit of these inquiries, the

author hath been able to rectify any errors which either himself or others

may have heretofore imbibed, his pains will be sufficiently answered: and if in

some points he is still mistaken, the candid and judicious reader will make due

allowances for the difficulties of a search so new, so extensive, and so laborious.

Nov 2 1765.

POSTSCRIPT.

XOTWITHSTAKDIHO the diffidence expressed in the foregoing Preface, no sooner was the work

completed, but many of its positions were vehemently attacked by zealots of all (even opposite)

denominations, religious as well as civil; by some with a greater, by others with a less degree

of acrimony. To such of these animadverters as have fallen within the author's notice (for he

doubts not but some have escaped it), he owes at least this obligation: that they have

occasioned him from time to time to revise his work, in respect to the particulars objected to;

to retract or expunge from it what appeared to be really erroneous; to amend or supply it when

inaccurate or defective; to illustrate and explain it when obscure. But, where be thought

the objections ill-founded, he hath left and shall leave the book to defend itself: being fully

of opinion, that, if his principles be false and his doctrines unwarrantable, no apology from

himself can make them right; if founded in truth and rectitude, no censure from others can

make them wrong.

THE following sheets contain the subst.ance of a course of lectures on the
Laws of England, which were read by the author in the university of OXFORD.
His original plan took its rise in the year 1753; and, notwithstanding the
novelty of such an attempt in this age and country, and the prejudices usually
conceived against any inno,·ations in the established mode of education, he had
the satisfaction to find, and he acknowledges it with a mixture of pride and
gratitude, that his endearnurs were encouruge<l and patronised by those, both
in the university and out of it, whose good opinion and esteem he was
principally desirous to obtain.
The death of Mr. VINER in 1756, and his ample benefaction to the university for promoting the study of the law, produced about two years afterwards a regular and public establishment of what the author had privately
undertaken. The knowledge of our laws and constitution was adopted as a
liberal science by general academical authority; competent endowments were
decreed for the support of a lecturer, and the perpetual encouragement of
student.a; and the compiler of the ensuing Commentaries had the honor to be
elected the first Vinerian professor.
In this situation he was led, both by duty and inclination, to investigate the
elements of the law, and the grounds of our civil polity, with greater assiduity
and attention than many have thought it necessary to do. And yet all, who
of late years have attended the public administration of justice, must be
sensible that a masterly acquaintance with the general spirit of laws and
principles of universal jurisprudence, combined with an accurate knowledge .
of our own municipal constitutions, their original, reason, and history, hath
given a beauty and energy to many modern judicial decisions, with which our
ancestors were wholly unacquainted. If, in the pursuit of these inquiries, the
author hath been able to rectify any errors which either himself or others
may have heretofore imbibed, his pains will be sufficiently answered: and if in
some points he is still mistaken, the candid and judicious reader will make due
allowances for the difficulties of a search so new, so extensive, and so laborious.
Nov 2 1765.

PO ST SCRIPT.
NOTWITRSTAlfJ>IlfO the diffidence exprellled in the foregoing Preface, no sooner wu the work
eompleted, but many of it11 positions were vehemently attacked by zealots of nil (even opposite)
denominations, religious a11 well a11 civil; by some with a greater, by others with a less degree
of acrimony. To such of these animad verteni 311 have fallen within the author's notice (for he
doubts not but some have escaped It), he owes at least this obligation: that they have
occasioned him from time to time to revise his work. in respect to the particulars objected to;
to retract or expunge from It what appeared to be really erroneous; to amend or supply it when
inaccurate or defective; to Illustrate and explain it when obscure. But, where he thought
the objections lll·founded, he hath lef\ and shall leave the book to defend itself: being fully
of opinion, that, If his principles be false and his doctrlnt>B unwarrantable, no apology from
himself can make them right; if founded in truth and rectitude, no ceu11ure from others C&ll
make them wrong.
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10. royal Hsh, which are whnle and sturgeon, ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 290
11. shipwrecks and things jetsam, flotsam and ligan, •••••••••• , ••••• 291-294
12. mines of silver and gold,... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 295
13. treasure trove,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 295
14. waifs, .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 297
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which in America vest in the several states, ••••••••••••••••••••• 302n
18. custody of idiots and lunatics, •••••••••••••••••••••••• , • • • • • • • • • • • 303
an idiot one without glimmering of reason,........... • • • • • • • • • • • • 304
a lunatic one who hath lost the use of reason,.,........ • • • • • • • • • • 304
the extraordinary revenue consists in aids, subsidies and supplies granted by
the commons,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 306
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the annual are, I. the land tax, which has superseded former modes of
rating property, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 309-314
314
2. the malt tax, .•••••••••••••••
the perpetual are duties on imp<>rts and exports, •••• , ••••••••••••••••••••• 314
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expenses defrayed by civil list are all that relate to government, 332

the king's present prerogative compared to former times, 334-337
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CHAPTER IX. ««•

Or SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES, 338-365

1. the sheriff, who does the king's business in each county, 339

receives his appointment from the crown 340n

is judge and conservator of the peace 343

executes judicial process, 344

is the king's bailiff, „ 344

appoints under-sheriffs and bailiffs, . 345

is responsible for their misconduct, 345

jailors are his servants, 346

2. coroners, the lord chief justice being principal, 347

chosen by the freeholders of the county, ..... 347

hold inquests in case of sudden death, 348

inquire concerning shipwrecks and treasure trove, 348

serve process when sheriff interested, &c., 349

3. justices of the peace,.,, 349

are commissioned by the king, 351

some are to be of the quorum, 351

their qualifications., 252

the office, how determined, 353

an; conservators of the peace, 353

may hear and determine offenses, 354
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their liability to an action, 354n

4. constables, are officers-of hundreds and townships, 355

of two classes: 1. high; 2. petty 355

appointed to preserve the peace, keep watch, and ward and arrest offenders,.. 356

6. surveyors of highways, are officers appointed annually to keep highways in

repair, and remove annoyances therefrom 357

6. overseers of the poor, 359-365

how the poor formerly aided, 359

overseers now appointed annually, 360

their duties to assist-the poor and find employment for those who can work,. 361

the law of settlements, 362

CHAPTER X.

OP THE PEOPLE, WHETHER ALIENS, DR.VIZENS OR NATIVES, 366-376

natural born subjects are those born within the ligeance 366

aliens are those born out of it, 366

allegiance binds the subject 'to the king in return for protection, 366

in natives this is natural and perpetual 369

in aliens it is local, and continues only white they are within the king's

dominion 370

the rights of natives also natural and perpetual, 371

of aliens local and temporary 371

their right to purchase, hold and dispose of property is qualified, 371

children of English subjects born abroad are natural born subjects, 373

also children of aliens born within the realm, 373

aliens may be denizens by letters patent 374

may also be naturalized,. 374

naturalized citizens have rights of native born, except of holding offices,

etc., 374

former disabilities of the Jews' now removed 375

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE CLERGT ,, 376-396

the whole people divided into clergy and laity 376

the clergy comprehend all persops in holy orders and ecclesiastical offices, 376

are exempted from serving on juries or holding temporal offices, 377

and from arrests during divine service 377

formerly had benefit of clergy when convicted of crime, 377

cannot be members of commons, engage in trade, &c., 377

the ecclesiastical orders are :

1. The archbishop or bishop, elected by the chapter of the cathedral church

by virtue of license from, the crown, 377
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Or THB CLEHOY (continued).

Or

the archbishop the chief of the clergy of the province, 380

the bishop chief within his diocese 382

their offices become void by death, deprivation, or resignation, 382

2. the dean and chapter, the conncil of the bishop, 382

3. the archdeacon subordinate to the bishop in the diocese, 383

(eotltittued).
PAo&
tke archbishop the chief or the clergy of the province.. • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • 380
the bishop chief within his diocese, •••••••••••••••••••••••• , , •••••• , 382
tlleir offices booome void by death, deprivation, or resignation, ••••••• , • • 382
2. the dean and chapter, the council of the bishop,. . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • 382
3. the archdeacon suoordinate to the bishop in the diocese, ................. 383
4. the rural dean, now almost out or
383
5. the parson and vicar; thfl first having for the most p&rt the whole right to
the dues in the parish ; the second having an appropriator over
him, ••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ·••••••••••••... 384-388
to theae, holy orders, presentation, institution and induction necessary,. 388
they cease to be such in various modes, .••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••• 392
6. the curate, a temporary oftici.ting mini8Ler,. .. , • • • • .. .. .. • • .. .. .. .. .. .. 3Y3
7. church wardens, the guardians of the church and representatives of the
lJc>d.y of tile i-ri8h,..... • • • • • • • . • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . • . • • • 394
8. parish clerks and sextons, ••••••••••••••••••••••••.• ~..... • • • • • • • • • • • • 395
wo1uan may be sexton, ••••••••.•••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••• 395n
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wie,.... .. . ... . ... .... .... . ... ......

4. the rural dean, now almost out of use, 383

5. the parson and vicar; the first having for the most part the whole right to

the dues in the parish; the second having an appropriator over

him, ". 384-388

to these, holy orders, presentation, institution and induction necessary,. 388

they cease to be such in various modes, 392

6. the curate, a temporary officiating minuter,. 393

7. church wardens, the guardians of the church and representatives of the

body of the parish, 394

8. parish clerks and sextons, 395

woman maybe sexton . ...395n

CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XII.

OF TIIK CIVIL STATE, 396-406

OP THB CIVIL STA.TB, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 396-406

the laity divU;ible into three states, civil, military and maratime,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 396
the c&tnl, includes all the state except the clergy, the &Plft.Y and navy,. ....... 396
conaists of the nobility and commonalty,......... , •••••••••••••••••• 396
th• nobility are, 1. dukes; 2. marquel8ell; 3. ·earls; 4. viscounts;
5 .. barons, ................................................ 396-399
are created by writ or patent,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 400
an triec.I by their J»eerl, .......... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 40 l
can Rot be arrested in ciYil e&llefl, •••••••••••• •... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 402
tlaey render YeFdicts and giYe evidence upon their honor,. • • • • • • • • • 402
oannot. '4>.~ their 11obility uoept by death or "tainder, •••••••••••• 402
the eemmonalty consist of the several orders of knigbta, esquires, gent!..
men, yeomen, tradesmen, artifieera and laborers, •••••••••••••••• 403-407
&able of pr808()o.oce1 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 40611

the laity divisible into three states, civil, military and maratime, 396

the civil, includes all the state except the clergy, the army and navy, 396

consists of the nobility and commonalty, 396
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the nobility are, 1. dukes; 2. marquesses; 3.'earls; 4. viscounts;

5. barons, 396-399

are created by writ or patent, 400

are tried by their peers, v ...4... 401

cannot be arrested in civil cases, 402

they render verdicts and give evidence upon their honor 402

cannot lo.se their nobility except by death or attainder,. 402

the commonalty consist of the several orders of knights, esquires, gentle-

men, yeomen, tradesmen, artificers and laborers 403-407

table of precedence, 406n
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CHAPTER XIII.

OF THB MILITARY AND MAKITIUB STATES 408-421

the military state includes all such persons as are appointed for the safeguard and

OP TDB M1LtTART AND MAatTtXR STATES, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408-421

the military state includes all such persons as are a.ppointed for the safeguard and
deCe11Se ot the realm,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 408
historical view or the military state, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 408-413
the militia or each county chosen by lot•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 413
regular troops necessary for time of war, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 413
origin of standing army,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 414
it is kept on root only from year to year, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 415
and governed by military law, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 417
relier of &0ldiers disabled, &c., •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 418
the maritime state consists of oftloers and mariners of the navy,. •••••• , •••• , 418
ii. present oonditioo dU& to navig&&ioo ac~ •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 419
1n&y be supplied by impreBBOlent, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 419
goYemed by i&s own POies, articles and orden, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 421
d.i8abled OI" 111pel'llDDuat.ed aailorsoared for, ••••• , , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 421

defense of the realm, 408

historical view of the military state, 408-413

the militia of each county chosen by lot,. 413

regular troops necessary for time of war,. 413

origin of standing army, 414

it is kept on foot only from year to year 415

and governed by military law, 417

relief of soldiers disabled, Ac., 418

the maritime state consists of officers and mariners of the navy, 418

its present condition due to navigation acts, 419

may be supplied by impressment,... 419

governed by Us own rales, articles and orders, ..... 421

disabled or superannuated sailors oared for, 421

CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF MASTER A!fn SERVANT, 422-432

the private economical relations of persons are:

1. master and servant; 2. husband and wife ; 3. parent Hid child; 4. guard-

ian and ward, 422

master and servant considered :

1. as to the several sorts of servants,.. 423

slavery, historical view of, 423-425

now abolished, 425n

menial tenants, or domestics, 425

apprentices, who are bound by indentures to learn an occupation, 426

laborers, who are hired by day or week, 427

stewards, bailiff's and factors, who act rather in a ministerial capacity, but

in law are servants, 427

.
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)fAsTBB AND SsaTAIIT, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 422-432

the private economical relations of peraons are :
1. master and ae"ant; 2. husband and wife; 3. parent mid child; 4. guardian and ward,. • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 422
muter and servant considered :
1. a1 to the se•eral sorts of senants,.............. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • . . • 423
fto17erg, historical 'View or, .••..••••••••••••.••••.•••.••..••••••. 423-425
nor Abolished,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••••••• 425n
fllettitsl i.ervant.I, or domestics,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 425
tJptYl'e'ICtieu, who are bound by indentures to team an oocupation,. • • • • • • 426
laborerrr, who are hired by day or week,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • -427
1tewarda, "baili.ff11 and factor1, who act rather in a miniRterial cap&eity, but
in law are servants, .......................................... • • •. 427
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Or MASTER AMD SERVANT (continued). *«••

2. reciprocal rights of servant and master 427

01'

MASTER AlfD SERVANT

(continued).

•-

2. nciprocal right11 of sen ant and master,................................ 427
third persons may be affected by this relation,...... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 429
master may maintain his 11enant in his suits, ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 429
may have an action for loss of senice, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 429n
may justify assault in his defence,... • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 429
the servant a corresponding right,....... • ••••••••••••••••••••• 429
is re11~nsible for acts of servants done by his command,..... • • • • • • • • • • 431)
liable upon contracts made \..y servant within &cope of his authority, 4307t
liable for injuries caused by negligence of servant,..... • • • • • • • • • • • • 431
not for his intentional torts, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 43lri

third persons may be affected by this relation, 4iU

master may maintain his servant in his suits, 429

may have an action for loss of service, . ....429w

may justify assaull in his defence, 429

the servant a corresponding right, 429

is responsible for acts of servants done by his command, 430

liable upon contracts made by servant within scope of his authority, 430»

liable for injuries caused by negligence of servant, 431

not for his intentional torts, 431»

CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 433-445

the relation of marriage includes the reciprocal rights and duties of husband and

wife 433

it is, in lav, a civil contract, 433

to form it, the parties must

1. be willing to contract, 434

2. able to contract, 434

3. must contract in fact, 439

the disabilities are,

I. canonical, which include precontract, relationship within prohibited
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degrees, and some particular corporal infirmities, 434

II. legal, which include

1. a prior existing marriage, 436

2. want of age, whjpli renders the marriage voidable, 436

3. want of consent of parents or guardians,... 437

4. want of reason, 438

what is a sufficient contract of marriage 439

the relation may be dissolved by death or divorce, 440

divorce is of two kinds, one total, and the other partial, 440

when marriage declared null, the issue are bastards, 440

by marriage, the legal existence of the woman is suspended, 442

husband and wife cannot covenant with each other, 442

wife may be attorney for husband, 442

husband may bequeath to wife 442

must provide wife with necessaries, 443

must pay her previous debts, 443

must be joined in her suits, 443

husband and wife cannot generally be witnesses for or against each other 443

as to her separate estate, the wife has a power of control, 444n

•wife presumed to act under compulsion of husband, 444
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HUSBAND AND WIP'r., •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 433-44a

the relation of marriage includes the reciprocal rights and duties of husband and
wife,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • 433
it is, in law, a civil contract,. • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••. 433
to form it, the parties must
1. be willing to contract, ••••••••••••••••••••• •••• •••••••••••••••••• 43-l
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3. must contract in fact,....... • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 439
the diubilities are,
I. canonical, which include precontract, relationship within prohibited
degrees, and some particular corporal infirmities,.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 434
II. legal, which include
1. a prior existing marriage,........ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 436
2. want of age, whV:h renders the marriage voidable, •••••••••••••• 436
3. want of consent of parents or guardians,............... • • • • • • • • 437
4. want of reason,.... • . . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • . • 43d
what is a sufficient contract of marriage,........... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 439
the relation may be dissolved by death or diTorce,...... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 440
divorce is of two kinds, one total, and the other partial, ••••••••••••••••••• 440
when marriage declared null, the il!'sue are bastards, •••••••••••••••••••••• 440
by marriage, the legal existence of the woman is suspended, ••••••••••••••••••• , 442
husband and wife cannot covenant with each other, ••••••••••••••••••••••• 442
wife may be attorney for husband,....................... • •••••••••••.• 442
hui;band may bequeath to wife,. . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • 442
must provide wife with necessaries, .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , 443
n1ust pay her previous debt11,... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • 443
must be joined in her suits, . • • • • • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . 443
husband and wife cannot generally be witnesses for or against each other,. • • • 443
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estates in pledge are, 1. where the profits of land are granted till a debt is
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vests at death of devisor, but only on a future contingency, 172
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the peculiar estate granted to husband and wife jointly, 182

on death of one joint tenant, the entire estate remains to the survivors, 183

this estate is destroyed by destroying any of its constituent unities, usually

done by partition, 185

an estate in coparcenary, is where an estate descends to two or more persons,.... 187

in which case each is seized of a distinct moiety only 188

the parceners may have partition, 189

incident to this estate is the law of hotchpot, 190

in the United States estates so descending are estates in common 192n

tenancy in common is where there is unity of possession merely, but perhaps an

entire disunion of interest, title and time 191

this may be created by deed, or by destruction of another joint estate without

partition 192

the tenants take by moieties only, and there is no survivorship, 194

they may sever their interests by partition, 194

CHAPTER XIII.

Of THE TITLE TO THINGS REAL IN GENERAL, 195-199

a title is the means whereby the owner of lands hath just possession of his

property 195

1. the lowest title is mere naked possession without right, 195

2. the next step is the right of possession, which one may have though disseized,.. 196

3. the mere right of property may be without possession or right of possession,... 197

as where one disseized has neglected to pursue his remedy till it is barred,.... 198

4. a complete title combines possession with right of property, 199

CHAPTER XIV.

OF TITLE BY DESCENT, 200-240

descent is the title whereby a man on the death of his ancestor acquires his estate

as heir at law, 201 v

this depends on consanguinity, which is either lineal or collateral 202

the degrees are computed according to the canon law, by which two persons

are related in whatsoever degree the most remote is distant from the com-

mon ancestor, 206

the computation of the civil law is different, 207n

the cam HIS of descent are :

1. inheritances shall descend to the issue of the person who last died seized,

in infinitum, but never lineally ascend, 208

this now altered 208n

2. the male issue shall be admitted before the female, 212
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OF TITLE BY DESCENT (continued).

3. of two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit, but the

0.r

females altogether, 214

4. lineal descendants in infinitum of a person deceased shall represent their

ancestor, 216

5. on failure of descendants of the person last seized, the estate shall descend

to his collateral relatives of the blood of the first purchaser, 220

6. the collateral heir must be the next collateral kinsman of the whole blood, 224

this now modified, 224*

7. in collateral inheritances the male stocks are preferred to the female, un-

less where the lands hare descended from a female 234

the present canons of descent in England, 240n

(continued).
na&
3. of two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit, but the
females altogether, •••.•••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 214
4. lineal descendants in i11finitum of a person deceased shall represent their
an~stor,............... . .......................................... 216
5. on failure of descendants of the person last seired, the estate shall descend
to his collateral relatives of the blood of the first purchaser,......... • ••• ~
6. the collateral heir must be the next collateral kinsman of the whole blood, 224
this now modified, •••••..•••••.•••••••••••••.•••••••••••.••••••••• 22411
7. in collateral inheritance!I the male Rtock11 are preferred to the female, unless where the lands h&Te descended from a female, •••••••••••••••••••••• 234
the present canons of descent in England, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 240R

TITLB BY DESCENT

CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XV.

OF TITLE BT PURCHASE; AND, I, BY ESCHEAT, 241-258

purchase, in its most extensive sense, is the possession of an estate which a man

hath by his own agreement, and not by descent, 241

in its legal signification, it includes title by, 1. escheat; 2. occupancy ; 3. pre-

scription ; 4. forfeiture ; 5. alienation, 244

escheat is where, in default of inheritable blood, the estate results back to the

lord of the fee, 244

inheritable blood is wanting:

1. when the tenant dies without relations, 246
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2. when he leaves no relations on the part of the ancestors from whom

the estate descended, 246

O:r

PuacsAeB; AND, I, BY EsCBEAT, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 241-258
purchase, in its most utensive sense, is the poeeessioo of an estate which a man
hath by his own agreement, and not by descent,.... • • . • .. .. .. . • • .. • .. • • 241
in its legal signification, it includes title by, 1. eecbeat; 2. occupancy; 3. prescription; 4. forfeiture; 5. alienation, ................................. 244
escheat is where, in default of inheritable blood, the estate results back to the
lord of the feie, • • • • . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . 244
inheritable blood is wanting :
1. when the tenant dies without relations,,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 246
2. when he leaves no relations on the part of the ancestors from whom

T1TL1: BY

the estate descende<l,. . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . • . • . . . • • . . • • • . . . . 246

3. when he leaves no relations of the whole blood, 246

4. a monster cannot be heir 246

5. nor a bastard, 247

G. nor aliens not naturalized 249

7. by attainder of treason and felony the blood was formerly corrupted,.. 251

8. formerly nonjuring papists were incapable of inheriting, 257

3. when he leaves no relations of the whole blood, •••••••••••••••••• , • •
4. a monster cannot be heir,. . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • • . . . . • . • . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . •
5. nor a llasta.rd, ........•.. •........••...••••••.••.•.••...•.•••.•.
6. nor aliens not naturalized,.... • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • . • . • • • • • • • • •
7. by attainder of treason and felony the blood was formerly corrupted,..
8. formerly noojuring papists were incapable of inheriting,.. • • • • • • • • • • • •

246
246
247
249
251
257

CHAPTER XVI.

OF TITLE BY OCCUPANCY 258-202

CHAPTER XVI.

occupancy is the taking possession of those things which before belonged to no-

body, 258

this, in case of real property, is confined to the case of tenant pur outer vie

who dies during the life of cestui que vie, 258

he who first entered could then retain possession as special occupant while

<:eiitni ijui' vie lived, 258

unless the estate was granted to the tenant tmrl his heirs, in which case the

heir would be special occupant, 259

but by statute estates pur outer vie are devisable, and, if not devised, are

assets, 260n

islands rising in the middle of a river belong in common to the proprietors on each

side, 261

if nearest one side, they belong to the proprietor on that side, 261

land gained from the water imperceptibly belongs to the adjoining owner,.... 262

if the alluvion or dereliction be sudden and considerable, it belongs to the

king, 262

if the course of a river be suddenly changed, the proprietor on either

side shall gain or lose thereby 262

CHAPTER XVII.

OP TITLE BY OCCUPANCY, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 258-262

occupancy is the taking possession of those things which before belonged to noOOdy, . . . • • . . • • • • • . . • • • . . . • • . . .....••.•••...................•••.•. 258
this, in case of real property, is confined to the case of tenant pur auter t;u
who dies during the life of cestui que t-ie, ............................... 258
he wh~ first .en~ered could then retain possession as special occupant while
cutu1 que vie lived,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
unless the estate was granted to the tenant aiul his heirs, in which case the
heir would be special occupant,.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 259
but by statute estates pur auter vie are devisable, and, if not de,·ised, are
assets, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. * • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 260n
islands rising in the middle of a river belong in common to the proprietors on each

side, . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 261
if nearest one side, they belong to the proprietor on that side,. • • . • • • • • • • • • • •
land gained from the water imperceptibly belongs to the adjoining owner, ••••
if the alluvion or dereliction be sudden and considerable, it belongs to the
king, ...................... ....................................
if the course of a river be suddenly changed, the proprietor on either
side shall gain or lose thereby, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

261
262
262

262

OF TITLE BY PRESCRIPTION 263-266

CHAPTER XVII.

custom is properly a local usage, not annexed to any person, 263

prescription is a personal usage, and must be either

1. in a man and his ancestors 264

2. in a man and those whose estate he hath; which is called prescribing in a

que estate, 264

prescription can only be of incorporeal hereditaments 264

it must always be laid in him who is tenant of the fee 264, 265

t cannot be for any thing which cannot be raised by grant, for it always

presupposes a grant to have existed, 265

OP TITLE BT PRWSORlPTION, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 263-266

custom is properly a local usage, not annexed to any person, •••••••••••••••••••
prescription is a personal usage, and must be either
1. in a man and his ancea;tors,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
2. in a man and those whose estate he hath; which is called prescribing in a
q1te estate,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . .
prescription can only be of incorporeal hereditaments,............ • •••••••
it must always be laid in him who is tenRnt of the fee,. ............ 264,
t cannot be for any thing which cannot be raised by grant, for it always
presupposes a grant to b6ve existed,....... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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OF TITLE BY PRESCRIPTION (continued). . "»»•

01'

whatever is to arise by matter of record cannot be prescribed for 265

if one prescribes in a que estate, nothing is claimable but things incident,

appcndant or appurtenant to lands 266

rules of prescriptiou, 266»»

(contit1ued).
.
•AOL
whatever is to a1·ise by matter of record cannot be prescribed for ••••••• 265
if one prescribes in a que estate, nothing is claimable but things incident,
appendl\nt or appurtenant to lands,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • . • 266
ru.les of presc1iptio11, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2661'

TITLB BY PRESCRIPTION

CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Of TITLR BT FORFEITURE, 267-286

forfeiture is a punishment annexed by law to some illegal act or negligence in

the owner of things real, whereby he loses his interest to another 267

I. forfeiture for crime is principally for, 1. treason ; 2. felony; 3. misprision

of treason ; 4. praemunire; 5. assault on a judge, or in court; 6. popish

recusancy, Ac 267, 268

IT. alienations which induce forfeiture are those made—

1. in mortmain, or to corporations in violation of statute, 268

history of the statutes of mortmain 268-274

2. to an alien, which is cause of forfeiture to the crown of the land

aliened, 274

3. by tenants of a larger estate than the law entitles them to make 274

as where tenant for life aliens in fee, 274

of this class is also the disclaimer by the tenant of the lord's right 275

III. lapse is a forfeiture of the right of presentation to a church by neglect

of the patron to exercise it within six months 278
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IV. simony is a corrupt presentation to an ecclesiastical benefice, whereby that

turn becomes forfeited to the crown 278

V. breach of conditions may cause forfeiture ; as to which see ch. x, 281

VI. waste is another species of forfeiture, 281

which is a spoil or destruction in any corporeal hereditaments to the

disherison of him that hath the inheritance, 281

it is either voluntary or permissive; the latter being matter of omission

only 281

who may be liable for waste 282

tenancies may be created without impeachment of Waste, 283

Til. copyhold estates may be forfeited by breach of customs of the manor, 284

VIII. the act of becoming bankrupt may cause forfeiture 285

a bankrupt is a trader who secretes himself, or does certain other specified

acts to the injury of his creditors, 285

on his bankruptcy his estates are transferred to assignees, to be sold for

OJP

TITLE BT' FoarstTURB, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 267-286

forfeiture is a punio;hment annexed by law to some illegal act or negligence in
the owner of things real, whereby he loses his interest to another,.. • • • • • • 267
I. forfeiture for crime is principally for, 1. treason ; 2. felony; 3. misprision
of treason ; 4. prromunire; 5. assault on a judge, or in court; 6. popish
recusancy, &c., .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••.• 267, 268
II. alienations which induce forfeiture are those made1. in mortmain, or to corporations in violation of statute,....... • • • • • • • • • • • • 268
history of the statutes of mortmain, •••••••••••• , •••••••••• , ••••• 268-274
2. to an alien, which is cau11e of forfeiture to the crown of the land
aliened, .•••••••••••• ,............... • ••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••• 274
3. by tenants of a larger estate than the law entitles them to make, ......... 274
as where tenant for life aliens in fee, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 274
of this clas.<i iR also the disclaimer by the tenant of the lord's right, •• , •• 275
III. lapse is a forfeiture of the ri~ht of prcaentation to a church by neglect
o( the patron to exercise it withm six months, •••••••••••••••••••••••••. 278
IV. 11imony is a corrupt presentation to an ecclesiastical benefice, whereby that
turn becomes forfeited to the crown, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , • • • • 278
V. brel\ch of conditions may CaUBe forfeiture j as to Which see ch. x,.,, ••• ,, 281
VI. waste is another species of forfeiture,............................. • •• 281
whieh is a spoil or destruction in any corporeal hereditaments to the
disherison of him that hath the inheritance,....................... 281
it is either voluntary or pennissive; the latter being matter of omission
only, ........................................................... 281
who may be liable for waste,. .................................... , 282
tenancies may be created without impeachment of waste,.... • • • • • • • • • • 283
YII. copyhold estates may be forfeited by breach of customs of the manor, ••••• 284
VIII. the act of becoming bankrupt may cause forfeiture, ••••••••••••••••••••• 285
a bankrupt is a trader who secretes himself, or does certain other specified
acts to the injury of his creditors,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 285
on his bankruptcy his estates are transferred to assignees, to be sold for
the benefit of his creditors,.... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 285

the benefit of his creditors, 285

CHAPTER XIX.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF TITLE BT ALIENATION, 287-294

alienation, conveyance, or purchase in its more limited sense, comprises any

method whereby estates are voluntarily surrendered to one man and ac-

cepted by another 287

this formerly could not be done by tenant without consent of the lord, 287

nor by the lord without the tenant's consent, 288

the consent was given by attorning, or professing to become tenant

of the new lord 288

the statute qiria emptora left all persons to alien at their discretion 289

and by statutes lands became chargeable for debts, and subject to be

pawned therefor, and sold in bankruptcy and devised 289

all persons in possession are prima facie capable of conveying, 290

but with only the right of possession or of property one is not 290

remainders and reversions are exceptions, and may be granted, 290

contingencies and mere possibilities may be released or devised, or

pass by death, but not be assigned, 290

persons attainted cannot convey, 290

but may purchase, subject to have their title defeated, __' 291

the conveyances of idiots, insane persons, infants and persona > V.Ac*' o-urei*>

are voidable, J"* «*

so also of their purchases „ *"' ~^,

the purchase of a feme covert is voidable, „ * • •' .. 7!
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alienation, conveyance, or purchase in its more limited sense, comprises any
method "\\'hereby estates are voluntarily surrendered to one man and accepted by another,. • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 287
this fonnerly could not be done by tenant without consent of the lord, .•••••• 287
nor by the lord without the tenant's consent, .•••.••••••.••••••••••••• 288
the consent was given by attorning, or professing to become tenant
of the new lonJ,.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 288
the statute qttia empt-Ores left all persons to alien at their discretion, .•••• 289
and by statutes lands became chargeable for debts, and subject to be
pawned therefor, and sold in bankruptcy and devised, ••••••••.•••••• 289
all persons in possession are prima j<JC1°e capable of conveying,.. • • • • • • • • • • • • 2<JO
but with only the right of possession or of property one is Mt,... . . . . • . 2'JO
remainders and reversions are exceptions, and may be granted,...... 290
contingencie~ and mere possibilities may be released or de\'ised, or
pass by death, but not be assigned, ••••••••••.•••••••••••••••• 290
persons at tainted cannot convey,. • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2<.lO
but may purchase, subject to have their title defeated,. •••• , ••••• • • • · • 2.<Jl
the conveyan~cs of idiots, insane persons, infants and persons ~-nl\ef aure1111, 'l:';ll
are voulab~e, .••...•••••••••••.••••••••••••••.••••• ,
, ••• • · • · · · "')\
so also of their purchases, .•••••••••••• • • • • • • • • • · • • • • • ... " • • • • •' • • • • 'ilJ'l
the purchase of a feme covert is voidable,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ... ... • • • , • • • • • • • · ~
her conveyances, unless by matter of record, are void,• • ... ... ' • • • •• " """ · -

......

her conveyances, unless by matter of record, are void,... ^ "*• ..' ^ ..••••" •-

Dig ize b

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

lvi

ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

Ivi ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

OF TITLE BY ALIENATION (continued"). «««•

an alien may purchase any thing, but hold nothing as against the crown, ex-

cept a lease for years of a house for trade 293

papists were formerly disabled, but not now, 29&n

conveyances are of four kinds: 1. by matter in pais, or deed; 2. by matter of

record ; 3. by special custom ; 4. by devise, 294

OF

TtTLF: BY ALIBSATION

(continued).

r-.

an alien may purcbMe any thing, but hold nothing as agaim;t the crown, except a lease for p~arN of a house for trade, ••••••••••••••••••••.•.•••• , • 293
papists were formerly disabled, but not now,. ............................ 293n
conveyances are of funr kin•ls: 1. liy mn.Ller in pais, or deed; 2. by matter of
record ; 3. by special custom; 4. by devh;e,..... .. .. • • • • • .. .. • • • • .. .. • • • • • • 29-1

CHAPTER XX.

Or ALIENATION BT DEED 295-343

CHAPTER XX.

a deed is a writing sealed and delivered by the parties, 295

it may be either, 1. a deed indented, or indenture, 2. a deed poll, 296

the requisites of a deed are

I. parties capable of contracting, and a thing to be contracted for, 296

II. it must be upon sufficient consideration, 296

which may be either good, as of natural love and affection 297

or valuable, as money, marriage or the like, 297

III. it must be written or printed on paper or parchment 297

but certain leases not exceeding three years may be oral, 297

IV. the matter written must be legally and orderly set forth, 297

the parts of a deed are, 1. the premises; 2. the habendum; 3. the tenen-

ilitm; 4. the terms of the grant, if any, 299

5. the condition, if any, on the happening of which the estate may

be defeated 299
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6. the clause of warranty which binds the warrantor and his heirs,.. 302

7. covenants or conventions, by which either party may stipulate for

the truth of certain facts, or bind himself to some act, 304

8. the conclusion, 304

V. the fifth requisite to a deed is the reading of it, if desired 304

VI. the sealing and signing, 305

VII. the delivery, until which the deed does not take effect, 307

this may be either absolute or as an escrow 307

VIII. the attestation in the presence of witnesses, 307

a deed may be avoided

1. by erasures or interlineations improperly made in material parts 308

2. by breaking off or defacing the seal, 308

3. by delivering it up to be canceled 308

4. by the disagreement of such whose concurrence is necessary in order

that it may stand 309

5. by judgment or decree of court, 309

of the several species of deeds, some serve to convey property, some only to

charge or discharge it, 309

some are at common law, and some under the statute of uses, 310

original conveyances by the common law are—

1. a feoffment, employed to convey a fee-simple, 311

to this and every other freehold livery of seisin was necessary, 311

which was a delivery of actual or symbolical possession, 311

2. a gift, properly applied to an estate tail, and like a feoffment except in

the estate conveyed, 316

3. a grant, applicable to corporeal hereditaments, reversions, &c., whereof

livery could not be had 317

4. a lease, which is a conveyance for life, for years oral will, but usually of

a less estate than grantor hath 318

5. an exchange, or a mutual grant of equal interests, the one for the other,. 323

6. a partition, when two or more joint-tenants, parceners or tenants in com-

mon, agree to divide the lands so held among them in severally, 323

secondary or derivative conveyances at the common law are,

7. releases, which are the discharge or conveyance of a man's right to

another that hath a former estate in possession, 324

these may enure by way, 1. of enlarging an estate ; 2. of passing an es-

tate; 3. of passing a right; 4. of extinguishment; 5. of entry and feoff-

ment 324

8. a confirmation makes unavoidable a voidable estate, or increases a particu-

lar estate, 325
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a deed is a writing sealed and delivered by the parties,. . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 295
it may be either, l. a deed imlented, or indenture; 2. a deed poll, .......... 296
the requisites of a deed are
I. parties ca pa hie of <'ontracting, and a thing to be contracted for,. • • • • • • 296
II. 1t must be upon sufficient consideration, •••••••••• , ••.••••• , . . • • • • • 296
which may be either good, as of natural love and affection,. • • • • • • • • 2<J7
or valuable, a11 money, marriage or the like,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 297
III. it must be written or printed on paper or parchment, ••••.••••••••••• 297
but certain leases not exceerling three years may be oral, •••••••••• 297
IV. the matter written must be legally and orderly i;et forth, .••••••••••• 297
the parts of a df'ed are, 1. the prcmi11cs; 2. the habendum; 3. the tenendum; 4. the terms of the grant, if any, ........................ 299
5. the condition, if any, on the happening of which the estate may
be defc&tetl,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • .. . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . • 299
6. the clause of warranty which binds the warrantor and his heirs, •• 302
7. covenant:; or comentions, by which either party may stipulate for
the truth of c~rtain facts, or bind himself to some act, ...•••••• 30-I
8. the conclusion, •••.••.••.•••••••.••••••••.•••••••••••••••.•• 30-l
V. the fifth requisite to a deed is the reading of it, if desired, ••••••.••••• 30-l
VI. the sealing aud signing,...... • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 305
VII. the delivery, until which the deed does not take effect,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 301
this may be either absolute or as an escrow, .••••••••••••••••••••• 307
VIII. the attestation in the presence of witnesses, •••••••••••••••••••••••• 30i
a deed may be avoided
1. by erasures or interlineations improperly made in material parts,. • • • • 308
2. by breaking off or defacing the seal, .••••• , •••••••••••••••••••••••• 308
3. by delivering it up to be canceled,...... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 308
4. by the disagreement of such whose concurrence is necessary in order
that it may stand, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 309
5. by judgnient or decree of court, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 309
of the several species of deeds, some serve to convey property, some only to
charge or discharge it,... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 309
some are at common law, and some under the statute of uses, •••••••••••••• 310
original conveyances by the common law are1. a feotfment, employed to convey a fee-simple,.... • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • 311
to this and every other freehold livery of seisin was necessary, .•••• 311
which wa.<1 a delivery of actual or symbolical possession,. •••••• 311
2. a gift, properly applied to an estate tail, and like a fcoffment except in
the estate conveyed,..... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • 316
3. a grant, applicable to corporeal hereditaments, reversions, &c., whereof
livery cou Id not be had, • • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 317
4. a lease, which is a conveyance for life, for years or at will, but usually of
a less estate than grantor hath,. •••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••• 318
5. an exchange, or a mutual grant of equal interests, the one for the other,. 323
6. a partition, when two or more joint-tenants, parceners or tenants in common, agree to divide the lands so held among them in severalty,. ••••• 323
secondary or derivative conveyances at the common law are,
7. releases, which are the dii;charge or conveyance of a man's right to
another that hath a. former estate in possension, •••••••••••••.•.•••• 324
these may enure by way, 1. of enlarging an estate ; 2. of passing an estate; 3. of passing a right; 4. of extinguishmcnt; 5. of entry and fcoffment, ••••.•••••••..•••.•.•••.••••••.•••.••••••••••••••••...••• 324
8. a confirmation makes unavoidable a voidable estate, or increases a particular estate, .. .......... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 325
9. a surrender is the yielding up of an estate for life or for years to him that
hath the immediate reversion or remainder, •••••••••••••••••••••••• 326

9. a surrender is the yielding up of an estate for life or for years to him that

bath the immediate reversion or remainder 326
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10. an assignment is the passing over to another of the whole right one has

Or

in an estate 326

11. a defeasance is a collateral deed made at the same time with the original

conveyance, and specifying the condition on which it may be de-

feated, 327

uses and trusts had their origin in the desire to evade the statutes of mort-

main, 327, 328

conveyances being made in trust, chancery protected the confidence reposed,.. 328

the system of uses which grew up, 330

the statute of uses was passed to transfer the uses into possesion, thus turn-

ing the equitable into a legal ownership, 332

the doctrine of springing or contingent, shifting and resulting uses which

sprung up 334

in case of a use upon a use, the first only was held to be executed by the stat-

lvii

Dnn (continued).
J>•a•.
10. an assignment is the passing over to another of the whole right one has
in an estate, . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • • . . . . . . . . • 326
11. a defcasance is a collateral deed made at the same time with the original
conveyance, and specifying the condition on which it may be defeated, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
uses .and trusts had their origin in the desire to e\'ade the statutes of mor!-
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mai11, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 321,

328

conveyances being made in trutlt, chancery protected the confidence reposed,..
the system of uses which grew up,...... . • • • . • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • . . • • . • • •
the statute of uses was passed to transfer the uses into possesion, thus turning the equitahle into a legal owner;.;hip, ••.•••••.••.••••••••••••••••.•.
the doctrine of springing or contingt>nt, shifting and resulting uses which
sprung up,....... • • • • • . • • • • • . • . • • • • . • • • • . • . • • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . •
in case of a use upon a use, the first only was held to be executed by the stat-

328
330
332
334

ute,.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
a use in a chattel interel't was not executed, .••.••.•.•.••••••••••.••••••.• 336

ute 335

a use in a chattel interest was not executed, 336

under the various decisions a system of trusts has sprung up, administered in
equity,. . • . • • • • • • • . . • • . . . • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • . . • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • 336
the conveyances deriving their force under the statute of uses are,
12. a covenant to stand seized to uses, the consideration of which is blood
or marriage, .•••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••.•••••••.•..•.•••. 338
13. a deed of bargain and sale, which requires a pecuniary consideration, ••. 3:18
14. a deed of lease and release,.... . . . • . • • • • . • • • ••• , •••••••••••••••• 339
15. a deed to lead or declare the uses of other conveyances, .•••••••••••••• 339
16. deeds of revocation of uses, ..•.••••.••• ·, •••••••.•••. . •.••••••••••• 339
deeds which do not convey, but only charge or discharge real estate are,
1. obligations or bonds, with condition, ............................... 340
the condition in which under some circumstances may be void, while
under others the bonds are void, .............................. 340
2. recognizances, or obligations acknowledged of record, •••..••••••••••• 341
3. defeasances, upon bonds, obligations or judgments; and these are conditions which, when performed, are to defeat or undo the bonds, &c., •••• 342
the registry acts and their effect, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 343n

under the various decisions a system of trusts has sprung up, administered in

equity 336

the conveyances deriving their force under the statute of uses are,

12. a covenant to stand seized to uses, the consideration of which is blood

or marriage, 338

13. a deed of bargain and sale, which requires a pecuniary consideration,... 338
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14. a deed of lease and release 339

15. a deed to lead or declare the uses of other conveyances, 339

16. deeds of revocation of uses, 339

deeds which do not convey, but only charge or discharge real estate are,

1. obligations or bonds, with condition, 340

the condition in which under some circumstances may be void, while

under others the bonds are void, 340

2. recognizances, or obligations acknowledged of record 341

3. defeasances, upon bonds, obligations or judgments; and these are condi-

tions which, when performed, are to defeat or undo the bonds, &c.,.... 342

the registry acts and their effect 343»

CHAPTER XXL

CHAPTER XXI.

OF ALIENATION BY MATTER OF RECORD 344-364

assurances by matter of record are where the sanction of a court of record is

called in to substantiate and witness the transfer, 344

1. the first class are private acts of parliament, which are obtained when the

nature of the title is such that reasonable relief is not otherwise to be had, 344

2. the king's grants by letters patent 346

3. fines: a fine was an amicable composition or agreement of a suit, actual or

fictitious, whereby the lands in question were acknowledged to be the

right of one of the parties, 348

parties, privies and strangers were bound by a fine; the latter unless they

interposed their claim in due time :-!:",">

4. common recoveries, invented to elude the statutes of mortmain, 357

which were suits or actions actual or fictitious, in which a fictitious re-

covery of the land was had 357

the effect was, to bar estates tail, remainders and reversions 361

fines and common recoveries are now abolished, 348n, 357n

» in addition to the conveyances mentioned, there were also deeds to lead

OF

ALIENATION BY ~!ATTER OF RECORD, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 344-364

assurances by matter of record ar1i where the sanction of a court of record is
called in to substantiate and witness the trani:for, •••••••••.••••.•.•••••• 341
1. the first class are private acts of parliament, which are obtained when the
nature of the title is such that reasonable relief is not otherwise to be had, 344
2. the king's grants by letters patent, ••••••••••.•••••••••••••••.•••.••••. 340
3. fines: a fine WM an amicable composition or agreement of a suit, actual or
fictitious, whereby the lands in question were acknowletlged to be the
right of one of the p:trties,... • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • • • • . 348
parties, privies and strangers were bound by a fine; the latter unless they
interposed their claim in due time, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3[;5
4. common recoveries, invented to elude the statutes of mortmain, ••..•••••• S57
which were suits or actions actual or fictitious, in which a fictitious recovery of the land was had,. . . . • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • 357
the effect was, to bar estates tail, remainders and reversions, ••••••••.•• 301
fines and common recoveries are now abolished, ................. 348n, 357n
in addition to the conveyances mentioned, there were also deeds to lead
•
or declare the uses of fines and recoveries,.... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 363

or declare the uses of fines and recoveries, 363

CHAPTER

CHAPTER XXII.

OF ALIEN-ATION BY SPECIAL CUSTOM, 365-372

assurances by special custom are confined to copyhold estates, 365

this was effected by

1. surrender by the tenant into the hands of the lord to the use of an-

other, according to the custom of the manor, 365

2. presentment by the tenants, or homage, of such surrender, 366

3. admittance of the surrenderee by the lord 366

admittance may also be had upon original grants to the tenant from the lord,

xxn.

OF ALTEN'.~TION BY SPF.CI AL CUSTOM, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 305-372

assurances by special custom are confined to copyhold estates, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 365
this was effected by
1. surrender by the tenant into the hands of the lord to the use of another, according to the custom of the manor,.... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 365
2. presentment by the tenants, or homa~, of such surrender,. •••..••••. 366
3. admittance of the surrenderec by the lord, .•••••••••••• , • • • • • • • • • • • 366
admittance mn.y also be had upon original grants to the tenant from the lord,
and upon descents to the heir from tht! ancestor,. •••••••••••••••.••. 370-371

and upon descents to the heir from the ancestor, 370-371
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CHAPTER XXIII. M8m.

OP ALIENATIONS BY DEVISE, 373-383

devise is a disposition of real property in a man's last will and testament, 373

this was not permitted by the common law as it stood since the conquest,

hut was introduced by statute under Henry VIII, 375

corporations, excepted in these statutes, may take to charitable uses,.... 375

the statute of frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, requires wills to be signed and at-

tested 376

an instrument similarly executed may revoke a will, 376

it may also be revoked by burning, cancelling, tearing or obliterating 376

and impliedly by marriage and birth of a child, 376

what is a sufficient signing, 377

witnesses must attest in the testator's presence, 377

how interest affects their competency 377

wills are subject to the rights of creditors 378

as to personal estate they speak from the death, but as to real from

the time of execution 378

certain rules of construction apply to all conveyances, 379

1. that the construction be favorable, and as near the intent of the parties as

the law will admit, 379

2. that the intent is to be regarded rather than the words, 379

3. that the construction is to be made upon the entire deed, and not merely
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upon disjointed parts of it 379

4. that it shall be taken most strongly against him who is agent or con-

tractor, and in favor of the other party, 380

5. that if the words will bear two senses, one agreeable to and one against law,

the first shall be preferred 380

6. that in a deed, if two clauses are totally repugnant, the first shall be re-

ceived and the last rejected 381

but that in a will the last of two repugnant clauses shall stand, 381

7. that a devise be most favorably expounded ; the law sometimes dispensing

with the want of words here which are absolutely requisite in other in-

struments, 381
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DEvtsE, .••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3i3-383
devise is a dispo11ition of real property in a man's last will and lestament,.... • • • • 3i3
this was not permitted by the common law as it stood since the conquest,
but was introduced by i;tatute under Henry VII I, •.•• , • • • • • • • . • • • • • 375
corporations, excepted in these statutes, may take to charitable uses, .••• 375
the statute of frauds, 2g Car. II, c. 3, requires wills to be signed and atteste•l, . • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 376
an instrument similarly executed may revoke a will, .•• , ••••• ,,., •••••• 3i6
it may ali;o he revoked by burning, cancelling, tearing or obliterating,,, •• 3i6
and impliedly by marriage and birth of a child, •.•••••• , •••• ,., •••• 376
what is a sufficient signing,., .••• , ••••••••.•••• , , • , ••••.••• , •••• , •• 377
witnesse~ must attest in the tc11tator's presence, •••••••••••• , • , • • • • • • • 371
how interest affects their competency, •••••••••••••••• , , ••••••• , , 377
wills arc subject to the rights of creditors,., . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • 3i8
as to personal estate they speak from the death, but as to real from
the time of execution,.... • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 378
certain rules of construction apply to all conveyances, •••••• ,.......... • •••••• 379
1. that the construction be favorable, and as near the intent of the parties as
the law will admit, ••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••• , •••••••••••••••• , 379
2. that the intent is to be regarded rather than the words, •••• , ••••• , • • • • • • • 379
3. that the construction is to be made upon the entire deed, and not merely
upon diajoiuted parts of it,.... • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 379
4. that it shall be taken most strongly against him who is agent or contractor, and in favor of the other party, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 380
5. that if the words will bear two senses, one agreeable to and one against law,
the first shall be preferred,.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • 380
6. that in a deed, if two clauses are totally repugnant, the first shall be received and the last rejected,. ••••••••. , •••••••••••••••••••• , •••••• 381
but that in a will the lL'lt of two repu:;nant clauses shall stand, .•••••••• 381
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CHAPTER XXIV.

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF THINGS PERSONAL 384-388

things personal include all sorts of things movable which may attend a man's

person 384

also certain interest in lands, under the general designation of chattels 385

chattels are, 1. chattels real; 2. chattels personal, 386

1. chattels real include such interests in the realty as are less than free-

hold, 386

2. chattels personal are properly things movable, 387

CHAPTER XXV.

OF THINGS PERSON AL, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

I

•••••

3~4-388

things personal include all sorts of things movable which may attend a man's
])'r8<>n,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
also certain interest in lands, under the general designation of chattels,,,....
chattels are, 1. chattels real ; 2. chattels pcr!lonal, ••••••••••••••••••••••••.
1. chattels real include such interests in the realty as are less than freehold,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
2. chattels personal are properly things movable,............ • • • • • • • • • •

384
385
386
386
387

OF PROPERTY IN THINGS PEBSONAL :••••; 389-399

CHAPTER XXV.

property in chattels personal may be cither in possession or in action, 389

I. a man hath property in possession absolute when he hath solely and exclu-

sively both right and possession, 389

II. of animals ferts natures, a man may have a qualified property, 391

1. this may be per industriam, by his reclaiming and taming them, ...... 391

2. or ratione impotentite, as in the case of young birds or coneys in their

nests or burrows on one's land, 394

3. or propter privilegium, as in the case of animals usually called game,.. 395

a qualified property also exists in air, light and water, while in actual use and

occupation « 395

also in property bailed, in which neither party has the absolute property,.... 395

also in goods pawned or pledged, and goods distrained, 396

property in action is where a man hath not the occupation, but a bare right to oc-

cupy ; the possession whereof may be recovered by suit, 396

this right is called a chose in action; as in case of money due on bond 397

interests in personalty may be either in possession or expectancy, 398

also in severally, joint tenancy or in common, 399

01' PROPERTY

IN THINGS PERSON AL,.... • • • • • • • • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 389-399
property in chattels personal may be either in possession or in action, ••••••••.••• 389
I. a man hath property in possession absolute when he hath solely and exclusively both right and possession,... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • 389
II. of animals fertE natur<.e, a man may have a qualified property, ••••••••••• 391
1. this may be per itidustriam, by his reclaiming and taming them, •••• ,• 391
2. or ratwm: impot.entin!, as in the case of young birds or coneys in their
nests or burrows on one's land, ••••••••.••••••••..•••••.•••••••• 394
3. or propt.er pt·foilegitlm, as iu the case of animals mmally called game, .• 395
a qualified property also eiists in air, light and water, while in actual use and
occupation, ..••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••• • • • •.... • • • • 395
also in property bailed, in which neither party has the absolute property, •••• 395
ali.;o in goods pawned or pledgf>d, and goods distrained, .......... , .•••••••.• 396
property in action is whe~e a man hath not the occupation, b~t a bare right to occupy; the possession whereof may be recovered by smt, .•••••••••••••••• 3!l6
this right is called a chose in action; as in ca.<1e of money due on bond, •••••• 397
interests in pe~onalty may be either in possession or expectancy, ............... 398
also in severalty, joint tenancy or in common, .••••••••••• •.••.• •••••• • ••• 399
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CHAPTER XXVI. *«».

OP TITLE TO THINGS PERSONAL BY OCCUPANCT, 400-407

the various modes of acquiring property to things personal mentioned, 400

I. by occupancy, where they are found without any owner, in which case for

the most part they belong to the king 400

1. the goods of an alien enemy one may seize as may be authorized by

the public authority, • 401

and also his person 402

2. goods found, unless waifs, estrays, wrecks or hidden treasure, belong

totheflnder '. 402

3. light, air and water can only be appropriated by occupancy, 402

4. animals ferae natures, except in a few cases, are the qualified property

of him who seizes them, and his absolute property if killed 403

5. the right to emblements is referred to occupancy, 404

6. property is gained by accession, as by the growth of vegetables, the

pregnancy of animals, the conversion of wood into vessels, &c., ..... 404

7. if one wilfully intermixes his property with another's, the latter shall

have it in some cases, 405

8. in books and other intellectual productions, one may have copyright,.. 405

patents of privilege are also granted for new inventioDS, 407

»

CHAPTER XXVII.
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OF TITLE BT PREROGATIVE AND FORFEITURE, .408-421

by prerogative a title may accrue to the crown itself, or to such as claim under the

crown, ^0°

to this head are referred taxes and customs, 4UH

the king cannot be joint owner of a chattel with another, but shall own the

the title to wrecks, treasure-trove, waifs, estrays, royal fish, &c., is inherent

in the kin&r •*•••••••••••••••••••••*•••••••** •••• •••••••••••• •••• "i'[..j

the king has' also a prerogative copyright in the statutes, &c., in books of

divine service, a right to books compiled, etc , at the expense of the crown,

and to print the translation of the Bible, 410

game is a species of prerogative property, 410

but any person may now kill game on procuring license 41U»

by forfeiture for crime, the title to things personal may also be lost and acquired, 420

the cases enumerated in which forfeiture occurs, '.••••" ',"*"*'"

the forfeiture dates from conviction only; in which it differs from the forfeit-

ure of real property, 421

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OP TITLE BT CUSTOM .• • .• • • v • V • • • • • '422-429

bv custom obtaining in particular places a right may be acquired in chattels, and

the most usual of which customs, and which obtain pretty generally, are:

1 heriots, which are either hcriot service or heriot custom 422

the first is due upon special reservation in a grant or lease of lands 4J4

the second depends entirely upon custom, •••/•• 4<J2

and is a customary tribute of goods and chattels payable to the lord

of the fee on the decease of the owner of lands 423

in some places it is commuted for in money 424

2. mortuaries, which are a customary gift due to the minister in many parishes on

the death of his parishoners • • • • • • *-5

there are similar dues on the death of clergymen and prelates,... ....... 4^b

3. heirlooms, which are such personal chattels as by custom descend to the heir

with his inheritance 4^7

CHAPTER XXIX.

OP TITLE BT SUCCESSION, MARRIAGE AND JUDGMENT, • 430-439

in corporations aggregate one set of men, by succeeding another set, acqu.re a

property in all the goods, &c., of the corporation, •. • 4dU

also such corporations sole as are the heads and representatives of bodies ag-

gregate have the like powers to take personal property in succession, 4dl

VOL. I.—H
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OF TITLE BY SUCCESSION-, MARRIAGE AND JUDGMENT (continued). **•»

so also have two other corporations sole: the king and the chamberlain

of London, 432

by marriage the chattels which belonged to the wife are vested in the hnsband, 433

and this includes her chattels real, but these on his death survive to the

wife unless he has reduced them to possession, 433

as do also her choses in action, 434

but if the wife die first, the chattels real survive to the husband, but the

chosfs in action pass to the wife's administrator, 435

the wife's paraphernalia, and her jewels and ornaments are her property

at the husband's death, 436

by judgment the right and property of chattel interests are frequently vested

in the prevailing party, 436

and sometimes in the failing party from whom the value has been recov-

ered, 436n

the right to a penalty in a popular action belongs to him who will first ob-

tain judgment, 437

the right to damages is also acquired and lost by judgment, 438

as are also, costs, when awarded by the court, 439

CHAPTER XXX.

Op TITLE BY GIFT, GRANT AND CONTRACT, : 440-470

a gift of personal property is a gratuitous transfer of the right of possession thereof, 440
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a grant differs from a gift in being for some consideration or equivalent, 440

both these if made in fraud of creditors are void,... 441

a gift is not complete without delivery, but after delivery cannot be retracted, 441

a contract is an agreement upon sufficient consideration to do or not to do a par-

ticular thing, 442

the agreement requires parties capable of contracting, 442

it may be either express, which is where the terms are uttered and avowed,

or implied, which are such as reason and justice dictate, 443

it may also be executed or executory 443

the consideration may either be good, which is that of blood and natural affec-

tion between relations, 444

or valuable, as for marriage, money, &c., 444

valuable considerations are either, 1. do ut des ; 2. facio ut facias ; 3. facto at

den ; 4. do ut facias 444

without consideration the contract is void, but any degree of reciprocity will

prevent its being so, 445

a moral obligation will sometimes support the promise 445n

a seal is evid ence of a consideration, - 446

the most usual contractg are :

1. sale or exchange, which is a transmutation of property from one man to another

in consideration of some recompense of value 446

it is not complete without payment unless the contrary be agreed, 447

the statute of frauds requires certain contracts of sale to be in writing, 447

sales in market-overt will pass property though the seller may not own it,... 449

the seller impliedly warrants the title of the thing sold, 451

but not generally its goodness or quality. 451

there is an exception in case of provisions and goods sold by sample 451n

2. bailment is a delivery of goods in trust upon a contract, express or implied, that

the trust shall be faithfully executed on the part of the bailee, 451

the two classifications of bailments, 451n

of which that by Sir William Jones is 1. deposition; 2. mandatum or com-

mission; 3. commodatum or loan for use ; 4. pignori acceptum or bail-

ment in pledge; 5. locatum, or hiring for a reward, which is of three

kinds, 451n

the liability of innkeepers and carriers, 45 IN

agistment is a species of bailment, 452

hiring and borrowing are contracts by which a qualified property is transferred

to the hirer or borrower, hiring being for a price, and borrowing gra-

tuitous 453

the most usual is the hiring of money for interest, excess of which is usury,., 454

in some cases, in regard to the unusual hazard, compensation above the usual

rate is allowed, 457
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OF TITLE BY GIFT, GRANT AND CONTRACT (continued'). rM*-

these are, 1. bottomry or respomlentia; 2. policies of insurance; 3. annui

OF

TITLE BY GIFT, GRANT AND CONTR.<\~T

(continued).

lxi
rAaa.

these are, l. bottomry or respom.lentia; 2. policies of insurance; 3. annui
ties upon lives,.. • • • . • • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••..•••••..•••••• 45 7-462
3. debt is a contract whereby a right to a certain sum of money is mutually acquired and lost, ....•.•••..•••••..••••.••••.•.••••••.••••.•••• , ••••.• 464
a debt of record is a sum of money which appears to be due by the evidence
of a court of record,. . . . • • • • • • • . . • . . . • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • . • . • • • 464
a debt by 11pccialty is one acknowledged to be due by instrument under seal :
all other dcbIB are debts by simple contrnct, .•••••••••..•.•••••••••.••.. 465
certain simvle contract debts are required by the slatute of frauds to be in
writing, ...•.•••••••.••••••••••.••.•••••••••••••••••••.•••••••..... 466
a bill of exchange is an open letter of requei:;t from one man to another, desiring him to pay a sum of money therein named to a third person on his
account,. . . . . • • . • • • . • • • • • . . . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • 466
these are either fortJign or inland, •••...••.••••••••••.•••••••••••.••• 467
promissory notes are an engagement in writing to pay a sum specified, at a
time limited, to a person named, or to order or bearer,.................. 467
the re;;pective rights and obligations of the parties to these instruments
specified, •••••••.•••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4ti8-470

ties upon lives, 457-462

3. debt is a contract whereby a right to a certain sum of money is mutually ac-

quired and lost, 464

a debt of record is a sum of money which appears to be due by the evidence

of a court of record, 464

a debt by specialty is one acknowledged to In; due by instrument under seal:

all other debts are debts by simple contract, 465

certain simple contract debts are required by the statute of frauds to be in

writing, 4C6

a bill of exchange is an open letter of request from one man to another, desir-

ing him to pay a sum of money therein named to a third person on his

account, 466

these are either foreign or inland, 407

promissory notes are an engagement in writing to pay a sum specified, at a

time limited, to a person named, or to order or bearer, 467

the respective rights and obligations of the parties to these instruments

specified, 468-470

CHAPTER XXXI.

CHAPTER XXXI.

OF TITLE BT BANRRUPTCY 471-489

a bankrupt is a trader who secretes himself or does certain other acts tending to

OF

a bankrupt is a trader who secretes himself or does certain other acts tending to
defraud his creditors, ..••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••..•• 471
hist.ory of the bankrupt laws,................................... • .•• 4i2-475
what constitutes a trader, ••.•••••••••••••••••••• : • ••••••••••••••••••.•• 4i6
the acts which constitute a man a bankrupt specified, ••••••••••••••••. 4ii-4i9n
the proceedings on a commission of bankrupt, .••••••••••••••••••••••••. 4i9-4ti5
the discharge of the bankrupt and allowances to him, ••. , • • • • • • •••.••• 482-485n
by the bankruptcy the property of the bankrupt passes to his assignees for
the benefit of his creditors, .•••••••••••••••••••••••.••••..••••. 485-488
their proceedings and final dividend, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••. 486-489

defraud his creditors, 471
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TITLE BY BANRRUPTCY, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471-489

history of the bankrupt laws, 472-475

what constitutes a trader, '. 476

the acts which constitute a man a bankrupt specified, 477-479»

the proceedings on a commission of bankrupt, 479-465

the discharge of the bankrupt and allowances to him 482-485w

by the bankruptcy the property of the bankrupt passes to his assignees for

the benefit of his creditors, 485-488

their proceedings and final dividend, 486-489

CHAPTER XXXII.

CHAPTER XXXII.

OF TITLE BY TF.STAMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 490-520

the original of testaments and administrations considered 490

they have subsisted in England immemorially ; the deceased being at liberty

to dispose of his personal estate, reserving anciently to his wife and children

their reasonable part, 491

if one died intestate, the king might seize his goods, and this right he formerly

exercised 493

afterwards he invested the prelates with this branch of his prerogative,.. 494

the prelates abusing this power, the legislature required administrators to

be appointed, 495

all persons may make a will unless disabled

1. by want of discretion, in which class is included infants under 14, if

males, and 12, if females, 496, 497

also idiots and insane persons, 497

and persons become imbecile by old age or distemper 497

and persons besotted with .drunkenness, 497

2. by want of freedom of will, in which class are married women, who

can only make testaments by license of their husbands 497

except of property which they hold en auter droit, 498

and marriage of feme sole revokes her previous will 498

3. by criminal conduct, where the punishment includes forfeiture, 499

testaments are, 1. written ; 2. verbal, or nuncupative 500

a codicil is a supplement or addition to a will, 500

nuncupative wills are now limited by statute to a few cases 501

witnesses formerly were not required to testaments of personalty, but now

they are, 501n

a testament takes effect after the death of the testator, and if there be several

testaments the last prevails 502

but a will republished dates from the republication, 502

testaments may be avoided,

1. if made by one under incapacity, 502

OP

TITLE BY TF.STAll'.F.NT AND An:111NISTRATION, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490-520

the original of testaments and administrations considered, •••••••••..•••..•••••• 490
they have subsisted in England immemorially; the deceased being at liberty
to dispose of his personal estate, reserving anciently to his wife and children
their reasonable part,.... • . . • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • . . . . • • • 491
if one died intestate, the king might seize his goods, and this right be formel"ly
exercised,. ... , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 493
afterwRrds he invested the prelates with this branch of his prerogative, .• 494
the prelates abusing this power, the legislature required administrators to
be nppointed, ........................ , .......................... 495
all persons may make a will unless disabled
1. by want of discretion, in which class is included infants under 14, if
males, and 12, if fomales, .......... . ........................ 496, 497
also idiots and insane persons, .••••••.••••••••••••••• , • • • • • • • • • • 497
and persom1 become imbecile by old age or distemper,... • • • • • • • . • • 497
and persons besotted with .drunkenness,. • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • 497
2. by want of freedom of will, in which class are married women, who
can only make testaments by license of their husbands,. • • • . • • • • 497
except of property which they hold en aukr droit,.. • • • • • • • • • • • • . • 498
and man-iage of feme sole revokes her previous will,. . • • • • • • • • • • • • • 498
3. by criminR! conduct, where the punishment includes forfeiture, ••••••• 40<J
testaments are, 1. written ; 2. verbal, or nuncupative,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 500
a codicil is a supplement or addition to a will, ............................ 500
nuncupati\·e wills are now limited by statute to a few cases, ••.••..••••••••• 501
witnei;ses formerly were not required to testaments of personalty, but now
they are, ••••••••.•..•.•••••••••••••••••••••••..••...•••••••.•••••. 50ln
a testament takes effect after tho death of the testator, and if there be several
testa111ents the last prevails,... • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • 502
but a will repu bli;;hed dates from the republication,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • 502
testaments may be avoided,
l. if mat.le by one under incapacity,..... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 502..
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Or TITLE BT TESTAMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (continued). «•«•

2. by another testament of later date 502

01'

the party lives 502

and subsequent marriage and birth of a child constitutes an implied re-

vocation, 502

an executor is he to whom another man commits by will the execution of that,

his last will and testament 503

all persons who may make wills may be executors ; also femes covert and in-

fants, even those unborn 503

but infant executors cannot act until 17, 503

if no executor is named or will act, administration is granted with the will

annexed 503

if the deceased died wholly intestate, letters of administration are issued; certain

persons being entitled thereto in order, 504

in computing kindred for this purpose the civil law is followed 504

an executor may himself appoint an executor, who will represent his testator, but

if an administrator dies, there must be new grant of administration 506

the duties of executor and administrator are nearly the same, except that the exe-

cutor must perform the will 507

the executor's authority dates from the death; the administrator's from his

appointment, 507

if one interferes with the goods of the deceased without authority, he is exe-
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T1TLB

BT TESTAMENT

AND ADMINISTRATION

(continued).

2. by another testa1nent of later date, ••••••••••.••.••••••••••••.•••• , , •
3. by cancelling or revoking; for all wills are subject to revocation so long as
the party lives,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
and subsequent marriage and birth of a child constitutes an implied revooation,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
an executor is he to whom another man commits by will the execution of that,
his last will and testament,.... • • • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • •
all persons who may make wills may be executors ; also femes COTiert and infants, even those unOOm 1 , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • • • • • • •
but infant executors cannot act until 17,. ••••••.•••..•.••••••...•••••••••
if no executor is named or will act, administration is granted with the will
annexec:l, . . • • . . • . • • • • • • . . • • • . . • • . . • • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . • • . • . . • • • • • • • . . .
if the deceased died wholly intestate, letters of administration are issued ; certain
persons being entitled thereto in order, ••••••..••••••••••.•••••••• , • • • •
in computing kindred for this purpose the civil law is followed,.... • • • • • • • • •
an executor may himself appoint an executor, who will represent his testator, but
if an administrator dies, there must be new grant of administration,.,, ••••
the duties of executor and administrator are nearly the same, except that the executor mm,it perform the will, ••.••••••••••.•.•.•.•••••••..•..•••••••••
the executor's authority dates from the death; the administrator's from his
appointment,..... • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • . • • • . • • . . • • • . •
if one interferes with the goods of the deceased without authority, he is executor de son tort, and may be made liable as executor without any of the
profits or aclvantages, ..... .....•••....• , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . • . . . . . . . .
the rightful executor must,
1. bury the deceased in suitable manner, and at suitable expense, •••• , • • • • • .
2. prove the will ; which is either in common form or per testes,..... • • • • • • . •
and if there be no will, the person entitled must take lett.ers of administration in the jurisdiction where there are b0tia notabilia,.... • • • • • • • •
3. the executor or administrator must make and file an im-entory,. •.•• ,.... .
4. he is to collect the goods and chattels; and what is collected is assets for
payment of debts and legacies,. . . . • • • • • • • • . . . • • • . • • • . • • . . • • . • • • • • •
5. he must pay the debts of the deceased in proper order: l. funeral and probate expenses; 2. debts due the king on record or specialty; 3. debts preferred by statute; 4. debts of record; 5. debts due on specialties; 6. debts
on simple contracts,.... • • • • . • • • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • • . • • • • .
but his own debt may be retained in preference to others in equal degree, .•
if a debtor be appointed executor to his creditor, his debt is released, ••••••
6. after the debts, legacies must be paid, so far as as.-;ets extend, .•..•••••.••
a legacy is a bequest or gift of goods and chattels by testament, .•..•..•
it may be general, as of a sum of money named, or specific, as of a
certain piece of plate,. •••••••.••.•••.••••••••.••.••••••••••••
if the assets are iruiufficient to pay all, the general leg11cies abate proportionably,..................... . . . • • . . • • • • • . . . . • . . • • • . . • . . • • • • • • .
if a legatee die before the testator, the legacy is lapsed and falls into the

3. by cancelling or revoking; for all wills are subject to revocation so long as

cutor de son tort, and may be made liable as executor without any of the

profits or advantages 508

the rightful executor must,

1. bury the deceased in suitable manner, and at suitable expense , 508

2. prove the will; which is either in common form or per testes, 508

and if there be no will, the person entitled must take letters of adminis-

tration in the jurisdiction where there are liumi notabilia 508

3. the executor or administrator must make and file an inventory, 510

4. be is to collect the goods and chattels; and what is collected is assets for

payment of debts and legacies, 510

5. he must pay the debts of the deceased in proper order: 1. funeral and pro-

bate expenses; 2. debts due the king on record or specialty; 3. debts pre-

ferred by statute; 4. debts of record; 5. debts due on specialties; 6. debts

on simple contracts, 511

but his own debt may be retained in preference to others in equal degree,.. 511

if a debtor be appointed executor to his creditor, his debt is released, 512

6. after the debts, legacies must be paid, so far as assets extend, 512

a legacy is a bequest or gift of goods and chattels by testament 512

it may be general, as of a sum of money named, or specific, as of a

certain piece of plate, 512

if the assets are insufficient to pay all, the general legacies abate propor-

residuum, 513

and so of contingent legacies where the contingency never occurs,... 513

a donatio causa mortis is where a person in his last illness, apprehending

his dissolution near, delivers to another possession of personal goods,

to keep in case of his decease, 514

7. when the debts and legacies are disfcharged, the surplus goes to the residu-

ary legatee, if any, 514

it not, it is to be distributed according to the statute of distributions,.514-517

in which sometimes the distribution will be per capita and sometimes per
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stirpes 517

and the customs of London and York are to be regarded, 517

No. 2. A modern conveyance by lease and release.

No. 3. An obligation or bond, with condition for the payment of money.

No. 4. A fine of lands sur cognizance de droit, come ceo, .to.

502
5()2

503
5()3

503
5()3

504
504
506

507
507

508
508
508
508
510

510

511
511

512
512
512

512
512

and so of contingent legacies where the contingency never occurs,... 513
a donatio causa rnorti.s is where a person in his last illness, apprehending
his dissolution near, delivers to another possession of personal goods,
to keep in case of hi11 decease,.......... • . . • • . • • • • . • . . • • • . • . • • • • • . 514
7. when the debts and legacies arc dis~harged, the surplus goes to the residuary legatee, if any, ..••••••••.•..••••.•••••.••••••••...•••••••••. 514
if not, it is to be distributed according to the statute of distributions,. 514-517
in which sometimes the distribution will be per capit.a and sometimes per
stfrpes, • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • . • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • . • 51 i
and the customs of London and York are to be regarded,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5 l i

if a legatee die before the testator, the legacy is lapsed and falls into the

No. 1. Vetug Carta Feoffamenti.

502

residuum,................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513

tionably 512
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No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

1. Vetus Carta Feoftkmenti.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

A modem conveyance by lease and release.
An obligation or bond, with condition for the payment of money.
A fine of lands sur cognizance de droit, come ceo, &c.
A common recovery of lands with double voucher.
A modern mortgage in fee, by appointment and release, with power of sale.

No. 5. A common recovery of lands with double voucher.

No. 6. A modern mortgage in fee, by appointment and release, with power of sale.
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A TABLE OF THE REIGNS OF ENGLISH MONARCHS.

Sovereigns. Commencement of Reign. Length of Belgn.

William I October 14, 1066,(o) II year*

William II September 26, 1087,(e) 13

Henry I, August 5,1100,(t>) 38

Stephen, December 26,1135,(b) 1»

Henry II December 19, ll.M.(li) 35

Kit-hard I Septembers, 1I89,(6) 10

John May 17, 11S9,(6) 18

Heury III October 28, 121S,(b) ft

Edward I November 16, 1271, (c) 35

K.hv.,1,111 July 8, 1307,<<r) !0

A TABLE OF THE REIGNS OF ENGLISH MONARCHS.

Edward III January 20, 1327,(c) 5]

Richard II June 22, ]377,(<:) 23

Henry IV September 30,139»,(c) 14

Henry V March 21, 14I3,(c) 10

Henry VI, September 1, 1422,<ei 39

Edward IV March 4, 1461, (c) S3

Edward V April 9,1483,(c)

Richard III June 26,H83,(c) 3

Henry Vll August 22.1485,(c) M

Henry VIH April 25, IMB.(e) 38

Edward VI January 28,1547,(e) 7
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(a) Date of the battle of Hastings.

(b) Date of coronation.

(«) Date of accession.

(d) References to the reign of Mary couple the name of her husband Philip with hers. Their marriage took plae*

Inly a, 1554.

(< j The reign of Charles II, in loga] contemplation, Includes the period of the Commonwealth.
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Chit. Cr. J.. Chitty'• (.;rit"inal Law.
Chit. Med. Juris. Chitty'• Kedl.eal Jurl.lpnMlenee.
Chit. Pl. Cblliy'a Plea•llng1.
'
Chit. Pr. Cbltt7's Ge111Jraf Pracllce.
Chit. R, Chltt~"• Kcpurt5.
Clan. Hus. and W. Clancy on Hullhaad and WI~.
Cl. and Fin. Clark &Dd ll'lnoelly, Houte Qf Lor<b
Reports.
Clarke. Clarke's Chanoery Roporta. N. Y.
Co. Cop. Coke'• Copyholder.
C<>. Ent. Co6'.e'e Entiiet.
Co. LIL Coke11poo UIUotoll, orCoke'•Lltlutimw.
Co. Coke's Report.a.
Cod. or Cod. Jur. CIY. Codex Jnria Ch11la.
Col. Cas. {;Qle1UJ1'1 C - . N. Y.
Cot and C. Coleman an•J Cah1e1•1
lf. Y.
t.;-011. Pare. Con"er 011 P1trntenhip.
Coll. or CoU. C. C. C,ollyer'• Kcpor&e, CbMOerf.
Collea.. 4.A>Uea'a C&llQ In l.'l&l'lianw!U.
Com. Co.C. Comyn 011 Coniracu.
Com. Dlir. Cotu,-11'1 Dlge1t.
Com. or Comvn. Comyo'1 lleporta.
Comb. Com6erba.eh'• Report.s.
Comst. (;oml&Oelt::'1 Bc1•orw ll-' N. T.I
Conk. Pr. Conlt::llng'1 Practice in U. S. Coaria,
Conk. Adm. Jurla. Conkllng•a .A.d1111n.lty .JurilldJe..
tion.
C-Ouo. Connecticut Reporta.
Con. and L. CounOT and La\1Jaoll'l llep9Tt8. Cb.aa·
cerv.
Conat. kep. Re~rtl otCoostltutlon&l C011n, 8. C.
Cooke, Tenn. Coo.110'1 Tenoouee ltcporta.
Coo. (;qn8'. UJll. Cooley'• Coai-tltudool&l I.hnlta-
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Com Illar. W. Cor<l on Rlgbt8 of ll11rrled Womea.
Corp. Jnr. t;h· Cor111111 J11rl11 t:h'ili11.
l:ow. Cowen'& Ucpo1U, N. Y.
Cowp. Cowper's Rev111·tsJ. K. B.
'(;ox Ch. (;ox's lie1'01·ts, ~h:uicery.
(.;ox(;. C. Cox'11 (.;rown Casee.
Coxe. Co~e·s ltcpol't.8, N. J. ·
Crabbe. Crabbe'11 Hcpor~, 11. S., F..ut Dlat. Pt>nn.
Cr. and Phil. Craig and Phillip's Kcports, Cllaoccry.
Cr. and .ilt. CnJie and Stewart's Report.I, House
ot Lord11.
Cr. or Crancla. Crancla'1 llepon., U. 8. Supremo
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Cr. C. C. or Cranch C. C. Cranch'1 Circuit Conli
Rcµorta, U. 8.
Cro. <..:ar. Crokc'a Reports, thno or Charles I.
<..:ro. J.;liz. <.:roke's Hcports, time or Jo:llz:ahctb.
Cro. Jae. (.;rokc'11 Reports, Uruc of Jarue.s I.
Crock. Sher. Crocker ou Sherill's.
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Rcpor .... t.:ii:ch.
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Crom .• .&I. au•I ll or C.1... X. and R. Crompton.
Meeson and RolCOO's ueports, Exch.
Cruise l>lg. t:rui-.e'8 Dl~•11t.
Curt. Jo.:ec. Curtlcs'8 Jo:ccleiowticAI Report.a.
Cnrt. (;. C. t.:urtis'1 Circuit ~oort Reports, U. 8.
Cnrt. ll:q. Pree. Curti1'1 Kqnl&v 1•recoo11ut1.
Curt. Pat. Curtl.11 on Patenta. •
Cush. Cushing'a Reports, Ua.u.
Cush. Leg. Aa. C11t1hlug'11 f.<>gi~lath-e .llll!Ombllet
D. (;hip. D. Chl11mrm'1 lleport.1, VL
Dal. 1Jall1100'1 lteporu. t.:ngliab.
l>aU. Dallall'.11 Kevorta. U.S. and rcnn
Dalt. J11•. or Unit. J. Daltuo'• Juatloo..
Ila.Ir. Jo;ot. Dalrylmpl" on Jo;11blila.
Dnlr. F. L. Dalrylmple on t"e11tl11l Law.
Dau. Ch. Pr. D1rnlell's <.:ha.ocery Practl~
!Jana. Uan11's lteport8, Ky.
·
Dane A.br Da11t"11 Ahrhlgmenc.
Dllrt. V. .t P. Dlll't on Veudon and Purehaeert.
Davies. Da\·lee's Kcpol'U, U . .S. DJllt. Court11.
Dav. and Mor. J..>a,lson and Mcrlrale'1 Reporta,
Eui', Q. B.
Vay. Day'• lleportll, Conn.
Dayt. Sar. l>a)ton'• Surrorte.
·
Deae. Beacon's llcpom .Kn111tsb Bankmpt.ey.
Dcac. and C. Deacon and Ch1Uy'a Repurtl!, Engtlela
Bankruptcy.
Dean Med. Juris. Deu'1 'Medical Jurts11ntdenee.
Doan. J>eur&ley'1 Ctowu Ca.ea l~1erred.
Dears. and n. Dearsley and Bell'• Crown Guel Roscr,·etl.
De G. B1mkr. De Gex•s Bankruptey Ca-.
De G., F . ftnd J . Ch. De Uex, Fl.sher and Jonee11
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De G. and J . Cb. l>e Gex aad Jones'• Chancery
Reports.
De G,. J. aDdS. Bankr. De Dex, Jones and Smith'•
Bankruptcy Cues.
De G., J, and S. Cb. De Gox, .Jones and 8mith'1
Chancery Bel>°rtl.
De G., lll. aOd G. Bankr. De Gex, lf11e11augbtoa
and Gordou•s BitnliruptcJ' Ca891.
De G., lf. and G. (,'\. De Oex, Macunghton 811cl
Gordon•a Chauoor.r Reportl.
De G. and Sm. De Gex and Smale"e Chancery Roportll.
Dea. and Sw. Deane and Swabey'a Report.II, Pro·
bate and Divorce.
Dea. or Denio. Denio'• Report!!, 11. Y.
Ven. C. C. Deolaon·1 Crown Ca891.
Dea. or Deeaua. Deaauaaure'• Equity Bepor111, 8. C.
Der. Devercux'e J..a"" Reporte, lf. C.
De... Eq. Dernreux'a Equfty Reports, N. C.
l>e\', and Bat. Dorereuii: and &ttle'a Report., N.C.
Dev. and Bat. E7. Devereux and B11ttle's Equity
Reports, N. C.
Dick. Dicken'• Rnports, Chant>ery.
Doe. and Stu. Doctor and StndcnL
dODI.
Dodi. Dodson'• Admiralty Beportl
Coop. Ch. Cooper'• Reportl, Chan~.
Dom. Ch·. 1,. Domat'i ctvll La11•.
Coop. Te•p. Broq. Cooper'• Beporta ~ Dom. Proc. Domini Proct.o!'j Cuea B&neeolLordt.
Brcingham.
Do11ic. Oonf!as's 1te11orts J\. B.
Coop. Temp. Co&&. Cooper'allepore lalpoNCoUe•· Doug. Mich. r>o11gl11~·• Michigan Reylorts.
ham.
llow or Dow P . C. ()Qw'1 Reports In P11r1lament.
Coo(J. Just. or Coop. In.at. Cooper"• l.na&Uuta of Dow anr1 C. D<>w aod Clark, Honse otLords Ca1e1.
Jo1tlniAll.
Dow and lly. nT D. and '&. Do'll'liDI an4 Ryland'I
Coo. Kort. Coo&e OD Jilortg&ge8.
RepoN, K. B.
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Co. Coke's Reports.

Cod. or Cod. Jur. Li r. Codex Juris drill*.

Col. Cas. Coleraan's Cases. N. Y.

Col. and C. Coleman and Caincs's Cases, N. T.

Uott. Part. Coflver on Parntsrship.

Coll. or Coll. C. C. Oollyer's Reports, Chancery.

Culles. Colles's Cases in Parliament.
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»><>w. and By. .N. P. Dowling and UylanJ's Nisi I Golds. Goldeslwrongh's Reports, K. B.

l'i ins Gould PI. Gonld on Pleadm

Dowl. P. C. Dowllng's Practice Coses.

Dr. and St. Doctor anil Student.

Drake Attach. Drake on Attachment*.

Dr. and Wai. Drill? and Walsh's Chancery Re-

ports. Ireland.

Dr. and War. Drury and Warren'* Chancerj Re-

ports, Ireland.

Drew. Drewry's Reports, Chancery.

Drew, and Sin. Drewry and Smale's Reports,

Chancery.

Driiry. Drury's Reports, Chancery, Ireland.

Dudley Dudley's Reports, Ga.

Dudley, S. C. Dudley's Reports, S. C.

Duer. Duer's Reports, N. V.

Duer Ins. Doer on Insurance.

Dug. Grig. Dugdale's Origines.

Diik. Duke's Law of Uses.

Dunlap Adro. Pr. Dunlap's Admiralty Prnctlce,

Du Ponceau Juris. Du Ponceau on Jurisdiction of
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United States Courts.

Hum. and East Smne as Term Reports.

Dutch. Dutcher's Reports, N.J.

I HIV. DuralTs Reports, Ky.

liwur Stat. Dwnrris on Statutes

Dy. or Dyer. Dyer's Reports.

Kost. East's Reiwrts, K. B.

East P. C. East's Pleas of the Crown.

Eden. Eden's Reports, English Ch.

K'lrn hurt, Eden on Injunctions.

Edw. Ch. Edwards's Chancery Reports, N. T.

K<hv Bail. Edwards on Bailments.

Edw. Bills. Edwards on Bills.

Edw. HIT Edwards on Receivers In Equity.

El., B. and S. Ellis, Best and Smith's Reports, Q. B.

El. and Bl. Ellis ami Blackburn Reports, 6. II.

El. B. and E. Ellis, Blackburn and Ellis's Reports,

Q. B.

El. and El. Ellis and Ellis's Reports, Q. B.

Emer. Ins. Emerigon on Insurance.

Eng. L. and K. English Law and Equity Reports.

Eq. Ca. Abr. Equity Cases Abridged.

Esp. or Esp. N. P. Espinasse's Reports.

E. T. Easter Term.

Kxch. Welsby, Hnrlstonc and Gonlon's Reports.

F. and F. Foster and Finlayson's Reports, Klsl

Pi-ius.

F. K. B. Fitzherbert's Nalnra Brevlum.

Fcarne. Fcarne on Contingent Remaiuders.

Fell Guar. Fell on Guaranties.

Ferg. Ferguson's Reports. Scotch.

Ff. Pandeclte IJuris Civllis).

Finch Ch. Finch's Chancery.

Finch or Finch L. finch's Law.

Fitxg. Fitlgibbon's Reports.

FI. or Flct. Fleta.

Fla. Florida Reports.

Fonbl. Fonolanque on Equity.

For. Forrest's Report's, Ex.

Fort, de Land. Fortescue de laudibus Angli;c

:>ow. and R;r. N. P. Dowling and R7laml'• Nial I Golils. Golole~borongh'~ Reports, K. B.
Prlua.
Gould Pl. Gonltl on .t'lead111g.
Dowl. P. C. Dowling'• Practice ea-.
Gow N. P. C. Gow'e Slel Prim Caaea.
Dr. and St Doctor RDd S'udenL.
Grans (;orp. Grant on C.:orp<>r&tlen1.
Drake Attach. l>rake on Attachmen&ll.
Grant. Grant'• l'enn. Repor&ll.
Dr. and Wal. Drury and Walah"1 Chancery Re- Grat. Gratlan's Re1>orb, Va.
ports, Ireland.
I Gmy. Gra'J.'' Re11orts, MaM
Dr. and War. Drury and Warren'• Cbancer:r Be· Green, N . . Green'• ReVor&llt..N. J.
porta. Ireland.
Green t:h. Green's l:hMcery ue)>0rta, N . .J.
Drew. D1-ewry·1 Reports, Chancery.
Greene, lown, Greene'a Iowa Reporte.
Druw. and Sm. Drewry and Smale'• Beportl, Greenl. Grcenlenrs Report<!. Me.
(;bancery.
Grcenl. ET. Greenlenron Evidence.
Dn1ry. Drnry'e Reports, Chancery, Ireland.
Gro. de J . B. Groslns de Jure &DI.
l>udley Dudley'• Kepuna, G11.
H. Bl. Henry Dlncbtone•a Reports.
D11dle7, 8. C. Dudley's Kepona, 8. C.
H. and C. Hnrlstone and Coltman•a Re]M>rta. Excb.
Duer. l>ue1"1 ReporLll, N. Y.
II. and G. or Har. and G. Burris aud Gill'e .R&Duer Joa. Duer on In111nrnce.
porte, Md.
l>ug. Orig. Dugdale'• Originea.
H. and J. or Har. and .J. Bania and .Jobnaon•a
Dnli:. Duke's I.aw of Use.!.
Reforte Md.
Dunlap A•lm. Pr. Dunlar,'s A'lmlraUy Prncllce.
H. am McH. Harri• and McHenry'a Reports. lf.I.
Du l'oncean Jnrls. Du 1 onceau on Juriadlctlon or H and S. HnrLttone anrl Sorman '1 Reporl&. .t:xch.
United Slates Courta.
H. P. C. or Hale P. C. Hale's Pica• or the Crown.
Durn. aud Eaai. Same oa Term Repon&.
II. T. or Hil. T. Hllarv 1'enn.
Dutch. Dutcber'e Reports, N. J.
H. anti Tw. Hall an•I twt'll'• Chancery Heport.!1.
Duv. Du\·a11·1 Rcpo!1.B, K7.
Hag. t:e. or lhtgg. llnggn.rd"s l:ecle..lnetlr~I ReporW.
Dwar. Stat. Dwnrrie on Statutea
HRg. l:on. Hlu:p:ard'8 Con1l1tory Reports.
Dy. or Dyer. l>yer'• Reports.
llalt". A1lm. Haggam•s A•lmlntlly Reports.
Kut Ea8t'11 Re\10rt8, K. B.
H11l. In&. L. Hulleck'11 lntcm11tlonal Law.
East P. C. Ena& 11 Plt!as of the Cro'll'll.
HRll' C. I .. Hale's Cnmmon Law.
l!:den. Edeu's Reports, English Cb.
Hale P. l:. Hale's Pleas oftbe Crown.
Eden lnjct. Eden on lujunr.tlone.
Hall. llall'I Repo1·1~. S. l".
Haist. Haldearl's UeJ>OfU, !'l . .J.
Erlw. (;h. .&hrarde'a Chancery Reporta, N. Y.
Edw &ii. E<lwanl1 on Dallmenu.
Hal!l. Ch. Hals&ead'• Chancery Bepona, N . .J.
Edw. Bille. E<hranle on Billi.
Hanlin. Hanlin'• Reporll!, Kv.
E•lw. Rec. l!:c\wardll on Ueceh·ers lo F.qully.
Hardr. or H11rd. H11rdres·1 lieporta, :Exch.
El., B. and 8. Ellis, Best111ul Smlth.e lkportll Q. B. Hare Hai-e's Rt>porte. Chnncerv.
El. an1l Bl. Ellis n11d Blackbum Heporcs, Q . h.
HArir. SS. Tr. Harirnive'a Stnte Trlala.
El. n. and E. Ellie, Blackburn and EUl11'8 Reports, H11rper. R11rper·a Urports, S. C.
Q. B.
Harr. Harrington's Ri•portll, Del.
El. an1I El. Ellis and Ellie's Report8, Q. B.
Harr. Ch. Harrington's t:hancery Rcpor111, Ulch.
Erner. Ins. Emerlgon 011 ln11urance.
Harr. N . .J Harrlto0n'a Reports. N. J.
Eng. I.. and E. E11gll11h Lllw an•I F.qul&y Reporte. llawlr.. P. C. H11wkln8'e Ple1u or the Crown.
Eq. Cu.. Abr. Equity CMes Abrl•lg'e•l.
Hnwke. Ha11·k111 Reports. N. C.
Eap. or Eep. .K. P. Eaplnaellll'1.Keporte.
H11yw. Hayw00<l"s H.4•110rts, N. C. and Tenn.
E.T. Easter Tenn.
HeR<I. HeRd·s Reports, Tenn.
1-:xch. Welsby, Hurlstono and Go"lon'11 Re.ports.
JleArd L. and S Hean! on I.lbPl 11nd Slande1.
F. an•l F. Foeter and Flnlayaon'a Rcporu, NW Hem. and M. llemmln,11.' amt Miller. Chancerv
Pri111.
Ben. aud Jtilomr. Henning and Mumfonl'a Repor&a,
F. S . B. Fitzherbert'• N11tura Brevlum.
Va.
Fearne. Fearne on (;ontlni:en' Remainders.
Het. HeUev's Reports, C. P.
Fell Gnar. Fell on Gnanmtie&.
Hill. Hlll 11'n..rorts, N. T.
)'erg. Fergnson's Ucpom, Scotch.
RllfS. C. Hill 1 South Carolina Report..
Fr. Pandeclte (Jnrl11 CIYlll•>·
Hill Ch. Hiii 's t:hane..,rv Reporta. S. C.
Finch (;h. Fln"h"a Cha11cery.
Hill. Mort. Hilliard on Mortgagee.
Finch or Finch L. •"inch's Law.
Hill. SalH. Hlllhtrd on S11les.
Flr.&g. Fltz;gibbon'a Reports.
Hill. Torts. Hilliard on Torti!.
Hill Trust. Hill on Trustet>a.
Fl. or Flet. Flebi.
Fla. Florida Reports.
Hile. Hilton'• Reporte. S. Y.
Fonbl. Fnnlll11.n<111e on F.qulty.
Hoh. Hobart's Ht•\>0rts. K. B .
For. Forrest's Re1K>rt's 1 Ex.
Holl'. Hotrmon'• <.: umcen· Report., N. T.
)'ort. de Laud. Fortescue de Ja11dlbus Aogllm i Holr. Ch. Pr. Hoft'man's ChRncory Practice.
Letrnm.
Roll. Holt's Reµortll, K. JS.
)'ort. or Fortes Fortese11e'8 Ropo!Vi K. B.
Holt N. P . Holt's Xiel Prins Reports.
Fost. 01· l"oat. C. L l"oster'11 Cn•\\·n ..il\V.
Hnpk. Hopkln's Rl'porf.tl. N. Y. Ch.
Fost. S . H . }"oater's Nt!w llRmpshlre Jfoport8.
Hon. (•. CM. Honse of J.ortlll CMCa.
1''ost. an•l F. J.-o6ter rm•l Jo"lnluon'd ll"ports, Engllah. Ho''. Sllppl. ff,,,·cn •len's Supplement to Vesey, .Jr.
}'rec. Ch~-. Freeman's ChRncery Ucporte.
How. Howal'fl"a Reporte. U. S.
Freem. Freeman's Reporti<. K. ll.
Hnw. MIN. Hownr.l's lllle· l881ppl Reports.
Froom. Ml88. Freeman'e llrlsslsslpµI Rcportll, Chan- How. Pr. HowRl'fl'• Practice Cases, N. Y.
cery.
How. St. Tr. Howell'" Stale Trlal1.
Fry Spec. Pert: Fry on Spcdllr. Pcrfonnance.
' Hughes. Hnghei.'s Heporu, Ky.
G. and J. Glyn and Jame110n'• llnnkrnptc~· BcPQrtl. Hnmph. Hnmphrey•e Rt>ports, Tenn.
Gnl. an•l lla\·. Gale anti Oan•on'• Reports, K. 11.
H11rt.I H. C. Hurd on Hnhell8 Corpus.
Gnl. and W. F.1111. Gale Hn•I Wheatlev on E1wcme11ts. Hut. Hntton '~ Report1, C. I'.
G1tll. or Galli11. Galill'On'• Reports, 'lat t:lrcult, U.S. Ill. ntlnols Re11orts.
Geo. or Gu. Georgia Reports.
Imp. K. 8. Jmpe~"R Practice, K. B
1Jmp. C. P. Jmpey'1 Pl'll"llce, C. P.
Geo. Dec. Georgfa l>em<lons.
Glf. GilrRt~l's Rcporta, (;lrnneerr.
i Imp. Sh. lmpey's 8hcrllr.
. Jmf. .t'I. Impey·a l'lcRder.
Gilb. C. P. Gilberl"11 Common P)ea1.
Gilh. JC. R. Gilliert'• Kh11(1 Jlm1ch .
In• . Indiana lteports.
Glib. Ch. Gllhert'11 l:hRncery Rcporta.
11. 2, Inst. (l, 2 ) Coke'11 Jn11tltn~.
Gilh. Rem . Glll>ert on llem&l111len.
Inst. J, 2. S, Justinian's lnetltutes, lib. I, tit. t,
Glib. Us. Gilbert on Usca.
1ec. S.
I Iowa. Iowa Reports.
Giii. Giii's Report.a, Md.
Gill an•I J . <>r G. and J. Giii and Jobnaon•a Ro- i J . an•I W. or JRc. nnd W. Jacob and Walter'• Reports. Md.
:
poru. Ch1mcory.
. Jae. The reign nr King Jnmes.
Glim. Gllm:m's Repor&e, 111.
Gilmer. Gllmer's Rcporta. Va.
Jae. or Jacob. Jncob's Reports, Chanoerv.
Gilpin. Gllpln'a Uep<\rts. U. S. Diet. Penn.
•
1JRc. L. D. Ja~ob'a Law Dfetlonary.
James. Const. Con. Jame110n on Coll8tltntlonal
GIRnv. GIRn\·ille de Leglbus.
Godb. Godoolt'e lle)>orte, K. B.
CoDTentlona.

I

I

Legum.

Fort, or Fortes Fortescne's Report*. K. B.

Fost. or Fost. C. L. Foster's Cmwn Law.

Fost. N. H. Foster's Ne\r Hampshire Reports.

Fost. and F. Foster nnd Flnlason'e Reports, English.

Free. Chy. Freeman's Chancery Reports.

Ki rcm. 'Freeman's Reports. K. B.
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Jeff. Jefferson's Reports, Va.

Jcr. Eq. Jeremy's Equity Jurisdiction.

Jenk. Jenkins's Reports, Exch.

Johns. Johnson's Reports, N. T.

Johns, rh. Johnson's Chancery Report*, N. T.

Johns. CBS. Johnson's Cases, N. T.

Johns. Ch. Kng. Johnson's Chancery Reports,

English.

Johns, and H. Johnson and Homing's Bcportf,

English Chancery.

Jones L. Jones's Law Reports, N. C.

Jones Eq. Jones's Equity Reports, N. C.

Jones, T. Sir T. Jones's Reports. K. B.

Jones, W. Sir W. Jones's Report*, K. B.

Jur. The Jurist.

Jur. N. S. Jurist. New Series.

Just. Inst. Justinian's Institutes.

Kay. Kay's Reports. Chancery.

K«y and J. Kuy and Johnson's Reports, Chancery.

Keb. Kcblc'8 Reports, K. B.

Keen. Keen's Reports, Rolls Court.
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Kcilw. or KeU. Kcilway's Reports. K. B.

Kel. Sir John Kclynge's Reports, K. B.

Kelly. Kelly's Reports. Ga.

Kent. Kent's Commentaries on the T.uws of the

United States.

Kern. Kcrnan'e Reports (10-14 N. T.)

Kirby. Kirby's Reports, Conn.

I. J. R. Law Journal Reports.

La. Lane's Reports, Exchequer.

La. An. Louisiana Annual Reports.

I.at Latch's Reports, K. B.

Law Juris. Law on Jurisdiction of the United
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I/I. Ken. Kenyon's Reports, K. B.

I.'I, Kayra. Lord Raymond's Reports, K, B.

Leach. Leach's Crown I ,:i\v.

Lead. Cas. Eq. 1-ciuJlng Cases In Equity.

Lee. Lee's Consistory Reports.

Leigh. I.cijrhv Reports, Va.

I.i'ini. Leonard's Reports. K. B.

Lev. Levinz's Reports, K. B.
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Lew. Tr. Lewln on Trusts and Trustees.

Ley. Ley's Reports, K. B.

Lilt. Liittell's Reports. Ky. or Littleton.

Litt. Set. Cas. Littell's Select Cases, Ky.

Lind. Part. LimHey on Partnership.

Lofft. LofTt's Reports, K. B.

Lube Eq. PI. Lube's Equity Pleading.

Lush. Lushington's Admiralty Report*.

Lut. Lutwych's Reports, C. P.

M. D. and D. Montague, Deacon and DoGex's Re-

ports. Bankruptcy.

M. ami Mo A. Monta'gue and Mr Arthur's Reports.

Bankruptcy.

M. and Ayr. It. Montague and Ayrton's Reports,

Bankruptcy.

II. and S. or Man. and S. Maule and Selwyn's Re-

ports, K. B

.Jd. Jell'enon's Reports, Va.
,Jcr. Eq. Jeremy's Equity Jnrisdlctloo.
Jenk. Jeukl1111•a Reports, E:rch.
Johns. Johnaou's Ht>porlJ!, N. T .
Johns. <;:II. Johnaon'!' C~ant".ery Reporta, N. Y.
Johns. t:as. Johneous Cues, N. Y.
Johns. t:h. Enc. Johnson's ChanC1!1'7 Reports,
Englleb.

Johns. and U. Johnson and Heming"• Roporta,
Enirllsh Chancery.
Jones L. Jones'e Law Reports, N. C.
Jonea Eq. Jont!8's l!:qnltv Reporta, N. C.
Jones. 1'. Sir T. Jonea•s'Reporta. K. B.
JonCll, W. Sir W. Jone1'a Reporta, K. B.
Jur. The Jurist.
Jnr. N. S. Jurist. New Serles.
Just. Inst. JusLlnlan'11 IneLltutes.
Kay. Kay's Reports. Chancery.
Kay and J. Kay and Joh11son'11 Reports, Chancery.
Keb. Keble'11 Report&, K. 8.
Keen. Keen's Re.J><?rle, Rolls Court.
Kellw. or Kell. Kcllway'11 Reports. K. B.
Kel. Sir John Kelyn,e'11 Reports, K. B.
Kelly. Kelly's Heportll. Ga.
Kent. Kent's Commentaries on the Laws or the
Unit<•d Stales.
Kem. Kemnn's Reporta (10-H N. Y.!
Kirt>r. Kirby's Reports, Conn.
L J. R. Law Journal Kr.porta.
La. l.ane's Reports, Exchequer.
La. An. Louisiana Annual Reports.
Lat. Latch's Reports, K. B.
Law Juris. Law on Jurisdiction or the United
States Conrte.
Loi. Ken. Kenyon's Reports, K. B.
Ltl. Uaym. J..ord Raymond's Reports, K. B.
Leach. Leach's Crown I.aw.
Lead. Cas. Eq. J.ea<lln1t Cases in Eqult7.
Lee. Lee's Consistory Reports.
Leigh. Lelsh's HeportA, Va.
I.eon. J..oonam's Reports, K. B.
Le\". Levinz's Reports, K. B.
Lew. C. C. 1.ewln's Crown Cues.
Lew. Tr. Lewin on Tru1ta and Tru11tee1.
Ley. Ley'a HeJ>Orts. K. R.
Lin. LllU.cll's Rcporta.. Ky. or Littleton.
Litt. Sel. Cu. Littell'& Select Cases, Ky.
Lind. Part. I.lndley on Partnership.
Loirt. Loll't'a Jll•porlJ!, K . 8 .
Lube E't Pl. Lube's Equltv Pleailinlf.
Lnah.
ushlngton'e Admiralty Reporta.
Lut. Lutwych'a Report.II, C. P.
11. D. and D. Jl.fontague, Deacon and DeGex•s Re·
ports. Bankruptcy.
M. anit Mc A. Montague and McArthur'a Roporta.
BAnkrup~y.

Melp, M'f'lg11's Report11. Tenn.
Mer. or MeriY. Merh"ale's Reports ChanCOl'J.
Met. Con. Netr.11lf on Contractll.
Mel. or Mete. Metcalf'& Reports, Ha.u.
Met. Ky. Metcalf's Reporu, Ky.
.Micb. ldichll.{an Reports.
Mich. T. Mlchaclmne Term.
llliles. Miles'• Reports, Pa.
Minn. Minnesota Reports.
Mis. or Mo . .Ml11~011rl Reportll.
Miss. Miul88lp11l Reports.
Mitt. or Mitt. Pl. MirCord'a Pleadlnp.
Mo. Ml880\1rl Reporlll.
Mod. llc>tlern ReporL8, K . D.
Moore. Moore's JWporta. K. B.
Mont. D. C. )lontngue·e Banknrptcy Cases.
Mont. anti B. Montague &11d Bligh's Reports, Bank·
n1ptcy.
Mont. and Chit. Montague and Chitty'& Reports,
Bankruptcy.
Monte6q. Monte~qleu, E.,,,.U ~ ~.
Moo. C. C. Moodv's Crown C11&es.
Moo. and M. or M. and M. Moody and Jlalkln'I
Reports, N . P.
Moo. and R. or M. and B. Moody and Roblnaon'1
Reports, N . P.
Moo. J. B. J.B. l1Ioore'11 Reports, C. P.
Moo. and P. Moore 11nd Payne's Reports C. P.
Moo. and S. llloore and Scott's Reports. C. P.
Moore C. P. Moore's Common Plel\8 Reports.
Morris. Morris's Iowa Reporu.
Mos. Moseley's Keporta, Chancery.
Munt. Munfortl's Reports, \'a.
lllurph. Mnrp_hy'a Reports, N. C.
Myl. and Cr. Mylne amt Craig's Rcpom, Chancery.
Myl. anti K. Mylne anti J(ef'ne's Reports, Chancery.
N. Benl. New Benloc, K. B. Reports.
N. Chip. N. Clllpman's Reports, VL.
N. H . New Hampshire Reports.
N. J. New Jersey Reports.
N. S. New Serles.
N. Y. New York Reports.
Neb. N"braaka Reports.
Ncla. :Sclson'' Reports. Chancery.
N. and lllcC. ·Nott and '.McCord'& Reports.
NeY. anit M. Neville and M11nnln~·s Reports, K. B .
Nc:w. and P. Neville an•t Perry's ReporlJ!. K. :B.
Newb. Newberry'& Arlmlrally Reports, u. S.
NorLh. Northington's Heports, by Kden, Chancery.
Noy. :Soy'• Rer.oru. K. B.
Noy Max. Noy•s Maxims.
0. Beul. Old Benloe. C. P.
Ohio. Ohio Reports:
Ohio N. 8. or Ohio St. Ohio Rcporte New Serles.
Olr.ott. Olcott'& lteporta, llist. otN. T.
Oil'. Br. Otllcina BreTlnm.
Op. Att.-Gen. Oalclal Opinions or .Mtorney-Gen·
eral oCU. S.
Ord. Med. Juris. Ordronaux'1 Mtldlcal Jnrlspru·
deuce.
Ori. Brldlflllan. Orlando Bridgman's Reports, C. P.
Overt. Ovcrron'1 Reports. Tenn.
Ow. Owen's Reports, K. B.
P. C. Pleas of the Crown.
P. and n. or Per. and Dav. Perry and Davl1on'1
·Heportii, K. B.
P. Wms. Peere Wllllam111 Reportll, Chancery.
P1dge, Paige'• ReporlJ!, N. Y., Chancery.
PBlne. Paine's Reports, U . S., !d Circuit.
Pal. or Pal:n. Palmer's Repor&e, K. B.
Pal. Ag. Paley on Agency.
Par. or Pork. Parker's Reports, Exchequer.
PRrk ln1. l'ark on lnsnnmee.
Park. Cr. Pnrker's Criminal Reports, N. Y.
Pare. Con. Parsons on Contnt.,u.
PRra. Mer. J,, Panont on Mercantile Law.
Pars. Mar. L. Parsons on Maritime J.u.-.
Para. N. and B. Paraon1 on Bille of Exchange and
Prom1880ry Notes.
Pat. and H. Patton an•l Heath's Reports, Va,
Pea. N .. P. C. l'l'ak's Nial l'rlna Cases.
Peck. Peck's Reports. Tenn,
Penn. l'ennsylvanla Reports.
Penn. SL l'ennHylvanla Stllte Reports.
Penn. N. J. Pennington'• N1l\v Jersey Reports.
Pet. Peters'" ltt>porte. U. S.
Pet. C . .C .. Peters'& Clrenlt Conrt RRports.
Phil. Phillipa's Repom, Chancery.
Phil . and M. or P . and M. The relrn otPhlWp and

ll. and Ayr. K. Montague and Ayrton's Reports,
Bankruptcy.
Iii. and S. or Mau. and S. llaule and Selwyn'• Reports. K. B
Iii. and W. or Mee. and W. Meason and Wellsby'e
Reports. Ex.
)fcCle. )lcCleland'a Reports. Ex.
llct:le. and Yo. )lcCleland and Younge'• Reporta,
E:t.:.
McLean. l\lcLean'a Reports, lT. S.
Mac. and G. Macnaghten and Gordon'• lleporta,
Chancery.
Hack. R. L. Maclcen1tle'11 Roman Law.
Macl. and B.. Haclean and Robinson'• Scotch
Appeals.
Maeq. H. I,. C. Mar.queen'& Scotch Appeal Cales.
.M1uh1. .Madtloclc's Reports, Chancery,
Madd. Ch. Ma1ldock'11 Ch1rnr.erv Practice.
Hnn. and G. Manning an1l Gnanger'• IWports. C.P.
lltan. and R. Manning and Ryland'• lleports, K.B.
Manw. Manwoo<l's Forest l.awa.
Mar. March'& Reriorts, K. B .
Manh. MArshAll'e Reports, C. P.
M 11rsh. In. H1m1hall on Jnsnranr.c.
)fart. S. C. Martin's lleporlJ!, N. C.
111\rt. LA. Marttn•1 lteports, 1.a.
Kart. and Yerg
MBrtln and Yerger'• Beports,
Tenn.
Hu. Mason's Repol'h, lat Circuit, U. 8.
Mn1111. H&1-tllleh1111eu.11 1teporu.
M11.11. nnd Pol. Sh. Kaude and Pollock's Law of
· ShlpJlinir.
Md. Marvli1nd Report.I.
Jild. Ctr. 'Marylan<t (;bancery Reporta.
MarT.
Ph. Ev. "or Phil Ev. Ph!Ulp11'a Evidence.
lie. Ualue lleportM.

H. and W. or Mee. and W. Meeson and Wcllsby's

Reports. Ex.

McClc. McCleland's Reports. Ex.

McCle. and Yo. McClcland and Younge's Reports,

Ex.

McLean. McLean's Reports, U. S.

Mac. and G. Macnaghten and Gordon'! Reports,

Chancery.
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Phil. Ins. Phillips nn Insurance. i geld. Selden's Reports, (S-10 N T.)

r lull. Int. L. Plilllimore on International Law. Selw. N. P. Selwyn's Xisi Prins.

Phllllm. or Phill. EC. PhiUimore's Reports, Kccle- Set. Ca. Select Cases. Chancery.

.

statical.

Pick. Pickering's Reports. Mass.

Plowd. Plowden's Reports. K. B.

Pol. Pollexfen's Reports, K. B.

Pol. L. N. Poison's Law of Nations.

Poph. Popham's Reports, K. B.

Port. Ala. or Port. Porter's Alabama Reports.

Poll). Ob. Polhler on Obligations.

Poth. Part. Pothier on Partnership.

Pr. Ch. Precedents in Chancery, (Finch.)

Pres. dm v. Preston's Conveyancing.

Pres. Est. Preston's Estates.

Fres. Shep. T. Sheppitrd's Touchstone, by Preston.

Price or Pr. Price's lloports, Exchequer.

Q. B. Adolphus and Ellis'* Reports. New Series.

Q. B. I )>|i C. Queen's Bunch Reports, Upper

Canada.
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R. I. Rlnide Island Reports.

Raud. Kamlolph's Reports, Va.

Rawle. Kawlr's l!i-|,.,i t -, Pa.

Rawlo Cor. Knwle on Covenants for Title.

Ray. T. Sir Thoa. Raymond's Rcjiorts, K. B.

Ray Med. Jnr. Ins. Ray's Medical Jurisprudence

of Insanity.

Redf. Ex. RedUeld on Executors and Adralnlstra-

Redf. Railw. Redfleld on Railways.

Rerlf. Snr. Rcdfluld's Surrogate Reports, N. Y.

Redf. Wills. Reitfle!d on Wills.

Rcer. Hist. E. L. Reeves's History of English Law.

Reeve Dom. Rel. Uecre's Domestic Relations.

Reg. Brer. Register of Writs.

Rep. Coke's Reports.

Rep. Con. Ct. Report* of Constitutional Court, S. C.

Rep. Temp. Finch. Finch's Reports, Chancery.

Rice. Rice's Reports. S. C.

Rich. Richardson's Reports, S. C.

Rich. Eq. Richardson's Equity Reports, S. C.

Riley. Riley's Reports. S. C.

Rob. Aidn. Robinson's Reports. Admiralty. (See

•' C. Rob. Adm." and "W. Hob. Adm "

Rob. Ap. Robertson's Report* of Appea

-•---. iinhertson'8 Ecclesiastical Re

K"lfi t~ on Frauds.

Reports.

Rob. Ecc.

Rub. Fr.

Rob. i.;i Robinson's Louisiana Reports.

Rob. V;i, Robinson's Virginia Reports.

Roll. Rolled Reports.

Roll. Abr. Rulle'8 Abridgment.

Rop. Leg. Roper on Legacies.

Root. Root's Reports. Conn.

Ko.-. Cr. Ev. Kuscoe's Criminal Evidence.

Run. I'i.ieei. Runnington's Kjectnicnt.

Rush. Rushworth's Collection.

RUM. RubaeU's Reports C'liiim-ery.

Rnss. Cr. I.. Russell on Crimes.

Phil. Ins. Phillips on lnMrance.
Phlll. Int. L. Ph1lllmore on International Llnr.
Phllllm. or Phill. Ee. 1•11JUlmore'1 B.epona, Eocl&slastical.
"
Pick. l'ickcrlng'<1 Reports, Maas. ·
Plowd. l'low•hm'a lleports. K. B,
Pol. Pollcxrrm's Rrporta, K. B.
Pol. L. N. J'ol~o11's Lllw of Natlona.
Poph. Poph11111'<1 Ueporta, K. B.
·
Po1t. Ala. or Port. Po1·&er's Alab11ma Beportl.
Poth. Ob. Pothier on OblijpUions.
Poth. Part. Po,bier oo P11.rtner11bl1J. .
l'r. Ch. Precedents in Chancery. lfinch.)
Pres. ConY. Preston's ConYeyr.nciDf.
P1-es. to:st. Pre~ton 'a Kst.lltes.
P1-es. 8h«if.. T. She1•pNnl'e Touchstone. b7 Prellion.

Price or I r. Prlc11'11 Uoports, Kxchequor.
Q. B. Atlolphus and F.llis's Reports. New Serlo1.
Q. B. Up11. C. Q11.cen'e .Bclncb .Reporra. Upper
Cannila.
R. I. Rhode Island Report.a.
Band. 1ta111tolph'a Report&, Va.
Uawle. H&,,.·w" ft.cpo1·t~. Pa.
Rawle Cov. H1n•do on (;o\·onanta fbr Title.
Bay. T. t!lr Tboa. lla)'mo111J•a Rc~rta, K. B.
Hay Med. Jnr. Ins. Ra)''I Medical Jariaprudeoce
of Insanity.
Bed!. Ex. Redfield on Exeentora and AdmlnJstra·

tors.
Redr. lfallw. Rootlold on Rallwava.

Reclf. Sur. RcillMd "11 Surrogate

Ucilf. Willi.

Redlle~d

on Willa.

&porta, N. Y.

Seid. Seldc11'e Report.I~ (6-10 N T.1
Selw. N. P . Selwyn'• :Slel Prl118.
Sel. Ca. Select c.:aee1, Chanoerr,
Seid. Sehten.
8er1f&. ColuL L. Se~t 011 Con1U&ut.lonal Law.
Se81. Cu. Se&Slons Casea.
Seu. CU. Sc. Scotch Scsalo.ns Cases.
t!haw App. Shaw's lteporta. House oCJ.orda.
Sb. amt McL. Sbaw and McLean'• Reporte, Houe
otJ,ord1.
Shaw, W. nnd S. Shaw, Wlllon and Shaw•a Report., HMJllO of Lords,
Shear. and R. Meg. Shearman and Bedleld Oil
Negligence.
Shep. Touch. Shepard's Touchstone.
Show. Shower's Rcpon., K. B. ·
Show. P. C. Showe1·'s Parllamontary C--.
Sirl. Slderllu's Reporta, X. B.
Sim. Simo11111, Bepol'W, Chari~.
Sln1. and S. Simone ana Stel\·&rt 11 Reporia, Choen·
Skin. Skinner'• Reportll K. B.
Sm. and G . Smale and Gl1rard'1 Deport.I, Chaaeel'J'.
Sm. Con. SmlLh on Contracl.8.
Sm. Lead. c.:aa. or SmUb Lead. Cu. Smllh'I Lead.Ing Cuea.
Sm. Mero. I.aw. Smith'• HeroanWe J..aw.
Smith. Smlth"e Reporu, K. B.
Sneed. Sneed's Reports, Tenn.
South. &uth1ud's lleports. N. J.
Sp. L. Monte~uien, EqwU ctu LoU.
8µeen. Speeni e Rt>po.-ts, S. C.

Ree,. Hist. E. L. 11o111·es·a History orEnirllsh Law. Spoon Kq. 8'>een'• E:c111lty Report.I 8. C.

Reevo Dom. Rel. lle!'~e·~ Dowt9tlo Belatloua.
ltllg. Brei'. llegl.lter of W rt ta.
Rep. (;()ke'a K<'porta.
Rep. Con. Ct. Reporlll of Con1tl&ntlonal Court, 8. C.
Rep. Temp. f'inch. Finch'• Be1>orta, Chancery.
Rice. Uicc's Rept•rts. 8. C.
Rich. Kichardson's Report.'!.. S. C.
Rich. Eq. Wd1an1so11's E•tnlty Reporta., 8. C.
Riley. Rlley'd ROJ>Ol' lli. s. c.
Roll. Adm. Robinson's Reportl. AdmirallJ. !Sae
"(). Rob. Adm." an1l "W . .11ob. Adm")
Rob. Ap. Robcrtaon 11 ReporM! of Appeals.
Roll. Eoo. Bobert....00'1 Er~cloalaetloal Hcport..
Ruh. Fr. Roberta on Frauds.
·
Roll. J..a. Rollinson'• 1..ouiaiana Hepol1L
Rob. Va. Robinson's Virginia Beportt.
Roll. Rolle'~ Reporta.
Roll. Ahr. Rollo's AbrldgmeaL
Rop. Leir. Roper on Lefaieles.
Root. Root'a Ueporta. Conn.
RoiL Cr. Ev. Jf.01Cne'1 Crilnlnal Evidence.
Hnn. l!:Jcmt. RunningtoD'e lijocC111en~
Rush. Kushworth's C.:Ollcctloo.
lluu. Ruuuli"& Reports. Cbanceey.
Russ. Cr. J,, R1188ell on Crimes.
Kuu. and H.• or&. and R. C. C. RUSIOll and Byan•1
Crown Cases.
R:f. II'. or Rym. Foecl. R1mer11 Fnedora.
Ry. ancl M. or R. and Moo. Kyan W1d Xoody'• .Nial
Prins He1>11rta.
·
S. C. Same Case.

s. c . c. Setoec C!laneery c....

8. P. Same Point or Pnnelple.
S. and K. or Smedel and X. Smedel and ManbaU'I
Rc!port.I, MW...
8. and R. or :se~. and & Serpan& and Kawle'•
Keportll, Pa.
S. and S., or Sim. and SL Simona and Stuarc.•s
Re1iorta, Chance,.,..
8. and Sm. Senrle aild SmltlJ.'1 Bepona, Probate
and rnvorce. .
Salk. Salkeld's Rcporta. X:. B.
Sandt. SAll4l>rd Superior Coure Jleport., N. Y.
Samit. Ch. Saadlord'1 Cha11cory Kepol1d.
S.11nd. 8auoden'• lleporta. JL, 8;
Saund. U. and T. Sannrlcra on u- and Trnl&a.
Sav. Sa'"lll•'• Reporta, c. P.
Say. Sayer'• Repor&e. K. B.
..
Saxton or Saii:. Cb. S&x&ou'a CbUteel'J Beporta,
N.J.

Scam. SoammOD'a Bepo&U. ID.
.
Sch. aud I.et. 8choiale1 and Lefrc>y'• Reports,
Chancery, trelnnd.
Serlb. Dow. 8crlbaer on Dower.
Scrh·. Cop. Scrivea oo ibe Law ofCop7hold.
8edg. Dama. S..lgwlot on the )(e-1"' of" DamftllllB.
Sedl!'. St. and Cone. L. Sedgwick Oil Statnlory and
Con1tJmiionll i.w.

Spence Eq. Spence's Equftlilile Juri.dlcdon.
Sjl<lncer. Spencer'a Re11orta, N. J.
S1JCI. or Spelman'• m-r7.
Sprague. Sprague'• Admiralty Deolllona, U.
St. Tr. Slate Tl"ials.
Stark. C. L. Startle'• Crlmh11l Law.
Stark. Ev. Startle'& Evidence.
Stark. N. P . Starklo'e Nlsl Prlus Repone.
Stat. at Largo. United Sta&es 'tatu&es at Larso.
Stepb. Com. Sterhen'• Commentarle•.
Ste1>h. Pl . S&ef.ben on Plea1llng.
81.ew. Stewart 1 Reporta. Ala.
Stew. Adm. L. C. Stewart'• Admiralty, Lo,,..
Canada.
Stew. and P. Stewart and Port.er'• Repo1t11, Al&.
r!tock. Stookton's Hepone. N. J.
Story. Story's Reporu. 18& Clro11lt. U. 8.
Story Ag. Story on A.pncr.
Story Ball. Storv on &llmentl.
St.ory Coaft. L. Atory's ConGict orI.aw1.
Story Const. Stol]· on the Constitution.
Story Eq. Jarla. 1j&ory'11 Equity Jurieprud~
Story F.q. Pl. Story's EqnUy Ple1utlna.
Story Pr. N. Story'• Promillllory Nolel.
Str. or Stra. 8trange's Reporl.8. K. B.
Stroh. Strobharl"s Reports. S. C.
Stroh. F.q. StrobhRrt's F.qul&y Reporta, 8. C.
S~y. Style'• UeJ>Orll!, IC. B.
Sug. V. anrl P. Sugden on Vondor11 and Pqrchuen.
Sug. P. Sulf'IOn on Powers.
Sumo. Sumner'• Reportll lat Circuit, U. 8.
Swa. Ad. Swabey's Aflm ralty ReJ>ol'W.
Swa. and Tr. '-wabey aod Tria1·un•a Roporta.
Probllte and Dh·orce.
Swan. 8\l'ao•1 Re~ns, Tenn.
8w11n1. SwansCo1111 Rot>Ortll. Cha&C81'1.
Swlu. Swinllumc on Willa. ·
T. 8. lllonr. T, B. llfonroe11 Report.I. J[y.
T. and M. Temple and U'ew'11 Criminal Appea.
C&&es.
T . R. Tonn Rl>por'8, (Dumtord and EA&tl. K. B.
T. Rayin. Sir T. Raymond'• R.eporl&.
Talb. TAibot's Re)lOrtl.
Tami . Tamlyn•a Heports, BoUs.
Tapp. O. Tappan'• Repone, o . .
Tnun. Tannton's Beporta, C. P.
Tnyl. Med. Jnris. Tnylor'1 Mectlcal Jorl11pmrtenoe.
Tayl. L . 1rnd T. T11.ylor111 Landlord and Tenanl
Temp. and M. Temple and lllew•a Crown c--.
Tenn. Tenneuee Reports.

Tex. Tena lk>porta.
Thach. C.:. C. Thatcher'• Criminal Ca-. x-.
Thoma. N. S Thomrwion'a Beportl, Nora lk.otia.
TMd Pr. Tl•kl's Practice.
Tit and B. Tr. Tllrsny and Bollard Oil TruR an•

Trn1tee1.
Todd Parl. Goy. Todd's Partlamen&Aey Gov. . .
ment In Bagtand.

KH.-S. ami 1!.. or K. and R. C. C. Unwell and Ryan's

Crown Cases.

Ry. F. or Kim. Foed. Rymcr's Foedcra.

Ry. anil H. or R. and Moo. Ryan and Momly'n Nisi

Prins Kepnrts.

S. C. Same Case.

S. C. C. Select Chaiwery Cases.
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Town. S. and I-. Townsend on Slander and Libel.

Trtn. T. or T. T. Trinity Tenn.

Troub. I.. P. Troabat on Limited Partnership.

Turn, and It. Turner and Iiu.»dl's Reports, Chan-

cery.

Tyler. Tyler's Reports, Vt.

Tyler EC. L. Tyler's American Ecclesiastical Law.

Tyl. Inf. and Cov. Tjlcr on Infancy and Coverture.

Tyrw. Trrwhitt's Reports, Exchequer.

Tyrw. mnn G. Tyi«liiu and Granger's Reports, Ex-

chequer.

V. and B. or Yes. and Be*. Vesey and Beames's

Reports. Chancery.

Va. C'as. Virginia Cuses.

Val. L. V Vatlel's Law of Nations.

Vaii.nl' Vaughn's Reports. C. P.

Vent. Ventns's Report*, K. B.

Vcs. Sen. Vesey Sen.'s Reports, Chancery.

Ves. J. or Ves. Vesey Jim.'.-, Reports, Chancery.

Vet. N. Br. Old Natura Breva.

Vern. Vemon's Reports, Chancery
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Vern. and S. Vernon and Scrlven'g Reports, K. B.,

Ireland.

Tin. Abr. Vlner's Abridgment.

Vin. Sup. Viner's Supplement.

Vt. Vermont Reports.

W. Bl. Wm. Bla<-kstone's Reports.

W. H. and G. WeUby, Hurlstone and Gordon's

Reports.

W. Jones. W. Jones's Reports.

W. R. Weekly Reporter iu nil the Conrts.

W. Rob. Ailm. Wm. Robinson's Admiralty Re-

ports.

Town. 8. and J,, Towneen., on Sluder and Libel. Wend. Wendell's Reports, N. Y.
Trtn. T. or T. T. Trinity Tenn.
Went. Ex. Wentwortb'• l!:xecntor.
Troub. L. P. Troabat oo Limited Partnenihlp.
We.it H. L. We•fa Reports Holl86 orLords.
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INTRODUCTION,

OF THE STUDY, NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

SECTION 1.

ON THE STUDY OF THE LAW.-

ME. VICE-CHANCELLOR AND GENTLEMEN OF THE UNIVERSITY:

THE general expectation of so numerous and respectable an audience, the

novelty, and (I may add) the importance of the duty required from this chair,

must unavoidably be productive of great diffidence and apprehensions in him

who has the honour to be placed in it. He must be sensible how much will

depend upon his conduct in the infancy of a study, which is now first adopted

by public academical authority, which has generally been reputed (however

unjustly) of a dry and unfruitful nature, and of which the theoretical, elemen-

tary parts have hitherto received a very moderate share of cultivation. He

cannot but reflect, that, if either his plan of instruction be crude and injudicious,

or the execution of it lame and superficial, it will cast a damp upon the further

progress of this most useful and most rational branch of learning, and may

defeat for a time the *public-spirited design of our wise and munificent r *. -.

benefactor. And this he must more especially dread, when he feels by «• J

experience how unequal his abilities are (unassisted by preceding examples) to

complete, in the manner he could wish, so extensive and arduous a task; since

he freely confesses that his former more private attempts have fallen very short

of his own ideas of perfection. And yet the candour he has already experienced,

and this last transcendent mark of regard, his present nomination by the free
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and unanimous suffrage of a great and learned university (an honour to be ever

remembered with the deepest and most affectionate gratitude), these testimonies

of your public judgment must entirely supersede his own, and forbid him to

believe himself totally insufficient for the labour at least of this employment.

One thing he will venture to hope for—and it certainly shall be his constant

aim—by diligence and attention, to atone for his other defects: esteeming that

the best return which he can possibly make for your favourable opinion of his

capacity will be his unwearied endeavours in some little degree to deserve it.

The science thus committed to his charge, to be cultivated, methodized and

explained, in a course of academical lectures, is that of the laws and constitution

of our own country—a species of knowledge in which the gentlemen of Eng-

land have been more remarkably deficient than those of all Europe besides. In

most of the nations on the continent, where the civil or imperial law, under

different modifications, is closely interwoven with the municipal laws of the

land, no gentleman, or at least no scholar, thinks his education is completed till

he has attended a course or two of lectures, both upon the Institutes of Justinian

•It.'n.i In Oxford at the opening of the Vlncrlnn Iroturoi, 25th of October, 1768. The author had been

elected first Viiiurian professor the 20th of October previously.
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and the local constitutions of his native soil, under the very eminent professors

that abound in their several universities. And in the northern parts of our

own island, where also the municipal laws are frequently connected with the

civil, it is difficult to meet with a person of liberal education, who is destitute

of a competent knowledge in that science which is to be the guardian of thxs

natural rights and the rule of his civil conduct.

,-«, g-, *Nor have the imperial laws been totally neglected even in the English

L •" nation. A general acquaintance with their decisions has ever been deserv-

edly considered as no small accomplishment of a gentleman; and a fashion has

prevailed, especially of late, to transport the growing hopes of this island to

foreign universities, in Switzerland, Germany and Holland; which, though infi-

nitely inferior to our own in every other consideration, have been looked upon

as better nurseries of the civil, or (which is nearly the same) of their own muni-

cipal law. In the mean time, it has been the peculiar lot of our admirable

system of laws to be neglected, and even unknown, by all but one practical

profession; though built upon the soundest foundations, and approved by the

experience of ages.

Far be it from me to derogate from the study of the civil law, considered

(apart from any abiding authority) as a collection of written reason. Xo man

is more thoroughly persuaded of the general excellence of its rules and the usual

equity of its decisions, nor is better convinced of its use as well as ornament to

the scholar, the divine, the statesman, and even the common lawyer. But we
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must not carry our veneration so far as to sacrifice our Alfred and Edward to

the names of Theodosius and Justinian; we must not prefer the edict of the

praetor, or the rescript of the Roman emperor, to our own immemorial customs,

or the sanctions of an English parliament; unless we can also prefer the des-

potic monarchy of Rome and Byzantium, for whose meridians the former were

calculated, to the free constitution of Britain, which the latter are adapted to

jxjrpetuate.

Without detracting, therefore, from the real merits which abound in the

imperial law, I hope I may have leave to assert, that if an Englishman must be

ignorant of either the one or the other, he had better be a stranger to the

Roman than the English institutions. For I think it an undeniable position,

r,gn that a competent knowledge of the laws of that society *in which

L J we live, is the proper accomplishment of every gentleman and scholar ;

a highly useful, I had almost said essential, part of liberal and polite education.

And in this I am warranted by the example of ancient Rome; where, as Cicero

informs us, (a) the very boys were obliged to learn the twelve tables by heart, as

a carmen necessarium or indispensable lesson, to imprint on their tender minds

an early knowledge of the laws and constitution of their country.

But, as the long and universal neglect of this study with us in England

seems in some degree to call in question the truth of this evident position, it

shall therefore be the business of this introductory discourse, in the first place

to demonstrate the utility of some general acquaintance with the municipal law

of the land, by pointing out its particular uses in all considerable situations of

life. Some conjectures will then be offered with regard to the causes of neglect-

ing this useful study, to which will be subjoined a few reflections on the peculiar

propriety of reviving it in our own universities.

And, first, to demonstrate the utility of some acquaintance with the laws of

the land, let us only reflect a moment on the singular frame and' polity of that

land which is governed by this system of laws; a laud, perhaps the only one in

the universe, in. which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope of

the constitution, (b) This liberty, rightly understood, consists in the power (1)

of doing whatever the laws permit; (c) which is only to be effected by a general

(a) Dt Legy. 2. 23. fb) Montep<|. K$p. L. I. 11 .-. r,

(c) Facuttai ejta, quod cutque facere liln-t nisi quid i-i, out jttrr jm-hiWur. Iiat. 1. 3. 1.

(1) For Mr. Christian's view of this definition of liberty, see note,pott, 136.
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conformity of all orders and degrees to those equitable rules of action by which

the meanest individual is protected from the insults and oppression of the

greatest. As, therefore, every subject is interested in the preservation of the

laws, it is incumbent upon every man to be acquainted with those at least with

which he is immediately concerned; lest he incur the censure, as well as

inconvenience, of living in society without knowing the obligations which

it lays him under. And thus much may suffice for *persons of infe- r *~ -•

rior condition, who have neither time nor capacity to enlarge their views >• -"

beyond that contracted sphere in which they are appointed to move. But

those, on whom nature and fortune have bestowed more abilities and greater

leisure, cannot be so easily excused. These advantages are given them, not for

the benefit of themselves only, but also of the public: and yet they cannot, in

any scene of life, discharge properly their duty either to the public or them-

selves, without some degree of knowledge in the laws. To evince this the more

clearly, it may not be amiss to descend to a few particulars.

Let us therefore begin with our gentlemen of independent estates and fortune,

the most useful as well as considerable body of men in the nation; whom even

to suppose ignorant in this branch of learning is treated by Mr. Locke (d) as a

strange absurdity. It is their landed property, with its long and voluminous

train of descents and conveyances, settlements, entails, and mcumbrances, that

forms the most intricate and most extensive object of legal knowlege. The

thorough comprehension of these, in all their minute distinctions, is perhaps
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too laborious a task for any but a lawyer by profession; yet still the under-

standing of a few leading principles, relating to estates and conveyancing, may

form some check and guard upon a gentleman's inferior agents, and preserve

him at least from very gross and notorious imposition.

Again, the policy of all laws has made some forms necessary in the wording

of last wills and testaments, and more with regard to their attestation. An

ignorance in these must always be of dangerous consequence to such as, by

choice or necessity, compile their own testaments without any technical assist-

ance. Those who have attended the courts of justice are the best witnesses of

the confusion and distresses that are hereby occasioned in families, and of

the difficulties that arise in discerning the true meaning of the testator, or,

sometimes, in discovering any meaning at all; so that in the end, his estate

*may often be vested quite contrary to these his enigmatical intentions, r *o -i

because, perhaps, he has omitted one or two formal words, which are neces- "- -"

sary to ascertain the sense with indisputable legal precision, or has executed his

will in the presence of fewer witnesses than the law requires.

But, to proceed from private concerns to those of a more public consideration.

All gentlemen of fortune are, in consequence of their property, liable to be

called upon to establish the rights, to estimate the injuries, to weigh the accu-

sations, and sometimes to dispose of the lives, of their fellow-subjects, by serving

upon juries. In this situation they have frequently a right to decide, and that

upon their oaths, questions of nice importance, in the solution of which some

legal kill is requisite; especially where the law and the fact, as it often happens,

are intimately blended together. And the general incapacity, even of our best

juries, to do this with any tolerable propriety, has greatly debased their author-

ity ; and has unavoidably thrown more power into the hands of the judges, to

direct, control, and even reverse their verdicts, than perhaps the constitution

intended.

But it is not as a juror, only, that the English gentleman is called upon to

determine questions of right, and distribute justice to his fellow-subjects: it is

principally with this order of men that the commission of the peace is filled.

And here a very ample field is opened for a gentleman to exert his talents, by

maintaining good order in his neighborhood; by punishing the dissolute and

idle; by protecting the peaceable and industrious; and, above all, by healing

petty differences, and preventing vexatious prosecutions. But, in order to attain

(d) Education, Sec. 167.
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these desirable ends, it is necessary that the magistrate shonld understand bis

business, and have not only the will, bnt the power also (under which must

be included the knowledge), of administering legal and effectual justice. Else,

when he has mistaken his authority, through passion, through ignorance, or ab-

r *a i surdity, he will be the object of *eontempt from his inferiors, and of

L J censure from those to whom he is accountable for his conduct.

Yet farther: most gentlemen of considerable property, at some period or

other in their lives, are ambitious of representing their country in parliament;

and those, who are ambitious of receiving so high a trust, would also do well

to remember its nature and importance. They are not thus honorably distin-

guished from the rest of their fellow-subjects, merely that they may privilege

their persons, their estates, or their domestics; that they may list under party

banners; may grant or withhold siipplies; may vote with or vote against a

popular or unpopular administration ; but upon considerations far more inter-

esting and important. They are the guardians of the English constitution;

the makers, repealers, and interpreters of the English law; delegated to watch,

to check, and to avert every dangerous innovation, to propose, to adopt, and to

cherish any solid and well-weighed improvement; bound by every tie of nature,

of honor, and of religion, to transmit that constitution and those laws to

their posterity, amended if possible, at least without any derogation. And how

unbecoming must it appear in a member of the legislature to vote for a new

law, who is utterly ignorant of the old! what kind of interpretation can he be

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

enabled to give, who is a stranger to the text upon which he comments!

Indeed, it is perfectly amazing that there should be no other state of life, no

other occupation, art, or science, in which some method of instruction is not

looked upon as requisite, except only the science of legislation, the noblest and

most difficult of any. Apprenticeships are held necessary to almost every art,

commercial or mechanical: a long course of reading and study must form the

divine, the physician, and the practical professor of the laws: but every man of

superior fortune thinks himself born a legislator. Yet Tully was of a difler-

r*i ol cnt opinion- " It is •necessary," says he, («) " for a senator to be thor-

"- J oughly acquainted with the constitution; and this," he declares, "is a

knowledge of the most extensive nature; a matter of science, of diligence, of

reflection; without which no senator can possibly be fit for his office."

The michiefs that have arisen to the public from inconsiderate alterations in

our laws, are too obvious to be called in question; and how far they have been

owing to the defective education of onr senators, is a point well worthy the

public attention. The common law of England has fared like other venerable

edifices of antiquity, which rash and inexperienced workmen have ventured to

new-dress and rehne, with all the rage of modern improvement Hence,

frequently its symmetry has been destroyed, its proportions distorted, and its

majestic simplicity exchanged for specious embellishments and fantastic novel-

ties. For, to say the truth, almost all the perplexed questions, almost all the

niceties, intricacies, and delays (which have sometimes disgraced the English

as well as other courts of justice), owe their original not to the common law

itself, but to innovations that have been made in it by acts of parliament,

" overladen (as Sir Edward Coke expresses it) (/) with provisoes and additions,

and many times on a sudden penned or corrected by men of none or very little

judgment in law." This great and well experienced judge declares, that in all

his time he never knew two questions made upon rights merely depending upon

the common law; and warmly laments the confusion introduced by. ill-judging

and unlearned legislators. "But if," he subjoins "acts of parliament were

after the old fashion penned, by such only as perfectly knew what the common,

law was before the making of any act of parliament concerning that matter, aa

also how far forth former statutes had provided remedy for former mischiefs

and defects, discovered by experience; then should very few questions in law

(e) Tit Lean 3 IS. Kit itnatnri necetinrhim noise rrnnpvllicnn ,- Mgve Mtputtl >—tanl Joe • •>*»* .viY*K«.
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arise, *and the learned should not so often and so much perplex their

heads to make atonement and peace, by construction of law, between

insensible and disagreeing words, sentences, and provisoes, as they now do."

And if this inconvenience was so heavily felt in the reign of Queen Elizabeth,

you may judge how the evil is increased in later times, when the statute book

is swelled to ten times a larger bulk, unless it should be found that the penners

of onr modern statutes have proportiouably better informed themselves in the

knowledge of the common law.

What is said of our gentlemen in general, and the propriety of their applica-

tion to the study of the laws of their country, will hold equally strong or still

stronger with regard to the nobility of this realm, except only in the article of

serving upon juries. But, instead of this, they have several peculiar provinces

of far greater consequence and concern; being not only by birth hereditary

counselors of the crown, and judges upon their honour of the lives of their

brother peers, but also arbiters of the property of all their fellow-subjects, and

that in the last resort. In this, their judicial capacity, they are bound to decide

the nicest and most critical points of the law; to examine and correct such errors

as have escaped the most experienced sages of the profession, the lord-keeper, and

the judges of the courts of Westminster. Their sentence is final, decisive, irrev-

ocable ; no appeal, no correction, not even a review can be had; and to their

determination, whatever it be, the inferior courts of justice must conform;

otherwise the rule of property would no longer be uniform and steady.
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Should a judge in the most subordinate jurisdiction be deficient in the

knowledge of the law, it would reflect infinite contempt upon himself, and

disgrace upon those who employ him. And yet the consequence of his igno-

rance is comparatively very trifling and small; his judgment may be examined,

and his errors rectified by other courts. But how much more serious and

affecting is the case of a superior judge, *if, without any skill in the laws, r*ioi

he will boldly venture to decide a question upon which the welfare and >• -"

subsistence of whole families may depend; where the chance of his judging right

or wrong, is barely equal; and where, if he chances to judge wrong, he does an

injury of the most alarming nature, an injury without possibility of redress.

Yet, vast as this trust is, it can nowhere he so properly reposed, as in the

noble hands where our excellent constitution has placed it; and therefore placed

it, because, from the independence of their fortune and the dignity of theii

station, they are presumed to employ that leisure, which is the consequence of

both, in attaining a more extensive knowledge of the laws than persons of

inferior rank, and because the founders of our polity relied upon that delicacy

of sentiment so peculiar to noble birth; which, as on the one hand it will

prevent either interest or affection from interfering in questions of right, so, on

the other, it will bind a peer in honor, an obligation which the law esteems equal

to another's oath, to be master of those points upon which it is his birthright to

decide. (2)

The Roman pandects will furnish us with a piece of history not inapplicable

to our present purpose. Serving Sulpicius, a gentleman of the patrician order,

and a celebrated orator, had occasion to take the opinion of Quintus Mutius

Scscvola, the then oracle of the Roman law; but, for want of some knowledge

in that science, could not so much as understand even the technical terms

which his friend was obliged to make use of. Upon which, Mutius Sctevola

could not forbear to upbraid him with this memorable reproof: (g) " that it was

a shame for a patrician, a nobleman, and an orator of causes to be ignorant of

fs) ','.''!-•-•' *8. Turpe e*M patrieio, el nabUi, ft cmuat oranti, }iu in quo venaretitr ignorare.

(2) [As a peer of parliament, when that body is sitting judicially, a nobleman's pledge of

honour is considered equal to another's oath. The ordinary courts of common law know no

arise, •and the learned should not 80 oft.en and 80 much peTplex their [•ll]
heads to make atonement and peace, by construction of law, between
insensible and disagreeing words, sentences, and provisoes, as they now do."
And if this inconvenience was so heavily felt in the reign of Queen Elizabeth,
yo11 ma.v judge how the evil is increased in later times, when the statute book
is swelled to ten times a. larger bulk, unless it should be found that the penners
of onr modern st.atutes have proportionably better informed themselves in the
knowledg-e of the common law.
What is sa.id of our gentlemen in general, and the propriety of their application to the study of the laws of their country, will hold equally strong or still
stronger with rega.nl to the nobility of this realm, except only in the article of
serving upon juries. But, instead of this, they ha.\'e seveml peculiar provinces
of far greater conse.quence and concern ; bein~ not only by birth hereditary
counselors of the crown, and judges upon their honour of the lives of their
brother peel'S; but also arbiters of the property of all their fellow-subjects, and
that in the last resort. In this, their judicial capacity, they are bound to decide
the nice~t and most critical points of the law; oo examine and correct such errors
a.s have escaped the most experienced sages of the profession, the lord-keeper, and
the judges of the courts of Westminster. Their sentence is final, decisive, irrevocable; no appeal, no correction, not even a. review ron be had ; and to their
determination, whatever it be, the inferior courts of justice must conform ;
otherwi~ the rule of property would no longer be uniform and steady.
Should a judge in the most subordinate jurisdiction be deficient in the
knowledge of the law, it would reflect infinite contempt upon himself, and
disgrace upon those who employ him. And yet the consequence of his ignorance is comparatively very trifling and small; his judgment may be examined,
and his errors rectified. by other court& But how much more serious and
affecting is the ease of a superior judge, •if, without any skill in the laws, [•! 2]
he will boldly venture oo decide a question upon which the welfare and
subsistence of whole families may depend; where the chance of his judging right
or wrong, is barely equal; and where, if he chances to judge wrong, he does an
injury of the most alarming nature, an injury without possibility of redress.
Yet, vast as this trnst is, it can nowhere be so properly reposed, as in the
noble hands where our excellent constitution has placed it; and therefore placed
it, because, from the independence of their fortune and the dignity of theh
station, they are presumed oo employ that leisure, which is the consequence of
both, in attaining a more extensive knowledge of the laws than persons of
inferior rank, and because the founders of our polity relied upon that delicacv
of sentiment so peculiar oo noble birth; which, as on the one hand it witl
prevent either interest or affection from interfering in questions of right, so, on
the other, it will bind a peer in honor, an obligation which the law esteems equal
to another's oath, to be master of those points upon which it is his birthright to
decide. (2)
'fhe Roman pandects will furnish us with a piece of history not ino.pplicahle
to our present purpose. Servius Sulpicius, a gentleman of the patrician order,
and a celebmted orator, had occasion oo take the opinion of Quintus Mutins
Screvola, the then oracle of the Roman law; but, for want of some knowledge
in that science, could not so much as understand even the technical terms
which his friend was obliged to make use of. Upon which, Mutius Scrernla
could not forbear to upbraid him with this memorable reproof: (g) "that it was
a shame for a patrician, a nobleman, and an orator of canses to he ignorant of

distinction of this kind; there, wherever an ordinary subject must swear to speak the truth, a peer

must squally be nworn. In courts of equity, peers, peeresses, and lords of parliament answer on

(g) Ff.

I. 2. !. f '3.

Turpe u11epalrlcio, fl ttoMll, rt ca..,.oranti, Ju In quo 11er11armar lgflloraN.

their honour onlv; though persons of inferior degree are required, in like cage, to answer on oath.

1 Jacob and Walker's Reports, 524.]

5

(2) c+~ 8 ~er of parliament, when that body is sitting jndicially, ll nobleman's pledge of
honour 18 co11111dered equal to another's oath. The ordinary courts of common law know no
di1.t:inction of thi~ kind ; th<'re, whcret'er 1m ordinl\lj subject mnllt swear to speak the truth, a peer
mu><t flqUally be 11worn. In oourtl! of equity, pcel'I!, peerel!l'OI!, and lord11 of parliament answer ou
tlwir honour onlv; though persons of inferior degree are required, in like C88e1 t.o answer on oath.
1 Jocob and Wa)ker's Reports, 524.]
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that law in which he was so peculiarly concerned." This reproach made so

deep an impression on Sulpicius, that he immediately applied himself to the

T*131 8^ucty °^ *ne ^aw' wherein he arrived to that *proticiency, that he left

1 -1 behind him about an hundred and four-score volumes of his own compiling

upon the subject, and became in the opinion of Cicero, (A) a much more

complete lawyer than even Mutius Scsevola himself.

I would not be thought to recommend to our English nobility and gentry to

become as great lawyers as Sulpicius, though he, together with this character,

sustained likewise that of an excellent orator, a firm patriot, and a wise, inde-

fatigable senator; but the inference which arises from the story is this: that

ignorance of the laws of the land hath ever been esteemed dishonourable in those

who are intrusted by their country to maintain, to administer, and to amend

them. (3) ' "

But, surely, there is little occasion to enforce this argument any farther to

persons of rank and distinction, if we, of this place may be allowed to form a

general judgment from those who are under our inspection: happy that while

we lay down the rule, we can also produce the example. You will therefore

permit your professor to indulge both a public and private satisfaction, by bearing

this open testimony, that, in the infancy of these studies among us, they were

favoured with the most diligent attendance, and pursued with the most unwearied

application, bv those of the noblest birth and most ample patrimony, some of

whom are still the ornaments of this seat of learning, and others, at a greater
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distance, continue doing honor to its institutions by comparing our polity and

laws with those of other kingdoms abroad, or exerting their senatorial abilities

in the councils of the nation at home.

Nor will some degree of legal knowledge be found in the least superfluous to

persons of inferior rank, especially those of the learned professions. The clergy,

in particular, besides the common obligations they are under in proportion to

F*14l ^ne*r rank and fortune, have also abundant reason, considered "merely

L -I as clergymen, to be acquainted with many branches of the law, which

are almost peculiar and appropriated to themselves alone. Such are the laws

relating to advowsons, institutions, and inductions; to simony, and simoniacal

contracts; to uniformity, residence, and pluralities; to tithes and other ecclesi-

astical dues; to marriages, (more especially of late,) and to a variety of other

subjects, which are consigned to the .care of their order by the provisions of

particular statutes. To understand these aright, to discern what is warranted

or enjoined, and what is forbidden by law, demands a sort of legal apprehension,

which is no otherwise to be acquired than by use and a familiar acquaintance

with legal writers.

For the gentlemen of the faculty of physic, I must frankly own that I see no

special reason why they, in particular, should apply themselves to the study of

(h) Brut. 41.

(3) " One of the constitutions of our own King Alfred expressly required that his nobility

should be instructed in the laws. Without this knowledge, indeed, a man will advance but

that ,law in which he was so peculiarly concerned." This reproach made so
deep an impression on Sulpicius, that he immediateZ, applied himself to the
[*l 3] study of the law, wherein he arrived to that proficiency, that he left
behind him about an hundred and four-score volumes of his own compiling
upon the subject, and became in the opinion of Cicero, (h) a much more
complete lawyer than even Mutius Screvola himself.
I would not be thought to recommend to our English nobility and gentry to
become as ~reat lawyers as Sulpicius, though he, together with this character,
sustained likewise that of an excellent orator, a firm patriot, and a wise, indefatigable senator; but the inference which arises from the story is this: that
ignorance of the laws of the land hath ever been estremed dishonourable in those
who are intrusted by their country to maintain, to administer, and to amend
them. (3)
But, surely, there is little occasion to enforce this argument any further to
persons of rank and distinction, if we, of this place may be allowed to form a
general judgment from those who are under our inspection: happy that while
we lay down the rule, we can also produce the example. You will therefore
permit your professor to indulge both a public and private satisfaction, by bearing
this open testimony, that, in the infancy of these studit:s among us, they were
favoured with the most diligent attendance, and pursued with the most unwearied
application, by those of the noblegt birth and most ample patrimony, some of
whom are still the ornaments of this seat of learning, and otht-rs, at a greater
distance, continue doing honor to its institutions b.J comparing our polity and
laws with those of other kingdoms abroad, or exertmg their senatorial abilities
in the councils of the nation at home.
Nor will some degree of legal knowledge be found in the least superfluous t-0
persons of inforior rank, especially those of the learned professions. The clergy,
m particular, besides the common obligations they are under in proportion t.o
[ • 14] their rank and fortune, have also abundant reason, considered *merely
as clergymen, to be acquainted with many brunches of the law, which
are almost peculiar and appropriated to themselrns alone. Such are the laws
relating to advowsons, institutions, and inductions; to simony, and simoniaeal
contracts; to uniformity, residence, and pluralities; to tithes and other ecclesiastical dues; to marriages, (more especially of late,) and to a Yariety of other
subjects, which are consigned to the .care of their order by the pro,·isions of
})articular atatute&. To understand these aright, to discern what is warranted
or enjoined, and what is forbidden by law, demands a sort of lefi<7al apprehension,
which is no otherwise to be acquired than by use and a fa.mi iar acquaintance
with legal writers.
For the gentlemen of the faculty of physic, I must frankly own that I see no
special reason why they, in particular, should apply themsehes to the study of

Tiiin and frivolous pretences to exercise the functions of a statesman or a legislator. It U

('lt)Bnd. '1.

true he may be eager enough to meddle with such matters; he may indeed l>e " given to

change;" he may become, perhaps, a showy declaimer, fluent in the use of common-places—

th.it is, if either house of parliament will tolerate his puerile inanities; he may possibly

acquire credit on occasions of minor, of mere temporary or local interest and importance; bnt

ou the stirring, grand national, CONSTITUTIONAL questions, which are often so suddenly

started, he wiU be, he needs must be, an inglorious mute; his " vote and influence" may bo

solicited by the contending parties, but nothing further will be expected or, indeed, permitted.

Such information as is required on these occasions, however great may be his zeal or talents,

or intense his desire of distinction, he neither has nor can get. No cram will suffice;

nothing bnt the careful, leisurely acquisition of early years, assiduously kept up—at once

generating and justifying confidence and self-reliance^—will enable a man to acquit himself

on such occasions even creditablv. And how often in these pregnant times do such occa-

sions arise; what melancholy exhibitions are sometimes the consequence!" Warren's Lau

•piics, 85.

dil't, 6

(3) "One of the constitutions of our own King .Alfred expressly required that hi!! nobility
should be inf!tructed in the laws. Without this knowledge, mdm~d, a man will advance but
vain and frivolous pretences to exercise the functions of a state11man or a legislator. It is
true he may be eager enough to meddle with such mattel'll ; ho may indeed l>e ;; gin•n to
change;" he mav become, perhaps, a showy declaimer, fluent in the use of corumon-placeirtbat ·is, if either house of parliament will tolerate his puerile inanities; be may pt18sihly
acquire credit on occ11Bions of minor, of mere temporary or local interest and importance; hut
on the stirring, grand national, CONSTITUTION.AL questions, which are often so 11uddcnly
E1t11rtml, he will be, he needs must be, an inglorious mute; his "vote and influence" may be
fmlkited by the cont.ending parties, but nothing further will be expected or, indeed, pennitt.ed.
Such infonnation B8 is reqtured on tlleae occMionR, however great may be his zeal or talenti!,
or inteDKe his desire of di~tinction, he neither has nor can ~et. No cram will sufHC'e ;
nothing but the careful, leisurely acquisition of early yeAJ'S, as111duously kept up-at on<:e
g1meroting and ju11tifJ;ng confidence au1l ~lf-reliaMe-will enable a mrm to acquit him,;elf
1iu such occasions even creditablv. And how often in tbe11e pregnant times do such OCl'&~ions ari:m; what melancholy exhibitions are sometimes the consequence!" Warren's La•
·1dica, 85.
dili11
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the law unless in common with other gentlemen, and to complete the character

of general and extensive knowledge; a character which their profession, beyond

others, has remarkably deserved. They will give me leave however to suggest,

and that not ludicrously, that it might frequently be of use to families, upon

sudden emergencies, if the physician were acquainted with the doctrine of last wills

and testaments, at least so far as relates to the formal part of their execution.

But those gentlemen who intend to profess the civil and ecclesiastical laws, in

the spritual and maritime courts of this kingdom, are, of all men (next to

common lawyers),, the most indispensably obliged to apply themselves seriously

to the study of our municipal laws. For the civil and canon laws, considered

with respect to any intrinsic obligation, have no force or authority in this king-

dom ; they are no more binding in England than our laws are binding at Rome.

But, as far as these foreign laws, on account of some peculiar propriety, have in

some particular cases, and in some particular courts, been introduced and

allowed by our laws, so far they oblige, and no farther; their authority being

wholly founded upon that permission and adoption. In which we are not sin-

gular in our "notions; for even in Holland, where the imperial law is r*ig-|

much cultivated, and its decisions pretty generally followed, we are L J

informed by Van Leeuwen, (t) that " it receives its force from custom and the

consent of the people, either tacitly or expressly given; for otherwise," he adds,

" we should no more be bound by this law than by that of the Almains, the

Franks, the Saxons, the Goths, the Vandals, and other of the ancient nations."
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Wherefore, in all points in which the different systems depart from each other,

the law of the land takes place of the law of Rome, whether ancient or modern,

imperial or pontifical. And, in those of our English courts wherein a reception

has been allowed to the civil and canon laws, if either they exceed the bounds

of that reception, by extending themselves to other matters than are permitted

to them, or if such courts proceed according to the decisions of those laws, in

cases wherein it is controlled by the law of the land, the common law in either

instance both may, and frequently does, prohibit and annul their proceedings; (k)

and it will not be a sufficient excuse for them to tell the king's courts at West-

minster that their practice is warranted by the laws of Justinian or Gregory,

or is conformable to the decrees of the Rota or imperial chamber. For which

reason it becomes highly necessary for every civilian and canonist, that would

act with safety as a judge, or with prudence and reputation as an advocate, to

know in what cases and how far the English laws have given sanction to the

Roman; in what points the latter are rejected; and where they are both so

intermixed and blended together as to form certain supplemental parts of the

common law of England, distinguished by the titles of the king's maritime, the

king's military, and the king's ecclesiastical law; the propriety of which inquiry

the university of Oxford has for more than a century so thoroughly seen that

in her statutes (1) she appoints that one of the three questions to be annually

discussed at the act by the jurist-inceptors shall relate to the common law;

subjoining this reason, "quia juris civilis studiosos decet hand imperitos esse

*juris municipalis, et differentia* ezteri patriique juris notas haberc."

And the statutes (m) of the university of Cambridge speak expressly to

the same effect

From the general use and necessity of some acquaintance with the common

law, the inferences were extremely easy with regard to the propriety of the

present institution, in a place to which gentlemen of all ranks and degrees

resort as the fountain of all useful knowledge. But how it has come to pass

that a design of this sort has never before taken place in the university, and the

reason why the study of our laws has in general fallen into disuse, I shall pre-

viously proceed to inquire.

(0 Dedicatio corporit juris ririlli. Mil, 1663.

(i-) Hale Hist. C. I., c. 3. Sclden in Fletam. S Rep. Candroy's Case. 2 Itut. 699.

(I, Tit. riT. Sect. 9. f t.

the law unless in common with other gentlemen, and to complet.e the character
of general and extensive knowledge; a character which their profession, beyond
others, has remarkably deserved. They will give me leave however to suggest,
and that not ludicrously, that it might frequently be of use to families, upon
sudden emergencies, if the physician were acquainted with the doctrine of last wills
and testaments, at least so far as relates to the formal part of their execution.
But those gentlemen who intend to profess the civil and ecclesiastical laws, in
the spritual and maritime courts of this kingdom, are, of all men (next to
common lawy~),_ the most indispensably obliged fo apply themselves seriously
to the study of our municipal laws. For the civil and canon laws, considered
with respect to any intrinsic obligation, have no force or authority in this kingdom; they are no more binding in England than our laws are binding at Rome.
But, as far as these foreign laws, on account of some peculiar propriety, have in
some particular cases, and in some particular courts, been introduced and
allowed by our laws, so far they oblige, and no farther; their authority being
wholly founded upon that permission and adoption. In which we are not singular in our •notions; for even in Holland, where the imperial law is [*l 5]
much cultivated, and it.a decisions pretty generally followed, we are
informed by Van Leeuwen, (i) that "it receives its force from custom and the
consent of the people, either tacitly or expressly given; for otherwise," he adds,
"we should no more be bound by this law than by that of the Alma.ins, the
Franks, the Saxons, the Goths, the Vandals, and other of the ancient nations."
Wherefore, in all points in which the different systems depart from each other,
the law of the land takes place of the law of Rome, whether ancient or modern,
imperial or pontifical. And, in those of our English courts wherein a reception
has been allowed to the civil and canon laws, if either they exceed the bounds
of that reception, by extending themselves to other matters than are permitted
to them, or if such courts proceed according to the decisions of those laws, in
cases wherein it is controlled by the law of th,e land, the common law in either
instance both may, and frequently does, prohibit and annul their proceedings; (k)
and it will not be a sufficient excuse for them to tell the kin~s courts at Westminster that their practice is warranted by the laws of Justmian or Gregory,
or is conformable to the decrees of the Rota or imperial chamber. For which
reason it becomes highly necessary for every civilian and canonist, that would
act with safety as a judge, or with prudence and reputation as an advocate, to
know in what cases and how far the English laws have given sanction to the
Roman; in what points the latter are rejected; and where they are both so
intermixed and blended together as to form certain supplemental parts of the
common law of England, distinguished by the titles of the king's maritime, the
king's military, and the king's ecclesiastical law; the propriety of which inquiry
the university of Oxford has for more than a century so thoroughly seen that
in her statutes (l) she appoints that one of the three questions to be annually
discussed at the uct by the jurist-inceptors shall relate to the common law;
subjoining this reason, ~'!Juia .furis civilis studiosos decet haud imperifos esse
*juris municipal-is, et differentias exteri patriique juris notas haberc.'' [*l 6]
And the statutes (m) of the university of Cambridge speak exprea&ly to
the same effect.
From the general use and necessity of some acquaintance with the common
law, the inferences were extremely easy with regard to the propriety of the
present instit.ution, in a place to which gentlemen of all ranks and degrees
resort as the fountain of all useful knowledge. Bnt how it has come to pass
that a design of this sort has neYer before taken place in the university, and the
reason why the study of our laws has in general fallen into disus~, I shall previously proceed to inquire.

(m) Doctor legum max a iRctoratudatritopernm legilttts Anqlia. ut non nit impmtut eantm Irijiim qvni naba

tuapatriti, ct di/trtntias exteripatriiqwjurit noscat. Stat. Kite. n. c. 14. CowcU. Jnttitut. in proemfo.

7

(f) Dedicatl-0 cor'pOf"U j"m cirllu.

Edit. 1663.

(k) Hale Hi8t. C. T•. c. 2. Selden in Fletam. 6 Rep. CandT<'y'e Caec. 2 Inst. 1199.
(11 Tit. VII. Std. 2. t 2.
(m) noctor legum mo:r a dt)ctoratti dabit operam legUnu Anglia. ut non ltit imperitua ean1m l~g11m qtin• ~bd
IUa 11atrfo, et di/fermlitu ezteri patriiqvtJUrM nouat. Stat. Eliz. R. c. a. Cowell. J1i.titut. ill proetnto.
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Sir John Fortescue, in his panegyric on the laws of England, (which was

written in the reign of Henry the Sixth,) puts (n) a very obvious question in

the mouth of the young prince, whom he is exhorting to apply himself to that

branch of learning: " why the laws of England, being so good, so fruitful, and

so commodious, are not taught in the universities, as the civil and canon lawe

are ?" In answer to which he gives (o) what seems, with due deference be it

spoken, a very jejune and unsatisfactory reason; being, in short, that, "as the

proceedings at common law were in his time carried on in three diifercnt

tongues, the English, the Latin, and the French, that science must be necessa-

rily taught in those three several languages; but that, in the universities, all

sciences were taught in the Latin tongue only;" and therefore, he concludes,

" that they could not be conveniently taught or studied in our universities."

But without attempting to examine seriously the validity of this reason, (the

very shadow of which, by the wisdom of our late constitutions, is entirely

taken away,) we perhaps may find out a better, or at least a more plausible,

account, why the study of the municipal laws has been banished from these

seats of science, than what the learned chancellor thought it prudent to give to

his royal pupil.

T171 ""That ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which is

' J called the common law, however compounded or from whatever fountains

derived, had subsisted immemorially in this kingdom; and, though somewhat

altered and impaired by the violence of the times, had in great measure
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weathered the rude shock of the Norman conquest. This had endeared it to

the people in general, as well because its decisions were universally known, as

because it was found to be excellently adapted to the genius of the English

nation. In the knowledge of this law consisted great part of the learning of

those dark ages; it was then taught, says Mr. Selden, (p) in the monasteries,

in the universities, and in the families of the principal nobility. The clergy, in

particular, as they then engrossed almost every other branch of learning, so

(like their predecessors the British Druids) (q) they were peculiarly remarkable

for their proficiency in the study of the law. Niittus clericus nisi causidicus,

is the character given of them soon after the conquest by William of Malms-

bury, (r) The judges, therefore were usually created out of the sacred order, («)

as was likewise the case among the Normans; (t) and all the inferior offices

were supplied by the lower clergy, which has occasioned their successors to be

denomitated clerks to this day.

But the common law of England, being not committed to writing, but only

handed down by tradition, use and experience, was not so heartily relished by

the foreign clergy, who came over hither in shoals during the reign of the Con-

queror and his two sons, and were utter strangers to our constitution as well as

our language. And an accident, which soon after happened, had nearly com-

pleted its ruin. A copy of Justinian's pandects, being newly (u) discovered at

pig-i Amalfi, (4) *soon brought the civil law into vogue all over the west of

*• -I Europe, where before it was quite laid aside, (w) and in a manner forgot-

ten, though some traces of its authority remained in Italy (x) and the eastern

provinces of the empire, (y) This now became in a particular manner the

favourite of the popish clergy, who borrowed the method and many of the

maxims of the canon law from this original. The study of it was introduced,

into several universities abroad, particularly that of Bologna, where exercises

l«l Lnigaaie irrtg. jurw. c. a.

pertonnea et mttcntiytte*,—»icomt la nrcJirretqurt. evaquet. Itt ehanotnft rf« rglitts

r tonnes qui ont tltaittiez in tainctc eglUc; leg abbez, Utprieurs, conrenhtulx, et let

Grand Coiintttmter, ck. 9.

Sir John Forteecne, in his panegyric on the laws of England, (which waa
written in the reign of Henry the ::iixth,) puts (n) a very obvious question in
the mouth of the young prince, whom he is exhorting to a.pp9' himself to that
branch of learning: ••why the laws of England, being so good, so fruitful, and
so commodious, are not taught in the uni,·eraities, as the civil and oonon law11
a.re?" In answer to which he gives (o) what seems, with due deference be it
spoken, a i.-ery jejune and unsatisfactory reason; bein~, in short, that, .. as the
proceedings at common law were in his time earned on in three different
tongues, the English, the Lat.in, and the French, that science must be necessarily taught in those three seveml languages; but that, in the universities, all
sciences were taught in the Latin tongue only;" and therefore, he conclude.a, "that they could not be conveniently taught or studied in our universities."
But without attempting to examine seriously the \·alidity of this reason, (the
very shadow of which, by the wisdom of our late constitutions, is entirely
taken away,) we perhaps may find out a better, or at lea.rt a more pfausibl~
account, why the study of the municipal laws bus been banished from the.ee
seats of science, than what the learned chancellor thought it prudent to give to
his royal pupil.
*fl ]
*That ancient collection of unwritten maxims o.nd customs, which is
7 called the common law, however comJ)()ttnded or from whate\"er fountains
derived, had subsisted immemorially in this kingdom; and, though somewhat
altered and impaired by the violence of the times, had in great measure
weathered the rude shock of the Norman com1uest. 'rhis had ende.ared it t-0
the people in general, as well bec1mse its decisions were unh·ersally known, ae
because it was found to be excellently sda~tcd to the genius of the English
nation. In the knowledge of this law consisted great part of the learning of
those dark Bi:,<:reS; it was then taught, says Mr. Selden, (p) in the monasteries,
in the universitiu, and in the families of the principal nobility. The clergy, in
particular, as they then engrossed almost every other branch of foarning, eo
(like their predecessors the British Druids) (q) they were peculiarly remarkable
for their proficiency in the study of the law. Nttlltts clericus nisi cattsidicu-8,
is the character given of them soon after the conquest by William of Ma.lmsbury. (r) The judges, therefore were usually created out of the sacred order, (s)
as was likewise the cue among the N om1ans; ( t) and all the inferior offices
were supplied by the lower clergy, which hu occasioned their successors to be
denomitnted clerks to this day.
But the common law of England, being not committed to writing, but only
handed down by tradition, use and experience, was not so heartily relished by
the foreign clergy, who came over hither in shoals during the reign of the Conqueror and his two sons, and were utter strangers to our constitution as well as
our language. And an accident, which soon affor happened, had nearlv completed its ruin. A copy of Justinian's pandects, being newly (u) discovered at
[*lS] Amalfi, (4) •soon brought the civil 11\w into vogue all over the west of
Europe, where before it was quite laid a.side, ( w) and in a manner forgot.ten, though some traces of its authority remained in Italy (x) and the ea.stem
pro,·inces of the empire. (y) 'l'his now became in a particular manner the
favourite of the popish clergy, who borrowed the method and many of the
maxims of the canon law from this original. The study of it was introduced
into several universities abroad, p1uticularly that of Bologna., where exerci.elw

(n) C. 47. (o) C. 48. (p) In Fldam. 7. 7. (q) Cwsnr de bello Gal. 6. 18.

(r) De Gat. Keg. I. 4. («) Dugctali? Orig. Jurid. c. 8.

(t) I*ri jtiffcs innt »age> perm

eaikcdraulx. • / fc* autrcs per*

goureriirun <tes egluet, ifc. (

(tal C. 47.
(o) C. 48.
(pl 111 Fktarta. 7. 7.
(q) Clrsar de bello Gal. 6. JI.
(r) /Je a ....t. Reg. l. 4..
(al Dugrlale Qrig, J1trld. c. 8.
(ti ,_,, j1tge11 •rml aag,.,. ptt"11onnu d nttt<!Rl!'J't,.... -noo-. ta nr~11 ettaquu. ~.. cl&attl>ln,..a dn rg1'oa'1wdra111..i. ''' la autn!Iyerw,,neJJ qtd onl d1g11itt'.z iii 1aincle egU.e; lu ab~, lu prieura, conrrntaul.r, tit l6I
gouttr11M1r1 du ~gli4u, '1'C- Gr.ind Coudttmler, cA. 11.
(u) C"irc . .A. IJ. 1130.
(t0) LL. WUigotl&. 2, 1. II.
(.r) CapUulaf'. Hl""°". PU. 4. JOS.
(J) Sohlen in F Id.am. II. 5.

(u) Ore. ! D. 1130. (w) LL. Wuigoth. 2, 1. 9. (x) Capitular. >lln<lnr. 1'ii. 4.10*.

(y) Selden in Fletam. S. 6.

(4) Tho fact of this discovery, Mr. Hallam says, " though not impossible, scorns not to

rest upon sufficient evidence." Hallam's Middle Ages, chap. 9, ft. 2, citing earlier authors.

8

(4) Tho fact of this dil!COvery, Mr. Halll\m so.ys, "though not imp08llible, se"ms not to
rest upon sufficient evidence." HallaRi'a Middle Ages, chap. 9, pt. 2, citing earlier authors.
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were performed, lectures read, and degrees conferred in this faculty, as in other

branches of science; and many nations on the continent, just then beginning

to recover from the convulsions consequent upon the overthrow of the Roman

empire, and settling by degrees into peaceable forms of government, adopted

the civil law, (being the best written system then extant,) as the basis of their

several constitutions; blending and mterweaving it among their own feodal

customs, in some places witli a more extensive, in others a more confined

authority.(z)

Nor was it long before the prevailing mode of the times reached England.

For Theobald, a Normon abbot, being elected to the see of Canterbury, (a) and

extremely addicted to this new study brought over with him in his retinue

many learned proficients therein; and, among the rest, Roger, sirnamed Vaca-

rius, whom he placed in the university of Oxford, (b) to teach it to the people of

this countrv. But it did not meet with the same easy reception in England,

where a mild and rational system of laws had been long established, as it did

upon the continent; and though the monkish clergy, devoted to the will of a

foreign primate, received it with eagerness and zeal, yet the laity, who were

more interested to preserve the old constitution, and had already severely felt

the effect of many Norman innovations, continued wedded to the use of the

common law. King Stephen immediately *published a proclamation, (c) r*ig-i

forbidding the study of laws, then newly imported from Italy, •• J

which was treated by the monks (d) as a piece of impiety; and, though it might
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prevent the introduction of the civil law process into our courts of justice, yet

did not hinder the clergy from reading and teaching it in their own schools

and monasteries.

From this time the nation seems to have been divided into two parties, the

bishops and clergy, many of them foreigners, who applied themselves wholly

to the study of the civil and canon laws, which now came to be inseparably

interwoven with each other; and the nobility and laity, who adhered with

equal pertenacity to the old common law; both of them reciprocally jealous of

what they were unacquainted with, and neither of them, perhaps, allowing the

opposite system that real merit which is abundantly to be found in each. (5)

This appears, on the one hand, from the spleen with which the monastic writ-

ers (e) speak of our municipal laws upon all occasions; and, on the other, from

the firm temper which the nobility showed at the famous parliament of Merton,

when the prelates endeavoured to procure an act to declare all bastards legiti-

mate in case the parents intermarried at any time afterwards; alleging this only

reason, because holy church (that is, the canon law,) declared such children legit-

imate; but "all the earls and barons (says the parliament roll) (f) with one

voice answered that they would not change the laws of England, which had

hitherto been used and approved." And we find the same jealousy prevailing

above a century afterwards, (g) when the nobility declared with a kind of

prophetic spirit, " that the realm of England hath never been, unto this hour,

neither by the consent of our Lord the King and the lords of parliament shall

it ever be", "ruled or governed by the civil law." (h) And of this temper r*onl

between the clergy and laity many more instances might be given. ' " '

While things were in this situation, the clergy, finding it impossible to root

out the, municipal law, began to withdraw themselves by degrees from the tem-

(») Domnt's Treatise of Laws, c. 13. } 9. Epittol. Innocent IV. in ST. Parti ad A. D. ISM.

(a) .(. ]:. 1198. (6) Gervas. Uorohern. Act. Pontif. Cantuar. col. 1665.

(c) Rope. Bacon citat. per Selden in Flctnm. 7. 6. in ForteM. c. 33. and 8 Rep. I'ret

Id) Joan SarUburicns. Pofycrat. 8. 22 (e) Idem. ibid. .V 16. Polyiior Virgil. ITi.--l. I. 9.

(f\ Slot. MerioH. 20. lien. III. c. !>. 1'J omnes comites et barones vna voce rcspondervnt, quod nolunt ieg&

AnqJia- mature, gva hucvsquc uritata; tunt et approbates. (g) 11 Kic. II.

(ft) Scldcn, Ja*. Anglor, /,-;!::. in Fortetc. c. 33.

(5) [Though the civil law, in matters of contract and the general commerce of life, may be

founded in principles of natural and universal justice, yet the arbitrary and despotic maxims,

•which recommended it as a favorite to the pope and the Romish clergy, rendered it deservedly

odious to the people of England.]
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poral courts; and, to that end, very early in the reign of King Henry the Third,

episcopal constitutions were published, (i) forbidding all ecclesiastics to appear

as advocates in foro aceculari: nor did they long continue to act as judges

there, not caring to take the oath of office which was then found necessary to

be administered, that they should in all things determine according to the law

and custom of this realm, (k) though they still kept possession of the high office

of chancellor, an office then of little juridical power; and afterwards, as its busi-

ness increased by degrees, they modelled the process of the court at their own

discretion.

But wherever they retired, and wherever their authority extended, they car-

ried with them the same zeal to introduce the rules of the civil, in exclusion of

the municipal law. This appears in a particular manner from the spiritual

courts of all denominations, from the chancellor's courts in both our universi-

ties, and from the high court of chancery before mentioned; in all of which

the proceedings are to this day in a course much conformed to the civil law:

for which no tolerable reason can be assigned, unless that these courts were all

under the immediate direction of the popish ecclesiastics, among whom it was

a point of religion to exclude the municipal law; Pope Innocent the Fourth

having forbidden (I) the very reading of it by the clergy, because its decisions

were not founded on the imperial constitutions, but merely on the customs of

the laity. And if it be considered that our universities began alxmt that period

to receive their present form of scholastic discipline; that they were then, and
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r*211 continue<* t° *be till the time of the reformation, entirely under the influ-

L ' -1 ence of the Popish clergy; (Sir John Mason, the first protestant, being also

the first lay, Chancellor of Oxford;) this will lead us to perceive the reason

why the study of the Boman laws was in those days of bigotry (m) pursued

with such alacrity in these seats of learning; and why the common law was

entirely despised, and esteemed little better than heretical.

And, since the reformation, many causes have conspired to prevent its becom-

ing a part of academical education. As, first, long usage and established cus-

tom; which, as in everything else, so especially in the forms of scholastic

exercise, have justly great weight and authority. Secondly, the real intrinsic

merit of the civil law, considered upon the footing of reason and not of obliga-

tion, which was well known to the instructors of our youth; and their total

ignorance of the merit of the common law, though its equal, at least, and per-

haps an improvement on the other. But the principal reason of all, that hag

hindered the introduction of this branch of learning, is, that the study of the

common law, being banished from hence in the times of popery, has fallen into

a quite different channel, and has hitherto been wholly cultivated in another

place. But, as the long usage and established custom of ignorance of the laws

of the land begin now to be thought unreasonable, and as by these means

F*221 *ne men* °f those *laws will probably be more generally known, we may

"• -" hope that the method of studying them will soon revert to its ancient

course, and the foundations at least of that science will be laid in the two uni-

versities, without being exclusively confined to the channel which it fell into at

the times I have just been describing.

For, being then entirely abandoned by the clergy, a few stragglers excepted,

the study and practice of it devolved of course into the hands of laymen: who

11) Snelman. Condi. A. D. 1817. Wilkins. ml. 1 p. 57*. 699.

(it) Selden. in fktam. 9. 3. (I) H. Paris, A. D. 12S4.

(m) There cannot be a stronger instance of the absurd and superstitions veneration that was paid to

these Inws. than that the most learned writers of the times thought they could not form a perfect

character, even of the Blessed Virgin, without making her a civilian and a canonist which Alburlns Matrons,

mumdyabotum ; in cauianostradementia; lentmtiamoptatamnbtinuU." To which an eminent Franciscan

two centuries afterwards. licrnanUniu deBiisti (Mnriale,part. 4, term. ».) very frravclv aiil.jmna this note-

" AM videtur iucnngruum mulierei habere peritiam jtirii. Lepitur enim (It uxore Jounnii Andrta glotiatorii'

quod tantamperitiam in ulroijuejure kabuit, iU publice in tcnolu Icgere ausa sit." '
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entertained upon their parts a most hearty aversion to the civil law, («) and

made no scruple to protess their contempt, nay even their ignorance (o) of it,

in the most public manner. But still as the balance of learning was greatly on

the side of the clergy, and as the common law was no longer taught, as formerly,

in any part of the kingdom, it must have been subjected to many inconven-

iences, and perhaps would have been gradually lost and overrun by the civil,

(a suspicion well justified from the frequent transcripts of Justinian to be met

with in Bracton and Fleta,) had it not been for a peculiar incident, which hap-

pened at a very critical time, and contributed greatly to its support.

The incident which I mean was the fixing the court of common pleas, the

grand tribunal for disputes of property, to be held in one certain spot; that

the seat of ordinary justice might be permanent and notorious to all the nation.

Formerly that, in conjunction with all the other superior* courts, was r „„» i

held before the king's capital justiciary of England, in the aula regis, •• '

or such of his palaces wherein his royal person resided; and removed, with

his household, from one end of the kingdom to the other. This was found

to occasion great inconvenience to the suitors; to remedy which it was

made an article of the great charter of liberties, both that of King John and

King Henry the Third, {p) that " common pleas should no longer follow the

kinjps court, but be held in some certain place:" in consequence of which they

have ever since been held (a few necessary removals in times of the plague

excepted) in the palace of Westminster only. This brought together the
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professors of the municipal law, who before were dispersed about the kingdom,

and formed them into an aggregate body; whereby a society was established of

persons, who, (as Spelman (q) observes,) addicting themselves wholly to the

study of the laws of the land, and no longer considering it as a mere subordi-

nate science for the amusement of leisure Iiours, soon raised those laws to that

pitch of perfection, which they suddenly attained under the auspices of our

English Justinian, King Edward the first.

In consequence of this lucky assemblage, they naturally fell into a kind of

collegiate order, and, being excluded from Oxford and Cambridge, found it

necessary to establish a new university of their own. This they did by pur-

chasing at various times certain houses (now called the inns of court (6) and of

(6) The inns of court are four in number, and are called Lincoln's Inn, Middle Temple, Inner

Temple and Gray's Inn. The first and last were named from noble families, and the others

were so called from the Knights Templar, who established themselves here in the twelfth

century, and called their house the New Temple. After the dissolution of that order, the

Temple was granted by King Edward the Third to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, by

whom it was soon after leased to professors of the common law, and continued to be so leased

until the appropriation of the property of religious houses by the crown in the reign of Henry

the Eighth. The inns of court are not corporations, but voluntary societies; and mandamus

will not lie to compel them to admit a member to the degree of barrister. Rex v. Gray's Inn,

Dong. 353 ; Rex v. Lincoln's Inn, 4 B. and C. 855; Rex v. Barnard's Inn, 5 A. and E. 17. There

are attached to them seven inns of chancery; Clifford's, Clement's and Lyon's belonging to the

Inner Temple, Xuw Inn to the Middle Temple, Thavies' to Lincoln's Inn, and Barnard's and

Stable's to Gray's Inn. Formerly there were also Furnival's and the Strand inns, which have

ceased to exist.

Each of the inns of court is governed by its own benchers, who fill all vacancies in their

order, usually from the Queen's Counsel, though any barrister is eligible. The benchers of

each inn exercise the power of calling to the bar the members of their own inn, and also

of disbarring any they have called, whenever they see sufficient reason. All advocates reach

the bar through one of those inns. To " keep a term " in any of them, one must dino in the

common hall at least three times. Some of these dinners are grand occasions, in which the,
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chancery) between the city of Westminster, the place of holding the king's

courts, and the city of London; for advantage of ready access to the one, aiid

plenty of provisions in the other, (r) Here exercises were performed, lectures

read, and degrees were at length conferred in the common law, as at other univer-

sities in the canon and civil. The degrees were those of barristers (first styled

r *24 I apprentices, («) from apprendre, to *learn) who answered to our baehe-

1 " J lors; as the state and degree of a Serjeant, (t) servientis ad legem, did to

that of doctor.

(r) Fortune, c. 48.

(«) Apprentices nrbarristers aeem to have been first appointed by an ordinance of Kinir Edward the first

in parliament, in the 90th year of his n-iiin. (Spclin. Glut*. 37. K'ligdale, Orig. Jurtd. 63.)

(t) The first inentjon which I hnve met with in our law huokt* of scrji'anU or coiintor*, is in the statute of

Westtn. 1. 3 Edvr I. c. 29, and In Horn's Mirror, c. 1. f 10. c. 2. * 5. c. 3. H. In tli« same reign. But M.l'aris,

In his life of John II. Abbot of St. Alban't. which he wrote in I J.'.V 38 I l<-un III. speaks of" advocates at the

common law, or conn tors, (quo* band narratore* rutffariltr iippeUamus.}—as of an order of men well known.

And we have an example of the antiquity of the coif in thannme author's History of England, A. I). 1*59, in

the case of one William dc Bnssy ; who, being called to account for his jjrent knavery nml mal-uraclices,

claimed the l>eneflt of his orders or clerxy. whicn till then remained an entire secret; and to thai end iWw*-

Kaamtnia cotyot. *wr. «o/rerr, vtpalatn rnnnutraret se toiuntram kabtreclerictil&n ; Sfd tu>n fit uermf«*u«. f^tit

teles reroeum arripieiw, MOM per co\fic liynmittd fed per yittlur eum tipprchiiidtns. trturit aacarrerem. Ilu-lire

Sir H. Spelman conjectnre&«?/0Mrtr. 33fi, I that coir* were introduced to hide the tonsure of snc.h reneumle

rink-. as were still tempted to remain in the we ulnr courts hi the quality ol advocates or judges, notwith-
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standing their prohibition by canon.

Iiins of Court, and Ireland's Inns of Court, illustrated. Mr. Jefferson in his " Book of Law-

yers," has gome pleasant information on the name subject.

Doctors' Commons is the college of the civilians in London, and takes its name from the

fact that the doctors of the civil law practicing in London diet and lodge there in a collegiate

manner, and common together.

For a long time until recently, systematic instruction in the law was discontinued in the

inns of court. A curriculum of'legal education is however now established by general regu-

lations, and we present here a synoposis of it as given by Messrs. Broom and liadley.

I. As to tlie admission of student*.—Every person, not otherwise disqualified, who has passed

a public examination at anv of the universities within the British dominions, may be admitted

as a student at any inn of" court, for the purpose of being called to the bar, or of practicing

under the bar, without passing anv preliminary examination. But every other person so

applying to be admitted is required before admission to pass an examinatio'n in the following

Bubjeets, viz; The English language; the Latin huiguage, and English history. The bench-

ers of any inn have power however to relax or dispense with this regulation, in whole or in

part, in any case in which they may think that special circumstances justify a departure

iroin it.

II. Ag to keeping terms.—Students of the inns of court, being at the same time members of

any of the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, London, Durham, the Queen's University

in Ireland, St. Andrew's, Aberdeen, Glasgow, or Edinburgh, can keep terms by dining in the

halls of then- respective societies any three days in each term; and students, who are not at

the same time members of any of the said universities, may do so by dining in the halls of

their respective societies auy six days in each term.

III. As to calling to the oar.—Every student must have attained the age of twenty-one years

before being called to the bar, and must have kept twelve terms before being so called, uuloss

auy term or terms shall have been dispensed with as hereinafter meutioned. Further, no stndeut

is eligible to be called to the bar who has not attended during one whole year the lectures

and private classes of two of the readers, unless he has been a pupil during one whole year,

or periods equal to one whole year, in the chambers of some barrister, certified special pleadi-r,

conveyancer or draftsman in equity, or two or more of such persons, or has satisfactorily passed

a general examination.

Calls ta the bar take place during term and on the same day by the several societies, namely,

on the sixteenth day of each torui, unless such day happen to be Sunday, and in snch case on

the Monday after.

IT. As to certificates to practice under the bar.—No student of any inn of court is allowed

student applying has kept twelve terms. Snch permission is granted for one year only from

the date thereof but mav be renewed annually.

No student can obtain any such certificate unless he shall have attended such lectures and

classes, or passed such an examination, or been such pupil, as would be necessary to entitle

him to be called to the bar.
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The crown seems to have soon taken under its protection this iufant semi-

nary of common law; and, the more effectually to foster and cherish it, King

Henry the Third, in the nineteenth year of his reign, issued out an order

directed to the mayor and sheriffs of London, commanding that no regent of

The crown seems to have soon taken under its protection this infant seminary of common Jaw; and, the more effectuallv to foster and cherish it, Kiug
Henry the Third, in the nineteenth year of· his reign, issued out an order
directed to the mayor and sheriffs of London, commanding that no regent of

V. An to the lectures and examination*.—These are under the special superintendence of "The

Couucij of Legal Education," consisting of eight benchers, of whom two are nominated by each

of the inns of court, and of whom four arc a quorum.

The council has power to grant dispensations to students, who may have been prevented by

any reasonable cause from complying with the regulations as to attendance at lectures and

classes; and all arrangements touching the number of public lectures to be delivered by the

readers, and the hours and extent of private classes, are with the council.

For the purpose of education the legal year is considered as divided into three terms, one

commencing on the 1st of November and ending on the 2i!d of December; the second commenc-

ing on the Hili of January and ending on thu 30th of March, and the third commencing on the

15th of April and ending'on the 31st of July, subject to a deduction of the dnys intervening

between the end of Easter and the beginning "of Trinity Term.

For the purpose of affording to the students the means of obtaining instruction and guidance

in their legal studies, six readers are appointed, viz.: 1. A reader on jurisprudence and civil and

international law; U. A reader on the law of real property; 3. A reader on the common law; 4.

A readeron equity; 5. A reader on constitutional law and legal history, and 6. A reader on Hindu

and M M In in id inn law, and on the laws in force in British India.

The duties of these readers principally consists in the delivery of lectures in each educational
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term; of the formation of classes of students, for the purpose of giving instruction in a more

detailed and personal form than can be supplied by general lectures; and of affording to students,

generally, advice and directions for the conduct of their professional studies.

Tin1 readers also assist in conducting the general examinations held twice a year, for the

examination of all such students as may be desirous of being examined previously to being

called to the bar.

As an inducement to students to propose themselves for such an examination, studentships and

exhibitions have been founded of lifty guineas per annum each, and twenty-five guineas per

annum each, respectively, to continue for a period of three years. One each studentship is con-

ferred on the most distinguished student at each general examination, and one such exhibition is

conferred on the student who obtains the second position; and, further, the examiners select

and certify the names of three other students who have passed the next best examinations,

and the inns of court to which such students as aforesaid belong may, if desired, dispense with

any terms, not exceeding two, that may remain to be kept by such students previously to their

being called to the bar. Pass certificates for a call to the bar are also awarded at these

examinations; the examiners, however, are not obliged to confer or grant any studentship,

exhibition, or certificate, unless they are of opinion that the examination of the students hag

been such as entitles them thereto.

At every call to the bar those students who have passed a general examination, and either

obtained at such examination a studentship, an exhibition, or a certificate of honor, take rank in

seniority over all other students who may be called on the same day.

The examination is by printed and oral questions on books and subjects specified in a pro-

gramme previously issued. Besides the above general examinations, there arc, in the month of

July, in each year, voluntary examinations of the students unon the subjects of the several

courses of lectures, but no student is entitled to go in for examination on any of such subjects,

unless he has obtained a certificate from the reader that he has duly attended his lectures and

classes upon the subject on which he offers himself for examination. These voluntary examina-

tions are conducted by barristers (not being readers) nominated for that purpose by the Council

of Legal Education.

No attorney at law, solicitor, writer to the signet, or writer of the Scotch courts, proctor, notary

public, clerk m chancery, parliamentary agent, or agent in court, clerk to any justice of the peace,

clerk to any barrister, conveyancer, special pleader, equity draftsman, clerk of the peace, or

clerk of HI- to any officer in any court, ig admissible as a student at any inn of court for the pur-

pose of being coUed to the bar, or of practicing uudor the bar, until such person shall have ceased

to act or practice in any of the said capacities.

Until recently instruction in the law in the United States has been given for the most part in

the offices of practicing lawyers. The Litchfield Law School was established in 1784, and was

continued about fifty years, attaining much celebrity. Mr. (afterwards Judge) Reeve, of Con-

necticut, was at first the sole instructor, but Judge Gould was afterwards associated with him,

V. Ast<> the leottWe.R mtd exa11ti1tntfon.9.-Th0ffe are under the special superint.endence of "The
Couueil of Legal J~ducation," coui'i>!tin~ of oiitht lumchens, of whom two are nominated by c~h
of the inn~ of court, 1Wd of whom four 11rc a (juorum.
'fhe council h11:1 power to grant dbpen~ntions to student>'. who may have been prt!vented by
any reasonahle eau1m from complying with the repilnt.inm; as t.o attendance at lectures and
cla.~:m,;; and all ammgement.~ touching the number of public locture11 to be delivered by the
readers, and the hours and ext.ent of private classe8, are with the council.
For the purpose of t.!ducatiou the legal year iii con~idered 11.;1 divided into three terms, one
commPndnir on the l~t of Nonmbcr and ending on the 2'..td of December; the second commrncinir 011 the 11th of Jnnuury rmd ending on tho 30th of March, and the third comwoncing on the
l&tb of •.\pril and ending on the 31st of July, subject to a deduction of the days intervening
between the end of Ea:iter and the beginning of 'l'rioity Tenn.
}'or the purpOi!e of affording to tbe studt!nt,; the mean:i of obta.iniu~ in~truction o.nd guidance
in thdr legal studie", six rt•nders are appointed, viz.: 1. A reader on Jnri~prudenee and civil nnd
inten111tim.inl law; 2 . .A reader on the hLw of real propertv; 3. A roadcr on the common law; 4•
.A readeron equity; 5 . .A reU1foron con1<titutioual law and foiral history, and 6. A. reo.der on Hindu
and Mnhomodan 1aW', and on the law11 in force in Briti~h India.
The dut.ies of the:<e readers prinl'ipally eon~i:>t~ in the delivery of lectnreB in cnl'h educational
tcnn; of the fonuation of c1Mi;e:1 of student.", for the purpose of giving instruction in a more
detailed nnd penion11.I fonn th1m can be supplied by general l0Ctnros; and of affording to students,
generally, advice and directions for the conduct of their profos~ional studies.
Tho readellj al~o &l'll!ist in conducting the general eirnminations held twice a year, for tho
e:xamiu11tiou of all such studentd as may bu dusirous of being exrun.ined previou~ly to being
called to the bar.
..b au inducement to stndent.q to propoRe them!ltllve!I for sneh an examination, l!tudent.~hip!I and
exhibition,: have been founded of fifty guineas per annum each, e.nd twonly-five guinel\8 pt!r
annum ea<·h, resp<ic•tively, to continue for a poriod of three years. One 1mch studeutshiP, it1 conferred on the most dist.iuguishlld :4udent at each general examination, and one 111wh exhibition is
conferred on the student who obtain:! the second po"itiou ; 11nd, further, the examiners select
and certify the names of three other students who have pas.~ed the next best examinations,
and the inns of court to which such student.i as aforesaid belong may, if desired, di!lpcnse with
anr tem1>1, not exceeding two, that may remain to be kept by such students pre\'iously to their
bllmg callod to the bar. Pa."ls certificates for a call to the bar are also awarded at these
examinations; the cx11111inur~, however, Me not obll~ed to confer or grant any stndent."lhip,
exhibition, or certifkate, unle~s they are of opinion that the examination of the students has
been i;uch ~ entitles them thereto.
At every call to the bar those students who have '{l&SSed a general examination, and either
obtained at such examination a studentship, an exhihit1011, or a cortifice.te of honor, take rank iu
scniority o\'er nil other i:;tudents who mny be callc<l on the Name day.
The examination fa by printed and oral questions on books and subject~ i1pecitied in a programme pre,·iou:;l_v i11sue<l. Besi<leH tho nbo\'e general cxamiuntiom1, there arc, in the month of
July, in eQ<•h yenr, voluntary examinations of the Rtudent.i UJ?On the RUbjects of the several
course:! of lectnre11, but no ~tudent i11 entitled to go in for e.xnmmation on any of 11ueh subject<!,
uuJess he ho.-; obtained a certificnte from the render that he hn:1 duly attended his lectures and
clas.-es upon the imbject on which he offera himself for examination. These voluntary examiutitioni; are conducted by barril!ters (not being ree.<lerti) nominated for that purpose by the Council
of Legal Education.
No nttomer at law, solicitor, writer to the signet, or writer of the Scotch courts, proctor, notary
public, clerk ill chancery, pnrliamente.ry agent, or agent in court, clerk to any justice of the pellee,
clerk to any bnrril!ter, conveyancer, special pleader, equity draftsman, clerk of the peace, or
clerk of or to any officer in any court, is admi&1ible e.s a student at e.ny inn of court for the purpo;.e of being called to the bar, or of practicing under the bar, until such person shall have ceased
to act or practice in any of the said oapadties.
Until recently instruction in the law in the Unit.ed States has been given for the most pnrt in
the offices of practicing lawyers. The Litchfield Law School was established in 1784, and w11B
c;intiuued about fifty yeani, attainiug n1uch oeltibrity. Mr. (afterwardt1 Judge) Ree\"e, of Con·
necticut, was at first the sole in;;truct.or, but Judge Gould was afterwards asRociat.od with him,
and under them many leacliug lawyel'll and statusmen of the country received their legal train·
iup:. The Harvard Law School Wik! ntixt in point of time, being establit!hed in 18li. Li•w
schools are now numerous, and the proportion of students in the law who roceive instruction in them increases e\'ery year. Moi;t of tht!JU oonfer the degree of Bachelor of LalY~,
which, however, is not an admission to the bar. The rules of admiS11ion are ditforeut in the
difft!n:•nt States, aud are establ sht!d either by 11tatute or by rule of oourt. In sollle of the
Staw:> a diploma from the law school entitles the student to a<lmissiou ou motion, without

and under them many leading lawyers and statesmen of the country received their legal train-

ia

ing. The Harvard Law School was next in point of time, being established in 1817. Law

schools are now numerous, and the proportion of students in the law who receive instruc-

tion in them increases every year. Most of tlirm confer the degree of Bachelor of Laws,

which, however, is not an admission to the bar. The rules of admission ore different in thu

different States, and are establ shed either by statute or by rule of court. In some of the

States a diploma from the law school entitles the student to admission on motion, without
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any law schools within that city should, for the future, teach law therein. («)

The word law, or leges, being a general term, may create some doubt at tnia

distance of time, whether the teaching of the civil law, or the common or both,

is hereby restrained. But in either case it tends to the same end. If the civil

law only is prohibited, (which is Mr. Selden's (to) opinion,) it is then a retalia-

tion upon^the clergy, who had excluded the common law from their seats of

learning, 'if the municipal law be also included in the restriction, (as Sir Edward

Coke (x) understands it, and which the words seem to import, (then the inten-

tion is evidently this: by preventing private teachers within the walls of the

city, to collect all the common lawyers into the one public university, which was

newly instituted in the suburbs.

F*25l **n ^8 juridical universitity (for such it is insisted to have been by For-

L -I tescue(y) and Sir Edward Coke) (z) there are two sorts of collegiate houses;

oue called inns of chancery, in which the younger students of the law were

usually placed, "learning and studying (says Fortescue,) (a) the originals, and,

as it were, the elements of the law; who profiting therein, as they grew to ripe-

ness, so were they admitted into the greater inns of the same study, called the

inns of court." And in these inns of both kinds, he goes on to tell us, the

knights and barons, with other grandees and noblemen of the realm, did use to

place their children, though they did not desire to have them thoroughly learned

in the law, or to get their living by its practice: and that in his time there were

about two thousand students at these several inns, all of whom he informs us
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werejilii nobilium, or gentlemen born.

Hence it is evident, that (though under the influence of the monks our univer-

sities neglected this study, yet) in the time of Henry the Sixth it was thought

highly necessary, and was the universal practice, for the young nobility and

gentry to be instructed in the originals and elements of the laws. But by

degrees this custom has fallen into disuse; so that in the reign of Queen Eliza-

beth, Sir Edward Coke (b) does not reckon above a thousand students, and the

number at present is very considerably less. Which seems principally owing to

these reasons: first, because the inns of chancery being now almost totally filled

by the inferior branch of the profession, are neither commodious nor proper for

the resort of gentlemen of any rank or figure; so that there are very rarely any

young students entered at the inns of chancery: secondly, because in the inns

of court all sorts of regimen and academical superintendence, either with regard

to morals or studies, are found impracticable, and therefore entirely neglected:

lastly, because persons of birth and fortune, after having finished their usual

F*26l courses a* *he universities, have *seldom leisure or resolution sufficient

' -I to enter upon a new scheme of study at a new place of instruction. Where-

fore few gentlemen now resort to the inns of court, but such for whom the

knowledge of practice is absolutely necessary; such, I mean as are intended for -

the profession: the rest of our gentry (not to say our nobility also) having

usually retired to their estates, or visited foreign kingdoms, or entered upon

(«) -YV aliqutt tcholai regent de legiinu in eadem civitate tit catero ibidem Itaet doceat.

(w) la Flat. S. 2. (x) 2 luet. proom. (y) (J. 49. (j) 3 Uep. pref. (a) C. 48.

(6) 3 Rep. pref.
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any law schools tDithin that city should, for the future, teach law therein. ( u)
The word law, or 'leges, being a general t.erm, may creat.e some doubt at this
dist.ance of time, whether the t.eaching of the civil law, or the common or both,
is hereby restrained. But in either case it t.ends to the same end. If the civil
law only is prohibited, (which is Mr. Selden's (to) opinion,) it is then a retaliation upon the clergy, who had excluded the common law from tlieir seats of
learning. •If the municipal law be all!O included in the restriction, (as Sir Edward
Coke (x) understands it, and which the words seem to import, (then the intention is evidently this: by preventing private t.eachers within the walli! of the
city, to collect all the common lawyers into the one public unh·ersity, which was
newly instituted in the suburbs.
*In this juridical universitity (for such it is insisted to have been by For[ • 25]
tescue(y) and Sir Edward Coke) (z) there are two sorts of collegiate houses;
one called inns of chancery, in which the younger students of the law were
usi1ally placed, "learning and studying (says Fortescue,) (a) the originals, and,
as it were, the elements of the law; who profiting therein, as they grew to ripeness, so were they admitted into the greater inns of the same study, called the
inns of court." And in these inns of both kinds, he goes on to tell us, the
knights and barons, with other grandees and noblemen of the realm, did use to
pliwe their children, though they did not desire to have them thoroughly learned
m the law, or to get their living by its practice: and that in his time there were
about two thousand students at these several inns, all of whom he informs us
were filii Mhilium, or gentlemen born.
Hence it is evident, tbat (thou~h under the influence of the monks our universities neglected this study, yet) m the time of Henry the Sixth it was thought
highly necessary, a.nd was the universal practice, for the young nobility and
gentry to be instructed in the originals and elements of the laws. But by
degrees this custom has fallen into disuse; so that in the reign of Queen Elizabtth, Sir Edward Coke (h) does not reckon above a thousand students, and the
number at present is very considerably less. Which seems principally owino- t-0
these reasons: first, because the inns of chancery being now almost totally filled
by the inferior branch of the profession. are neither commodious nor proper for
the resort of gentlemen of any rank or figure; so that there are very rarely any
young students entered at the inns of chancery: secondly, because in the inns
of court all sorts of regimen and academical superintendence, eit.her with regard
to morals or studies, are found impracticable, and therefore entirely neglected :
lastly, because persons of birth and fortune, after having finished their usual
[ • 26 ] courses at the universities, have •seldom leisure or resolution sufficient
.
to enter upon a new scheme of study at a new place of inst.ruction. Wherefore few gentlemen now ~esort to the inns of court, but such for whom the
knowledge of practice is absolutely necessary; such, I mean a.s a.re intended for
the profession: the rest of our gentry (not to say our nobility also) having
usually retired to their est.ates, or visited foreign kingdoms, or entered upon

examination. The general rale is that applicants must pass a satisfactory examination; either in

open court or before a committee of practitioners appointed by the court. To the federal courts,

attorneys and counsellors of the highest courts of the several states are admitted on motion,

Cul .ve aliqut. •cllola.I "'f!MI de kg{btu '" ~ clt!UNe tie catWo '1Mdtt1t ~u doual.
In Fld. 8. 2.
(Z) 2 luat. proem.
(J') t;, 411.
(~) 3 Rep. pref,
(G) C. '9.
(b) 3 Rep. pret.

(tc)

without further evidence of fitness.

As to the comparative advantages of pursuing the study of the law in the law school and in

'the office of the practicing lawyer, Mr. Bishop expresses his views in his First Book of the Law,

chap. 17.

Not the least among the valuable results of the law schools has been the publication, by some

of the eminent jurists who have been professors therein, of the lectures delivered by them upon

leading subjects. The commentaries of Blaokstone and Kent and Story, the lectures of Austin

on the Province of Jurisprudence, and the treatises on the Conflict of Laws, by Justice Story, on

Domestic Relations, by Judge Reeve, on Pleading, by Judge Gould, on Evidence, by Mr. Green-

leaf, on Contracts, by "Mr. Parsons, and on Keal Property, by Mr. Wash burn, will at once occur

to the reader.
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'the office of the practicing lawyer, lrlr. Bishop expresses his views in hie First Book of the Law,
chap. 17.
Not the least among the Yalua.ble resnlts of the law i!Chools hBB been the publication, by eome
of the eminent juri11te who have been professol'l1 therein, of the lootures delivered by them upon
leading subjects. The commentaries of Blookstone and Kent and Story, the lectures of Austin
on the.Province of Jurisprudence, and the treatiMls on the Conflict of Laws, by JuHtice Story, on
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t.o the reader.

14

1g 1ze b

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

Sect 1.] STUDY OF THE LAW. 26

public life, without any instruction in the laws of the land, and indeed with

hardly any opportunity of gaining instruction, unless it can be afforded them in

these seats of learning.

And that these are the proper places, for affording assistances of this kind to

gentlemen of all stations and degrees, cannot (I think) with any colour of rea-

son be denied. For not one of the objections, which are made to the inns of

court and chancery, and which I have just now enumerated, will hold with regard

to the universities. Gentlemen may here associate with gentlemen of their own

rank and degree. Nor are their conduct and studies left entirely to their own

discretion ; but regulated by a discipline so wise and exact, yet so liberal, so

sensible, and manly, that their conformity to its rules (which does at present so

much honour to our youth) is not more the effect of' constraint than of their

own inclinations and choice. Neither need they apprehend too long an avoca-

tion hereby from their private concerns and amusements, or (what is a more

noble object) the service of their friends and their country. This study will go

hand in hand with their other pursuits : it will obstruct none of them ; it will

ornament and assist them all.

But if, upon the whole, there are any still wedded to monastic prejudice, that

can entertain a doubt how far this study is properly and regularly academical,

such persons I am afraid either have not considered the constitution and design

of an university, or else think very meanly of it. It must be a deplorable nar-

rowness of mind, that would confine these seats of instruction to the limited
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views of one or two learned professions. To the praise of this age be it spoken

a more open *and generous way of thinking begins now universally to r*27i

prevail. The attainment of liberal and genteel accomplishments, though «• J

not of the intellectual sort, has been thought by our wisest and most affectionate

patrons, (c) and very lately by the whole university, (d) no small improvement

of our ancient plan of education : and therefore I may safely affirm that noth-

ing (how unusual soever) is, under due regulations, improper to be taught in

this place, which is proper for a gentleman to learn. But that a science, which

distinguishes the critenons of right and wrong ; which teaches to establish the

one, and prevent, punish or redress the other ; which employs in its theory the

noblest faculties of the soul, and exerts in its practice the cardinal virtues of the

heart ; a science, which is universal in its use and extent, accommodated to each

individual, yet comprehending the whole community ; that a science, like this

should ever have been deemed unnecessary to be studied in a university, is mat-

ter of astonishment and concern. Surely, if it were not before an object of aca-

demical knowledge, it was high time to make it one : and to those who can doubt

the propriety of its reception among us, (if any such there be,) we may return

an answer in their own way, that ethics are confessedly a branch of academical

learning ; and Aristotle himself lias said, speaking of the laws of his own coun-

try, that jurisprudence or the knowledge of those laws, is the principal and most

perfect branch of ethics, (e)

From a thorough conviction of this truth, pur munificent benefactor, Mr.

Viner, having employed above half a century in amassing materials for new-

modelling and rendering more commodious the rude study of the laws of the land,

consigned *both the plau and execution of these his public-spirited designs r*oQi

to the wisdom of his parent university. Resolving to dedicate his learned "• •"

labours " to the benefit of posterity and the perpetual service of his country,"

(/) he was sensible he could not perform his resolution in a better and more

effectual manner, than by extending to the youth of this place, those assistances

of which he so well remembered and so heartily regretted the want. And the

sense which the university has entertained of this ample and most useful bene-

(c) Lord Chancellor Clarendon, In hits dialogue of education, among his tracts, p. 325, appears to have

been vcrv soliciting, that It might ho made '• a part of the ornament of our learned academies, to tcnc-h tho

qualities of riding, dancing and fencing, at those hours when more serious exercises should be Intermitted."

(d) By accepting in full convocation the remainder of Lord Clarendon's lii-ton from hie noble descend.

auU on" condition to apply the proflta arising from its publication to the establishment of a manage in the

university. («') Te?.«a fiaZifr apery, en ri)f Ttlciaf aptrjjf ^o/iaff(f e£t. Ethie. ad ..Vicoiwic/i. I. 5. o. S.

(/) Sos the 1're/uce to the isih volume of his abridgment.
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faction must appear beyond a doubt from their gratitude, in receiving it with all

possible marks of esteem; (g) from their alacrity and unexampled dispatch in

carrying it into execution; (h) and above all, from the laws and constitutions

by which the^r have effectually guarded it from the neglect and abuse to which

such institutions are liable. (I) We have seen an universal emulation who best

should understand, or most faithfully pursue, the designs of our generous patron:

r*3Q] and with pleasure we recollect, that those who are most distinguished *by

L J their quality, their fortune, their station, their learning, or their experi-

ence, have appeared the most zealous to promote the success of Mr. Viner'a

establishment.

(?) Mr. Vlner la enrolled among the public benefactors of the university by decree of convocation.

(h) Mr. Viner died June ft, 1736. His effect* were collected and settled, near a volume of hi* work printed,

ahnoBt Tli.- whole dlsixmed of. and the account* made up. In a year nnd a half from Ms dccva»e, by the very

diligent and worthy adniinistrRtorB, with the will annexed, (Dr. West and Dr. Good, of Magdalene; Dr. Wlialev.

of Oriel; .Mr Buckler, of All Nouls; and Mr. Belts, of University College :) to whom that care waacouaigned by

the University. Another half year was employed In considering and settling a plan of the proposed institution,

and iu framing the statutes thereupon, which were finally continued i>y convocation, on tlie 3d of July, 1743. Tli«

professor WHS elected on the 20tn October following, and two scholars ou the succeeding day. And laMly. it

van aftreed at tin- annual audit iu 1761 to i-htablUh n fellowship: and a fellow was accordingly rlrrti-tl in January

following. The residue of this fund, arising from the sale of Mr. Viuer> abridgement, win probably be aufflclt-nt

hereafter to found another fellowship and scholarship, or three more scholarships, aa shall be "thought uuiafc
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expedient.

(0 The statutes are ID substance a* follow*:

1. That the Recounts of this benefaction be separately kept, and annually audited by the delegate* of aocounta

and profetutor, and afterwards reported to convocation.

2. That a professorship nf the laws of England in- established, with a salary of two hundred pounds per annum ;

the professor to be elected by convocation, aud to be at the tint* of hi* election at leaat a inaMvr of arts or bachelor

of civil law in the University of Oxford, of tea years ataudiug from his matriculation; and ulso a barriater at law of

fun i year* standing at the bar.

:*. That *uoh promisor (by himself, or by deputy to be previously approved hv convocation) do read one aolemn

public lecture on the laws of England, nud in the Engliah language in every academical term, at certain stated

lime* previous to the commencement of the comiuon law term; or forfeit twenty ponnda for even oniiaaion to

Mr. vih'-r'.H general fuud; and also (*>y hiniKelf, or by deputy to be approved, if occaainnal, bv the vice-chan-

cellor nud proctors; or, if permanent, both the cause and the deputy to be annually approved by convocation,)

do yearly read one complete course of lectures on the laws of England, and la the 'English language, consisting

of sixty lecture* at the least, to be read during the nutverslty term time, with such proper intervnls that not

more than four lectures may fall within any single week , that the protestor do give a mouth's iiotlce of the tinia

when the Mane I* to begin, and do read gratia to the aclmlars of Mr. Viner's foundation; but may demand of

other auditors such gratuity as shall be settled from time to time by decree of convocation, and thai fur every

of the said sixty lectures omitted, the professor on complaint made to the vice-chancellor within the vear, do

forfeit forty winnings to Mr. Viuer's general fund, the proof of having performed hi* duty to lie unou the said

professor.

4. That every profesaor do continue In hts office during life, unlesti In case of suoh misbehavior an all all amount 1o

baunitiou by the university atittutes, or unless he deserts the profession of the law by betaking himself to

another profession ; or unless, after one admonition by the vice-chancellor and proctors for notorious neglect, he is

guilty of another flagrant oiuisbiou; iu any of which caaes he be deprived by the vice-chancellor, with consent of

the house of ctki vocation.

5. That such a number of fellowships, with a stipend of flfty pound* per annum, and scholarship* with a stipend

Of thirty pounds, be established, aa the convocation shall from time to time ordain, according to the state of Mr.

Viner's revenues.

6. That every fellow be elected by convocation, nnd at the time of election b* unmarried, and at least a master

of art* or a bachelor of civil law, uud a member of some college or hall In the university of Oxford; the scholar* of

this foundation, or such a* have been scholars. (If qualified and approved of by convocation,) to have the preference:

that if not a barrister when chosen, he be called to the bar within one year after hi* ttleulion; hot do reside in tlie

uiiivtTbity two months In every year, or, Iu case of uou-resideuce, do forfeit the stipend of that year to Mr. Viuer'a

general fund.

7. That every scholar be elected by convocation, and, at the time of election be unmarried, and a member of

pome college or hall in the university of Oxford, who shall have been matriculated tweiitv-fnur calendar month*

at the leaat; that he do take the degree of bachelor of civil law with all couvcniout speed (either proceeding ui

arts or otherwise); and previous to Ma taking the name, between the second and eighth year from his matriculation.

be bound to attend two course* of the professor's lectures, to be certified under the profeaaor'ft hand; aud within

one year after taking the same to be called to the bar; that he do annually reaUle. six mouths, till he is of four vears*

standing, and four mouths from that time till he t* matter of att* or bachelor of civil lav; after which he be bound

IM reside two months in every year; or, in case of non-residence, do forfeit th« stipend of that year to Mr. Viner'a

general fund.

a. That the acholarahipn do become void In case of non-attendance on the professor, or not taking the degree of

bnchelor of civil law, boiugduly admonished so to do by the vice-chancellor and prooton; aud thatbnth fellowship*

and scholarship* do expire at the end of ten year* after each respective electi<m: and become void iu caae of
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STUDY OF THE LA w.

The advantages that might result to the science of the law itself, when a little

more attended to in these s_eats of knowledge, perhaps, would be very consider-

able. The leisure and abilities of the learned in these retirements might either

suggest expedients, or execute those dictated by wiser heads, (k) for improving

its method, retrenching its superfluities, and reconciling the little contrarieties,

which the practice of many centuries will necessarily create in any human

system; a task which those who are deeply employed in business, and the more

active scenes of the profession, can hardly condescend to engage in. And as to

the interest, or (which is the same) the reputation of the universities them-

selves, I may venture to pronounce, that if ever this study should arrive to any

tolerable perfection, either here or at Cambridge, the nobility and gentry of this

kingdom would not shorten their residence upon this account, nor perhaps

entertain a worse opinion of the benefits of academical education. Neither should

it be considered as a matter of light importance, that while we thus extend the

poiiiaria of university learning, and adopt a new tribe of citizens within these

philosophical walls, we interest a very *numerous and very powerful pro- r*oi-i

fession m the preservation of our rights and revenues. *• -I

For I think it past dispute that those gentlemen, who resort to the inns of

court with a view to pursue the profession, will find it expedient, whenever it is

practicable, to lay the previous foundations of this, as well as every other science,

in one of our learned universities. We may appeal to the experience of every

sensible lawyer, whether any thing can be more hazardous or discouraging, than
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the usual entrance on the study of the law. A raw and unexperienced youth,

in the most dangerous season of life, is transplanted on a sudden into the midst

of allurements to pleasure, without any restraint or check but what his own

prudence can suggest; with no public direction in what course to pursue his

inquiries; no private assistance to remove the distresses and difficulties which

will always embarrass a beginner. In this situation he is expected to sequester

himself from the world, and, by a tedious lonely process, to extract the theory of

law from a mass of undigested" learning; or else, by an assiduous attendance on

the courts, to pick up theory and practice together, sufficient to qualify him for

the ordinary run of business. How little, therefore, is it to be wondered at, that

we hear of so frequent miscarriages; that so many gentlemen of bright imagina-

tions grow weary of so unpromising a search, (I) and addict themselves wholly

to amusements, or other less innocent pursuits; and that so many persons of

moderate capacity confuse themselves at first setting out, and continue ever dark

and puzzled during the remainder of their lives.

The evident want of some assistance in the rudiments of legal knowledge has

given birth to a practice, which, if ever it had grown to be general, must have

proved of extremely *pernicious consequence. I mean the custom, by r*ool

some so very warmly recommended, of dropping all liberal education, as "- J

of no use to students in the law, and placing them, in its stead, at the desk of some

Ekilful attorney, in order to initiate them early in all the depths of practice, and

render them more dextrous in the mechanical part of business. A few instances

of particular persons, (men of excellent learning and unblemished integrity,)

who, in spite of this method of education, have shone in the foremost ranks of the

bar, have afforded some kind of sanction to this illiberal path to the profession,

and biassed many parents, of shortsighted judgment, in its favour; not consider-

ing that there are some geniuses fonned to overcome all disadvantages, and that,

from such particular instances, no general rules can be formed; nor observing

that those very persons have frequently recommended, by the most forcible of

all examples, the disposal of their own offspring, a very different foundation of

legal studies, a regular academical education. Perhaps too, in return, I could

now direct their eyes to our principal seats of justice, and suggest a few hints in

•ply picture of his own distress

c w ;'».< cum vatOwlum latu-

' inam moiem van ingentem
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The advantages that might result to the science of the law itself, when a little
more attended to in these seats of knowledge, perhaps, would he very considerable. The leisure and abilities of the learned in these retirements might either
suggest expedients, or execute those dictated by wiser heads, (k) for improving
its method, retrenching its superfluities, and reconciling the littfe contrarietie11,
which the practice of many centuries will necessarily create in any human
system; a task which those who are deeply employed in business, and the mo1'f
active scenes of the profession, can hardly condescend to engage in. And as to
the interest, or (which is the same) the reputation of the universities Uwmselves, I may venture to pronounce, that if ever this study should arrive to any
tolerable perfection, either here or at Cambridge, the nobility and gentry of this
kingdom would not shorten their residence upon this account, nor perhnps
en tt-rta.in a worse opinion of the benefits of academical education. Neither should
it be considered as a matter of light importance, that while we thus exknd the
ponusria of university learning, and adopt a new tribe of citizens within these
philosoJ;lhical walls, we interest a very •numerous and very powerful pro- [•ai]
fossiou m the preservation of our rights and reYenues.
For I think it past dispute that those gentlemen, who resort to the inns of
court with a ,·iew to pursue the profession, will find it expedient, whenever it is
practicable, to lay the preYious foundations of this, as well as every other science,
m one of our learned uniYersities. We may appeal to the experience of every
sensible lawyer, whether any thing can be more hazardous ord1sconrnging, than
the usual entrance on the study of the law. A raw and unexperienced youth,
in the most dangerous season of life, is transplanted on a sudden into the midst
of allurements to pleasure, without any restraint or check but what his own
prudence can suggest; with no public direction in what course to pursue his
inc/uiries; no private assistance to remove the distresses and difficulties which
wi l always embarrass a beginner. In this situation he is expected to sequester
himself from the world, and, by a tedious lonely process, to extract the theory of
law from a mass of undigested learnin~; or else, by an assiduous attendance on
the courts, to pick up theory and practice together, sufficient to qualify him for
the ordinary run of business. How little, therefore, is it to be wondered at, that
we hear of so frequent miscarriages; that so manv gentlemen of bright imagina.tiops grow weary of so unpromising a se.arch, (l) and addict themselves wholly
to amusements, or other less innocent pursuits; and that so many persons of
moderate capacity confuse themselves at first setting out, and continue ever dark
u.ml puzzled dunng the remainder of their lives.
'fhe evident want of some assistance in the mdiments of legal knowledge has
given birth to a practice, which, if ever it had grown to be general, must have
proved of extremely •pernicious consequence. I mean the custom, by • 2]
some so very warmly recommended, of dropping all liberal education, as [ 3
of no use to students in the law, and placing them, in its stead, at the desk of some
skilful attorney, in order to initiate them early in all the depths of practice, and
render them more dextrous in the mechanical part of business. A few instances
of particular persons, (men of excellent learning and unblemished integrity,)
who, in spite of this method of education, have shone in the foremost ranks of the
bar, have afforded some kind of sanction to this illiberal path to the profession,
and biassed many parents, of shortsighted judgment, in its favour; not considering that there are some geniuses fonned to overcome all disadvantages, and that,
from such particular instances, no general rules can be formed; nor obsening
that those very persons have frequently recommended, by the most forcible of
all examples, the disposal of their own offspring, a very different foundation of
legal studies, a regular academical education. Perhaps too, in return, I could
now direct their eyes to our principal seats of justice, and suggest a few hints in

(It) See Lord Bacon's proposals and offer ofa dljrost.

(kl :lee Lor<t Bacon's proposals and oft'cr oh dli:c11t.
(ll Sir Henry l'lpclml\n, In the preface to his glossnry. haa jff-rcn ns a -rc>ry Jlvl'ly plch1re of his own dletreea
opon this occ1talo11 : " E ..ilit me mnter Londint1m, juri• 1iostrl capea1en11i gratw : cv,ju1 cum t>Ulibt1lum •ah•·
'6A1rm, r~rblt""/fU lin!T""m p<Tegrinam. dinkctmn bnrbflM<m, mdlaodum IHccmcinna.. fllOlem "'"' ingentewt
/IOllt• ~ ~rpduu
1Ulti~adam, ucidU mild (fateor) """""'• <jc•.,

°'"""'"'
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favour of university learning: (m) but in these, all who hear me, I know, hare

already prevented me.

Making, therefore, due allowance for one or two shining exceptions, experi-

ence may teach us to foretell that a lawyer, thus educated to the bar, in subser-

vience to attorneys and solicitors, (n) will find that he has begun at the wrong

end. If practice be the whole he is taught, practice must also be the whole he

will ever know: if he be unmstructed in the elements and first principles upon

whicli the rule of practice is founded, the least variation from established prece-

dents will totally distract and bewilder him: Ha lex scripta est (») is the utmost

his knowledge will arrive at; he must never aspire to form, and seldom expect

to comprehend, any arguments drawn, a priori, from the spirit of the laws and

the natural foundations of justice.

r*SSl *Nor is this all; for, (as few persons of birth or fortune, or even of

•• ' J scholastic education, will submit to the drudgery of servitude and the

manual labour of copying the trash of an office,) should this infatuation prevail

to any considerable degree, we must rarely expect to see a gentleman of distinc-

tion or learning at the bar. And what the consequence may be, to have the inter-

pretation and enforcement of the laws (which include the entire disposal of our

properties, liberties, and lives;) fall wholly into the hands of obscure or illiterate

men, is matter of very public concern.

The inconveniences here pointed out can never be effectually prevented, bnt

by making academical education a previous step to the profession of rhe com-
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mon law, and at the same time making the rudiments of the law a part of

academical education. For sciences are of a sociable disposition, and flourish

best in the neighbourhood of each other; nor is there any branch of learning but

may be helped and improved by assistances drawn from other arts. If, therefore,

the student in our laws hath formed both his sentiments and style by perusal

and imitation of the purest classical writers, among whom the historians and

orators will best deserve his regard; if he can reason with precision, and sepa-

rate argument from fallacy, by the clear, simple rules of pure, unsophisticated

logic; if he can fix his attention, and steadily pursue truth thorugh any, the

most intricate deduction, by the use of mathematical demonstrations; if lie has

enlarged his conceptions of nature and art, by a view of the several branches of

genuine experimental philosophy; if he has impressed on his mind the sound

maxims of the law of nature, the best and most authentic foundation of human

laws; if, lastly, he has contemplated those maxims reduced to a practical system

in the laws ol imperial Rome; if he has done this, or any part of it, (though all

may be easily done under as able instructorsasever graced any seats of learning.)

a student thus qualified may enter upon the study of the law with incredible

f*341 a<lyantage an(l reputation. And if, at the conclusion, or during *the

*- -" acquisition of these accomplishments, he will afford himself here a year

or two's further leisure, to lay the foundation of his future labours in a solid

Bcientifical method, without thirsting too early to attend that practice which it

is impossible he should rightly comprehend, he Will afterwards proceed with the

greatest ease, and will unfold the most intricate points with an intuitive rapidity

and clearness.

I shall not insist upon such motives as might be drawn from principles of

economy, and are applicable to particulars only: I reason upon more general

topics. And therefore to the qualities of the head, which I have just enumer-

ated, I cannot but add those of the heart; affectionate loyalty to the king, a z«vl

for liberty and the constitution, a sense of real honour, and well grounded prin-

ciples of religion, as necessary to form a truly valuable English lawyer, a Hyde,

(m) Thofimrhiffhest judicial nrtlcies were nt that time tilled by gentlemen, two of whom had been fellows of

AH Souls C'>lleife; another, utiiclentol'Chi-istChurch; and the fourth, aMlo\rol'Tr!iiityCoUugu,Cambri(igo.v7)

(n) Sec Kennel's Life of Soiuner, n. 67.

(v) Ff. 40. 9. 1*.

(7) [The two first wore, Lord JTorthinjrton and Lord Chief Justice Wiling; the third, Lori

Mansfield; and the fourth, Sir Thomas Sewell, Master of the Rolls.]
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a Hale, or a Talbot And, whatever the ignorance of some, or unkindness of

others, may have heretofore untruly suggested, experience will warrant us to

affirm, that these endowments of loyalty and public spirit, of honour and religion,

are no where to be found in more hig'h perfection than in the two universities

of this kingdom.

Before I conclude, it may perhaps be expected that I lay before you a short

and general account of the method I propose to follow, in endeavouring to exe-

cute the trust you have been pleased to repose in my hands. And in these solemn

lectures, which are ordained to be read at the entrance of every term, (more

perhaps to do public honour to this laudable institution, than for the private

instruction of individuals,) (p) I presume it will best answer the intent of our

benefactor, and the expectation of this learned body, if I attempt to illustrate at

times such detached titles of the law as are the most easy to be understood, and

most capable of historical or critical ornament. But in reading the complete

course, which is annually consigned to my care, a more regular method will be

necessary; and, till a better is proposed, I *shall take the liberty to follow r*o5-i

the same that I have already submitted to the public, (q) To till up and L J

finish that outline with propriety and correctness, and to render the whole intel-

ligible to the uninformed minds of beginners, (whom wo are too apt to suppose

acquainted with terms and ideas, which they never had opportunity to learn,)

this must be my ardent endeavour, though by no means my promise, to accom-

plish. You will permit me, however, very briefly to describe rather what I con-
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ceive an academical expounder of the laws should do, than what I have ever

known to be done.

He should consider his course as a general map of the law, marking out the

shape of the country, its connexions and boundaries, its greater divisions and

principal cities; it is not his business to describe minutely the subordinate lim-

its, or to fix the longitude and latitude of every inconsiderable hamlet His

attention should be engaged, like that of the readers in Fortescue's inns of chan-

cery, " in tracing out the originals and as it were the elements of the law." For

if, as Justinian (r) has observed, the tender understanding of the student be

loaded at the first with a multitude and variety of matter, it will either occasion

him to desert his studies, or will carry him heavily through them, with much

labour, delay, and despondence. These originals should be traced to their foun-

tains, as well as our distance will permit; to the customs of the Britons and

Germans, as recorded by Caesar and Tacitus; to the codes of the northern nations

on the continent, and more especially to those of our own Saxon princes; to the

rules of the Eoman law either left here in the days of Papinian, or imported by

Vacarius and his *followers; but above all, to that inexhaustible reservoir r*o/.-i

of legfil antiquities and learning, the feudal law, or, as Spelman (*) has "- -I

entitled it, the law of nations in our western orb. These primary rules and

fundamental principles should be weighed and compared with the precepts of

the law of nature, and the practice of other countries; should be explained by

reasons, illustrated by examples, and confirmed by undoubted authorities; their

history should be deduced, their changes and revolutions observed, and it should

be shewn how far they are connected with, or have at any time been affected by,

the civil transactions of the kingdom.

A plan of this nature, if executed with care and ability, cannot fail of admin-

istering a most useful and rational entertainment to students of all ranks and

professions; and yet it must be confessed that the study of the laws is not

merely a matter of amusement; for, as a very judicious writer (t) has observed

(p) See Ixm'th'e Oratio Crewlana. p. 885.

('i> The Anal.vnls of the Laws of Knirlnnd, Brst published A. It. 1750. and exhibiting the order and

principal divisions of the ensuing Cvmmcatariei, which were originally submitted to the university in a

private emirsc nf lectures, A. D. 1753.

fr) InciptCHtibHA iwbi* Krponere jurapopult Komant, tta videntltr trrtrli posse commotiigKime. si primo levi

ac simplicl fia slnauhi tradatitur t allttqui, si stntitit ttb initio rudem atlhuc el iujfrmum nnimum stutiiosi mul-

titurfiite ac rttrlfhtte rerun rutfrarimus, duontm alterum. ftvt (tcjtertorem studittrumftflcicmtts, tnttcttm mtigno

lal*>re, turpe etlnm cum itiMilenlitt (t/nie plerHmqut juvenet arrrtit) teritis ail id perifucrmits, ad qtKXt, knore

fui tlttctuit, fine nwgna Itutore., ct sine ulla tUjRtleHtin maturiut perditci pvtufaset. Inst. I. 1. 2.

(tj Oi' uarliameuta, 57. (t) lit. Taylor's Fref. to Klein, of Civil Luw.
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upon a similar occasion, the learner " will be considerably disappointed, if he

looks for entertainment without the expense of attention." An attention, how-

ever, not greater than is usually bestowed in mastering the rudiments of other

sciences, or sometimes in pursuing a favourite recreation or exercise. And this

attention is not equally necessary to be exerted by every student upon every

occasion. Some branches of the law, as the formal process of civil suits, and

the subtle distinctions incident to landed property, which are the most difficult,

to be thoroughly understood, are the least worth the pains of understanding

except to such gentlemen as intend to pursue the profession. To others I may

venture to apply, with a slight alteration, the words of Sir John Fortescue (w)

when first his royal pupil determines to engage in this study: "It will not be

necessary for a gentleman as such, to examine with a close application the

critical niceties of the law. It will fully be sufficient, and he may well enough

be denominated a lawyer, if under the instruction of a master he traces up the

r*371 principles and grounds of the *law, even to their original elements.

L '-1 Therefore, in a very short period, and with very little labour, he may

be sufficiently informed in the laws of his country, if he will but apply his

mind in good earnest to receive and apprehend them. For, though such knowl-

edge as is necessary for a judge is hardly to be acquired by the lucubrations of

twenty years, yet, with a genius of tolerable perspicacity, that knowledge which

is fit for a person of birth or condition may be learned in a single year, without

.neglecting his other improvements."
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To the few therefore (the very few I am persuaded,) that entertain such

unworthy notions of an university, as to suppose it intended for mere dissipa-

tion of thought; to such as mean only to while away the awkward interval

from childhood to twenty-one, between the restraints of the school and the licen-

tiousness of politer life, in a calm middle state of mental and of moral inac-

tivity; to these Mr. Viner gives no invitation to an entertainment which they

never can relish. But to the long and illustrious train of noble and ingenuous

youth, who are not more distinguished among us by their birth and possessions,

than by the regularity of their conduct and their thirst after useful knowledge,

to these our benefactor has consecrated the fruits of a long and laborious life,

worn out in the duties of his calling; and will joyfully reflect (if such reflec-

tions can be now the employment of his thoughts,) that he could not more

effectually have benefited posterity, or contributed to the service of the public,

than by founding an institution which may instruct the rising generation in the

wisdom of our civil polity, and inspire them with a desire to be still better

acquainted with the laws and constitution of their country. (8)

(u) De Laud. Leg. c. 8.

(8) [It is remarkable that the celebrated historian, Mr. Gibbon, animadverting freely upon

the lectures and institutions of Oxford, speaks only of the Vinerian professorship with respect;

upon a similar occasion, the learner "will be considerably disappointed, if he
looks for entertainment without the expense of attention." An attention, however, not greater than is usually bestowed in mastering the rudiments of other
sciences, or sometimes in pursuing a favourite recreation or exercise. And this
attention is not equally necessary to be exerted by eYery student upon every
occasion. Some branches of the law, as the formal process of civil suits, and
the subtle distinctions incident. to landed property, which are the most difficnlt,
to be thoroughly nnderstood, are the least worth the pains of understanding
except to such gentlemen as intend to pursue the profession. To others I mar
venture to apply, with a slight alteration: the words of Sir John Fortescue (u)
when first his roynl pupil determines to engage in this study: "It will not be
necessary for a gentleman as such, to examine with a close application the
critical niceties of the law. It will fully be sufficient, and he may well enou~h
be denominated a lawyer~ if under the instruction of a mast.er he traces up tne
[ *37] rrrinciples and grounds of the •law, even to their original elements.
Therefore, in a very short period, and with very little labour, he may
be sufficiently informed in the laws of his country, if he will but apply his .
mind in good earnest to receh·e and apprehend them. For, thou uh such know}- ·
edge as is necessary for a judge is hardly to be ncquired hy the fucnbrations of
twenty years, yet, with a genius of tolemble perspicacity, that knowledge which
is fit for a person of birth or condition may be learned m a single year, without
. ne<Tlecting his other improvements."
To the few therefore (the wry few I am persuaded,) that entertain such
unworthy notions of an univt!rsity, as to suppose it intended for mere dissipation of thonght; to such as mean only to while away the awkward interval
from childhood to twentv-one, between the restraints of the school and the licentiousness of politer life,· in a cnlm middle state of mental and of moral inactivity; to these Mr. Viner gives no invitation to an entertainment which they
never can relish. But to the long and illustrious train of noble and ingenuous
youth. who are not more distinguished among us by their birth and possessions,
than by the regularity of their conduct and th~ir thirst after useful kn.owledge,
to these our benefactor has consecrated the frmts of a long and lubonous life,
worn out in the duties of his calling; and will joyfullv reflect (if such reflections can be now the employment of his thoughts,) th.at he could not more
effectually have benefited posterity, or contributed to the service of the public,
than by founding an institution which may instruct the rising generation in the
wisdom of our civil polity, and inspire them with a desire to be still better
acquainted with the laws and constitution of their country. (8)

for, after noticing the establishment of the riding school, he adds: " The Vinerian professorship

(u) De Laud. Leg. c. 8.

is of far more serious importance. The laws ot his country are the first science of an English-

man of rank and fortune who is called to be a magistrate, and may hope to be a legislator.

This judicions institution was coldly entertained by the graver doctors, •who complained (I

have heard the complaint) that it would take the yonng people from their books; but Mr.

Viner's Benefaction is not unprofitable, since it has at least produced the excellent commen-

taries of Sir William Blackstone." Gibbon's Life, p. 53. And in another part, having stated

his inducements for bestowing attention upon new publications of merit, he tells us, " A more

respectable motive may be assigned for tho third perusal of Blackstone's Commentaries, and

a copious and critical abstract of that English work was my first serious production in my

native language." Ib. p. 141. Such, it may be observed, are even the remote consequences

of every liberal and literary institution, that Viner's Abridgment may have contributed in no

inconsiderable degree to the elegance and perspicuity of the Decline and Fall of the Unman

Empire.]

(8) [It is remarkable that tho celebrated bist.orian, Kr. Gibbon, aoimadT"ening freelv upon
the lectures and institutiom1 of Oxfc1rd, speaks only of the Vinerian profoswrabip with respect;
for, ofter noticing thl' establishment of the ridin~ school, he adds : " The Vinerian pn1fessonmip
is of far more serious importanc~. The !awl! ol hi;i Cl!tmtry are the first scienoe of an E!1dii1hmnn of rank and fortune who 1~ called to be a magistrate, and may hope to be a 1egiSintur.
This judicious institution was cold1y entertained by the graver docto~, who complained (I
have beard tho complaint) that it would ta.ke the young people from their books; but Mr.
Viner's lienefactiou is not unprofitable, since i~ hn.~ nt Jen.st J)mducc<l the excellent commentaries of Sir William Blacbtone." Gibbon's Lite, p. 53. And in auother ptlrt, having stated
hi~ inducement.~ for bestowing attention upon new pul>lfoations of merit, he tells us, "A more
rc!!pcctable motil"e may be a.'isigned fur tho third perusal of Black11tone't1 Cummentariee, and
a copious and critical abstract ot' that English work w1w my fir:>t serious production in my
native lnnguage." lb. p. 141. Such, it may be ol>Norn)(l, are even the remote oonReqUellOOil
of every liberal and literal'y im.titution, that Viner'11 .Abridgment may have contributed in no
inconsiderable degree to the elegW'.lco and perspicuity of the Declino llDd Fall of the Roman
Empire.]
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SECTION II.

OF THE NATURE OF LAWS IN GENERAL.

LAW, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action,

OF THE NATURE OF LAWS IN GENERAL.

and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inani-

mate, rational or irrational. Thus we say, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of

optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is

that rule of action which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior

is bound to obey.

Thus, when the Supreme Being formed the universe, and created matter out

of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can

never depart, and without which it would cease to be. When he put that mat-

ter into motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all movealilc

bodies must conform. And, to descend from the greatest operations to the

smallest, when a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanism,, he estab-

lishes, at his own pleasure, certain arbitrary laws for its direction,—as that

the hand shall describe a given space in a given time, to which law as long as

the work conforms, so long it continues in perfection, and answers the end of its

formation.

If we farther advance, from mere inactive matter to vegetable and animal life,

we shall find them still governed by laws, more numerous indeed, but equally

fixed and invariable. The whole progress of plants, from the seed to the root,

and from thence to the seed again; the method of animal ""nutrition, r#of,-|
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digestion, secretion, and all other branches of vital economy; are not left *• -I

to chance, or the will of the creature itself, but are performed in a wondrous invol-

untary manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the great Creator.

This, then, is the general signification of law, a rule of action dictated by

3ome superior being; and, in those creatures that have neither the power to

think, nor to will, such laws must be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature

itself subsists, for its existence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their

more confined sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them,

denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct; that

is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature

endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those

faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.

Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his

Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any

other, has no rule to pursue, biit such as he prescribes to nimself; but a state of

dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him on whom

he depends as the rule of his conduct; not, indeed, in every particular, but in

all those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle, therefore, has

more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the superiority of the one and

the dependence of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And conse-

quently, as man depends absolutely upon his Maker for every thing, it is neces-

sary that he should, in all points, conform to his Maker's will.

This will of his Maker is called the law of nature. (1) For as God, when he

created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain .

(1) [The "Law of Nature" is a supreme, invariable and ^uncontrollable rule of conduct to

all men; and it is so called because its general precepts are essentially adapted to promote

the happiness of mat), as long as he remains a being of the same nature with which lie is at

present endowed, or, in other words, as long as he continues to be man, in all the variety

of times, places and circumstances in which he has been known, or can be imagined to exist;

because it is discoverable by natural reason, and suitable to our own natural constitutions;

becanse its fitness and wisdom are founded on the general nature of human beings, and not

J_JAw, in its most general and comprehensive sens~ signifies a rule of action,
and is applied indiscrimina.tely to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, n.tlonal or irrational. Thus we say, the laws of motion, of gravitation. of
optics, or mechanics, as well e.s the laws of nature and of nations. And it is
that rule of action which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior
is bound to obev.
Thus, when the Supreme Being formed the universe, and created matter out
of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can
never depart, and wit.bout which it would ce.ase to be. When he put that matter into motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all moveable
bodies must conform. And, to descend from the greatest operations to the
smallest, when a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechanism,. he establishes, at his own pleasure~ certain arbitrary laws for its direction,-as that
the hand shall describe a given space in a gi\'en time, to which law as long as
the work conforms, so long it continues in perfection, and answers the end of its
formation.
If we farther advance, from mere inactive matter to vegetable and animal life,
we shall find them still governed by laws, more numerous indeed, but equally
fixed and invariable. 'rl1e whole progress of plants, from the seed to the root,
and from thence to the seed again; the method of animal •nutrition, * <
digestion, secretion, and all other branches of vital economy; a.re not left [ 3 1:1]
to chance, or the will of the creature itself, but are performed in a wondrous involuntary manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the great Creator.
'rh1s, then, is the general signification of law, a rule of action dictated by
3ome superior being; and, in those creatures t.hat have neither the power to
think, nor to will, such laws must be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature
itself subsists, for its existence depends on that obedience. But laws. in their
more confined sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them,
denote the rules, not of action in generat but of ltuman action or conduct; that
is, the precepts by which man, tlie noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature
endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those
fiwnlties in the general regulation of his behaviour.
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his
Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any
other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of
dependence will inentably oblige the inferior to take the will of him on whom
he depends as the rule of his conduct; not, indeed, in every particular, but in
all those points wherein his dependence consists. 'rhis principle, therefore, hns
more or less exknt and effect, in proportion as the snperiority of the one and
the dependence of the other is greater or less, abisolnte or limikd. And consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his Maker for every thing, it is necessary that he should, in all points, conform to his Maker's will.
'!'his will of his lfaker is culled the law of nature. (1) For as God, when he
created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain .
·

on any of those temporary and accidental situations in which they may be placed ; and, lastly,

because its violation is avenged by natural punishments which necessarily flow from the con-

stitution of things, and are as fixed and inevitable as the order of nature, as by shame,

(1) [The "Law of Nature" ifl a supreme, invariable and .uncontrol111hle ntle of conduct t-0
o.ll men; and it is RO called because its ~encral precepts are essentially adapted to j>rmnute
the happine811 of man, a.'! long a-, he rema.ms a bcmg of the same nature with which w i;; at
pre~ent. endowed, or, in other 'vordB, as long &'I he- oontinuos to be man, in o.11 the rnril~ty
of times, plaee~ and circnmBtances in which he hai! been known, or can be imagined to cxi8t;
becau;;c it i:i di!lcowmhlo bv natural rea.'lon, and suitable to our own natural constitution,; ;
bec1mse its fitness and wii;dom are founded on the general nature of human bcingi<, nnd not
on any of those t emporary n.ncl accidental f!ituations in which t.hey may be placed; and, la.~tly,
becnu;;e its violation hi avenged hy natural punh•hment~ which noc-011111\rily flow from the constitution of things, und are as fixed l\lld inevitable as the order of nature, n.s by shame,
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rules for the perpetual direction of that motion, so, when he created man, and

F*40l endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of "life, he laid

1 J down certain immutable laws of human nature, wherehy that freewill is

in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason

to discover the purport of those laws.

Considering the Creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unques-

tionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, how-

ever unjust or severe. But, ae he is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid

down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice that existed

in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal

immutable laws of good and evil, to which the Creator himself, in all his dis-

pensations, conforms; and which be has enabled human reason to discover, so

far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such, among others,

are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and

should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian

(a) has reduced the whole doctrine of law.

But if the discovery of these first principles of the law of nature depended

only upon the due exertion of right reason, and could not otherwise be obtained

than by a chain of metaphysical disquisitions, mankind would have wanted

some inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the

world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance, its insep-

arable companion. As, therefore, the Creator is a being not only of infinite
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power, and wisdom, but also of infinite goodness, he has been pleased so to con-

trive the constitution and frame of humanity, that we should want no other

prompter to inquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-

love, that universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected, ao

inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each indi-

vidual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the

former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence

f*411 °^ which mutual connexion of justice and human felicity, he *has not

I J perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and

precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have

vainly surmised, but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one

paternal precept, " that man should pursue his own true and substantial happi-

ness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law; for the

several articles into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no more

than demonstrating that this or that action tends to man's real happiness, and

therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law

of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of man's

real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.

This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself,

is of course superior in obligation to anv other. It is binding over all the globe,

in all countries, and at all times: no numan laws are of any validity, if con-

trary to this; (2) and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all

their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original. (3)

(nj Jurisprattfla tun! Mae, ftoftMfc rt'n-n-. altmtm mm laden mum euiqve trU-mre. tint. 1.1. 3,

remorse, infamy and misery, and still further enforced by reasonable expectation of still more

awful penalties in a future and more permanent state of existence.—MACKI.VTOSH,]

(.•-' i [Lord Chief Justice Hobart has also advanced, that even an act of parliament made

rules for the perpetual direction of that motion, so, when he created man, and
[* 40] endued hi~ w!th freewill to conduct himself in all parts of •Jife, he. lai.d
down oertam immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is
in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason
to discover the purport of those laws.
Considering the Creator only as a being of infinite fH>!O", he WM able unquestionably to have prescribed whate\"er laws he pleased to his ctMture, man, bow·
e,·er unju8t or severe. But, ae he is also a being of infinit.e tcfsdo-m, be has laid
down only euch laws ae were founded in those relations of justice that existed
iu the nature of things antecedent to any )l?Bitive precept. 1.'hese are the et~al
immutable laws of good and evil, to wluch the Creator himself, in sll his di&peneations, conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so
far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such, among others,
are these principles: that we ehould live honestly, should hurt nobo<ly, and.
should render to every one hie due; to which three general precepts Justinian
(a) has reduoed the whole doctrine of law.
But if the diecovery of theee first principles of the law of nature dependoo
only upon the due exertion of right reason, and could not other"·ise be obtained
than by a chain of metaphysica.l disquisitione, mankind would haw wanted
some inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the
world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance, its inseparable companion. As. therefore, the Creator is a being not only of infinite
power, and wisdom, but also of infinite good11nu1, he has been pleased so to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity, that we should wa.nt no other
prompter to inquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own selflove, that universal principle of action. For he has so intimatdy connected, so
inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal jm1tice with the happiness of ,eRCb inclividua.l, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the forme1·; and, if the
former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. Iu consequence
[ ,.41 ] of which mutual connexion of justice and human felicity, he *bas not
perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and
precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have
vainly snrmi~, but has graciously reduced the rule of obcdienee to this one
patA•rnal r,recept, "that man shonlll pursue his own true and substantial happiness." '1 his is the foundl\tion of what we call ethics, or natural law ; for the
several articlt'S into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no more
than demonstrating that this or that action tends to man's real happiness. and
therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a purt of the law
of nature; or, on the other hund, that this or that action is destructiYe of man's
real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.
This law of nature, bein~ coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himsel(
fs of course superior in obhgation to any other. It is binding over all theflobe,
in all conn tries, and st all times: no huma.n laws are of any >ulidity, i cont.rary to this; (2) and such of them as are Yalid deriYe all their force, and all
their authority, mediat:ely or immediately, from this original. (3)
(a) Jurla prCPClpl4111111 Ttala,

~ ""-e,

slterua llOll

~-

cviqwetrlb111irc. Jul. I. I. S.

against natural justice, as to make a man a judge in bin own cause, is void in itself, for jitra

naturae mint immntabilia, and they are leges lf(/um. Hob. 87. With deference to these high

authorities, I should conceive that in no case whatever can a judge oppose his own opinion and

authority to the clear will and declaration of the legislature. His province is to interpret and

obey the mandates of the supreme power of the state. And if an act of parliament, if we could

suppose such a case, should, like the edict of Herod, command all the children under a certain

age to be slain, the judge ought to resign his office rather than be auxiliary to its execution; but

it could only be declared void by the nigh authority by which it was ordained. The learned

judge himself is also of this opinion in p. 91.—CHRISTIAN.]

(3) [By this sentence, though somewhat strongly expressed, I understand the author to

mean merely, that a human law against the law of nature has no binding force on the con-

22

remorse, infamy and misery, and still fnrther enforced by reasonable expec>tat.ion of still more
awful ~naltie8 in a future and more permanent state of e1iKtence.-YAcK1~011u. l
(2) [Lon\ Chief Jni!tice Hobart hM all!O advanced, that even an oot of J?MilRment made
again~t natural justice, as to mRke a man a judge in hb1 own CAU!'e, is void m itself, for jt1r4
naturre sunt ""mutabilia, and tae1 are ~ leg"'"· Hob. 'i!'I. With deforence to these high
nuthoritil's, I should conc~ive thai m no ca.ore whatever can a judge oppose his own opinion and
authority to the clear will and declaration of the legi1!lature. His proYiI1cc i~ to iuter1>ret and
ohcy the mandates of the supreme power of the state. And if an act of pRrliamont, if we could
suppose such a cBSe, Rbould, like the edict of Herod, command all the <1hildren under a certain
Rtre to be slain, the judge OUll(ht to resign his office rather than be auxiliary to its cxec>utiou; but
it could only be declared void hf the nigh autholity by which it W88 ordained. The learned
jurlge himself is abm ot this opimon in p. 91.-CHRll!TIAN.)
(3) [By this eentenc,'6, Utou,:h 110mewhat strongly expres.~nd, I unden;t1md the author to
mean merely, that a human law against the law of nature haii no binding force on the <"Oll-
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But, in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each individual, it

is still necessary to have recourse to reason, whose office it is to discover, as was

before observed, what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life, by

considering what method will tend the most effectually to our own substantial

happiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his

transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice,

unimpaired by disease or intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we

should need no other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in

his own experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of

ignorance and error.

This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of divine Provi-

dence, which, in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness

of human reason, "hath been pleased, at sundry times and in divers man- riMo-i

ners. to discover and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation. >- -"

The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to

be found only in the holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found

upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend

in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to con-

clude that the knowledge of these truths was attainable by reason, in its present

corrupted state; since we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from

the wisdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the

same original with those of the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of
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equal strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely.

more authenticity than that moral system which is framed by ethical writers,

and denominated the natural law; because one is the law of nature, expressly

-declared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of

human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the

latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority; but, till

then, they can never be put in any competition together.

Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation,

depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to

contradict these. There are, it is true, a great number of indifferent points in

which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty, but which

are found necessary, for the benefit of society, to be restrained within certain limits.

And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for,

•with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declara-

tory of, and act in subordination to, the former. To instance in the case of

tourder: this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the

natural law; and, from these prohibitions, arises the true unlawfulness of this

crime. Those human laws that annex a punishment to it do iiot-at all increase

its moral guilt, or *snperadd any fresh obligation, in foro conscientice, r*Ao-i

to abstain from its perpetration. Nay, if any numan luw should allow or •• -*

enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we

must offend both the natural and the divine. But, with regard to matters that

are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those

superior laws,—such, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries,—

here the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make

that action unlawful which before was not so.

If man were to live in a state of nature, unconnected with other individuals,

there would be no occasion for any other laws than the law of nature and the

law of God. Neither could any other law possibly exist: for a law always sup-

poses some superior who is to make it; and, in a state of nature, we are all

equal, without any other superior but Him who is the author of our being.

But man was formed for society; and, as is demonstrated by the writers on this

subject, (b) is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do

! *) Pnffendorf, 1. 7, c. 1. compured with Bai-l>cyme'» Commentary.

science; and that if a man submits to the penalty of disobedience, he stands acquitted. In

thin sense the position seems unquestionable.—COLERIDGE.] But see note, p. 57.
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But, in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each individual, it
is still necessary to h11.ve recourse to reason, whose office it is to discover, as was
before observed, what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life, by
oeonsidering wha.t method will tend the most effootuully to our own substantial
h11.ppiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his
-tr&nsgression1 ele&r and perfect, unruffled by pe.ssions, unclouded by prejudice,
nnimp&ire~ by diseast> or intem~rance, the t.aak would be pleasant and easy; we
ehould need no othor guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in
his O\rn e!ICperience; that his roaaon is corrupt, and his understanding full of
ignorance and error.
. 'fhis has given manifold oceasion for the benign interposition of divine Providence, which, in compa88ion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness
of human reason, •bath been pleased, at sundry times and in divers man- [•42]
ners~ to discov-er and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation.
'!'he doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to
be found only in the holy scriptures. 'fhese precepts, when revealed, are found
upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend
in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we a.re not from thence to conclude that the knowledge of these truths was attainable by reason, in its present
corrupted state; since we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from
the wisdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the
same original with those of the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of
equal strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubt.edly the rew.aled law is of infinit.ely.
more authenticity than that moral system which is framed by ethical writers,
and denominated the natural law; because one i11 the law of nature, expressly
-declared so to be by GOO himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of
human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the
latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority; but, till
then, they mm never be put in any competition together.
Upon these two foundations, t.he law of nature and the law of revelation,
depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suflered to
contradict these. There are, it iii true, e. great number of indifferent points in
which both the divine law and the natura.l l~ve a man at his own liberty, but which
are found necessary, for the benefit of society, to be restrained within certain limits.
And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for,
with regard to jiUCh points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declarat.ory of, and act in snbordination to, the former. To instance in the case of
'murder: this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the
natuml law; and, from these prohibitions, arises the true unlawfulness of this
crime. Those human laws that annex a punishment to it do uot·a.t all increase
its moral guilt, or •supemdd any fresh obligation, in foro conscienti(JJ, [•43 ]
t.o abstain from its perpetration. Nay, if any human law should allow or
enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we
must offend both the natural and the divine. Ilut, with regard to matters that
are in them1elves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by those
superior laws,-snch, for instance, as exporting of wool into foreign conntries,herc the inferior legislature has scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make
thnt action unlawful which before was not so.
If rnn.n were to live in a state of nature, unconnected with other individuals,
th(>re would be no occasion for any other laws than the law of nature and the
law of God. Neither could any other law possibly exist: for a law always supfloses some superior who is to make it; and, in a state of nature, we are all
equal, without any other superior but Him who is the author of our bein~.
But man was formed for society; and, as is demonstrated by the writers on th1s
subject, (h) is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed ha1:1 the courage to do
, ., P1ia'endol'f, I. 7, c. I. coraparc1l with Barboyruc'& Commeot11ry.

---------

· - - - -- - - -- - · -
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41Cience; and that if a man submits to the penalty of doo>bedience, be ~tand11 acquitted.
thi;1 sen8e the position seems unquestionable.-COLEHIDGE.] But see note, p. 57.
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it. However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in

one great society, they must necessarily divide into many, and form separate

states, commonwealths, and nations entirely independent of each other, and yet

liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law to regulate

this mutual intercourse, called " the law of nations," which, as none of these

states will acknowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be dictated by any,

but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts,

treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several communities; in the

construction also of which compacts we have no other rule to resort to, but the

law of nature; being the only one to which all the communities are equally

subject: and therefore the cival law (c) very justly observes, that quod naturalii

ratio inter omnes homines constituit, vocatur jus gentium.

r*441 *Thus much I thought it necessary to premise concerning the law of

L -I nature, the revealed law, and the law of nations, before I proceeded,

to treat more fully of the principal subject of this section, municipal or civil

law: that is, the rule by which particular districts, communities or nations,

are governed; being thus defined by Justinian, (d) "jus civile est quod quisque

sibi populus constituit." I call it municipal law, in compliance with common

speech; for, though strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of

one single municipium or free town, yet it may with sufficient propriety be

applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the same laws and
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customs.

Municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined to be " a rule of civil

conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right

and prohibiting what is wrong."(4) Let us endeavour to explain its several prop-

erties, as they arise out of this definition. And, first, it is a rule: not a

(o) ff. I. 1, 9. (d) Iiut. I. *. 1.

it. However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in
one great society, they must necessarily divide into many, and form eeparate
states, commonwealths, and nations entirely independent of each other, and yet
liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law to regulate
this mutual intercourse, called" the law of nations," which, as none of these
states will acknowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be dictated by any,
but depends entii-ely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts,
treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several communifie.s; in the
construction also of which compa.cts we liave no other rule to resort to, but the
law of nature; being the only one to which all the communities are equall7
subject: and therefore the cival law (c) very justly observes, that quod natu·ral16
ratio inter omnes ltomlnes constilttit, vocatur jus gentium.
*Thus much I thought it nece88.ary to premise concerning the law of
[•«] nature,
the reYealed law, and the law of nations, before I proceeded
to treat more fully of the principal subject of this section, municipal or ch·il
law; that is, the rule by which )11\l'ticular districts, communities or nations,
are governed; being thus defined by Justinian, (d) "jus ci-vile e8t quod qui8qtt~
sibi populus comtituit." I call it municipal law, in compliance with common
speech ; for, though strictly that expression denotes the particular customs of
one single m.unicipium or free town, yet it may with sufficient propriety be
applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the same laws and
cust-0ms.
Municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined to be" a mle of civil
conduct 1;1rescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right
and prohibiting what is wrong."( 4) Let us endeavour to explain it.s several properties, as they arise out of this definition. And, first, it is a rule: not a

(4) [Though the learned judge treats this as a favorite definition; yet when it is examined,

(cl Ff. I. 1, 9.

(dJ IMI. I. !. 1.

it will not perhaps appear so satisfactory as the definition of civil or municipal law, or tin.'

law of the land, cited above from Justinian's Institutes, viz: Quod quisque populu-s ipse sibi

jus constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est, vocaturquejus civile, quasi jus proprium ipsiut

civitatis.

A municipal law is completely expressed by the first branch of the definition: " A role of

civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state." And the latter branch, " com-

manding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong," must either be superfluous, or convey

a defective idea of a municipal law; for if right and wrong are referred to the municipal law

itself, then whatever it commands is right, and whatever it prohibits is wrong, and the clanse

would be insignificant tautology. But if right and wrong are to be referred to the law of

nature, then the definition will become deficient or erroneous: for though the municipal law

may seldom or never command what is wrong, yet in ten thousand instances it forbids what

is right. It forbids an unqualified person to kill a hare or a partridge; it forbids a man to

exercise a trade without having served seven years as an apprentice; it forbids a man to keep

a horse or a servant without paying the- tax. Now all these acts were perfectly right before

the prohibition of the municipal law. The latter clause of this definition seems* to have been

taken from Cicero's definition of a law of nature, though perhaps it is there free from the

objections here suggested: Lex est sunima ratio insita a natura qua jubet ea, qua: faciemiti

sitnt proliibetque eotitraria. Cio. de Leg. lib. i. c. 6.

The description of law given by Demosthenes is perhaps the most perfect and satisfactory

that can either be found or conceived : " The design and object of laws is to ascertain what is

just, honorable and expedient; and. when that is discovered, it is proclaimed as a general

ordinance, equal and impartial to all. This is the origin of law, which, for various reasons,

all arc under an obligation to obey, but especially because all law is the invention and gift

of heaven, the resolution of wise men, the correction of every offence, and the general compact

of the state; to live in conformity with which is the duty of every individual in society."

Orat. 1. Cent. Aristogit.]

Those things which the supreme authority forbids, however innocent in themselves,

abstractly considered, must be understood as inhibited, because, in view of the relations of the

citizen to the state, or to some one or more of his fellow citizens, it is not proper, right or

best that they should be done. The laws which forbade unqualified persons to destroy game,

were based upon an assumed superior right in the privileged classes; and the regulation of

trades has its foundation in the legislative judgment of what is best and most expedient for

society at large. Viewed relatively, therefore, the acts forbidden are not perfectly right, but,

(4) [Though the learned judge treats this 88 a favorite dnfinition; yet when it is e:tamined,
it will not perhaps appear so satisfactory as the definition of ciru or municipal law, or the
law of the land, cited above from Justinian's Institut~s, viz: Qt1od qui8qtu1 populUB i~ Bibi
jus constituit, id ipsius proprium cfritati& e&t, t:ocaturqiw jua cfrile, qulUi jus proprium ipriu
cit:itatis.

.A municipal law le completely expressed by the fi.ret branch of the definition : " A. rule nC
civtl conduct 1;1rescribed by the supreme power in a state." And the latter branch, ••commanclin~ what 1s right, and prohibiting what is wrong," must either be superfluous, or convey
a defective idea of a municipal law; for if right and wrong are referred to the nmnicipe.l law
itself, then whatever it commands is right, and whatever it prohibits is wrong, and the clause
would he insignificant tautology. But if ri~ht and wrong are to be referred to the low of
nature, then the definition will become deficient or erroneous; for though the municipal law
may seldom or never command what is wrong, yet in ten thouMnd instances it forbids what
ie nght. It forbids an unqualified pel'llon to kill a he.re or a partridge; it forbids a man to
exercise a trade without having Rerved ~even years ~ an apprentice ; it forbids e. man to keep
a hol'lle or a servant without paying the' tax. Now a.ll these acts were perfectly right before
the prohibition of the municipa.l law. The latter clause of this definition seems to have been
taken from Cicero's definition of a law of nature, though perhaps it is there free from the
objectious here sugge8ted: Lex est s11mma ratio insita a flatttra qure jubct ea, qua facit:11(ld
nmt prol1ibetquc rontraria.. Cic. de Leg. lib. i. c. 6.
'fhe descriptfon of law given by Demosthenes ie perhaps the most perfect &nd satisfactory
that can either be found or conceived : " The design and object of lows is to ascertain what is
just, honorable and expedient; e.nd1 when that is discoverc>d, it ie proclaimed as e. general
cmlinance, equal and imJ?artial to all. This is the origin of law, which, for various reasons,
all o.re under an obli~at1on to obey, but especia.lly because all law is the invention and ~rift
of heaven, the resolution of wise men, the correction of every offence, and the general compact.
of the state; to live in conformity with which is the duty of every individual in society."
Orat. 1. Cont. A.ristogit.]
Those things which the supreme au_thoritr. forbids, however innocent in themselves,
ab!;tractly considered, must be unden;tood e.i1 inhibited, because, in view of the relations of the
citizen to the state, or to some one or more of his fellow citizens, it is not proper, right or
be"t that they ~hould be done. The laws which forbade unqualified persons to destruy game
were based upon on assumed superior right in the prh-ileged classes; and the regulation of
trnde11 hl\8 it-! foundation in the lcgi!'11itive judgment of what is best and most expedient for
society at largo. Viewed relatively, therefore, the acUI forbidden are not perfectly right, but,
in ~ome of tbtir relations, incidents or conee<p1ences, would work a wrong, which, o.~muing
the premises to be correct, tho legililative authonty moy properly prevent. See pp. 55 and 58, pod
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the premises to be correct, the legislative authority may properly prevent. See pp. 55 and 58, post
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transient sudden order from a superior to or concerning a particular person;

but something permanent, uniform, and universal. Therefore a particular act

of the legislature to confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high

treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation of

this act is spent upon Titins only, and has no relation to the community in

general; it is rather a sentence than a law. But an act to declare that the crime

of which Titius is accused shall be deemed high treason : this has permanency,

uniformity, and universality, and therefore is properly a rule. It is also called

a rule, to distinguish it from advice or counsel, which we are at liberty to follow

or not, as we see proper, and to judge upon the reasonableness or unreasonable-

ness of the thing advised: whereas our obedience to the law depends not upon

our approbation, but upon the maker's will. Counsel is only matter of persua-

sion, law is matter of injunction; counsel acts only upon the willing, law upon

the unwilling also.

*It is also called a rule to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; r*<g-i

for a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed L J

to us. The language of a compact is," I will, or will not, do this;" that of a law

is, "thou shalt, or snalt not, do it." It is true there is an obligation which a

compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then

the original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourselves determine

and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are

obliged to act without ourselves determining or promising any thing at all.
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Upon these accounts law is denned to be "a rule."

Municipal law is also "a rule of civil conduct." This distinguishes municipal

law from the natural, or revealed; the former of which is the rule of moral

conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but also the rule of

faith. These regard man as a creature, and point out his duty to God, to

himself, and to his neighbour, considered in the light of an individual. But

municipal or civil law regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties

towards his neighbour than those of mere nature and religion; duties, which he

has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which

amount to no more than that he do contribute, on his part, to the subsistence

and peace of the society.

It is likewise "a rule,prescribed." Because a bare resolution, confined in the

breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself by some external sign, can

never be properly a law. It is requisite that this resolution be notified to the

people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be

made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by universal

tradition and long practice, which supposes a previous publication, and is the

case of the common law of England. It may be notified viva voce, by officers

appointed for that purpose, as is done with regard to proclamations, and such

acts of parliament as are appointed* to be publicly read in churches and r^g-i

other assemblies. It may lastly be notified by writing, printing, or the *- '

like; which is the general course taken with all our acts of parliament. Yet,

whatever way is made use of, it is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in

the most public and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula, who (according to

Dio Cassius) wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them upon

high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people. There is still a more

unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws ex post facto ;

when after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislator then for

the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon

the person who has committed it. Here it is impossible that the party could

foresee that an action innocent when it was done, should l>e afterwards converted

to guilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain from it;

and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and

unjust (e) All laws should be therefore made to commence in futuro, and be

(e) Siich laws among the Romans wore denominated pririltgia, or private laws, of which Cicero fd« leg. 8.

19. ami in his oration pro domo, 17.) thus »pc.ikD: " Vetant leget tacrator veiaiit duwlecim tiibvla, teget prlvatii
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transient sudden order from a. superior to or concerning a particular person;
but something permanent, uniform, and universal. 'l'herefore a particular act
of the legislature to confiscate the goods ot' 'ritius, or to attaint him of high
treason, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation of
this act is spent upon Titins only, and hus no relation to the community in
general; it is rather a sentence than a law. But an act to declare that the crime
of which Ti tins is accused shall be deemed high treason: this has permanency,
uniformity, and universality, and therefore is properly a rule. It is also called
a rule, to distinguish it from advice or counsel, which we are at liberty to follow
or not, as we see proper, and to judge upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the thing ad vised: whereas our obedience to the law depends not upon
Ottr approbation, but upon the maker's will. Counsel is only matter of persuasion, law is matter of injunction; counsel acts only upon the willing, law upon
the unwilling also.
•It is also called a rttle to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; [*4:5]
for a compact is a promise proceeding from. us, law is a command directed
to us. The language of a compact is," I will, or will not, do this;" that of a lMv
is, "thou shalt, or shalt not, do it." It is true there is an obligation which a
compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but tllen
the original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourselves determine
and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are
obliged to act without ourselves determining or promising any thing at al1.
Upon these accounts lu.w is defined to he "a rule."
Municipal law is also "a rule of civil conduct." This distinguishes municipal
law from the natural, or revealed; the former of which is the rule of moral
conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but also the rule of
faith. 'fhese regard mo.n as a creature, and point out his duty to God, to
himself, and to his neighbour, considered in the light of an individual. But
municipal or civil ln.w regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties
towards his neighbour than those of mere nature and religion; duties, which he
bas engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which
amount to no more than that he do contribute, on his part, to the subsistence
and peace of the society.
It is likewise "a rnle prescribed." Because o. bare resolution, confined in the
breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself by some external sign, can
never be properly a law. It is requisite that this resolution be notified to the
people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be
made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by univer~al
tradition and long practice, which supposes a previous publication, and is the
case of the common law of England. It mo.y be notified viva voce, by officers
appointed for that purpose, as is done with regard to proclamations, and such
acts of parliament as are appointed• to be publicly read in churches and [* 46 ]
other assemblies. It may lastly be notified by writing, printing, or the
like; which is the general course taken with all our acts of parliament. Y ct,
whatever way is made use of, it is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in
the most public and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula, who (a~corcling to
Dio Cassius) wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them upon
high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people. There is still a more
unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws ex post facto ;
when after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislator thm for
the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon
the person who has committed it. Here it is impossible that the party could
foresee that an action innocent when it was done, should he afterwards converted
to (J'uilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstuin from it;
and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and
unjust. (e) All laws should be therefore made to commence in futuro, and be
(t!.) Such laws among the Romans WCl'e rlcnomlnaterl priril•gfa. OT )ll"lvntc ID\1"8, or which ClcC'TO (de leg.~·
19. 1111<1 i11 hl11 orotloupro donao, 17.) thus 11pclllt.!: " Vetcmtlegu 1acrat<P tieta1it duockciS& tabula:, kgeaprlool.,.
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notified before their commencement; which is implied in the term "prescribed."

But when this rule is in the usual manner notified or prescribed, it is then the

subject's business to be thoroughly acquainted therewith ; for if ignorance, of

what he //;/<//// know, were admitted as a legitimate excuse, the laws would be

of no effect, but might always be eluded with impunity. (5)

But further: municipal law is " a rule of civil conduct proscribed by the

supreme potoer in a stale." For legislature, as was before observed, is the

greatest act of superiority that can be exercised by one being over another.

Wherefore it is requisite to the very essence of a law, that it be made by the

supreme power. Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms; one

cannot subsist with out the other.

[-„. »-• *This will naturally lead us into a short inquiry concerning the nature

*• J of society and civil government; and the natural inherent right that

belongs to the sovereignty of a state, wherever that sovereignty be lodged, of

making and enforcing laws.

The only true and natural foundations of society are the wants and the fears

of individuals. Not that we can believe, with some theoretical writers, that

there ever was a time when there was no such thing as society either natural or

civil; and that, from the impulse of reason, and through a sense of their wants

and weaknesses, individuals met together in a large plain, entered into an

original contract, and chose the tallest man present to be their governor.

This notion of an actually existing unconnected state of nature, is too wild
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to be seriously admitted: and besides it is plainly contradictory to the

revealed accounts of the primitive origin of mankind, and their preservation

two thousand years afterwards; both which were effected by the means .of

single families. Tliese formed the first natural society among themselves;

which, every day extending its limits, laid the first though imperfect rudiments

of civil or political society: and when it grew too large to subsist with conven-

ience in that pastoral state, wherein the patriarchs appear to have lived, it

necessarily subdivided itself by various migrations into more. Afterwards, as

agriculture increased, which employs and can maintain a much greater number

of hands, migrations became less frequent: and various tribes, which had formerly

separated, reunited again; sometimes by compulsion and conquest, sometimes

homnibtu irrogari; U mim at pririltgitim. Ifemo unquam In HI, nihil at crudeliui, iiihil prrmcitniut, nihil

yuod mi mi 1 hue ctvitai fern potnt "

notified before their commencement ; which i1 implied in the term "prea<Jri'IHd."
But when this rule is in the usual manner notified or preecribed, it is then the
subject's busin088 t.o be thoroughly acquainted therewith ; for if ignorance, of
what he migltt know, were admitted u a legitimate exoµse, the laws would be
of no effect, but might always be eluded with im~unity. (5)
But further: municipal law is "a mle of civil conduct proecribed by thB
8ttprtNM power in a stat~." For legislature, as was before ohMerved, is the
greatest act of superiority that can be exercised by one being over another.
Wherefore it is requisite t.o the very e88ence of ~ law, that it be made by the
iupremc power. Sovereignty and legislature &re indeed convertible terms; one
cannot subsist without tl1e other.
·
will
naturally
lead
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int.o
a
short
inquiry concerning the nat~re
•
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of society and civil government; and the natural inherent right that
belongs to the sovereignty of a state, wherever that sovereignty be lodged, of
making and enforcing law&
'l'he only true and natural foundations of society are the wanta and the feara
of individuals. Not that we can believe, with some theoretical writers, that
there ever WBS a time when there was no such thing as society either natural or
civil; and that, from the impulse of reason, and through a sense of their wants
and weakn088Cll, individuals 01et t.ogether in a large plain, entered int.o an
original contract, and chose the tallest man present t.o be. their go'\'emor.
This notion of an actually existing unconnected state of nature, is t.oo wild
to be seriously admitted: and besides it is plRinly contradict.ory to the
revealed acoounts of the primitive origin of mankind. and their presern.tion
two thousand years afterwards; · both which were effected by the means .of
ein~le fa.milie& These formed the first natural society among themielvcs;
which, every day extending its limits, la.id the first though imperfect mdiments
of civil or political society: and when it grew too large to subsist with convenience in that past.oral state, wherein the patriarchs appear to have lived, it
necessarily subdivided itself by various migrations int.o more. Afterwards, aa
agriculture increased, which employs and can maintain a much greater number
of hands, migrutions became lesB frequent: and various tribes, which had formerly
separated, reunited again; som~times by compulsion and conqueat, ti0metimes

(5) Br statute 33 Geo. Ill, c. 13, it is now provided, that acts of parliament shall take effect

on the day of their passnge, except when otherwise provided therein. In the American gtatoa

there are commonly constitutional or statutory provisions Axing the time for statute,- to take

1aomnlbtu lrrognrl; Id em111 ut prlftleglu•. Neroo Ullq1IOlll tul#, RUIU ut ~. niAll pernteloritu, '"1fl
pod mi111u A<ee chlUa.ftrn poutl ''

effect on some future day after their passage. Thus: In Illinois, in sixty days from the end of

the session at which they are poised. Const art. 3, $ 23. In Michigan, at the expiration of

ninety days from the end of the session. Const, art. 4, J 20. In Mississippi, not until sixty days

from the passage thereof. Const, art. 7, $ 6. In Indiana, not until the same shall have been

?nblishcd and circulated in the several counties of the state by authority. Const, art. 4, J •„'-.

n Wisconsin, not until " published." Const, art. 7, J 21. In IOWB, those passed at a regular

session of the legislature, not until the fourth day of July thereafter, and thorn passed at a

special session, ninety days after the adjournment. Const, art. 3, $ 26.

The statutes of the United States take effect from their approval. 1 Kent, 426. See Gardner

v. The Collector, 6 "Wai. 499.

The constitution forbids congress to pass ex post facto laws, but it is well settled that this

phrase has no reference to any other laws of a retrospective character than those relating to

criminal matters. Mr. Justice Chase, in Calder v. Hull, 3 Dal. 386, has classified ex pott facto

Jaws as follows: 1. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, oud

which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action. 2. Every law that aggra-

vates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. 3. Every law that changes the

punishment, and inflicts a greater pnnislunent than the law annexed to the crime when commit-

ted. 4. Every law that alters the legal rnlo« of evidence, and receives loss or different testimony

than the law'required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict tho

offender. This definition and classification have been generally accepted since. See Fletcher

r. Peck, 3 Crunch, 87; Ogdeu v. Sounders, 12 Wheat. 266 ; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 330;

"Watson ». Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; Charles River Bridge v. "Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 421;

Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 463; Gumming* r. Missouri, 4 Wai. 277; Ex porto Garland,

ibid, 333.
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(5) By ~tatnte 33 Goo. III, c. 13, ft t~ now provided, that acts of p-.rliament shall take otroot
on the day of their pusi~e, excert when otherwise :providOO therein. In the American atar.ea
there are commonly oomtitutiona or statutory proris1oll8 fixing the time for statures to take
effect on some future day after their p!WSl\ge. Thu8 : In Illinois, in sixty days trom the end of
the eCSt1lon st which thev are pB'IROO. O>m~t. art. 3, f 23. In Michigan, at the expiration o(
ninety days from the end Of the ses&ion. Const. art. 4, f ~. In Hiesismppi, not until l'ixty days
from the pB>l81\ge thereof. Const. art. 7, f 6. In Indians, not until the same iib.U have 1-n
pnhlbhcd and circulated in the several counties of the state by Ruthority. Const. art. 4, ~ ~.
In Wisconsin, not until "pnbllehod.'' Const. art. 7, ~ 21. In Iowa, thoBe pasBCd at a regular
scs~;on of the ll"giidatnre, not until Nie fourth day of July thereafter, and t.bOIMI pusetr at •
1pecial llellsion, ninety days after the adjournment. Const. art. 3, ~ 216.
'fhe statutes of the United Sta.tel take oflect from their approval. 1 K:ent, 426. See Gardner
ti. The Collector, 6 Wal. 499.
The com1titution forbids congre!IS to pMS n post facf-0 laws, but ft is well settled that this
phrR~e ha.'! no referenoo to any other laws of a retro~tive character than thoae relatibfr to
criminal matter&. Kr. Jastice Chue, in Calder (7, Bull, 3 Dal. 386, bas clMIUied ez ~t ftM;l4
Jaws Roi follows: 1. Every law tbat makes an action, done before the pBlliling of the law, iwd
which WW< innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action. 2. Every Jaw that l\ggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. 3. Every Jaw that t>.hang6S the
punl11hmcnt1 and inflicts a greater pnnl~hment than the law annexed to the crime when commit·
ted. 4. Evory law that alte!'ll the legal rnlos of evidenoo, and receives leM or dilflll'Ont temmony
than the law required at the time of the commi11Bion of the offence, in order to convict tho
offender. This definition and cl!W!itieatlon have been gcnemUy accept.Ad since. See Fletcher
t'. Peck, 3 Cran ch, 87; O~eu v. Scr.unders, 12 Wheat. 200 ; Satterlee v. Katt~wifOn, 2 Pet. ~;
W atl!on ti. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; Che.rle11 River Bridge v. Warren Brid~, 11 Pel. 4:.!l;
Cnrpentcr v. Pcnn.-.ylvania, 17 How. 463; Cumming~ 11. Mi8:10uri, 4 Wal. 'l77; Ex parte Garland,
ibid, 333.
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by accident, and sometimes perhaps by compact. But though society had not

its formal beginning from any convention of individuals, actuated by their wants

and their fears; yet it is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keeps

mankind together; that demonstrates the necessity of this union; and that

therefore is the solid and natural foundation, as well as the cement of civil

society. And this is what we mean by the original contract of society; which,

though perhaps in no instance it has ever been formally expressed at the first

institution of a state, yet in nature and reason must always be understood and

impjied, *in the very act of associating together : namely, that the whole r^g-i

should protect all its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to •- -"

the will of the whole, or, in other words, that the community should guard the

rights of each individual member, and that (in return for this protection) each

individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which sub-

mission of all it was impossible that protection could be certainly extended to

any.

For when civil society is once formed, government at the same time results

of course, as necessary to preserve and to keep that society in order. Unless

some superior be constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members

are bound to obey, they would still remain as in a state of nature, without any

judge upon earth to define their several rights, and redress their several wrongs.

But, as all the members which compose this society were naturally equal, it may

be asked, in whose hands are the reins of government to be entrusted ? To this
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the general answer is easy: but the application of it to particular cases has occa-

sioned one-half of those mischiefs, which are apt to proceed from misguided

political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree that government should be

reposed in such persons, in whom those qualities are most likely to be found, the

perfection of which is among the attributes of him who is emphatically styled

the Supreme Being; the three grand requisites, I mean of wisdom, of goodness,

and of power: wisdom, to discern the real interest of the community; goodness,

to endeavour always to pursue that real interest; and strength, or power, to

carry this knowledge and intention into action. These are the natural founda-

tions of sovereignty, and these are the requisites that ought to be found in every

well constituted frame of government.

How the several forms of government we now see in the world at first actually

began, is matter of great uncertainty, and has occasioned infinite disputes. It

is not my business or intention to enter into any of them. However they

began, or by *what right soever they subsist, there is and must be in all r*iq-i

of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which L * J

the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside. And this authority

is placed in those hands, wherein (according to the opinion of the founders of

such respective states, either expressly given, or collected from their tacit appro-

bation) the qualities requisite for supremacy, wisdom, goodness, and power, are

the most likely to be found.

The political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three regular forms

of government; the first, when the sovereign power is lodged in an aggregate

assembly consisting of all the free members of a community, which is called a

democracy; the second, when it is lodged in a council, composed of select mem-

bers, and then it is styled an aristocracy; the last, when it is entrusted in the

hands of a single person, and then it takes the name of a monarchy. All other

species of government, they say, are either corruptions of, or reducible to, these

three.

By the sovereign power, as was before observed, is meant the making of laws;

for wherever that power resides, all others must conform to and be directed by

it, whatever appearance the outward form and administration of the government

may put on. For it is at any time in the option of the legislature to alter thit

form and administration by a new edict or rule, and to put the execution of the

laws into whatever hands it pleases; by constituting one or a few, or many

executive magistrates: and all the other powers of the state must obey the legis-
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by accident, and sometimes perhaps by compact. But though society had not
its formal beginning from any convention of individuals, actuated by their wants
and their fears ; yet it is the sanse of their weakness and imperfection that keeps
mankind _together i. that demonstrates th~ necessity of this union; and t!111:t
therefore 1s the sohd and natural foundation, as well as the cement of mv1l
society. And this is whut we mean by the original contrnct of society; which,
though perhaps in no instance it has ever been formally expressed at the first
institntion of a state, yet in nnture and reason must nlways he understood and
imp)ied, *in the very act of associating together : namely, that the whole [* 4S]
should protect all its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to
t~e will of the .wh.ol~, or, in other words, that .the comm unit)'.' should guard the
rights of each md1v1dual member, and that (m return for this prok>Ct10n) each
individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which sub-mission of all it was impossible that protection could be certainly ext.ended to
any.
For when civil society is once formed, go'\"emment at the SRme time results
of course, as necessary to preser\'e and to keep that society in order. Unless
some s11perior be constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members
are bound to obey, they would still remain as in a state of nature, without any
judge upon earth to define their several 1i~hts, and redrees their &eversl wrongs.
But, ns all the members which compose this society were naturally equal, it may
l>e asked, in whose hands are the rems of government to be entrust.ed? 'fo this
the general answer is easy : but the application of it to particular caaes has occasioned one-half of those mischiefs, which a.re apt to proceed from misguided
political zeal. In gene1'3l, all mankind will agree that government should be
reposed in such :eersons, in whom those qualities are most likely to be found, the
perfection of which is among the attributes of him who is emphatically stylecl
the Supreme Being; the three grand requisites, I mean of wisdom, of goodness,
and of power: wisdom, to discern the real interest of the community; goodness,
to endeavour always to jnrs11e that real interel!t; and strength, or power, to
carry this knowledge an intention into action. These are the ne.tnrnl founda.tions of so.vereignty, and these are the requisites that ought to be found in every
.
well constituted frame of government.
How the seveml forms of government we now see in the world at flrst actually
began, is matter of great uncertainty, and has occasioned infinite disputes. It
is not my business or intent.ion to enter into any of them. However they
began, or by •what right soever they subsist, there is and must be in all [* 491
of them a supreme, in-esistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which
the jrtra summi t'.mperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside. And this authority
is placed in those hands, wherein (according to the opinion of the founders of
such respective states~ either expressly giTen, or collected from their tooit approbation) the qualities requisite for supremacy, wisdom, goodnese, and power, are
the most likely to be found.
'rhe political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three regular forms
of gon~rnment ; the first, when the sovereign power is lodged in an aggregate
assembly consisting of a.II the free members of a community, which is called a.
democracy; the second, when it is lodged in a council, composed of select members, and then it is styled an aristocracy; the Ia.st, when it is entrusted in the
hands of a single person, and then it takes the name of a monarchy. All other
species of government, they say, are either corrnptione of, or reducible to, these
three.
By the sovereign power, as was before observed, is meant the makin~ of laws;
for wherever that power resides, all others must conform to and be direct-Rd hy
it, "·hatever appearance the outward form and administration of the government
may put on. For it is at any time in the option of the legislature to alter th'lt
form and administration by a new edict or rule, and to put the execution of the
laws into whatever hands it pleases; by constituting one or a few, or many
executive magistrates: and all the other powers of the state must obey the legis27
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lative power in the discharge of their several functions, or else the constitution

is at an end. (6)

In a democracy, where the right of making laws resides in the people at large,

public virtue, or goodness of intention, is more likely to be found, than either of

the other qualities of government. Popular assemblies are frequently foolish in

their contrivance, and weak in their execution ; but generally mean to do the

thing that is right and just, and have always a'degree of patriotism or public

r*5()-| spirit. In *aristocracies there is more wisdom to be found, than in the

, !• •" other frames of government; being composed, or intended to be composed,

of the most experienced citizens : but there is less honesty than in a republic, and

less strength than in a monarchy. A monarchy is indeed the most powerful of

any ; for, by the entire conjunction of the legislative and executive powers, all

the sinews of government are knit together, and united in the hand of the prince:

but then there is imminent danger of his employing that strength to improvi-

dent or oppressive purposes.

Thus these three species of government have, all of them, their several per-

fections and imperfections. Democracies are usually the best calculated to

direct the end of a law; aristocracies to invent the means by which that end

shall be obtained ; and monarchies to carry those means into execution. And

the ancients, as was observed, had in general no idea of any other permanent

form of government but these three: for though Cicero (/) declares himself of

opinion, " esse optima constitutam rempublicam gum ex iribus generibus illis,
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regali, optima, et populari, sit modi-ce confusn; " yet Tacitus treats this notion

of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages

of each, as a visionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be lasting or

secure. (g)

But, happily for us of this island, the British constitution has long remained,

and I trust will long continue, a standing exception to the truth of this obser-

vation. For, as with us the executive power of the laws is lodged ill a single

person, they have all the advantages of strength and dispatch, that are to be

found in the most absolute monarchy: and as the legislature of the kingdom is

entrusted to three distinct powers, entirely independent of each other ; first, the

(/) In hla fragments, ife rep, I. 2.

(g) Cunctat twtionet et urbti popului nnt primnrei, nttf sinjflili rfffitnt; deltfta tx hit et conftitiita repubUcai

lath-e power in the discharge of their several functions, or else the constitution
is at an end. (6)
In a democracy, where the right of making laws resides in the people at large.,
public virtue, or goodness of inkntion, is more likely to be found, than either of
the other qualities of government. Popular assemblies arc frequently foolish in
their contrivance, and weak in their execution; but genera.By mean to <l.o the
thing that is right and just, and have nlways 11: degree of putriuti:im or public
[*50] spirit. In *aristocracies there is more wisdom to be found, than in the
othe1· frames of g<H-ernment; being composl'd, or intended to be composed,
.
of the most experienced citizens : but there is less honesty than in a republic, and
less strength than in a monarchy. A monarchy is indeed the most powerful of
any; for, by the eutfre conjunction of the legislative and executive powers, all
the sinews of go,·ernment are knit together, and united in the hand of the prince:
but then there is imminent danger of his employing that strength to improvident or oppressive purposes.
Thus these three species of government have, all of them, their several perfect.ions and imperfections. Democmcil's are usually the best calculated to
direct the end of a law; aristocracies to invent the means by which that end
shull be obtained; and monarchies to carry those menns into execution. And
the ancients, as was observed, had in gene.ml no idea of anv other permanent
form of government but these three: for though Cicero (/) declares himsdf of
opinion, "esse optime constilltlmn rempublicam qum ex tn'.bus generibu.~ ill is,
re_q<tll'., optimo, et populari, sit modi'.t:e c01~fwm;" yet Tacitus treats this notion
of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and.Jmrfaking of the advantages
of each, as a visionary whim, and one that, if dfectc , could ne\'er he lasting or
secure. (g)
Bnt, happilY. for us of this island, the British constitution h11S long remained,
and I trust will long continue, a standing exception to the truth of this ob~r
vation. For, as with us the executhe power of the laws is lodged in a single
person, they have all the advantages of stren~th and dispatch, that are to be
found in the most absolute monarchy: and as the legislature of the kin~dom is
entrusted to three distinct powers, entirely independent of each other; first, the

forma laudarifacUita guam epentre, i:cl. n ere/til, haud diuturna ts«e potent." Ann. I. 4.

(6) The constitution of England may be said to consist of the unwritten rulas and usages in

accordance with which the powers of government are habitually exercised. By the theory of

~ rq1, I. 'l.
(g) Crmdna 11atio11u d ttr~A populu1 a1tt

!fl In his l'rftgment8.

primm-e•, nut lliupt11i rfpttnl ; rlel('('fa 'x hi~ rl e-0111tittl'4 rl!ptlblicc

/orma laudarifacUlu1 quaui evenire, ttl, Ii et'C1tU, hmul 1U11lurna uaepotet1t."

.A1111.

l. '·

the British government, the exercise of sovereign powers rests in the parliament, which is so

far supreme in action that hy a strong figure of speech it is sometimes said to be " omnipotent.''

By this is to be understood that no other human power is placed over or made superior to it,

or can question that what parliament declares to be law is law. From this theory of its

powers it must follow that parliament is superior to the constitution itself, and may modify it

at pleasure, as indeed has often been done. A verv different theory prevails in America.

According to the fundamental principles of both the Federal and State constitutions, the gov-

ernment, the supreme power or jura summi imperil, resides in the people, and it follows that

it is the right of the people to make laws. But as the exercise of that right by the people at

large would be equally inconvenient and impracticable, the constitution reposes the exercise of

that power in a body of representatives of the people, but at the same time imposes upon them

such restrictions as" are deemed important for the general welfare or for the protection of indi-

vidual rights. Whenever this body of representatives exceed the limits prescribed to their

action by the fundamental law from which their whole authority is derived, or whenever they

exercise their powers in a manner which the people, by the constitution, have not thought

proper to allow, their action is not only censurable, but in point of law is void, aud must not

only bo so declared by the courts whero the point arises in litigation, but may be disregarded and

disobeyed by any citizen. From this it will appear how broad is the difference between the con-

stitution of Britain and those of the American states; the courts of the former country not

venturing to declare that there are any legal limits to the legislative authority, except such as

rest in the legislative will aud discretion; while in America a considerable portion of the time of

the courts is occupied with a discussion of questions respecting the constitutional limitations

upon the power of the several departments of the government. See 1 Tucker's Blackstone,

appendix A.; Coolcy, Const. Lim. cc. 1 and 7.
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(6) The con11titution of England may be said to consM of the unwritten rule.'l and usages in
accordance with which the power,; of government are habitually c:iwrci~cd. By th(• theory of
the Briti8h ~ovcrnmcnt, the e:xcrc-isc of sovereign powers rests in the porliomC'nt, whieb i~ ro
far snvreme m action that by a strong figure of ::<pecch it i8 ~ometime~ I'll.Id to be "omnipotent.''
By thu; i~ to he undrrstood thRt no other human power i~ plaeed o\"er or made supen~ir to it,
or. can question that what parlinmPnt d(~clnrcs to be lnw i:> law. :F rom this theory of it;i
powers it muHt follow that 1mrlinmrnt is RUperior to the ron~titution it.~clf, and may modi(\" it
at ph•RSure, RS indeed has oft<•n been done. .A. verv difforPnt th1•ory prevail8 in .America.
.According to the fundamental principles of both the Federal and State e<onF<titntions, th1• go>emment, the supreme power or jura s111nmi impe1·i·i, resides iu t.hc people, anJ it follows that
it is the right of the people to make laws. But as the exercise of that right by the peopll) at
lnrge would be equally ine{mvenicnt 111111 imprll<'ti<'nble, the 1·011stitution rl'Pl>';r" the e:xt>n:1s1• of
that power in a body of represeutnti\•cs of the people, but nt the ~ame time impose~ upon tb..-m
such restrictions as are de1m1ed im portnnt for the general welfare or for tho protection of individual right:!. Whene\·er this budy of representativeti exceed the limit.-< prescribed to th1•.ir
action by the fundnmontal law fmm which their whole authority ii< 1lL·rived1 or whcm•\·pr they
exemise their power:l in a manner which the people, by the eon;<titution, h1H"e not thou~ht
proper to allow, their oction it1 not only censurable, but in point of Jaw i11 n1id, nncl mn;.t not
only be !lo declared by the court.-; where the point ariscl'! in litigation, hut. mar be di~regar<lPd and
disobeyecl by any citizen. From this it will appear how broad is the difl'ert•nce between the constitution of Britain and thMe of the American states; the courts of the fonncr country not
venturing to declare that th<irc are any legal limit" to the legi,;lntin) authority, except ~ueh M
re8t in the legislative will and discretion; while in America a eon~idcrabl c portion of tl1~ time of
the court.~ iN occupied with a di:1eu~:;ion of question:; respertiug the constituti(lnal limitations
upon the power of the sernml depurtuwnt~ uf t.hc government. See 1 Tucker's Blal'.k;;tone,
appendix .A.; Cooley, Con.~t. Lim. cc. 1 and 7.
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king; secondly, the lords spiritual and temporal, which is an aristocratical

assembly of persons selected for their piety, *their birth, their wisdom, r*-i]

their valour, or their property; and, thirdly, the House of Commons, L ° J

freely chosen by the people from among themselves, which makes it a kind of

democracy: as this aggregate body, actuated by different springs, and attentive

to different interests, composes the British parliament, and has the supreme dis-

posal of every thing; there can no inconvenience be attempted by either of the

three branches, but will be withstood by one of the other two; each branch

being armed with a negative power, sufficient to repel any innovation which it

shall think inexpedient or dangerous.

Here then is lodged the sovereignty of the British constitution; and lodged

as beneficially as is possible for society. For in no other shape could we be so

certain of finding the three great qualities of government so well and so happily

united. If the supreme power were lodged in any one of the three brunches

separately, we must be exposed to the inconveniences of either absolute monarchy,

aristocracy, or democracy; and so want two of the three principal ingredients

of good polity; either virtue, wisdom, or power. If it were lodged in any two of

the branches; for instance, in the king and house of lords, our laws might be

providently made, and well executed, but they might not always have the good

of the people in view; if lodged in the king and commons, we should want that

circumspection and mediatory caution, which the wisdom of the peers is to

afford: if the supreme rights of legislature were lodged in the two houses only,
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and the king had no negative upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to

encroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps to abolish the kingly office,

and thereby weaken (if not totally destroy) the strength of the executive power.

But the constitutional government of this island is so admirably tempered and

compounded, that nothing can endanger or hurt it, but destroying the equilib-

rium of power between one branch of the legislature and the rest. For if ever

it should happen that the independence of any one of the three should be lost,

or that it should become subservient to the views of either of the other two,

there would *soon be an end of our constitution. (7) The legislature r*-o]

would be changed from that, which (upon the supposition of an original •- J

contract, either actual or implied) is presumed to have been originally set up by

the general consent and fundamental act of the society; and such a change,

however effected, is, according to Mr. Locke, (h) (who perhaps carries his theory

too far,) at once an entire dissolution of the bands of government; and the

people are thereby reduced to a state of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to

themselves a new legislative power.

Having thus cursorily considered the usual three species of government, and

our own singular constitution, selected and compounded from them all, I

proceed to observe, that, as the power of making laws constitutes the supreme

(ft) On government, part 2. eee. 212.

(7) [If it bo true that there would be an end of the constitution if at any time any one of

the three should become subordinate to the views of the other branches, then assuredly the

king; secondly, the lords spiritual and temporal, which is an aristocra.tical
]
assembly of persons selected for their piety, *their birth, their wisdollii, [
their yal<JUr, or their property; and, thirdly, the House of C<>mmons, *51
freely cho.mi by tlie peopfo from among fltemselves, which makes it u. kind of
democracy: as this aggregate body, Ketnated by different springs, and attentiye
to different interests, composes the British parliament, and has the supreme disposal of every thing; there can no inconvenience be u.ttemptcd by either of the
three branches, but will be withstood by one of the other two; each branch
being armed with a negative power, sufficient to repel any innovation which it
shall think inexpedient or dangerous.
Here then is lodged the sovereignty of the British constitution; and lodged
as beneficially as is possible for society. For in no other shape could we be so
certain of finding the throe great qualities of government so well and so happily
united. If the supreme power were lodged in any one of the three brunches
separately, we must be exposed to the inconveniences of either absolute monarchy,
aristocracy, or democracy; and so want two of the three principal ingredients
of good polity; either virtue, wisdom, or power. If it were lodged in any two of
the branches; for instance, in the king and house of lords, our laws might be
providently made, and well executed, but they might not always have the good
of the people in view; if lodged in the king and commons, we should want that
circumspection a.nd mediatory caution, which the wisdom of the peers is to
afford: if the supreme rights of legislature were lodged in the two houses only,
and the king had no uegu.tive upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to
encroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps to abolish the kingly office,
and thereby weaken (if not totally destroy) the sti·cngth of the executive power.
But the constitutional government of this island is so admirabl.Y tempered and
compounded, that nothing can endanger or hurt it, but destroymg the equilibrium of power between one brunch of the legislature and the rest. For if cnir
it should happen that the independence of u.ny one of the three should be lost,
or that it should become subservient to tho views of either of the other two,
there would *soon be an end of our constitution. (7) The legislature ["'- 2]
0
would be changed from that, which (upon the supposition of an orio'inu.l
contrnct, either actual or implied) is presumed to have been originalYy set up by
the general consent and fundamental act of the society; and such a. change,
howeYer effected, is, according to }fr. Locke, (/i) (who perhaps carries his theory
too far,) at once an entire dissolution of the bands of government; and the
people are thereby reduced to a st.ute of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to
themselves a new legislative power.
Having thus cursorily considered the usual three species of goYernment, and
our own singular constitution, selected and compounded from them all, I
proceed to observe, that, as the power of making laws constitutes the supreme
(~)

constitution is at an end; for it would be difficult to contend that in the times of Henry the

On government, part ll.

11611.

lllll.

Eighth and Elizabeth, the two houses of parliament were not subservient to the crown, or

that before the reform act the hou.se of lords hod not the ascendancy, or that since that act

the house of commons have not had it. Indeed, it does not seem easy to name any eventful

period of our constitutional history when the exact equilibrium of power, referred to by

Blackstone, existed. That this supposed theory of our constitution is now denied by political

writers of different parties, is at any rate indisputable.—-STEWAHT.]

The fact here pointed out is made still more prominent by the circumstances attending the

passage of the bill for the disestablishment of the Irish church, when the lords were, a second

time, from fear of the consequences to their own order induced to surrender their will to

that of the house of commons, and to assent to a bill which, to a largo majority of thoir

number, was exceedingly distasteful and obnoxious. And as now the executive department,

that is to say, the cabinet or ministry, must bo in accord with the majority of the commons

on all leading^ measures, it is difficult to say that there is any longer, even in theory, an

equilibrium ot powers in the British government. See May. Const. Hist. ch. 5, Todd, ParL

Ouv. vol. 1, pp. 30, 66.
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(7) [If it be true that there would be au end of the constitution if at any time any one of
the three should become subordinate to the views of the other branches, then a.~suredly the
con11titution is at an end; for it would be difficult to contend that in the times of Henry the
Eighth and Elizabeth, the two bou,qis of pBrliameut were not subservient to tho crown, or
that before the reform act the bou~e of lords had not the a.~eudancv, or that since that act
the house of commons have not bad it. Indeed, it does not seem easy to name any eventful
period of our constitutional histc,>ry when the exact equilibrium of power, referred to by
Black11tone, existed. That thl8 supposed theory of our constitution is now denied by political
writers of different 1,>artie~, is at any rote iudisputahle.-STEW'ART.]
The fact here J:Kllnted out is made Htill more prominent by the eiroumstanoet1 attending the
pa.~SBgo of tho bill f<1r the d!J!e!ltabli~hmont of tho Irillb church, when the lonls were, a 11econd
time, from fear of the consequences t.o their own order induced to surrender their will to
that of the house of common!!, and to ~ent to a bill whioh, to a largo nu\jority of their
number, W&I! exceodinisly di"t&i!toful and obnoxious. .Aud a11 now the executive department,
that is to say, the c.abmot or miui~try, mu~t bo in aooord with the majority of the oomu10ns
on 11.ll leading mo&-lures, it is difficult to MY that there is any longer, eyen in thoorv, an
equilibrium ot powers in the British govorwuent. Seo Hay, Const. Hist. ch. 6, Todd,· Parl;
Gov. vol. 1, pp. 30, 66.
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authority, so wherever the supreme authority in any state resides, it is the right

of that authority to make laws; that is, in the words of our definition, to prescribe

the rule of civil action. (8) And this may be discovered from the very end and

institution of civil states. For a state is a collective body, composed of a multi-

tude of individuals, united for their safety and convenience, and intending to

act together as one man. If it tlirn-rmv is to act as one man, it ought to act by

one uniform will. But, inasmuch as political communities are made up of many

natural persons, each of whom has his particular will and inclination, these

several wills cannot by any natural union be joined together, or tempered and

disposed into a lasting harmony, so as to constitute and produce that one

uniform will of the whole. It can therefore be no otherwise produced than by

a political union; by the consent of all persons to submit their own private

wills to the will of one man, or of one or more assemblies of men, to whom the

supreme authority is entrusted; and this will of that one man, or assemblage of

men, is in different states, according to their different constitutions, understood

to be law.

Thus far as to the right of the supreme power to make laws: but farther, it

r*roi is its duty likewise. (9) For since the 'respective members are bound

*• J to conform themselves to the will of the state, it is expedient that they

receive directions from the state declaratory of that its will. Bui, as it is

impossible, in so great a multitude, to give injunctions to every particular man,

relative to each particular action, it is therefore incumbent on the state to estab-
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lish general rules, for the perpetual information and direction of all persons in

all points, whether of positive or negative duty. And this, in order that every

man may know what to look upon as his own, what as another's; what absolute

and what relative duties are required at his hands; what is to be esteemed

honest, dishonest, or indifferent; what degree every man retains of his natural

liberty; what he has given up as the price of the benefits of society; and after

what manner each person is to moderate the use and exercise of those rights

which the state assigns him, in order to promote and secure the public tranquility.

From what has been advanced, the truth of the former branch of our defini-

tion, is (I trust) sufficiently evident; that " municipal law is a rule of civil

conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state." I proceed now to the latter

branch of it; that it is a rule so prescribed, "commanding what is right, and

prohibiting what is wrong."

Now in order to do this completely, it is first of all necessary that the bound-

aries of right and wrong be established and ascertained by law. And when this

is once done, it will follow of course that it is likewise the business of the

law, considered as a rule of civil conduct, to enforce these rights, and to

restrain or redress these wrongs. It remains therefore only to consider

in what manner the law is said to ascertain the boundaries of right and

wrong; and the methods which it takes to command the one and prohibit the

other.

(8) But in America the supreme authority—the people-j-only make the fundamental law or

constitution of the state, and create a department to which they intrust the exercise of the

ordinary powers of li'irislation. The Jaw making power, therefore, in the popular sense, is

not the supreme authority, but exercises a tnisi within prescribed limits.

(9) From the performance of this duty the legislative department cannot relieve itself by

devolving it upon any other authority, nor even by referring it book to the people themselves.

The legislature has no power to submit a proposed law to the people, nor have the people

power to bind each other by acting upon it. They voluntarily surrendered that power when

they adopted the constitution. Per RuggleH, Ch. .1., in Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. T. 439. And see

Kiee v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Parker ». Commonwealth, 6 Ponn. St. 507; Commonwealth r.

Mr\Villi:ims. 11 JViin. St. 61; Thome v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112; Bradley v. Baxter, ibid. 1-,'•.':

People r. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; Sauto «. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Ge.brick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491; State

r. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 3(13; Maice >•. State, 4 Ind. 342; Meshnioiur r. State, 11 Ind. 482; State r.

Parker, 26 Vt. 362; State v. Copoloiid, 3 K. I. 33; State v. Swisher, 17 Texas, 441; State r.

AVilciix. 45 Mo. 458. For qualifications or deeming exception* to this principle, see Cooler,

Count. Lim. 117 to 122, and caties cited.
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DECI.ARATORY LAWS.

For this purpose every law may be said to consist of several parts: one

declaratory ; whereby the rights to be observed, and the wrongs to be eschewed,

are clearly defined and *laid down: another, directory; whereby the i-*^-]

subject is instructed and enjoined to observe those rights, and to abstain *• -"

from the commission of those wrongs: a third, remedial; whereby a method is

pointed out to recover a man's private rights, or redress his private wrongs: to

which may be added a fourth, usually termed the sanction or vindicatory branch

of the law; whereby it is signified what evil or penalty shall be incurred by such

as commit any public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty.

With regard to the first of these, the declaratory part of the municipal law,

this depends not so much upon the law of revelation or of nature, as upon the

wisdom and will of the legislator. This doctrine, which before was slightly

touched, deserves a more particular explication. Those rights then which God

and nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights, such as are

life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually invested

in every man than they are; neither do they receive any additional strength

when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no

human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall

himself commit some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or

natural duties (such as, for instance, the worship of God, the maintenance of

children, and the like) receive any stronger sanction from being also declared

to be duties by the law of the land. The case is the same as to crimes and
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misdemeanors, that are forbidden by the superior laws, and therefore styled

mala in se, such as murder, theft, and perjury; which contract no additional

tiirpitude from being declared unlawful by the inferior legislature. For that

legislature in all these cases acts only, as was before observed, in subordination

to the great lawgiver, transcribing and publishing his precept*. So that, upon

the whole, the declaratory part of the municipal law has no force or operation

at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and intrinsically right or wrong.

*But, with regard to things in themselves indifferent, the case is entirely r*,--i

altered. These become either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or *• °°J

misdemeanors, according as the municipal legislator sees proper, for promoting

the welfare of the society, and more effectually carrying on the purposes of civil

life. Thus our own common law has declared, that the goods of the wife do

instantly upon marriage become the property and right of the husband; (10)

and our statute law has declared all monopolies a public offence: yet that right,

and this offence, have no foundation in nature, but are merely created by the

law, for the purpose of civil society. And sometimes, where the thing itself

has its rise from the law of nature, the particular circumstances and mode of

doing it becomes right or wrong, as the laws of the land shall direct Thus, for

instance, in civil duties; obedience to superiors is the doctrine of revealed as

•well as natural religion: but who those superiors shall be, and in what circum-

stances, or to what degrees they shall be obeyed, it is the province of human laws

to determine. And so, as to injuries or crimes, it must be left to our own legis-

lature to decide, in what cases the seizing another's cattle shall amount to a

trespass or a theft; and where it shall be a justifiable action, as when a landlord

takes them by way of distress for rent.

Thus much for the declaratory part of the municipal law: and the directory

stands much upon the same footing; for this virtually includes the former, the

declaration being usually collected from the direction. The law that says," thou

shalt not steal," implies a declaration that stealing is a crime. And we have

(10) Thin rule is very generally abrogated In American law by statutory or constitutional

provisions, under which the real and personal property of the wife, possessed by her iit the

time of the marriage, or acquired afterwards by gift, grant, devise or otherwise, remains her

propertv to the same extent as if she were unmarried, with restrictions, however, in gome of

For this purpo!!e every law may be said to consiet of several parts: one
declaratory; whereby the rights to be observed, and the wrongs to be eschewed,
are clearly defined and •1a1d down: another, d-irectory; whereby the [*54]
subject is instructed and enjoined to observe those rights, and to abstain
from the commission of those wrongs: a third, remedial; whereby a method is
pointed out to recoYer a man's private rights, or redress hie private wrongs: to
which may be added a fourth, usually termed the ~anction or vindicatory branch
of the law; whereby it is eignified what evil or penalty shall be incurred by such
88 commit any public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty.
With regard l;o the firet of these, the declaratot'y part of the municipal law,
this depends not so much upon the law of revelation or of nature, as upon the
wisdom and will of the legislator. This doctrine, which before was slightly
touched, deserves a more part1~ular explication. '!'hose rights then which Goa
and nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights, such as are
lire and liberty, need not the aid of human la"·s to be more effectually invested
in every man than they are; neither do they receive any additional strength
when declared by the municipal )awe 1;o be inviolable. On the contrary, no
human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unles.s the owner shall
himself commit some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do diYine or
natural duti1J8 (such as, for instance, the wonhip of God, the maintenance of
children, and the like) receive any stronger sanction from being also declared
t.o be duties by the law of the land. 'fhe case is the same as to crimes and
misdemeanors, that are forbidden by the superior laws, and therefore styled
mala in s,,, such as murder, theft, and perjury; which contract no additional
turpitude from being declan.'Cl unlawful by the inferior legislature. For that
legislature in all these oo.ees acts only, as was before observed, in subordination
to the great lawgiver, transcribing and publishing his precepts. So that, upon
the whole, the dl'Claratory part of the municipal law baa no force or operation
at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and intrinsically right or wrong.
*But, with regard to thin~e in themselves indifferent, the case is entirely [*5 ~]
0
altered. 'fhese become either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or
misdemeanors, according as the municipal legisla.t-Or sees proper, for promoting
the welfare of the society, nnd more effectually carrying on the purpos('8 of ch-il
life. Thus our own common law has declared, that the goods of the wife do
instantly upon marriage become the property and right of the husband; (10)
and our statute law has declared all monopolies a public offence: yet that right,
and this offence, have no foundation in nature, but are merely created by the
Jaw, for the purpo1m of civil society. And sometimes, where the thing Itself
bas its rise from the law of n"ture, the particular circumstances and mode of
doing it becomes right or wrong, 88 the laws of the land shall direct.. Thus, for
instance, in ci\'il dnties; obedience to superiors is the doctrine of revellled as
""·ell as natuml religion: but who those superiors shall be, and in what circumstances, or to what degrees they shall be obeyed, it is the province of human laws
to determine. And so, as to mjnries or crimes, it must be left to our own legislature to decide, in what cases the seizing another's cattle shall amount to a.
trespMS or a theft; and where it shall be a justifiable action, as when a landlord
takes them by way of distress for rent.
Thus much for the declaratory po.rt of the municipal ll\w: and the directory
stands much upon tho eame footing; for this virtually includes the former, the
declaration being usually collected from the direction. The law that says, •' thou
shalt not steal," implies a declaration tha.t stealing is a crime. And we have

the states, upon the control which she may exercise over it, or her power to dispose of it.

of ihi-M- provisions are collected in 1 Pan. oil Cont. 370.

(10) Tbi11 role ts very gt1nemlly abrogated In American law by ~tatutory or <'On8titntional
prorilrion1, under 'lltbid1 the real and personal proP.CrtY of the wife, poss(~Nl!(!d hy h1·r at the
time of the rua.rrlage, or acquired atrerwarrl~ by gilt, pant, devi11e or otberwif'e, remain!! ·her
prupert\' to the !IO.lDft <'Xtent Ill! if she wer~ UDUIBrried, with re11triction11, however, In 80Ulfl of
the l'taie!I. upon the eontrol which ~h~ mny exflt"Cil!e over it, or her power to diSJIOfie of it.
)I.any of the11e provisioUB are collected in 1 Pars. ou Cont. 370.
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seen (t) that, in things naturally indifferent, the very essence of right and wrong

depends upon the direction of the laws to do or omit them.

The remedial part of a law is so necessary a consequence of the former two,

r*-g-i that laws must be very vague and imperfect *without it. For in vain

L J would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no

method of recovering and asserting those rights, when wrongfully withheld or

invaded. This is what we mean properly, when we speak of the protection of

the law. When, for instance, the declaratory part of the law has said, " that the

field or inheritance, which belonged to Titius's father, is vested by his death in

Titius;" and the directory part has " forbidden any one to enter on another's

property, without the leave of the owner:" if Gaius after this will presume to

take possession of the land, the remedial part of the law will then interpose its

office; will make Gaius restore the possession to Titius, and also pay him

damages for the invasion.

With regard to the sanction of laws, or the evil that may attend the breach of

public duties, it is observed, that human legislators have for the most part

chosen to make the sanction of their laws rather vindicatory than remunera-

tory, or to consist rather in punishments, than in actual particular rewards.

Because, in the first place, the quiet enjoyment and protection of all our civil

rights and liberties, which are the sure and general consequence of obedience to

the municipal law, are in themselves the best and most valuable of all rewards.

Because also, were the exercise of every virtue to be enforced by the proposal of
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particular rewards, it were impossible for any state to furnish stock enough for

so profuse a bounty. And farther, because the dread of evil is a much more

forcible principle of human actions than the prospect of good, (k) For which

reasons, though a prudent bestowing of rewards is sometimes of exquisite

use, yet we find that those civil laws, which enforce and enjoin our duty, do

seldom, if ever, propose any privilege or gift to such as obey the law; but do

constantly come armed with a penalty denounced against transgressors, either

expressly defining the nature and quantity of the punishment, or else leaving it

to the discretion of the judges, and those who are entrusted with the care of

putting the laws in execution.

r*r~-i *0f all the parts of a law the most effectual is the vindicatory. For it

"• •" is but lost labour to say, " do this, or avoid that," unless we also declare,

" this shall be the consequence of your non-compliance." We must therefore

observe, that the main strength and force of a law consists in the penalty annexed

to it. Herein is to be found the principal obligation of human laws.

Legislators and their laws are said to compel and oblige: not that by any

natural violence they so constrain a man, as to render it impossible for him to

act otherwise than as they direct, which is the strict sense of obligation; but

because, by declaring and exhibiting a penalty against offenders, they bring it to

pass that no man can easily choose to transgress the law; since, by reason of the

impending correction, compliance is in a high degree preferable to disobedience.

And, even where rewards are proposed as well as punishments threatened, the

obligation of the law seems chiefly to consist in the penalty; for rewards, in

their nature, can only persuade and allure j nothing is compulsory but punish-

ment.

It is true, it hath been holden. and very justly, by the principal of our ethical

writers, that human laws are binding upon men's consciences. But if that were

the only or most forcible obligation, the good only would regard the laws, and

the bad would set them at defiance. And, true as this principle is, it must still

be understood with some restriction. It holds, I apprehend, as to rights ; and

that, when the law has determined the field to belong to Titius, it is matter of

conscience no longer to withhold or to invade it. So also in regard to natural

duties, and such offences as are mala in se: here we are bound in conscience;

because we are bound by superior laws, before those human laws were in being, to

perform the one and abstain from the other. But in relation to those laws, which

(() Sao page 43. (l:j Locke, Hum. Uud. b. 2. c. 11,
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seen (i) that, in things naturally indifferent, the verx essence
right and wrong
der.ends upon the direction of the laws to do or omit them.
The rem.edial part of a law is so necessary a con~ucnce of the former two,
[ *w0 6] that laws must be very vague and imperfect without it. For in min
would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no
method of recornring aud asserting those rights, when wrongfully withheld or
invaded. This is what we mean properly, when we speak of the protection of
the law. When, for instance, the declaratory part of the law has said, •'that the
field or inheritance, which belonged to Titius's father, is vested by his death in
Titius ;" and the directory part has "forbidden any one to enter on another's
property, without the leave of the owner:" if Gaius after this will presume to
take possession of the land, the remedial part of the law will then interpose its
office; will make Gains restore the possession to 'l'itius, and also pay him
damages for the invasion.
With regard to the sanction of laws, or the evil that may attend the breach of
public duties, it is observed, that human legislators hiwe for the most part
chosen to make the sanction of their laws rather vfodicatory than remun.~ra
tory, or to consist rather in punishments, than in actual particular rewards.
Because, in the first place, the quiet enjoyment and protection of all our ch·il
rights and liberties, which are the sure and general consequence of obedience to
the municipal law, are in themselves the best and most valuable of all rewards..
Because also, were the exercise of every virtue to be enforced by the proposal of
particular rewards, it were impossible fur any state to furnish stock enough for
so profuse a bounty. And farther, because the dread of evil is a much more
forcible p1inciple of human actions than the prospect of good. (k) For which
reasons, though a prudent bestowing of rewards is sometimes of exquisite
use, yet we find that those civil laws~ which enforce and enjoin our duty, do
seldom, if ever, propose any privilege or gift to such as obey the law; but do
constantly come armed with a penalty denounced against transgressors, either
expressly defining the nature and quantity of the punishment, or else leaving it
to the discretion of the judges, and those who are entrusted with the care of
putting the laws in execution.
[*w 7]
*Of all the parts of a law the most effectual is the vindicatory. For it
0
is hut lost labour to say, "do this, or uvoid that," unless we also declare,
"this shall be the consequence of your non-compliance." We must therefore
observe, that the main strength and force of a law consists in the penalty annexed
to it. Herein is to be found the principal obligation of human laws.
Legislators and their laws are said to compel and obllge: not that by any
natural violence they so constrain a man, as to render it impotisible for him to
act otherwise than as they direct, which is the strict sense of obligation; but
because, by declaring and exhibiting a penalty against offenders, they bring it to
pass that no man can easily choose to transgress tht1 law; since, by reason of the
impending correction, compliance is in a high degree preferable to disobedience.
And, even where rewards are proposed as well us punishments threatened, the
obligation of the law seems chiefly to consist in the penalty; for rewards, in
their nature, can only persuade and allure ; nothing is compulsory but punishment.
It is true, it hath been holden, and very justly, by the principal of our ethical
writers, that hnmlln laws are binding upon men's consciences. But if that were
the only or most forcible obligation, the good only would regard the laws, and
the bad would set them at defiance. And, true as this principle is, it must still
be understood with some restriction. It holds, I apprehend, as to rights; and
that, when the law has determined the field to belong to Titius, it is matter of
conscience no longer to withhold or to inmde it. So also in regard to nntuml
duties, and such offences as are mala in se: here we arc bound in conscience;
because we are bound by superior laws, before those hnm1in laws were in being, to
perform the one and abstain from the other. But in relation to those laws, which
OJ Sec pail' '3.
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enjoin only positive duties, and forbid only such things as are not main in sc, but

mala prohilnta merely, without any intermixture of moral guilt, *annexing r*r en

a penalty to non-compliance, (1) here I apprehend conscience is no farther L J

concerned, than by directing a submission to the penalty, in case of our breach

of those laws: for otherwise the multitude of penal laws in a state would not

only be looked upon as an impolitic, but would also be a very wicked thing;

if every such law were a snare for the conscience of the subject. But in these

cases the alternative is offered to every man; " either abstain from this, or sub-

mit to such a penalty:" and his conscience will be clear, which ever side of the

alternative he thinks proper to embrace. Thus, by the statutes for preserving

the game, a penalty is denounced against every unqualified person that kills a

hare, dnd against every person who possesses a partridge in August. And so

too, by other statutes, pecuniary penalties are inflicted for exercising trades with-

out serving an apprenticeship thereto, (11) for not burying the dead in woollen,

for not performing the statute-work on the public roads, and for innumerable

other positive misdemeanors. Now these prohibitory laws do not make the

transgression a moral offence, or sin: the only obligation in conscience is to

submit to the penalty, if levied. It must however be observed, that we are here

speaking of laws that are simply and purely penal, where the thing forbidden or

enjoined is wholly a matter of indifference, and where the penalty inflicted is an

adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to arise from the

offence. But where disobedience to the law involves in it also any degree of
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public mischief or private injury, there it falls within our former distinction,

and is also an offence against conscience, (m) (12)

(I) See Book Jl. p. 420.

(m) Lex pure pasnalu dbligat tantum ad jwntnn. non item ad culpam i lex panalis mix/a et ad culpam

t'njoin only positive duties, and forbid only such things as are not mala in sc, but
mala prollibita merely, without any intennixtureofmoral guilt, *annexing [*:>S]
a penalty to non-compliance, ( l) here I apprehend conscience is no farther
concerned, than by directing a submission to the penalty, in case of our breach
of those laws: for otherwise the multitude of penal laws in a state would not
only be looked upon as an impolitic, but would also be a very wicked thing;
if every such law were q snare for the conscience of the subject. But in the~
cases the alternative is offered to every man; "either abstain from this, or submit to such a penalty:" and his conscience will be clear, which ever side of the
alternative he thinks proper to embrace. Thus, by the statutes for preserving
the game, a penalty is denounced against every unqualified person that kills u.
ha.re, 11nd against every person who possesses a partridge in August. And so
too, by other statutes, pecuniary penalties are inflicted for exercising trades without serving an apprenticeship thereto, (11) for not burying the dead in woollen,
for not perfonnin~ the statute-work on the public roads, and for innumerable
other positive misdemeanors. Now these prohibitory laws do not make the
transgression a moral offence, or sin: the only obligation in conscience is to
submit to the penalty, if levied. It must however be observed, that we are here
speaking of laws that are simply and purely penal, where the thing forbidden or
enjoined is wholly a matter of indifference, and where the penalty inflicted is an
adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to arise from the
offence. But where disobedience to the law involves in it also any degree of
public mischief or private injury, there it falls within our former distinction,
and is also an offence against conscience. (m) {12)

obKgat, etadpontam. (Sanderson de cotKcieni, Miynt, pratl. Till, S 17. 24.)

(11) [By stat. 54 Geo. Ill, c. 96, this law, and, by stat. 54 Geo. Ill, c. 108, that for not burying

in woolen, are repealed.]

(l) See Book II, p. 420.
(m) Lu pure pimalis obligat tantuin ad panam, non item a4 culpam: lu ptZnolla nrizta d ad -cUZpam
obligat, 5 ad poenam. (Sanderson de con•cimt, obltgat, prael. l'ill. § 17. 2'.)

(12) In a note upon this passage Mr. Christian has shown, that it is implied in every case in

•which an act is forbidden under a penalty, that " some degree of public mischief or private

injury" is involved in it, and is the occasion of the prohibition.

"I perfectly agree," says Mr. Justice Rooke, "with my brother Heath in reprobating any dis-

tinction between malum prohibitum and malum in sc, and consider it as pregnant with mischief.

Every man is as much bound to obey the civil law of the land as the law of nature."

Anbert «. Maze, 2 B. and P. 375. "It is contended," says Gilchrist, J., "that there is a

distinction between malum prohibitum and malum in se; between ttungs intrinsically and

morally wrong, and things which are made so merely by legislation. The inference [of counsel]

from this distinction is, that when an act is merely malum prohibitum, it may conscientiously be

done, provided only the party is willing to incur the penalty. He considers it optional with the

party to do or to refrain from doing the act in question, and that the alternative is presented

him by the legislature to abstain from the act, or to do it and pay the penalty. If these

premises and this reasoning be correct, the courts, he says, cannot declare the act to be illegal,

for that would be the infliction of a penalty beyond that imposed by the statute. But any person

who should attempt to put this theory into practice, and to regulate his conduct bv it, would

find his path filled with difficulties. In the first place he must assume to judge for himself

•what is right and what is wrong, irrespective of the law. He must test his obligation to obey

the law by a standard which exists in his own bosom. His moral sense must be so acute

that he would never be in danger of mistaking his duty, and of sacrificing it to considerations

of private advantage. Men differ in their views of right and wrong; the moral sense of one

man is more acute than that of another. And just m proportion to his obtuseness will he

be liable to overstep the line that separates right from wrong, and his reasoning may lead

him into the commission of a felony when he fancies himself to be merely a trespasser, and

that the payment of a fine which the statute might impose in a given case would make the

balance even. The subtle casuistry which self interest teaches us is a most unsafe guide iu

questions of morals, and particularly so in relation to those things which have been called

duties of imperfect obligation, and whose performance might be enforced by penalties. The

]aw would be extremely unequal in its operation if its prohibitions were imperative on those

only who should choose to be bound by it. If obedience to the law should depend entirely

on the conscience of the individual, all legal restraints would soon be abolished." Lewis v.

Welch, 14 N. H. 296.

The doctrine of some early cases, that where a statute merely inflicts a penalty for doing

a particular act, or making a particular contract, without also prohibiting the act or rout met,
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(11) [By stat. 54 Geo. III, c. 96, this la.w, and, by stat. 54 Geo. III, c. 108, tha.t for not burying
in woolen, are repealed.]
(12) In a note upon this passage Yr. Christian has shown, tha.t it is implied in e'\"ery case in
which an act is forbidden under a penalty, that "some degree of public mischief or private
injury" is involved in it, and is the occasion of the prohibition.
"I perfectly agree," says Mr. JuRtice Rooke, "with my brother Heath in reprobating any dis·
tinction between 111alum pm11ibitmn and malum in se, and conBidcr it 68 pregnant with mischief.
Every man is ns much bound to obey the civil law of the land 68 t.lie la.w of nature."
A.uhert v. Maze, 2 B. and P. 375. "It is contended," says Gilchrist, J., "that there is a
distinction between malum prohibitum and 111al11m in se; between Mrings intrinsically and
morally wron~, and things which are made AO merely by legislation. The inference [of counsel]
from thiA distinction is, that when an act i~ merely malttm proliibitum, it may conscientiously be
done, provided only tho party is willing to incur the penalty. He considers it otitional with the
party w do or to refrain from doing the act in que~tion, and that the alternative is presented
him by the legi8lature to abstain from the act, or to do it and pay the penalty. If these
premises and this reasonin!1i be correct, the courts, he say~, cannot declare the act to be illegal,
for that would be the infliction of a penalty beyond that imposed by the statute. But any person
who should attempt to put this theory into practice, and to regulate his conduct bv it, would
find his path filled witli diflicultie~. In the first place he must assume to judge for himself
what is right and what is ~ng, _irrel!Jlect!ve of the law. H~ must test his obligation to obey
the law by a. standard which ensts m lus own bosom. Hts moral sense must be so acute
that he would never be in danger of mistaking his duty, and of sacrificing it to considerations
of private advantage. Yen differ in their views of ri~ht and wrong; the moral sense of one
man is more ft(lUte th!\ll that of another. And just m proportion to his obtuseness will he
be liable to overstep the line that separates right from wrong, and his reasoning may lea<l
him into the comnussion of a felony when he fancim! himself to be merely a tre>ipo.sser, and
that the payment of a fine which the statute might impose in a. given case would make the
balance even. The subtle casuistry which self interest teaches us is a. most unsafe guide in
que8tions of morals, and particularly so in relation to those things which have been ce.lled
duties of imperfect obligation, aud whose performance might be enforced by penalties. The
law would be extremely unequal in its O]!eration if its prohibitions were imperative on those
only who 1.1hould choose to be bound by 1t. If obedience to the law should depend entirely
on the conscience of the individual, a.II legal restraints would soon be abolished." Lewis v.
Welch, 14 N. H. 296.
The doctrine of eome early ca808, that where a ste.tute merely infilcts a pena.lty for doing
a particular act, or ma.king a particular contract, without also prohibiting the act or contrac~.

Vor.. 1.-5
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\

I have now gone through the definition laid down of a municipal law; and

have shown that it is " a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power

in a state, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong;" in the

explication of which I have endeavoured to interweave a few useful principles

concerning the nature of civil government, and the obligation of human laws.

Before I conclude this section, it may not be amiss to add a few observations

concerning the interpretation of laws.

When any doubt arose upon the construction of th'e Roman laws, the usage

was to state the case to the emperor in writing, and take his opinion upon it

This was certainly a bad method of interpretation. (13). To interrogate the

legislature to decide particular disputes is not only endless, but affords great

room for partiality and oppression. The answers of the emperor wer» called

his rescripts, and these had in succeeding cases the force of perpetual laws;

though they ought to be carefully distinguished by every rational civilian from

those general constitutions which had only the nature of things for their guide.

The emperor Macrinus, as his historian Capitolinus informs us, had once

r*Kq-i resolved to *abolish these rescripts, and retain only the general edict*:

*- J he could not bear that the hasty and crude answers of such princes as

Commodus and Caracalla should be reverenced as laws. But Justinian thought

otherwise, (n) and he has preserved them all. In like manner the canon laws,

or decretal epistles of the popes are all of them rescripts in the strictest sense.
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Contrary to all true forms of reasoning, they argue from particulars to generals.

The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is

by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the

most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context,

the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the

law. (14) Let us take a short view of them all:—

(-a) In»t. 1.J. 6.

the payment of the penalty is the only legal consequence of a violation of the statute: Comyns

*. Boyer, Cro. Eliz. 485; Gremaire v. Valon, 2 Camp. 144; is now repudiated both in England

and in this country, and it is now well settled that the obligations the parties assume in con-

sideration of the forbidden act, will not be enforced. See Drury v. Defontaine, 1 Taunt. 136;

De Begins v. Armistead,10 fling. 107, and 3 M. and Scott, 516; Benslev v. Bignold, 5 B. and Aid.

335; Cope v. Rowlands, 2 M. and "W. 149; Wheeler ». Russell, 17 Mass. 258; Mitchell v. Smith,

1 Binn. 118; Eberman v. Reitell, 1 W. and S. 181; Hale v. Henderson, 4 Humph. 199; Bracket!

». Hoyt, 9 Fost. 264; Nichols v. Ruggles, 3 Day, 145; Tyson v. Thomas, McClel. and Y. 119:

Elkins v. ParkhurBt,17 Yt. 105; Terntt v. Bartlett, 21 Vt. 184; Bancroft ». Dumas, ib. 456:

Griffith v. "Wells, 3 Denio, 226; Coombs v. Emery, 14 Me. 404; Sharp v. Toese, 4 Halst. 352^

Statutes passed solely for the security of the revenue have been supposed to be exceptions to this

rule. Cundell v. Dawson, 4 C. 13. 398, per "Wilde, Ch. J. And see Smith v. Mawhood, 14 M. and

"W. 452; Forster v. Taylor, 5 B. and Ad. 887; Taylor v. Crowland Gas Co., 10 Ezch. 293; Hill t.

Smith, Morris, 70. But certainly no such distinction can be recognized where the penalty is

imposed with a view to prohibition. Smith v. Mawhood, supra.

(13) The legislature may interpret the law by a declaratory statute, but in America where

the legislative and judicial functions are separated and confided to different departments, die

declaratory statute will have the effect to determine the meaning of the law in its application to

future transactions only, and not to bind the courts in their application of the law to transactions

which have taken place previously. To declare what the law is or has been is the province of

the judiciary; to prescribe what it shall be in the future belongs to the legislature. Dash r.

Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 498; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494; Reiser v. Tell Association,

39 Penn. St. 137.

(14) The intention of the legislature when properly discoverable is always to control in the

construction of statutes: Jackson v. Collins, 3 Cow. 89; Jackson ». Vanzandt, 12 Johns. 176;

People v. Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johns. 358; Crocker p. Crane, 21 Wend. 211; Ellis r. Paige,

1 Pick. 45; Holbrook v. Holbrook, ib. 250; People v. Canal Commissioners, 3 Scam. 153; Bar-

ker v. Esty, 19 "Vt. 131; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Tt. 152. But the intent must be gathered from

the language employed to express it: and where the language is clear and explicit, and sus-

ceptible of uut one meaning, and there is nothing incongruous in the act, a court is bound to

suppose the legislature intended what the language imports. Barstow v. Smith. "Wai. ch.

394; Bidwell ». Whitaker, 1 Mich. 469; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 35; Spencer t>. State, 5

Ind. 76; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 399; United States v. Ragsdale, 1 Hemp. 497; Ingalls

v. Cole, 47 Me. 530; Newell v. People, 7 K. Y. 83; Alexander ti. 'Worthington, 5 Md. 476;
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1. Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known sig-

nification ; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general

and popular use. Thus the law mentioned by Puffendorf (o) which forbad

a layman to lay liands on a priest, was adjudged to extend to him, who had

hurt a priest with a weapon. Again, terms of art, or technical terms, must be

taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, and sci-

ence. (15) So in the act of settlement, where the crown of England is limited

" to the princess Sophia, and the heirs of her body, being protestants," it becomes

necessary to call in the assistance of lawyers, to ascertain the precise idea of the

words " heirs of her body," which, in a legal sense, comprise only certain of her

lineal descendants.

*2. If words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their mean- r*^0-i

ing from the context, with which it may be of singular use to compare a "- J

word or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal or intricate. Thus

the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of

parliament. (16) Of the same nature and use is the comparison of a law with

other laws, that are made by the same legislator, that have some affinity with

the subject, or that expressly relate to the same point. (17) Thus, when the law

of England declares murder to be felony without benefit of clergy, we must

resort to the same law of England to learn what the benefit of clergy is; and,

•when the common law censures simoniacal contracts, it affords great fight to the

subject to consider what the canon law has adjudged to be simony. (18)
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(n) L. of N. and N. 6.12. 8.

Cantwell ». Owens, 14 Md. 215; Pattison v. Tuba, 12 Cal. 175; Heirs of Ludlow v. Johnson, 3

Ohio, 553; In re Murphy, 3 Zab. 180; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Kelly, 146; McClusky c. Cromwell, 11

N. Y. 593; Holmea v. Gurley, 31 N. Y. 289; Steamboat Co. v. Transportation Co., 3 Green, N.

(15) See United States v. Magill, 1 "Wash. C. C. 463; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610;

Merchant's Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 411; Poole v. Poole, 3 B. and P. 620; Astor v. Union Ins. Co.,

7 Cow. 202.

(16) The title of a statute may be a guide to the intent of the law-maker, where the body of

the statute appears to be ambiguous or doubtful. United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Bur-

g«tt e. Burgett. 1 Ohio, 480; Eastman e: McAlpin; 1 Kelly, 157; Bristow v. Barker, 14 Johns.

206; Cohe,n r. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195. So also may the preamble. Edwards v. People, 3 Scam. 465;

Jackson v. Gilchrist, 15 Johns. 89; People v. Utica Insurance Co., ib. 390; Holbrook t>. Hoi-

brook, 1 Pick. 250; Halton v. Cove, 1 B. and Ad. 538; Whitmoro v. Robertson, 8 M. and W.

472; Plyuu v. Abbott, 16 Cal. 358; Constantino v. Van Winkle, 6 Hill, 177. Under the constitu-

tions of some of the American States, which require the object or subject of a statute to be

expressed in the title, it is obvious that the title has become more important, and may control the

construction. See Cooley Const. Lim. 141.

(17) [It is an established rule of construction that statutes in pan materia, or upon the same

unbject. must be construed with a reference to each other; that is, that what is clear in one stat-

ute shall be called in aid to explain what is obscure and ambiguous in another. Thus the qualifi-

cation act to kill game (22 aud 23 Car. II, c. 25,) enacts, " that every person not having lands

and tenements, or some other estate of inheritance, of the clear yearly value of 1001. or for life,

or having lease or leases of ninety-nine years of the clear yearly value of 150Z." (except certain

persons,) shall not be allowed to kill game. Upon this statute a doubt arose whether the words

or for life should be referred to the 1002. or to the 150J. per annum. The court of king's bench

having looked into the former qualification acts, and having found that it was clear by the first

qualification act; 13 R. I. St. 1, c. 13; that a layman should have 40s. a year, and a priest in/, a

year, and that, by the 1 Ja. c. 27, the qualifications were clearly an estate of inheritance of 101. a

year, and an estate for life of 302. a year, they presumed that it still was the intention of the legisla-

ture to make the yearly value of an estate for life greater than that of an estate of inheritance,

though the same proportions were not preserved; and thereupon decided that clergymen, and all

others possessed of a life estate only must have 1502. a year to be qualified to kill game. Lowndes

v. Lewis, E. T. 22 Gep. III.

That same rule to discover the intention of a testator is applied to wills, viz., the whole of a will

hiiall be taken under consideration, in order to decipher the meaning of an obscure passage in it.]

The statutes in part materia are to bo construed together, see Church v. Crocker, 3 Mass. 17;

Mendon v. Worcester Co., 10 Pick. 235; Frink v. King, 3 Scam. 144; M'Cartee v. Orphan Asy-

Jum Society, 9 Cow. 507; Isham r. Bennington Iron Co., 19 Tt. 230; Hayes ». Hanson, 12 N. H.

5284; Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Ohio St. 458; McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Oregon, 31; Rogers v. Brad-

sbaw, 20 Johns. 735; Green r. Commonwealth, 12 Allen, 155: BiUingdea v, liidi 1 win, 23 Md.

85; Rabbins v. Railroad Co., 32 Cal. 472.

(18) See United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610.
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3. As to the subject matter, words are always to be understood as having a

regard thereto, for that is always supposed to be in the eye of the legislator, and

all his expressions directed to that end. Thus, when a law of our Edward III.

forbids all ecclesiastical persons to purchase provisions at Rome, it might seem

to prohibit the buying of grain and other victual; but, when we consider that

the statute was made to repress the usurpations of the papal see, and that the

nominations to benefices by the pope were called provisions, we shall see that the

restraint is intended to be laid upon such provisions only.

4. As to the effects and consequence, the rule is, that where words bear either

none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little

deviate from the received sense of them. Therefore the Bolognian law, men-

tioned by Puffendorf, (p) which enacted " that whoever drew blood in the

streets should be punished with the utmost severity," was held after long debate

not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in

the street with a fit. (19)

f*611 *5' ^ut> k^y* *ne mos* nniversal and effectual way of discovering

I J the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by consider-

ing the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to

enact it. (20) For when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to

cease with it. An instance of this is given in a case put by Cicero, or whoever

was the author of the treatise inscribed to Herennius. (q) There was a law, that

those who in a storm forsook the ship should forfeit all property therein ; and
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that the ship and lading should belong entirely to those who staid in it. In a

dangerous tempest all the mariners forsook the ship, except only one sick

passenger, who, by reason of his disease, was unable to get out and escape. By

chance the ship came safe to port. The sick man kept possession, and claimed

the benefit of the law. Now here all the learned agree, that the sick man is not

within the reason of the law; for the reason of making it was, to give encourage-

ment to such as should venture their lives to save the vessel; but this is a merit

which he could never pretend to, who neither staid in the ship upon that account,

nor contributed any thing to its preservation. (21)

From this method of interpreting laws, by the reason of them, arises what

we call equity, which is thus defined by Grotius: (r) " the corrections of that

wherein the law (by reason of its universality,) is deficient." For, since in laws

all cases cannot be forseen or expressed, it is necessary that, when the general

decrees of the law come to be applied to particular cases, there should be some-

where a power vested of defining those circumstances, which (had they been

foreseen) the legislator himself would have expressed. And these are the cases

(p) I. 6. c. 12. <;< 8. (q) I. 1. c. 11. (r) He Egultata, 9 S.

(19) See Langdon v. Potter, 3 Mass. 220; Gore ». Brazier, ib. 523; Ayres v. Knox, 7 Mass. 310.

Putnam v. Longley, 11 Pick. 487; Dash «. Van Eleek, 7 Johns. 502; Henry «. Tilson, 17 Vt 479;

The inconveniences resulting from disregarding the practical construction of a statute, and long

continued usage under it, will sometimes be allowed great weight in cases of doubt. Rogers r.

Goodwin, 2 Mass. 478; State c. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487; Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills, 14 Allen, 389 :

Isaacs v. Steele, 3 Scam. 97; Edwards v. Pope, ib. 465; Chestnut v. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio,

599; Union Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. 66; Britton ». Perry, 14 Mich. 66; Plnmmer r.

Plummer, 37 Miss. 185; Norris ». Clymer, 2 Penn. St. 277; Hedgecock v. Davis, 64 N". C. 652.

(20) See further, Dash v. Van Kleck, 7 Johns. 486; People v. Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johns.

381; Miller v. Dobson, 1 Gilm. 572; Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch, 307 ; People c. Canal

Commissioners, 3 Scam. 153; Tonele v. Hall, 4 N. T. 140. Henry v. Tilson, 21 Vt. 485.

(21) A statute is always to be construed so as to render it effectual, if possible, rather than to

defeat it. Watervliet Turnpike Co. t>. McKean, 6 Hill, 616; Shrewsbury v. Boylston, 1 Pick.

105. And so as to give effect to all its provisions, if practicable: People ». Pnrdy, 2 Hill, 36;

Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Ryegate v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt, 746; Brooks t>. School Commis-

sioners, 31 Ala. 227 ; Green v. "Weller, 32 Miss. 650; "Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 49; People r.

Burns, 5 Mich. 114.

And if a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would render it unconstitu-

tional, and the other not, it is to receive the latter construction as presumptively expressing the

legislative intent. Newland v. Marsh, 19 111. 384; Dow ». Norris, 4 N. H. 17; People e. Super-

visors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 241; Clark v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 471.

On interpretation generally, see Rutherford's Institutes of Natural Law, B. 2, c. 7, and Lieber'a

Hermenentics.
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which according to Grotius, " lex non exude definit, sed arbitrio boni viri

permittU." (22)

Equity thus depending, essentially, upon the particular circumstances of each

individual case, there can be no established *rules and fixed precepts of r*fioi

equity laid down, without destroying its very essence, and reducing it to *• J

a positive law. And, on the other hand, the liberty of considering all cases in

an equitable light must not be indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy all law,

and leave the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge.

And law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable

for the public good than equity without law; which would make every judge a

legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion; as there would then be almost

as many different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differences

of capacity and sentiment in the human mind. (23)

SECTION III.

OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

which according to Grotius, "lex non exa,cte definit, sed arbitrio boni viri
permittit." (22)
Equity thus depending, essentially, upon the particular circumstances of each
individual case, there can be no established *rules and fixed precepts of * ,
equity laid down, without destroying its very essence, and reducing it to [ 62]
a positive law. And, on the other hand, the liberty of considering all cases in
an equit.able light must not be indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy all law,
and leave the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge.
And law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable
for the public good than equity without law; which would make every judge a
legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion; as there would then be almost
as ma.ny different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differences
of capacity and sentiment in the human mind. (23)

The municipal law of England, or the rule of civil conduct prescribed to the

inhabitants of this kingdom, may with sufficient propriety be divided into two

kinds: The lex non scripta, the unwritten, or common law; and the lex scripta,

the written, qr statute law..

The lex non scripta, or unwritten law, includes not only general customs, or

SECTION III.

the common law properly so called; but also the particular customs, of certain

parts of the kingdom; and likewise those particular laws, that are by custom
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observed only in certain courts and jurisdictions.

OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

When I call these parts of our law leges non scripta, I would not be under-

stood as if all those laws were at present merely oral, or communicated from

the former ages to the present solely by word of mouth. It is true indeed that,

in the profound ignorance of letters which formerly overspread the whole

western world, all laws were entirely traditional, for this plain reason, because

the nations among which they prevailed had but little idea of writing. Thus

the British as well as the Gallic Druids committed all their laws as well aa

learning to memory; (a) and it is said of the primitive Saxons here, as well as

their brethren on the continent, that leges sola memoria et usu retinebant (b).

But with us at present, the monuments and evidences of our legal customs are

fa) Caes, dt b. G. lib. 6, a. 13. (b) Spelm. Ql. 301.

(22) [I cannot forbear observing, (said Lord Tenderden), that I think there is always danger

in giving effect to what is called " the equity of a statute;" and that it is much safer and better

to rely on »nd abide by the plain words; although the legislature might possibly have provided

for other cases had their attention been directed to them. 6 B. and 0. 475; And in a recent case

in which this rule was much discussed, Air. Justice Coleridge said, "It is, in my opinion, so

important for the court, in construing modern statutes, to act upon the principle of giving full

effect to their language, and of declining to mould that language in order to meet either an alleged

convenience or an alleged equity, upon doubtful evidence of intention) that nothing will induce

me to withdraw a case from the operation of a section which is within its words, but clear and

The municipal law of England, or the rule of civil conduct prescribed to the
inhabitants of thia kingdom, may with sufficient propriety be divided into two
kinds : The lex non scripta, the unwritten, or common law; and the lex acripta,
the written, qr statute law.
The l,ex non scripta, or unwritten law, includes not only general customs, or
the common law properly so called ; but also the particular customs, of certain
parts of the kingdom ; and likewise those particular laws, that are by custom
observed only in certain courts and jurisdictions.
When I call these parts of our law leges non scriptf.8, I would not be understood as if all those laws were at present merely oral, or communicated from
the former ages to the present solely by word of mouth. It is true indeed that,
in the profound ignorance of letters which formerly overspread the whole
western world, all laws were entirely traditional, for this pie.in reason, because
the nations among which they prevailed had but little idea of writing. Thus
the British as well as the Gallic Druids committed all their laws as well as
learning to memory; (a) and it is said of the primitive Saxons here, as well as
their brethren on the continent, that leges sola memM'ia et usu retinebant (b).
But with us at present, the monuments and evidences of our legal customs are

unambiguous evidence that so to do is to fulfill the general intent of the statute; and also to

(a)

Caee, ~ b. G. Ub. 6, c.13.

(b) Spelm. Gt 3M.

adhere to its literal interpretation, is to decide inconsistently with other overruling provisions of

the same statute." 6 A. and E. 7.]

(_23) [The only equity, according to this description, which exists in our government, either

resides in the king, who can prevent the summum jus from becoming swmma injuria, by an

absolute or a conditional pardon, or in juries, who determine whether any, or to what extent,

damages shall be rendered. But equity, as here explained, is by no means applicable to the

court of chancery; for the learned judge has elsewhere truly said, that " the system of our courts

of equity is a laboured connected system, governed by established rules, and bound down by

precedents, from which they do not depart, although the reason of some of them may perhaps be

liable to objection." Book iii. 432.]

(22) [I cannot forbear observing, (said Lord Tenderden), that I think there is always danger
in giving effect to what i1:1 called "the equity of a statute;" and that it is much safer o.nd better
to rely on and abide by the plain words; although the legislature might possibly have provided
for other cascs had their attention been directed to them. 6 B. and C. 475, And in a recent case
in which this rule was much discusaed, Mr. Justice Coleridge said, "It is1 in my OJ?inion, so
important for the court, in construing modem statutes, to act upon the principle of giving full
effect to their language, and of declining to mould that langua~e in order to meet either an alleged
convenience or an alleged equity, upon doubtful evidence of mtention1 that nothing will induce
me to withdraw a case from the operation of a section which is Within its words, bnt clear and
unnmbiguous evidence that so to do is to fulfill the general intent of the statute; and also to
adhere to its literal interpretation, is to decide inconsistently with other overruling provisions of
the same statute." 6 A. and E. 7.]
(23) [The only equity, o.ccording to this description, which exists in our government, either
resides in the kinS:, who can prevent the summum jus from becoming summa injuria, by an
absolute or o. conditional pardon, or in juries, who determine whether any, or to what extent,
damages !!hall be rendered. But equity, BS here expla.int1d, is by no meo.ns applicable to the
court of chancery; for the learned judge has e~ewhere truly said. that "the system of our courta
of equity is a le.hon.red connected system, governed by established rulc~1 and bound down by
prol·(~donts, from which they do not depart, although the reason of 1:1ome of them may perhapfl be
lialilc hi ohjection." Book iii. 43'..l.]
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contained in the records of the several courts of justice, in books of

F*64l *reP°r*B an^ judicial decisions, and in the treatises of learned sages of

"• J the profession, preserved and handed down to us from the times of

highest antiquity. However, I therefore style these parts of our law leges non

scripts, because their original institution and authority are not set down in

writing as acts of parliament are, but they receive their binding power and the

force of laws by long and immemorial usage, and by their universal reception

throughout the kingdom. In like manner as Aulus Gellius defines the jus non

scriptum to be that, which is " tacito et illiterate hominum consensu et moribus

expressum."

Our ancient lawyers, and particularly Fortescue,(e) insist with abundance of

warmth that these customs are as old as the primitive Britons, and continued

down, through the several mutations of government and inhabitants to the

present time, unchanged and unadulterated. This may be the case as to some;

but in general, as Mr. Selden in his notes observes, this assertion must be

understood with many grains of allowance; and ought only to signify, as the

truth seems to be, that there never was any formal exchange of one system of

laws for another; though doubtless, by the intermixture of adventitious

nations, the Romans, the Picts, the Saxons, the Danes, and the Normans, they

must have insensibly introduced and incorporated many of their own customs

with those that were before established; thereby, in all probability, improving

the texture and wisdom of the whole by the accumulated wisdom of divers
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particular countries. Our laws, saith Lord Bacon,(rf) are mixed as our

language; and, as our language is so much the richer, the laws are the more

complete.

And indeed our antiquaries and early historians do all positively assure us,

that our body of laws is of this compounded nature. For they tell us that in

the time of Alfred the local customs of the several provinces of the kingdom

were grown so various, that he found it expedient to compile his Dome-Book, or

F*65l Liber Judicialis, for the general use of the whole kingdom. *This book

"- -"is said to have been extent so late as the reign of King Edward the

Fourth, but is now unfortunately lost.(l) It contained, we may probably

suppose, the principal maxims of the common law, the penalties for misdemea-

nors, and the forms of judicial proceedings. Thus much may at least be

collected from that injunction to observe it, which we find in the laws of King

Edward the elder, the son of Alfred.(e) " Omnibus qui republics prcesunt

etiam atque etiam mando, ut omnibus cequos se prcebeant judices, perinde ac in

judiciali libra (Saxonice,botn3)ec) scriptum habetur: nee quicquam formident

quinjus commune (Saxonice, TOlcjuhte) audacter libereque dicant."

But the irruption and establishment of the Danes in England, which followed

soon after, introduced new customs, and caused this code of Alfred in many

provinces to fall into disuse, or at least to be mixed and debased with other

laws of a coarser alloy; so that, about the beginning of the eleventh century,

there were three principal systems of laws prevailing in different districts: 1.

The Mercen-Lage, or Mercian laws, which were observed in many of the midland

counties, and those bordering on the principality of Wales, the retreat of the

ancient Britains; and therefore very probably intermixed with the British or

Druidical customs. 2. The West-Saxon Lage, or laws of the West Saxons,

which obtained in the counties to the south and west of the island, from Kent

to Devonshire. These were probably much the same with the laws of Alfred

above mentioned, being the municipal law of the far most considerable part of

his dominions, and particularly including Berkshire, the seat of his peculiar

residence. 3. The Dane-Lage, or Danish law, the very name of which speaks

its original and composition. This was principally maintained in the rest of

(e) C. 17. <-n See his proposals for a digest. (• } C. 1.

(1) [It is a loose report of late writers that Alfred compiled a dom-boc, or general code for

the government of his kingdom. Hallaui's Mid. Ag. 2,402.]
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contained in the records of the several courts of justice, in books of
[ • 64] *reports and judicial decisions, and in the treatises of learned sages of
the -profession, preserved and handed down to us from the times of
highest antiquity. However, I therefore style these parts of our law lege,s non
scriptm, because their original institution and authority are not set down in
writing as acts of parliament are, but they receive their bindin~ power and the
force of laws by long and immemorial usage, and by their universal reception
throughout the kingdom. In like manner 118 Aulus Gellius defines thejus mm
scriptum to be that, which is" tacito et illiterato hominum consensu et moril>us
expressum."
Our ancient lawyers, and particlllarly Fortescue,(c) insist with abundance of
warmth that these customs are M old as the primitive Britons, and continued
down, through the several mutations of government and inhabitants to the
present time, unchanged and unadulterated. This may be the case as to some;
but in general, as Mr. Selden in his notes observes, this assertion must be
understood with many grains of allowance; and ought only to signify, as the
truth seems to be, that . there never was any formal exchange of one system of
laws for another; though doubtless, by the intermixture of adventitious
nations, the Romans, the Picts, the Saxons, the Danes, and the N onnans, they
must have insensibly introduced and incorporated many of their own customs
with those that were before established; thereby, in all probability, improving
the texture and wisdom of the whole by the accumulated wisdom of divers
particular countries. Our laws, saith tord Ba.con,(d) are mixed as our
language; and, as our language is so much the richer, the laws are the more
complete.
And indeed our antiquaries and early historians do all positively a.ssure us,
that our body of laws is of this compounded nature. For they tell us that in
the time of Alfred the local customs of the several provinces of the kingdom
were grown so various, that he found it expedient to compile his Dome-Boole, or
[ • 65 ] Liber Judicialis, for the general use of the whole kingdom. *This book
is said to have been extant so late as the reign of King Edward the
Fourth, but is now unfortunately lost.(1) It contained, we may probably
suppose, the principal maxims of the common law, the penalties for misdemeanors, and the forms of judicial proceedings. 'fhus much may at least be
collected from that injunction to observe it, which we find in the laws of King
Edward the elder, the son of Alfred.(e) "Omnibus qm'. republic(8 prmsunt
etiam atque etiam mando, ut omnibus wquos .<Je prwbeant iudices, p~rlnde ac in
judiciali libro (Saxonice, boM-l>ec) scriptum habetur: nee quicquam formident
quin jus commune (Saxonice, TOlcmbt:e) audacter libereque dicant."
But the irruption and estabflshment of the Danes in England, which followed
soon after, introduced new customs, and caused this code of Alfred in many
provinces to fall into disuse, or at least to be mixed and debased with other
Jaws of a coarser alloy; so that, about the beginning of the eleventh century,
there were three principal systems of laws prevailing in different districts : I.
The Mercen-Lage, or Mercian laws, which were observed in many of the midland
counties, and those bordering on the principality of Wales, the retreat of the
ancient Britains; and therefore very probably intermixed with the British or
Dn1idical customs. 2. The West-Saxon Lage, or laws of the West Saxons,
which obtained in the counties to the south and west of the island, from Kent
to Devonshire. These were probably much the same with the laws of Alfred
above mentioned, being the municipal law of the far most considerable part of
his dominions, and particularly including Berkshire, the seat of his peculiar
residence. 3. The Dmie-Lage, or Danish law, the very name of which speaks
its original and composition. This was principally maintained in the rest of
(c)

C. 17.

(d)

- - - -

See his proposals tor a digest.

(e)

C. l.

--- - - - -- - -- ·- - -- -

(1) [It is a loose report of late writer~ that AlfrBd compiled a dom-boc, or general code for
the government of his kingdom. llaUam"s Mid. Ag. 2,402.]
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the midland counties, and also on the eastern coast, the part most exposed to

the visits of that piratical people. As for the very northern provinces, they were

at that time under a distinct government (f\

* Out of these three laws, Koger Hoveden (g) and Ranulphus Cestrensis pgg-i

(h) informs us, King Edward the Confessor extracted one uniform law, or L -*

digest of laws, to be observed thoughout the whole kingdom; though Hovenden,

and the author of an old manuscript chronicle (t) assure us likewise that this

work was projected and begun by his grandfather King Edgar. And indeed a

general digest of the same nature has been constantly found expedient, and

therefore put in practice by other great nations, which were formed from an

assemblage of little provinces, governed by peculiar customs, as in Portugal,

under King Edward, about the beginning of the fifteenth century. (&) In Spain

under Alonzo X, who, about the year 1250, executed the plan of his father St.

Ferdinand, and collected all the provincial customs into one uniform law, in the

celebrated code entitled Las Partidas. (I) And in Sweden, about the same era,

when a universal body of common law was compiled out of the particular customs

established by the laghman of every province, and entitled the land's lagh, being

analogous to the common law of England, (m)

Both these undertakings of King Edgar and Edward the Confessor seem to

have been no more than a new edition, or fresh promulgation, of Alfred's code

or dome-book, with such additions and improvements as the experience of a

century and a half had suggested; for Alfred is general^ styled by the same
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historians the legum Anglicanarum conditor, as Edward the Confessor is the

restitutor. These, however, are the laws which our histories so often mention

under the name of the laws of Edward the Confessor, which our ancestors

struggled so hardly to maintain, under the first princes of the Norman line; and

which subsequent princes so frequently promised to keep and restore, as the

most popular act they could do, when pressed by foreign emergencies or domestic

discontents. These are the laws that so vigorously withstood *the repeated pgw-i

attacks of the civil law; which established in the twelfth century a new L -I

Roman empire over most of the states of the continent: states that have lost,

and perhaps upon that account, their political liberties; while the free consti-

tution of England, perhaps upon the same account, has been rather improved

than debased. These, in short, are the laws which gave rise and original to that

collection of maxims and customs which is now known by the name of the

common law; a name either given to it in contradistinction to other laws, as

the statute law, the civil law, the law merchant, and the like; or, more probably,

as a law common to all the realm, the jus commune, or fokright, mentioned by

king Edward the elder, after the abolition of the several provincial customs and

particular laws before mentioned.

But though this is the most likely foundation of this collection of maxims

and customs, yet the maxims and customs, so collected, are of higher antiquity

than memory or history can reach (2) nothing being more difficult than to ascer-

(f) Hal. Hi«t. 55 (g) In Hen. II. (h) In Edu>. Confettor. (i) In Sdd. ad Eadmer, 8.

ft) Mod. On. Hist, ndi 185. ft} IMA. x*. 811. (m) Ibid, xxxltl. 21, 58.

(2) "Our English lawyers," observes Mr. Hallam, "prone to magnify the antiquity like the

the midland counties, and also on the eastern coast, the part most exposed to
the visits of that piratical people. As for the very northern provinces, they were
at that time under a distinct government. (()
"- •Out of these three laws, Roger Hoveden (g) and Ranulphus Cestrensis [*66]
( h) informs us, King Edward the Confessor extracted one uniform law, or
digest of laws, to be observed thoughout the whole kingdom; though Hovenden,
and the author of an old manuscript chronicle (i) assure us likewise that this
work was projected and begun by his grandfather King Edgar. And indeed a
general digest of the same nature has been constantly found expedient, and
therefore put in practice by other great nations, which were formed from an
assemblage of little provinces, governed by peculiar customs, as in Portugal,
under King Edward, about the beginning of the fifteen th century. ( k) In Spain
under Alonzo X, who, about the year 1250, executed the plan of his father St.
Ferdinand, and collected all the provincial customs into one uniform law, in the
celebrated code entitled Las Partidas. (l) And in Sweden, about the same era,
when a universa.l body of common law was compiled out of the particular customs
established by the lagl1man of every province, and entitled the land's lagh, being
analogous to the common law of England. (m)
Botn these nndertnkings of King Edgar and Edward the Confessor seem to
have been no more than a new edition, or fresh promulgation, of Alfred's code
or dome-hook, with snch additions and improvements as the experience of a
century and a half had suggested; for Alfred is general\y styled by the same
historians the legum Anglicanarum conditor, as Edward the Confessor is the
restitutor. These, however, arc the laws which our histories so often mention
under the name of the laws of Edward the Confessor, which our ancestors
struggled so hardly to maintain, under the first princes of the N onnan line; and
which subsequent princes so frequently promised to keep and restore, as the
most popular act they could do, when pressed by foreign emergencies or domestic
discontents. These are the laws that so vigorously withstood *the repeated [*67]
attacks of the civil law; which established in the twelfth century a new
Roman empire over most of the states of the continent: states that have lost,
and perhaps upon that account, their political liberties; while the free constitution of England, perhaps upon the same aecount, has been rather improved
than debased. These, in short, are the laws which gave rise and original to that
collection of maxims and customs which is now known by the name of the
common law; a name either given to it in contradistinction to other laws, as
the statute law, the civil law, the law merchant, and the like; or, more probably,
as a law common to all the realm, the jus commune, or .folcrigld, mentioned by
king Edward the elder, after the abolition of the several provincial customs and
particular laws before mentioned.
But though this is the most likely foundation of this collection of maxims
and customs, yet the maxims and customs, so collected, are of higher antiquity
than memory or history can reach (2) nothing being more difficult than to ascer-

other merits of their system, are apt to carry up the date of the common law till, like the

pedigree of an illustrious family, it loses itself in the obscurity of ancient times: Sir Mat-

(f) Hal. Hiet. M .
Cg) In Hen. IL
(k) Mod. Un. Hist. .lCdi 1311. (l) 111id. xx. 211.

(h) In EdlD. Cunfet1a<>r.
xxxlli. 21, 118.

(m) Ibid.

(j)

In Sdd. ad EadmM', 8.

thew Hale not hesitating to say that its origin1 is as undiscoverable as that of the Nile!" It

would be equally perplexing and unsatisfactory to the student, to parade before him the

various speculations and controversies on this subject, which lie scattered over some twenty

volumes now lying open around the writer of these pages. Suffice it to observe, that if the

reader be moderately well acquainted with the early history of his country, proofs will

accumulate upon him as he advances in the scientific study of his profession, of the very

composite character of the common law. He will find indubitable evidence that some parts

of it have been handed down to us from Saxon times; that a far greater portion has oeen

derived from our Norman forefathers; that the Roman law bears a much greater proportion

to the other ingredients of the common law than the jealous professors of the latter have

been, even in recent times, willing to admit; and that some ofite most disfigured portions

bear the deep traces of that scholastic philosophy which, at so early a period and for so long a

39

(2) "Our EngliRh lawyers,'' observes Mr. Hallam, "prone to magnify the antiquity like the
other merits of their 1:tyi;tem, are apt to carry up the date of the common law till, like the
pedigree of an illustriou.'! family, it loses it!!elf in the ob1:tcurity of ancient times: Sir Matthew Hale not hesitating to say that it.~ orig'itl in as undiscoverable as that of the Nile!" It
would be equally perplexing and un~tisfactory to the student, to parade before him the
various speculatioru; and controverhies on this subject, which lie RCattered over some twenty
volumes now lying open around the writer of these page11. Suffice it to obt10rve, that if the
reader be moderately well acquainted with the early history of his country, proofs will
accumulate upon him as he advances in the scientific study of his _P,rofes~don, of the very
composite character of the common law. Ile will find indubitable eTidence that some parts
of it have been handed down to us from .Saxon times ; that a far greater portion has been
derived from our. Norman forefathers; that the Romnn law bears a much grC'ntcr proportion
to the other ingredient!! of the common law than the jealou;i profeHsor:; of the latter have
betin, even in ro<'ent times, willing to admit; and that 8ome of it.K most disfigured portions
bear the deep traces of that '1<'holastie philosophy which, at so early a period and' for so long a
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tain the precise beginning and the first spring of an ancient and long established

custom. Whence it is that in our law the goodness of a custom depends upon

its having been used time out of mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase,

time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. This it is that

gives it its weight and authority: and of this nature are the maxims and customs

which compose the common law, or lex non scripta, of this kingdom.

This unwritten, or common, law is properly distinguishable into three

kinds: 1. General customs; which are the universal rule of the whole king-

dom, and form the common law, in its stricter and more usual signification.

2. Particular customs; which, for the most part, affect only the inhabitants of

particular districts. 3. Certain particular laws; which, by custom, are adopted

and used by some particular courts, of pretty general and extensive jurisdiction.

F*681 *1- ^8 *° &eneral customs, or the common law, properly so called; this

L -1 is that law, by which proceedings and determinations in the king's ordi-

nary courts of justice are guided and directed. This, for the most part, settles

the course in which lands descend by inheritance; the manner and form of

acquiring and transferring property; the solemnities and obligation of con-

tracts; the rules of expounding wills, deeds, and acts of parliament; the

respective remedies of civil injuries; the several species of temporal offences;

with the manner and degree of punishment; and an infinite number of minuter

particulars, which diffuse themselves as extensively as the ordinary distribution

of common justice requires. Thus, for example, that there shall be four superior
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courts of record, the Chancery, the King's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the

Exchequer;—that the eldest son alone is heir to his ancestor;—that property

may be acquired and transferred by writing;—that a deed is of no validity unless

sealed and delivered;—that wills shall be construed more favourably, and deeds

more strictly;—that money lent upon bond is recoverable by action of debt;—

that breaking the public peace is an offence, and punishable by fine and imprison-

ment ;—all these are doctrines that are not set down in any written statute or

ordinance, but depend merely upon immemorial usage, that is, upon common law,

for their support

Some have divided the common law into two principal grounds or founda-

tions: 1. Established customs; such as that, where there are three brothers,

the eldest brother shall be heir to the second, in exclusion of the youngest: and

2. Established rules and maxims; as " that the king can do no wrong, that no

man shall be bound to accuse himself," and the like. But I take these to be one

and the same thing. For the authority of these maxims rests entirely upon

general reception and usage: and the only method of proving, that this or that

maxim is a rule of the common law, is by shewing that it hath been always the

T*69l CU8*om *° observe it. (3) *But here a very natural, and very material, qn.es-

L J tion arises: how are these customs and maxims to be known, and by whom

is their validity to be determined? The answer is, by the judges in the several

time, retarded the advance of knowledge of every kind. That our ancestors were,nndej- the

first princes of the Norman line, engaged in frequent straggles to maJntHin certain institu-

tions known by the name of the Laws of Edward tlte Confessor, is indispntable, however

tain the precise beginning a.nd the first spring of an ancient and long est.abliihed
custom. Whence it is that in our law the g-oodness of a custom depends upon
its having been used time out of mind; or, m the solemnity of our legal phrase,
time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. This it is that
gives it its weight and authority: and of this nu.ture a.re the maxims and customs
which compose the common law, or lex non scripta, of this kingdom.
'fhis unwritten, or common, law is properly distinguishable into three
kinds: 1. General customs; which are the uuiversal rule of the whole kiugdom, and form the common law, in its stricter and more usual signification.
2. Particular customs; which, for the most part, affect only the inhabitants of
particular districts. 3. Certain particular laws; which, by custom, a.re adopted
and used by some particular courts, of pretty general and extensive jurisdiction.
[•BS]
•i. As to genera.I customs, or the common law, properly so called; this
is that law, by which proceedings and determinations in the king's ordinary courts of justice are guided and directed. This, for the most part, settles
the course in which lands descend by inheritance; the manner and form of
acquiring and transferring property; the solemnities and obligation of contracts; the rules of expounding wills, deeds, and acts of parliament; the
respective remedies of civil injuries; the several species of temporal offences;
with the manner and degree of punishment; and an infinite number of minuter
particulars, which diffuse themselves as extensively as the ordinary distribution
of common justice requires. Thus, for example, that there shall be four superior
courts of record, the Chancery, the King's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the
Exchequer ;-that the eldest son alone is heir to his ancestor ;-that property
may be acquired and transferred by writing ;-that a deed is of no validity unle&i
sea.led and delivered ;-th~t wills shall be construed more favourably, and deeds
more strictly ;-that money lent upon bond is recoverable by action of debt;that breaking the public peace is an offence, and punishable by fine and imprisonm.ent ;-all these are doctrines that are not set down in any written statute or
ordinance, but depend merely upon immemorial usage, that is, upon common law,
for their support.
Some have divided the common law into two principal grounds or founda.tions: 1. Established customs; such as that, where there are three brothers,
the eldest brother shall be heir to the second, in exclusion of the youngest: and
2. Established rules and maxims; as "that the king can do no wrong, that no
man shall be bound to accuse himself," and the like. But I take these to be one
and the same thing. For the authority of these maxims rests entirely upon
general reception and usage: and the only method of proving, that this or that
maxim is a rule of the common law, is by shewing that it ha.th been always the
[ • 69 ] custom to observe it. (3) •Rut here a very natural, and very material, question arises: how a.re these customs and maxims to be known, and by whom
is their validity to be determined? The answer is, by the judges in the several

doubtful may be the origin, form and character of these laws; which, in all probability were

little else than a digest by Edward of the Mcrcien, West Saxon and Danish laws, then existing

and in force in different parts of the kingdom. It may upon the whole be received as generally

true, that our common law traces its origin to the early usages and customs of the aboriginal

Britons, and was necessarily augmented, in different ages, by the admixture of some of the

laws and usages of the Romans, the Picts, the Saxons, the Danes and the Normans, who spread

themselves over the country: " Onr laws/' says Lord Bacon, " becoming as mixed as our lan-

guage." "Warren's Law Studies, 397.

(3) The common law includes those principles, usages and rules of action applicable to

the government and security of person and property, which do not rest for their authority

upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature. 1 Kent, 468. The

common law of the American States consists of the common law of England as modified by

English statutes previous to the colonization of America, so far as it had boon found adapted to

our altered condition and circumstances. And those English statutes passed afterwards, at

any time prior to the revolution, which were practically accepted and adopted in America,
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time, retarded the advance of knowledge of every kind. That our a.nC".est.ors were, under t.be
first princes of the Norman line, engaged in frequent struggles t.o maintain certain institutions known by the name of the lAll!B of Edward tlw Co1ifessor, is indisputable, however
doubtful may be the origin, form and charact.er of these law~; which, in all probability were
little else than a digest by Edward of the Merrien, West Saxon and Danish laws, then e:rimng
and in force in different partR of the kin~dom. It may upon the whole be received as generally
true, that our common law tracel! it.I ongin t.o the early n11agcs and cnst.omt1 of the aboriginal
Britons, and was neceRBarily augment.ed, in different ageR, by the admixture of some of the
laws and m1ages of the Romans, the Picts, the Saxons, the Danes and the N ormanll, who spre!W\
themselves over the country: "Our law>1;" says Lord Bacon, "becoming BS mixed as our langna.ge." Warren's Law Studies, 397.
(3) The common law includes tho110 principles, m;ages and rules of action a1,1pliC'a.ble to
the government and secnritr of person a.nd propert.r,, which do not rest for thmr authority
upon a.ny express and positive declaration of the will of the legfale.ture. 1 Kent, 468. The
common law of the American Stat.es con8ists of the common law of England M modified by
English statute11 previous to the colonization of America, 110 for as it had boon fuund adapted to
our altered condition and circum:itauces. And those English statutes paHsed afterwards, at
any time prior t.o the revolution, which were pmctically l\ccepted and adopted in .Ameril'a,
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Sect. 3.] JUDICIAL DECISIONS. 6&

courts of justice. They are the depositaries of the laws; the living oracles, who

must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to decide

according to the law of the land. Their knowledge of that law is derived from

experience and study; from the " viginti annorum lucubrationes," which Fortes-

cue (») mentions; and from being long personally accustomed to the judicial

decisions of their predecessors. And indeed these judicial decisions are the

principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the exist-

ence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law. The judg-

ment itself, and all the proceedings previous thereto, are carefully registered

and preserved, under the name of records, in public repositories set apart for

that particular purpose; and to them frequent recourse is had, when any critical

question arises, in the determination of which former precedents may give light

or assistance. And therefore, even, so early as the conquest, we find the prtete-

ritorum memoria eventorum" reckoned up as one of the chief qualifications of

those who were held to be " legibus patriae optime instituti." (o) |\For it is an

established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come

again in litigation: as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not

liable to waver with every new judge's opinion; as also because the law in that

case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and

perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule which it is not in the breast

of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to his private senti-

ments ; he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment,
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but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to

pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one. \\Yet tnis rule

admits of exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary

to reason; *much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine law. But r*»Q-i

even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new L -I

law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found

that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, (4) it is declared, not

that such a sentence was bad law ; but that it was not law ; that is, that it is not the

established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined. And hence

(nj Cap. 8. (<>) Seld. Review of Titb. o. 8.

became also a part of the American common law. See Von Hess v. Packard, 2 Pet. 144;

Morgan ». King, 30 Barb. 9; May v. "Wilson, 1 ~S. H. 58; Houghton c. Page, 2 N. H. 44; State

t». Rolling, 8 N. H. 550; Commonwealth f. Kuowlton, 2 Mass. 534; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4

Met. 128; Lindsey v. Coats, 1 Ohio, 245; State «. Buchanan, 5 H. and J. 356; Pratt v. Eads, 1

Elaokf. 81; Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. and R. 330; Simpson v. State,' 5 Yerg. 356: Stout v. Keyes,

2 Dong. Mich. 184; Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18; If orris e. Harris, 15 Cal. 226; Pierson «.

State, 12 Ala. 149.

The courts of one state will presume the common law of a sister state to be the same as their

own: Abell v. Douglass, 4 Demo, 303; High's Case, 2 Dong. Mich. 515; but not its statute law.

Kermott t>. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181.

Of the United States, as a nation, there is no common law. "The federal government is com-

posed of sovereign and independent states> each of which may have its local usages, customs

and common law. There is no principle which pervades the Union, and has the authority of

law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the Union. The common law could be

made a part of our federal system only by legislative adoption." McLean, J., in Wheatpn v.

Peters, 8 Pet. 658. And see United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; United States «. Coolidge,

1 Wheat. 415; United States v. Worral, 2 Dall. 384.

(4) But it cannot be dissembled, that both in our law, and in all other laws, there are

decisions drawn from established principles and maxims, which are good law, though such

decisions may be both manifestly absurd and unjust. But notwithstanding this, they must be

religiously adhered to by the judges in all courts, who are not to assume the characters of legis-

lators. It is their province jus dicere, and not jus dare. Lord Coke, in his enthusiastic fondness

for the common law, goes farther than the learned commentator; he lays down, that argumentum

ab inconvenienti plurimum valet in legs, because nihil quod est inconveniens est liaitum. Mr.

Hargrove's note upon this is well conceived and expressed: "Arguments from inconvenience

certainly deserve tie greatest attention, and where the weight of other reasoning is nearly on an

equipoise, ought to turn the scale. But if the rule of law is clear and explicit, it is in vain to

insist upon inconveniences; nor can it be true that nothing, which is inconvenient, is lawful,

for that supposes in those who make laws a perfection, which the most exalted human wisdom

is incapable of attaining, and would be on invincible argument against ever changing the law."

jf. Co. Litt. (56. ]
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70 FORCE OF PRECEDENTS. [Intro.

it is that our lawyers are with justice so copious in their encomiums on the

reason of the common law; that they tell us, that the law is the perfection of

reason, that it always intends to conform thereto, and that what is not reason

is not law. Not that the particular reason of every rule in the law can at this

distance of time be always precisely assigned; but it is sufficient that there be

nothing in the rule flatly contradictory to reason, and then the law will presume

it to bo well founded, (p) And it hath been an ancient observation in the laws

of England, that whenever a standing rule of law, of which the reason perhaps

could not be remembered or discerned, hath been wantonly broken in upon by

statutes or new resolutions, the wisdom of the rule hath in the end appeared

from the inconveniences that have followed the innovation.

The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules must be

followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust: (5) for though their reason be not

obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former times as not to

suppose that they acted wholly without consideration. To illustrate this doc-

trine by examples. It has been determined time out of mind, that a brother

of the half blood shall never succeed as heir to the estate of his half brother,

but it shall rather escheat to the king, or other superior lord. Now this is

a positive law, fixed and established by custom, which custom is evidenced by

judicial decisions; and therefore can never be departed from by any modern judge

without a breach of his oath and *the law. For herein there is nothing

repugnant to natural justice; (6) though the artificial reason of it, drawn
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from the feudal law, may not be quite obvious to every body. And therefore,

though a modern judge, on account of a supposed hardship upon the half

brother, might wish it had been otherwise settled, yet it is not in his power to

alter it. But if any court were now to determine, that an elder brother of the

half blood might enter upon and seize any lands that were purchased by his

younger brother, no subsequent judges would scruple to declare that such prior

determination was unjust, was unreasonable, and therefore was not law. So

that the law, and the opinion of the fudge, are not always convertible terms, or

one and the same thing; since it sometimes may happen that the judge may

mistake the law. Upon the whole, however we may take it as a general rule,

" that the decisions of courts of justice are the evidence of what is common

law:" in the same manner as, in the civil law, what the emperor had once

determined was to serve as a guide for the future, (q)

(p) Herein agreeing with the civil law, Ff. 1. 3. SO. 21. " ffon omnium, qntf a majorUnu nottrii contti-

tuta f-ttni. ratio reddipotest. Kt ?'</*•" ration?* eoruro, qua constttuuntur, inquiri turn oportet • alioquin multa

ex hi*, qua. certa sunt. siittrertuntur."

(g) " Si imperialis mnjejttaf causam coffnttionaliter examinaverit, etpartibtts, cominus constitute sententiam

<li first. mnnraomninojudices, quitub nottro imperio tunt, sciant hanc etse legem. nan tolum UK causa pro qua

productn e*t, ted et in omnibus similibus.1' C. 1. 14. 12.

(5) " When a rule has once been deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be dis-

turbed unless by a court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, unless for very urgent

reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were otherwise, it would be

leaving us in a perplexing uncertainty as to the law." 1 Kent. 475. See Nelson u. Allen, 1 Yerg.

376; Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N. T. 260; Palmer v. Lawrence,

5 N. T. 389; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246. A judgment rendered by a court is authority, not-

withstanding it was one given of necessity, tinder the law, on an equal division of the court.

Kegina v. Mulls, 13 M. and W. 361; Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wai. 107.

A precedent flatly unreasonable and unjust may be followed if it has been for a long period

acquiesced in, or if it has become a rule of property, so that titles have been acquired in reliance

upon it, and vested rights will be disturbed by overruling it. In such a case it will be proper to

leave the correction of the error to the legislature, which can so shape its action as to make it

prospective only, and thus prevent the injurious consequences that must follow from judicially

declaring the previous decision unfounded. Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Pratt v. Brown, 3

"Wis. 609; Day v. Munson, 14 Ohio N. S. 488; I'aylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49; Bellows v. Parsons,

13 X. H. 256;' Hannel v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N. Y. 260; Ram on Legal

Judgment, ch. 14.

(6) [But it is certainly repugnant to natural reason, where a father leaves two sons by two

different mothers, and dies intestate, and a large estate descends to his eldest sou, who dies a

minor or intestate, that this estate should go to the lord of the manor, or to the king, rather than

to the younger son. When such a case happens in the family of a nobleman, or a man of great

property, this law will then appear so absurd and unreasonable, that it will not be suffered to

remain long afterwards to disgrace our books. See book ii. p. 231.]

It has since been repealed by Stat, 3 and 4 William IT., c. 106, § 9.
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The decisions therefore of courts are held in the highest regard, and are not

only preserved as authentic records in the treasuries of the several courts, but

are handed out to public view in the numerous volumes of reports which furnish

the lawyer's library. These reports are histories of the several cases, with a

short summary of the proceedings, which are preserved at large in the record;

the arguments on both sides and the reasons the court gave for its judgment;

taken down in short notes by persons present at the determination. And these

serve as indexes to, and also to explain, the records, which always, in matters of

consequence and nicety, the judges direct to be searched. The reports are

extant in a regular series from the reign of King Edward the Second inclusive;

and, from his time, to that of Henry the *Eighth, were taken by the r*7oi

prothonotaries, or chief scribes of the court, at the expense of the crown, *- -*

and published annually, whence they are known under the denomination of the

year books. And it is much to be wished that this beneficial custom had, under

proper regulations, been continued to this day; for, though King James the

First, at the instance of Lord Bacon, appointed two reporters (r) with a hand-

some stipend for this purpose, yet that wise institution was soon neglected, and

from the reign of Henry the Eighth to the present time this task has been

executed by many private and contemporary hands; who sometimes through

haste and inaccuracy, sometimes through mistake and want of skill, have

published very crude and imperfect (perhaps contradictory) accounts of one

and the same determination. Some of the most valuable of the ancient reports
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are those published by Lord Chief-Justice Coke ; a man of infinite learning in

his profession, though not a little infected with the pedantry and quaintness of

the times he lived in, which appear strongly in all his works. However, his

writings are so highly esteemed, that they are generally cited without the

authors name, (s)

Besides these reporters, there are also other authors, to whom great venera-

tion and respect is paid by the students of the common law. Such are Glanvil

and Bracton, Britton and Fleta, Hengham and Littleton, Statham, Brooke,

Fitzherbert, and Staundforde, (7) with some others of ancient date; whose

treatises are cited as authority, and are evidence that cases have formerly hap-

pened in which such and such points were determined, which are now become

settled and first principles. One of the last of these methodical writers in

noint of time, whose works are of any intrinsic authority in the courts of

justice, and do not entirely depend on the strength of their quotations from

older authors, is the *same learned judge we have just mentioned, Sir r*~Q-i

Edward Coke; who hath written four volumes of institutes, as he is L ' J

pleased to call them, though they have little of the institutional method to

warrant such a title. The first volume is a very extensive comment upon a

little excellent treatise of tenures, compiled by Judge Littleton in the reign of

Edward the Fourth. This comment is a rich mine of valuable common law

learning, collected and heaped together from the ancient reports and year books,

but greatly defective in method, (t) The second volume is a comment upon

many old acts of parliament, without any systematical order; the third a more

methodical treatise of the pleas of the crown; and the fourth an account of the

several species of courts, (u)

And thus much for the first ground and chief corner stone of the laws of

England, which is general immemorial custom, 'or common law, from time to

(r) Pat. IS Joe. I. p. 18. 17 Rym. 26.

(») His reports, for Instance, are styled K<zr e$<>xqv, the report*; and, in quoting them, we usually say, 1

or 2 Rep. not 1 or 2 Coke's Rep. as in citing other authors. The reports of Judge Crqke Are also cited in a

peculiar manner, by the names of those princes, in whose reigns the cases reported In his three volumes were

determined; viz.t Quepn Elizabeth, King James, and King Charles the First: as well as by the number of each

volume. For sometimes we call them 1,2, and 3 Cro. but more commonly Cro. Elix.. Cro. Jar. and Cro. Car.

(«) It is usually cited either by the name of Co. Iiltt. or as 1 Inet.

(u) These are cited as 2, 3, or 4 Inst. without any author's name. An honorary distinction, which, we

observed, is paid to the works of no other writer; the generality of reports and other tracts being quoted

in the name of the compiler, as 2 Ventrls, 4 Leonard,.! Siderfin, and the like.

(7) Crabbe's and Reeves's Histories of the English Law give some account of the works of

these several authors.
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time declared in. the decisions of the courts of justice; which decisions are

preserved among our public records, explained in our reports, and digested for

general use in the authoritative writings of the venerable sages of the Taw.

The Roman law, as practised in the times of its liberty, paid also a great

regard to custom; but not so much as our law; it only then adopting it, when

the written law was deficient Though the reasons alleged in the digest (v) will

fully justify our practice, in making it of equal authority with, when it is not

contradicted by, the written law. " For, since (says Julianus,) the written law

binds us for no other reason but because it is approved by the judgment of the

people, therefore those laws which the people have approved without writing

ought also to bind every body. For where is the difference, whether the people

F*741 ^-ec^are their *assent to a law by suffrage, or by a uniform course of

L -1 acting accordingly ?" Thus did they reason while Rome had some

remains of her freedom; but, when the imperial tyranny came to be fully estab-

lished, the civil laws speak a very different language. " Quod principi placuit

legis habet vigorem, cum populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem

comferat," says Ulpian. (w) "Imperator solus et conditor et interpres legis

existimatur," says the code, (x) And again, " sacrilegii instar est rescripto prin-

cipis obviari." (y) And indeed it is one of the characteristic marks of English

liberty, that our common law depends upon custom ; which carries this internal

evidence of freedom along with it, that it probably was introduced by the volun-

tary consent of the people. (8.)
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II. The second branch of the unwritten laws of England are particular cus-

toms, or laws, which affect only the inhabitants of particular districts.

These particular customs, or some of them, are without doubt the remains of

that multitude of local customs before mentioned, out of which the common

law, as it now stands, was collected at first by King Alfred, and afterwards by

King Edgar and Edward the Confessor: each district mutually sacrificing some

of its own special usages, in order that the whole kingdom might enjoy the

benefit of one uniform and universal system of laws. But for reasons that have

been now long forgotten, particular counties, cities, towns, manors, and lord-

ships, were very early indulged with the privilege of abiding by their own cus-

toms, in contradistinction to the rest of the nation at large : which privilege is

confirmed to them by several acts of parliament, (z.)

Such is the custom of gavelkind in Kent, and some other parts of the king-

dom (though perhaps it was also general till the Norman conquest), which

F*75l or^a'ns' among other things, *that not the eldest son only of the father

*• -I shall succeed to his inheritance, but all the sons alike : and that, though

the ancestor be attain ed and hanged, yet the heir shall succeed to his estate,

without any escheat to the lord. Such is the custom that prevails in divers

ancient boroughs, and therefore called borough-English, that the youngest son

shall inherit the estate, in preference to all nis elder brothers. Such is the

custom in other boroughs that a widow shall be entitled, for her dower, to all

(c) Ff. 1. 8. 82* (w) ff. 1. 4.1. (x) C. 1. 14.12. («rt C. 1.23. 5.

(*) Mag. Cart. 9 Hen. HI, c. 9. — 1 Edw. HI. St. 2. c. 9. —14 Edw. Ill

St. 1. c. 1. —and 2 Hen. IV. c. 1.
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time declared in the decisions of the courts of justice; which decisions are
preserved among our public records, explained in our reports, and digested for
general use in the authoritath-e writings of the venerable sages of the law.
The Homan law, as practised in the times of its liberty, pa.id also a great
regard to custom; but not so much as our law; it only then adopting it, when
the written law was deficient. Though the reasons alleged in the digest (v) will
fully justify our practice, in making it of equal authority with, when it is not
contra.dieted by, the written law. "For, since (sl\ys Julia.nus,) the written Jaw
binds us for no other reason but because it is approved by the judgment of the
people, therefore those laws which the people have approved without writing
ought also to bind every body. For where is the difference, whether the people
[*'74] declare their *assent to a law by suffrage, or by a lllliform course of
acting accordingly?" Thus did they reason while Rome had some
remains of her freedom ; but, when the imperial tyranny came to be fully est.ab·
lished, the civil laws speak a very different language. " Quod principi placuit
legia habet vigorem, cum populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem
CQfflferat," says Ulpian. (w) "lmperator solus et conditor et interpres legis
existimatur," says the code. (x) And again," sacrikgii instar est rescripto principis om:iari." (y) And indeed it is one of the characteristic marks of English
liberty, that our common law depends upon custom ; which carries this internal
evidence of freedom along with it, that it probably was introduced by the volun·
tarv consent of the people. (8.)
!I. 'l'he second branch of the unwritten laws of England are particular cue.
toms, or laws, which affect only the inhabitants of particular districts.
These particular customs, or some of them, are without doubt the remains of
that multitude of local customs before mentioned, out of which the common
law, as it now stands, was collected at first hy King Alfred, and afterwards by
King Edgar and Edward the Confessor: each district mutually sacrificin~ some
of its own special usages, in order that the whole kingdom might enJOY the
benefit of one uniform and universal svstem of laws. But for reasons that have
been now long forgotten, particular counties, cities, towns, manors, and lordships, were very early indulged with the privilege of abiding by their own customs, in contra.distinction to the rest of the nation at large : which privilege is
confirmed to them by several acts of parliament. (z.)
Such is the custom of gavelkind in Kent, and some other parts of the kingdom (though perhaps it was also general till the Norman conquest), which
[ • 75 ] ordains, among other things, *that not the eldest son only of the father
shall succeed to his inheritance, but all the sons alike : and that, though
the ancestor be attain ed and hanged, yet the heir shall succeed to his estate,
without any escheat to the lord. Such is the custom that prevails in divers
ancient boroughs, and therefore ca1led borough-English, that the youngest son
shall inherit the estate, in preference to all his elder brothers. Such is the
custom in other boroughs that a widow shall be entitled, for her dower, to all

(8) [Lord Chief-Justice Wilmot has said that " the statute law is the will of the legislature in

writing ; the common law is nothing else but statutes worn out by tisae. All our law began by

(11) Ff.

1. 8. 82.

(IO)

F.f. 1. '· 1.

(c) Yag. Cart. 9 Hen. III, c. 9. -1 Edw.

consent of the legislature, and whether it is now law by usage or writing is the same thing. 2

(Z) c.

1. 14. 12.

m. St. 2. c. 9. -1' Edw.

(y) c. 1. 23. 5.

lI1St.1. c. 1. -and 2 Ben. IV. c. 1.

T\rils. 348. And statute law, and common law, both originally flowed from the same fountain."

Ib. 350. And to the same effect Lord Hale declares, "that many of those things that we now

take for common law, were undoubtedly acts of parliament, though now not to be found of

record." Hist. Com. Law, 66. Though this is the probable origin of the greatest part of the

common law, yet much of it certainly has been introduced by usage, even of modem date, which

general convenience has adopted. O'f this nature is the law of the road, viz. : that horses and

carriages should pass each other on the whip hand. This law has not been enacted by statute,

and is so modern, that perhaps this is the first time that it has been noticed in a booK of law.

But general convenience discovered the necessity of it, and our judges have so far confirmed it,

as to declare frequently at nisi prius, that he who disregards this salutary rule is answerable in

damages for all tne consequences.]
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(o) (Lord Chief-Justice Wilmot has said that "the statute law is the will of the legislature in
vrriting; the common law is nothing else but statute;; worn out by time. All our law began by
con1<ent of the legislature, and whether it is now law b; U:!a.ge or writinir is the l!allle thing. 2
Wils. 348. .And statute law, and common Jaw, both onginally flowed from the same founU\in.''
lb. 350. And to the l!Bllle effect Lord Hale declares, "that many of those things tliat we now
take for common law, were undoubtedly acts of parliament, though now nut to be found of
record." Hist. Com. Law, 66. Though this is the probable origin of the grcatei;t part of the
common law, yet much of it. certainly ha.s been introduced by u1mge, even of modem date, which
general convenience has adopted. Of this nature is the law of the road, viz. : that hon;es and
carriages should pa811 rooh other on the whip hand. This law baa not been enacted by statute,
and is RO modem, that perhaps thiH is the first time that it has been noticed in a book of law.
But general convenience di~covered the necc8sity of it, and our judges have so far confirmed it,
as to declare frequently at nisi prius, that he who disreg&.rdl! this salutary rule is a.nswcrable in
damages for all the conilequences.]
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her husband's lands; whereas, at the common law, she shall be endowed of one

her husba.nd's lands; whereas, at the common law, she shall be endowed of one
third part only. Such aleo are the special and particular customs of manors,
of which every one has more or less, and which bind all the copyhold and
customary tenants that hold of the said manors. Such likewise is the custom
of holding divers inferior courts, with power of trying causes, in cities and
trading towns, the right of holding which, when no royal grant can be shewn,
depends entirely upon immemorial and established usage. Such, lastly, are
many particular customs within the city of London, with regard to trade,
apprentices, widows, orphans, and a variety other matters. All these ar.e
contrary to the general law of the land, and are good only by special usage~
though the ct.UJtoms of London are also confirmed by act of parliament. (a)
To this head may most properly be referred a particular system of customs
used only among one set of the king's subjects, called the custom of merchants,
or lex mercatoria: which~ however different from the ~enera.l rules of the
common law, is yet ingrafted into it, and made a part of it; (b) being allowed,
for the benefit of trade, to be of the utmost validity in all commercial
transactions: for it is a maxim of law, that "cuilibet in sua arte credendum est." (9)
The rules relating to particular customs re~ either the proof of their
existence ; their legality when proved ; or their usual method of all()'IJ)ance.
And first we will consider the rules of proof.
*As to ~q, and ~glisl!, the law takes particular [* 76]
notice of them, (c}lLnd there is no~ to prove that such customs
actually exist, but only that the lands in question are subject thereto. All
other private customs must be particularly pleaded,(d) and as well the
existence of such customs must be shewn, as that the thing in dispute is within
the custom alleged. The trial in both cases (both to shew the existence of the
custom, as, " that in the manor of Dale lands shall descend only to the heirs
male, and never to the heirs female ;" and also to shew " that the lands in
question are within that manor") is by a jury of twelve men, and not by the
Judges; except the same particular custom has been before tried, determined,
and recorded in the same court. (e)
The customs of London differ from all others in point of trial : for, if the
existence of the custom be brought in question, it shall not be tried by a jury,
but by certificate from the lord mayor and aldermen by the mouth of their
recorder; (/)unless it be such a custom as the corporation is itself interested in,
as a right of taking toll, &c., for then the law permits them not to certify on
their own behalf. ( g)
When a custom is actually proved to exist, the next inquiry is into the
legality of it; for, if it is not a good custom, it ought to be no longer used;
" .JJfalus us1ts abolendus est" is an established mo.xim of the law. (h) To make
a particular custom good, the following are necessary requisites. (10)

third part only. Such also are the special and particular customs of manors,

of which every one has more or less, and which bind all the copyhold and

customary tenants that hold of the said manors. Such likewise is the custom

of holding divers inferior courts, with power of trying causes, in cities and

trading towns, the right of holding which, when no royal grant can be shewn,

depends entirely upon immemorial and established usage. Such, lastly, are

many particular customs within the city of London, with regard to trade,

apprentices, widows, orphans, and a variety other matters. All these are

contrary to the general law of the land, and are good only by special usage;

though the customs of London are also confirmed by act of parliament, (a)

To this head may most properly be referred a particular system of customs

used only among one set of the king's subjects, called the custom of merchants,

or lex mercatoria: which, however different from the general rules of the

common law, is yet ingrafted into it, and made a part of it; (b) being allowed,

for the benefit of trade, to be of the utmost validity in all commercial

transactions: for it is a maxim of law, that" cuilibet in sua arte credendum est." (9)

The rules relating to particular customs regard either the proof of their

existence; their legality when proved; or their usual method of allowance.

And first we will consider the rules of proof.

*As to gajelkind, and borough-English. the law takes particular

notice of tnem7 (c7~Jind there is no occaSonto prove that sucn customs
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actually exist, but only that the lands in question are subject thereto. All

other private customs must be particularly pleaded,(d) and as well the

existence of such customs must be shewn, as that the thing in dispute is within

the custom alleged. The trial in both cases (both to shew the existence of the

custom, as, " that in the manor of Dale lands shall descend only to the heirs

male, and never to the heirs female;" and also to shew " that the lands in

question are within that manor") is by a jury of twelve men, and not by the

judges; except the same particular custom has been before tried, determined,

and recorded in the same court, (e)

The customs of London differ from all others in point of trial: for, if the

existence of the custom be brought in question, it shall not be tried by a jury,

but by certificate from the lord mayor and aldermen by the mouth of their

recorder; (/) unless it be such a custom as the corporation is itself interested in,

as a right of taking toll, &c., for then the law permits them not to certify on

their own behalf. (g)

When a custom is actually proved to exist, the next inquiry is into the

legality of it; for, if it is not a good custom, it ought to be no longer used;

" Mains usus abolendus est" is an established maxim of the law. (A) To make

a particular custom good, the following are necessary requisites. (10)

(a) 8 Rep. 126. Cro. Car. 347. (b) Winch. 44. (c) Co. Lltt, 175. (d) Lltt. > 265.

(e) Dr. and 8t 1.10. (/) Cro. Car. 616. (g) Hob. 85. (ft) Lltt. > 212.4 Inst. 274.

(9) The lex meroatoria, or custom of merchants, as Mr. Christian observes, is only a great

division of the law of England. The laws relating to bills of exchange, insurance, and all

(a) 8 Rep. 126. Cro. Car. 3'7.
(bl Winch. U.
(e) Dr. and St. 1. 10.
(/) Cro. Car. 1116.

mercantile contracts, are as much the general law of the land as the laws relating to

(d) Litt. f l1611.
(A) Ll&t. f 212. ' Inst. 27•.

(cl Co. Litt, 1711.

(g) Hob. Bli.

marriage or murder. Merchants do not modify them at will, but take the law from the

courts tike all other classes.

. / (10) A custom is denned as being such a usage as, by common consent and uniform

'/ I practice, has become the law of the place, or of the subject matter to which it relates : Bouv.

Law. Die. " custom;" or, as another has it, it is a law not written, established by long usage

and the consent of our ancestors. Jacob Law Die. " custom." A particular custom is

distinguished from a rule of the common law in this: that the latter is universal, while the

former is particular to this or that place: Broom's Maxims. 3 London Ed. 823-4; and it is

distinguished from usage in this, that custom is the rule of which usage is the legal

evidence. Read v. Rann, 10 B. and C. 440.

So far as particular customs only go to explain the meaning of terms of art, or words

employed in certain occupations, or to prescribe rules for the transaction of particular kinds

of business, they are generally, if well established, easily susceptible of proof, and not

45
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(9) The rez mercatoria, or custom of merchants, as Mr. Christian observes, is on}y a great
division of the law of England. The laws relating to bills of exchange, insure.nee, and all
mercantile contra.eta, are 68 much the general law of the land as the laws rufating to
marriage or murder. Merchants do not modify them at will, but take the law from tho
oourtil like all other cla.~ses.
(10) A cut1tom is defined &ll being such a usage as, by common con"6nt and nnifonn
practice, has become the law of the place1 or of the subject matter to which it relates: Bouv.
Law. Die. "custom;" or, 811 another has it, it is a law not written, established by long US&lljO
and the consent of our ancestors. Jacob Law Die. "custom." A po.rticular custom is
distinguished from a role of the common law in this: that the latter is universal. while the
former is particular to this or that place : Broom's Maxims 3 London Ed. 823-4 ; and it is
distinguished from usage in thi1:1, that custom is the ruie of which usage is the legal
evidence. Read v. Rann, 10 B. and C. 440.
So far as particular customs only go to explain the meaning of tenmi of art, or worut1
employed in certain occupations, o_r to prescribe .rules for !he transac.tion of particnlar kinds
of bwrlness, they are generally, if well established, eo.aily susceptible of pro4~ and not
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1. That it have been used so long, that the memory of man runneth not to

the contrary. So that, if any one can shew the beginning of it, is no good

custom. For which reason no custom can prevail against an express act of

*parliament, since the statute itself is a proof of a time when such a

custom did not exist, (i)

It) Co. LitL 111.

opposed to sound policy. Every trade, profession and occupation has rules of its own which,

those who follow it expect to comply with, and in reference to which they make their

contracts; and it is not uncommon that words used by them in reference to their employment

are employed by them in a SCURB quite distinct from that which they bear generally. See

Spartoh v. Benecke, 10 C. B. 212; Lucas v. Briatow, E., B. and E. 907; Brown v. Byrne, 3 E.

and B. 703; Robertson v. Money, Ry. and M. 75. The usages of a particular occupation, if thev

become general, will be taken notice of as a part of the common law, and require no proof;

like the usage in banking that depositors, instead of being compellable to receive all tU.-it is

owing them at once, like creditors generally, may withdraw their funds in such sums as thcy

may choose. Munn v. Burch, 25 111. 35. In such a case the parties whose dealings may be

affected by the custom, are not at liberty to relieve themselves from its operation by showing

1 lii'ir ignorance of it But particular usages must be collected from evidence in pats, and the

existence of the custom provable by them is to be found as a fact by the jury. If for a

considerable period a certain business has been conducted in a particular way, or if all the

persons engaged in a certain occupation in one place have, for a considerable time, used par-

ticular words in their contracts m a certain sense only, a jury may fairly infer that any
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contract made in that business, or at that place, has been made in reference to this usage,

and in the expectation that its terms would be controlled by it, and therefore may interpret

the contract in the light of the usage. Coit v. Commercial Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 385; Astor v.

Union Insurance Co., 7 Cow. 202; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. t>. De Graff, 12 Mich. 125; Avory t>.

Stewart, 2 Conn. fi9; Gordon v. Little, 8 S. and R. 533; Syers v. Jonas, 2 Exch. Ill; Cuthbert

v. Gumming. 10 Exch. 809, and 11 Exch. 405; Ford v. Tyrrell, 9 Gray, 401; Taylor v. Sonora,

&c., Co. 17 Cal. 594; Parker v. Ibbotson, 4 C. B., N. S. 346; Field ». Lelean, 6 H. and N. 617;

Gpodenow v. Tyler, 7 Mass. 37 ; Dwight v. Whitney, 15 Pick. 179 ; City Bank v. Cutler, 3

Pick. 414. The custom in such a case becomes the law of the contract, because it ia to be

presumed that such was the intention of the parties. See further Humfrey v. Dale, 7 E. and

B. 266; Williams ». Oilman, 3 Greenl. 276 ; Gunther «. Atwell, 19 Md. 157 ; Kilgore ».

Buckley, 14 Conn. 363; Miller v. Tetherington, 7 H. and N. 954; Smith f. Wilson, B. and Ad.

728; Garrison v. Pcrrin, 2 C. B., N. S. 681; Robertson v. Clark. 1 Bing. 445; Jones v. Fales, 4

Mass. 245; Thompson ». Hamilton, 12 Pick. 425; Macy v. Whaling Ins. Co., 9 Mete. 354; Put-

nam v. Tillotson, 13 Mete. 517 ; Uhdc v. Waters, 3 Camp. 16; Grinman v. Walker, 9 Iowa,

426; Bank of Washington ». Triplet!, 1 Pet. 25 ; Mills t>. Bank of TJ. S., 11 Wheat. 431.

These particular usages, however, cannot generally be enforced against a party who was

ignorant of them, and whose assent to them, consequently, cannot fairly be implied. A

merchant, for instance, cannot charge his customer interest on a running account on the

ground of a usage at his store to do so, unless he can bring home to such customer a knowl-

edge of such usage ; and even if it were customary for all the merchants of the place to

charge interest on such accounts this custom could not bind in the absence of direct proof of

knowledge by such customer, unless it was " so well settled, so uniformly acted upon, and

of so long a continuance as to raise a fair presumption that it was known to both contracting

parties, and that they contracted in reference to conformity with it." Foye v. Leighton, 22

N. H. 76. See also Clayton v. Grigson, 5 A. and E. 302; Stevens v. Reeves, 9 Pick. 108 ;

Martin v. Maynard, 16 N. H. 167; Smith «. Gibbs, 44 N. H. 348; Coxe r. Heisley, 19 Penn.

St. 245; Caldwell ». Dawson, 4 Met. Ky. 121; Walker v. Barren, 6 Minn. 508; Warnersley

». Dally, 26 L. J. Exch. 219; Humphreysville Copper Co. v. Vermont Copper Mining Co., 33

Tt. 92; Bissell t>. Ryan, 23 111. 570; Register v. Spencer, 24 Md. 520; Sipperly «. Stewart,

60 Barb. 62.

One well understood and very definite limitation upon such customs is this: that they will

not be allowed to control a written instrument in opposition to its express terms. They ore

allowed to be proved, not to contradict the contract, but to interpret the meaning of its" lan-

guage, or to ascertain the nature and extent of the contract, in the absence of express stipulations,

and where the meaning is equivocal or obscure. Schooner Reeside, 2 Sumn. 569; Cutler ».

Powell, 6 T. R. 320; Notes to Wigglesworth v. Dallison, 1 Smith Lead. Cases, 821; Vallonce

v. Dewar, 1 Camp. 503 ; Beala «•. Terry, 2 Sandf. 130 ; Taylor v. Ketcham, 5 Rob. 507 ;

Boardnian r. Spooner, 13 Allen, 359. As they are only enforced upon a presumption that

the parties adopted them in their contracts, it is very plain that they are not admissible

in any case where the contract by its terms excludes the presumption. Roberts v. Walker,

1 C. and M. 808; Dickinson r. Gray, 7 Allen, 29; Martin v. Maynard, 16 N. H 165; Wheeler

c. Newbould, 16 N. Y. 392 ; Lewis ?. Thatcher, 15 Mass. 431 ; Hooper v. Pound, 10 Ind.

32 ; Macomber r. Parker, 13 Pick. 175 ; Carkhi ». Savory, 14 Gray, 528 ; Insurance Cos.

r. Wright, 1 Wai. 470. Decisions on this subject are far too numerous to be all cited ;

nor is it important, since they only apply to the varying circumstances of particular cases

the same general rule.
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2. It must have been continued. Any interruption would cause a temporary

ceasing: the revival gives it a new beginning, which will be within time of

memory, and thereupon the custom will be void. But this must be understood

with regard to an interruption of the right; for an interruption of the posses-

sion only, for ten or twenty years, will not destroy the custom. (/) As if the

inhabitants of a parish have a customary right of watering their cattle at a

certain pool, the custom is not destroyed, though they do not use it for ten

years; it only becomes more difficult to prove: but if the right be any how dis-

continued for a day, the custom is quite at an end.

fjj Co. Lltt. 114.

2. It must have been continued. Any interruption would cause a temporary
ceasing: the revival gives it a new beginning, which will be within time of
memory, and thereupon the custom will be void. But this must be understood
with regard to an interruption of the right; for an interruption of the possession only, for ten or twenty years, will not destroy the custom. ( f) As if the
inhabitants of a parish have a customary right of watering their cattle at a
cert..un pool, the custom is not destroyed, though they do not use it for ten
years; it only becomes more difficult to prove: but if the right be any how discontinued for a day, the custom is quite at an end.

Nothing relating to these particular customs is more noticeable in the judicial decisions than

(j)

the strong repugnance of the courts to sustaining them, when they go to vary the common law

Co. IJtt. U4.

obligations of parties, or to subject them to liabilities which depend on the customs alone. This

is not to be wondered at when we reflect how often the very existence of the usage depends

upon conflicting testimony, so that the court, when a verdict is found sustaining it, cannot feel

entire confidence that the parties contracted in reference to the usage, nor that the court is not

enforcing as the law of the contract some practice supposed to have been assented to, but of

which one of the parties may never have heard. The following cases will illustrate the truth of

our statement: Rogers v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 1 Story, 608; Schooner Reeside, 3 Sumn. 569;

Dickinson v. Gay, 7 Allen, 37; Stoever v. Whitman's Lessee, 6 Biun. 416; Caldwell «. Dawson,

4 Met. Ky. 121; Howe v. Mutual Safety Ins. Co., 2 Sandf. 130. Coxe v. Heisley, 19 Penn. St. 245;

Bissell v. Ryan, 23 111. 566.
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Mr. Broome says, following Blackstone and the earlier writers, that if one can show its

commencement it is no good custom. However true this may be as regards the local customs

which establish rights in favor of parties irrespective of contracts, it is clear that it can have no

application to the usages which go to interpret the contracts the parties have made. In respect

to these it is only necessary that they shall nave existed a sufficient length of time without inter-

ruption, contention "or dispute, to raise a presumption that contracts must have been made hi

reference to them. Smith v. "Wright, 1 Caines, 43; Bartow v. McKelway, 2 If. J. 165. The

usages of a new business may soon become fixed and understood, if but few persons are engaged

in it who uniformly transact it in a particular way. See Nobell v. Kennaway, Doug. 510; Dor-

chester and Milton Bank v. New England Bank, 1 Gush. 188.

That the usage must be certain, see Blewett v. Tregoning, 3 A. and E. 555; Padwick v.

Knight, 7 Bxch. 854; Strong ». Grand Trunk Railway Co., 15 Mich. 221; Wallace v. Morgan, 23

Ind/408; Wilson «. Willes, 6 East, 121.

The question of the reasonableness of a usage is a question of law for the court: Bowen v.

Stoddard, 10 Met. 381; Bourke v. James, 4 Mich. 338; and "the court will not enforce it, or

give it the sanction of law, unless it be reasonable and convenient, and adapted not only to

increase facilities in trade, but to the promoting of just dealing in the intercourse between

parties." Per Hubbard, J., in Macy v. Whaling Ins. Co., 9 Met. 363. A custom that the

master of a stranded vessel may soil without necessity is unreasonable and void. Bryant v.

Commercial Ins. Co., 6 Pick. 131. So is one that makes the owners of vessels responsible as

acceptors on bills drawn by the master, and which have been negotiated on the assumption

that the funds were needed for supplies aud repairs. Bowen v. Stoddard, 10 Met. 381. So is

one that seamen's advance wages due under shipping articles, shall be paid to the shipping

agent, to be paid by him to the boarding house keeper bringing the seamen. Motcalf v. Weld,

14 Gray, 210. And see Sweeting v. Pearce, 7 C. B., N. S., 449; Miller v. Pendleton, 8 Gray,

547; Holmes v. Johnson, 42 Perm. St. 159, So is a custom for the inhabitants of a town to take

a profit in alieno solo. Grimstoad v. Marlowe, 4 T. R. 717; Perley v. Langley, 7 N. H. 233;

Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N. H. 527. So is any usage that is opposed to the general law of the state

on the subject to which it refers; as, for instance, if it give usurious interest on contracts: Green

0. Tyler, 39 Penn. St. 361; Dunham v. Dey, 13 Johns. 40; Dunham i>. Gould, 16 Johns. 377;

Bank of Utica v. Wager, 2 Cow. 712; Pratt v. Adams, 7 Paige, 615; Delaplaine ». Crenshaw, 15

Gratt. 457; or would defeat the purpose of the state inspection laws. Tremble v. Crowoll, 17

Mich. 493. And in any case where the statute has defined a word in reference to its use in

contracts, usage cannot be allowed to give it a diiferent moaning. Many v. Beektnan Iron

Co., 9 Paige, 188.

The most serious question pertaining to usages is, whether they arc admissible in any ease

when they oppose or alter a general principle or rule of law, and upon a fixed state of facts

would make the legal rights or liabilities of the parties other than they are by the common

law. We think we are justified by the authorities in answering this question in the negative.

"Nothing," says Ch. J. Gibson, "should be more pertinaciously resisted than those attempts

Nothing relating to these particular cnstoms is more noticeable in the judicial decisions than
the strong repugnance of the courts to sustaining them, when they go to vary the common law
obligations of parties, or to subject them to liahilities which depend on the customs a.lone. Thie
is not to be wondered at when we reflect how often the Yery existence of the usage depends
upon conflicting testimony, so that tho court, when a verdict is found sustaining it, cannot feel
entire confidence that the parties contracted in reference to the usage, nor that the court is not
enforcing as th" law of the contract eome practice suppo<1ed t-0 have been assented to, but of
which one of the parties may never have heard. The following cases will illustrate the truth of
our i;tatement: Rogers ti. Mechanics Ins. Co., 1 Story, 608; Schooner Reeaide, :.l Sumn. 569;
DickillS-On t'. Gay, 7 Allen, 37; Stoever ti. Whitman's Lessee, 6 Binn. 416 i Caldwell ti. DawS-On,
4 Met. Ky. 121; Howe ti. Mutual Safety Ins. Co., 2 Sandf. 130. Coxe ti. He1sley, 19 Penn. St. 245;
Bisl'ell v. Ryo.n, 23 Ill. 566.
Yr. Broome 116ys, following Blackstone and the earlier writers, that if one can show its
commencement it is no good custom. However true this may be as regards the local customs
which establish rights in favor of parties irrespective of contracts, it is clear that it can have no
application to the usages which go to interpret the contracts the parties have made. In respect
to these it is only n~cessary that they sho.11 have existed a sufficient length of time without interruption, contention or dispute, to raise s presumption that contracts must have been made in
reference to them. Smith t1. Wright, 1 Caines, 43; Bart-Ow ti. McKelway, 2 N. J. 165. The
usages of a new bu<liness may soon become fixed and understood, if but few persons are engaged
in it who uniformly trani<act it in a particular way. See N obell ti. Kennaway, Doug. 510; Dorcher1ter and Miltlon Bank v. New England Bank, 1 Cush. 188.
That the usage must be certain, see Blewett ti. Tregoning, . 3 A. and E. 555; Padwick v.
Knight, 7 Exch. 854; Strong v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 15 Mich. 221; Wallace ti. Morgan, 23
Ind. 408; Wilson v. Willes, 6 Eo.st, 121.
The question of the reasonableness of o. usage is a question of law for the oourt: Bowen v.
Stoddard, 10 Met. 381 ; Bourke t1. James, 4 Mich. 338; and "the court will not enforce it, or
~ve it the sanction of law, unle~:i it be reasonable and convenient, and adapted not only to
mcrease facilities in trade, but to the promoting of just dealing in the intercourse between
parties." Per Ilubbo.rd, J., in Macy v. Whaling Ins. Co., 9 Met. 363. A. custom that the
master of a stranded vessel mo.y sell without necessity is unreasonable and void. Brr.ant "·
Commercial Ins. Co., 6 Pick. 131. So is one that makes the owners of vessels resp-0ns1ble aa
acceptors on bills drown by the master, and which have been negotiated on the assumption
that the funds were needed for supplies and repain!. Bowen ti. Stoddard, 10 Met. 381. So is
one that seamen's advance wages due under shipping articles, shall be paid to the shipping
agent, to be paiid by him to the boarding house keeper bringing the seamen. Moten.If v. Weld,
14 Gray, 210. .And see Sweeting v. Pearce, 7 C. B., N. S., 449; Miller v. Pendleton, 8 Gray,
547; Holmes ti. Johnson, 42 Pem1. St. 159, So is a custom for the inhabitants of a town to take
a profit in alien<> Bolo. Grimstead ti. Marlowe, 4 T. U. 717; Perley ti. Langley, 7 N. H. 233;
Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N. H. 527. So is any usage tho.tis opposed to the general. law of the state
-0n the subject to which it refers; as, for instance, if it give usurious interest on contracts: Grecu
<t. Tyler, 39 Penn. St. 361; Dunham v. Dey, 13 Johns. 40; Dunham t•. Gonld, 16 Johns. 377;
Bank of Utica ti. Wager, 2 Cow. 712; Pratt v . .A.dams, 7 Paige, 615; Delaplaine v. CrenRhe.w, 15
Gratt. 457; or w-0uld defeat the purpose of the state inspection lawt1. Tremble v. Crowell, 17
Mieh. 493. .And in any case where tho statute he.s defined a word in referenco to its use in
contracts, usage cannot be o.llowed to give it a different meaning. Many ti. Beekman Iron
Co., 9 Paige, 188.
The most serioUB question pertaining to usages is, whether they arc admissible in any case
when they oppose or alter a general .Principle or rule of law, and upon a fixed state of facts
wonld make tho legal rights or liabilities of the parties other than they are by the common
le.w. We think we are justified by the authorities in answering thii; question in the negative.
"Nothing," says Ch. J. Gibson, "shonld be more pertinaciously resisted than those attompts
to transfer the function~ of the judge t-0 the witnesse11' stand, by ovidence of customs in derogation of the general lo.w, that wonld involve the responsibilitief! of the parties in rules whose
existence, perhaps, they had no reason to suspect before thei came to be applied to their
rights." Bolton v. Coulter, 1 Watts. 360: and see Coxe v. Heutley, 19 Penn. St. 247; Weth-
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3. It must have been peaceable, and acquiesced in; not subject to contention

and dispute, (k)^ For as customs owe their original to common consent, their

being immemorially disputed, either at law or otherwise, is a proof that such

consent was wanting.

4. Customs must be reasonable ; (I) or rather, taken negatively, they must not

be unreasonable. Which is not always, as Sir Edward Coke says, (m) to be

understood of every unlearned man's reason, but of artificial and legal reason,

warranted by authority of law. Upon which account custom may be good,

though the particular reason of it cannot be assigned; for it sufficeth, if no

good legal reason can be assigned against it. Thus a custom in a parish, that no

man shall put his beasts into the common till the third of October, would be

good; and yet it would be hard to shew the reason why that day in particular

is fixed upon, rather than the day before or after. But a custom, that no cattle

shall be put In till the lord of the manor has first put in his, is unreasonable,

and therefore bad: for peradventure the lord will never put in his, and then the

tenants will lose all their profits, (n)

F*781 *^' ^'TIS*oms ought to be certain. A custom, that lands shall descend

•- -"to the must worthy of the owner's blood, is void; for how shall this worth

be determined ? but a custom to descend to the next male of the blood, exclu-

sive of females, is certain, and therefore good, (o) A custom to pay two-pence

an acre in lieu of tithes, is good; but to pay sometimes two-pence, and some-

times three-pence, as the occupier of the land pleases, is bad for its uncertainty.
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Yet a custom, to pay a year's improved value for a fine on a copyhold estate, is

good; though the value is a thing uncertain: for the value may at any time be

ascertained; and the maxim of law is, id cerium est, quod cerium reddi potest.

6. Customs, though established by consent, must be (when established)

compulsory ; and not left to the option of every man, whether he will use them

or no. Therefore a custom, that all the inhabitants shall be rated towards the

maintenance of a bridge, will be good; but a custom that every man is to

contribute thereto at his own pleasure, is idle and absurd, and indeed no custom

at all.

ftj Ibid. (1) Litt. j 212. (m) 1 Inst. 82. (n) Co. Copyh. t 33. fa} 1 Roll. Abr. 866.

erill v. Neilson, 20 Penn. St. 453. "Though usage," said Ch. J. Kent, "is often resorted to for

explanation of commercial instruments, it never is, nor ought to be, received to contradict a

settled rule of commercial law." Frith v. Baker, 2 Johns. 335. See further, Thompson «.

Ashton, 14 Johns. 317; Woodruff v. Merchants' Bank, 25 "Wend. 673; Otsego County Bank v.

Warren, 18 Barb. 290; Hunton v. Locke. 5 Hill, 437; Bowen ». Newell, 8 N. T. 190; Freeman

c. Loder, 11 A. and E. 589; Homer v. Dorr, 10 Mass. 29; Eager v. Atlas Ins. Co. 14 Pick. 141;

Perkins v. Franklin Bank, 21 Pick. 483; Strong v. Bliss, 6 Met. 393; Richardson v. Copeland,

6 Gray, 536; Brown v. Jackson, 2 Wash. C. C. 24; Steward v. Scudder, 4 Zab. 96; West v. Ball,

12 Ala. 347; Beokwith v. Farnum, 5 R. I. 221; Ripley v. Cooper, 47 Me. 370; Harper c. Pound,

10 Ind. 32; Barlow v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 710. Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen, 360. " The proper

office of a custom or usage in business is to ascertain and explain the intent of the parties; and

it cannot be in opposition to any principle of general policy, nor inconsistent with the terms of

the agreement between the parties, nor against the established principles of law." Per Breese,

J.,in Bissell v. Ryan, 23 111. 570. A commercial usage is a long and uniform practice, applied to

habits, modes, and courses of dealing. It relates to modes of action, and does not comprehend

the mere adoption of certain peculiar doctrines or rules of law. It may operate to give

effect to contracts different from that which the common law would have done, but the con-

sequent variation of the legal rights of the parties is only the result of the mode of dealing.

The adoption, however, of a mere doctrine as to the rights and obligations of the parties under

a contract, which doctrine is contrary to the rule of the common law on the subject, as, for

instance, that a warranty should be implied in a sale of chattels where the common law-

implied none: Coxe v. Heisley, 19 Penn. St. 243; Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Penn. St. 448;

Dickinson v. Gay, 7 Allen, 29; Tremble v. Crowell, 17 Mich. 493; or that a warranty should

not exist where the common law implies one: Whitmore c. Sonth Boston Iron Co., 2 Allen,

52; is beyond the province of a commercial usage. The distinction has been well said to be

somewhat nice: per Chapman, J., in Dickinson v. Gay, 7 Allen, 37; and it certainly has not

always been kept in view; but it is believed to be sound, and, if adhered to, will tend to

uniformity in the law, and to protect parties against usages of uncertain character and doubtful

propriety.
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7. Lastly, customs must be consistent with each other: one custom cannot be

set up in opposition to another. For if both are really customs, then both are

of equal antiquity, and both established by mutual consent: which to say of

contradictory customs is absurd. Therefore, if one man prescribes that by

custom he has a right to have windows looking into another's garden ; the other

cannot claim a right by custom to stop up or obstruct those windows: for these

two contradictory customs cannot both be good, nor both stand together. He

ought rather to deny the existence of the former custom, (p)

Next, as to the allowance of special customs. Customs, in derogation of the

common law, must be construed strictly. Thus, by the custom of gavelkind, an

infant of fifteen years *may, by one species of conveyance, called a deed of r+^qi

feoffment,) convey away his lands in fee simple, or forever. Yet this custom L J

does not impower him to use any other conveyance, or even to lease them for

seven years: for the custom must be strictly pursued, (a) And, moreover, all

special customs must submit to the king's prerogative. Therefore, if the king

purchases lands of the nature of gavelkind, where all the sons inherit equally;

yet, upon the king's demise, his eldest son shall succeed to those lands alone, (r)

And thus much for the second part of the leges non scripts, or those particular

customs which affect particular persons or districts only.

III. The third branch of them are those peculiar laws, which by custom are

adopted and used only in certain peculiar courts and jurisdictions. And by

these I understand the civil and canon laws, (s)

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

It may seem a little improper at first view to rank these laws under the head

of leges non scripts, or unwritten laws, seeing they are set forth by authority in

their pandects, their codes, and their institutions; their councils, decrees, and

decretals; and enforced by an immense number of expositions, decisions, and

treatises of the learned in both branches of the law. But I do this, after the

example of Sir Matthew Hale, (t) because it is most plain, that it is not on

account of their being written laws that either the canon law, or the civil law,

have any obligation within this kingdom: neither do their force and efiicacy

depend upon their own intrinsic authority, which is the case of our written

laws, or acts of parliament. They bind not the subjects of England, because

their materials were 'collected from popes or emperors; were digested by

Justinian, or declared to be authentic by Gregory. These considerations give

them no authority here; for the legislature of England doth not, nor ever did,

recognize any foreign power as superior or equal to it in this kingdom, or as

having the right to give law to any, the meanest, of its subjects. But all the

*strength that either the papal or imperial laws have obtained in this r#oQ-i

realm, or indeed in any other kingdom in Europe, is only because they >• •"

have been admitted and received by immemorial usage and custom in some

particular cases, and some particular courts; and then they form a branch of

the leges non scripts, or customary laws; or else because they are in some

other cases introduced by consent of parliament, and they owe their validity to

the leges scriptce, or statute law. This is expressly declared in those remark-

able words of the statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 21, addressed to the king's royal

majesty: "This your grace's realm, recognizing no superior under God out only

your grace, hath been and is free from subjection to any man's laws,

but only to such as have been devised, made, and ordained within this realm,

for the wealth of the same ; or to such other as, by sufferance of your grace and

your progenitors, the people of this your realm have taken at their free liberty,

by their own consent, to be used among them; and have bound themselves by

long use and custom to the observance of the same; not as to the observance of

the laws of any foreign prince, potentate, or prelate; but as to the customed and

ancient laws of this realm, originally established as laws of the same, by the

said snfferance, consents, and custom ; and none otherwise."

By the civil law, absolutely taken, is generally understood the civil or munici-

pal law of the Roman empire, as comprised in the institutes, the code, and the

(t) 9 Sep. 88. fqjCo. Cop. {33. (r} Co. Litt. 15. (t) Hirt. C.L. 0. 8. rtjHUt.C.L. p. 2.
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digest of the emperor Justinian, and the novel constitutions of himself and

some of his successors. Of which, as there will frequently be occasion to cite

them, by way of illustrating our own laws, it may not be amiss to give a short

and general account

The Human law (founded first upon the regal constitutions of their ancient

kings, next upon the twelve tables of the decemviri, then upon the laws or

statutes enacted by the senate or people, the edicts of the praetor, and the

r*811 resP°'nsa prudentum, or opinions of learned lawyers, *and lastly upon the

L J imperial decrees,or constitutions of successive emperors,) had grown to

so great a bulk, or, as Livy expresses it, (u) " tarn immensus aliarmn super alias

ascervatarum legum cumulus, that they were computed to be many camels' load

by an author who preceded Justinian, (v) This was in part remedied by the

collections of three private lawyers, Gregorius, Hermogenes, and Papirius; and

then by the emperor Theodosins the younger, by whose orders a code was com-

piled A. D. 438, being a methodical collection of all the imperial constitutions

then in force: which Theodosian code was the only book of civil law received

as authentic in the western part of Europe till many centuries after; and to

this it is probable that the Franks and Goths might frequently pay some regard,

in framing legal constitutions for their newly erected kingdoms: for Justinian

commanded only in the eastern remains of the empire; and it was under his

auspices that the present body of civil law was compiled and finished by

Tribonian and other lawyers, about the year 533.
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This consists of, 1. The institutes, which contain the elements or first prin-

ciples of the Roman law in four books. 2. The digests, or pandects, in fifty

books; containing the opinions and writings of eminent lawyers, digested in a

systematical method. 3. A new code, or collection of imperial constitutions, in

twelve books; the lapse of a whole century having rendered the former code of

Theodosiub imperfect. 4. The novels, or new constitutions, posterior in time to

the other books, and amounting to a supplement to the code; containing new

decrees of successive emperors, as new questions happened to arise. These

form the body of Roman law, or corpus juris civilis, as published about the

time of Justinian; which, however, fell soon into neglect and oblivion, till

about the year 1130, when a copy of the digests was found at Amalfi, in Italy ;

which accident, concurring with the policy of the Roman ecclesiastics, (w) sud-

denly gave new vogue and authority to the civil law, introduced it into several

F*821 na^ons> an(i Occasioned that mighty inundation of voluminous com-

L -1 ments, with which this system of law, more than any other, is now

loaded.

The canon law is a body of Roman ecclesiastical law, relative to such matters

as that church either has, or pretends to have, the proper jurisdiction over.

This is compiled from the opinions of the ancient Latin fathers, the decrees of

general councils, and the decretal epistles and bulls of the holy see; all

which lay in the same disorder and confusion as the Roman civil law, till, about

the year 1151, one Gratian, an Italian monk, animated by the discovery of

Justinian's pandects, reduced the ecclesiastical constitutions also into some

method, in three books, which he entitled Concordia Discordantium Canonum,

but which are generally known by the name of Decretum Gratiani, These

reached as low as the time of Pope Alexander III. The subsequent papal

decrees, to the pontificate of Gregory IX, were published in much the same

method, under the auspices of that pope, about the year 1230, in five books,

entitled Decretalia Gregorii Noni. A sixth book was added by Boniface VIII,

about the year 1298, which is called Sextus Decretalium. The "Clementine con-

stitutions, or decrees of Clement V. were in like manner authenticated in 1317,

by his successor John XXII, who also published twenty constitutions of his

own, called the Extravagantes Joannis, all which in some measure answer to

the novels of the civil law. To these have been since added some decrees of

later popes, in five books, called Evtravagantes Communes: and all these

(«) t. S. c. 34. (v) Taylor's Elements of Civil Law, 17. (V) See J 1. page 16.
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together, Gratian's decree, Gregory's decretals, the sixth decretal, the Clementine

constitutions, and the extravagants of John and his successors, form the corpus

juris canoniei, or body of the Boman canon law.

Besides these pontificial collections, which, during the times of popery, were

received as authentic in this island, as well as in other parts of Christendom,

there is also a kind of national canon law, composed of legatine and provincial

constitutions, and adapted only to the exigencies of this church *and r*gq-|

kingdom. The legatine constitutions were ecclesiastical laws, enacted in •- -"

national synods, held under the cardinals Otho and Othobon, legates from Pope

Gregory lA and Pope Clement IV, in the reign of King Henry III, about the

years 1220 and 1268. The provincial constitutions are principally the decrees

of provincial synods, held under divers archbishops of Canterbury, from Stephen

Langton, in the reign of Henry III, to Henry Chichele, in the reign of Henry

V; and adopted also by the province of York (x) in the reign of Henry VI.

At the dawn of the reformation, in the reign of King Henry VIII, it was enacted

in parliament (y) that a review should be had of the canon law ; and, till such

review should be made, all canons, constitutions, ordinances, and synodals pro-

vincial, being then already made, and not repugnant to the law of the land or

the king's prerogative, should still be used and executed. And, as no such

review has yet been perfected, upon this statute now depends the authority of the

canon law m England.

As for the canons enacted by the clergy under James I in the year 1603, and
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never confirmed in parliament, it has been solemnly adjudged upon the princi-

ples of law and the constitution, that where they are not merely declaratory of

the ancient canon law, but are introductory of new regulations, they do not bind

the laity, (z) whatever regard the clergy may think proper to pav them. (11)

There are four species of courts in which the civil and canon laws are permit-

ted, under different restrictions, to be used: 1. The courts of the archbishops

and bishops, and their derivative officers, usually called in our law courts

Christian, curia Cliristianitatis, or the ecclesiastical courts. 2. The military

courts. 3. The courts of admiralty. 4. The courts of the two universities. In

all, their reception in general, and the different degrees of that reception, are

grounded entirely upon custom, corroborated in the latter instance by act of

'parliament, ratifying those charters which confirm the customary law

of the universities. The more minute consideration of these will fall

properly under that part of these commentaries which treats of the jurisdiction

of courts. It will suffice at present to remark- a few particulars relative to them

all, which may serve to inculcate more strongly the doctrine laid down concern-

ing them, (a)

I. And, first, the courts of common law have the superintendency over these

courts; to keep them within their jurisdictions, to determine wherein they

exceed them, to restrain and prohibit such excess, and, in case of contumacy, to

punish the officer who executes, and in some cases the judge who enforces, the

sentence so declared to be illegal. (12)

(*) Burn's Eccl. Law, pref. -rill. (y) Statute 25 Hon. vm. c. 19, revived and confirmed by 1 Eli*.

e. 1. (t) Stra. 1067. (a) Hale, Hist. c. 2.

(11) [Lord Hardwicke cites the opinion of Lord Holt, and declares it is not denied by any

one, that it is very plain all the clergy are bound by the canons confirmed by the king only, but

they must be conJSrmed by the parliament to bind the laity. 2 Atk. G05. Hence, if the arch-

bisfiop of Canterbury grants a dispensation to hold two livings distant from each other more than

thirty miles, no advantage can be taken of it by lapse or otherwise in the temporal courts, for

the restriction to thirty miles was introduced by a canon made since the 25 Hen. Till. 2 Bl.

Rep. 968.]

(12) The ecclesiastical courts cannot be allowed conclusively to determine for themselves

•what matters fall within their jurisdiction. Rex ». Eyre, Stra. 1067. Parties in custody

under their orders made without authority will be set at liberty by the common law courts:

Jenkins ex parte, 1 B. and C. 655; Boraine's Case, 16 Yes. 346; and a prohibition will issue to

the ecclesiastical courts when a want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings, or
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2. The common law has reserved to itself the exposition of all snch acts of

parliament as concern either the extent of these courts, or the matters depend-

ing before them. And therefore, if these courts either refuse to allow these acts

of parliament, or will expound them in any other sense than what the common

law puts upon them, the king's courts at Westminster will grant prohibitions to

restrain and control them.

3. An appeal lies from all these courts to the king, in the last resort; which

proves that the jurisdiction exercised in them is derived from the crown of

England, and not from any foreign potentate, or intrinsic authority of their

own. And, from these three strong marks and ensigns of superiority, it appears

beyond a doubt that the civil and canon laws, though admitted in some cases by

custom in some courts, are only subordinate, and leges nub graviori lege ; and

that, thus admitted, restrained, altered, new-modeled, and amended, they are by

no means with us a distinct independent species of laws, but are inferior

branches of the customary or unwritten laws of England, properly called the

king's ecclesiastical, the king's military, the king's maritime, or the king's

emical laws.

F*8f)l *Let U8 next proceed to the leges scripts, the written laws of the king-

"- -I dom, which are statutes, acts or edicts, made by the king's majesty, by and

with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons

in parliament assembled, (b) The oldest of these now extant, and printed in our

statute books, is the famous magna charta, as confirmed in parliament 9 Hen.
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Ill, though doubtless there were many acts before that time, the records of which

are now lost, and the determinations of them perhaps at present currently received

for the maxims of the old common law.

The manner of making these statutes will be better considered hereafter, when

we examine the constitution of parliaments. At present we will only take notice

of the different kinds of statutes, and of some general rules with regard to their

construction, (c)

First, as to their several kinds. Statutes are either general or special, public

r*8Pl or Pr^va^e- A general or public act is an *universal rule, that regards

L -1 the whole community; and of this the courts of law are bound to take

notice judicially and ex officio ; without the statute being particularly pleaded,

or formally set forth by the party who claims an advantage under it. Special

or private acts are rather exceptions than rules, being those which only operate

upon particular persons, and private concerns; such as the Romans entitled

senatus-decreta, in contradistinction to the senatus consulta, which regarded

the whole community ; (d) and of these (which are not promulgated with the

same notoriety as the former,) the judges are not bound to take notice, unless

they be formally shewn and pleaded. Thus, to show the distinction, the statute

13 Eliz. c. 10, to prevent spiritual persons from making leases for longer terms

than twenty-one years, or three lives, is a public act; it being a rule prescribed

to the whole body of spiritual persons in the nation ; but an act to enable the

bishop of Chester to make a lease to A. B. for sixty years is an exception to

il>) 8 Rep. 20.

(c) The method of citing these act* of parliament Is various Mum- of onr ancient statutes are called after

the name of the place where the parliament was held that made them ; aa the statutes of Merton and Marle-

berge, of Westminster. Gloucester, and Winchester. Others are denominated entirely from their subject, as

2. The common law has reserved to itself the exposition of all such acts of
parliament as concern either the extent of these courts, or the matters depending before them. And therefore, if these courts either refuse to allow these acts
of parliament, or will expound them in any other sense than what the common
law puts upon them, the king's courts at Westminster will grant prohibitions to
restrain and control them.
3. An appeal lies from all these courts to the king, in the last resort ; which
proves that the jurisdiction exercised in them is derived from the crown of
England, and not from any foreign potentate, or intrinsic authority of their
own. And, from these three strong marks and ensigns of superiority, it appears
beyond a doubt that the civil and canon laws, thougb admitted in some cases by
custom in some courts, are only subordinate, and leges snb gravfori lege; and
that, thus admitted, restrained, altered, new-modeled, and amended, they are by
no means with us a distinct independent species of laws, but are inferior
branches of the customary or unwritten laws of England, properly called the
~king's ecclesiastical, the king's military, the king's maritime, or the king's
~ acaclemical. laws.
*Let us next proceed to the lege.<J scriptm, the written laws of the king[ .,85 ]
dom, which are statutes, acts or edicts, made by the king's majesty, by and
with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons
in parliament assembled. (b) The oldest of these now extant, and printed in our
statute books, is the famous ma.gna charta, as <'-Onfirmed in parliament 9 Hen.
III, though doubtless there were many acts before that time, the records of which
are now lost, and the determinations of them perhaps at present currently received
for the maxims of the old common law.
The manner of makin~ these statutes will be better considered hereafter, when
we examine the constitution of parliaments. At present we will only take notice
of the different kinds of statutes, and of some general rules with regard to their
constmction. (c)
First, as to their several kinds. Statutes are either general or speC'l"al, public
.,
[ 86] or private. A general or/ublic act is an *universal rule, that regards
the whole community; an of this the courts of la.w are bouncl to take
notice judicially and ex officio; without the statute being particularly pleaded,
or formally set forth by the party who claims an advantage under it. Special
or private acts are rather exceptions than rules, being those which only operate
upon particular persons, and private concerns; such as the Romans entitled
senatus-decreta, in contmdistincfion to the senatus consulta, ·which regarded
the whole community; ( d) and of these (which are not promulgated with the
same notoriety as the former,) the judges are not bound to take notice, unless
they be formally shewn and pleaded. Thus, to show the distinction, the statute
13 Eliz. c. 10, to prevent spiritual persons from making leases for longer term~
than twenty-one years, or three lives, is a public act; it being a rule prescribed
to the whole body of spiritual persons in the nation; but an act to enable the
bishop of Chester to make a lease to A. B. for sixty years is an exception to

the statutes of Wales and Ireland, the articuli cirri, and the nrctrogatim regis. Some are distinguished by

their initial words, a method of citing very ancient, being usea by the Jews in denominating the books of the

Pentateuch : by the Chriatain church in distinguishing their hymns and divine offices : by the lloiuanists in

ilescriblng their papal bulls; and, in short, by the whole body of ancient civilians and canonists, among whom

this method of citation generally prevailed, not only with regardito chapters.butinferior sections also; In imita-

tinii of all which we still call some of our old statutes by their initial words, as the statute of qttia entptores, and

that ofciraunupecieagatla. But the most usual method of citing them, especially since the time of Kdward

the Second, is by naming the year of the king's reign in which the statute was made, together with the chap-

tor, or particular ant, according to its numeral order, as 9 Gco. n. c. 4, for all the acts of'ono session of Parlin-

nient taken together make properly but one statute; and therefore, when two sessions have been held in oua

year, we usually mention stat. 1 or 2. Thus the bill of righte is cited as 1 W. and M. St. 2. c. 2, signifying that

it is the second chapter or act of the second statute, or the laws made in the second session of parliament, ia

the first year of King William and Queen Mary. (rf) Gravin, Orig, I. j 24.

is shown allunde by affidavit. Full v. Hutching, Cowp. 424; Roberts v, Hornby, 3 M. and "W.

120; Griffiths ». Anthony, 5 Ad. and E. 623.

(b) 8Rep. ~.
(c) The method of citing these act. of parliament Is ve.rlons . Many of onr ancient stamtee are called after
the name of the plar.e whero the parliament was held that made them ; u the statutes of Merion and Marlehcrge, of Wc@tmlnster , Glonceeter, and Winche~ter. Others are denomlnnted entirely from tbelr aubjoot, a11
the statntes of Wales an rt Ireland, the articull elm. and the prmrogalioa r'fl'!. Some are dlstiog\lished by
their Initial wo1·fle, a method of citing very ancient, being used by the Jews In denomloatiug the bOOk~ of the
P<•n Lateuch : by the Christain church in dlstingoishing their hymus aod dfrloe omces : by the Romanists in
dc~cribing their pnpnl bulls; nnd,in ehort. by the whole body ofancient clvilinns and canonist:!, among whom
th is method ofcitation generally prevailert. not only with regant to chapt.el'8,butinfcrioreectione Rll.IO; In lmita..
I.inn ofoll which we still <'.&ll some of om· old statutes by their initial words, as the statnte of qtdaew1ptol"U, and
thnt of cirtJUnuptcu.agatU. But the most mmal method of citing them, espeolally since tile timtl of l<Mward
the Second. le by naming the year of the king's reign In which the statute was made, together with the chap.
wr, or pnrticnlal" a~t. acr.orrllng to itR numeral order, ae 9 Geo. Il. c . .&, for all the acts of'onc ~C!l8ion of ParllR·
mcut t.aken together matke properly butonostatnte; an•I therefore, when two sessions have been ht•ltl in oue
wnr. we usunlly 1ue11tion stat. I or 2. Thus the hill ofrighte !11 cited as l W. and .M. St. 2. c. 2, 11ignifdng that
It iri th e second chapter or act of the eecoml fftntnte, or the laws matde In the second :;cssioo ofparll1imcnt, In
the first year ol King WilliRm and Queen Mary.
(d) Gradn, Orig. I. I U.
- - · - - -- - - -- -- - - -- - -

is Rhown aliu1ide by affidavit. Full v. Hutchins, Cowp. 424; Roberts 11, Humby, 3 ll. and W.
~:.!O ; Griffiths 11. Anthony, 5 Ad. and E. 623,
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this rule; it concerns only the parties and the bishop's successors; and is

therefore a private act (13)

Statutes also are either declaratory of the common law, or remedial of some

defects therein. (14) Declaratory, where the old custom of the kingdom is

almost fallen into disuse, or become disputable; in which case the parliament

has thought proper, in perpetuum rei testimonium, and for avoiding all doubts

and difficulties, to declare what the common law is and ever hath been. Thus

the statute of treasons, 25 Edw. Ill, cap. 2, doth not make any new

species of treasons, but only, for the benefit of the subject, declares and

enumerates those several kinds of offence which before were treason at the com-

mon law. Remedial statutes are those which are made to supply such defects,

and abridge such superfluities, in the common law, as arise either from the

general imperfection of all human laws, from change of time and circumstances,

(13) See other cases upon the distinction between public and private acts, Bac. Ab. statute,

F. The distinction between public and private acts is marked with admirable precision by

Mr. Abbott (afterwards Lord Colchester), in the following note, in the printed report from the

committee for the promulgation of the statutes:—PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACTS. I. IN LEGAL

LANGUAGE. 1. Acts are deemed to be public and general acts which the judges will take

notice of without pleading, viz: acts concerning the king, the queen, and I In- prince; those

concerning all prelates, nobles, and great officers; those concerning the whole spirituality, and

those which concern all officers in general, such as all sheriffs, <tc. Acts concerning trade

in general, or any specific trade; acts concerning all persons generally, though it be a special
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or particular thing, such as a statute concerning assizes, or woods in forests, chases, <tc.

4c. Com. Dig. tit. Parliament, R. 6.; Bac. Ab. statute, P. 2. Private acts are those which

concern only a particular species, thing or person, of which the judges will not take notice

without pleading of them, viz: acts relating to the bishops only: acts for toleration of

dissenters; acts relating to any particular place, or to divers particular towns, or to one or

divers particular counties, or to the colleges only in the universities. Com. Dig. tit. Parliament.

K. 7. 3. In a general act there may be a private clause, ibid.; and a private act, if recognized

by & public act, must afterwards be noticed by the courts as such. 2 Term Rep. 569. II. IK

PARLIAMENTARY LANGUAGE, 1. The distinction between public and private bills stands upon

different grounds as to fees. All bills whatever from which private persons, corporations, Ac.,

derive benefit, are subject to the payment of fees, and such bills are in this respect denominated

private bills. Instances of bills within this description, are enumerated in the second volume

of Mr. Hatsel's Precedents of Proceedings in the house of commons, edit. 1796, p. 267,

&o. 2. In parliamentary language, another sort of distinction is also used; and some acts

are called public general acts, others public local acts, viz: church acts, canal acts, Ac.

To this class may also be added some acts, which though public are merely personal, via : acts

of attainder, and patent acts, At-. Others are called private acts, of which latter class some

are local, viz: enclosure acts, <tc., and some personal, viz: such as relate to names, estates,

divorces, <fec.]

It is probable that some of the acts enumerated by Mr. Abbot as private would be properly

classified as public under late decisions. An act extending only to sheriffs was at one time

held to be a private act, but it is now ruled otherwise. Lovell v. Plomer, 15 East. 320. It is

not essential in order to constitute a statute a public act, that it be applicable to all parts of

the state. It is sufficient if it extend to all persons doing or omitting to do an act within the

territorial limits described therein. Pierce v. Kimball, 9 Greenl. 54. Thus, an act regulating the

taking of fish in a particular river in a certain town is a public act. Bumham r. Webster, 5

Mags. 268. So acts for the establishment of towns and counties, and fixing their boundaries,

and for the erection of public buildings for the use thereof, and for public highways and

fences, are public acts. Commonwealth v. Springfield, 7 Mass. 9; East Hartford v. Hartford

Bridge Co., 10 How. 511; Mills v. St. Clair Co.. 8 How. 569; Gorham v. Springfield, 8 Shep.

58; Stephenson c. Doe, 8 Blackf. 508; Rex». Paulding, Sid. 209. So sembte an act incorporating

a turnpike company, where it contains a provision that the road in a certain event shall revert to

the people. Jenkins v. Union Turnpike Co., 1 Games' Cas. 86. So the act incorporating the

United States Bank: Rogers's Case, 2 Greenl. 303; and the act incorporating the Bank of

Missouri. Douglass v. Bank of Mo., 1 Mo., 24. So it seems any act chartering a bank is to be

deemed a public act. Bank of Utica *. Smedes, 3 Cow. 662; Crawford*. Planters and Merchants'

Bank, 6 Ala. 289. So an act, otherwise private, if it contain provisions for forfeitures to the

state, or for the punishment of public offences. Roger's Case, 2 Greenl. 303; Heridia v. Ayres,

12 Pick. 344. So a private act which is recognized by a subsequent public act. Rogers's Case,

2 Greenl. 303. So an act otherwise private which is declared therein to be a public act. Brook-

ville Ina. Co. v. Records, 5 Blackf. 170. See further, Dawson v. Paver, 5 Hare, 434; Cock c.

Gent, 12 M. and W. 234. Pecs are not payable in America on private bilk.

(14) [This division is generally expressed by declaratory statutes, and statutes introductory of

a new law. Remedial statutes are generally mentioned in contradistinction to penal statutes.

See note 19. p. 88.]
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from the mistakes and unadvised determinations of unlearned (or even learned)

Judges, or from any other cause whatsoever. And this being done, either by

enlarging the common law where it was too narrow and circumscribed, or by

r*oiy-i restraining it *where it was too lax and luxuriant, hath occasioned

I- -I another subordinate division of remedial acts of parliament into enlarging

and restraining statutes. To instance again in the case of treason: clipping

the current com of the kingdom was an offence not sufficiently guarded against

by the common law; therefore it was thought expedient, by statutes Eliz. c. 11,

to make it high treason, which it was not at the common law: so that this was

an enlarging statute.(\b) At common law also spiritual corporations might lease

out their estates for any term of years till prevented by the statute 13 Eliz.

before mentioned: this was therefore, a restraining statute.

Secondly, the rules to be observed with regard to the construction of statutes

are principally these which follow.

1. There are three points to be considered in the construction of all remedial

statutes; the old law, the mischief, and the remedy: that is, how the common

law stood at the making of the act; what the mischief was, for which the

common law did not provide; and what remedy the parliament hath provided

to cure this mischief. And it is the business of the judges so to construe the

act as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.(e) Let us instance

again in the same restraining statute of 13 Eliz. c. 10: By the common law,

ecclesiastical corporations might let as long leases as they thought proper: the
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mischief was, that they let long and unreasonable leases, to the impoverishment

of their successors; the remedy applied by the statute was by making void all

leases by ecclesiastical bodies for longer terms than three lives, or twenty-one

years. Now in the construction of this statute, it is held that leases, though for

a longer term, if made by a bishop, are not void during the bishop's continuance

in his see: or, if made by a dean and chapter, they are not void during the

continuance of the dean; for the act was made for the benefit and protection

of the successor.( /) The mischief is therefore sufficiently suppressed by vacating

r*8o-i them after the determination of the interest of the *grantors; but the

"- J leases, during their continuance, being not within the mischief, are not

within the remedy.

2. A statute, which treats of things or persons of an inferior rank, cannot by

any general words be extended to those of a superior. So a statute, treating 01

" deans, prebendaries, parsons, vicars, and others having spiritual promotion," is

held not to extend to bishops, though they have spiritual promotion, deans being

the highest persons named, (16) and bishops being of a still higher order.(ff)

3. Penal statutes must be construed strictly.(17) Thus the statute 1 Edw.

VI, c. 12, having enacted that those who are convicted of stealing horses should

(t) 3 Rep. 7 Co. Litt. 11. 42. (f) Co. Litt. 46. 3 Rep. 60. 10 Rep 68. (9) 2 Rep. 46.

(15) [This siatnti- against clipping the coin hardly corresponds with the general notion either

of a remedial or an enlarging statute. In ordinary legal language remedial statutes are contra-

distinguished to penal statutes. An enlarging or an enabling statute is one which increases, not

restrains, the power of action, as the 32 Hen. Till, c. 28, which gave bishops and all other sole

ecclesiastical corporations, except parsons and vicars, a power of making leases, which they

did not possess before, is always called an enabling statute. The 13 Eliz. c. 10, which after-

wards limited that power, is, on the contrary, styled a restraining or disabling statute. See this

fully explained by the learned commentator, 2 Book, p. 319.]

This statute is since repealed.

(16) See to the same point, Hall v. Byrne, 1 Scam. 140; Lyndon r. Standbridge, 2 H. and N". 51.

(17) See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76; Melody ». Reab, 4 Mass. 473; Jones v.

Estis, 2 Johns. 379; Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. 419; Myers ». Foster, 6 Cow. 567; Pike v.

JenMns, 12 N. H. 255; Dagpett r. State, 4 Conn. 61; Hall c. State, 20 Ohio, 7; Gushing v. Dill, 2

Scam. 461; Chase v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 523 ; State v. Lovell, 23 Iowa, 304; U. S.

v. Athens Armory 35 Ga. 344. The rule that penal statutes shall be construed strictlv, means

only that they are not to be BO extended, boyond the legitimate import of the terms used therein,

as to embrace cases or acts not clearly described by such words, and so as to briiig them within

the prohibition or penalty of such statutes. Rawson v. State, 19 Conn. 292.
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not have the benefit of clergy, the judges conceived that this did not extend

to him that should steal but one horse, Tl8) and therefore procured a new act

for that purpose in the following year, (h) And, to come nearer our own times,

by the statute 14 Geo. II, c. 6, stealing sheep, or other cattle, was made felony,

without benefit of clergy. But these general words, " or other cattle," being

looked upon as much too loose to create a capital offence, the act was held to

extend to nothing but mere sheep. And therefore, in the next sessions, it was

found necessary to make another statute, 15 Geo. II, c. 34, extending the former

to bulls, cows, oxen, steers, bullocks, heifers, calves and lambs, by name.

4. Statutes against frauds (19) are to be liberally and beneficially expounded.

This may seem a contradiction to the last rule; most statutes against frauds

being in their consequences penal. But this difference is here to be taken:

where the statute acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty, as the pillory or

a fine, it is then to be taken strictly; but when the statute acts upon the offence,

by setting aside the fraudulent transaction, here it is to be construed liberally.

Upon this footing the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, which avoids all gifts of goods,

&c., made to defraud creditors and others, was *held to extend by the r*gp,-i

general words to a gift made to defraud the queen of a forfeiture, (i) ' ' ' "

5. One part of a statute must be so construed by another, that the whole may

(if possible) stand: ut res mac/is valeat, yuanipereat. (20) As if land be vested

in the king and his heirs by act of parliament, saving the right of A., and A.

has at that time a lease of it for three years: here A. shall hold it for his term
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of three years, and afterwards it shall go to the king. For this interpretation

furnishes matter for every clause of the statute to work and operate upon. But,

6. A saving, totally repugnant to the body of the act, is void. If, therefore,

an act of parliament vests land in the king and his heirs, saving the right of all

persons whatsoever; or vests the land of A. in the king, saving the right of A.;

in either of these cases the saving is totally repugnant to the body of the

statute, and (if good) would render the statute of no effect or operation; and

therefore the saving is void, and the land vests absolutely in the king, (k)

(h) 2 and 3 Ertw. VI. c. 83. Bac. Elem. c. 12. (i)SRep. 82. (Jb) 1 Rep. 47.

(18 [Lord Hale thinks that the scruple of the judges did not merely depend upon the words

being in the plural number, because no doubt had ever occurred respecting former statutes in the

not have the benefit of clergy, the judSes conceived that this did not extend
to him that should steal but one horse, 18) and therefore procured a new act
for that purpose in the following year. (h And, to come nearer our own times,
by the st.atnt.e 14 Geo. II, c. 6, stealing sheep, or other cattle, was made felony,
without benefit of clergy. But these general words, "or other cattle," being
looked upon as much too loose to create a capital offence, the act was held to
extend to nothing but mere sheep. And therefore, in the next sessions, it was
found necessary to make another statute, 15 Geo. II, c. 34, extending the fonner
to bulls, cows, oxen, steers, bullocks, heifers, calves and lambs, by name.
4. Statutes against frauds (19) are to be liberally and beneficially expounded.
This may seem a contradiction to the last rule; most statutes against frauds
being in their consequences penal. But this difference is here to be taken:
where the statute acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty, as the pillory or
a fine, it is then to be taken strictly; but when the statute acts upon the offence,
by setting aside the fraudulent transadion, here it is to be construed liberally.
Upon this footing the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, which avoids all gifts of goods,
&c., made to defraud creditors and otliers, was *held to extend by the [*S9]
general words to a gift made to defraud the queen of a forfeiture. (i)
5. One part of a statute must be so construed by another, that the whole may
(if possible) stand: ut res magis valeat, 91tarn pereat. (20) As if land be vest.ed
in the king and his heirs by act of parhament, saving the right of A., and A.
has at that time a lease of it for three years: here A. shall hold it for his term
of three years, and afterwards it shall go to the king. For this interpretation
furnishes matter for every clause of the statute to work and operate upon. But,
6. A savin~, totally repugnant to the body of the act, is void. If, therefore,
an act of parliament vests land in the king and his heirs, savfog the right of all
:persons whatsoever; or vests the land of A. in the king, saving the right of A.;
m either of these cases the saving is totally repugnant to the body of the
statute, and (if good) would render the statute of no effect or o:peration; and
therefore the saving is void, and the land vests absolutely in the kmg. (k)

plural number; as for instance, it was enacted by the 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, that no person con-

victed of burning any dwelling houses should be admitted to clergy. But the reason of the diffi-

culty in this case was, because the statute of 37 Hen. Till, c. 8, was expressly penned in the

singular number, If any man do steal any horse, mare, or filly; and then this statute, thus vary-

ing the nnmber, and at the same time expressly repealing all other exclusions of clergy introduced

since the beginning of Hen. Till, it raised a doubt whether it were not intended by the legisla-

ture to restore clergy where only one horse was stolen. 2 H. P. C. 365.

It has since been decided that, where statutes use the plural number, a single instance will be

comprehended. The 2 Geo. II, c. 25, enacts, that it shall be felony to steal any bank notes; and

it has been determined, that the ofl'ence is complete by stealing one bank note. Hassel's Case,

Leach, Cr. L. 1.]

(19) [These are generally called remedial statutes; and it is a fundamental rule of construc-

tion that penal statutes shall be construed strictly, and the remedial statutes shall be construed

liberally. It was one of the laws of the twelve tables of Rome, that whenever there was a

question between liberty and slavery, the presumption should be on the side of liberty. This

excellent principle our law has adopted in the construction of penal statutes! f°r whenever

any ambiguity arises in a statute introducing a new penalty or punishment, the decision shall

be on the side of lenity and mercy; or in favor of natural right and liberty; or, in other

words, the decision shall be according to the strict letter in favor of the subject. And though

the judges in such cases may frequently raise and solve difficulties contrary to the intention

of the legislature, yet no further inconvenience can result, than that the law remains as it was

before the statute. And it is more consonant to principles of liberty that the judge should

acquit whom the legislator intended to punish, than that he should punish whom the legislator

intended to discharge with impunity. But remedial statutes must be construed according to the

spirit; for, in giving relief against Iraud, or in the furtherance and extension of natural right and

justice, the judge may safely go beyond even that which existed in the minds of those who

framed the law.]

(20) Shrewsbury v. Boylston, 1 Pick. 105; Opinion of Judges, 22 Pick. 571; Atty. General v.

Detroit & Erie Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 138; Leversee v. Reynolds, 13 Iowa, 310; People v.

Draper, 15 N. Y. 532.
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(I) 8

Rep. 82.

(.I:) 1

Rep. 4.7.

(18 [Lord Ha.le thinks that the scruple of the judges did not merely depend upon the words
being in the plural number, because no doubt had ever occurred respecting former statutes in the
plural number; n..'I for instance, it WBll enacted by the 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, that no penlOn convicted of burning any dteelling k<>Wles should be admitted to clergy. But the reason of the difficulty in this case wa.~, because the statute of :f'l Hen. VIII, c. 8, was expressly penned in the
singular number, If any man do steal any horse, mare, or .filly; and then this statute, thus varying the number, and at the same time expressly repealing all other exclusions of clergy introduced
since the beginning of Hen. VIII, it raised a doubt whether it were not intended by the legislature to rest.me clergy where only one horse was stolen. 2 H. P. C. 365.
It has since been decided that, where statutes use the plural number, a single in8tance will be
oomprebcnded. The 2 Geo. II, c. 25, enacts, that it shall be felony to steal any bank notes; and
it has been determined, that the offence is complete by stealing t>ne bank note. Hassel's Case,
Leach, Cr. L. 1.]
(19) [These are generally called remedial statutes; and it is a fundamental rule of constmotion that penal statutes shall be construed strictly, and the remedial statutes shall be construed
liberally. It was one of the Jaws of the twelve tables of Rome, that whenever there was a
question between liberty and slavery, the :i,>resumption should be on the side of liberty. This
excellent principle our law has adopted m the construction of penal statutes; for whenever
any ambiguity arises in a statute introducing a new penalty or punishment, the decision shall
be on the side of lenity and mercy; or in favor of natural right and liberty; or, in other
words, the decision shall be according t;o the strict lEltter in favor of the subject. And though
the judges in such ca11eR may frequently raise and solve difficulties contrary to the intention
of the legislature, yet no further inconvenience can result, than that the law remains as it w11.11
before the statute. And it is more consonant to principles of liberty that the judge should
acquit whom the legislator intended to punish, than that he should punish whom the legislator
intended to discharge with in1vunity. But remedial statutes must be constrtted according to the
spirit; for, in giving relief agrun,;t fraud, or in the furtherance and extension of natural right and
justice, the juilgo may safely go beyond even that which exil!ted in the minds of those who
framed the Jaw.]
(20) Shrewsbury v. Boylston, l' Pick. 105; Opinion of Judges, 22 Pick. 571; Atty. General 11.
Detroit & Erie Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 138; Leversee t'. Reynolds, 13 Iowa, 310; People 11.
Draper, 1;; N. Y. 532.
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7. Where the common law and the statute differ, the common law rives place

to the statute; and an old statute gives place to a new one. (21) And this upon

a general principle of universal law, that "leges posterior es,priores contraries

abrogant; (22) consonant to which it was laid down by a law of the twelve

tables at Rome, that "quod populus postremum jussit, id jus ratum esto." But

this is to be understood, only when the latter statute is couched in negative

terms, or where its matter is so clearly repugnant, that it necessarily implies a

negative. As if a former act says, that a juror upon such a trial shall have

twenty pounds a year; and a new statute afterwards enacts, that he shall have

twenty marks: here the latter statute, though it does not express, yet necessarily

implies a negative, and virtually repeals the former. For if twenty marks be

made qualification sufficient, the former statute which requires twenty pounds

T*90l 1S a* an en^' (^ ^u*' ^ koth ac*a k® merelv affirmative, *and the sub-

"- -* stance such that both may stand together, here the latter does not repeal

the former, but they shall both have a concurrent efficacy. If by a former law

an offence be indictable at the quarter-sessions, and a latter law makes the same

offence indictable at the assizes; here the jurisdiction of the sessions is not

taken away, but both have a concurrent jurisdiction, and the offender may be

prosecuted at either: unless the new statute subjoins express negative words, as,

that the offence shall be indictable at the assizes, and not elsewfore. (m)

8. If a statute, that repeals another, is itself repealed afterwards, the first

statute is hereby revived, without any formal words for that purpose. (23) So

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

when the statutes of 26 and 35 Hen. ^TIII, declaring the king to be the supreme

head of the church, were repealed by a statute 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, and this

latter statute was afterwards repealed by an act of 1 Eliz. there needed not any

express words of revival in Queen Elizabeth's statute, but these acts of King

Henry were impliedly and virtually revived, (n)

(I) Jenk. Cent. 2. 73 (m) 11 Rep. 83 (n) 4 Tnst. 325.

(21) State v. Norton, 3 Zab. 33; Moore's Lessee v. Vance, 1 Ohio, 10; State v. Miskimmons, 2

1 ml. 440.

But where the new statute does not in terms repeal the old law, the two will stand together so

far as effect can be given to both. Repeals by implication are not favored. Naylor v. Field, 5

Dntch. 287; Bowon c. Lease, 5 Hill, 221; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58; Dodge p. Gridley, 10 Ohio,

177; McCool«. Smith, 1 Black, 459; New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 15 La. An. 89; "Wyman v.

Campbell, 6 Port. 219; State ». Bishop, 41 Mo. 16; Furman v. Nichols, 3 Cold. 432; Couley ».

Calhoun Co., 2 W. Ya. 416.

A statute which makes an innovation on the established principles of the common law must be

strictly construed. McQueen v. Middletown Manuf. Co., 16 Johns, 7; McClusky v. Cromwell, 11

N. T. 593; Sonter v. Sea Witch, 1 Cal. 162; Gilson v. Jenney, 15 Mass. 205; Rue v. Alter, 5 Denio,

119; Wilber v. Crane, 13 Pick. 290; Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich. 486; Esterly's Appeal, 54 Penn. St.

192; Heam i>. Enrin, 3 Cold. 399.

So m iist, statutes in derogation of common right. Spragne r. Birdsall, 2 Cow. 419; Bridgewater

Ac. Plank Road Co.«. Robbins, 22 Barb. 662; Wright». Briggs, 2 Hill, 77; Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill,

76; Smith 0. Spooner, 3 Pick. 229; Sewell v. Jones, 9 Pick. 412.

So must statutes granting exclusive privileges. Cayuga Bridge Co. v. Magee, 6 Wend. 85;

Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica and S. R. R. Co., 6 Paige, 554; Young v. McKenzie, 3 Kelly, 31.

And charters of incorporation are to be construed most strongly against those who claim rights

under them, and most favorably to the public. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. r. Canal Commissioners,

81 Penn. St. 22; Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh <fcc. R. R. Co., 24 Penn. St. 159; Chenango Bridge

Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 27 N. Y. 93; Bradley r. N. Y. and N. H. R. R. Co., 21 Conn. 306;

Camden and Amboy R. K. Co., v. Briggs, 2 N. J. 623.

(23) Mr. Tucker remarks of this maxim, that it is to be understood as relating only to IAWB

made by a legislature possessing equal or superior powers to that by which the first law waa

made. Thus the congress of the United States may alter, amend, repeal or annul anv of its own

acts, but should congress attempFto pass a law contrary to the constitution of the tfnited States,

or should the state legislature make a similar attempt against it, or against the state constitution,

such acts, though clothed with all the forms of law, would not be law, nor repeal in any manner

what was established by a higher authority, to wit, that of the people. Yet the people, whenever

they see fit, may make any alterations in the constitution which they may deem necessary to their

happiness and the prosperity of the nation. But to this it should be added that the people, in

making changes in the constitution, or in establishing a new one, must observe sudh rules as they

have laid down to govern their action in the premises, in the constitution as it stands.

(23.) [The Bishop's Case, 12 Rep. 7; 4 Inst. 325; Tattle v. Greenwood, 3 Biug. 493; Doc v.

Gully, 9 B. and C. 344; Phillips r. Jlopwond, 10 B. and C; 39.

56

Sect. 3.] CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. 90

9. Acts of parliment derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments

bind not So the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 1, which directs that no person for

assisting a king de facto shall be attainted of treason by act of parliament or

otherwise, is held to be good only as to common prosecution for nigh treason;

but will not restrain or clog any parliamentary attainder, (o) Because the

legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of

absolute authority; it acknowledges no superior upon earth which the prior

legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parlia-

ment. And upon the same principle Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, treats with

a proper contempt these restraining clauses, which endeavor to tie up the hands

of succeeding legislatures. "When you repeal the *law itself, (says he,) •- ^^ n

you at the same time repeal the prohibitory clause, which guards against L ' '

such repeal." (p) (24)

10. Lastly, acts of parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no

validity; and if there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences,

manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those

collateral consequences, void. (25) I lay down the rule with these restrictions;

though I know it is generally laid down more largely, that acts of parliament

contrary to reason are void. But if the parliament will positively enact a thing

to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms of

the constitution that is vested with authority to control it; and the examples

usually alleged in support of this sense of the rule do none of them prove, that,
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where the main object of a statute is unreasonable, the judges are at liberty to

reject it; for that were to set the judicial power above that of the legislature,

which would be subversive of all government. But where some collateral

matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be unreasonable; there

the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by

the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by

equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it. Thus if an act of parliament gives a man

power to try all causes, that arise within his manor of Dale; yet, if a cause should

arise in which he himself is party, the act is construed not to extend to that,

because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel, (a)

But, if we could conceive it possible for the parliament to enact, that he should

try as well his own causes as those of other persons, there is no court that has

power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in such evident and

express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legislature

or no. (26)

(o) 4 Inst. 48. (p) Cum lex abrogatur, itlud ipenm abrogatwr, quo no* earn abrogari oporteat. I. 3. cp.23.

(9) 8 Rep. 118.

See also Harrison v. Walker, 1 Kelly, 32; Commonwealth ». Churchill, 2 Met. 118. But now

in England the repeal of a repealing act does not revive the act before repealed, unless words be

inserted reviving it. Stat. 13 and 14 Vic. c. 21, $ 5. There are similar statutes in some of the

American states! A recent act of Congress ia to the same effect (July 14, 1870.)

(24) A legislature cannot adopt irrepealable legislation. Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 Mr Lean, 161;

Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 623; Thorpe ». R. & B. R. R. Co. 27 Tt. 149. There is a modifica-

tion of this principle in the case of those statutes which are in the nature of contracts, and by

which the state, for a consideration received, grants something of value, as for instance a fran-

chise, or an exemption from taxation. Such contracts are made inviolable by the constitution

of the United States. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 618; New'jersey v. Wilson,

7 Cranch. 164.

(25) [If an act of parliament is clearly and unequivocally expressed, with all deference to the'-

learned commentator, I conceive it is neither void in its direct nor collateral consequences, how-

ever absurd and unreasonable they may appear. If the expression will admit of doubt, it will

not then be presumed that the construction can be agreeable to the intention of the legislature,

the consequences of which are unreasonable; but where the signification of a statute is manifest,

no authority less than that of parliament can restrain its operation.]

(26) In addition to those stated in the text, it may be important to mention here another car-

dinal rule of construction, namely: that eveiy statute is to be construed to operate prospectively

only, unless its terms clearly imply a legislative intent that it shall have retrospective effuct.

Dash v. Tankleek, 7 Johns. 477 ; Sayre t. Wisner, 8 Wend. 661; State ». Atwood, 11 Wis. 422;

Hastings r. Lane, 3 Shep. 134; Brown r. Wilcox, 14 S. and M. 127; Price r. Mott, 52 Penn. St.

315; Allbyer r. State. 10 Ohio. N. S. 583; State v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258; Moon v. Dnrden, 2 Exch.

22: State r. Auditor. 41 Mo. 25; Finney v. Ackerman, 21 Wis. 268.
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These are the several grounds of the laws of England; over and above which,

F*921 eclu^y *s a^8° frequently called in to *assist, to moderate and to explain them.

L -" What equity is, and how impossible in its very essence to be reduced to

stated rules, hath been shewn in the preceding section. I shall therefore only

add, that (besides the liberality of sentiment with which our common law judges

interpret acts of parliament, and such rules of the unwritten law as are not of a

positive kind) there are also peculiar courts of equity established for the benefit of

the subject: to detect latent frauds and concealments, which the process of the

courts of law is not adapted to reach; to enforce the execution of such matters of

trust and confidence, as are binding in conscience, though not cognizable in a

court of law; to deliver from such dangers as are owing to misfortune or oversight;

and to give a more specific relief, and more adapted to the circumstances of the

case, than can always be obtained by the generality of the rules of the positive

or common law. This is the business of our courts of equity, which however

are only conversant in matters of property. For the freedom of our constitution

will not permit, that in criminal cases a power should be lodged in any judge,

to construe the law otherwise than according to the letter. This caution, while

it admirably protects the public liberty, can never bear hard upon individuals.

A man cannot suffer more punishment than the law assigns, but he may suffer

less. The laws cannot be strained by partiality to inflict a penalty beyond what

the letter will warrant; but, in cases where the letter induces any apparent

hardship, the crown has the power to pardon.
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SECTION IV.

OF THE COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

These a.re the several grounds of the laws of England; over and above which,
[ *92] equity is also frequently called in to *assist, to moderat.e and to explain them.
What equity is, and how impossible in its very essence to be reduced to
stated rules, hath been shewn in the precedin~ section. I shall therefore only
add, that (besides the liberality of sentiment with which our common law judges
interpret acts of parliament, and such rules of the unwritt.en law as are not of a.
positive kind) there are also peculiar courts of equity established for the benefit of
the subject: to detect lat.ent frauds and concealments, which the process of the
courts of law is not adapted to reach; to enforce the execution of such matters of
trust and confidence, a.a are binding in conscience, though not cognizable in a.
court of law; to deliver from such dangers a.a are owing to misfortune or o-Yersight;
and to give a more specific relief, and more adapt.ed to the circumstances of the
case, than can alwalis be obtained by the generality of the rules of the positive
or common law. '!his is the business of our courts of equity, which however
are only conYersant in matters of property. For the freedom of our constitution
will not permit, that in criminal cases a -vower should be lodged in any judge,
to construe the law otherwise than according to the letter. This caution, while
it admirably protects the public liberty, can never bear hard upon individuals.
A man cannot suffer more punishment than the law assigns, but he may suffer
less. 'fhe laws cannot be strained by partiality to inflict a penalty beyond what
the letter will warrant; but, in cases where the lett.er induces any apparent
hardship, the crown ha.a the power to pardon.

The kingdom of England, over which our municipal laws have jurisdiction,

includes not, by the common law, either Wales, Scotland, or Ireland, or any

other part of the king's dominions, except the territory of England only. And

SECTION IV.

yet the civil laws and local customs of this territory do now obtain, in part or

in all, with more or less restrictions, in these and many other adjacent coun-

tries ; of which it will be proper first to take a review, before we consider the

kingdom of England itself, the original and proper subject of these laws.

OF :J'HE COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.
I\ . ~n-~~

--.

Wales had continued independent of England, unconquered and uncultivated,

in the primitive pastoral state which Caesar and Tacitus ascribe to Britain

in general, for many centuries ; even from the time of the hostile invasions of

che Saxons, when the ancient and Christian inhabitants of the island retired to

those natural intrenchments, for protection from their Pagan visitants. But

when these invaders themselves were converted to Christianity, and settled into

regular and potent governments, this retreat of the ancient Britons grew every

day narrower ; they were overrun by little and little, gradually driven from one

fastness to another, and by repeated losses abridged of their wild independence.

Very early in our history we find their princes doing homage to the crown of

England; till at length in the reign of Edward the First, who may justly be

[*941 8*y^ *ne conquerer of * Wales, the line of their ancient princes "was

L -I abolished and the King of England's eldest son became, as a matter of

course, (1) their titular prince ; the territory of Wales being then entirely re-

annexed (by a kind of feudal resumption) to the dominion of the crown of

England; (a) or, as the statute (2) of Ehudlaud (J) expresses it. " Terra Wall ice

(a) Vaugh. 400. ( 6) 10 Bdw; I.

(1) [It cannot, be said that the king's eldest son became prince of "Wales by any necessary

or natural consequence ; but, for the origin and creation of his title, see page 224.1

(2) [The learned judge ban made a mistake in referring to the statute, which is called tin

statute of Rutland, in the 10 Bdw. I, which does not at all relate to "Wales. But the statute oi
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'rhe kingdom of England, over which our municipal laws have jurisdiction,
includes not, by the common law, either Wales, Scotland, or Ireland, or any
other part of the king's dominions, except the tcrrit-0ry of England only. And
yet the civil laws and local customs of this t.erritory do now obtain, in part or
m all, with more or less restrictions, in these and many other adjacent countries; of which it will be proper first to take a review, before we consider the
kingdom of England itself, the original and proper subject of these laws.
Wales had continued independent of England, unconquered and uncultivated,
in the primitive pastoral stat.e which Cresar and 'racitus ascribe to Britain
in general, for many centuries; even from the time of the hostile invasions of
the Saxons, when the ancient and Christian inhabitants of the island retired to
those natural intrenchments, for protection from their Pag-an visitants. But
when these invaders themselyes were converted to Christianity, and settled into
regular and potent governments, this retreat of the ancient Britons grew every
day narrower; they were overrun by little and little, gradually driven from one
fastness to another, and by repeated losses abridged of their wild independence.
Very early in our history we find their princes doing homage to the crown of
England; till at length in the reign of Ed ward the First, who may justly be
[ *9-1] styled the conquerer of "'Wales, the line of their ancient princes· wu.s
abolished and the King of England's eldest son became, as a matter of
course, (1) their titular prince; the territory of Wales being then entirely reannexed (by a kind of feudal resumption) to the dominion of the crown of
.England; (a) or, as the statute (2) of Rhudlaud (b) expresses it." Terra WalUm
(111 Vaugh. 400.

(b) lOFldw,I.

(1) [It cannot ho said that the king's eldeRt eon became prince of Walei! by any nece11sary
or natural conseqnence; but, for the origin and creation of bLl title, Ree page 2'l4. l
(2) [The learned judge hM made a mistake in referring to the statute, which is called tha
6tatute of Rutland, in the 10 Etlw. I, which doos not at all relate to WaleA. But the sta.tnte of
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KINGDOM o:r ScoTLAND.

cum incolis suis, prius regi jure feodali subjecta, (of which homage was the

sign) jam in proprietatis dominium totaliter et cum integritate conversa est,

et corona regni Angli® tanquam pars corporis ejusdem annexa et unita." By

the statute also of Wales (c) very material alterations were made in divers parts

of their laws, so as to reduce them nearer to the English standard, especially in

the forms of their judicial proceedings: but they still retained very much of

their original polity; particularly their rule of inheritance, viz. that their lands

were divided equally among all the issue male, and did not descend to the eldest

son alone. By other subsequent statutes their provincial immunities were still

farther abridged; but the finishing stroke to their independency was given by

the statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 26, which at the same time gave the utmost advance-

ment to- their civil prosperity, by admitting them to a thorough communication

of laws with the subjects of England. Thus were this brave people gradually

conquered into the enjoyment of true liberty; being insensibly put upon the

same footing, and made fellow-citize^Si with their conquerors. A generous

method of triumph, which the republic of Rome practiced with great success,

till she reduced all Italy to her obedience, by admitting the vanquished states to

partake of the Roman privileges.

It is enacted by this statute 27 Hen. VIII, 1. That the dominion of Wales

shall be for ever united to the kingdom of England. 2. That all Welshmen

born shall have the same liberties as other the king's subjects. 3. That lands

in Wales shall be inheritable according to the English tenures and rules of
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descent. 4. That the laws of England, and no other, shall *be used in

Wales: besides many other regulations of the police of this principality.

And the statute 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 26, confirms the same, adds farther

regulations, divides it into twelve shires, and, in short, reduces it into the same

order in which it stands at this day; differing from the kingdom of England in

only a few particulars, and those too of the nature of privileges, (such as having

courts within itself independent of the process of Westminster-hall,) and some

other immaterial peculiarities, hardly more than are to be found in many coun-

ties of England itself.

The kingdom of Scotland, notwithstanding the union of the crowns on the

accession of their King James VI, to that of England, continued an entirely

separate and distinct kingdom for above a century more, though an union had

been long projected; which was judged to be more easy to be done, as both

kingdoms were anciently under the same government, and still retained a very

great resemblance, though far from an identity, in their laws. By an act of

parliament, 1 Jac. I, c. 1, it is declared that these two mighty, famous, and

ancient kingdoms, were formerly one. And Sir Edward Coke observes, (d) how

marvellous a conformity there was, not only in the religion and language of the

two nations, but also in their ancient laws, the descent of the crown, their par-

liaments, their titles of nobility, their officers of state and of justice, their writs,

their customs, and even the language of their laws. Upon which account he

supposes the common law of each to have been originally the same; especially as

their most ancient and authentic book, called regiam -majestatem, and containing

the mles of their ancient common law, is extremely similar to that of Glanvil,

which contains the principles of ours, as it stood in the reign of Henry II. And the

(c) Edw. I, {d) I Ins. MS. »•

Rutland, as it is called in Vaughan, p. 400, is the same as the Statutum WalUa. Mr. Barring-

ton, in his Observations on the Ancient Statutes, p. 74, tells us, that the Statutam Walli<e

bears date omul Rotlielanum, what is now called Bhuydland in Flintshire. Though Edward says,

cum incolis suis, prius regi jure feodali subjecta, (of which homage was the
sign) jam in proprietatis dominium totaliter et cum integritate conversa est,
et coronm regni A nglim tanquam pars corporis ejusde1n annexa et unita." By
the statute also of Wales (c) very material alterations were made in divers parts
of their laws, so as to reduce them nearer to the English standard, especially in
the forms of their judicial proceedings: but they still retained very much of
their ori~nal polity; particularly their rule of inheritance, viz. that their lands
were divided equally among all the issue male, and did not descend to the eldest
son alone. By other subsequent statutes their provincial immunities were still
farther abridged; but the finishing stroke to their independency was given by
the statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 26, wluch at the same time gave the utmost advancement tcr their civil prosperity, by admitting them to a thorough communication
of laws with the subjects of England. rrhus were this brave people gradually
conquered into the enjoyment of true liberty; being insensibly put upon the
same footing, and made fellow-ci~iz~1' with their conquerors. A generous
method of triumph, which the ref>ubhc of Rome practiced with great success,
till she reduced all Italy to her obedience, by admitting the vanquished states to
partake of the Roman privileges.
It is enacted by this statute 27 Hen. VIII, 1. That the dominion of Wales
shall be for ever unit~d to the kingdom of England. 2. That all Welshmen
born shall have the same liberties as other the king's subjects. 3. That lands
in Wales shall be inheritable according to the English tenures and rules of
descent. 4. That the laws of England, and no other, shall *be used in [* 95 ]
Wales: besides many other regulations of the police of this principality.
And the statute 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 26, confirms the same, adds farther
regulations, divides it into twelve shires, and, in short, reduces it into the same
order in whic!i it stands at this day; differing from the kingdom of England in
only a few J?articulars, and those too of the nature of privileges, (such as having
courts withm itself independent of the process of Westminster-hall,) and some
other immaterial peculiarities, hardly more than are to be found in many counties of England itself.
The kingdom of Scotland, notwithstanding the union of the crowns on the
Becession of their King- James VI, to that of England, continued an entirely
separate and distinct kingdom for above a century more, though an union had
been long projected; which was judged to be more easy to be done, as both
kingdoms were anciently under the same government, and still ret.ained a very
great resemblance, though far from an identity, in their laws. By an act of
parliament, 1 Jae. I, c. 1, it is declared that these two mighty, famous, and
ancient kingdoms, were formerly one. And Sir Edward Coke observes, (d) how
marvellous a conformity there was, not only in the religion and language of the
two nations, but also in their ancient laws, the descent of the crown, their parliaments, their titles of nobility, their officers of state and of justice, their writs,
their customs, and even the language of their laws. Upon which account he
supyoses the common law of each to have been originally the same; especially as
their most ancient and authentic book, called regiam ·nuijestatem, and containing
the rules of their ancient common law, is extremely similar to that of Glanvil,
which contains the principles of ours, as it stood in the reign of Henry II. And the

that terra WaUAm prius regi jure feodali subjecta, yet Mr. Barrington assures us, that the feudal law

(c)

Edw. I,

(<l)

'Ins. 8'5.

was then unknown in "Wales, and that " there are at present in North "Wales, and it is believed

in South Wales, no copyhold tenures, and scarcely an instance of what we call manorial rights;

but the property is entirely free and allodial. Edward, however, was a conqueror, and ho had. a

right to make use of his own words in the preamble to his law." Ib. 76. See also Reeves' His-

tory of the Euglwh law, ii. 90.]
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Rutland, as it is called in Vaughan, p. 400, is the same as the Statutum Wa.lliai. Yr. Barringin his Observations on the .Ancient Statutes, p. 74, tells us, that the Statutum WaUim
bears date avud Rotlwumum, what itrnow called Rhuydle.nd in Flintshire. Though Edward says,
that terra Wallice pri11$ rcgi Jure feodali subjecta, yet Mr. Barrington assures us, that the feudal. law
wa.~ then unknown in Wnle8, and that " there are at l?resent in North Wal.cs, and it is believed
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many diversities, subsisting between the two laws at present, may be well enough

accounted for, from a diversity of practice in two large and uncommunicating

jurisdictions, and from the acts of two distinct and independent parliaments,

which have in many points altered and abrogated the old common law of both

kingdoms.

f*Qfil *However, Sir Edward Coke, and the politicians of that time, con-

"- -" ceived great difficulties in carrying on the projected union; but these

were at length overcome, and the great work was happily effected in 1707, 6

Anne; when twenty-five articles of union were agreed to by the parliaments of

both nations; the purport of the most considerable being as follows:

1. That on the first of May, 1707, and for ever after, the kingdoms of England

and Scotland shall be united into one kingdom, by the name of Great Britain.

2. The succession to the monarchy of Great Britain shall be the same as was

before settled with regard to that of England.

3. The united kingdom shall be represented by one parliament.

4. There shall be a communication of all rights and privileges between the

subjects of both kingdoms, except where it is otherwise agreed.

9. When England raises 2,000,0002. by a land tax, Scotland shall raise 48,0002.

16, 17. The standards of the coin, of weights, and of measures, shall be reduced

to those of England, throughout the united kingdoms.

18. The laws relating to trade, customs, and the excise, shall be the same in

Scotland as in England. But all the other laws of Scotland shall remain in
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force; though alterable by the parliament of Great Britain. Yet with this

caution: that laws relating to public policy are alterable at the discretion of the

parliament: laws relating to private right are not to be altered but for the evi-

dent utility of the people of Scotland.

F*971 * Sixteen peers are to be chosen to represent the peerage of Scotland

L J in parliament, and forty-five members to sit in the house of commons.

23. The sixteen peers of Scotland shall have all privileges of parliament; and

all peers of Scotland shall be peers of Great Britain, and rank next after those

of the same degree at the time of the union, and shall have all privileges of peers,

except sitting in the house of lords, and voting on the trial of a peer. (3)

(3) [Since the union, the following orders have been made in the house of lords respecting

the peerage of Scotland. Queen Anne, in the seventh year of her reign, had created James

duke of Queensbury, duke of Dover, with remainder in tail to his second son, then earl of

many diversities, subsisting between the two laws at present, may be well enough
accounted for, from a diversity of practice in two lar~e and uncommunicating
jurisdictions, and from the acts of two distinct and mdependent parliaments,
which have in many points altered and abrogated the old common law of both
kingdoms.
[* 96 ]
*However, Sir Edward Coke, and the politicians of that time, conceived great difficulties in carrying on the projected union; but these
were at length overcome, and the great work was happily effected in 1707, 6
Anne; when twenty-five articles of union were agreed to by the parliaments of
both nations; the purport of the most considerable being as follows:
1. That on the first of May, 1707, and for ever after, the kingdoms of England
and Scotland shall be united into one kingdom, by the name of Great Bntain.
2. The succession to the monarchy of Great Britain shall be the same as was
before settled with regard to that of England.
3. The united kingdom shall be represented by one parliament.
4. There shall be a communication of all rights and privileges between the
subjects of both kingdoms, except where it is otherwise agreed.
9. When England raises 2,000,000l. by a land tax, Scotland shall raise 48,000Z.
16, 17. 'l'he standards of the coin, of weights, and of measures, shall be reduced
to those of England, throughout the united kingdoms.
18. The laws relating to trade, customs, and the excise, shall be the same in
Scotland as in England. But all the other laws of Scotland shall remain in
force; though alterable by the parliament of Great Britain. Yet with this
caution: that laws relating to public policy are alterable at the discretion of the
parliament: laws relating to private right are not to be altered but for the evident utility of the people of Scotland.
[* 9 ]
*22. Sixteen peers are to be chosen to represent the peerage of Scotland
7 in parliament, and forty-five members to sit in the house of commons.
23. The sixteen peers of Scotland shall have all ~rivileges of parliament; and
all peers of Scotland shall be peers of Great Britam, and rank next after those
of the same degree at the time of the union, and shall have all privileges of peers,
except sitting in the house of lords, and Yoting on the trial of a peer. (3)

Solway, in Scotland; and upon the 21st of January, 1708-9, it was resolved by the lords, that

a peer of Scotland claiming to sit in the house of peers by virtue of a patent passed under the

great seal of Great Britain, and who now sits in the parliament of Great Britain, had no right

to vote in the election of the sixteen peers who are to represent the peers of Scotland in par-

liament.

The duke of Hamilton having been created duke of Brandon, it was resolved by the lords on

the 20th of December, 1711, that no patent of honor granted to any peer of Great Britain,

who was a peer of Scotland at the time of the union, should entitle him to sit in parliament.

Notwithstanding this resolution gave great offence to the Scoteh peerage, and to the queen and

her ministry, yet a few years afterwards, when the duke of Dover died, leaving the earl of

Solway, the next in remainder, an infant, who, upon his coming of age, petitioned the king for

a writ of summons as duke of Dover; the question was again argued on the 18th Decem-

ber, 1719, and the claim as before disallowed. See the argument, 1 P. "Wrns. 582. But in

1782, the duke of Hamilton claimed to sit as duke of Brandon, and the question being referred

to the judges, they were unanimously of opinion, that the peers of Scotland are not disabled

from receiving, subsequently to the union, a patent of peerage of Great Britain, with all the

privileges incident thereto. Upon which the lords certified to the king, that the writ of sum-

mons ought to be allowed to the duke of Brandon, who now enjoys a seat as a British peer.

(6th June, 1782.) But there never was anv objection to an English peer's taking a Scoteh

peerage by descent; and therefore, before the last decision, when it was wished to confer an

.English title upon a noble family of Scotland, the eldest son of the Scoteh peer was created,

in ms father's life-time, an English peer, and the creation was not affected by the annexation

by inheritance of the Scotch "peerage. On the 13th February, 1787, it was resolved, that

the earl of Abercom and the duke of Queensbury, who had been chosen of the number of the

sixteen peers of Scotland, having been created peers of Great Britain, thereby ceased to sit iu

that house as representatives of the peerage. See the argument in Ann. Beg. for 1787, p. 95.

At the election occasioned by the last resolution, the dukes of Queensbury and Gordon had
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(3) [Since the union, the following orders have been made in the house of lords respecting
the peerage of Scotland. Queen Anne, in the seventh year of her reign, had created JamP,11
duke of Queensbury, duke of Dover, with remainder in tail to his second son, then earl of
Solway, in Scotland; nnd upon the 21st of January, 1708-9, it was resolved by the lords, that
a peer of Scotland claiming to sit in the house of peers by virtue of a patent p11&1ed under the
great seal of Great Britain, and who now sits in the parliament of Great Britain, had no right
to vote in the election of the sixteen peers who are to reprei;ent the peers of SC.Otland in parliament.
The duke of Hamilton having been created duke of Brandon, it waa ret10lved by the lords on
the 20th of December, 1711, that no patent of honor granted to any peer of Gre.at Britain,
who was a peer of Scotland at the time of the union, should entitle him to sit in parliament..
N otwithsto.nding this resolution gave great offence to the Scotch peerage, and to the queen and
her ministry, yet a few ,rears afterwards, when the duke of Dover died, leaving the earl of
Solway, the next in rcmamder, an infant, who, upon his coming of age, petitioned the king for
a writ of RUmmons as duke of Dover; the question was again argued on the 18th December, 1719, and the olaim as before disallowed. See the argument, 1 P. Wms. 58'.l. But in
178'.l, the duke of Hamilton claimed to sit as duke of Brandon, and the question being reforred
to the judges, they were unanimously of opinion, that the peers of Scotll\.Ild are not disabfod
from receiving, subsequently to the union, a patent of peerage of Great Brita.in, with all the
privileges incident thereto. Upon which the lords certified to the king, that the writ of summons ought to be allowed to the duke of Brandon, who now enjoys a seat as a Britit1h peer.
(6th June, 1782.) But there never WBll e.nv objection to an EngliEili peer't1 taking a Scotch
peerage bl' descent; and therefore, before the last decision, when it WUI! wished to confer an
1'Jnglish title n.P.on a noble family of Scotland, the eldest son of the S<~otch peer w11.s created,
in his father's hfe-time, an EngliRh peer, and the creation was not affected by the annexation
by inheritance of the Scotch peerage. On the 13th Ft1bruary, 1787, it was resolved, that
the earl of Abercom and the duke o( Queensbury, who had been chosen of the number of the
sixteen peers of Scotland, having been created peers of Great Britain, thereby ceased to sit in
that house as representativetJ of the peerage. See the argument in .Ann. Reg. for 1787, p. 95.
At the election occasioned by the last resolution, the dukes of Queensbury and Gordon had
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These are the principal of the twenty-five articles of union, which are ratified

and confirmed by statute 5 Ann. c. 8, in which statute there are also two acts of

parliament recited; the one of Scotland, whereby the church of Scotland, and

also the four universities of that kingdom, are established forever, and all suc-

ceeding sovereigns are to take an oath inviolably to maintain the same; the

other of England, 5 Ann. c. 6, whereby the acts of uniformity of 13 Eliz. and

13 Car. II, (except as the same had been altered by parliament at that time,)

and all other acts then in force for the preservation of the church of England,

are declared perpetual; and it is stipulated, that every subsequent king and

queen shall take an oath inviolably to maintain the same within England, Ire-

land, Wales, and the town of Berwick upon Tweed. And it is enacted, that

these two acts " shall for ever be observed as fundamental and essential condi-

tions of the union."

Upon these articles and act of union, it is to be observed, 1. That the two

kingdoms are now so inseparably united, that nothing can ever disunite them

again, except the mutual consent of both, or the successful resistance of either,

upon apprehending an infringement of those points which, when they were sep-

arate and independent nations, it was mutually stipulated should be " funda-

mental and essential conditions of the union." (e) 2. That whatever else may

be deemed " fundamental *and essential conditions," the preservation of r*Qo-i

the two churches of England and Scotland in the same state that they >• J

were in at the time of the union, and the maintenance of the acts of uniformity
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which establish our common prayer, are expressly declared so to be. 3. That

therefore any alteration in the constitution of either of those churches, or in

the liturgy of the church of England, (unless with the consent of the respective

churches, collectively or representatively given,) would be an infringement

of these "fundamental and essential conditions," and greatly endanger the

union. 4. That the municipal laws of Scotland are ordained to be still observed

in that part of the island, unless altered by parliament; and as the parliament

has not yet thought proper, except in a few instances, (4) to alter them, they

. still, with regard to the particulars unaltered, continue in full force. Where-

fore the municipal or common laws of England are, generally speaking, of no

force or validity in Scotland; (5) and of consequence, in the ensuing Commen-

(r) It may Jnstly be doubted whether even such an infringement (though a manifest breach of good faith,

unless done upon the moat pressing necessity) would of itselt dissolve tho union ; for the bare idea of a State,

•without a power somewhere vented to alter ever}1 part of its laws, is the height of political absurdity. The

truth seems to be, that in such an incorporate union (which is well distinguished by a very learned prelate

from H.firihnite. alliance, where such an infringement would certainly rescind the compact) the two con-

tracting states are totally annihilated, without any power of a revival; and a third arises from their con-

jiiiii-iu.ii. in which all the rights of sovereignty, "and particularly that of legislation, mnst of necessity

reside. See Warbnrton's Alliance, 195. But the wanton or imprudent exertion of this right would probably

raise a very alarming ferment In tho minds of individuals ; and therefore it Is hinted above that such an

attempt mfght endanger (though by no means dettroy) the union.

To illustrate this matter a little farther, an act ofparliament to repeal or alter the act of uniformity in Eng-

land, or to establish episcopacy in Scotlaud, would doubtless in point of authority be sufficiently valid and

bindiiiK i and notwithstanding such an act, the union wonld continue unbroken. Nay, each of these measures

might be safely and honorably pursued, if respectively agreeable to the sentiments of the English church,

or the kirk In Scotland. But it should seem neither prudent, nor perhaps consistent with good faith, to

venture upon either of those steps, by a spontaneous exertion of the inherent powers of parliament, or at

the instance of mere Individuals. So sacred indeed are the laws above mentioned (for protecting each

church and the English liturgy! esteemed, that In the regency acts both of 1751 and 1765 the regents are

expressly disabled from assenting to the repeal or alteration of either these or the act of settlement.

given their votes as peers of Scotland, contrary to the resolution of 1709, in consequence of which

it was resolved, 18th May, 1787, that a copy of that resolution should be transmitted to the lord

register of Scotland, ae a rule for his future proceeding in cases of election.

The duke of Queensbury and marquis of Abercorn had tendered their votes at the last general

election, and their votes were rejected; but notwithstanding the former resolutions, on 23d May,

1793, it was resolved, that, if duly tendered, they ought to nave been counted.]

There were, in 1861, no less than forty Scottish peers sitting in the house of lords by virtue

of British peerages created in their favor since the union of the two kingdoms. May, Const.

Hist. c. 5.

(4) [Acts of parliament passed since the union extend in general to Scotland; but -whore a

These are the principal of the twenty-five articles of union, which are ratified
and confirmed by statute 5 Ann. c. 8, in which statute the1·e are also two acts of
parliament recited; the one of Scotland, whereby the church of Scotland, and
also the four universities of that kingdom, are established forever, and all succeeding sovereigns are to take an oath inviolably to maintain the same; the
other of England, 5 Ann. c. 6, whereby the acts of uniformity of 13 Eliz. and
13 Car. II, (except as the same had been altered by parliament at that time,)
and all other acts then in force for the preservation of the church of England,
are declared perpetual; and it is stipulated, that every subsequent king and
queen shall take an oath inviolably to maintain the same within England, Ireland, Wales, and the town of Berwick upon Tweed. And it is enacted, that
these two acts "shall for ever be observed as fundamental and essential conditions of the union."
Upon these articles and act of union, it is to be observed, 1. That the two
kingdoms are now so inseparably united, that nothing can ever disunite them
agam, except the mutual consent of both, or the successful resistance of either,
upon apprehending an infringement of those points which, when they were separate and independent nations, it was mutually stipulated should be "funda·
mental and essential conditions of the union." (e) 2. That whatever else may
be deemed "fundamental *and essential conditions,'' the preservation of [* 9S]
the two churches of England and Scotland in the same state that they
were in at the time of the union, and the maintenance of the acts of umformity
which establish our common prayer, are expressly declared so to be. 3. That
therefore any alteration in the constitution of either of those churches, or in
the liturgy of the church of England, (unless with the consent of the respective
churches, collectively or representatively !riven,) would be an infringement
of these "fundamental and essential cond'itions," and greatly endanger the
union. 4. That. the municipal laws of Scotland are ordained to be still observed
in that part of the island, unless altered by parliament; and as the parliament
has not yet thought proper, except in a few instances, (4) to alter them, they
. still, with regard to the particulars unaltered, continue in full force. Wherefore the municipal or common laws of England are, generally speaking, of no
force or validity in Scotland; (5) and of consequence, in the ensuing Commen('-J It may jnat.ly be doubted \Vhethcr ernn such an infringement (though a manifest breach or good faith,
nnlesa done upon the most pressing neceeaity) would orltselt dl880lve the union; for the bare Idea or a State,
a power somewhere vested to alter every part of its laws is the height of polltfoal absnrdity. The
truth seems to be, that In such an incorporate uni-On (which le weh distinl{Ulshed by a \"Cry leame<l prelate
from af~GU allianu, where such au infriugement would certainly rcscln<I the compRCt) the two contracting states are totally annihilate<l, .without any power or a revival; and a third arises Ji·om their con·
junction, In which all the rights of sovereignty, aml partlcul11rly that of legislation, mnst of nece881ty
re~lde. See Warburton'& Alliance, l!lli. But the wanton or imprndent exertion of this rigbt would probably
raise a very alarming forment In the minds of lndh-i<luals ; and therefore it Is hinted above that such an
attempt might "11danger (though by no means deatrOfl) tho unlou.
To illustrate this matter a. little Carther, an act orµarliament to repeal or alter tbe act of nnilhnnity In Eng·
land, or t.o establish episcopaey in Seotl11ud, woul<l doubtless in point of authority be snftlclently valid and
bindin1e; and notwlthstan•llng such an nct, the union won Id continue unbroken. Nay, each ofthClle measures
might be aately and honorably pur1med, if respecth·ely agreeable to the sentiments of tho English church,
or the kirk In Scotlanrl. But it should seem neither pni<lent, nor perhaps consistent with good &ith, to
venture upon either or those st.cps, by a ~pontaneons exertion of the inherent powurs of parliament, or at
the instance of mere Individuals. So llRCred indeed are the laws above mentioned (for protecting ea11h
r.hurch and the English liturgy) esteemed, that In the re~ncy acts both of rnn and 1765 the regents are
expre88ly dl.eabled from &886nting to the repeal or alteration of either the88 or the act or settlement.
wi~bout

~ven

their votes as peers of Scotland, contrary to the resolution of 1709, in consequence of which

1i:. was resoh·ed, 18th .May, 1787, that a copy of that resolution 11bould be tr&llBillltted to the lord
refrister of Scotland, as a rule for his future proceeding in cases of election.
The duke of Queensbury and marqui1:1 of Abercom had tendered their votes at the last general
election, and their votes were rejected; but notwithstanding the former resolutions, on 23d .May,
1793, it was resolved, that, if duly tendered, they ought to have been counted.]
There were, in 1861, no less than forty Scottish peer11 sitting in the hou1:1e of lords by virtue
of British peerages created in their favor sinca the union of the two kingdoms. May, Const.
Hist. c. 5.
(4) [.A.cts of parliament pa.~sed since the union extend in general to Scotland; but whore a.
statute is only applicable to England, and whore Scotland is not intended to be inclndod, the
biU expres~ly provides that it does not extend w Scotland. See 3 Burr. 853.]
(5) LSee the cai;o of the King v. Cowie, in 2 Burr. 834, where the constitution of tho town of
Remick upon Tweed, and indeed the prerogative ae to dominion · extra Great Brita.in, is very
elaborately discussed.]
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statute is only applicable to England, and whore Scotland is not intended to be included, the

bill expressly provides that it does not extend to Scotland. See 3 Burr. 853.]

(5) [See tiie case of the King v. Cowle, in 2 Burr. 834, where the constitution of the town of

Berwick upon Tweed, and indeed the prerogative as to dominion extra Great Britain, is very

elaborately discussed.]
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taries, we shall have very little occasion to mention, any further than sometimes

by way of illustration, the municipal laws of that part of the united kingdoms.

The town of Berwick upon Tweed was originally part of the kingdom of

f*991 Scotland; and, as such, was for a time reduced *by King Edward I into

L J the possession of the crown of England: and during sucn, its subjection,

it received from that prince a charter, which (after its subsequent cession by

Edward Balliol, to be for ever united to the crown and realm of England,) was

confirmed by King Edward III, with some additions; particularly that it should

be governed by the laws and usages which it enjoyed during the time of King

Alexander, that is, before its reduction by Edward I. Its constitution was new

modelled, and put upon an English footing, by a charter of King James I: and

all its liberties, franchises, and customs, were confirmed in parliament by the

statutes 22 Edward IV, c. 8, and 2 Jac. I, c. 28. Though, therefore, it hath

some local pecularities, derived from the ancient laws of Scotland, (/) yet it is

clearly part of the realm of England, being represented by burgesses in the

house of commons, and bound by all acts of the British parliament, whether

specially named or otherwise. And therefore it was, perhaps superfluously,

declared, by statute 20 Geo. II, c. 42, that, where England only is mentioned in

any act of parliament, the same, notwithstanding, hath and shall be deemed to

comprehend the dominion of Wales and town of Berwick upon Tweed. And

though certain of the king's writs or processes of the courts of Westminster

do not usually run into Berwick, any more than the principality of Wales, yet
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it hath been solemnly adjudged (g) that all prerogative writs, as those of man-

damus, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, &c., may issue to Berwick as well

as to every other of the dominions of the crown of England, and that indict-

ments ana other local matters arising in the town of Berwick may be tried by

a jury of the county of Northumberland. (6)

As to Ireland, that is still a distinct kingdom, though a dependent subordi-

nate kingdom. It was only entitled the dominion or lordship of Ireland, (h)

and the king's style was no other than dominus Hiberniee, lord of Ireland, till

the thirty-third year of King Henry the Eighth, when he assumed (7) the

r*1001 *^e °f kin£> which is recognized by act parliament 35 Hen. VIII,

' J c. 3. But, as Scotland and England are now one and the same kingdom,

and yet differ in their municipal laws, so England and Ireland are, on the other

hand, distinct kingdoms, and yet in general agree in their laws. The inhabit-

ants of Ireland are, for the most part, descended from the English, who planted

it as a kind of colony, after the conquest of it by King Henry the Second; and

the laws of England were then received and sworn to by the Irish nation, assem-

bled at the council of Lismore. (i) And as Ireland, thus conquered, planted,

and governed, still continues in a state of dependence, it must necessarily con-

form to, and be obliged by, such laws as the superior state thinks proper to

prescribe.

At the time of this conquest the Irish were governed by what they called the

Brehon law, so styled from the Irish name of judges, who were denominated

Brehons. (k) But king John, in the twelfth year of his reign, went into Ire-

land, and carried over with him many able sages of the law; and there, by his

letters patent, in right of the dominion of conquest, is said to have ordained

and established that Ireland should be governed by the laws of England: (?)

which letters patent Sir Edward Coke (m) apprehends to have been there con-

(/) Hale, Hist. C. L. 188. 1 Sid. 88?, 482. 2 Show. 365.

(g) Cro. Jae. 543. 2 Boll. Abr. 292. Stat. 11 Geo. I, c. 4. Burr. 894. (\) Stat. Jlibrmia, 14 Hen. in.

(i) Pryn. on 4 Inst. 249. (k) 4 Inst. 358. Edm. Spenser's State of Ireland, p. 1513, edit Hughes.

(1) Vaugh. 294. 2 Pryn. Bee. 85. 7 Rep. 23. (m) 1 Inst. 141.

taries, we shall have very little occasion to mention, any further than sometimes
by way of illustration, the municipal laws of that part of the united kingdoms.
'l'he town of Berwick upon Tweed was originally part of the kingdom of
[•gg] Scotland; and, as such, was for a time reduced *by King Edward I into
the possession of the crown of England: and during such, its subjection,
it received from that prince a charter, which (after its subsequent cession by
Edward Balliol, to be for ever nuited to the crown and realm of England,) was
confirmed by King Edward II I, with some additions; particularly that it should
be governed by the laws and usages which it enjoyed during the time of King
Alexander, that is, before its reduction by Edward I. Its constitution was new
modelled, and put upon an English footing, by a charter of King James I: and
all its liberties, franchises, and customs, were confirmed in parliament by the
st.atutes 22 Edward IV, c. 8, and 2 Jae. I, c. 28. Though, therefore, it hath
some local pecularities, derived from the ancient laws of Scotland, (/) yet it is
clearly part of the realm of England, being represented by burgesses in the
house of commons, and bound by all acts of' the British parliament, whether
specially named or otherwise. And therefore it was, perhaps superfiuousl_y,
declared, by statute 20 Geo. II, c. 42, that, where England only is mentioned m
any act of parliament, the same, notwithstanding, ha.th and shall be deemed to
comprehend the dominion of Wales and town of Berwick upon Tweed. And
though certain of the king's writs or processes of the courts of Westminster
do not usually run into Berwick, any more than the principality of Wales, yet
it hath been solemnly adjudged ( g) that all prerogative writs, a.s those of mandamus, prohibition, liabea.'l rorpus, certiorari, &c., may issue to Berwick BB well
as to every other of the dominions of the crown of England, and that indictments and other local matters arising in the town of Berwick may be tried by
a jury of the county of Northumberland. (6)
As to Ireland, that is still a distinct kingdom, though a dependent subordinate kingdom. It was only entitled the dominion or lordship of Ireland, (It)
and the kin~'s style was no other than domhius Hibernim, lord of Ireland, till
the thirty-t11ird year of King Henry the Eighth, when he assumed (7) the
[*lOO] *title of king, which is recognized by act parliament 35 Hen. VIII,
c. 3. But, as Scotland and England are now one and the same kingdom,
and yet differ in their municipal laws, so England and Ireland are, on the other
hand, distinct kingdoms, and yet in general agree in their laws. The inhabitants of Ireland are, for the most part, descended from the English, who planted
it us a kind of colony, after the conquest of it by King Henry the Second; and
the laws of England were then received and sworn to by the Irish nation, assembled at the council of Lismore. (i) And BB Ireland, thus conquered, planted,
and governed, still continues in a state of dependence, it must necessarily conform to, and be obliged by, such laws as the superior state thinks proper to
prescribe.
At the time of this conquest the Irish were governed by what they called the
Brehon law, so styled from the Irish name of judges, who were denominated
Brehons. (k) But king John, in the twelfth year of his reign, went into Ireland, and carried over with him many able sages of the law; and there, by his
letters patent, in right of the dominion of conquest, is said to have ordained
and established that Ireland should be governed by the laws of England: (l)
which letters patent Sir Edward Coke (m) apprehends to have be.en there con-

(6^ Since these commentaries were written, a number of acts of parliament have been passed,

uwkmg alterations in the mode of administering justice in Scotland, but it is not deemed

important to enumerate them here.

I Sid.~. 462. 2 Show. 366.
2 Roll. Allr. 292. Stat. 11 Geo. I, c. 4. Burr. 834. (11) Stat. HOJernlal 1' Hen. Ill.
Pryn. on 4 lnst. 149.
(k) 4 Inst. MS. Edm. Spenser•s State of Ireland, p. UllS, ed t. Bugbee.
Vnugh. 294. i Pryn. Rec. 86. 7 Jfep. ~.
(•) I Inst. 141.

(f) H11le, Hist. C. L . 183.

(q) Cro. Jae. f>.13.
(1)
(l)

(7) [The title of king was conferred upon him and his successors; and it was made treason

for any inhabitant of Ireland to deny it. by 33 Hen. Till, c. 1, Irish Stat]
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(6) Since these commentari.e~ were written, a number of acts of parliament have been passed,
mukinir nlU>rationx in the mode of administering jUi>tice in Scotland, but it is not deemed
important to enumerate them here.
(i) [The title of king wa.~ conferred upon him and bis successori!; and it was made treason
for any inhabitant of Ireland to deny it, by 33 Hen. VIII, o. 1, Irish Stat.]
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firmed in parliament. But to this ordinance many of the Irish were averse to

conform, and still stuck to their Brehon law: so that both Henry the Third (n)

and Edward the First (o) were obliged to renew the injunction; and at length,

in a parliament holden at Kilkenny, 40 Edw. Ill, under Lionel duke of Clar-

ence, the then lieutenant of Ireland, the Brehon law was formally abolished, it

being unanimously declared to be indeed no law, but a lewd custom crept in of

later times. And yet, even in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the *wild r *-in-i -\

natives still kept and preserved their Brehon law, which is described (p) >- J

to have been " a rule of right unwritten, but delivered by tradition from one to

another, in which oftentimes there appeared great shew of equity in determin-

ing the right between party and party, but in many things repugnant quite

both to God's laws and man's." The latter part of this character is alone

ascribed to it, by the laws before cited of Edward the First and his grandson.

But as Ireland was a distinct dominion, and had parliaments of its own, it is

to be observed, that though the immemorial customs, or common law, of Eng-

land were made the rule of justice in Ireland also, yet no acts of the English

parliament, since the twelfth of King John, extended into that kingdom, unless

it were specially named, or included under general words, such as " within any

of the king's dominions." And this is particularly expressed, and the reason

given in the year books: (q) " a tax granted by the parliament of England shall

not bind those of Ireland, because they are not summoned to our parliament;"

and again, " Ireland hath a parliament of its own, and maketh and altereth laws;
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and our statutes do not bind them, (8) because they do not send knights to

our parliament, but their persons are the king's subjects, like as the inhabitants

of Calais, Gascoigne, and Guienne, while they continued under the king's sub-

jection." The general run of laws, enacted by the superior state, are supposed

to be calculated for its own internal government, and do not extend to its

distant dependent countries, which, bearing no part in the legislature, are not

therefore in its ordinary and daily contemplation. But, when the sovereign

legislative power sees it necessary to extend its care to any of its subordinate

dominions, and mentions them expressly by name, or includes them under

general words, there can be no doubt but then they are bound by its laws, (r)

*The original method of passing statutes in Ireland was nearly the same r ».. „„ ^

as in England, the chief governor holding parliaments at his pleasure, *• -I

which enacted such laws as they thought proper. (s) But an ill use being made

of this liberty, particularly by lord Gormanstown, deputy-lieutenant in the

reign of Edward IV, (t) a set of statutes were then enacted in the 10 Hen. VII,

(Sir Edward Poynings being then lord deputy, whence they are called Poynings'

laws) one of which, (u) in order to restrain the power as well of the deputy as

the Irish parliament, provides, 1. That, before any parliament be summoned or

holden, the chief governor and council of Ireland shall certify to the king,

under the great seal of Ireland, the considerations and causes thereof, and the

articles of tne acts proposed to be passed therein. 2. That after the king, in

his council of England, shall have considered, approved, or altered the said acts

or any of them, and certified them back under the great seal of England; and

shall have given license to summon and hold a parliament, then the same shall

be summoned and held; and therein the said acts so certified, and no other,

shall be proposed, received, or rejected, (w) But as this precluded any law from

being proposed, but such as were pre-conceived before the parliament was in

being, which occasioned many inconveniences and made frequent dissolutions

necessary, it was provided by the statute of Philip and Mary, before cited, that

(n) A. R. 30. 1 Kyin. Frmt. 442.

(o) A. R. b.—pro eo quod leyes qvibus utuntur Hubernict Deo detestabiles e rial mil, et omni juri ditiomnt,

adeo quod leges cenicri noil debeant i—iuMs et corurilio, nottro tatit viiletur expedient, eisdemutendas concedcre

firmed in parliament. But to this ordinance many of the Irish were averse to
conform, and still stuck to their Brehon law : so that both Henry the Third (n)
and Edward the First (o) were obliged to renew the injunction; and at length,
in a parliament holden at Kilkenny, 40 Edw. III, under Lionel duke of Clarence, the then lieutenant of Ireland, the Brehon law was formally abolished, it
being unanimously declared to be indeed no law, but a lewd custom crept in of
later times. And yet, even in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the •wild [ *lOl ]
natives still kept and preserved their Brehon law, which is described (p)
to have been "a rule of right unwritten, but delivered. by tradition from one to
another, in which oftentimes there appeared great shew of equity in determining the right between party and party, but in many things repugnant quit.e
both to God's laws and man's." The latt.er part of this character is alone
ascribed to it, by the laws before cited of Edward the First and his ~randson.
But as Ireland was a distinct dominion, and had parliaments of its own, it is
to be observed, that though the immemorial customs, or common law, of England were made the rule of justice in Ireland also, yet no acts of the English
parliament, since the twelfth of King John, extended into that kingdom, unless
it were SJ?CCially named, or included. under general words, such as "within any
of the kmg's dominions." And this is particularly expressed, and the reason
given in the year books: (q) "a tax granted by the parliament of England shall
not bind those of Ireland, because they are not summoned to our parliament;"
and again, "Ireland hath a parliament of its own, and maketh and altereth laws;
and our statutes do not bmd them, (8) because they do not send knights to
our parliament, but their persons are the king's subjects, like as the inhabitants
of Calais, Gascoigne, and Guicnne, while they contmned under the king's subjection." The general run of laws, enacted by the superior state, are supposed
to be calculated for its own internal government, and do not extend to its
distant de_pendent countries, which, bearing no -part in the legislature, are not
therefore m its ordinary and daily contemplat10n. But, when the sovereign
legislati"rn power sees it necessary to extend its care to any of its subordinate
dominions, and mentions them expressly by name, or includes them under
§"eneral words, there can be no doubt but then they are bound by its laws. (r}
The original method of passing statutes in Ireland was nearly the same [ • 102 ]
as in England, the chief governor holding parliaments at his pleasure,
which enacted such laws as they thought proper. (s) But an ill use being made
of this liberty, particularly by lord Gormanstown, deputy-lieutenant in the
reign of Edward IV, (t) a set of statutes were then enacted m the 10 Hen. VII,
(Sir Edward Poynings being then lord deputy, whence they are called Poynings'
laws) one of which, (u) in order to restrain the power as well of the deputy as
the 1rish parliliment, provides, 1. That, before any parliament be summoned or
holden, the chief governor and council of Ireland shall certify to the king,
nuder the great seal of Ireland, the considerations and causes thereof, and the
articles of the acts proposed to be passed therein. 2. That after the king, in
his council of England, shall have considered, approved, or altered the said acts
or any of them, and certified them back under the great seal of England ; and
shall have given license t-0 summon and hold a parliament, then the same shall
be summoned and held ; and therein the said acts so certified, and no other,
shall be proposed, received, or rejected. (w) But as this precluded any law from
being pro.P?sed, but such as were pre-conceived before the parliament was in
being, whwh occasioned many inconveniences and made frequent dissolutions
necessnry, it was provided by the statute of Philip and Mary, before cited, that

legct Anglicanat. 8 Pryn. Rec. 1218. (p) Edm. Spenser, ibid. (?) 20 Hen. VI. 8. 2 Klc. Ill, 12.

(r) Yearbook 1 Hen. VIJ, 3. 7. Kep. 22. Calvin's case. («) Irish stat. 11 Eliz. et. 3. c. 8.

(<) Ibid. 10 Hen. VII. c. 23. (u) Cap. 4. expounded by 3 and 4 Pb. and M. c. 4. (ic) 4 lost. 353.

(8) [Lord Coke, citing this in Calvin's case, 7 Co., 22, inserts this parenthesis, viz.: "(which

is to be understood unless specially named.)"]

(t1) A. R. ~. i Rym. Feod. «!.
lo) A. R. li.-flro eo quod legu quibu1 utuntur Ht1bendcl Deo ddutaMla ezutunt, et omn( juri dillOflant,
adeo quod legu cemeri non del>Mnt 1-110lria d oon.rilw. nonro 1atu riddur tzpedietu, rilltkmwenmu concedere
legu Anglicano.A.
8 Pryo. Rec. i218.
(p) Edm. Spenser, illld.
(q) 20 Hen. VI. 8. 2 Ric. Ill, 12.

1r1 Yearbook I Hen. vn, 3. 7.
Ibid.
10 Hen. VII, c. 23.

(t)

Rep. i2. Cal\'ln 's cai;e.
(a) Irish stat. 11 Eliz. st. 3. c. 8.
(u) Cap. '· expounued by 3 and 4 Pb. and M. c. 4..
\Mi) 4 Inst. 8/i8.

52CUUS)
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(8) [Lord Coke, citing this in Calvin's c68e, 7 Co., 22, insert.a this parenthesia, viz.: "(which
is to be understood unless specially no.med.)"]

63

Dig ize b

Original from
NEW Y·)R .., ~J.J~Lll~ } tiBRA RY

102 COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO LAWS OF ENGLAND. [Intro.

any new propositions might be certified to England in the usual forms, even

after the summons and during the session of parliament. By this means, how-

ever, there was nothing left to the parliament in Ireland but a bare negative or

power of rejecting, not of proposing or altering, any law. But the usage now is,

that bills are often framed in either house, under the denomination, of " heads

for a bill or bills:" and in that shape they are offered to the consideration of

the lord lieutenant and privy council, who, upon such parliamentary intimation,

or otherwise upon the application of private persons, receive and transmit such

F *1031 *^ea<^8' or raJ60* them without any transmission to England. And with

J regard to Poynings' law in particular, it cannot be repealed or suspended,

unless the bill for that purpose, before it be certified to England, be approved by

both the houses, (a;)

But the Irish nation, being excluded from the benefit of the English statutes,

were deprived of many good and profitable laws, made for the improvement of

the common law : and the measure of justice in both kingdoms becoming

thence no longer uniform, it was therefore enacted by another of Poynings'

laws, (y) that all acts of parliament before made in England should be of force

within the realm of Ireland, (z) But, by the same rule, that no laws made in

England, between King John's time and Poynings' law, were then binding in

Ireland, it follows that no acts of the English parliament, made since the 10

Hen. VII, do now bind the people of Ireland, unless specially named or included

under general words, (a) And on the other hand it is equally clear, that where
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Ireland is particularly named, or is included under general words, they are

bound by such acts of parliament. For this follows from the very nature and

constitution of a dependent state : dependence being very little else, but an

obligation to conform to the will or law of that superior person or state, upon

which the inferior depends. The original and true ground of this superiority,

in the present case, is what we usually call, though somewhat improperly, the

right of conquest: a right allowed by the laws of nations, if not by that of

nature ; but which in reason and civil policy can mean nothing more, than

that, in order to put an end to hostilities, a compact is either expressly or

tacitly made between the conqueror and the conquered, that if they will

acknowledge the victor for their master, he will treat them for the future as

subjects, and not as enemies, (b)

T *1041 *But this state of dependence being almost forgotten and ready

' -I to be disputed by the Irish nation, it became necessary some years ago to

declare how that matter really stood: and therefore by statute 6 Geo. I, c. 5. it

is declared that the kingdom of Ireland ought to be subordinate to, and depend-

ent upon, the imperial crown of Great Britain, as being inseparably united

thereto; and that the king's majesty, with the consent of the lords and com-

mons of Great Britain in parliament, hath power to make laws to bind

the people of Ireland. (9)

Thus we see how extensively the laws of Ireland communicate with those of

England: and indeed such communication is highly necessary, as the ultimate

resort from the courts of justice in Ireland is, as in Wales, to those in England;

<-r) Irlnh stat. 11 Eliz. St. S. c. 38. (y) Cap. 22. (*) i lest. 351. (a) 12 Rep. 112.

(») Puff. L. of N. TiU, 6, 24.

(9) [Prynne, in his learned argument, has enumerated several statutes made in England
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any new propositions might be certified to England in the usual forms, even
after the summons and during the session of parliament. By this means, however, there was nothing left to the parliament in Ireland but a bare negative or
power of rejecting, not of proposing or altering, any law. But the usage now is,
thu.t bills are often framed in either house, under the denomination, of " heads
for a bill or bills : " and in that shape they are offered to the consideration of
the lord lieutenant and privy council, who, upon such parliamentary intimation,
or otherwise upon the application of private persons, receive and transmit such
[ • 103 ] *heads, or reject them without any transmission to England. And with
regard to Poynings' law in particular, it cannot be repealed or suspended,
unless the bill for that purpose, before it be certified to England, be approved by
both the houses. (x)
But the Irish nation, being excluded from the benefit of the English statutes,
were deprived of many good and profitable laws, made for the improvement of
the common law : and the measure of justice in both kingdoms becoming
thence no longer uniform, it was therefore enacted by another of Poynings'
laws, (y) that all acts of parliament before made in England should be of force
within the realm of Ireland. (z) But, by the same rule, that no laws made in
England, between King John's time and Poynings' law, were then binding in
Ireland, it follows that no acts of the English parliament, made since the 10
Hen. VII, do now bind the people of Ireland, unless specially named or included
under general words. (a) And on the other hand it is equally clear, that where
Ireland is particularly named, or it1 included under general words, they are
bound by such acts of parliament. For this follows from the very nature and
constitution of a dependent state : dependence being very little else, but an
obligation to conform to the will or law of that superior person or state, upon
which the inferior depends. The original and true ground of this superioritv,
in the present case, is what we usually call, though somewhat improperly, tlic
right of conquest : a right allowed by the laws of nations, if not by that of
nature ; but which in reason and civil policy can mean nothing more, than
that, in order to put an end to hostilities, a compact is either expressly or
tacitly made between the conqueror and the conquered, that if they will
acknowledge the victor for their master, he will treat them for the future as
subjects, and not as enemies. (h)
*But this state of dependence being almost forgotten and ready
[ ,..104 ]
to be disputed by the Irish nation, it became necessary some years ago to
declare how that matter really stood: and therefore by statute 6 Geo. I, c. 5~ it
is declared that the kingdom of Ireland ought to be subordinate to, and dependent upon, the imperial crown of Great Britain, as being inseparably united
thereto ; and that the king's majesty, with the consent of the lords and commons of Great Britain in parliament, hath power to make laws to bind
the people of Ireland. (9)
Thus we see how extensively the laws of Ireland communicate with those of
England: and indeed such communication is hi~hly necessary~ as the ultimate
resort from the courts of justice in Ireland is, as m "\\.ales, to those in England ;

from the time of King John, by which Ireland was bound. 3 St. Tr. 343. That was an

argument to prove that Lord Connor Maguire, Baron of Inneskillin in Ireland, who had com-

(zo) lrlf1h stat. 11 Eliz. st. S. c. 88.
(b) Puff. L. ofN. Till, 8, ~.

(lt)

Cap. 22.

(.c) 4

Inst. 361.

(a) 12

Rep. 112.

mitted treason in that country, by being a principal contriver and instigator of the Irish

rebellion and massacre in the time of Car. I, and who had been brought to England against

his will, could be lawfully tried for it in the King's Bench at Westminster by a Middlesex

jury, and be ousted of his trial by his peers in Ireland, by force of the statute of 35 Hen.

Till, c. 2.

Tho prisoner having pleaded to the jurisdiction, the court, after hearing this argument,

overruled the plea, and the decision was approved of by a resolution of the two houses of

parliament, and Lord Maguire was found guilty, and was afterwards executed at Tyburn as a

traitor.]
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([I) [Prynne, in hi~ learned arJ,rument, hall enumerated several statute1:1 me.de in England
from the time of Kin!! John, bv whieh Ireland was bound. 3 St. Tr. 343. That was an
arp;umcmt to prove that Lord Connor .Maguire, Baron of Inneskillin in Ireland, who had comDUttcd troa.~on in that conntry, by being a princioal contriver and instigator of tho Irish
rebellion and ma."*'acre in the time of I.Jar. I, and who had been brought to England against
hi~ will. <'ould he lnwfnllv tri!'Cl for it. in the King's Bench at Westminster by a Middlesex
jury. and be ousted of his trio.I by his peers in Ireland, by force of the statute of 35 Hen.
VIII, c. \!.
Tho prisoner hating pleaded to tho jurisdiction, tho court, after hearing this argument,
ov1~rruled the plea, and the decision was approved of by a resolution of the two hou11eii of
parlio.mont, and Lord Maguire was found guilty, and was afterwards executed at Tyburn as a
traitor.]
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a writ of error (in the nature of an appeal) lying from the King's Bench in

Ireland to the King's Bench in England, (c) as the appeal from the Chancery

in Ireland lies immediately to the house of lords here: it being expressly

declared by the same statute, 6 Geo. I, c. 5, that the peers of Ireland have no

jurisdiction to affirm or reverse any judgments or decrees whatsoever. The pro-

priety, and even necessity, in all inferior dominions, of this constitution, " that,

though justice be in general administered by courts of their own, yet that the

appeal in the last resort ought to be to the courts of the superior state," is founded

upon these two reasons. 1. Because otherwise the law, appointed or permitted

to such inferior dominion, might be insensibly changed within itself, without

the assent of the superior. 2. Because otherwise Judgments might be given to1

the disadvantage or diminution of the superiority; or to make the depend-

ence to be only of the person of the king, and not of the crown of England.

(d) (10)

(e) This was law In the time of Hen. VIII. as appears by the ancient book, entitled, Diversity of Courti,

e. bane le roy. (d) Vitugh. 402.

u. writ of error (in the nature of an appeal) lying from the King's Bench in
Ireland to the King's Bench in England, (c) as the appeal from the Chancery
in Ireland lies immediately to the house of lords here: it being expressly
declared by the same statute, 6 Geo. I, c. 5, that the peers of Ireland have no
jurisdiction to affirm or reYerse any judgments or decrees whatsoever. The propriety, and even necessity, in all inferior dominions, of this constitution, "that,
though justice be in general administered by courts of their own, yet that the
appe.al in the last resort ought to be to the courts of the superior state," is founded
upon these two reasons. 1. Because otherwise the law, appointed or permitted
to such inferior dominion, might be insensibly changed within itself, without
the assent of the superior. 2. Because otherwise Judgments might be given to ·
the disadvantage or diminution of the superiority; or to make the dependence to be only of the person of the king, and not of the crown of England.
(d) (10)

(10) [The following is the purport of the eighth article of the union of Great Britain and

Ireland, extracted from the 39 ana 40 Geo. Ill, c. 77.

c.

(c) This waa law In the time of Hen. VIII. as appears by the ancient book, entitled, 1XfJflf'rit71 of Couf'U,
batae ~ 1'01/·

(d) Vsugb. 402.

Art I. That the kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland shall, on the first day of January,

1801, and forever after, be united into one kingdom, by the name of The United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Ireland; and that the royal style and titles of the imperial crown, and the

ensigns, armorial flags and banners, shall be such as should be appointed by his majesty's royal
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proclamation.

Art. II. That the succession to the imperial crown shall continue settled in the same manner

as the succession to the crown of Great Britain and Ireland stood before limited.

Art. III. That there shall be one parliament, styled, The Parliament of the United Kingdom

of Great Britain and Ireland.

Art. IV. That four lords spiritual of Ireland, by rotation of sessions, and 28 lords temporal of

Ireland, elected for life by the peers of Ireland, shall sit in the house of lords; and 100 com-

moners, two for each county, two for the city of Dublin, and two for the city of Cork, one for

Trinity College, and one for each of the 31 most considerable cities and boroughs, shall be the

number to sit in the house of commons on the part of Ireland.

That questions respecting the rotation or election of the spiritual or temporal peers shall be

decided by the house of lords, and in the case of an equality of votes in the election of a tem-

poral peer, the clerk of the parliament shall determine the election by drawing one of the names

from a glass.

That a peer of Ireland, not elected one of the 28, may sit in the house of commons; but whilst

he continues a member of the house of commons, he shall not be entitled to the privilege of peer-

age, nor capable of being elected one of the 28, nor of voting at such election, and he shall be

sued and indicted for any offence as a commoner.

That as often as three of the peerages of Ireland, existing at the time of the union, shall

become extinct, the king may create one peer of Ireland; and when the peers of Ireland are

reduced to 100 by extinction or otherwise, exclusive of those who shall hold any peerage of

Great Britain subsisting at the time of the union, or created of the united kingdom since the

union, the king may then create one peer of Ireland for every peerage that becomes extinct, or

as often as any one of them is created a peer of the united kingdom, so that the king may always

keep up the number of 100 Irish peers, over and above those who have an hereditary seat in tie

house of lords.

That questions respecting the election of the members of the house of commons returned

for Ireland, shall be tried in the same manner, as questions respecting the elections for places

in Great Britain, subject to such particular regulations as the parliament afterwards shall deem

expedient.

That the qualifications by property of the representatives in Ireland, shall be the same

respectively as those for counties, cities, and boroughs in England, unless some other provision

be afterwards made.

Until an act shall be passed in the parliament of the united kingdom, providing in what cases

persons holding offices and places of profit under the crown of Ireland shall be incapable of sit-

ting in the house of commons, not more than 20 such persons shall be capable of sitting; and if

more than 20 such persons shall be returned from Ireland, then the seats of those above 20 shall

be vacated, who have last accepted their offices or places.

That all the lords of parliament on tile part of Ireland, spiritual and temporal, sitting in

the house'of lords, shall have the same rights and privileges, respectively as the peers of Great

Britain; and that all the lords spiritual and temporal of Ireland shall have rank and prece-

dency next and immediately after all the persons holding peerages of the like order and

(10) [The following is the purport of the eighth article of the union of Great Britain and
Ireland, e:s:tracted from the 39 and 40 Goo. III, c. 77.
.A.rt. I. That the kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland shall, on the first day of January,
1801, and forever after, be united into one kingdom, by the name of The United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland; and that the royaf style and titles of the imperial crown, and the
ensigns, armorial flags and banners, shall be such as should be appointed by his majesty's royal
proclamation.
.A.rt. II. That the succession to the imperial crown shall continue settled in the same manner
88 the snccession to the crown of Great Britain and Ireland stood befnre limited .
.Art. III. That there shall be one parliament, styled, The Parliament of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland.
.Art. IV. That four lords 11piritual of Ireland, by rotation of 11essions1 and 28 lorde temporal of
Ireland, elected for life by the peers of Ireland, shall sit in the humm of lords; and 100 commoners, two for each county, two for the city of Dublin, and two for the city of Cork, one for
Trinity College, and one for each of the 31 most considerable cities and boroughs, shall be the
number to sit in the house of commons on tho part of Ireland.
That questions respecting the rotation or election of the spiritual or temporal peers i1hall be
decided by the house of lords, and in the case of an equality of votes in the election of a temporal peer, the clerk of the parliament Bhall determine the election by drawing one of the names
from a glass.
That a peer of Ireland, not elected one of the 28, may sit in the house of commons; but whilst
he continues a member of the house of commons, he shall not be entitled to the privilege of peerage, nor capable of being elected one of the 28, nor of voting at such election, and he shall be
sued and indicted for any offence as a commoner.
That as often as three of the peerages of Ireland, existing at the time of the union, shall
become extinct, the king may create one peer of Ireland ; and when the peers of Ireland are
reduced to 100 by extinction or otherwise, exclusive of those who shall hold any peerage of
Great Britain subsisting at the time of the union, or created of the united kingdom since the
union, the king may then create one peer of Ireland for every peerage that become11 extinct, or
aa often as any one of them is cmiated a peer of the united kingdom, so that the king may always
keep np the number of 100 Irish peers, over and above those who have an hereditary seat in the
house of lords.
That questions respecting the election of the members of the house of commons returned
for Ireland, shall be tried in the same manner, as questions respecting the elections for places
in Great Britain, subject to such particular regulations as the parliament afterwards 11hall deem
expedient.
That the qualifications by property of the representatives in Ireland, shall be the same
respectively &11 those for counties, cities, and boroughs in England, unless some other provision
be afterwards made.
Until an act shall be passed in the parliament of the united kingdom, providing m what cases
penions holding offices and places of profit under the crown of Ireland shall be incapable of sitting in the house of commons, not more than 20 such persons shall be capable of sitting; and if
more than 20 such persons shall be returned from Ireland, then the seats of those above 20 shall
be vacated, who have last accepted their offices or places.
That all the lords of parliament on the part of Ireland, spiritual and temporal, sitting in
the house· of lords, shall have the same rights and privileges, respectively as the peers of Great
Britain ; ~d that all the lords t<piritual and temporal of Ireland shall have rank and precerlency next and immediately after all the persons holding peerages of the like order and
degree in Great Britain, subsisting at the time of the union; and that all peerages here.
after oreitted of Ireland, or of the united kingdom, of the same degree, shall have precedeucy
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degree in Great Britain, subsisting at the time of the union; and that all peerages here-

after created of Ireland, or of the united kingdom, of the same degree, shall have precedency
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r *10f> 1 With regard to the other adjacent islands which are subject to the

L luo J crown of Great Britain, some of them (as the Isle of *Wight, of Portland,

of Thanet, &c.) are comprised within some neighboring county, and are therefore

to be looked upon as annexed to the mother island, and part of the kingdom of

England. But there are others which require a more particular consideration.

And, first, the Isle of Man is a distinct territory from England, and is not

governed by our laws: neither doth any act of parliament extend to it, unless

it be particularly named therein; and then an act of parliament is binding

there, (e) It was formerly a subordinate feudatory kingdom, subject to the

kings of Norway; then to King John and Henry III of England; afterward

to the kings of Scotland; and then again to the crown of England: and at length

we find King Henry IV claiming the island by right of conquest, and disposing

of it to the earl of Northumberland; upon whose attainder it was granted (by

the name of the Lordship of Man) to Sir John de Stanley by letters patent, 7

Henry IV. (/) In his lineal descendants it continued for eight generations, till

the death of Ferdinando, earl of Derby, A. D. 1594: when a controversy arose

concerning the inheritance thereof, between his daughters and William his

surviving brother: upon which, and a doubt that was started concerning the

validity of the original patent, (g) the island was seized into the queen's hands,

and afterwards various grants were made of it by King James the Frst: all

which being expired or surrendered, it was granted afresh in 7 Jac. I, to William

earl of Derby, and the heirs of his body, with remainder to his heirs general;
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which grant was the next year confirmed by act of parliament, with a restraint

of the power of alienation by the said earl and his issue male. On the death of

James, earl of Derby, A. D. 1735, the male Hue of Earl William failing, the duke

of Atholl succeeded to the island as heir general by a female branch. In the

mean time, though the title of king had been long disused, the earls of Derby,

(e) 4 Inst. 284. 2 And. 116. (/) Seldon, tit. hon. J, 3. (g) Camden. Ellz. A. D. 189*.

according to the dates of their creations; and that all the peers of Ireland, except those who are

members of the house of commons, shall have all the privileges of peers as fully as the peers of

With regard to the other adjacent islands which are subject to the
[ *l05 ] crown of Great Britain, some of them (as the Isle of *Wight, of Portland,
of Thanet, &c.) are comprised within some nei~hboring county, and are therefore
to be looked upon as annexed to the mother island, and part of the kingdom of
England. But there are others which require a more particular consideration.
And, first, the Isle of Man is a distinct territory from England, and is not
~overned by our laws: neither doth any act of parliament extend to it, unleBB
it be particularly named therein; and then an act of parliament is binding
there. (e) It was formerly a subordinate feudatory kingdom, subject to the
kings of N orwa{ ; then to King John and Henry III of England; afterward
to the kin~s of Scotland; and then again to the crown of England: and at lensth
we find Kmg Henry IV claiming the island by right of conquest, and disposmg
of it to the earl of Northumberland; upon whose attainder it was granted (by
the name of the Lordship of Man) to Sir John de Stanley by letters patent, 1
Henry IV.
In his lineal descendants it continued for eight generations, till
the death o Ferdinando, earl of Derby, A. D. 1594:: when a controversy a.rose
concerning the inheritance thereof, between his daughters and William his
survh·ing brother: upon which, and a doubt that was started concerning the
validity of the original patent, (g) the island was seized into the queen's hands,
and afterwards various grants were made of it by King James the Frst: all
which being expired or surrendered, it was granted afresh in 7 Jae. I, to William
earl of Derby, and the heirs of his body, with remainder to his heirs general;
which grant was the next year confirmed by act of parliament, with a restraint
of the power of alienation by the said earl and his issue male. On the death of
James, earl of Derby, A. D. 1735, the male line of Earl William failing, the duke
of Atholl succeeded to the island as heir genel"al by a female branch. In the
mean time, though the title of king had been long disused, the earls of Derby,

V')

Great Britain, the right and privilege of sitting in the house of lords, and upon the trial of peers

(e) i Inst. 28i. 2 And. 116.

(fl Seldon, tit. hon. l, 3.

(g) Camden. EU&. A. D. 11194.

only excepted.

Art. V. That the churches of England and Ireland be united into one protestant episcopal

church, to be called The United Church of England and Ireland; that the doctrine and worship

shaU be the same; and that the continuance and preservation of the united church as the estab-

lished church of England and Ireland, shall bo deemed an essential and fundamental part of the

union; and that, in like manner, the church of Scotland shall remain the same as is now estab-

lished by law, and by the acts of union of England and Scotland.

Art. VI. The subjects of Great Britain and Ireland shall be entitled to the same privileges with

regard to trade and navigation, and also in respect of all treaties with foreign powers.

That all prohibitions and bounties upon the Importation of merchandise from one country to

the other shall cease.

But that the importation of certain articles therein enumerated shall be subject to such coun-

tervailing duties as are specified in the act.

Art. VII. The sinking funds, and the interest of the national debt, of each country, shall be

defrayed by each separately. And, for the space of 20 years after the union, the contribution of

Great Britain and Ireland towards the public expenditure in each year, shall be iu the proportion

of fifteen to two, subject to future regulations.

Art. VIII. All the laws and courts of each kingdom shall remain the same as they are now

established, subject to such alterations by the united parliament as circumstances may require;

but that all writs of error and appeals shall be decided by the house of lords of the united King-

dom, except appeals from the court of admirality in Ireland, which shall be decided by a court

of delegates appointed by the court of chancery in Ireland.

The statute then recites an act passed in the parliament of Ireland, by which the rotation of

tho four spiritual lords for each session is fixed; and it also directs the time and mode of electing

tho 'J8 temporal peers for life; and it provides that 04 county members, two for each county, two

for the city of Dublin, two for the city of Cork, one for Trinity College, Dublin, and one for each

of 31 cities and towns which are there specified, whiph are the only places in Ireland to be repre-

sented iu future. One of the two members of each of those places was chosen by lot, unless the

other withdrew his name, to sit in the first parliament, but at the next elections, one member

onlv will be returned.]

T1 he number of Irish members of the house of commons was increased by the addition of five,

by st. 2 and 3 William IV, c. 88, $ 11-
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according to the dates of their creations; and that all the peers of Ireland, except thOAe who are
mumbcra of the house of commons, shall have all the privileges of peers as fully os the peers of
Great Britain, the right and privilege of sitting in the house of lords, and upon the trial of peers
only excepted.
.Art. V. That the churches of England and Irel&.nd be united into one protestant episcopal
church, to be called The United Church of England and Ireland; that the doctrine and wor8hip
i!hall be the same; and that the continuance and pre~ervation of the united church as the establi~hed church of England and Ireland, shall bo deemed an e&1entiru and fundamental po.rt of the
union ; and that, in like manner, the church of Scotland shall remain the same 118 is now established by law, and by the acts of union of England and Scotland.
.A.rt. YI. The subjects of Great Britain and Ireland shall be entitled to the same privileges with
retzard to trade and navigation, and also in respect of all treaties with foreiS!l powem.
'fhat all prohibitions and bounties upon the importation of merchandise from one country to
the other shall cease.
·
Ilut that the importation of certain articles therein enumerated shlill be subject to such countervailing duties as are specified in the act.
Art. VII. The sinking funds, and the interest of the national debt, of each country1 shall be
defrayed by each separately. And, for the space of 20 years after the union, the contribution of
Great Britain and Ireland towlll'ds the public expenditure in each year, shall be in the proportion
of fifteen to two, subject to future regulations.
Art. VIII. All the laws and court.~ of each kingdom shall remain the same 118 they are now
e~tablished, subject to 1meh alteration.'! by the united parliament as ciroumstanees may require;
hut that all writs of error and appeals shall be decided by the house of lords of the united lrlnguum, except appeals from the court of admini.lity in Ireland, which shall be decided by a. court
of delegates appointed hy the court of chancery in Ireland,
The Rtatutc then recites an act p81!11Cd in the parliament of Ireland, by which the rotation of
the four Hpiritual lords for each session is fixed ; and it also directs the time and mode of electing
the ~ temporal peers for life; and it provides that 64 COlµlty members, two for each county, two
for the city of Dublin, twq for the city of Cork1 one for Trinity College, Dublin, e.nd one for each
of 31 cities and towns ')'hich are there speciftea, which are the only places in Ireland to be reprosentliu iu future. Ono of' the two members of eac4 of those places was chot!6Il by lot, unles:; the
other withdrew his namo, to sit in the tint parliament, but at the next elections, one member
only will be· returned.]
The number of Jrish members of the house of coµµnona was incTM.@8d by the addition of five,
by st. 2 and 3 William IV, c. 88, ~ 11.
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as lords of Man, had maintained a sort of royal authority therein ; by assenting

or *dissenting to laws, and exercising an appellate jurisdiction. Yet, r ^Qg -,

though no English writ, or process from the courts of Westminster, was *- ' '

of any authority in Man, an appeal lay from a decree of the lord of the island

to the king of Great Britain in council, (h) But the distinct jurisdiction of

this little subordinate royalty being found inconvenient for the purposes of public

justice, and for the revenue, (it affording a commodious asylum for debtors, out-

laws, and smugglers,) authority was given to the treasury by statute 12, Geo. I,

c. 28, to purchase the interest of the then proprietors for the use of the crown:

which purchase was at length completed in the year 1765, and confirmed by stat-

utes 5 Geo. Ill, c. 26 and 39, whereby the whole island and all its dependencies

so granted as aforesaid, (except the landed property of the Atholl family, their

manorial rights and emoluments, and the patronage of the bishoprick (i) and

other ecclesiastical benefices,) are unalienably vested in the crown, and subjected

to the regulations of the British excise and customs.

The islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Sark, Alderney, and their appendages, were

parcel of the duchy of Normandy, and were united to the crown of England by

the first princes of the Norman line. They are governed by their own laws,

which are for the most part the ducal customs of Normandy, "being collected in

an ancient book of very great authority, entitled le grand Coustumier. The

king's writ, or process from the courts of Westminster, is there of no force ; but

his commission is. (11) They are not bound by common acts of our parliaments,
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unless particularly named, (k) All causes are originally determied by their own

officers, the bailiffs and jurats of the islands; but an appeal lies from them to

the king and council, in the last resort. (12)

Besides these adjacent islands, our most distant plantations in America, and

elsewhere, are also in some respects subject to the English laws. Plantations or

colonies, in distant *countries, are either such where the lands are claimed r *i nw -i

by right of occupancy only, by finding them desert and uncultivated, and *- J

peopling them from the mother-country; or where, when already cultivated,

they have been either gained by conquest, or ceded to us by treaties. And both

these rights are founded upon the law of nature, or at least upon that of nations.

But there is a difference between these two species of colonies, with respect to

the laws by which they are bound. For it hath been held, (I) that if an unin-

habited country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English

laws then in being, which are the birthright of every subject, (ni) are immedi-

ately there in force. (13) But this must be understood with very many and very

great restrictions. Such, colonists carry with them only so much of the English

law as is applicable to their own situation and the condition of an infant colony;

such, for instance, as the general rules of inheritance, and of protection from

personal injuries. The artificial refinements and distinctions incident to the

property of a great and commercial people, the laws of police and revenue, (such

especially as are enforced by penalties,) the mode of maintenance for the estab-

lished clergy, the jurisdiction of spiritual courts, and a multitude of other pro-

visions, are neither necessary nor convenient for them, and therefore arc not in

(A) 1 F. Wins. WO.

(<) The bishoprick of Man, or Sodor, or Sodorand Man, was formerly within the province of Canterbury,

l>ut annexed to that of York, by statute S3 Hen. VIII, c. 31. It) 4 Inst. 286

(1) Salk. 411, 006. tut) 2 P. Wins. 75.

(11) What are called prerogative writs, however, from tho Queen's Bench, run to these

islands. Roy v. Overton, Sid. 386; Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 384 ; Brenan and Galen's Case, 10 Q.

(12) [Of these islands the crown is proprietary; bnt, like the demesne lands, they are sn.bject

to the occasional interference of parliament. With reference to these islands, the exercise of the

executive power is regulated by customs and known laws: the people themselves haye no voipe,

but subject to these.]

(13) Regarding the extent to which the common law of England is in force in. the American

States by colonial adoption, see note, p. 68.
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force. (14) What shall be admitted and what rejected, at what times, and under

what restrictions, must, in case of dispute, be decided in the first instance by

their own provincial judicature, subject to the revision and control of the king

in council: the whole of their constitution being also liable to be new-modelled

and reformed by the general superintending power of the legislature in the

mother-country. (15) But in conquered or ceded countries, that have already

laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change those laws; (16) but,

till he does actually change them, the ancient laws of the country remain, unless

such as are against the law of God, as in the case of an infidel country, (n) Our

American plantations are principally of this latter sort, being obtained in the

last century either by right of conquest and driving out the natives (with what

r ajQg -I natural justice I shall not at present inquire), *or by treaties. (17) And

*• * therefore the common law of England, as such, has no allowance or

authority there; they being no part of the mother-country, but distinct, though

dependent, dominions. They are subject, however, to the control of the parlia-

ment ; though (like Ireland, Man, and the rest,) not bound by any acts of parlia-

ment, unless particularly named.

With respect to their interior polity, our colonies are properly of three sorts.

1. Provincial establishments, the constitutions of which depend on the respect-

ive commissions issued by the crown to the governors, and the instructions

which usually accompany those commissions; under the authority of which,

provincial assemblies are constituted, with the power of making local ordinances,
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not repugnant to the laws of England. 2. Proprietary governments, granted

out by the crown to individuals, in the nature of feudatory principalities, with

all the inferior regalities, and subordinate powers of legislation, which formerly

belonged to the owners of counties-palatine: yet still with these express con-

ditions, that the ends for which the grant was made be substantially pursued,

and that nothing be attempted which may derogate from the sovereignty of the

mother country. 3. Charter governments, in the nature of civil corporations,

with the power of making bye-laws for their own interior regulations, not con-

trary to the laws of England; and with such rights and authorities as are

specially given them in their several charters of incorporation. The form of

government in most of them is borrowed from that of England. They have a

governor named by the king, (or, in some proprietary colonies, by the propri-

etor,) who is his representative or deputy. They have courts of justice of their

own, from whose decisions an appeal lies to the king and council here in Eng-

(n) 7 Rep. 17, Calvin's case. Sbow. Farl. C. SI.

(14) [A statute passed in England after the establishment of a colony, will not affect it unless

it be particularly named; and therefore the requisites of the statute against frauds, in executing

force. (14) What shall be admitted and what rejected, at what times, and under
what restrictions, must, in case of dispute, be decided in the first instance by
their own provincial judicature, subject to the revision and control of the king
in council: the whole of their constitution being also liable to be new-modelled
and reformed by the general superintending power of the legislature in the
mother-country. (15) But in conquered or ceded countries, that have already
laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change those laws; (16) but,
till he does actually change them, the ancient laws of the country remain, unless
such as are against the law of God, as in the c.aae of an infidel country. (n) Our
American plantations are principally of this latter sort, being obtained in the
last century either by right of conquest and drinng out the natives (with what
[ *lOS] natural justice I shall not at present inquire), •or by treaties. (17) And
therefore the common law of England, as such, has no allowanc.e or
authority there ; they being no part of the mother-country, but distinct, though
dependent, dominions. They are subject, however, to the oontrol of the par1iament; though (like Ireland, Man, and the rest,) not bound by &ny acts of parliament, unless particularly named.
With respect to their interior polity, our colonies a.re properly of three sorts.
1. Provincial establishments, the constitutions of which depend on the respective commissions issued by the crown to the governors, and the instructions
which usually accompany those commissions; under the authority of which,
provincial assemblies are constituted, with the power of making local ordinances,
not repugnant to the laws of England. 2. Proprietary governments, granted
out by the crown to individuals, in the nature of feudatory principalities, with
all the inferior regalities, and subordinate powers of legislation, which formerly
belonged to the owners of counties-palatine: yet still with these express conditions, that the ends for which the grant was made be substantially pursued,
and that nothing be attempted which may derogate from the sovereignty of the
mother country. 3. Charter governments, in the nature of civil corporations,
with the power of making bye-laws for their own interior regulations, not contrary to the laws of England; and with such rights and authorities as are
specially given them in their several charters of incorporation. The form of
government in most of them is borrowed from that of England. They have a
governor named by the king, (or1 in some proprietary colonies, by the proprietor,) who is his representative or deputy. They have courts of justice of their
own, from whose decisions an appeal lies to the king and council here in Eng-

wills, <to. have no influence in Barbadoes: see cases collected 1 Cutty's Com. Law, 638; so the

(n) 7 Rep. 17,

5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 16, as to sale of offices, do not extend to Jamaica. 4 Mod. 222.]

Calvi.Q'~

ease. Show. Parl. C. 31.

(15) The reader need hardly be reminded that the right of the British parliament to legislate

generally for the American colonies which were not represented therein, was not admitted, but

was resisted by force of arms, and the resistance ultimated in establishing the independence of

the thirteen United States of America, which was acknowledged by Great Britain by the treaty

of Sept. 3, 1783.

(16) [See an elaborate and learned argument by Lord Mansfield, to prove the king's legislative

authority by his prerogative alone over a ceded conquered country. Cowp. 204.]

What the king may or may not do, by Tirtue of his prerogative, with reference to a conquered

or ceded country, is very elaborately discussed in Chalmer's Opinions, 169.

(17) The practical view taken of the American plantations, as well by statesmen as by the

courts, has not regarded them as obtained by right of conquest or under treaties, but as ac-

quired by right of discovery. The continent of America was looked upon as occupied by races

of savages, whose habits of life rendered them incapable of any such occupation and use of the

soil as should exclude the possession of others; for which reason the land was considered open

to be appropriated and colonized by the nation of the first discoverer. That European nation

first discovering a country and setting up marks of possession was regarded as acquiring the ex-

clusive right ax against all others to colonize and settle it, and to extinguish the Indian title

therein; but no better right was recognized in the Indians than one to mere occupancy, while

the title to the soil itself was in the civilized race. Sep Story on Const., $$ 152 to 157 ; 3 Kent,

308; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515.
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(14) (.A statute passed in Englo.nd atler the establishment of a colony, will not affect it unless
it be particularly ne.med; and therefore the requisites of the statute against frauds, in executing
wills, &o. have no influence in Barbadoes: see cases collected 1 Chitty's Com. Law, 638; so the
5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 16, as to sale of offices, do not extend to Jamaica. 4 Mod. 2'22.]
(15) The reader need hardly be reminded that the right of the British parliament to leJtislate
generally for the .Americo.n colonies which were not represented therein, was not admittea, but
was resisted by force of arms, and the resistance ultimated in establishing tho independence of
the thirteen United Sto.tes of America, which was ~knowledged by Great Britain by the treaty
of Sept. 3, 1783.
(16) [See an elaborate &nd learned argument by Lord Mansfield, to prove the king's legislative
authority by bis prerogative t\lone over a ct1ded con<\uered country. Cowp. 204.]
What the king may or may not do, by Tirtue of his prerogative, with reference to a conquered
or ceded country, i~ very elaborately discussed in Cbalmer's Opinions, 169.
(17) The practical view taken of the American plBDtations, 88 well by statesmen 8IJ by the
courts, bas not regarded them as obtained by right of conquest or under treaties, but 88 acquired by right of discovery. The continent of America was looked upon as occupied by races
of savages, whose habits of life rendered them incapable of any such occupation and use of the
soil as t1hould exclude the pollilession of others ; for which re880n the lana was considered open
to ue appropriated and colonized by tho nation of the first dii!coverer. That European nation
first dit1covering a coµntry and setting up marks of posseesion was regarded a11 acquiriuiz the exclm1ive right BK e.g..Wst all others to colonize and settle it, and to extinguiah the Indian title
therein; but no !Jetter right was reco~zed in the Indians than one to mere occupancy, whilo
the title to the soil itself was in the civilized race. Sf.It' Story Q~ Const., U 162 to 157; 3 Kent,
iJ08; Worcester 11. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515.
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land. Their general assemblies, which are their house of commons, together

with their council of state, being their upper house, with the concurrence of the

king, or his representative the governor, make laws suited to their own emer-

gencies. But it is particularly declared by statute 7 and 8 W. Ill, c. 22, that

*all laws, bye-laws, usages and customs, which shall be in practice in any r*i QQ-I

of the plantations, repugnant to any law, made or to be made in this"- J

kingdom relative to the said plantations, shall be utterly void and of none effect

And, because several of the colonies had claimed a sole and exclusive right of

imposing taxes upon themselves, the statute 6 Geo. Ill, c. 12, expressly declares,

that all his majesty's colonies and plantations in America have been, are, and

of right ought to be, subordinate to and dependent upon the imperial crown

and parliament of Great Britain; who have full power and authority to make

laws and statutes of sufficient validity to bind the colonies and people of

America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain in all cases whatsoever. And

this authority has been since very forcibly exemplified and carried into act, by

the statute 7 Geo. Ill, c. 59, for suspending the legislation of New York; and

by several subsequent statutes.(18)

These are the several parts of the dominions of the crown of Great Britain,

in which the municipal laws of England are not of force or authority, merely

as the. municipal laws of England. Most of them have probably copied the

spirit of their own law from this original; but then it receives its obligation,

and authoritative force, from being the law of the country
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As to any foreign dominions which may belong to the person of the king by

hereditary descent, by purchase, or other acquisition, as the territory of Hanover,

and his majesty's other property in Germany; as these do not in any wise apper-

tain to the crown of these kingdoms, they are entirely unconnected with the

laws of England, and do not communicate with this nation in any respect

whatsoever. The English legislature had wisely remarked the inconveniences

that had formerly resulted from dominions on the continent of Europe; from

the Norman territory which William the Conqueror brought with him, and

held in conjunction with the *English throne; and from Anjon and its piiQi

appendages which fell to Henry the Second by hereditary descent. *• *

They had seen the nation engaged for near four hundred years together in

ruinous wars for defence of these foreign dominions; till, happily for this

country, they were lost under the reign of Henry the Sixth. They observed

that, from that time, the maritime interests of England were better understood

and more closely pursued: that, in consequence of this attention, the nation,

as soon as she had rested from her civil wars, began at this period to flourish all

at once; and became much more considerable in Europe, than when her princes

were possessed of a larger territory, and her councils distracted by foreign inter-

ests. This experience, and these considerations, gave birth to a conditional

clause in the act(o) of settlement, which vested the crown in his present

majesty's illustrious house, " that in case the crown and imperial dignity of

(n) Slat. 12 and 13 Will. Ill, 0. 8.

(18) [Notwithstanding the establiflhment of their independence by the American States, the

mother country still possesses a number of colonies in different parts of the globe, to which the rea-

land. Their general assemblies, which are their house of commons, together
with their council of state, being their upper house, with the concurrence of the
king, or his representative the governor, make laws suited to their own emeriencies. But it is particularly declared by statute 7 and 8 W. III, c. 22, that
all laws, bye-laws, usages and customs, which shall be in practice in an.Y [*l09]
of the plantations, repugnant to any law, made or to be made in this
kingdom relative to the said plantations, shall be utterly void and of none effect.
And, because several of the colonies had claimed a sole and exclusive right of
imposing taxes upon themselves, the statute 6 Geo. III, c. 12, expressly declares,
that all his majesty's colonies and plantations in America have been, are, and
of right ought to be, subordinate to and dependent upon the imperial crown
and parliament of Great Britain ; who have full power and authority to make
laws and statutes of sufficient validity to bind the colonies and people of
America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain in all cases whatsoever. And
this authority has been since very forcibly exemplified and carried into act, by
the statute 7 Geo. III, c. 59, for suspending the legislation of New York; and
by several subsequent statutes.(18)
These &re the several parts of the dominions of the crown of Great Britain,
in which the municipal laws of England are not of force or authority, merely
u the.municipal laws of England. Most of them have probably copied the
spirit of their own law from this original; but then it receives its obligation,
and authoritative force, from being the law of the country
As to any foreign dominions which may belong to the person of the king by
hereditary descent, by purchase, or other acquisition, as the territory of Hanover,
and his majesty's other property in Germany ; as these do not in any wise apper•
tain to the crown of these kingdoms, they are entirely unconnected with the
laws of England, and do not communicate with this nation in any respect
whatiSOever. The English legislature had wisely remarked the inconveniences
that had formerly resulted from dominions on the continent of Europe; from
the Norman territory which William the Conqueror brought with him, and
held in conjunction with the *English throne; and from Aiijou and its [*llO]
appendages which fell to Henry the Second by hereditary descent.
They had seen the nation engaged for near four hundred yea.rs together in
ruinous wars for defence of these foreign dominions; till, happily for this
country, they were lost under the reign of Henry the Sixth. They observed
that, from that time, the maritime interests of England were better understood
and more closely pursued: that, in consequence of this attention, the nation,
as soon as she had rested from her civil wars, began at this period to flourish all
at once; and bees.me much more considerable in EuroPE'., than when her princes
were possessed of a larger territory, and her councils distracted by foreign interest& This experience, and these considerations, gave birth to a conditional
clause in the act(o) of settlement, which vested the crown in his present
majesty's illustrious house, "that in case the crown and imperial dignity of

soning in the text may be applied. The policy of the country has for gome time been to introduce

gradually representative free government unto them all, retaining in the crown, nevertheless,

fo)

tiie appointment of the Chief Executive officers. Where, however, the European population is

siat. 11 and u wm. m. o. s.

small, as compared to the native, or is fluctuating in character, it is sometimes deemed important

that i lic1 home government should retain and exercise a more complete control. Todd, Par 1. Gov.,

vol. 2, p. 519 et seq.

The opinions in England regarding the proper treatment of Colonies have become so changed

•within a few years, that it is doubtful if a demand for independence on the part of a colony of

Bach strength and resources, as to be able to make it with any reason would be seriously resisted or

objected to.

By the "act for the better government of India," passed Aug. 2, 1858, all the territories before

under the government of the East India Company were vested in the queen, and all its powers

are to be exercised in her name, through one of the principal secretaries of state.
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(18) [Notwithstanding the establishment of their independence by the .American States, the
mother country still po86e81!68 a number of colonies in different parts of the globe, to which the reasoning in the text ma)' be applied. The policy of the eountry lias for some time been t-0 introduce
~u&lly representative free government unt-0 them all, retaining in the crown, ne>ertheless,
the appointment of the Chief Executive officers. Where, however, the Europee.n population is
small, as compared t-0 the native, or is fluctuating in character, it ie sometimes deemed important
t.hat the home government should retain and exercise & more complete control. Todd, Pa.rl. Gov.,
vol. 2, p. 519 et seq.
The opinions in England regarding the proper treatment of Colonies have become so changed
within a few years, that it is doubtftil if a demand for independence on the pert of a colony of
such strength and reeouroes, 88 t-0 be able t-0 make it with any reaaon would be seriously resisted or
objected t-0.
By the "set for the bette:r government of India," p88sed Aug. 2, 1858, all the territories before
under the government of the East India Compe.ny were vested in the queen, and all its powers
are to be exerci1;e1J in her name, through one of the principal secretaries of state.
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this realm shall hereafter come to any person not being a native of this kingdom

of England, this nation shall not be obliged to engage in any war for the defence

of any dominions or territories which do not belong to the crown of England,

without consent of parliament."

We come now to consider the kingdom of England in particular, the direct

and immediate subject of those laws, concerning which we are to treat in the

ensuing commentaries. And this comprehends not only Wales and Berwick,

of which enough has been already said, but also part of the sea. The main or

high seas are part of the realm of England, for thereon our courts of admiralty

have jurisdiction, as will be shewn hereafter; but they are not subject to the

common law. (p) This main sea begins at the low-water mark. But between

the high-water mark, and the low-water mark, where the sea ebbs and flows,

the common law and the admiralty have divisum imperium, an alternate juris-

diction ; one upon the water, when it is full sea; the other upon the land, when

it is an ebb. (</)

r*nn *Tne territory of England is liable to two divisions; the one ecclesias-

L I11J tical, the other civil.

1. The ecclesiastical division is primarily, into two provinces, those of Canter-

bury and York. A province is the circuit of an archbishop's jurisdiction.

Each province contains divers dioceses, or sees of suflragan bishops; whereof

Canterbury includes twenty-one, and York three: besides the bishopric of the

Isle of Man, which was annexed to the province of York by King Henry VHL
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Every diocese is divided into archdeaconries, whereof there are sixty in all;

each archdeaconry into rural deaneries, which are the circuit of the archdeacon's

and rural dean's jurisdiction, of whom hereafter; and every deanery is divided

into parishes, (r)

A parish is that circuit of ground which is committed to the charge of one

parson, or vicar, or other minister having cure of souls therein. These districts

are computed to be near ten thousand in number. («) How ancient the division

of parishes is, may at present be difficult to ascertain; for it seems to be agreed

on all hands, that in the early ages of Christianity in this island, parishes were

unknown, or at least signified the same that a diocese does now. There was

then no appropriation of ecclesiastical dues to any particular church; but every

man was at liberty to contribute his tithes to whatever priest or church he

pleased, provided only that he did it to some; or, if he made no special appoint-

ment or appropriation thereof, they were paid into the hands of the oishop,

whose duty it was to distribute them among the clergy, and for other pious

purposes, according to his own discretion, (t)

Mr. Camden (u) says, England was divided into parishes by Archbishop

Honorius about the year 630. Sir Henry Hobart (w) lays it down, that parishes

were first erected by the council of Lateran, which was held A. D. 1179. Each

r *112 ^^7 differing *from the other, and both of them perhaps from the

*• truth; which will probably be found in the medium between the two

extremes. For Mr. Selden has clearly shewn, (a;) that the clergy lived in com-

mon without any division of parishes, long after the time mentioned by Camden.

And it appears by the Saxon laws, that parishes were in being long before the

date of tnat council of Lateran, to which they are ascribed by Hobart.

We find the distinction of parishes, nay, even of mother churches, so early as

in the laws of King Edgar, about the year 970. Before that time the consecra-

tion of tithes was m general arbitrary ; that is, every man paid his own (as was

before observed) to what church or parish he pleased. But this being liable to

be attended with either fraud, of at least caprice, in the persons paying; and

with either jealousies or mean compliances in such as were competitors for

receiving them; it was now ordered by the law of King Edgar, (y) that " den-

tur omnes deci'inoe primaries ecclesice ad quam parochia pertinet." However, if

any thane, or great lord, had a church, within his own demesnes, distinct from

(p) Co. Lltt. 260 (a) Finch, L. 78. (r) Co. Lltt. 91.

(«) Gibson's Britain (t) Seld. of THh. 9. 4. 2 Inat. 64«. Hob. 298. («) In hie Britannia.

(w) Hob. 296. (x) Of tithes, c. 9. (y\ Ibid. c. 1.
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this realm shall hereafter come to any person not being a native of this kingdom
of England, this nation shall not be obliged to engage in any war for the defence
of any dominions or territories which do not belong to the crown of England,
without consent of parliament."
We come now to consider the kingdom of England in particular, the direct
and immediate subject of those laws, conc.eming which we are to treat in the
ensuing commentaries. And this comprehends not only Wales and Berwick,
of which enough has been already said, but also part of the sea. The main or
high seas a.re part of the realm of England, for thereon our courts of admiralty
have jurisdiction, as will be shewn hereafter; but they are not subject to the
common law. (p) 'fhis main sea begins at the low-water mark. But between
the high-water mark, and the low-water mark, where the sea ebbs and flows,
the common law and the admiralty have divisum imperium, an alternate jurisdiction; one upon the water, when it is full sea; the other upon the land, when
it is an ebb.~)
[ •Ill] •T e territory of England is liable to two divisions; the one ecclesiastical, the other civil.
1. The ecclesiastical division is primarily, into two provinces, those of Canterbury and York. A province is the circuit of an archbishop's jurisdiction.
Each province contains divers dioceses, or sees of suffragan bishops; whereof
Canterbury includes twenty-one, and York three: besides the bishopric of the
Isle of Man, which was annexed to the province of York by King Henry VIII.
E•ery diocese is divided into archdeaconries, whereof there are sixty m all;
each archdeaconry into rural deaneries, which are the circuit of the archdeacon's
and rural dean's jurisdiction, of whom hereafter; and every deanery is divided
into parishes. (r)
A parish is that circuit of S'l:ound which is committed to the charge of one
parson, or vicar, or other mimster having cure of souls therein. These districts
are computed to be near ten thousand in number. (s) How ancient the division
of parishes is, may at present be difficult to ascertain; for it seems to be agreed
on all hands, that in the early ages of Christianity in this island, parishes were
unknown, or at least signified the same that a diocese does now. There was
then no approP.riation of ecclesiastical dues to any particular church; but every
man was at liberty to contribute his tithes to whatever priest or church he
pleased, provided only that he did it to some; or, if he made no special ap:pointment or appropriation thereof, they were paid into the hands of the bishop,
whose duty it was to distribute them among the clergy, and for other pious
purposes, according to his own discretion. (t)
Mr. Camden (1i) says, England was divided into parishes by Archbishop
Honorius about the year 630. Sir Henry Hobart (w) lays it down, that parishes
were first erected by the council of Lateran, which was held A. D. 1179. Each
[ • 112 widely differing •from the other, and both of them perhaps from the
truth; which will probably be found in the medium between the two
extremes. For Mr. Selden has clearly shewn, (x) that the clergy lived in common without any division of parishes, long after the time mentioned by Camden.
And it appears by the Saxon laws, that parishes were in being long before the
date of that council of Lateran, to which they are ascribed by Hobart.
We find the distinction of parishes, nay, even of mother churches, so early as
in the laws of Kin~ Edgar, about the year 970. Before that time the consecration of tithes was m general arbitrary; that is, every man pai~ his ?Wn .(as was
before observed) to what church or pansh he pleased. But this bemg liable to
be attended with either fraud, or at least caprice, in the persons paying; and
with either jealousies or mean compliances in such as were competitors for
receiving them; it was now ordered by the law of King Edgar, (y) that" denfar <fmnes decimm primarim ecclesics ad quam parochia pcrtinet." However, if
any thane, or great lord, had a church, within his own demesnes, distinct from
(p) Co. Litt. 2$:1
(I) Gibson's Britmn
(111) Hob. 296.

70

Finch, J,. 78.
(r) Co. Litt. 9•.
(I) ~ehl. or Tith. 9. 4. 2 Inst. Mil. Hob. 296.
(.r) Or tithes. c. 9.
(y) Ibid. c. 1.
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the mother-church, in the nature of a private chapel; then, provided such

church had a ccemetery or consecrated place of burial belonging to it, he might

allot one third of his tithes for the maintenance of the officiating minister; but

if it had no coemetery, the thane must himself have maintained his chaplain by

some other means; for in such case all his tithes were ordained to be paid to the

prirncarioB ecclesiai or mother church, (z)

This proves that the kingdom was then generally divided into parishes;

which division happened probably not all at once, but by degrees. For it seems

pretty clear and certain, that the boundaries of parisHes were originally ascer-

tained by those of a manor or manors: since it very seldom happens that a

manor extends itself over more parishes than one, though there are often many

manors in one parish. *The lords, as Christianity spread itself, began to r *^ jq -i

build churches upon their own demesnes or wastes, to accommodate their L

tenants in one or two adjoining lordships; and, in order to have divine sen-ice reg-

ularly performed therein, obliged all their tenants to appropriate their tithes to the

maintenance of the one officiating minister, instead of leaving them at liberty

to distribute them among the clergy of the diocese in general; and this tract of

land, the tithes whereof were so appropriated, formed a distinct parish. Which

will well enough account for the frequent intermixture of parishes one with

another. For, if a lord had a parcel of land detached from the main of his

estate, but not sufficient to form a parish of itself, it was natural for him to

endow his newly erected church with the tithes of those disjointed lands;
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especially if no church was then built in any lordship adjoining to those outly-

ing parcels.

Thus parishes were gradually formed, and parish churches endowed with the

tithes that arose within the circuit assigned. But some lands, either because

they were in the hands of irreligious and careless owners, or were situate in

forests and desert places, or for other now unsearchable reasons, were never united

to any parish, and therefore continue to this day extra-parochial; and their

tithes are now by immemorial custom payable to the king instead of the bishop,

in trust and confidence that he will distribute them for the general good of the

church: (a) yet extra parochial wastes and marsh-lands, when improved and

drained, are by the statute 17 Geo. II, c. 37, to be assessed to all parochial rates

in the parish next adjoining. And thus much for the ecclesiastical division of

this kingdom.

2. The civil division of the territory of England is into counties, of those

counties into hundreds, of those hundreds into tithings or towns. Which division,

as it now stands, seems to owe its original to King Alferd, (19) who, to prevent

*the rapines and disorders which formerly prevailed in the realm, insti- r„...., -•

tuted tithings, so called from the Saxon, because ten freeholders, with "- J

their families, composed one. These all dwell together, and were sureties or free

pledges to the king for the good behaviour of each other; and, if any offence

was committed in their district, they were bound to have the offender forthcom-

ing, (b) And therefore anciently no man was suffered to abide in England above

(i) Ihi-i. e. 2. See also the laws of King Canute, c. 11. about the year 1030.

(a) 2 fust.. 647. 2 Rep. 44. Cro. J'.liz. 512.

(ft) Flet. 1. 47. This the laws of King Edward the Confessor, c. 20. yery Justly entitled, '' sununn et maxima

tecuritat, per guam <annas statu JtrmUiimo sulttnentur s—gua hoc modofiebat, gttod sub dtceniiali fldqussione

debebcmt ate univerri, ifr."

(19) [Modern researches into the more remote periods of antiquity, have led to the discov-

ery, that the learned commentator was incorrect in ascribing the institution of these ciril

divisions of the kingdom to Alfred. In the reign of Ina, king of the "West Saxons, towards

the end of the seventh century, the tithing and shire are both mentioned. And no doubt they

•were brought from the continent by some of the first Saxon settlers in this island; for the

tithing, hundred, and shire, are noticed in the capitularies of the Franks, before the year 630,

whence it is reasonably inferred, they were known in France at least two centuries before the

reign of Alfred. It may therefore be concluded, that, among the people of this country, they

were part of those general customs which Alfred collected, arranged, and improved into an

uniform system of jurisprudence. See Whitaker's History of Manchester; Montesquieu Esprit

des Lois, torn. 2, p. 376; Stuart's Diss. on the English Constitution, 254; and Henry's History

of Great Britain.]
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forty days, unless he were enrolled m some tithing or decennary, (c) One of the

principal inhabitants of the tithing is annually appointed to preside over the

rest, being called the tithing-man, fhe headborough, (words which speak their

own etymology,) and in some countries the borsholder, or borough'e-ealder, being

supposed the discreetest man in the borough, town, or tithing, (d)

Tithings, towns, or vills, are of the same signification in law; and are said to

have had, each of them, originally a church and celebration of divine service,

sacraments, and burials: (e) though that seems to be rather an ecclesiastical,

than a civil, distinctionf The word town or vill is, indeed, by the alteration of

times and language, now become a generical term, comprehending under it the

several species of cities, boroughs, and common towns. A city is a town incor-

porated, which is or hath been the see of a bishop; and though the bishopric be

dissolved, as at Westminster, yet still it remaineth a city. (/) A borough is

now understood to be a town, either corporate or not, that sendeth burgesses to

parliament, (ig) Other towns there are, to the number, Sir Edward Coke says, (A)

of 8,803, which are neither cities nor boroughs; some of which have the privi-

leges of markets and others not; but both are equally towns in law. To several

T *1151 °^ *nese towns there are small appendages belonging, called *hamlets,

1- J which are taken notice of in the statute of Exeter, (i) which makes fre-

quent mention of entire vills, demi-vills, and hamlets. Entire vills Sir Henry

Spelman (k) conjectures to have consisted of ten freemen, or frank-pledges, demi-

vills of five, and hamlets of less than five. These little collections of houses are
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sometimes under the same administration as the town itself, sometimes governed

by separate officers; in which last case they are, to some purposes in law, looked

upon as distinct townships. These towns, as was before hinted, contained each

originally but one parish, and one tithing; though many of them now, by the

increase of inhabitants, are divided into several parishes and tithings; and some-

times, where there is but one parish, there are two or more villa or tithings.

As ten families of freeholders made up a town or tithing, so ten tithings com-

posed a superior division, called a hundred, as consisting often times ten families.

The hundred is governed by an high constable, or bailiff, and formerly there was

regularly held in it the hundred court for the trial of causes, though now fallen

into disuse. In some of the more northern counties these hundreds are called

wapentakes. (?)

The subdivision of hundreds into tithings seems to be most peculiarly the

invention of Alfred: the institution of hundreds themselves he rather introduced

than invented; for they seem to have obtained in Denmark (m) and we find

that in France a regulation of this sort was made above two hundred years before,

set on foot by Clotnarius and Childebert, with a view of obliging each district

to answer for the robberies committed in its own division. These divisions were,

in that country, as well military as civil, and each contained a hundred freemen,

who were subject to an officer called the centenarius, a number of which cente-

narii were themselves subject to a superior officer called the count or comes, (n)

P „,.. g -i And *indeed something like this institution of hundreds may be traced

L -I back as far as the ancient Germans, from whom were derived both the

Franks, who became masters of Gaul, and the Saxons, who settled in England:

for both the thing and the name, as a territorial assemblage of persons, from

which afterwards the territory itself might probably receive its denomination,

were well known to that warlike people* " Centeni ex singulis pagis sunt, idque

ipsum inter suos vocantur; et quod primo numerus fuit, jam nomen et honor

est." (o)

An indefinite number of these hundreds make up a County or shire. Shire is

a Saxon word signifying a division; but a county, comitatus, is plainly derived

from comes, the count of the Franks; that is, the earl, or alderman (as the Sax-

ons called him) of the shire, to whom the government of it was intrusted. This

he usually exercised by his deputy, still called in Latin vice-comes, and in English

(c) Mirr. c. 1. J 3. (rf) Finch, L. 8. (e) 1 lust. 115. (/) Co. Lttt. 109. (./) l.ilt. t J(4.

(ft) 1 Inst. 116. (t) 14 Edw. I. (t) Gloss. 274. (J) Sfelrt. in Fortesc. c. 24.

(m) Sold. tit. or honour, 2, 8, 3. (nj Monteeq. Sp. L. 30,17. (o) Tacit, de morib. German. 6.
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forty days, unless be were enrolled in some tithing or decennary. (c) One of the
principal inhabitants of the tithing is annually appointed to preside over the
rest, being called the tithing-man, the headborough, (words which speak their
own etymology,) and in some countries the borshofder, or borough's-ealder, being
surrposed the discreetest man in the borough, town, or tithing. (d)
Tithinge, towns, or ville, are of the same signification in law; a.nd are said to
have had, each of them, originally a church and celebration of divine service,
sacra.ments, and burials : ( e) though that seems to be rather an ecclesiastical,
than a ci vii, distinctiont The word town or vill is, indeed, by the a.Iteration of
times and language, now become a generical term, comprehending under it the
several species of cities, boroughs, and common towns. A city is a town incorporated, which is or hath been the see of a bishop; and though the bishopric be
dissolved, as at Westminster, yet still it remaineth a city. (/) A borough is
now understood to be a town, either corporate or not, that sendeth burgesses to
parliament. (g) Other towns there are, to the number, Sir Edward Coke says, (h)
of 8,803, which are neither cities nor boroughs; some of which have the privileges of markets and others not; but both are equally towns in law. To several
( • 115 ] of these towns there are small appendages belonging, called *hamlets,
which are taken notice of in the statute of Exeter, (i) which makes~
quent mention of entire ville, demi-ville, and hamlets. Entrre ville Sir Henr,y
SJ?elman (k) conjectures to have consisted of ten freemen, or frank-pledges, dem1v1lls of five, and ho.mlets of less than five. These little collections of houses are
sometimes under the same administration as the town itself, sometimes governed
by separate officers; in which last case they are, to some purposes in law, looked
upon as distinct townships. These towns, as waa before hinted, contained each
originally but one parish, and one tithing; though many of them now, by the
increase of inhabitants, are divided into several parishes and tithings; and sometimes, where there is but one parish, there are two or more villa or tithings.
As ten families of freeholders made up a town or tithing, so ten tithings com~sed a superior division, called a hundred, as consistin8: often times ten families.
The hundred is governed by an high constable, or bailiff, and formerly there was
regularly held in it the hundred court for the trial of causes, though now fallen
into disuse. In some of the more northern counties these hundreds are called
wapentakes. (Z)
'rhe subdivision of hundreds into tithings seems to be most peculia.rly the
invention of Alfred: the institution of hundreds themselves he rather introduced
than invented; for they seem to have obtained in Denmark (m) and we find
that in France a regulat10n of this sort was made above two hundred years before,
set on foot by Clotharius and Childebert, with a view of obliging each district
to answer for the robberies committed in its own division. These divisions were,
in that country, as well military as civil, and each contained a hundred freemen,
who were subject to an officer called the centenarius, a number of which centenarii were themselves subject to a superior oftlcer called the count or romu. (n)
[ • 116 ] And *indeed something like this institution of hundreds may be traCed
back as far as the ancient Germans, from whom were derived both the
Franks, who became masters of Gaul, and the Saxons, who settled in England:
for both the thing and the name, as a territorial assemblage of persons, from
which afterwards the territorx itself might probably receive its denomination,
were well known to that warlike people. " Genteni ex sinp_ulis pagis sunt, idqu~
1"psum inter suos vocantur; et qtwd primo numerus fuit, jam nomen et lwnor
BBt." (o)
An indefinite number of these hundreds make up a county or shire. Shire is
a Saxon word signifying a division; but a county, comitatus, is plainly deriTed
from comes, the count of the Franks; that is, the earl, or alderman (as the Saxons called him) of the shire, to whom the government of it was in trusted. This
he usually exercised by his deputy, still called in !Altih vice-comes, and in English
(c) Mirr. c. I. t 3.
(d) Finch, L. 8.
(e) 1 Inst. llll.
(}) Co. J,ltt. 109.
Cg) Litt. t 16'.
(h) 1 In11t. 116.
(i) 14 J.~tiw. I.
(#:) Glo81!. 27•.
(l) Sel<t. fa Forl'-llC. c. 2'.
(m) Seid. tit. or honour, 21 6, a.
(~ Monteaq. SJ>. L. 30, 17.
(o) 'faclt. de wwrib. Gennan. 6.
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the sheriff, shrieve, or shire-reeve, signifying the officer of the shire, upon whom,

by process of time, the civil administration of it is now totally devolved. In

some counties there is an intermediate division between the shire and the hun-

dreds, as lathes in Kent, and rapes in Sussex, each of them containing about

three or four hundreds apiece. These had formerly their lathe-reeves, and rape-

reeves, acting in subordination to the shire-reeve. Where a county is divided

into three of these intermediate jurisdictions, they are called trithings, (») which

were anciently governed by a tnthing-reeve. These trithings still subsist in the

large county of York, wnere, by an easy corruption, they are denominated

ridings; the north, the east, and the west riding. The number of counties in

England and Wales have been different at different times; at present they are

forty in England, and twelve in Wales.

Three of these counties, Chester, Durham, and Lancaster, are called counties

palatine. The two former are such by prescription, or immemorial custom, or

at least as old as *the Norman conquest: (q) the latter was created by r* 11«-i

King Edward III, in favour of Henry Plantagenet, first earl and then L -I

duke of Lancaster; (r) whose heiress being married to John of Gaunt, the king's

son, the franchise was greatly enlarged and confirmed in parliament, (s) to

honour John of Gaunt himself, whom, on the death of his father-in-law, the

king had also created duke of Lancaster, (t) Counties palatine are so called a

palatio, because the owners thereof, the earl of Chester, the bishop of Durham,

and the duke of Lancaster, had in those counties jura regalia, as fully as the
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king hath in his palace; regalem potestatem in omnibus, as Bracton expresses

it. (u) They might pardon treasons, murders, and felonies; they appointed all

judges and justices of the peace; all writs and indictments ran in their names,

as in other counties in the king's; and all offences were said to be done against

their peace, and not, as in other places, contra pacem domini regis. (w) And

indeed by the ancient law, in all peculiar jurisdictions, offences were said to be

done against his peace in whose court they were tried: in a court-leet, contra

pacem domini; in the court of a corporation, contra pacem ballivorum; in the

sheriff's court or tourn, contra paeem vice-comitis. (x) These palatine privileges

(so similar to the regal independent jurisdictions usurped by the great barons

on the continent, during the weak and infant state of the first feudal kingdoms

in Europe), (y) were, in all probability, originally granted to the counties of

Chester and Durham, because they bordered upon inimical countries, Wales and

Scotland, in order that the inhabitants, having justice administered at home,

might not be obliged to go out of the country, and leave it open to the enemy's

incursions; and that the owners, being encouraged by so large an authority,

might be the more watchful in its defence. And upon this account also there were

formerly two other counties palatine, *Pembrokeshire and Hexamshire, r *-., 8 -,

the latter now united with Northumberland; but these were abolished, L J

by parliament, the former in 27 Hen. VIII, the latter in 14 Eliz. And in 27

Hen. VIII, likewise, the powers before mentioned of owners of counties palatine

were abridged; the reason for their continuance in a manner ceasing; though

still all writs are witnessed in their names, and all forfeitures for treason by the

common law accrue to them, (z)

Of these three, the county of Durham is now the only one remaining in the

hands of a subject; for the earldom of Chester, as Camden testifies, was united?

to the crown by Henry III, and has ever since given title to the king's eldest'

son. And the county palatine, or duchy, of Lancaster, was the property of

Henry Bolingbroke, the son of John of Gaunt, at the time when he wrested

the crown from King Richard II, and assumed the title of King Henry IV. But

he was too prudent to suffer this to be united to the crown, lest, if he lost one,

he should lose the other also: for, as Plowden (a) and Sir Edward Coke (b)

fp) L. t. E0u>. e. 84. fa) Seld. tit. hon. 2, 6, 8.

(T) Pat. 25 Edw. III. p. 1, m. 18. Seld ibid. Sandfbrd'a Gen. Hist. 112.

(») Cart. 36 FAit. Ill, n. 9 (t) Pat. SI Edta. III. m. 33. Plowd. 215. 7 Rym< 138. 4 Inst. 204.

fa} I. 8. c. 84. M. fin) 4 Inst. 204. (x) Seld. in Heng. Mngn. c. 2.

fa) Robertson. Cha. V, i. m. (z) 4 Inst. 205. fa,) 215. (b) 4 Inst. 206.
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observe, " he knew he had the duchy of Lancaster by sure and indefeasible title,

but that his title to the crown was not so assured; for that after the decease of

Kichard II, the right of the crown was in the heir of Lionel, duke of Clarence,

second son of Edward III; John of Gaunt, father to this Henry IV, being but

the fourth son." And therefore he procured an act of parliament, in the first

year of his reign, ordaining that the duchy of Lancaster, and all other his

hereditary estates, with all their royalties and franchises, should remain to him

and his heirs for ever; and should remain, descend, be administered, and gov-

erned, in like manner as if he never had attained the regal dignity; and thus

they descended to his son and grandson, Henry V and Henry VI, many new

territories and privileges being annexed to the duchy by the former, (c) Henry

VI being attainted in 1 Edw. IV, this duchy was declared in parliament

F *1191 **° nave become forfeited to the crown, (d) and at the same time an act

L -" was made to incorporate the duchy of Lancaster, to continue the county

palatine, (which might otherwise have determined by the attainder,) (e) and to

make the same parcel of the duchy; and farther to vest the whole in King

Edward IV and nis heirs, kings of England, for ever; but under a separate

guiding and governance from the other inheritances of the crown. And in

1 Hen. VII another act was made, to resume such parts of the duchy lands as

had been dismembered from it in the reign of Edward IV, and to vest the

inheritance of the whole in the king and his heirs forever, as amply and largely,

and in like manner, form, and condition, separate from the crown of England
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and possession of the same, as the three Henries and Edward IV, or any of

them, had and held the same. (/)

The Isle of Ely is not a county palatine, though sometimes erroneously called

so, but only a royal franchise; the bishop having, by grant of King Henry the

First, jura regalia within the Isle of Ely, whereby he exercises a jurisdiction

over all causes, as well criminal as civil, (g)

F *1201 ""-There are also counties corporate, which are certain cities and towns,

L -I some with more, some with less territory annexed to them; to which,

out of special grace and favour, the kings of England have granted the privilege

to be counties of themselves, and not to be comprized in any other county; but

to be governed by their own sheriffs and other magistrates, so that no officers of

the county at lame have any power to intermeddle therein. Such are London,

York, Bristol, Norwich, Coventry, and many others. And thus much of the

countries subject to the laws of England. (20)

(e) Parl. 2 Jten. V. n. 30. 3 ffen. V. n. IB. (d) \ Ventr. 186. (el 1 Ventr. 157.

(/) Some have entertained an opinion (Plowd. 220,1. 2. Lamb. Archeion. 238. 4 Inst. 208) that by this act

the rinhi of the duchy vested only in the natural, and not in the political person of King Henry VII as for-

merly in that of Henry IV, and was descendible to his natural heirs, independent of the succession to the

crown. And, ifthis notion were well founded, It might have become a very curious question, at the time of

the revolution in HWS, in whom the right of the duchy remained after King James's abdication, and pre-

vious to the attainder of the pretended prince of Wales. But it is observable, that In the same act the duchy

of Cornwall is also vested in King Henry VII and his heirs ; which could never be intended in any event to be

separated from the inheritance of the crown. And indeed it seems to have been understood vory early after

the statute of Henry VH. that the duchy of Lancaster was by no means thereby made a separate inheritance

from the rest of the royal patrimony, since it descended with the crown to the half-blood in the instances of

Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, which it could not have done as the estate of a mere duke of Lancaster,

in the common course of legal descent. The better opinion therefore seems, to be that of those judges, who

held i Plowd. 221) that notwithstanding the statute ot Henry VII (which was only an act of resumption) the

duchy Etill remained, as established by the act of Edward IV, separate from the other possessions of the

crown in order and government, but united in point of inheritance. (g) ^ Inst. 220.

(20) There is an important difference between the civil divisions of Great Britain and those

of the United States, in that, in the latter country j there is no one authority possessing such

universal powers as are possessed by the parliament of the former. By the constitution of the

United States, which defines the powers of the national government, that government possesses

in respect to all the states exclusive control over all those concerns which would naturally

form the subject of relations with other governments, and also over some matters of internal

concern which it was deemed important to confer upon the general government with a view to

the general harmony, and in order to " a more perfect nuion." All those powers not by the

constitution conferred upon the general government remain with the states. With the states

local self-government is the rule: for convenience in administering it, the state is divided into

counties and towns, and it also creates village, borough, and city governments to meet the wants

of dense populations. All the jurisdictions inferior to the state possess only euch powers as the
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state confers upon them by the legislation by •which they arc created. See Cooley Const. Lira.

ce. 2 and 8. Also, Dillon on Municipal Corporations.

The congress of the United States possesses the power of exclusive legislation in all coses over

the District of Columbia: Const, art. 1, $ 8; and under another provision, art. 4, $ 3, it has

exercised the authority to originate governments for the territories, and to modify and supervise

them from time to time; but how far this authority is rightful has been of late the subject of

dispute between political parties, and also by the Mormon authorities exercising functions of gov-

ernment without congressional permission in Utah. The subject is treated on legal grounds by

Rtat.e confers upon them by tho le~slation by which they arc created. See Cooley Conet. Lim.
c-c. 2 and 8. Also, Dillon on Mumoipal Corporations.
The congress of the United States po1!86sses the power of exclllh'ive legislation in e.J.l cases over
the District of Columbia: Const. art. 1, 9 8; and under another prmision, art. 4, 9 3, it has
exercised the authority to originate govenrments for the territories, and to modify and supervise
them from time to time; but how fa.r this authority i11 rightful has been of late the 11ubject of
dispute between political ~es, and also by the Monnon authorities exercising functions of government without congreM1one.l penniRSion in Utah. The Ruhject is treated on legal grounds by
Judge Jameson in his work on the ConRtitutional Convention.

Judge Jameson in his work on the Constitutional Convention.
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THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

BOOK THE FIRST.

OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS.

CHAPTEB I.

COMMENTARIES

OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.

The objects of the laws of England are so very numerous and extensive, that,

in order to consider them with any tolerable ease and perspicuity, it will be

Oli

necessary to distribute them methodically, under proper and distinct heads;

avoiding as much as possible divisions too large and comprehensive on the one

hand, and too trifling and minute on the other; both of which are equally pro-

ductive of confusion.

*Now, as municipal law is a rule of civil conduct, commanding what r +^2 i

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

is right, and prohibiting what is wrong; or as Cicero, (a) and after him L -*

our Bracton, (b) have expressed it, sanctio justa, jubens honesta et prohibens con-

traria, it follows that the primary and principal objects of the law are EIGHTS

and WRONGS. In the prosecution, therefore, of these commentaries, I shall fol-

BOOK THE FIRST.

low this very simple and obvious division; and shall, in the first place, consider

the rights that are commanded, and secondly the wrongs that are forbidden, by

the laws of England.

Bights are, however, liable to another subdivision; being either, first, those

OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS.

which concern and are annexed to the persons of men, and are then called jura
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personarum, or the rights of persons ; or they are, secondly, such as a man may

acquire over external objects, or things unconnected with his person; which are

styled jura rerum, or the rights of things. Wrongs also are divisible into, first,

CHAPTER I.

private wrongs, which, being an infringement merely of particular rights, con-

cern individuals only, and are called civil injuries; and secondly, public wrongs,

which, being a breach of general and public rights, affect the whole community,

and are called crimes and misdemeanors. (1)

OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.

(a) 11 PMlipp. 12. fbj 1.1. «. 8.

(1) [This classification was adopted by Lord Oh. J. Hale (see Hale's Analysis of the Law),

who introduced it into our system from the Institutes. It has also been adopted in the Code

Civil of Prance.]
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The objects of the laws of England are so very numerous a.nd extensive, that,
in order to consider them with any tolerable ease and perspicuity, it will be
necessary to distribute them methodica.lly, under proper and distinct heads;
avoiding as much as possible divisions too large and comprehensive on the one
hnnd, and too trifling and minute on the other; both of which are equally producti ve of confusion.
•Now, as municipal law is a rule of civil conduct, commanding what [ • 122 ]
is right, and prohibiting what is wrong; or as Cicero, (a) and a.fter him
our Bmcton, ( b) have expressed it, sanctio justa, jubens honesta et prohibens contraria, it follows that the primary and pnncipal objects of the law are RIGHTS
and WRONGS. In the prosecution, therefore, of these commentaries, I shall follow this very simple and obvious division ; and shall, in the first place, consider
the rights that are commanded, and secondly the wrongs that are forbidden, by
the laws of England.
Rights are, however, liable to another subdivision; being either, first, those
which concern and are annexed to the persons of men, and are then called jura
pcrsonarum, or the rights of persons; or they are, secondly, such as a man may
acquire over external objects, or things unconnected with his person; which are
styled jura rerum, or the rights of things. Wrongs also are di visible in to, first,
private wrongs, which, being an infringement merely of particular ri~hts, concern individuals only, and a.re ca.lled civil injuries; and secondly, public wrongs,
which, being a breach of general and public rights, a:trect the whole community,
and are ca.lied crimes and misdemeanors. (1)
(a) 11Pl&Ulpp.1i.

(b)

i. 1. •. 3.

(1) [This clasaification was adopted by Lord Ch. J. Hale (see Hale's Anslysis of the Law),
who introduced it into our system from the Institutes. It has also been adopted in the Code
Civil of France.]
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ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.

[Book I.

The objects of the laws of England falling into this fourfold division, the

present commentaries will therefore consist of the four following parts. 1. The

rights of persons, with the means whereby such rights may be either acquired

or lost 2. The rights of things, with the means also of acquiring and losing

them. 3. Private wrongs, or civil injuries; with the means of redressing them

by law. 4. Public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors; with the means of pre-

vention and punishment. (2)

We are now first to consider the rights of persons, with the means of acquir-

ing and losing them.

f *123 1 *Now tne rights of persons that are commanded to be observed by the

1 J -1 municipal laws are of two sorts: first, such as are due/ro»» every citizen,

which are usually called civil duties ; and, secondly, such as belong to him, which

is the more popular acceptation of rights or jura. Both may indeed be com-

prised in this latter division; for, as all social duties are of a relative nature, at

the same time that they are due from one man, or set of men, they must also

be due to another. But I apprehend it will be more clear and easy to consider

many of them as duties required from, rather than as rights belonging to, par-

ticular persons. Thus, for instance, allegiance is usually, and therefore most

easily, considered as the duty of the people, and protection as the duty of the

magistrate; and yet they are reciprocally the rights as well as duties of each other.

Allegiance is the right of the magistrate, and protection the right of the people.

Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or artificial.
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Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as

are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and govern-

ment, which are called corporations or bodies politic.

The rights of persons considered in their natural capacities are also of two

sorts, absolute and relative. Absolute, which are such as appertain and belong

to particular men, merely as individuals or single persons: relative, which are

incident to them as members of society, and standing in various relations to

each other. The first, that is, absolute rights, will be the subject of the present

chapter.

By the absolute rights of individuals, we mean those which are so in their

primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to their persons merely in a

state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society

F *1241 or 'n ^u* w^ re§ar(l to the absolute duties, which man is bound *to

L -I perform considered as a mere individual, it is not to be expected that any

human municipal law should at all explain or enforce them. For the end and

intent of such laws being only to regulate the behaviour of mankind, as fhey arc

members of society, and stand in various relations to each other, they have con-

sequently no concern with any other but social or relative duties. Let a man

therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his practice, pro-

(2) [The distinction between private wrongs and public lorongs is more intelligible, and more

accurately limited by the nature of the subjects, than the distinction between the rights of

things, and tlif rights of persons ; for all rights whatever must be the rights of certain persons

The objects of the laws of England falling into this fourfold division, the
will therefore consist of the.four following~ 1. Tlte
rights of persons, with the means whereby such nghte may be either acquired
or lost. 2. The rig/its of thin!/s, with the means also of acquiring and losing
them. 3. Priiiate wrongs, or mvil injuries; with the means of redressing them
by law. 4. PuhUc wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors; with the means of prevention and punishment. (2)
We are now first to consider the right& of per&ons, with the means of acquiring and losing them.
[ • 123 ]
*Now the rights of persons that are commanded to be observed by the
municipal laws are of two sorts: first, such a.a are due from every citizen,
which are usually called civil duties; and, secondly, such as belon~ to him, which
is the more popular acceptation of rights or jura. Both may mdeed be comprised in this latter division ; for, as all social duties are of a relative nature, at
the same time that they are due fr<nn one man, or set of men, they must also
be due to another. But I ap~rehend it will be more clear and easy to consider
many of them as duties reqmred from, rather than as rights belonging to, particular persons. Thus, for instance, allegiance is usually, and therefore most
easily, considered a..s the duty of the people, and protection as the duty of the
magistrate; and yet they a.re reciprocally the rights as well as duties of each other.
Allegiance is the right of the magistrate, and protection the right of the people.
Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or artificial.
Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us ; artificial are such as
are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.
The rights of persons considered in their natural capacities are also of two
sorts, absolute and relative. Absolute, which are such as appertain and belong
to ~articular men, merely as individuals or single persons: relative~ which are
incident to them as members of society, and standing in various relations to
each other. The first, that is, absolute rights, will be the subject of the present
p~esent commentari~s

~~

'

By the absolute rights of individuals, we mean those which are so in their
primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to their persons merely in a.
state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society
[ • 124 ] or in it. But with regard to the absolute duties, which man is bound •to
perform considered as a mere individual, it is not to be expected that any
human municipal law should at all explain or enforce them. For the end and
intent of such laws being only to regulate the behaviour of mankind, a.s .~hev arc
members of society, and stand in various relations to each other, they have "consequently no concern with any other but social or relative duties. Let a man
therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his practice, pro-

to certain things. Every right is annexed to a certain character or relation, which each indi-

vidual bears in society. The rights of kings, lords, judges, husbands, fathers, heirs, purchas-

ers, and occupants, are all dependent upon the respective characters of the claimants. These

rights might again be divided into rights to possess certain things, and the rights to do certain

actions. This latter class of righta constitute powers and authority. But the distinction of

rights of persons and rights of things, in the first two books of toe Commentaries, seems to

have no other difference than the antithesis of the expression, and that, too, resting upon a

solecism; for the expression, rights of things, or a right of a horse, is contrary to the idiom of

the English language; we say, invariably, a right to a thing. The distinction intended by the

learned judge, in the first two books, appears, in a great degree, to be that of the rights of

persons in public stations, and the rights of persons in private relations. But, as the order of

legal subjects is, in a great measure, arbitrary, and does not admit of that mathematical arrange-

ment where one proposition generates another, it perhaps would be difficult to discover any

method more satisfactory than that which the learned judge has punned, and which was first

suggested by Lord Ch. 3. Hale. See Bale's Analysis of the L»w.]

Austin on the Province of Jurisprudence considers at some length and criticises the classification

of the text.
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(2) [The diRtinction between private 'llJT'<>ngs and public torongs is more int.elligible, and more
accurately Jimit.ed by the natnre of the 1mbjects1 than the distinction between the rights of
things, and tlie rights of pcrsOJtJJ; for all rights wnatever must be the rights of certain perB<>na
to certain things. Every right is annexed t.o a certain character or relation, which each individual bears in lilociety. The rights of kings, lords, judges, husbands, fathers, heirs, purchaaere1 and occupants, are all dependent upon the respective characters of the claimants. These
rignts might again be divided into rights to poesess certain thing11, and the righta to do certain
actions. This latter cla&! of righta constitute powers and authority. But the distinction of
rights of persons and rights of thing&, in the first two books of the C<lmmentaries, seems to
have no other diflerence than the antithesis of the expreR11ion, and that, too, resting upon a.
solecism i. for the expre::ision, right11 of things, or a right of a hor:ie, i11 contrary to the i1Uom of
the English language; we My, invariably, a right to a thing. The distinction int.ended by the
learn1id judge, in the fi.1'8t two boob, appears, in a grnat degree, to be that of tho right8 of
persons m public i;tatiom1, antl the rights of persons in private relations. But, as the order of
legal tmbject.~ is, in a great measure, arbitrary, and doe11 not admit (lf that mathematical arrangement where one proporiition gcn<lrattl11 another, it perhap~ would be difficult to diilCover any
method more satisfactory than thllt which the learned judge has pursued, and which waa fir:;t
tmp:geKted by L<trd (.,'b. J. Hale. Soo Hale's .A.nalysi11 of the IAw.)
Austin on the Provinoe of Jwisprudence considers at eome length and critioises the claiiidfication
of the text.
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vided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules

of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws. But if he makes his

vices public, though they be such as seem principally to affect himself, (as drunk-

enness, or the like,) they then become, by the bad example they set, of pernicious

effects to society; and therefore it is then the business of human laws to correct

them. Here the circumstance of publication is what alters the nature of the

case. Public sobriety is a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws;

private sobriety is an absolute duty, which, whether it be performed or not,

human tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never enforce it by

any civil sanction. But, with respect to rights, the case is different. Human

laws define and enforce as well those rights which belong to a man considered

as an individual, as those which belong to him considered as related to others.

For the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment

of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of

nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assist-

ance and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social

communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws

is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals. Such rights as

are social and relative result from, and are posterior to, the formation of states

and societies: so that to maintain and regulate these, is clearly a subsequent

consideration. And therefore the principal view of human law is, or ought

always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce such rights as are absolute, which
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in *themselves are few and simple: and then such rights as are relative, r*i OKI

which, arising from a variety of connexions, will be far more numerous >- -I

and more complicated. (3) These will take up a greater space in any code of

laws, and hence may appear to be more attended to, though in reality they are

not, than the rights of the former kind. Let us therefore proceed to examine

how far all laws ought, and how far the laws of England actually do, take notice

of these absolute rights, and provide for their lasting security.

The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discern-

ment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which

(3) The people of the American States have not been disposed to leave the protection of the

absolute rights of individuals exclusively to the legislative bodies to which they have intrusted

vided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules
of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws. But if he makes his
>ices public, though they be such as seem principally to affect himself, (as drunkenness, or the like,) they then become, by the bad example they set, of pernicious
effects to society; and therefore it is then the bnsiness of human laws to correct
them. Here the circumstance of publication is what alters the nature of the
case. Public sobriety is a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws;
private sobriety is an absolnte duty, which, whether it be performed or not,
human tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never enforce it by
any civil sanction. But, with respect to r/gltt.«, the case is different. Human
laws define and enforce as well those rights which belong to a man considered
as an individual, as those which belong to him considered as relat.ed to others.
For the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment
of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of
nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gamed by the institution of friendly and social
communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws
is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals. Such rights as
are social and relative result from, and are posterior to, the formation of states
and societies: so that to maintain and regulate these, is clearly a subsequent
consideration. And therefore the principal view of human law is, or ou~ht
always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce such rights as are absolute, which
in "'themselves are few and simple: and then such right~ as are relative, ["' 125]
which, arising from a variety of connexions, will be far more numerous
and more complicated. (3) These will take up a. greater space in any code of
laws, and hence may appear to be more attended to, though in reality they are
not, than the rights of the former kind. Let us therefore proceed to examine
how far all laws ou~ht, and how far the laws of England actually do, take notice
of these absolute rights, and provide for their lasting security.
·
The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which

the making of the laws; but, with what appeared to many at first an excess of prudence, they

have hedged about these rights with constitutional securities in a manner which reasonably

protects them from invasion. In the several state constitutions there is incorporated a " bill of

rights" declaratory of the rights of individuals, so framed as to limit the power of the legis-

lative department m the directions which might lead to their abridgment. Thus, bills of attainder

and ex post facto laws are prohibited; the right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and

freedom of religious worship are declared, and the legislature prohibited from abridging them;

private property is declared to be inviolable, except when required for public use, and then it can

only be taken on compensation being made; unreasonable searches and seizures are forbidden,

and the authorities are precluded from quartering soldiers upon citizens in time of peace. These

rights and immunities being thus declared, it becomes the duty of the courts to enforce them

against the action of the other departments of the government; and for the more complete

Erotection of the citizen, a right of trial by jury is preserved, that he may have the judgment of

is peers upon his controversies, and upon any accusation that may be preferred against him. The

constitution of the United States originally contained but few provisions in the nature of a bill

of rights, but such was the popular jealousy of undefined power over their persons and property,

that it was found impracticable to secure the adoption of that instrument except in connection

with the recommendation of amendments which should supply the deficiency. Those amend-

ments were soon added. It is a settled rule of construction of the national constitution that the

limitations it imposes upon the powers of government are in all cases to be understood as limitations

upon the government of the Union only, except where the states are expressly mentioned:

Barron ». Baltimore. 7 Pet. 243; Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, ib. 551; Pox v. Ohio, 5 How. 438;

Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 471; Pnrvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wai. 475; Twitchell r. Common-

wealth, 7 Wai. 321. Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of con-

tracts, and laws discriminating between citizens on account of race, color or previous condition

of servitude, the states are forbidden to pass; but for the most part the protection of individual

rights, as against the action of the state authorities, is not provided for by tho constitution of

the Union, but is left to the people of the states themselves, who will insert such prohibitions

and guaranties as they deem important when framing their fundamental law.
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(3) The people of the American States have not been disposed t.o leave the protection of the
absolute rights of individuals exclusively to tQe legislative OOdies to which they have intrusted
the making of the laws; but, with what appeared to many at first an exce11s of pmd1mce, they
have hedged about these rights with con11titutional securities in a manner which reasonably
protect.'! them from invasion. In the several state coni;titutiollil there is incorporated a "bill of
rights" declaratory of the ri~hts of individuals, so framed 8>! to limit the power of the legiRlative department m the directions which might lead to their abridgment. Thus, billti of attainder
and ex post facto laws are l?rohibited; the nght to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and
frooclom of religion~ wor11hip are declared, and the legislature prohibited from abridgmg them;
private property itl cleclnred to be inviolable, except when required for public use, and then it can
only be taken on compen~tion being made; unreSROne.ble searches and seizures a.re forbidden,
and the authorities a.re precluded from quartering soldiers upon citizens in time of peace. These
rights e.ud immunitieil being thus declared, it becomes the duty of the courts to enforce them
against the action of the other departments of the government; and for the more complete
protection of the citizen, a right of trial by jury is preserved, that he may have the jud~u10nt of
his peers upon his controversies, and nJ.><>n any accusation that may be preferred age.inst hnn. The
constitution of the United States origmally contained bnt few provisions in the nature of a bill
of ri~ht.'!, but lroCh wa.'! the popular jealousy of nndefined power O\"er their persons and property,
that it was found impracticable to secure the adoption of that instmment except in connection
with the recommendation of amendments which should supply the deficiency. Those amendments were soon added. It is a :'!ettle<l rule of con11truction of the national constitution that the
lhuitatiomi it imposes upon the powers of government are in all cases to be understood as limitations
upon the government of the Union orily, except where the states are oxpresRly mentioned:
Barron v. Baltimore. i Pet. 243; Livingston's Lc~sec v. Moore, ib. 551; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 43'.l;
Smith v. Me.rvle.nd, 18 How. 471; Pnrvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wal. 475; Twitchell 1:. Commonwealth, 7 Wal. 3'Jl. Bills of attainder, ex .rost facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and laws discriminating between citizens on oocount of race, color or previon11 condition
of servitude, the states arc forbidclen t.o pass; but for the mo.it part the protection of individual
right;i, as against the action of the state authorities, is not provided for by the coill!titution of
the Union, but is left to the people of the states themRelves, who will insert such prohibitions
and guaranties as they deem important when framing their fundamental law.
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appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appel-

appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty
consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or
control, unless by the law of nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and
one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the
faculty of free will. But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part
of his natural liberty, as the pnce of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration
of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to
those la.we, which the community has thought proper to establish. And this~
cies of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable than that wild
a.nd savage liberty which is sacrificed to obt.ain it. For no man, that considers a.
moment, would wish to retain the absolute and uncontrolled power of doing
whatever he pleases: the consequence of which is, that every other man woulJ
also have the same power; and then there would be no security to individuals
in any of the enjoyments of life. Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is
that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by
human laws (and no fl\rther) as is necessary and expedient for the general
advantage of the public. (c) 1Ience we may collect that the law, which restrains
[•126] a man from doing *mischief to his fellow-citizens, though it diminishes
the natural, increaaes the civil liberty of mankind; but that every wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether practised by a
monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly, is a. degree of tyrannY,: nay, that
even laws themselves, whether made with or without our consent, if they regulate and constrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without any good
end in view, are regulations destructive of liberty; whereas, if any public
8.(han~e can arise from observing such precepts, the control of our private
inclinations, in one or two particular points, will conduce to preserve our general
freedom in others of more importance; by supporting that state of society, which
a.lone can secure our independence. Thus the statute of King Edward IV, (d)
which forbade the fine gentlemen of those times (under the degree of a lord) to
wear pikes on their shoes or boots of more than two inches in length, was law
that savoured of oppression; because, however ridiculous the fashion then in use
might appear, the restraining it by pecuniary penalties could serve no purpose
of common utility. Butthestatuteof King Charles II,(e) (4) which prescribes
a thing seemlngly indifferent, (a dress for the dead, who are all ordered to be
buried in woollen) is a law consistent with public liberty: for it encourages the
staple trade, on which in great measure depends the universal good of the nation.
So that laws, when prudently framed, are by no means subversive, but rather
introductive of liberty; for, as Mr. Locke has well observed,(/) where there is
no law there is no freedom. But then, on the other hand, that constitution or
frame of government, that.system of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil
liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in
those points wherein the public good requires some direction or restraint. (5)

lation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty

consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or

control, unless by the law of nature ; being a right inherent in us by birth, and

one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the

faculty of free will. But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part

of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase ; and, in consideration

of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to

those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish. And this spe-

cies of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable than that wild

and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man, that considers a

moment, would wish to retain the absolute and uncontrolled power of doing

whatever he pleases : the consequence of which is, that every other man would

also have the same power ; and then there would be no security to individuals

in any of the enjoyments of life. Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is

that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by

human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general

advantage of the public, (c) Hence we may collect that the law, which restrains

f*126l a man ^rom ^°in£ "mischief to his fellow-citizens, though it diminishes

' -I the natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind ; but that every wan-

ton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether practised by a

monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny : nay, tnat
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even laws themselves, whether made with or without our consent, if they regu-

late and constrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without any good

end in view, are regulations destructive of liberty; whereas, if any public

advantage can arise from observing such precepts, the control of our private

inclinations, in one or two particular points, will conduce to preserve our general

freedom in others of more importance ; by supporting that state of society, which

alone can secure our independence. Thus the statute of King Edward IV, (d)

which forbade the fine gentlemen of those times (under the degree of a lord) to

wear pikes on their shoes or boots of more than two inches in length, was law

that savoured of oppression ; because, however ridiculous the fashion then in use

might appear, the restraining it by pecuniary penalties could serve no purpose

of common utility. But the statute of King Charles II, (e) (4) which prescribes

a thing seemingly indifferent, (a dress for the dead, who are all ordered to be

buried in woollen) is a law consistent with public liberty : for it encourages the

staple trade, on which in great measure depends the universal good of the nation.

So that laws, when prudently framed, are by no means subversive, but rather

introductive of liberty; for, as Mr. Locke has well observed, (/) where there is

no law there is no freedom. But then, on the other hand, that constitution or

frame of government, that, system of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil

liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in

those points wherein the public good requires some direction or restraint. (5)

f,:\ Facultat <yut, quod caique faeere lilief, nitt quid vi out Jure proMbetur. Iiat. 1. 3. 1.

(d) 3 Edw. IV, c. 5. (e) 30 Car. II St. 1. c. 3. (f) On Gov. p. 2. f 67.

- (4) [Repealed by Stat. 54 Geo. Ill, c. 108.1

f (5) [This section is one of the very few intelligible descriptions of liberty, which have have hith

(cl FacuUaa dtu, quod culqlul/oure Ubd, niri quid mmdjure prohlbetur. I~t. 1. S. 1.
rt, c. &.
(e) 30 Car. II St. 1. c. 3.
(/)On Gov. p. 2. ! 67.

erto beeu communicated to the world. Though declamation and eloquence in all ages have

(d) S Edw.

exhausted their stores upon this favorite theme, yet reason has mode so little progress in

ascertaining: the nature and boundaries of liberty, that there are very few authors indeed,

either of this or of any other country, which can furnish the studious and serious reader with

a clear and consistent account of this idol of mankind. I shall here briefly subjoin the differ-

ent notions conveyed by the word liberty, -which even by the most eminent writers and orators

are generally confounded together.

The libertas quidlibet faciendi, or the liberty of doing every thing which a man's passions urge

him to attempt, or his strength enables him to eflect, is savage ferocity ; it is the liberty of a

tiger, und not the liberty of a man.

" Moral or natural liberty (in the words of Burlamaqui, c. 3, J 15,) is the right which

nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they
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( 4) [Repealed by Stat. 54 Geo. III, c. 108. 1
[This section hrnne of the very few intelligible descriptions of liberty, which have have hith
erto been communicated to the world. Though declamation e.nd eloquence in all ages have
exhausted their stores upon this favorite theme, yet reason has mnde so little progretts in
a11certainin~ the nature and boundarfos of liberty, that there are very few authors indeed,
either of thu; or of any other country, which can furnish tho studious and serious reader with
a clear e.nd consistent e.ccount of this idol of me.nkind. I shall here brio:fly subjoin the different notions conveyed by the word liberty, which even by the most eminent writers and orators
are generally confounded together.
.
.
.
.
.
The liberta-9 quulli_l>et facie11<U, or the l!berty of doing every thing w~wh ~ n~an's p~ons urge
him to attempt, or hrn strength enablei> him to effect, IS 11avage ferocity; it lll the liberty of e.
tigPr, and not the libertr. of a man.
"Mora.I or natural hherty (in the words of Burlamaqui, c. 3, ~ 15,) is the right which
nature gives to all mQllkind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they
( r,)
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POLITICAL OR C1v1L LIBERTY.

The idea and practice of this political or civil liberty flourish in their highest

vigor in these kingdoms, where it falls *little short of perfection, and r #, „„ -,

can only be lost or destroyed by the folly or demerits of its owner: "- •"

the legislature, and of course the laws of England, being peculiarly adapted to

the preservation of this inestimable blessing even in the meanest subject. Very

different from the modern constitutions of other states, on the continent of

Europe, and from the genius of the imperial law; which in general are calcula-

jadge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law

The idea and practice of this political or civil liberty flourish in their highest
vigor in these kingdoms, where it falls *little short of perfection, and [ • 127 ]
can only be lost or destroyed by the folly or demerits of its owner:
the legislature, and of course the laws of England, being peculiarly adapted to
the preservation of this inestimable blessing even in the meanest subject. Very
different from the modern constitutions of other states, on the continent of
Europe, and from the genius of the imperial law; which in general are calcnla.-

of nature, and that they do not any way abuse it to the prejudice of any other men."

This is frequently confounded, and even by the learned judge in this very section, with savage

liberty.

Civil liberty is well defined by our author to be "that of a member of society, and is no other

than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as ia necessary and expedi-

ent for the general advantage of the public."

Mr. Paley begins his excellent chapter upon civil liberty with the following definition: " Civil

liberty is not being restrained by any law, but what conduces in a greater degree to the public

welfare." B. vi, c. 5.

The Archibishop of York has defined " civil or legal liberty to be that which consists in a free-

dom from all restraints except such as established Taw imposes for the good of the community,

to which the partial good of each individual is obliged to give place."—A sermon preached Feb.

21, 1777, p. 19.

All these three definitions of civil liberty are clear, distinct, and rational, and it is probable
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they were intended to convey exactly the same ideas; but I am inclined to think that the defini-

tion given by the learned judge is the most perfect, as there are many restraints by natural law,

which, though the established law does not enforce, yet it does not vacate and remove.

In the definition of civil liberty it ought to be understood, or rather expressed, that the

restraints introduced by the law should be equal to all, or as much so as the nature of things

will admit

Political liberty may be defined to be the security with which, from the constitution, form,

and nature of the established government, the subjects enjoy civil liberty. No ideas or defini-

tions are more distinguishable than those of civil and political liberty; yet they are generally

confounded; and the latter cannot yet claim an appropriate name. The learned judge uses

political and civil liberty indiscriminately; but it would perhaps be convenient uniformly to

use those terms in the respective senses here suggested, or to have some fixed specific denomina-

tions of ideas, which in their nature are so widely different. The last species of liberty has

probably more than the rest engaged the attention of mankind, and particularly of the people of

England. Civil liberty, which is nothing more than the impartial administration of equal and

expedient laws, they have long enjoyed nearly to as great an extent as can be expected under any

human establishment.

But some who are zealous to perpetuate these inestimable blessings of civil liberty, fancy that

onr political liberty may bo augmented by reforms, or what they deem improvements in the con-

stitution of the government. Men of such opinions and dispositions there will be, and perhaps

it is to be wished that there should be, in all times. But before any serious experiment is

made, we ought to be convinced, by little less than mathematical demonstration, that we shall

judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law
of nature, and that they do not any way abuse it to the prejudice of any other men."
This is frequently confounded, and even by the learned judge in this very section, with savage
libert,r..
Civil liberty is well defined by our author to be "that of a member of society, o.nd is no other
than natiiral liberty so far restrained by human laws (o.nd no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public."
Mr. Paley begins his excel.lent chapter upon civil liberty with the following definition: "Civil
liberty is not being restrained by any law, but what conduces in o. greater degree to the public
welfare." B. vi, c. 5.
The Archibishop of York has defined "civil or legal liberty to be that which consists in a freedom from all restraints except such wi established law imposes for the good of the community,
to which the partial good of each individual is obliged to give place."-.A. sermon preached Feb.
21, 1777, p. 19.

.All these three definitions of civil liberty are clear, distinct, and rational, and it is probable
they were intended to convey exactly the same ideas; but I am inclined to think that the definition given by the learned judge is the most perfect, as there are many restraints by natural law,
which, though the established law doe11 not enforce, yet it does not vacate and remove.
In the definition of civil liberty it ought to be under:>tood, or rather expressed, that the
restraints introduced by the law should be equo.l to all, or as much so as the nature of things
will admit.
Political liberty may be defined to be the security with which, from the constitution, form,
and nature of the established government, tho subjects enjoy civil liberty. No ideas or definitions are more dii;tinguishable than those of civil aud politicu.l liberty; yet they are generally
confounded ; and the latter cannot yet claim an appropriate name. The learned judge uses
political and civil liberty indiscriminately; but it would perhaps be convenient uniformly to
use those terms in the respective senses here su~geHted, or to have some fixed S_Pecific denominations of ide~, which in their nature are so widely different. The last spec10s of liberty ho.s
probably more than the rest engaged the attention of mankind, and particularly of the people of
England. Civil liberty, which is nothing more than the impartial administration of equal and
expedient laws, they have long enjoyed nearly to as great an extent as can be expected under any
human estahli11hmont.
But some who a.re zealous to perpetuate these inestimable blesgings of civil liberty, fancy that
our political liberty may be augmented by reforms, or what they deem improvements in the constitution of the government. Men of such opinions and di~pol-litions there will be, and perhaps
it is to be wished that there should be, in all times. But before any serious experiment is
made, we ought to be convinced, by little Jess than mathematical demonstration, that we shall
not sacrifice substance to form, the end to the means, or exchange present possession for future
prospects. It is true that civil liberty may exist in perfection under an absolute monarch,
according to the well-known verse:

not sacrifice substance to form, the end to the means, or exchange present possession for future

prospects. It is true that civil liberty may exist in perfection under an absolute monarch,

according to the well-known verse:

Fallitur egregio quisquis sub principe credit

tirrriiiiiiit. Nitnquam libertas gratior extat

Quam sub rege pio. CLAUD.

But what security can the subjects have for the virtues of his successor t Civil liberty can

only be secure where the king has no power to do wrong, yet all the prerogatives to do good.

Under such a king, with two houses of parliament, the people of England have a firm reli-

ance that they will retain and transmit the blessings of civil and political liberty to the latest

posterity.

There is another common notion of liberty, which is nothing more than a freedom from con-

finement. This is a part of civil liberty, but it being the most important part, as a man in a gaol

can have the exercise and enjoyment of few rights, it is xa-r1 efrxwo called liberty.

But, where imprisonment is necessary for the ends of public justice, or the safety of the com-

munity, it is perfectly consistent with civil liberty. For Mr. Paley has well observed that,

" it is not the rigour, but the inexpediency of laws and acts of authority, which makes them

tyrannical.'' B. vi, c. 5.

This is agreeable to that notion of civil liberty entertained by Tacitus, one who was well

acquainted with the principles of human nature and human governments, when he says,

FalUtur egregi<J quisquis sub principe credit
Bemti1'm. Nunquam libertas gratior extat
Qiuim sub rege pio.

CLAUD.

But what security can the subjects have for the virtues of his successor T Civil liberty can
only be secure where the king has no power to do wrong, yet all the prerogatives to do good.
Under such a king, with two houses of parliament, the pt'.Ople of England have a firm reliance that they will retain and transmit the blessings of civil and political liberty to the latest

~~~?'is another common notion of liberty, which is notbin~ more than a

freedom from conJinement. This is a pa.rt of civil liberty, but it bein~ the moRt important pa.rt, as a man in a gaol
can have the exercise and enjoyment of few rights, it is 1ear' e;ox7/V called liberty.
But, where imprisonment is necessary for the ends of public jwtice, or the safety of the community, it is perfectly consistent with civil liberty. For Yr. Paley has well observed that,
"it is not the rigour, but the inexpediency of laws and acts of authority, which makes them
tyrannical.'' B. vi, c. 5.
This is agreeable to that notion of civil liberty entertained by Tacitus, one who was well
acquainted with the principles of human nature and human governments, when he says,
Got.'w1le8 regnantur paula jam addiicti"81 quam caJterre ~norum gentes, mmdum tamen
npra libertatem. Do Mor. Ger. c. 43.

VoL. I.-11
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supra Kbertatem. De Mor. Ger. c. 43.
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ted to vest an arbitrary and despotic power, of controlling the actions of the

subject, in the prince, or in a few grandees. And this spirit of liberty is so

deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a

slave or negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of

the laws, and so far becomes a freeman; (g) though the master's right to his

service may possibly still continue. (6)

The absolute rights of every Englishman, which, (taken in a political and

extensive sense, are usually called their liberties,) as they are founded on nature

and reason, so they are coeval with our form of government; though subject at

times to fluctuate and change; their establishment (excellent as it is) being

still human. At some times we have seen them depressed by overbearing and

tyrannical princes; at others so luxuriant as even to tend to anarchy, a worse

state than tyranny itself, as any government is better than none at all. (7) But

the vigour of our free constitution has always delivered the nation from these

embarrassments: and, as soon as the convulsions consequent on the struggle

have been over, the balance of our rights and liberties has settled to its proper

level; and their fundamental articles have been from time to time asserted in

parliament, as often as they were thought to be in danger.

First, by the great charter of liberties, which was obtained, sword in hand,

from King John, and afterwards, with some alterations, confirmed in parlia-

ment by King Henry the Third, his son. Which charter contained very few

new grants; but, as Sir Edward Coke (h) observes, was for the most part
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F *1281 Declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental *laws of Eng-

" v -" land. Afterwards by the statute called confirmatio cartarum, (i)

whereby the great charter is directed to be allowed as the common law; all

judgments contrary to it are declared void; copies of it are ordered to be sent

to all cathedral churches, and read twice a year to the people; and sentence of

excommunication is directed to be as constantly denounced against all those that,

by word, deed, or counsel, act contrary thereto, or in any degree infringe it

Next, by a multitude of subsequent corroborating statutes (Sir Edward Coke, I

think, reckons thirty-two,) (k) from the first Edward to Henry the Fourth.

Then, after a long interval, oy the petition of right; which was a parliamen-

tary declaration of the liberties of the people, assented to by King Charles the

First in the beginning of his reign. Which was closely followed by the still

more ample concessions made by that unhappy prince to his parliament before

the fatal rupture between them; and by the many salutary laws, particularly

the habeas corpus act, passed under Charles the Second. To these succeeded

the bill of rights, or declaration delivered bv the lords and commons to the

prince and princess of Orange, 13th of February, 1688; and afterwards

(g) Salk. 666. See ch. 14. (h) 2 Inat. proem. (i) 25 Edw. 1. (Jh 2 Inst. proem.

It is very snprising that the learned commentator should cite with approbation (pp. 6 and

125), and that Montesquieu should adopt (b. xi, c. 13), that absurd definition of liberty given in

Justinian's Institutes: Facultas ejiis, quod cttique facere libet, nisi quod vi, aut jure prohibetur.

The liberty here defined implies that every one is permitted to do whatever is not forbidden by an

existing law, and perhaps whatever is not forbidden to all. The word vi seems to refer to a

restraimt against law. In every country, and under all circumstances, the subjects possess the

liberty described by this definition.

When an innocent negro is seized and chained, or is driven to his daily toil by a merciless

master, he still retains this species of liberty, or that little power of action, of which force and

barbarous laws have not bereft him. But we must not have recourse to a system of laws in

which it is a fundamental principle, quod principi plavuit, legis habet vigorttm, for correct notions

of liberty. CHRISTIAN.]

(6) [It is not to the soil, or to the air of England that negroes are indebted for their liberty,

but to the efficacy of the writ of habeas corpus.'] See Forbes t>. Cochrane, 2 B. and C. 448; 2

D. and K. 679. S. C. See also, note to Sommerset's Case, Broom's Const. Law. 65, 105, ct seq.

(7) [Lord Camden concluded his judgment in the case of general warrants in the same words:

" One word more for ourselves; wo are no advocates for libels; all governments must set their

faces against them, and whenever they come before us and a jury, we shall set our faces against

them; and if juries do not prevent them, they may prove fatal to liberty, destroy government,

and introduce anarchy; but tyranny is better than anarchy, and tho worst government bettei

than none at all." 2."Wils. 292.]
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enacted in parliament, when they became king and queen: which declaration

concludes in these remarkable words: "and they do claim, demand, and insist

upon, all and singular the premises, as their undoubted rights and liberties."

And the act of parliament itself (/) recognizes " all and singular the rights and

liberties asserted and claimed in the said declaration to be the true, ancient, and

indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom." Lastly, these liberties were

again asserted at the commencement of the present century, in the act of set-

tlement, (m) whereby the crown was limited to his present majesty's illustrious

house: and some new provisions were added, at the same fortunate era, for bet-

ter securing our religion, laws, and liberties; which the statute declares to be

" the birthright of the people of England," according to the ancient doctrine of

the common law. («)

*Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liberties. The r *i oq i

rights themselves, thus defined by these several statutes, consist in a L -"

number of private immunities; which will appear from what has been pre-

mised, to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty,

which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public conven-

ience ; or else those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in

lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals. These therefore were

formerly, either by inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind ; but, in

most other countries of the world being now more or less debased and destroyed,

they at present may be said to remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the
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rights of the people of England. And these may be reduced to three principal

or primary articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty

and the right of private property: because, as there is no other known method

of compulsion or of abridging man's natural free will, but by an infringement

or diminution of one or other of these important rights, the preservation of

these, inviolate, may justly be said to include the preservation of our civil immu-

nities in their largest and'most extensive sense.

I. The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted

enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.

1. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every

individual: and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able

to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a

potion or otherwise, killeth it in her womb ; or if any one beat her, whereby the

child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not

murder, (8) was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter, (o) But the

modern law doth not look *upon this offence in quite so atrocious a light r *i OQ -i

(&) but merely as a heinous misdemeanor. (p) I " I

An infant in venire sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be

born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a

copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; (q) and it is

(I) 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2. <n») 12 and 18 W. m, c. 2. (n) Plowd. M.

(o) Si aliqttitmuKeranpregnantemftrcutserU. vel ei venenum dtderlt. per quodfuxrit alinrtimm; tiputr-

perium jamformattim/uerit, ei maxime sifuerii animation, focil homiciaium. Bracton, I. 3 c. 21.

(p) II'In.-1. SO. (q) Stat. 12 Car. II, c. 24.

(8) [The distinction between murder and manslaughter, or felonious homicide, in the time

of Bracton, was in a great degree nominal. The punishment of both was the same, for mur-

der as well as manslaughter, by the common law, had the benefit of clergy. Post. 302. ]

enacted in parliament, when they became king and queen: which declaration
concludes in these remarkable words: "and they do claim, demand, and insist
upon, all and singular the premises, as their undoubted rights and liberties."
And the act of parliament itself ( l) recognizes "all and singular the ri~hts and
liberties asserfa~d and claimed in the said declaration to be the true, ancient, and
indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom." Lastly, these liberties were
again asserted at the commencement of the present century, in the act of settlement, (m) whereby the crown was limited to his present majesty's illustrious
house : and some new provisions were added, at the same fortunate era, for better securing our religion, laws, and liberties; which the statute declares to be
"the birthright of the people of England," according to the ancient doctrine of
the common law. (n)
*Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liberties. The *
rights themselves, thus defined by these several statutes, consist in a [ 129 J
number of private immunities; which will appear from what has been premised, to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural libertv,
which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else those civil pri"vile~es, which society hath engaged to provide, in
lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals. These therefore were
formerly, either by inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind; but, in
most other countries of the world being now more or less debased and destroyed,
they at present may be said to remain, m a peculiar and emphatical manner, the
rights of the people of England. And these may be reduced to three principal
or primar.Y articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty
and the right of private property: because, as there is no other known method
of compulsion or of abridging man's natural free will, but by an infringement
or dimmution of one or o-ther of these important rights, the preservation of
these, inviolate, may justlv be said to include the preservation of our civil immunities in their largest and· most extensive sense.
I. The right of personal security- consists in a person's legal and unint~rrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, lns body, his health, and his reputation.
1. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual: and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able
to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a
potion or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the
child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child ; this, though not
murder, (8) was by the ancient law homicide or manslau~hter. (o) But the
modern law doth not look *upon this offence in quite so atroc10us a light [ *l30]
(9) but merely as a heinous misdemeanor. (p)
An infant in, ·ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be
born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a
copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; (q) and it is
(l) I W . and M. St. 2, c . 2.
(m) 12 "n<l 18 W . IlI, c. 2.
(n) Plowd. M.
(o) 8' allquia mulierem preg11a11tem perctU1erit, lld ei ver&ent'1n lkderU, per quodfect:r'U allorffmln / ripu_...
JH!riumjamformatumfuuU, d mazime lifturit an,matum,facU lwtnlcidmm. Braeton, l. 3 c. 21.
(p) 3 Inst. 00.
(q) Stat. 12 Car. 11, c. M.

(9) [But if the child be born alive, and afterwards die in consequence of the potion or beating,

it will be murder: 3 Inst. 50. 1 P. \Vrns. 245; and of course those who, with a wicked intent,

administered the potion, or advised the woman to take it, will be accessories before the fact, and

subject to the same punishment as the principal.]

In the Queen v. West, 2 C. and K. 784, it was held that if a person, intending to procure

abortion, does an act which causes a child to be bom go much earlier than the natural time, that

it is born in a state much less capable of living, and afterwards dies in consequence of its expo-

sure to the external world, the person who by this misconduct so brings the child into the world,

and put? it therebv in a situation in which it cannot live, is guilty of murder, and the mere exis-

tence of a possibility that something might have been done to prevent the death, would not

render it the less murder.
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(8) [The distinction between murder and manslaughter, or felonious homicide, in the time
of Bracton, wa.s in a great d(•gree nominal. The punh1hment of both was the same, for murder as well as mam;laughter, by the common law, had tho benefit of clergy. Fo11t. 302.]
(9) [But if the child be born alive, 6nd nfterwardR die in rorn;equence of the potion or beating,
it will be murder: 3 Inst. 50. 1 P. WmR. 245; and of courae those who, with a wicked intent,
administered the potion, or advised the woman to take it, will be acceBSories before the fact, and
subject to the same punishment as the principal.]
In the Queen ti. West, 2 C. ·and K. 784, it was held that if a person, intending to procure
abortion, does an act which causes a chlld t.o be born so much earlier than the natural time, that
it is born in a 11tate mnch lesRcapable of living, and aflerwards dies in co~uence of its exposure to the external world, the person who by this misconduct RO brings the child into the world,
and puts it therebv in a situation in which it cannot live, is guilty of murder, and the mere exii;tcnoe of a possibility that something might have been done to prevent the death, would not
render it the lees murder.
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enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such limi-

tation, as if it were then actually born, (r) (10) And in this point the civil law-

agrees with ours. (s)

2. A man's limbs (by which for the present we only understand those mem-

bers which may be useful to him in fight, and the loss of which alone amounts

to mayhem by the common law) are also the gift of the wise Creator, to enable

him to protect himself from external injuries in a state of nature. To these there-

fore he has a natural inherent right; and they cannot be wantonly destroyed or

disabled without a manifest breach of civil liberty.

Both the life and limbs of a man are of such high value, in the estimation

of the law of England, that it pardons even homicide if committed sc defend-

endo, or in order to preserve them. For whatever is done by a man, to save

either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the highest necessity and

compulsion. Therefore, if a man through fear of death or mayhem is pre-

vailed upon to execute a deed, or do any other legal act: these, though

accompanied with all other the requisite solemnities, may be afterwards avoided,

if forced upon him by a well-grounded apprehension of losing his life, or even

his limbs, in case of his non-compliance, (t) And the same is also a sufficient

excuse for the commission of many misdemeanors, as will appear in the fourth

book. The constraint a man is under in these circumstances is called in law

r ,^3^ -i duress, from the Latin durities, of which there are two *sorts : duress

' * •" of imprisonment, where a man actually loses his liberty, of which we
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shall presently speak ; and duress per minas, where the hardship is only threat-

ened and impending, which is that we are now discoursing of. Duress per

minas is either for fear of loss of life, or else for fear of mayhem, or loss of

limb. And this fear must be upon sufficient reason; " non," as Bracton expresses

it, "suspicio cujuslibet vani et meticulosi hominis, sed talis qui possit cadere in

virum constaniem ; talis enim debet esse metus, qui in se continent vitce pericu-

lum, aut corporis cruciatum." (u) A fear of battery, or being beaten, though

never so well grounded, is no duress ; neither is the fear of having one's house

burned, or one's goods taken away and destroyed; (11) because in these cases,

(r) Stat. 10 and 11 W. in, c. 16.

(») Qui in a I Tn nmt, injure civili Melliguntur in rerun HI dura eue, cum de eonan commodo agatur. r/.

1. 6. 26.

(<) 2 Inat. 48S. (u) I. S. a. 6.

(10) [Every legitimate infant in vcntre de sa mere is considered as bom for all beneficial pur-

poses. Co, Litt. 36; IP. Wms. 329. Thus if lands be devised to B. for life, remainder to such

child or children as shall be living at the time of his decease, a posthumous child will take equally

with those who were born before B's death. Doe v. Clark, 2 Hen. Bla. 399. But the presump-

tive heir may enter and receive the profits to his own use, till the birth of the child who takes

land by descent. 3 "Wils. 526.

Such infant, <tc., may have a distributive share of intestate property even with the half-blood:

1 Tea. 81; it is capable of taking a devise of land : 2 Atk. 117 ; 1 Freern. 244, 293; it takes, under

a marriage settlement, a provision made for children living at the death of the father. 1 Ves. 85.

And it has lately been decided, that marriage and the birth of a posthumous child, amount to a

revocation of a will executed previous to the marriage. 5 T. R. 49. So in executory devises it is

considered as a life in being. 7 T. R. 100.]

See also Stedfast ». Nichol, 3 Johng. Gas. 18 ; Swift v. Dufficld, 5 8. and R. 38; Hall v. Han-

cock, 15 Pick. 255; Harper v. Archer, 4 Smedes and M. 99; Trower v. Butts, 1 Sim. and Stu.

181.

(11) An arrest may bo duress where it is made for an unlawful purpose, even though under

lawful process. Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H. 508 ; Severance 0. Kimball, 8 If. H. 386 ; Fisher

v. Shattuck, 17 Pick. 252; Osborn v. Robbins, 36 N. Y. 365. So may be, it is said, the fear of an

unlawful imprisonment. Whitefield v. Longfellow, 13 Me. 146. But not the threat of lawful

imprisonment. Alexander t). Pierce, 10 N. H. 497 ; Eddy v. Herrin, 17 Me. 338. See Jones u.

Rogers, 36 Go. 157. And although it is held that duress of goods will not avoid a contract:

Atlee »•. Backhouse, 3 M. and W. 642 ; Glynn v. Thomas, 11 Exch. 878; Skeate v. Beale, 11 A.

and K. 963 ; Bingham v. Sessions, 6 Smedes and M. 13 ; yet money paid to obtain their release is

regarded as paid under compulsion, and may be recovered back. Oates v. Hudson, 6 Exch. 346;

Cliase v. Dwmal, 7 Greenl. 134. And in this country a disposition has been manifested to hold

that duress of goods mav be sufficient to avoid one's contract, where he has no other speedy

means than the giving of the contract for obtaining possession of them. Sarportas v. Jennings,

1 Bay, 470; Collins v. Westbury, 2 Bay, 211; Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill 158.
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should the threat be performed, a man may have satisfaction by recovering equiva-

lent damages: (M>) but no suitable atonement can be made for the loss of life or

limb. And the indulgence shewn to a man under this, the principal, sort of duress,

the fear of losing his life or limbs, agrees also with that maxim of the civil law;

ignoscitur ei qui sanguinem suum qualiter, qualiter redemptum voluit. (x)

The law not only regards life and member, and protects every man in the

enjoyment of them, but also furnishes him with every thing necessary for their

support For there is no man so indigent or wretched, but he may demand a

supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the

community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor,

of which in their proper places. A humane provision; yet, though dictated by

the principles of society, discountenanced by the Roman laws. For the edicts of

the emperor Constantine, commanding the public to maintain the children of

those who were unable to provide for them, in order to prevent the murder and

exposure of infants, an institution founded on the same principles as our found-

ling hospitals, though comprised in the Theodosian code, (y) were rejected in

Justinian's collection.

*These rights, of life and member, can only be determined by the r *i 00 n

death of the person; which was formerly accounted to be either a civil L •"

or natural death. The civil death commenced, if any man was banished or

abjured the realm (z) by the process of the common law, or entered into

religion; that is, went into a monastery, and became there a monk professed;
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in which cases he was absolutely dead in law, and his next heir should have his

estate. For such banished man was entirely cut off from society; and such a

monk, upon his profession, renounced solemnly all secular concerns: and

besides, as the popish clergy claimed an exemption from the duties of civil life

and the commands of the temporal magistrate, the genius of the English laws

would not suffer those persons to enjoy the benefits of society, who secluded

themselves from it, and refused to submit to its regulations, (a) A monk was

therefore accounted civiltter mortuus, and when he entered into religion might,

like other dying men, make his testament and executors; or, if he made none,

the ordinary might grant administration to his next of kin, as if he were

actually dead intestate. And such executors and administrators had the same

power, and might bring the same actions for debts due to the religious, and

were liable to the same actions for those due from him, as if he were naturally

deceased. (V) Nay, so far has this principle been carried, that when one was

bound in a bond to an abbot and his successors, and afterwards made his execu-

tors, and professed himself a monk of the same abbey, and in process of time

was himself made abbot thereof; here the law gave him, in the capacity of

abbot, an action of debt against his own executors to recover the money due. (c)

In short, a monk or religious was so effectually dead in law, that a lease

made even to a third person, during the life (generally) of one who afterwards

became a monk, determined by such his entry into religion: for which reason

leases, and other conveyances for life, were usually made to have and to hold

for the term of one's natural life, (d) But, *even in the time of popery, r *i oo -i

the law of England took no cognizance of profession in any foreign L •"

countrv, because the fact could not be tried in our courts; (e) and therefore,

since the reformation, this disability is held to be abolished: (/)asis also the dis-

ability of banishment, consequent upon abjuration, by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 28. (12)

f«o) 2 Inst. 483. (x) Ff. 48. 21. 1. ;«) L. 11. *. 27. (z) Co. Litt. 133.

(a) This was :i 1 -o a rule in the feudal law, 1. 2. t. 21. ' 'desiit ease miles seculi, qui foetus eat mttes Chritti;

Ttte beneflcium pertinet ad turn qui non debet gerere offldum. (6) Litt. i 200. (c) Co. Litt 133.

(<D 2 Ilep. 48. Co. Litt. 132. («) Co. Litt. 132. (f) I Salk. 162.

(12) [One species of civil death may still exist in this country; that is, where a man by act of

parliament is attainted of treason or felony, and saving his life, is banished forever; this Lord

Coke declares to be a civil death. But, he says, a temporary exile is not a civil death. Co. Litt.

133. And for the same reason where a man receives judgment of death, and afterwards leaves

the kingdom for life, upon a conditional pardon, this seems to amount to a civil death. This

practice did not exist in the time of Lord Coke, who says, that a man can only lose his country by

authority of parliament. Ib.]
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should the threat be performed, a man may have satisfaction by recovering equi valent damages: (w) hut no suitable atonement can be made for the loss of life or
limb. And the indulgence shewn to a man under this, the principal, sort of duress,
the fear of losing his life or limbs, agrees also with that maxim of the civil law;
ignoscitur ei qui sanguinem suum qualiter, qualiter redemptum volu-it. (x)
The law not only regards life and member, and protects every man in the
enjoyment of them, but also furnishes him with 3Very thing necessary for their
support. For there is no man so indigent or wretched, but he may demand a
supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the
community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor,
of which in their proper places. A humane provision; yet, though dictated by
the principles of society, discountenanced by the Roman laws. For the edicts of
the emperor Constantme, commanding the public to maintain the children of
those who were unable to provide for them, m order to prevent the murder and
exposure of infants, an institution founded on the same princifles as our foundling hospitals, though comprised in the Theodosian code, (y were rejected in
Justinian's collection.
*These rights, of life and member, can only be determined by the [ *132 ]
death of the person; which was formerly accounted to be either a civil
or natuml death. The civil death commenced, if any man was banished or
abjured the realm (z) by the process of the common law, or entered into
religion; that is, went into a monastery, and became there a monk professe<l;
in which cases he was absolutely dead in law, and his next heir should hiwe his
estate. For such banished man was entirely cut off from society; and such a
monk, upon his profession, renounced solemnly all secular concerns: and
besides, as the popish clergy claimed an exemption from the duties of civil life
and the commands of the temporal magistrate, the genius of the English laws
would not suffer those persons to enjoy the benefits of society, who secluded
themselves from it, and refused to submit to its regulations. (a) A monk was
therefore accounted c-i-viliter mortuus, and when he entered into religion might,
like other dying men, make his testament an<l. executors; or, if he made none,
the ordinary might grant administration to his next of kin, as if he were
actually dead intestate. And such executors and administrators had the same
power, and might bring the same actions for debts due to the religious, and
were liable to the same actions for those due from him, as if he were naturally
deceased. (b) Nay, so far bas this principle been carried, that when one was
bound in a bond to an abbot and his successors, and afterwards made his executors, and professed himself a monk of the same abbey, and in process of time
was himself made abbot thereof; here the law gave him, in the capacity of
abbot, an action of debt against his own executors to recover the money due. (c)
In short, a monk or religious was so effectually dead in law, that a lease
made even to a third person, during the life (generally) of one who afterwards
became a monk, determined by such his entry into religion: for which reason
leases, and other conveyances for life, were usually made to have and to hold
for the term of one's natural life. (d) But, *even in the time of popery, [ *133 ]
the law of England took no cogmzance of profession in any foreign
countrv, because the fact could not be tried in our courts; (e) and therefore,
since the reformation, this disability is held to be abolished: (/)as is also the disability of banishment, consequent upon abjuration, by statutR 21 Ja-0. I, c. 28. (12)
rta) 2 Inst. 483.
(z) Ff. '8. 21. l.
:ul L. 11. t. '¥1.
(Z) Co. Litt. 133.
.
(a) This was nl~o a rule in the feudal law, l. 2. t. 21. "duiU uae milu seculi, qui factiu est miles Clirlati;
beneftcium perlinet ad eum qui mm debet gerere offecium.
(bl Litt. ! 200.
(c) Co. Litt. 138.
.
(d) 2 ltep. ts. Co. Litt. 13"2.
(e) Co. Litt. 132.
(fl 1 Salk. 162.

MC

( 12) [One sp~cic~ of civil dee.th mo.y still exist in this country; tho.t hi, where o. man b.f a.ct of
parliu.ment i::< o.ttnintcd of treason or felony, and saving his life, is baa.isaed forever; this Lord
Coke declares t{I be a civil death. But, he sayd, a temporary exile is not a civil death. Co. Litt.
13.:t And for the same rea.~on where a man receives Judgment of death, and aft-Orwards leaves
the kingdom for life, upon a conditional pardon, this seems to amount to a civil death. 'fbis
practice did not exist in tho time of Lord Coke, who says, that a man can only Io:se his country by
authority of parliament. 11.J.]
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This natural life being, as was before observed, the immediate donation of the

great Creator, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual,

neither by the person himself, nor by any other of his fellow-creatures, merely

upon their own authority. Yet nevertheless it may, by the divine permission,

be frequently forfeited for the breach of those laws of society, which are

enforced by the sanction of capital punishments; of the nature, restrictions,

expedience, and legality of which, we may hereafter more conveniently inquire

in the concluding book of these commentaries. At present, I shall only observe,

that whenever the constitution of a state vests in any man, or body of men, a

power of destroying at pleasure, without the direction of laws, the lives or

members of the subject, such constitution is in the highest degree tyrannical;

and that, whenever any laws direct such destruction for light and trivial causes,

such laws are likewise tyrannical, though in an inferior degree; because here

the subject is aware of the danger he is exposed to, and may, by prudent cau-

tion, provide against it. The statute law of England does therefore very seldom,

and the common law does never, inflict any punishment extending to life or

limb, unless upon the highest necessity; (13) and the constitution is an utter

stranger to any arbitrary power of killing or maiming the subject without the

express warrant of law. " Nullus liber homo," says the great charter, (g)

"aliquo modo destruatur, nisi per legate judicum parium suorum out per

legem terra." Which words, "aliquo modo destruatur," according to Sir

Edward Coke, (h) include a prohibition, not only of killing and maiming, but
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also of torturing, (to which our laws are strangers,) and of every oppression by

colour of an illegal authority. And it is enacted by the statute 5 Edw. Ill, c.

9, that no man shall be forejudged of life or limb contrary to the great charter

F *1341 an{^ ^ne *^aw °^ the ^an<^' an<^ again> by statute 28 Edw. Ill, c. 3, that no

L J man shall be put to death, without being brought to answer by due pro-

cess of law.

3. Besides those limbs and members that may be necessary to a man, in order

to defend himself or annoy his enemy, the rest of his person or body is also

entitled, by the same natural right, to security from the corporal insults of

menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding; though such insults amount not to

destruction of life or member.

4. The preservation of a man's health from such practices as may prejudice or

annoy it; and

5. The security of his reputation or good name from the arts of detraction

and slander, are rights to which every man is entitled, by reason and natural

justice; since, without these, it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of

any other advantage or right. But these three last articles (being of much less

importance than those which have gone before, and those which are yet to

come,) it will suffice to have barely mentioned among the rights of persons:

referring the more minute discussion of their several branches to those parts of

our commentaries which treat of the infringement of these rights, under the

head of personal wrongs.

II. Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and pre-

serves, the personal liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the

power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatso-

ever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint,

unless by due course of law. Concerning which we may make the same obser-

vations as upon the preceding article, that it is a right strictly natural; that

the laws of England have never abridged it without sufficient cause; and that,

in this kingdom, it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of the magis-

i.'/l e. 29. (k) 2 Iiwt. 48.

(13) [This is a compliment which, I fear, the common law does not deserve; for although it

did not punish with death any person who could read, even for any number of murders or other

felonies, yet it inflicted death upon every felon who coald not read, though his crime was the

stealing only of twelve pence farthing.]
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trate, without the explicit permission of the laws. Here again the language of

the great *charter (i) is, that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned r*io~i

but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land. (14) ^ 0-"

And many subsequent old statutes (/) expressly direct, that no man shall be

taken or imprisoned by suggestion or petition to the king or his council, unless

it be by legal indictment, or the process of the common law. By the petition

of right, 3 Car. I, it is enacted, that no freeman shall be imprisoned or detained

without cause shown, to which he may make answer according to law. By 16

Car. I, c. 10, if any person be restrained of his liberty by order or decree of any

illegal court, or by command of the king's majesty in person, or by warrant of

the council board, or of any of the privy council, he shall, upon demand of his

counsel, have a writ of habeas corpus, to bring his body before the court of

king's bench or common pleas, who shall determine whether the cause of his

commitment be just, and thereupon do as to justice shall appertain. And by 31

Car. II, c. 2, commonly called the habeas corpus act, the methods of obtaining

this writ are so plainly pointed out and enforced, that, so long as this statute

remains unimpeached, no subject of England can be long detained in prison,

except in those cases in which the law requires and justifies such detainer. (15)

And, lest this act should be evaded by demanding unreasonable bail, or sureties

for the prisoner's appearance, it is declared by 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, that exces-

sive bail ought not to be required.

Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty;
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for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison

arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper, (as in Prance it is daily

practiced by the crown,) (£) there would soon be an end of all other rights and

immunities. Some have thought that unjust attacks, even upon life or property,

at the arbitrary will of the magistrate, *are less dangerous to the the com- p^ogi

monwealth than such as are made upon the personal liberty of the L "'"

subject. To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, with-

fi) c. 189. (}) 6 Edw. IH, c. 9. 26 Edw. m, St. 6. o. 4. 28 Edw. HI. c. 8.

(k) I bave been aasnred, upon good authority that, during the mild administration of Cardinal Floury,

trat.e, without the explicit permission of tho laws. Here again the language of
the great *charter (i) is, that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned [*l3fi]
but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land. (14)
And many subsequent old statutes (i) expressly direct, that no man shall be
taken or imprisoned by suggestion or petition t;o the king or his council, unless
it be by legal indictment, or the process of the common law. By the petition
of right, 3 Car. I, it is enacted, that no freeman shall be imprisoned or detained
without cause shown, to which he may make answer according to law. By 16
Car. I, c. 10, if any person be restrained of his liberty by order or decree of any
illegal court, or by command of the king's majesty in person, or by warrant of
the council board, or of any of the privy council, he shall, upon demand of his
counsel, have a writ of habeas corpus, to bring his body before the court of
king's bench or common pleas, who shall determine whether the cause of his
commitment be just, and thereupon do as to justice shall appertain. And by 31
Car. II, c. 2, commonly called the luibem1 corpw; act~ the met,hods of obtaining
this writ are so plainly pointed out and enforced, that, so long as this statute
remains unimpeached, no subject of England can be long detained in prison,
except in those cases in which the law requires and justifies such detainer. (15)
And, lest this act should be evaded by demanding unreasonable bail, or sureties
• for the prisoner's appearance, it is declared by 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, that excessive bail ought not to be required.
Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty;
for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison
arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper, (as in France it is daily
practiced by the crown,) (k) there would soon be an end of all other rights and
immunitie11. Some have thought that unjust attacks, even upon life or property,
at the arbitrary will of the magistrate, "'are less dangerous to the the com- [*1361
monwealth than such as are made upon the personal liberty of the
subject. To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, with-

above 54,000 Mtn-i de cachet were issued, upon the single ground of the famous bull un&genitus.

(14) The words "law of the land " and "due process of law" are employed interchangeably

in constitutional law, and mean the same thing. State v. Simons, 2 Spears, 767; Van Zahdt ?.

r1; c. 29.
(JJ 5 Edw. m, c. 11. 21> Edw. m, St. 5. c. '· l!8 Edw. m 1 11, s.
(1') I bl\\'e been assured, upon good authority that, during tl1e mild administration of Cardinal Fleury,
above 5',000 Wtru ~ cachet were isl!ued, upon the single ground or the famollB bull unigMittu.

"Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260; Matter of John and Cherry Streets; 19 Wend. 659; Green v. Briggs,.!

Curt. 311; Brvme'R Appeal, 16 Perm. St. 256; Parsons ». Russell, 11 Mich. 129; Murray's

Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co. 18 How. 276. They have sometimes been supposed to be equiv-

alent to " the judgment of his peers," but this is an error, as they are applicable to a great

variety of cases in which trial by jury is not permissible or not applicable. "The meaning is

that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the protection of

general rules which govern society." Webster in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat.

519. Due process of law in each particular case means, such an exertion of the powers of

government as the settled maxims of law sanction and require, and under such safe-guards for

the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which

the one in question belongs. See State v Allen, 2 McCord, 56; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251;

Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 15; James v. Reynolds, 2 Texas, 251.

Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235; Lenz «. Charlton, 23 Wis. 478.

(15) Amended and enforced by 56 Geo. Ill, c. 100. See the construction of these acts.

1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 123. As to the writ of habeas corpus under these statutes and at the

common law, see 9 A. and E. 731. The habeas corpus act of 31 Charles II, has been generally

re-enacied in the American States, with modifications to conform it to our judicial systems. The

constitution of the United States, art 1, $ 9, forbids the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,

unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it; and no suspension

has been had under this permission except during the recent rebellion. The federal courts only

issue the writ in the cases prescribed in the acts of congress, and those cases are comparatively

few, and are only where the imprisonment is under pretence of national authority, or where this

process seems important to prevent encroachments by state officials upon the proper province of

the general government. The protection of individuals against unlawful imprisonments is for the

most part left to the state courts.

The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not legalize whatevet may be done during

the suspension; it only takes from the individual one of the usual me^js of redress, but leaves

the persons concerned in arrests and imprisonments to bear the re>^ ot)sMity if they prove

(14) The words "law of the land "and "due proceStl of law" are employed interchangeably
in constitutional law, and mean the Rame thing. State t>. Simons, 2 S11e11I'!I, 7b7; Van Zandt t•.
Waddell, 2 Yer~. 260; Matter of John and Cherry Streetll; 19 Wend. 659; Green v. Briggs, .1
Curt. 311; 1'Jrvme't1 .Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256; P&n!Ollil v. Russell, 11 .Mich. 129; .Murray't1
Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co. 18 How. 276. They have sometimes been supposed to be equivalent to "the judgment of his peers," but this is an error, as they are applicable to a great
variety of co.seR in which trial by jury is not permissible or not R)llllicnble. "The meaning is
that every citiv.en i;hall hold his life, liberty, property and immumties under the protection of
general rules which govern society." Webster in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wbee.t.
519. Due process of law in each particular cll.'!e means, such e.n exertion of the powers of
government a.'! tho Rettled maxims of le.w se.nction and require, and under such safe-guards for
the protection of individuBI. rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of case;i to which
the one in question belongs. See State v .Allen, 2 .McCord, 56 ; Sears ti; Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251 ;
Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 15; James 11. Reynolds, 2 Texas, 251.
Bank of Columbia. t•. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235; Lenz v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 478.
(15) Amended and enforced by 56 Geo. !JI1 c. 100. See the construction of theRe act.s.
1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 123. .As to the writ of ne.beas corpus nnder these statutes and at the
common law, Ree 9 .A. and E. 731. The habeas corpus act of 31 Charles II, bas been generally
re-en1Wted in the American State11, with modific-ations to conform it to our judicial systems. The
coililtitution of tho United States, art 1, ~ 9, forbids the suspension of the writ of babea.~ corpus.
unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the ptiblic safety may require it; and no suspension
has been had under this permission except during the recent rebellion. The federal courtll only
iKsue the writ in the cases prescribed in the acts of congress, and those cases are comparatively
few, and are only where the imprisonment is under pretence of nationa.l authority, or where this
process seems import.ant to pr.e vent eneroacbments by ~tate officials upon the proper provinee of
the general government. The protection of individuals against unlawful imprisonments is for the
most part left to the state courts.
The sU!:pemrlon of the writ of haben.'l coryus does not legalize whateve1 may be done during
the tmspension ; it only takes from the individual one of the usual me~n$ of redress, but leaves
the pel'llons concerned in arrests and imprisonments to bear the r~~von\\\\)i\ity . if they \)rove
illegal.
·
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out accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as

must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom; but

confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings

are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more

dangerous engine of arbitrary government. And yet sometimes, when the state

is in real danger, even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness of

our constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to determine when

the danger of the state is so great as to render this measure expedient; for it is

the parliament only, or legislative power, that, whenever it sees proper, can

authorize the crown, by suspending the habeas corpus act for a short and lim-

ited time,to imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so doing;

as the senate of Home was wont to have recourse to a dictator, a magistrate of

absolute authority, when they judged the republic in any imminent danger.

The decree of the senate, which usually preceded the nomination of this magis-

trate, " dent operam consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat," was called

the senatus consultum ultima necessitatis. In like manner this experiment

ought only to be tried in cases of extreme emergency; and in these the nation

parts with its liberty for awhile, in order to preserve it for ever.

The confinement of the person, in any wise, is an imprisonment; so that the

keeping a man against his will in a private house, putting him in the stocks,

arresting or forcibly detaining him in the street, is an imprisonment. (I) And

the law so much discourages unlawful confinement, that if a man is under duress
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of imprisonment, which we before explained to mean a compulsion by an illegal

restraint of liberty, until he seals a bond or the like; he may allege this duress,

r+, „„-! and avoid the extorted bond. But if a man be lawfully imprisoned, *and,

L iA • J either to procure his discharge, or on any other fair account, seals, a bond

or a deed, this is not by duress of imprisonment, and he is not at liberty to avoid

it. (m) To make imprisonment lawful, it mnst either be by process from the

courts of judicature, or by warrant from some legal officer having authority to

commit to prison ; which warrant must be in writing, under the hand and seal

of the magistrate, and express the causes of the commitment, in order to be

examined into, if necessary, upon a habeas corpus. If there be no cause

expressed, the gaoler is not bound to detain the prisoner: (n) for the law judges,

in this respect, saith Sir Edward Coke, like Festus the Roman governor, that it

is unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not to signify withal the crimes alleged

against him.

A natural and regular consequence of this personal liberty is, that every

Englishman may claim a right to abide in his own country so long as he pleases;

and not to be driven from it unless by the sentence of the law. The king,

indeed, by his royal prerogative, may issue out his writ ne exeat regnum, and

prohibit any of nis subjects from going into foreign parts without license, (o)

This may be necessary for the public service and safeguard of the common-

wealth. But no power on earth, except the authority of parliament, can send

any subject of England out of the land against his will; no, not even a crimi-

nal. For exile and transportation are punishments at present unknown to the

common law; and, whenever the latter is now inflicted, it is either by the choice

of the criminal himself to escape a capital punishment, or else by the express

direction of some modern act of parliament. (16) To this purpose the great

charter (p) declares, that no freeman shall be banished, unless by the judgment

of his peers, or by the law of the land. And by the habeas corpus act, 31 Car.

(I) 2 lust. 589. (m) 2 Inst. 482. (n) Ibid. 62, 53. („) F. N. B. 85. fi'J C. ».

(16) Exile is said to have been first introduced as a punishment by stat. 39 Eliz. c. 4. See Bar

rinpton on Statutes, 269. Persona capitally convicted are frequently pardoned on condition

out accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as
must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom; but
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings
are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more
dangerous engino of arbitrary government. And yet sometimes, when the state
is in real danger, even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness of
our constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to determine when
the danger of the state is so ~eat as to render this measure expedient; for it is
the parliament only, or legislative power, that., whenever it sees proper, can
u.uthQrize the crown, by suspending the liabeas corpus a.ct for a short and limited time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so doing;
a.s the senate of Rome was wont to have recourse to a dictator, a magistrate of
absolute authority, when they judged the republic in any imminent danger.
The decree of the senate, which usually preceded the nomination of this magistrate, " dent operam consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat," was called
the senatus consultum u,ltim<B necessitatis. In like manner this experiment
ought only to be tried in cases of extreme emergency; and in these the nation
parts with its liberty for awhile, in order to preserve it for ever.
'rhe confinement of the person, in any wise, is an imprisonment; so that the
keeping a man against his will in a private house, putting him in the stocks,
arresting or forcibly detaining him m the street, is an imprisonment. (l) And •
the law so much discourages unlawful confinement, that if a man is under duress
of im~risonment, which we before explained to mean a compulsion by an illegal
restramt of liberty, until he sea.ls a bond or the like; he may allege this duress,
[ ,.. 1371 and a.void the extorted bond. But if a man he lawfully imprisoned, •and,
either to procure his discharge, or on any other fair account, seals, a bond
or a deed, this is not by duress of imprisonment, and he is not at liberty to avoid
it. (m) 'fo make imprisonment lawfnl, it mnst either be by :erocess from the
courts of judicature, or by warrant from some legal officer haYmg authority to
commit to prison ; which warrant must be in writing, under the hand and seal
of the magistrate, and express the causes of the commitment, in order to be
examined into, if necessary, npon a habeas corpus. If there be no cause
expressed, the gaoler is not bound to detain the prisoner: (n) for the law judges,
in this respect, saith Sir Edward Coke, like Festus the Roman governor, that it
is unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not to signify withal the crimes alleged
against him.
A natural and regular consequence of this personal liberty is, that every
Englishman may claim a right to abide in his own country so long as he pleases;
and not to be driven from it unless by the sentence of the law. The king,
indeed, by his royal prerogative, may issue out his writ ne euat regnum, and
prohibit any of bis subjects from going into foreign parts without license. (o)
This may be necessary for the public service and safeguard of the commonwealth. But no power on earth, except the authority of parliament, can send
any subject of England out of the land against his will; no, not even a criminal. For exile and transportation are :punishments at present unknown to the
common law; an:d, whenever the latter is now inflicted, it is either by the choice
of the criminal himself to escape a capital punishment, or else by the express
direction of some modem act of parliament. (16) To this purpose the great
charter (p) declares, that no freeman shall be banished, unless by the judgment
of his peers, or by the law of the land. And by the habeas corpus a.ct, 31 Car.

of their being; transported for life; and it has been held in the United States that the condition

of voluntary exile might be lawfully attached to a pardon. People v. James, 2 Caines, 57;

OJ 2 Inst. 589.

(•) 2 Inst '82.

(n) Ibid. M, M.

(o) F. N. B. 86.

(p)

C.!8.

FlavelTa Case, 8 W. and S. 197. So may the condition that a payment of money by the convict

shall be rosil-1 or secured. Rood v. Winslow, 2 Doug. Mich. 68.
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of their beiug transpo1tod for lifo; antl it hBS been held in the United State!I that the condition
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II, c. 2, (that second magna carta, and stable bulwark of our liberties,) it is

enacted, that no subject of this realm, who is an inhabitant of England, Wales,

or Berwick, shall be sent prisoner into Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or

places beyond the seas, (where *they cannot have the full benefit and r *, „„ -,

protection of the common law); but that all such imprisonments shall "- -I

be illegal; that the person who shall dare to commit another contrary to this

law, shall be disabled from bearing any office, shall incur the penalty of a prce-

munire, and be incapable of receiving the King's pardon : and the party suffering

shall also have his private action against the person committing, and all his

aiders, advisers and abettors; and shall recover treble costs; besides his damages,

which no jury shall assess at less than five hundred pounds.

The law in this respect is so benignly and liberally construed for the benefit of

the subject, that, though within the realm the king may command the attend-

ance and service of all his liegemen, yet he cannot send any man out of the

realm, even upon the public service; excepting sailors and soldiers, the nature

of whose employment necessarily implies an exception: he cannot even consti-

tute a man lord deputy or lieutenant of Ireland against his will, nor make him

a foreign ambassador, (q) For this might, in reality, be no more than an honour-

able exile.

III. The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of prop-

erty : which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisi-

tions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.
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The origin of private property is probably founded in nature, as will be more

fully explained in the second book of the ensuing commentaries: but certainly

the modifications under which we at present find it, the method of conserving

it in the present owner, and of translating it from man to man, are entirely

derived from society; and are some of those civil advantages, in exchange for

which every individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty. The laws of

England are therefore, in point of honour and justice, extremely watchful in

ascertaining and protecting this right. Upon this principle the great charter

(r) has declared that no freeman shall be disseised, or divested, of his freehold,

or of his liberties, or free *customs but by the judgment of his peers, +*„* -,

or by the law of the land. And by a variety of ancient statutes (s) it is '

enacted that no man's lands or goods shall be seized into the king's hands,

against the great charter, and the law of the land; and that no man shall be

disinherited, nor put out of his franchises or freehold, unless he be duly brought

to answer, and be forejudged by course of law; and if anything be done to the

contrary it shall be redressed and holden for none.

So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will

not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the

whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the

grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the

public; but the law permits no man, or set of men to do this without consent

of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the indi-

vidual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to

allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this

common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no, Besides the public

good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every

individual's private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and sim-

ilar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does interpose, and

compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel ?

Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner;

but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby

sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an

individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner

to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of

(9) 3 Inst. 46 (r) C. 29. (s) 5 Edw. m, c. 9. 28 Edw. m, St. 5. c. 4. 28 Eclw. HI, c. 3.
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II, c. 2, (that second magna carta, and stable bulwark of our liberties,) it is
enacw.d, that no subject of this realm, who is an inhabitant of England, \Vales,
or Berwick, shall be sent prisoner into Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or
places beyond the seas, (where *they cannot have the full benefit and [ *138 ]
protection of the common law); but that all such imprisonments shall
be illegal; that the person who shall dare to commit another contrary to this
law, shall be disabled from bearing any office, shall incur the penalty of a prmmunire, and be incapahle of receivmg the King's pardon : and the party suffering
shall also have his private action against the person committing, and all his
aiders, advisers and abettors; and shall recover treble costs; besides his damages,
which no jury shall assess at less than five hundred pounds.
The law in this respect is so benignly and liberally construed for the benefit of
the subject, that, though wit/tin the realm the king may command the attendance and service of all his liegemen, yet he cannot send any man out of the
realm, even upon the public service; excepting sailors and soldiers, the nature
of whose employment necessarily implies an exception: he cannot even constitute a man lord deputy or lien tenant of Ireland against his will, nor make him
a foreign ambassador. (q) For this might, in reality, be no more than an honour:ible exile.
III. The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.
The origin of/rivate property is probably founded m nature, as will be more
fully explaine in the second book of the ensuing commentaries: but certainly
the modifications under which we at present find it, the method of conserving
it in the present owner, and of translating it from man to man, are entirely
derived from society; and are some of those civil advanta~es, in exchange for
which every individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty. The laws of
England are therefore, in point of honour and justice, extremely watchful in
ascertaining and protecting this right. Upon this principle the great charter
(r) has declared that no freeman shall be disseised, or divested, of his freehold,
or of his liberties, or free *customs but by the judgment of his l?eers, • 139 ]
or by the law of the land. And by a variety of ancient statutes(.~) it is
enacted that no man's lands or o-oods shall be seized into the king's hands,
a$'8:inst the great charter, and the ~aw of the land; and that no man shall be
disinherited, nor put out of his franchises or freehold, unless he be duly brought
to answer, and be forejudged by course of law ; and if anything be done to the
contrary it shall be redressed and holden for none.
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will
not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the
whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the
grounds of' a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the
public; but the law permits no man, or set of men to do this without consent
of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to
allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this
common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no, Besides the public
~ood is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every
mdividual's private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and mdeed frequently does interpose, and
compel the indiYidual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel?
Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner;
hut by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby
sustained. The public is now considered as an individual. treating with an
indiYidual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner
to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price ; and even this is an exertion of
(q)

2 Inst. 46

(r) C. 29.

(~l

6 Edw.

m, c. 9.

26 Edw. ID, St. 5. c. '· 28 Edw. III, c. 3.

VoL. 1.-J:!
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power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the

legislature can perform.(17)

r*140l °r 8 tn's tt}6 only instance in which the law of the land has post-

"- J poned even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of pri-

vate property. For no subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or

taxes, even for the defence of the realm or the support of government, but such

as are imposed by his own consent, or that of his representatives in parliament.

By the statute 25 Edw. I, c. 5 and 6, it is provided that the king shall not take

any aids or tasks, but by the common assent of the realm. And what that

common assent is, is more fully explained by 34 Edw. I., St. 4, c. 1, which(^)

d) See the Introduction to the great charter (edit. Oxon.)ntb anno 1297 ; wherein it is shewn that this

statute de tattiaffio non concedendo, supposed to have been made in 31 Edw. I, is in reality, nolhing more

than a sort of translation into Latin of the conflrmaiio cartarum, 25 Edw. I, which was originally published

in the Norman language.

(17) [These observations must be taken with considerable qualification, for, as observed by

Buller, J., there are many cases in which individuals sustain an injury, for which the law gives no

action : for instance, pulling down houses or raising bulwarks for the preservation and defence

of the kingdom against the king's enemies. The civil law writers indeed say that the individuals

who suffer have a right to resort to the public for a satisfaction, but no one ever thought that

the common law gave an action against the individual who pulled down the house, &c. And

whore the acts of commissioners appointed by a paving act occasion a damage to an individual,

without any excess of jurisdiction on their part, the commissioners or paviors acting under them
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are not liable to an action. 4 Term Rep. 794. 6, 7 ; 3 Wils. 461 ; 6 Taunton, 29. In general,

however, a power of this nature must be created by statute, and which usually provides com-

pensation to the individual. Thus by the highway act, 13 Geo. Ill, c. 78, and 3 Geo. IV, c. 126,

sec. 84-5, two justices may either widen or divert any highway through or over any person's

soil, even without his consent, so that the new way shall not be more than thirty feet wide, and

that they pull down no building, nor take away the ground of any garden, park, or yard. But

the surveyor shall offer the owner of the soil, over which the new way is carried, a reasonable

compensation, which, if he refuses to accept, the justices shall certify their proceedings to some

general quarter sessions ; and the surveyor shall give fourteen days' notice to the owner of the

soil of an intention to apply to the sessions ; and the justices of the sessions shall empanel a jury,

who shall assess the damages which the owner of the soil has sustained, provided that

they dp not amount to more than forty years' purchase. And the owner of the soil shall still

be entitled to all the mines within the soil which can be got without breaking the surface of the

highway. Many other acts for local improvements, recently passed, contain similar compensation.

clauses. ]

The constitutions of the United States and of the several states forbid the taking of private

property for public use without just compensation. It is well settled that government has no

right to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even on the making of full

compensation. Beekman v. S. and S. R. R. Co., 3 Paige, 45 ; Hepburn's Case, 3 Bland, 95 ;

1'ittsburg y. Scott, I Peun. St. 139 ; Matter of Albany St. 11 Wend., 149 ; Cooper v. "Williams.

5 Ohio, 393; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood county, 8 Ohio, X. S. 333 ; Nesbitt v. Truinbo, 39 111!

110 ; Osborn v. Hart, 24 Wis. 90 ; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540. The legislature has a right

to determine, or to provide a tribunal for determining, the necessity of appropriating property

for public purposes ; Lyon ». Jerome, 26 Wend. 484 ; Ford v. Chicago and X. W. R. R. Co., 14

Wis. 617 ; Hays v. Risher, 32 Penn. St. 169 ; North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515 ;

but on the question of the amount of compensation the owner has a right to require that an

impartial tribunal be provided for its determination ; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7

Pick. 344 ; Same Case, 11 Pet. 571 ; People v. Tallman, 36 Barb, 222 ; Booneville v. Ormrod, 26

Miss. 193. Some of the state constitutions provide that compensation shall be first made, but in

the absence of such provision it is sufficient if the means be provided by which the owner can,

with certainty, obtain it. Bloodgood v. Mohawk and H. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9. ; Rexford v.

Knight, 11 N. T. 308; Taylor c. Marcy, 25 111. 518; Collison v. Hedrick, 15 Grat. 244; People t\

Green, 3 Mich. 496 ; Charlostown Branch R. R. Co. e. Middlesex, 7 Met. 78 ; Harper v. Richardson,

2(3 Cal. 251. Corporations for the construction of railroads, turnpikes and other improved high-

ways may be adopted as public agencies, and may be authorized to take private property to

themselves under the right of eminent domain, on obtaining the proper legislative authority.

Beekman v. S. and S. R. R. Co., 3 Paige, 73; Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603; Wilson «. Blackbird

Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 251 ; Buonaparte v. Camden and A. R. R. Co., 1 Bald. 205 ; Swan v.

Williams, 2 Mich. 427 ; Stevens v. Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. 466 ; Raleigh, <tc., R. R. Co. c.

Davis, 2 Dev. and Bat. 451 : Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229. There has been some contro-

versy whether the appropriation of lands by the owners of mill sites in order to obtain power

for manufacturing purposes, was to be regarded as a public purpose, so as to authorize the exercise

of the right of eminent domain ; but laws for this purpose have been sustained in some states.

Wolcott W. M. Co. v. tJphain, 5 Pick, 294 ; French v. Braintree Manuf. Co., 23 Pick. 220; Hazen

0. Essex Co., 12 Cush. 477 ; Harding v. Goodlet, 3 Yerg. 41 ; Thein v. Voegtlander, 3 Wis. 405;

Pratt v. Brown, Ibid. 603. See People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 450.
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enacts, that no talliage or aid shall be taken without the assent of the arch-

bishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land:

and again by 14 Edw. Ill, St. 2, c. 1, the prelates, earls, barons, and commons,

citizens, burgesses and merchants, shall not be charged to make any aid, if it be

not by the common assent of the great men and commons in parliament. And

as this fundamental law had been shamefully evaded under many succeeding

princes, by compulsive loans, and benevolences extorted without a real and vol-

untary consent, it was made an article in the petition of right, 3 Car. I, that no

man shall be compelled to yield any gift, loan, or benevolence, tax, or such like

charge, without common consent by act of parliament. And, lastly, by the

statute 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, it is declared, that levying money for or to the

use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament, or for

longer time, or in other manner, than the same is or shall be granted; is illegal.

In the three preceding articles we have taken a short view of the principal

absolute rights which appertain to every Englishman. But in vain would these

rights be declared, ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if

the *constitution had provided no other method to secure their actual r *.. ... -•

enjoyment. It has therefore established certain other auxiliary subor- >- •"

dinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as outworks or barriers to

protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal

security, personal liberty, and private property. These are,

1. The constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament; of which I shall
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treat at large in the ensuing chapter.

2. The limitation of the king's prerogative, by bounds so certain and notorious,

that it is impossible he should either mistake or legally exceed them without the

consent of the people. Of this, also, I shall treat in its proper place. The former

of these keeps the legislative power in due health and vigor, so as to make it

improbable that laws should be enacted destructive of general liberty: the latter

is a guard upon the executive power by restraining it from acting either beyond

or in contradiction to the laws, that are framed and established by the other.

3. A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that of applying to the

courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since the law is in England the

supreme arbiter of every man's life, liberty, and property, courts of justice mnst

at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administered therein.

The emphatical words of magna carta, («) spoken in the person of the king,

who in judgment of law (says Sir Edward Coke), (w) is ever present and repeat-

ing them in all his courts, are these; nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut

differemus rectum vel justitiam: " and therefore every subject," continues the

same learned author, " for injury done to him in bonis, in terris, vel persona,

by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal, without any exception,

may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice and right for

the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speed-

ily without delay." It were endless to enumerate all the affirmative acts of

parliament, *wherein justice is directed to be done according to the law r *ixo -i

of the land; and what that law is every subject knows, or may know, L -I

if he pleases; for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge, but is

permanent, fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament I shall,

however, just mention a few negative statutes, whereby abuses, perversions, or

delays of justice, especially by the prerogative, are restrained. It is ordained

by magna carta (x) that no freeman shall be outlawed, that is, put out

of the protection and benefit of the laws, but according to the law of the

land. By 2 Edw. Ill, c. 8, and 11 Eic. II, c. 10, it is enacted, that no commands

or letters shall be sent under the great seal, or the little seal, the signet, or privy

seal, in disturbance of the law; or to disturb or delay common right: and,

though such commandments should come, the judges shall not cease to do

right; which is also made a part of their oath by statute 18 Edw. Ill, St. 4.

And by 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, it is declared, that the pretended power of sus-

(n) C. 29. (w) 2 Inst. 55. (x) c. 29.
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enacts, that no talliage or aid shall be taken without the assent of the archbishops, bishops, earls, barons, knights, burgesses, and other freemen of the land:
and again by 14 Edw. III, St. 2, c. 1, the prelates, earls, barons, and commons,
citizens, burgesses and merchants, shall not be charged to make any aid, if it be
not by the common assent of the great men and commons in parliament. And
as this fundamental law had been shamefully evaded under many succeeding
princes, by compulsive loans, and benevolences extorted without a real and volnntary consent, it was made an article in the petition of right, 3 Car. I, that no
man shall be compelled to yield any gift, loan, or benevolence, tax, or such like
charge, without common consent by act of parliament. And, lastly, by the
statute 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, it is declared, that levying money for or to the
use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament, or for
longer time, or in other manner, than the same is or shall be granted; is illegal.
In the three preceding articles we have taken a short Yiew of the principal
absolute rights which appertain to every Englishman. But in vain would these
rights be declared, ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if
the *constitution had provided no other method to secure their actual [ • 141 ]
enjoyment. It has therefore established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as outworks or barriers to
protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property. These are,
1. The constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament; of which I shall
treat at large in the ensuing chapter.
2. The limitation of the king's prerogative, by bounds so certain and notorious,
that it is impossible he should either mistake or legally exceed them without the
consent of the people. Of this, also, I shall treat in its proper place. The former
of these keeps the legislative power in due health and vigor, so as to make it
improbable that laws should be enacted destructive of general liberty : the latter
is a guard upon the executive power by restraining it from acting either beyond
or in contradiction to the laws, that a.re framed and established by the other.
3. A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that of applying to the
courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since the law is in England the
supreme arbiter of every man's life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must
at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administered therein.
The emphatical words of magna carta, (u) spoken in the person of the king,
who in jud~ent of law (says Sir Edward Coke), (w) is ever present and repeating them m all his courts, are these ; nulli vend.emus, nulli negahimu.s, aut
dijfer&mus rectum vel justiliam: "and therefore every subject," continues the
same learned author, "for injury done to him in bonis, iti terr1'.s, vel persona,
by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal, without any exception,
may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice and right for
the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay." It were endless to enumerate all the affirmative acts of
parliament, *wherein justice is directed to be done according to the law [ • 142 ]
of the land; and what that law is every subject knows, or may know,
if he pleases; for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge, but is
permanent, fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament. I shall,
however, just mention a few negative statutes, whereby abuses, perversions, or
delays of Justice, especially by the prerogative, are restrained. It is ordained
bv magna carta (x) that no freeman shall be outlawed, that is, put out
of the protection and benefit of the laws, but according to the law of the
land. By 2 Edw. III, c. 8, and 11 Ric. II, c. 10, it is enacted, that no commands
or letters shall be sent under the great seal, or the little seal, the signet, or privy
seal, in disturbance of the law; or to disturb or delay common right: and,
though such commandments should come, the judges shall not cease to do
right; which is also made a part of their oa.th by statute 18 Edw. III, St. 4.
And by 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, it is declared, that the pretended power of sus(ti)
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pending, or dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal 'authority,

without consent of parliament, is illegal. (18)

Not only the substantial part, or judicial decisions, of the law, but also the

formal part, or method of proceeding, cannot be altered but by parliament; for,

if once those outworks were demolished, there would be an inlet to all manner

of innovation in the body of the law itself. The king, it is true, may erect new

courts of justice; but then they must proceed according to the old established

forms of the common law. For which reason it is declared, in the statute 16

Car. I, c. 10, upon the dissolution of the court of starchamber, that neither his

majesty, nor his privy council, have any jurisdiction, power, or authority, by

English bill, petition, articles, libel, (which were the course of proceeding in the

starchamber, borrowed from the civil law,) or by any other arbitrary way what-

soever, to examine, or draw into question, determine, or dispose of the lands or

goods of any subjects of this kingdom; but that the same ought to be tried

and determined in the ordinary courts of justice, and by course of law.

r *14g -i 4. *If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of

' J the rights before mentioned, which the ordinary course of law is too

defective to reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate right, appertaining

to every individual, namely, the right of petitioning the king, or either house

of parliament, for the redress of grievances. (19) In Russia we are told (y) that

the Czar Peter established a law, that no subject might petition the throne till

he had first petitioned two different ministers of state. In case he obtained jus-
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tice from neither, he might then present a third petition to the prince; but

upon pain of death, if found to be in the wrong: the consequence of which

was, that no one dared to offer such third petition; and grievances seldom fall-

ing under the notice of the sovereign, he had little opportunity to redress them.

The restrictions, for some there are, which are laid upon petitioning in England,

are of a nature extremely different; and, while they promote the spirit of peace,

they are no check upon that of liberty. Care only must be taken, lest, under

the pretence of petitioning, the subject be guilty of any riot or tumult, as hap-

pened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 1640: and, to prevent

this, it is provided by the statute 13 Car. II, St. 1, c. 5, that no petition to the

king, or either house of parliament, for any alteration in church or state, shall

be signed by above twenty persons, unless the matter thereof be approved by

three justices of the peace, or the major part of the grand jury (20) in the

country; and in London by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council:

nor shall any petition be presented by more than ten persons at a time. But,

(y) Montesq. Sp. L. \ii. 26.

(18) [See the cose of the Seven Bishops, and note thereto. Broom's Const. L. 408, 493].

(19) [This right is guaranteed by the third amendment to the constitution of the United

States. For discussions in congress respecting it, see Benton's Abridgment of Debates, v. n, 57

to 60, 182 to 188, 209, 436 to 444; v. I. 397; v. XII, 660 to 679, 705 to 743; v. XIH, 5 to 28, 266 to

290, 557 to 562.

(20) [Which the grand jury may do either at the assizes or sessions. The punishment for an

offence against this act, is a fine to any amount not exceeding 1001. aud imprisonment for three

months. At the trial of Lord George Gordon, the whole court, including Lord Mansfield,

declared that this statute was not affected by the bill of rights, 1 \Vm. and 1C. St. 2, c. 2. See

Douglas, 571. But Mr. Dunning, in the house of commons, contended, "that it was a clear and

fundamental point in the constitution of this country, that the people had a right to petition

their representatives in parliament, and that it was by no means true that the number of names

signed to any such petition was limited. To argno that the act of Charles was now in force,

would be as absurd as to pretend that the prerogative of the crown still remained in its full

extent, notwithstanding the declaration in the bill of rights." See New An. Reg. 1781, v. ir. And

the acknowledged practice has been consistent with this opinion.

The state of disturbance and political excitement in which this kingdom was involved several

years after the peace of 1815, produced further regulations and restrictions of the right of

petitioning. The people iu the manufacturing districts having little employment, from the

general stagnation of trade, devoted themselves with intense ardor to political discussions,

and in some places the partisans of reform, presuming that their demands would not be con-

ceded to then- petitions, were preparing for the alternative of open force. In these circum-

stances the legislature thought fit to forbid all public meetings (except county meetings called

by the lord-lieutenant or the sheriff), which consisted of more than fifty persons, unless in
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under these regulations, it is declared by the statute 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, that

the subject hath a right to petition; and that all commitments and prosecutions

for such petitioning are illegal.

5. The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present

mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition

and degree, and such as are *ullowed by law. (21) Which is also declared r *,., -i

by the same statute, 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, and is indeed a public allow- L ^

ance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preser-

vation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain

the violence of oppression.

In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed,

the liberties of Englishmen: liberties more generally talked of than thoroughly

understood; and yet highly necessary to be perfectly known and considered by

every man of rank and property, lest his ignorance of the points whereon they

are founded should hurry him into faction and licentiousness on the one hand,

or a pusillanimous indifference and criminal submission on the other. And we

have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment of personal

security, of personal liberty, and of private property. So long as these remain

inviolate, the subject is perfectly free; for every species of compulsive tyranny

and oppression must act in opposition to one or other of these rights, having

no other object upon which it can possibly be employed. To preserve these

from violation, it is necessary that the constitution of parliament be supported
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in its full vigour; and limits, certainly known, be set to the royal prerogative.

And, lastly, to vindicate these rights, when actually violated or attacked, the sub-

jects of England are entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration and

free course of justice in the courts of law ; next, to the right of petitioning the

king and parliament for redress of grievances; and lastly, to the right of having and

using arms for self-preservation and defence. And all these rights and liberties it

is our birthright to enjoy entire; unless where the laws of our country have laid

them under necessary restraints: restraints in themselves so gentle and moder-

ate, as will appear, upon farther inquiry, that no man of sense or probity would

wish to see them slackened. For all of us have it in our choice to do everything

that a good man would desire to do; and are restrained from nothing but what

would oe pernicious either to ourselves or our fellow citizens. So that this

review *of our situation may fully justify the observation of a learned r *-IAK -i

French author, who indeed generally both thought and wrote in the "- '* '

spirit of genuine freedom, (z) and who hath not scrupled to profess, even in the

very bosom of his native country, that the English is the only nation in the

world where political or civil liberty is the direct end of its constitution.

Recommending, therefore, to the students in our laws a farther and more accu-

rate search into this extensive and important title, I shall close my remarks

upon it with the expiring wish of the famous Father Paul to his country,

"EsTO PERPETUA!"

(i) Montesq. Spirit of Laws xl, 5.

separate township or parishes, by the inhabitants thereof of which six days' previous notice

most be given to a justice of the peace, signed by seven resident householders. See 60 Geo.

under these regulations, it is declared by the statute 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, that
the subject hath a right to petition; and that all commitments and prosecutions
for such petitioning are illegal.
6. The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present
mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition
and degree, and such as are *ullowed by law. (21) Which is also declared [ • 144 ]
by the same si:atute, 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2, and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain
the violence of oppression.
In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed,
the liberties of Englishmen: liberties more generally talked of than thoroughly
understood; and yet highly necessary to be perfectly known and considered by
every man of rank and property, lest his ignorance of the points whereon they
are founded should hurry him into faction and licentiousness on the one hand,
or a pusillanimous indifference and criminal submission on the other. And we
have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment of personal
security, of personal liberty, and of pri~ate property. So long as these remain
inviolate, the subject is perfectly free; for every species of compulsive tyranny
and oppression must act in opposition to one or other of these rights, having
no other object upon which it can possibly be employed. To preserve these
from violation, it is necessary that the constitution of parliament be supported
in its full vigour; and limits, certainly known, be set to the royal prerogative.
And, lastly, to vindicate these rights, when actually violated or attacked, the subjects of England are entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration and
free course of justice in the courts of law ; next, to the right of petitioning the
king and parliament for redress of grievances; and lastly, to the right ofhavin~ and
using arms for self-presen·ation and defence. And all these rights and liberties it
is our birthright to enjoy entire; unless where the laws of our country have laid
them under necessary restraints: restraints in themselves so gentle and moderate, as will appear, upon farther inquiry, that no man of sense or probity would
wish to see them slackenec.l. For all of us have it in our choice to do everything
that a good man would desire to do; and are restrained from nothing but what
would be pernicious either to ourselves or our fellow citizens. So that this
review *of our situation may fully justify the observation of a learned [ ,.. 145 ]
French author, who indeed generally both thought and wrote in the
spirit of genuine freedom, (z) and who hath not scru_pled to profess, even in the
very bosom of his native country, that the English is the only nation in the
world where political or civil liberty is the direct end of its constitution.
Recommending, therefore, to the students in our laws a farther and more accurate search into this extensive and important title, I shall closo my remarks
upon it with the expiring wish of the famous Father Paul to his country,
" EsTO PERPETU A !"
(•) Mont&eq. Spirit of Laws :id, IS.

Ill, c. 6.

But as the mischief was temporary, the restrictions upon the right of meeting to deliberate

upon public measures were limited in their duration, and have mostly expired; those enactments

which were designed to prevent such meetings from being perverted to objects manifestly dan-

gerous to the peace of the community, only continuing in force.]

(21) Mr. Tucker, writing in 18(t2, calls attention to the fact that the Constitution of the United

States (4th amend.) declares that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be

infringed, and this without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the

British government. "Whoever examines the forest and game laws in the British Code, will

readily perceive that the right of keeping arms is effectually taken away from the people of Eng-

land. The commentator himself informs us (vol. 2, n. 412,) that "'the prevention of popular

insurrections and resistance to government, by disarming the bulk of the people, is a reason

oftener meant than avowed by the makers of the forest and game law."

As to the right of all persons to bear anna for self-protection, see Bliss t>. Commonwealth, 2

Lit. 90; Nnnn v. State, 1 Kelley, 243; and Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 73.
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separate township or parishes, by the inhabitants thereof of which six days' previons notice
must be given to a justice of the peace, signed by sevtin resident householders. See 60 Geo.
III, c. 6.
But 88 the mischief wBB temporary, the restrictions upon the right of meeting to deliberate
upon public measures were limited in their duration, and have mostly expired; those enactments
wmch were deHigned to prevent such meetings from being perverted to objects manifestly dangerous to the peace of the community, only continuing in force.]
(21) Mr. Tucker, writing in 1802, calls attention to the fact that the Constitution of the United
States (4th amend.) declares that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed, and this without any qualification 88 to their condition or de~ee, as is the case in the
British government. Whoever examines the forest and game laws m the British Code, will
readily perceive that the right of keeping am1s is effectually taken away from the people of England. The commenrutor himself informri us (vol. 2, 1?· 412,) that "the prnveution of popular
insurrections and resistance to governmen~ by disarnung the bulk of the people, is a reason
oftener meant than avowed by the makers ot the forest and game law."
.As to the right of all persons to bear arms for self-protection, sec RlisR t'. Commonwealth, 2
Lit. 90; Nunn "· State, 1 Kelley, 243; and Ely "· Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 73.
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WE are next to treat of the rights and duties of persons, as they are members

OF THE PARLIAMENT.

of society, and stand in various relations to each other. These relations are

either public or private : and we will first consider those that are public.

The most universal public relation, by which men are connected together, is

that of government ; namely, as governors and governed ; or, in other words, as

magistrates and people. Of magistrates, some also are supreme, in whom the

sovereign power of the state resides ; others are subordinate, deriving all their

authority from the supreme magistrate, accountable to him for their conduct,

and acting in an inferior secondary sphere.

In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the right both of

making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one

and the same body of men ; and wherever these two powers are united together,

there can be no public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and

execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in quality of dispenser

of justice, with all the power which he, as legislator, thinks proper to give him-

self. But, where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands,

the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power as may

tend to the subversion of its own independence, and therewith of the liberty of

the subject. With us, therefore, in England, this supreme power is divided into

f *147 1 *two Branches ; the one legislative, to wit, the parliament, consisting of
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"- J king, lords, and commons ; the other executive, consisting of the king

alone. It will be the business of this chapter to consider the British parliament,

in which the legislative power, and (of course) the supreme and absolute author-

tiy of the state, is vested by our constitution.

The original or first institution of parliament is one of those matters which

lies so far hidden in the dark ages of antiquity, that the tracing of it out is a

thing equally difficult and uncertain. (1) The word parliament itself, (parle-

ment or colloquium, as some of our historians translate it,) is comparatively of

modern date ; derived from the French, and signifying an assembly that met

and conferred together. It was first applied to general assemblies of the states

under Louis VII, in France, about the middle of the twelfth century, (a) But

it is certain that, long before the introduction of the Norman language into

England, all matters of importance were debated and settled in the great coun-

cils of the realm : a practice which seems to have been universal among the

northern nations, particularly the Germans, (b) and carried by them into all the

countries of Europe, which they overran at the dissolution of the Roman empire :

relics of which constitution, under various modifications and changes, are still

to be met with in the diets of Poland, Germany, and Sweden, and the assembly

of the estates in France ; (c) for what is there now called the parliament is only

the supreme court of justice, consisting of the peers, certain dignified ecclesias-

tics, and judges, which neither is in practice, nor is supposed to be in theory,

a general council of the realm.

With us in England this general council hath been held immemorially under

the several names of michel-synoth or great council, michel-gemote, or great meet-

r JCIJQ -I ing, and more *frequently wittena-gemote, or the meeting of wise men.

"- J It was also styled in Latin, commune concilium regni, magnum concilium

(at Mod. Un. Hist, xxlii. 307. The first mention of it in our statute law is in the preamble to the statute

of Westin. 1. 3 Eciw. I, A. D. 1272.

(4) De minoribui rebus principea consultant, dr. mqjorflntt omnei. Tac. de mor. Germ. c. 11 .

(c) These were assemble! for the lust time, A. D. 1581 (see Whltelockc, of Parl. c. 72.) or according to

Robertson. A. I). 1614. (Hlst^Clm^V.J, !W9.) __

( 1) [The word parliamentum was not used in England till the reign of Henrv III. Prynne on

4 lust. 2. ] The gradual development of representative institutions in England is shown in Hal-

WE are next to treat of the rights and duties of persons, as they are members
of society, and stand in various relations to each other. These relations are
either public or private: and we will first consider those that are public.
'fhe most universal public relation, by which men are con'D.ected together, is
that of government; namely, as governors and governed; or, in other words, as
magistrates and people. Of' ma~istrates, some also a.re supreme, in whom the
soverei~n power of the state resides; others are subordinate, deriving all their
authority from the supreme magistrate, accountable to him for their conduct,
and acting in an infenor secondary sphere.
In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the right both of
ma.king and of enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one
and the same body of men; and wherever these two powers a.re united together,
there can be no public liberty. 'l'he magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and
execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in quality of dispenser
of justice, with all the power which he, as legislator, thinks proper to give himself. But, where the legislatiYe and executive authority are in distinct hands,
the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power as may
tend to the subversion of its own independence, and therewith of the liberty of
the subject. With us, therefore, in England, this supreme power is divided into
[ • 147 ] *two branches; the one legislative, to wit, the parliament, consisting of
king, lords, and commons; the other executive, consisting of the king
alone. It will be the business of this chapter to consider the British parliament,
in which the legislative power, and (of course) the supreme and absolute n.uthortiy of the state, is vested by our constitution.
The original or first institution of parliament is one of those matters which
lies so far hidden in the dark ages of antiquity, that the tracing of it out is a
thing equally difficult and uncertain. (1) The word parliament itself, (parlement or colloquium, as some of our historians translate it,) is comparatively of
modern date; derived from the French, and signifying an assemblv that met
and conferred together. It was first applied to general assemblies of the states
under Louis VII, in France, about the middle of the twelfth century. (a) But
it is certain that, long before the introduction of the Norman language into
England, all matters of importance were debated and settled in the great councils of the realm: a practice which seems to have been universal among the
northern nations, particularly the Germans, {b) and carried by them into all the
countries of Europe, which they overran at the dissolution of the Roman empire:
relics of which constitution, under various modifications and changes, are still
to be met with in the diets of Poland, Germany, and Sweden, and the assembly
of the estates in France; (c) for what is there now called the parliament is only
the supreme court of justice, consisting of the peers, certain dignified ecclesiastics, and judges, which neither is in practice, nor is supposed to be in theory,
a general council of the realm.
With us in England this general council hath been held immemorially under
the several names of micltel-synotli or great council, rnfoltel-gemote, or great meet[ • 148 ] ing, and more *frequently wittena-gemote, or the meeting of wise men.
It was also styled in Lu.tin, commune conciliwn regni, rna.gnum concilium

'°

(al Mod. Un. HIAt. xxlll. 807. The ftrst mention of It In our statute law Is In the preamble the 1tatute
of Westm. 1. 3 Erlw. I. A. D. 1272.
(b) IM mi1uwibua rehtu principea COMUltant, ~ flllljoribw omnes. Tn.c. th rnor. Germ. c. 11.
(c) These were 111111Cm!Jle1! ror the 111.11t time, A. D. 1561 (see Whitelor.kc, of Parl. c. 7'l.) or according to
Uobcrtson
. A. D. 161.i. tlllst. Chu. V. !, 360. )
. . ·- · __ _... . --- - ·-·-·- -·· --·- - ·-·- - - - ·--· - - -- ·-1 .. - ---

( 1) [The word p<1rlia111e11tum wa.'> not used in J<~ugland till the reign of Henry III. Prynne on
4 In;;t. 2.] T~e gru<lual development of repre>1enta.tive iustitution11 in England is ahown in Hal.lam (Const. lllst.) and Todd (Parl. Gov.) and is discussed more or less in the popular histories..
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regis, curia magna, conventus magnatum vel procerum assisa, yeneralis, and some-

times communitas reyni Angliw. (d) We have instances of its meeting to order

• the affairs of the kingdom, to make new laws, and to mend the old, or, as Fleta (e)

expresses it, " novis injuriix emersis nova constituere remedia," so early as the

reign of Ina, king of the West Saxons, Offa, king of the Mercians, and Ethel-

bert, king of Kent, in the several realms of the heptarchy. And, after their

union, the Mirror (/) informs us, that King Alfred ordained for a perpetual

usage, that these councils should meet twice in the year, or oftener, if need be,

to treat of the government of God's people; how they should keep themselves

from sin, should live in quiet, and should receive right. Our succeeding Saxon

and Danish monarchs held frequent councils of this sort, as appears from their

respective codes of laws; the titles whereof usually speak them to be enacted,

either by the king with the advice of his wittena-gemote, or wise men, as " haic

sunt instituta, qu<e Edgarus rex consilio sapientum suorum instituit; " or to be

enacted by those sages with the advice of the king, as, " hoc sunt judicia, quce

sapientes consilio regis Ethelstani instituerunt; " or lastly, to be enacted by them

both together, as, " hmc sunt institutiones, quas rex Edmundus et episcopi sui

cum sapientibus suis instituerunt."

There is also no doubt but these great councils were occasionally held under

the first princes of the Norman line. Glanvil, who wrote in the reign of Henry

the Second, speaking of the particular amount of an amercement in the sheriff's

court, says, it had never been yet ascertained by the general assize, or assembly,
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but was left to the custom of particular counties. (g) Here the general assize

is spoken of as a meeting well known, and its statutes or decisions are put in

*a manifest contradistinction to custom, or the common law. And in r „,,, Q -•

Edward the Third's time an act of parliament, made in the reign of L -"

William the Conqueror, was pleaded in the case of the abbey of St Edmund's-

burv, and judicially allowed by the court. (A)

Hence it indisputably appears, that parliaments, or general councils, are coeval

with the kingdom itself. How those parliaments were constituted and com-

posed, is another question, which has been matter of great dispute among our

learned antiquaries; and, particularly, whether the commons were summoned

at all; or, if summoned, at what period they began to form a distinct assembly.

But it is not my intention here to enter into controversies of this sort. I hold

it sufficient that it is generally agreed, that in the main the constitution of par-

liament, as it now stands, was marked out so long ago as the seventeenth year

of King John, A. D. 1215, in the great charter granted by that prince ; wherein

he promises to summon all archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater bar-

ons, personally; and all other tenants in chief under the crown, by the sheriff

and bailiffs; to meet at a certain place, with forty days' notice to assess aids

and scutages when necessary. And this constitution has subsisted in fact at

least from the year 1266, 49 Hen. Ill: there being still extant writs of that date,

to summon knights, citizens, and burgesses, to parliament. I proceed therefore

to inquire wherein consists this constitution of parliament, as it now stands,

and has stood for the space of at least five hundred years. And in the prosecu-

tion of this inquiry, I shall consider, first, the manner and time of its assem-

bling : secondly, its constituent parts: thirdly, the laws and customs relating to

parliament, considered as one aggregate body: fourthly and fifthly, the laws and

customs relating to each house, separately and distinctly taken: sixthly, the meth-

ods of proceeding, and of making statutes, in both houses: and lastly, the manner

of the parliament's adjournment, prorogation and dissolution.

*I. As to the manner and time of assembling. The parliament is regu- r #lgo -i

larly to be summoned by the king's writ or letter, issued out of chancery L '

by advice of the privy council, at least forty days before it begins to sit. (2) It

(d) Glanvil, 1. 13. c. 32. I. 9. e. 10.—Prof. !> Rep.—8 Inst 528. (e) L. 2. c. 2. (/) C. 1. } 3.

(g\ Quanta cue debeat per miUam assisam generaiem determination ett, ted pro comuetudint ringvlorum

comitatum debetur. I. 9. e. 10. (A) Year book. 21 Edw. HI, 60.

reg ts, curia magna, convent-us rnagnatum vel procerum assisa, f1.6neralis, and sometimes c(Jlmnunitas re.qni .Angliw. (d) We have instances of its meeting to order
• the affairs of the kingdom, to make new laws, and to mend the old, or, as Fleta (e)
expresses it, " novis injurii.~ ernersis nova constituere remedia," so early a.<:! the
reign of Ina, king of the West Saxons, Offa, king of the !Yiercians, and Ethelbert, king of Kent, in the several realms of the heptarchy. And, after their
union, the Mirror (.f) informs us, that King .Alfred ordained for a perpetual
usage, that these councils should meet twice m the year, or oftener, if need be,
to treat of the government of God's people; how they should keep themselves
from sin, should live in quiet, and should receive ri15ht. Our succeeding Saxon
and Danish monarchs held frequent councils of this sort, as appears from their
respective codes of laws; the titles whereof usually speak them to be enacted,
either by the king with the advice of his witten&-gemote, or wise men, as" lu.Bc
sunt instituta, qum Edgarus rex consilio sapientum suorum instituit;" or to be
enacted by those sages with the advice of the king, as, "lime sunt judicia, qu11J
sapientes consilio regis Etlwlstani instituerunt; "or lastly, to be enacted by them
both together, as, " hmc sunt instifationes, quas rex Edmundus et episcopi sui
cum sapientibus suis in.r;tUuerunt."
There is also no doubt but these great councils were occasionally held under
the first princes of the Norman line. Glanvil, who wrote in the reign of Henry
the Second, speaking of the particular a.mount of an amercement in the sheriff's
court, says, it had never been yet ascertained by the general assize, or assembly,
but was left to the custom of particular counties. ( g) Here the general assize
is spoken of as a meeting well known, and its statutes or decisions are put in
"'a manifest contradistinction to custom, or the common law. And in [ ,..149 ]
Edward the 'l'hird's time an act of parliament, made in the reign of
William the Conqueror, was pleaded in the case of the abbey of St. Edmund'sburv, and judicially u.llowed by the court. (It)
Hence it indisputably appears, that parliaments, or genera.I councils, a.re coeval
with the kingdom itself. How those parliaments were constituted and composed, is another question, which has been matter of great dispute among our
learned antiquaries; and, particularly, whether the commons were summoned
at all ; or, if summoned, at what penod they began to form a distinct assembly.
But it is not my intention here to enter into controversies of this sort. I hold
it sufficient that it is generully agreed, that in the main the constitution of parliament, as it now stands, was marked out so long ago as the seventeenth year
of King John, A. D. 1215, in the great charter granted by that prince; wherein
he promises to summon all archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater bar·
ons, personally; and all other tenants in chief under the crown, by the sheriff
and bailiffs; to meet at a certain place, with forty days' notice to assess u.ids
and scutages when necessarv. And this constitution has subsisted in fact at
least from the year 1266, 49 Hen. III: there being still extant writs of that date,
to summon kmghts, citizens, and burgesses, to parliament. I proceed therefore
to inquire wherein consists this constitution of parliament, as it now stands,
and has stood for the space of at least five hundred years. And in the prosecution of this inquiry, I shall consider, first, the manner and time of its assemblin~: secondly, its constituent parts: thirdly, the laws and customs rftlating to
parliament, considered as one aggregate body: fourthly and fifthly~ the laws und
customs relating to each house, separately and distinctly taken: sixthly, the methods of proceeding, and of making statutes, in both houses: and lastly, the manner
of the parliament's adjournment, prorogation and dissolution.
*I. As to the manner and time of assembling. The parliament is regu- [ ,..150 ]
larly to be summoned by the king's writ or letter, issued out of chancery
by ad.Yice of the privy council, at least forty days before It begins to sit. (2) It

(2) The period was at one time fifty days, but is now rednoed to thirty-five. Stat 15 Vic. c. 23.
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(d) Gll\n\'il, l. 13. c. ~. l. 9. 11. 10.-Pt'<'t'. P Rcp.-2 Inst. 5'l6.
(e) L. 2. c. 2.
(gl Quanta use <hbMt per 11ullam auuam general~ <ktermlnatum ut, et.d pro
comUatum debdur. l. 9. c. 10.
(h) Year book. 21 Edw. Ill, 60.

(/) C. 1. I 3.
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(2) The period was at one time fifty days, but is now reduoed to thirty-five. Stat. 15 Vic. c. 23.
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is a branch of the royal prerogative, that no parliament can be convened hy its

own authority, or by the authority of any, except the king alone. And this

prerogative is founded upon very good reason. For, supposing it had a right to

meet spontaneously, without being called together, it is impossible to conceive

that all the members, and each ot the houses, would agree unanimously upon

the proper time and place of meeting; and if half of the members met, and

half absented themselves, who shall determine which is really the legislative

body, the part assembled, or that which stays tiway ? It is therefore necessary

that the parliament should be called together at a determinate time and place:

and highly becoming its dignity and independence, that it should be called

together by none but one of its own constituent parts: and, of the three con-

stituent parts, this office can only appertain to the king; as he is a single

person, whose will may be uniform and steady; the first person in the nation,

being superior to both houses in dignity; and the only branch of the legisla-

ture that has a separate existence, and is capable of performing any act at a

time when no parliament is in being, (i) Nor is it an exception to this rule

that, by some modern statutes, on the demise of a king or queen, if there be

then no parliament in being, the last parliament revives, and is to sit again

for six months, unless dissolved by the successor: for this revived parliament

must have been originally summoned by the crown.

F *1511 *^ *s *rue' *^at by » statute, 16 Car. I, c. 1, it was enacted, that if

' ' J the king neglected to call a parliament for three years, the peers might
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assemble and issue out writs for choosing one; and, in case of neglect of the

peers, the constituents might meet and elect one themselves. But this, if ever

put in practice, would have been liable to all the inconveniences I have just now

stated; and the act itself was esteemed so highly detrimental and injurious to

the royal prerogative, that it was repealed by statute 16 Car. II, c. 1. From

thence therefore no precedent can be drawn.

It is also true, that the convention-parliament, which restored King Charles

the Second, met above a month before his return ; the lords by their own

authority, and the commons, in pursuance of writs issued in the name of the

keepers of the liberty of England, by authority of parliament: and that the

said parliament sat till the twenty-ninth of December, full seven months after

the restoration ; and enacted many laws, several of which are till in force.

But this was for the necessity of the thing, which supersedes all law ; for if

they had not so met, it was morally impossible that the kingdom should have

settled in peace. And the first thing done after the king's return was to pass

an act declaring this to be a good parliament, notwithstanding the defect of the

king's writs, (k) So that, as the royal prerogative was chiefly wounded by their

so meeting, and as the king himself, who alone had a right to object, consented

to waive the objection, this cannot be drawn into an example in prejudice of

the rights of the crown. Besides we should also remember, that it was at that

time a great doubt among the lawyers, (I) whether even this healing act made

it a good parliament; and held by very many in the negative: though it seems

to have been too nice a scruple. And yet, out of abundant caution, it was

thought necessary to confirm its acts in the next parliament, by statute 13 Car.

II, c. 7, and c. 14.

f *1521 *^ '8 likewise true, that at the time of the revolution, A. D. 1688, the

L J lords and commons by their own authority, and upon the summons of

the prince of Orange, (afterwards King William.) met in a convention, and

therein disposed of the crown and kingdom. But it must be remembered, that

this assembling was upon a like principle of necessity as at the restoration ;

that is, upon a full conviction that King James the Second had abdicated the

(f) By motives somewhat similar to these the republic of Venice was actuated, when towards the end of

the seventh century it abolished the tribunes of the people, who were annually chosen by the several dis-

tricts of the Venetian territory, and constituted n doyc in their stead; in whom the executive power of the

sUitu at present resides. For "which their historians have assigned these, as the principal reasons. 1. The

propriety of having the executive power a part of the legislative, or senate; to which the former annual

magistrates were not admitted. 2. The necessity of having a single person to convoke the great council

when separated. (Mod. Un. Hist, xxvii, 16.) <>) Stat. 12 Car. II. c. 1. (/) 1 Sid. 1.
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is a branch of the royal prerogative, that no parliament can be convened by its
own authority, or by the authority of any, except the king alone. And this
prerogative is founded upon very good reason. For, supposing it had a right to •
meet spontaneously, without bein~ called together, it is impossible to conceive
that all the members, and each of the houses, would agree unanimously upon
the proper time and place of meeting; and if half of the members met, and
half absented themselves, who shall determine which is really the legislative
body, the part assembled, or that which stays away? It is therefore necessary
that the parliament should be called together at a determinate time and place:
and highly becoming its dignity and independence, that it should be called
together by none but one of its own constituent parts: and, of the three constituent parts, this office can only appertain to the king ; as he is a single
person, whose will may be uniform and steady ; the first person in the nation,
being superior to both houses in dignity; and the only branch of the legislature that has a separate existence, and is capable of performing any act at a.
time when no parliament is in being. (?'.) Nor is it an exception to this rule
that, by some modern statutes, on the demise of a king or queen, if there be
then no parliament in being, the last parliament revives, and is to sit again
for six months, unless dissofved by the successor: for this revived parliament
must have been originally summoned by the crown.
*It is true, that by a statute, 16 Car. I, c. 1, it was enacted, that if
[ • 151 ]
the king neglected to call a parliament for three years, the peers might
assemble and issue out writs for choosing one; and, in case of neglect of the
peers, the constituents might meet and elect one themselves. But this, if ever
put in practice, would have been liable to all the inconveniences I have just now
stated ; and the act itself was esteemed so highly detrimental and injurious to
the royal prerogative, that it was repealed by statute 16 Car. II, c. 1. From
thence therefore no precedent can be drawn.
It is also true, that the convention-parliament, which restored King Charles
the Second, met above a month before his return ; the lords by their own
authority, and the commons, in pursuance of writs issued in the name of the
keepers of the liberty of England, by authority of parliament: and that the
said parliament sat till the twenty-ninth of December, full seven months after
the restoration ; and enacted many laws, several of which are till in force.
But this was for the necessity of the thing:, which supersedes all law ; for if
they had not so met, it was morally impossible that the kingdom should haYe
settled in peace. And the first thing done after the king's return was to pass
an act declarin~ this to be a good parliament, notwithstan<ling the defect of the
king's writs. (k So that, as the rolal prerogative was chiefly wounded by their
so rneetina, an as the king himsel , who alone had a right to object, consented
to waive the objection, this cannot be drawn into an example in prejudice of
the rights of the crown. Besides we should also remember, that it was at that
time a great doubt among the lawyers, (l) whether even this healing act made
it a good parliament; and held by very many in the negative: though it seems
to have been too nice a scruple. And yet, out of abundant caution, it was
thought necessary to confirm its acts in the next parliament, by statute 13 Car.
II, c. 7, and c. 14.
*It is likewise true, that at the time of the revolution, A. D. 1688, the
[ • 152 ]
lords and commons by their own authority, and upon the summons of
the prince of Orange, (afterwards King William,) met in a comention, aud
therein disposed of the crown and kingdom. But it must be remembered, that
this assembling was upon a like principle of necessity as at the restoration;
that is, upon a full con victiou that King Jam es the Second had abdicated the
(i) By motives son111what similar to these the republic of Venice was actuated, when towanle tht> end ot
the ee1·enth century It abolishe<l the trib11nes of the people, who were annually chosen by the several dig.
trirta of the Venetian territory, and constltutc•l n doge in their stea•l; in whom Llle execnth·e po\\·er of the
stnt.e at present resiiles. t'or which their hietorla116 ha\"e 1U111igned these, as the principal reasons. l. The
propriety of hu\·iug the executive power a part of the legislative, or senl\te; to which the ft>rmer annuRl
mn~istnitcs were not admitted. 2. The necesalty of ha\•lng a single person to con vote the gre&i couooll
when sepa1·ftte11. (Mod. Un. Hist. xxvll, 16.)
(k) Stat. 12 car. II, c. 1.
(l) 1Sid.1.
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government and that the throne was thereby vacant: which supposition of the

individual members was confirmed by their concurrent resolution, when they

actually came together. And in such a case as the palpable vacancy of a throne

it follows ex necessitate rei, that the form of the royal writs must be laid aside,

otherwise no parliament can ever meet again. For, let us put another possible

case, and suppose, for the sake of argument, that the whole royal line should at

any time fail and become extinct, which would indisputably vacate the throne:

in this situation it seems reasonable to presume, that the body of the nation,

consisting of lords and commons, would have a right to meet and settle the

government; otherwise there must be no government at all. And upon this and

no other principle did the convention in 1688 assemble. The vacancy of the

throne was precedent to their meeting without any royal summons, not a conse-

quence of it. They did not assemble without writ, and then make the throne

vacant; but the throne being previously vacant by the king's abdication, they

assembled without writ, as they must do if they assembled at all. Had the

throne been full, their meeting would not have oeen regular; but as it was

really empty, such meeting became absolutely necessary. And accordingly it is

declared by statute 1 W. and M. St. 1, c. 1, that this convention was really the

two houses of parliament, notwithstanding the want of writs or other defects of

form. So that notwithstanding these two capital exceptions, which were justi-

fiable only on a principle of necessity, (and each of which by the way, induced a

revolution in the government,) the rule laid down is in general certain, that the
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king, only, can convoke a parliament.

*And this by the ancient statutes of the realm (m) he is bound to do r*i 53-1

every year, or oftner, if need be. Not that he is, or ever was, obliged L •"

by these statutes to call a new parliament every year; but only to permit a par-

liament to sit annually for the redress of grievances, and dispatch of business,

if need be. (3) These last words are so loose and vague, that such of our mon-

archs as were inclined to govern without parliaments, neglected the convoking

them sometimes for a very considerable period, under pretence that there was

no need of them. But, to remedy this, by the statute 16 Car. II, c. 1, it is

enacted, that the sitting and holding of parliaments shall not be intermitted

above three years at the most. And by the statute 1 W. and M. St 2, c. 2, it is

declared to be one of the rights of the people, that for redress of all grievances,

and for the amending, strengthening and preserving the laws, parliaments ought

to be held frequently. And this indefinite frequency is again reduced to a

certainty by statute 6 W. and M. c. 2, which enacts, as the statute of Charles the

Second had done before, that a new parliament shall be called within three years

(») after the determination of the former. (4)

(m) 4 Edw. m, e. 14. 86 Edw. HI, c. 10.

(n) This is the same period, that is allowed In Sweden for intermitting their general diets, or parliamen-

~overnment

and that the throne was thereby vacant: which supposition of the
rndividual members was confirmed by their concurrent resolution, when they
actually came together. And in such a case as the palpable vacancy of a throne
it follows ex necessitate rei, that the form of the royal writs must be laid aside,
otherwise no parliament can ever meet again. For, let us put another possible
case, and suppose, for the sake of argument, that the whole royal line should at
any time fail and become extinct, which would indisputably vaeate the throne:
in this situation it seems reasonable to presume, that the body of the nation,
consisting of lords and commons~ would have a right to meet and settle the
government; othernise there must be no government at all. And upon this and
no other principle did the convention in 1688 assemble. The vacancy of the
throne was precedent to their meeting without any royal summons, not a consequence of it. They did not assemble without wnt, and then make the throne
vacant; but the throne being previously vacant by the king's abdication, they
assembled without writ, as they must do if they assembled at all. Had the
throne been full, their meeting would not have been regular; but as it was
really empty, such meeting became absolutely necessary. And accordingly it is
declared by statute 1 W. and M. St. 1, c. 1, that this convention was really the
two houses of parliament, notwithstanding the want of writs or other defects of
form. So that notwithstanding these two capital exceptions, which were justifiable only on a principle of necessity, (and each of which by the way, induced a
revolution in the government,) the rule laid down is in general certain, that the
king, only, can convoke a parliament.
*And this by the ancient statutes of the realm (m) he is bound to do [* 153]
every year, or oftner, if need be. Not that he is, or ever was, obliged
by these statures to call a new parliament every year; but only to permit a parliament to sit annually for the redress of grievances, and dispatch of business,
if need be. (3) These last words are so loose and vague, that such of our monarchs as were inclined to govern without parliaments, neglected the convoking
them sometimes for a very considerable period, under pretence that there was
no need of them. But, to remedy this, by the statute 16 Car. II, c. I, it is
enacted, that the sitting and holding of parliaments shall not be intermitted
above three years at the most. And by the statute I W. and M. St 2, c. 2, it is
declared to be one of the rights of the people, that for redress of all grievances,
and for the amending, strengthening and preserving the laws, parliaments ought
to be held frequently. Aud this mdefiuite frequency is again reduced to a
certainty by statute 6 W. and M. c. 2, which enacts, as the su~tute of Charles the
Second had done before, that a new parliament shall be called within three years
(ti) after the determination of the former. (4)

tary assemblies. Mod. Un. Hist, xxxill, 19.

(3) [.Mr. (iraivillt- Sharp, in a treatise published some years ago, argued ingeniously against

this construction of the 4 Edw. Ill, and maintained that the words if need be, referred only to

!•l' Edw. ID, c. 14. 86Edw. III, c. 10.

"- - -

(n) Thia is the same J>eriod, that is allowed in Sweden tor lntermitting their general diets, or parilamen·
tary aeeemblles. Mod. Un. HI.at. xxxm, ~.

the preceding word, oftener. So that the true signification was, that a parliament should be

held once every year at all events; and if there should be any need to hold it oftener, then more

than once. See his Declaration, A<:., p. 166. The cotemporary records of parliament, in gome

of which it is so expressed without any ambiguity, prove beyond all controversy that this is the

true construction. ]

In the following reigns the longest durations and intermissions were nearly as follows:

nutations. Intermission*. Duration*. Intermlulons.

Henry VIII ,. 6years. 6 years. Edw. VI 4 years. —years.

(3) [Kr. Granville Sharp, in a. treatise published some ye&rB ago, argued ingeniously against
this construction of the 4 r..:dw. III, and maintained that the words if need be, referred only to
the preceding word, oftener. Bo that the true signification was, that a parliament should be
held once every year at all events; and if there should be any need to hold it ofiener, then more
than once. See his Declaration, &c., p. 166. The cotemporary records of parliament, in some
of which it is so expressed without any ambiguity, prove beyond all controversy that this is the
true COlltltruction.]
In the following reigns the longest durations and intermissions were nearly as follows :

Eliz 11 do 4 do Jas. 1 9 do 6 do

Duratlona.

Ch. 1 8 do 12 do Chas. II 17 do 4 do

(4) As the supplies and the mutiny act are voted for a year only, an annual session of parlia-

ment is a necessity.

Iutermlaalona.

Duration& Interml..tona.

Henry VIII............ 6 years. 6 years. Edw. VI............ 4 ye&rB. - years.
4 do Ja.s.
I............ 9 do
6 do
Eli.I....••••••••••.••••• 11 do
Ch. I.................. 8 do 12 do Chas. II ..•••.•••••• 17 do
4 do

The Congress of the United States is required by the constitution to assemble at least once in

every year: Art. 1, $ 4; and the president may besides, on extraordinary occasions, convene both

houses or either of them. Art. 2, * 3.
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(4) As the su\)pliea and the mutiny act are voted for a year only, an annual session of parliament is a neces&ty.
The Congress of the United States is required by the constitution to o.ssemble at least once in
ev-ery year : .Art. 1, § 4 ; and the president may besides, on extraordinary occasions, convene both
houses or either of them. Art. 2, ~ 3.
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II. The constituent parts of a parliament are the next objects of onr inquiry.

And these are the king's majesty, sitting there in his royal political capacity,"'

and the three estates of the realm ; the lords spiritual, the lords temporal, (who

sit, together with the king, in one house) and the commons, who sit by them-

selves in another. And the king, and these three estates, together, form the

great corporation or body politic of the kingdom, (o) of which the king is said

to be capnt principium et finis. For upon their coming together the king meets

them either in person or by representation ; without which there can be no

beginning of a parliament; (p) and he also has alone the power of dissolving

them.

r*1541 highly necessary for preserving the balance of the constitution,

' J that the executive power should be a branch, though not the whole, of

the legislative. The total union of them, we have seen, would be productive of

tyranny; the total disjunction of them for the present would in the end pro-

duce the same effects, by causing that union against which it seems to provide.

The legislative would soon become tyrannical, by making continual encroach-

ments, and gradually assuming to itself the rights of the executive power.

Thus the long parfiament of Charles the First, while it acted in a constitu-

tional manner, with the royal concurrence, redressed many heavy grievances,

and established many salutary laws. But when the two houses assumed the

power of legislation, in exclusion of the royal authority, they soon after

assumed likewise the reins of administration ; and, in consequence of these
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united powers overturned both church and state, and established a worse

oppression than any they pretended to remedy. To hinder therefore any such

encroachments, the king is himself a part of the parliament: and, as this is the

reason of his being so, very properly, therefore the share of legislation, which

the constitution has placed in the crown, consists in the power of rejecting

rather than resolving ; this being sufficient to answer the end proposed. For we

may apply to the royal negative, in this instance, what Cicero observes of the

negative of the Eoman tribunes, that the crown has not any power of doing

wrong, but merely of preventing wrong from being done, (q) The crown can-

not begin of itself any alterations in the present established law ; but it may

approve or disapprove of the alterations suggested and consented to by the two

houses. The legislative therefore cannot abridge the executive power of any

rights which it now ha-s by law, without its own consent ; since the law must

perpetually stand as it now does, unless all the powers will agree to alter it.

And herein indeed consists the true excellence of the English government, that

r*i KC i all the parts of it form a mutual *check upon each other. In the legis-

"• •" lature, the people are a check upon the nobility, and the nobility a

check upon the people ; by the mutual privilege of rejecting what the other has

resolved : while the king is a check upon both, which preserves the executive

power from encroachments. And this very executive power is again checked

and kept within due bounds by the two houses, through the privilege they have

of inquiring into, impeaching and punishing the conduct (not indeed of the

king, (r) which would destroy his constitutional independence ; but, which is

more beneficial to the public) of his evil and pernicious counsellors. Thus

every branch of our civil polity supports and is supported, regulates and is

regulated by the rest: for the two houses naturally drawing in two directions of

opposite interest, and the prerogative in another still different from them both,

they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper limits ; while the

whole is prevented from separation and artificially connected together by the

mixed nature of the crown, which is a part of the legislature, and the sole

executive magistrate. Like three distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel

the machine of government in a direction different from what either, acting by

itself, would have done ; but at the same time in a direction partaking of each",

(o) I I nst . 1. 2. Slat. Eli?., c. 3. Hale, of Farl. 1. (p) I last. 6,

(ff) Sulla—trOiuni»plel>Usualeneinmri<cfacienda!poie3iaiemademit,auxiliiferendtrtKmtii. De LL. 3. 9.

(r) Stat. 12 Car. II,c.80.
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and formed out of all; a direction which constitutes the true line of the liberty

and happiness of the community. (5)

Let us now consider these constituent parts of the sovereign power, or par-

liament, each in a separate view. The king's majesty will be the subject of the

next, and many subsequent chapters, to which we must at present refer.

The next in order are the spiritual lords. These consist of two archbishops

and twenty-four bishops, (6) and, at the dissolution of monasteries by Henry

VIII, consisted likewise of twenty-six mitred.abbots, and two priors: («) a very

considerable body, and in those times equal in number to the temporal nobility.

(t) (7) All these hold, or are supposed to hold, *certain ancient baronies r *i tgi

under the king; for William the Conqueror thought proper to change *• '

the spiritual tenure of frankalmoign, or free alms, under which the bishops

held their lands during the Saxon government, into the feudal or Norman tenure

by barony, which subjected their estates to all civil charges and assessments,

from which they were before exempt: (u) and, in right of succession to those

baronies, which were unalienable from their respective dignities, the bishops

and abbots were allowed their seats in the house of lords, (x) (8) But though

these lords spiritual are, in the eye of the law, a distinct estate from the lords

temporal, and are so distinguished in most of our acts of parliament, yet, in

practice, they are usually blended together under the one name of the lords;

they intermix in their votes; and the majority of such intermixture joins both

estates. And from this want of a separate assembly and separate negative of

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

(•) Seld. tit. hon. 2. 5. 27. (t) Co. Lltt. 97. (v) Glib. Hist Exoh. K. Spelm. W. I. 281.

UE) Glanv. 7.1. Co. Lltt. 97. Seld. tit. hon. 2.5.19.

(5) The gradual changes which have been taking place in the constitution of Great Britain

since these commentaries were written, but which have been particularly noticeable only on

and formed out of all; a direction which constitutes the true line of the liberty
and happiness of the community. (5)
Let us now consider these constituent parts of the sovereign power, or parliament, each in a separate view. The king's majesty will be the subject of the
next, and many subsequent chapters, to which we must at present refer.
The next in order are the spiritual lords. These consist of two archbishops
and twenty-four bishops, (6) and, at the dissolution of monasteries by Henry
VIII, consisted likewise of twenty-six mitred.abbots, and two priors: (s) a very
considerable body, and in those times equal in number to the temporal nobility.
(t) (7) All these hold, or are supposed to hold, *certain ancient baronies [ • 156]
under the king; for William the Conqueror thought proper to change
the spiritual tenure of frankalmoign, or free alms, under which the bishops
held their lands durin~ the Saxon goyernment, into the feudal or Norman t~nure
by barony, which subjected their estates to all civil charges and assessments,
from which they were before exempt: (u) and, in ri~ht of succession to those
baronies, which were unalienable from their respective dignities, the bishops
and abbots were allowed their seats in the house of lords. (x) (8) But though
these lords spiritual are, in the eye of the law, a distinct estate from the lords
temporal, and are so distinguished in most of our acts of parliament, yet, in
practice, they are usually blended together under the one name of the lords;
they intermix in their votes; and the majority of such intermixture joins both
estates. And from this want of a separate assembly and separate negati're of
l•l Seid. tit. hon. 2. 5. 'n.
(I) Co. J.Jtt. 97.
(U) Glib. Rillt. Exch. M. Spelm. w. I . illl.
(z) Gl&nv. 7. 1. Co. Litt. 97.

Seid. UL hon. 2. 5. 19.

occasions of great excitement, like those of the passage of the reform bill in 1832, and the Irish

Church Disestablishment bill in 1869, have had the effect to destroy in great degree the equili-

brium of power in the British government, and to make the house of commons at length the

controlling authority in that realm. The control over the executive department is established

by the recognition of the principle that on all important measures the advisers of the crown

must be in harmony with the majority of the commons, and that whenever it appears that

this harmony does not exist, the ministry must either resign, or dissolve the parliament and

appeal to the people in a new election, in the hope of obtaining a majority with different sen-

timents. The superiority over the house of lords exists in the right to originate all money

bills, and at last in the establishment, practicallv, of the principle that the lords shall not reject

an important measure that is clearly demanded by the people, and has been passed by the

commons. The gradual extension of the power of the commons will be traced with interest

in May's Constitutional History of England. The power of the crown to reject or veto a mea-

sure, adopted in parliament, is obsolete, as of course it must become when the principle is

recognized that the ministry must bo harmonious in sentiment with the majority of the commons,

and that the crown only acts through the ministrv. The power of impeachment would be

exercised unhesitatingly if this principle should be disregarded. The balance of power is bet-

ter arranged and better preserved in America. The president has a qualified veto upon all

congressional legislation, which can only be overcome by a concurrent vote of two-thirds of

each house. Const, art. 1, $ 7. And this, together with his right to communicate and recom-

mend measures by message, Art. '2, $ 3, makes him an important branch of the legislative depart-

ment. There is no constitutional principle in our government which renders it obligatory that

the president's advisers should be in harmony with congress, or with either house of it. Nor

does either house hesitate at any time to reject any measure adopted by the other, if the judg-

ment of its members recommends that course.

(6) On the union with Ireland an addition of four representative peers (one archbishop and

three bishops) was made for that kingdom, but by the disestablishment of the Irish Church these

bishoprics will cease to exist.

(7) [In the place referred to, Lord Coke says, there wore twenty-so von abbots and two priors,

and he is there silent respecting the number of the temporal peers; but, in the first page of the

4th Institute, he says their number, when he is then writing, is 106, and the number of the com-

mons 493.]

(8) [The right by which these spiritual lords sit, whether derived under their alleged baronies,

or from usage, is discussed, Hargr. Co. Litt. 135. b. n. 1. Mr. H. inclines to adopt Lord Hole's

position, namely, that they sit by usage. Mr. Hallam has also adverted to the question, Midd.

Ages, c. viii, and rendered it accessible to the general reader; but the student, if no have a turn

(5) The gradual changes which have been taking place in the constitution of Great Britain
since these commentaries were written, but which hn.ve boeu particularly- noticeable ouly on
occasions of great excitement, like those of the pBBsage of the refonu bill m 1832, 1md the Irish
Church Disestablishment bill in 1869, have had the effect to destroy iu great degree the equilibrium of power in the British govtJrnment, and to make the house of commons at lerigth the
controlling authority in that realm. The control over the executive department is estaulished
by the reco~tion of the principle that on all important measures the advisers of the crown
must be in harmony with the majority of the commons, and that whenever it appear8 that
this hannony does not exist, the miniRtry must either nisign, or di;il!olve the parliament and
a,1>peal to the people in a new election, in the hope of obtaining a majority with different sentimentll. The i!Uperiority over the house of lord~ exists in the right to originate rill money
billtJ, and at la..'lt in th6 establiRhment, prncticallv, of the principle that the lordti shall not reject
an important meaimre that is eh~arly demanded by the people, and ha~ been paAAed by the
commons. The gradual extension of the power of the commons will be traced with interest
in May's Con11titutioqal Hi11tory of England. The power of the crown to reject or vero a meai>ure, adopted in p!lrliament, is obsolete, as of course it must become when the principle is
recognized that the Illinistry must be harmonious in sentiment with the majority of thti commons,
and that the crown only acts through the ministrr. The power of impeachment would be
exercised unhesitatingly if this principle should be disregarded. The balance of power is better arranged and .better preserved in America. Thll president has a qualified veto u:pon all
congressional legislation, which cau only be overcomo by a concurrent vote of two-thirds of
each house. Const. art. 1, § 7. And this, together with his right to communicate and recommend measures by mesl!8ge, .A.rt. 2, ~ 3, mo.kes him an important branch of the legislative department. There is no constitutional principle in our government which rendel"I! it obligatory that
the president's advisers should be in hannony with congreS11, or with either house of it. Nor
does either house hesitate at any time to reject any measure adopted by the other, if the judgment of its members recommends that course.
(6) On the '!lnion with Ireland an addition of four representative peers (one archbishop and
three bishops) WIMI made for that kingdom, but by the disestablishment of the Irish Church these
bishoprics will cease to exist.
(7) [In the place referred to, Lord Coke says, there wore twenty-seven abbots and two prioni,
o.nd he is there silent respecting the number of the temporal peers; but, in the first page of the
4th Irn~titute, lie says their number, when he is then wnting, is 106, and the number of the commons 493.]
(8) [The right hr which these spiritual lords sit, whether derived under their alleged baronie~.
or from Ut'8ge, is discussed, Ha.rgr. Co. Litt. 135. b. n. 1. llr. H. inclines to adopt Lord lla.ll•',;
position, namely, that they sit by usage. Mr. Hallam has also adverted to the question, Midd.
Ages, c. viii, and rendered it accessible to the general reader; but the student, if he have o. turu
for conjectural investigation, may consult Lord Hale's MS. Jura Coronre, and Bishop, Warbur.
ton's Alliance between Church and State, 4th edit. p. 149.]
· ·

for conjectural investigation, may consult Lord Hale's MS. Jura Corona, and Bishop Worbur-

ton's Alliance between Church and State, 4th edit. p. 149.]
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156 OF THE PARLIAMENT. [Book I.

the prelates, some writers have argued (y) very cogently, that the lords spiritual

and temporal are now, in reality, only one estate, (z) which is unquestionably

true in every effectual sense, though the ancient distinction between them still

nominally continues. For if a bill should pass their house, there is no doubt of

its validity, though every lord spiritual should vote against it; of which Seldon,

(a) and Sir Edward Coke, (b) give many instances: as on the other hand, I

presume it would be equally good, if the lords temporal present were inferior to

the bishops in number, and every one of those temporal lords gave his vote to

reject the bill; though Sir Edward Coke seems to doubt (c) whether this would

not be an ordinance, rather than an act, of parliament.

r*157l *^ne lords temporal consist of all the peers of the realm (9) (the

L * J bishops not being in strictness held to be such, but merely lords of par-

liament) (d) by whatever title of nobility distinguished, dukes, marquises,

earls, viscounts, or barons; of which dignities we shall speak more hereafter.

Some of these sit by descent, as do all ancient peers; some by creation, as do

all new-made ones; others, since the union with Scotland, by election, which is

the case of the sixteen peers, who represent the body of the Scots nobility. (10)

Their number is indefinite, and may be increased at will by the power of the

crown; (11) and once, in the reign of Queen Annie, there was an instance of

creating no less than twelve together; in contemplation of which, in the reign

of King George the First, a bill passed the house of lords, and was countenanced

by the then ministry, for limiting the number of the peerage. This was
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thought, by some, to promise a great acquisition to the constitution, by restrain-

ing the prerogative from gaining the ascendant in that august assembly, by

pouring in at pleasure an unlimited number of new created lords. But the bill

was ill-relished, and miscarried in the house of commons, whose leading mem-

bers were then desirous to keep the avenues to the other house as open and easy

as possible. .^

The distinction of rank and honours is necessary in wsey well-governed state,

in order to reward such as are eminent for their services to the public, in a

manner the most desirable to individuals, and yet without burden to the com-

munity ; exciting thereby an ambitious yet laudable ardor, and generous emula-

tion, in others: and emulation, or virtuous ambition, is a spring of action,

which, however dangerous or invidious in a mere republic, or under a despotic

sway, will certainly be attended with good effects under a free monarchy, where,

without destroying its existence, its excesses may be continually restrained by

that superior power, from which all honour is derived. Such a spirit, when

nationally diffused, gives life and vigour to the community; it sets all the wheels

f*l'i81 government in motion, * which, under a wise regulator, may be

L J directed to any beneficial purpose; and thereby every individual may be

(y) Whltclocke on Parliam. c. 72. Warbnrt. Alliance, b. 2, c. 3. («) Dyer, 60.

(a) Baronage, p. 1, c. 6. The act of uniformity. 1. KHz. c. 2, was passed with the dissent of all the bish-

ops. (Gibs, codex. 286) and therefore the style of lord* spiritual is omiUnl throughout the whole.

(ii) 2 Inst. 585, 6, 7. See Kcllw. 184, where it is hold™ by the Judges, 7 Hen. VOT, that the king may hold

parliament without any spiritual lords. Thlg was also exemplified in fact, in the two first parliaments of

Charles II, wherein no bishops were summoned, till after the repeal of the statute 16 Car. I, c. 27, by statute

13 Car. II St. 1, c. 2. (c) 4 lost. 26. (i/.) Staundford, P. C. 163.

(9) By stat. 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, o. 67, art. 4, twenty-eight lords temporal of Ireland, elected

for life by the peers of Ireland, shall sit and vote, on the part of Ireland, in the house of lords.

The same article prescribes the mode of election, and refers the decision of any question arising

thereon to the honse of lords, where, if the votes be equal, the names of the candidates are to be

put into a glass and one drawn out by the clerk of the parliament during the sitting of the honse.

Until the peerage of Ireland be reduced to one hundred, the prerogative is limited to create one

peer upon three extinctions; and, on the peerage being reduced to one hundred, the prerogative

is limited to keeping up that number.]

(10) [The Scots nobility sit one parliament only: the Irish for life.]

(11 The reader will remember the carrying of the reform bill of 1832, by the threat of

creating a sufficient number of peers to overcome the adverse majority in that body. See

May's Const. Hist. c. 6. This, however, was an extreme measure, and was regarded at the time

as extra-constitutional, and only to be resorted to in order to avert the imminent danger of civil

commotions.
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made subservient to the public good, while he principally means to promote his

own particular views. A body of nobility is also more peculiarly necessary in

our mixed and compounded constitution, in order to support the rights of both

the crown and the people, by forming a barrier to withstand the encroachments

of both. It creates and preserves that gradual scale of dignity, which proceeds

from the peasant to the prince; rising like a pyramid from a broad foundation

and diminishing to a point as it rises. It is this ascending and contracting pro-

portion that adds stability to any government; for when me departure is sudden

from one extreme to another, we may pronounce that state to be precarious.

The nobility, therefore, are the pillars which are reared from among the people

more immediately to support the throne; and if that falls, they must also be

buried under its ruins. Accordingly, when in the last century the commons had

determined to extirpate monarchy, they also voted the house of lords to be use-

less and dangerous. And since titles of nobility are thus expedient in the state,

it is also expedient that their owners should form an independent and separate

branch of the legislature. If they were confounded with the mass of the people,

and like them had only a vote in electing representatives, their privileges would

soon be borne down and overwhelmed by the popular torrent, which would effect-

ually level all distinctions. It is therefore highly necessary that the body of

nobles should have a distinct assembly, distinct deliberations, and distinct powers

from the commons.

The commons consist of all such men of property in the kingdom as have not
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seats in the house of lords; every one of which has a voice in parliament, either

personally, or by his representatives. In a free state every man, who is supposed

a free agent, ought to be in some measure his own governor; and therefore a

branch at least of the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the

people. And this power, when the territories of the state are small and its citi-

zens easily known, should be exercised by the people *in their aggregate ^ +„$ i

or collective capacity, as was wisely ordained in the petty republics of ^ •*

Greece, and the first rudiments of the Eoman state. But this will be highly

inconvenient, when the public territory is extended to any considerable degree,

and the number of citizens is increased. Thus when, after the social war, all

the burghers of Italy were admitted free citizens of Home, and each had a vote

in the public assemblies, it became impossible to distinguish the spurious from

the real voter, and from that time all elections and popular deliberations grew

tumultuous and disorderly; which paved the way for Marius and Sylla, Pompey

and Caesar, to trample on the liberties of their country, and at last to dissolve

the commonwealth. In so large a state as ours, it is therefore very wisely con-

trived that the people should do that by their representatives, which it is imprac-

ticable to perform in person; representatives, chosen by a number of minute

and separate districts, wherein all the voters are, or easily may be, distinguished.

The counties are therefore represented by knights, elected by the proprietors of

lands ; the citizens and boroughs are represented by citizens and burgesses,

chosen by the mercantile part, or supposed trading interest of the nation; much

in the same manner as the burghers in the diet of Sweden are chosen by the

corporate towns, Stockholm sending four, as London does with us, other cities

two, and some only one. (e) The number of English representatives is 513, and

of Scots 45; in all 558. (12) And every member, though chosen by one partic-

ular district, when elected and returned, serves for the whole realm ; for the end

of his coming thither is not particular, but general; not barely to advantage his

constituents, but the common wealth ; to advise his majesty (as appears from the

writ of summons) (/) "de communi consilio super negotiis quibusdam arduis

(e) Mod. l.'n. Hist, xxxlli. 18. ffj 4 Inst. 18.

(12) By stat. 39 and 40 Gteo. Ill, c. 67, one hundred representatives of Ireland must be added

to these. By stat. 2 William IV, cc. 45, 65 and 88, the number of English representatives was

reduced to 500; the Scotch representation increased to 53, and the Irish to 105, making the total

made subservient to the public good, while be principally means to promote his
own particular views. A body of nobility is alio more peculiarly necessary in
our mixed and compounded constitution, in order to support the rights of both
the crown and the people, by forming a barrier to withstand the encroachments
of both. It creates and preserves that gradual scale of dignity, which proceeds
from the peasant to the prince; rising like a pyramid from a broad foundation
and diminishing to a point as it rises. It is this ascending and contracting proportion that adds stability to any government; for when the departure is sudden
from one extreme to another, we may pronounce that state to be precarious.
The nobility, therefore, are the pillars which are reared from among the people
more immediately to support the throne; and if that falls, they must also be
buried under its ruins. Accordingly, when in the last century the commons had
determined to extirpate monarchy, they also voted the house of lords to be useless and dangerous. And since titles of nobility are thus expedient in the state,
it is also expedient that their owners should form an independent and separate
branch of the legislature. If they were confounded with the mass of the people,
and like them had only a ,·ote in electing representatives, their J?rivileges would
soon be borne down and overwhelmed by the popular torrent, which would effectnallv level all distinctions. It is therefore highly necessary that the body of
nobfes should have a distinct assembly, distinct deliberations, and distinct powers
from the commons.
The commons consist of all such men of property in the kingdom as have not
seats in the house of lords; every one of which has a voice in parliament, either
personally, or by his representatives. In a free state every man, who is supposed
a free agent, ought to be in some measure his own governor; and therefore a
branch at least of the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the
people. And this power, when the territories of the state are small and its citizens easily known, should be exercised by the people *in their aggregate [ • 159 ]
or collectn-e capacity, as was wisely ordained in the petty republics of
Greece, and the first rudiments of the Roman state. But this will be highly
inconvenient, when the public territory is extended to any considerable degree,
and the number of citizens is increased. Thus when, after the social war, all
the burghers of Italy were admitted free citizens of Rome, and each had a vote
in the public assemblies, it became impossible to distinguish the spurious from
the real voter, and from that time all elections and popular deliberations grew
tumultuous and disorderly; which paved the way for Marius and Sylla, Pompey
and Cresar, to trample on the liberties of their country, and at last to dissolve
the commonwealth. In so large a state as ours, it is therefore very wisely contrived that the people should do that by their representatives, which it is impracticable to perform in person; representatives, chosen by a number of mmute
and separate districts, wherein all the voters are, or easily may be, distinguished.
The counties are therefore represented by knights, elected by the proprietors of
lands; the citizens and boroughs are represented by citizens and burgesses,
chosen by the mercantile part, or supposed trading interest of the nation; much
in the same manner as the burghers in the diet of Sweden are chosen by the
corporate towns, Stockholm sending four, as London does with us, other cities
two, and some only one. (e) The number of English representatives is 513, and
of Scots 45; in all 558. (12) And every member, though chosen by one particular district, when elected and returned, senes for the whole realm ; for the end
of his coming thither is not particular, but general; not barely to advantage his
constituents, but the common wealth; to advise his majesty (as appears from the
writ of summons) (/) "de communi cow;iUo super negoti1'.s quibusdam arduis

number 658.
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(e) Mod. Un. Hist. .lCIXlll. Ill.

(/) ' Inst. 18.

(12) By stat. 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 67, one hundred representatives of Ireland mu11t be added

to these. By Rtat. 2 William IV, cc. 45, 65 and 88, the number of English representatives W&'I
reduced to 500; the Scotch representation increased to 631 and the Irish to 1051 making the total
number (i.')8.
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et urgentibus, regem, statum, et defensionem regni Anglice et ecclesics Anglicants

ooncernentibus." And therefore he is not bound, like a deputy in the united

provinces, to consult with, or take the advice of, his constituents upon any par-

ticular point, unless he himself thinks it proper or prudent so to dp. (13)

r *, 60 -i ""These are the constituent parts of a parliament; the king, the lords

L -" spiritual and temporal, and the commons. (14) Parts, of which each is

so necessary, that the consent of all three is required to make any new law that

shall bind the subject. Whatever is enacted for law by one, or by two only, of

the three, is no statute; and to it no regard is due, unless in matters relating to

their own privileges. For though, in times of madness and anarchy, the com-

mons once passed a vote, (g) " that whatever is enacted or declared for law by

the commons in parliament assembled, hath the force of law; and all the people

of this nation are concluded thereby, although the consent and concurrence of

the king or house of peers be not had thereto;" yet, when the constitution was

restored in all its forms, it was particularly enacted by statute 13 Car. II, c. 1,

that if any person shall maliciously or advisedly affirm that both or either of the

houses of parliament have any legislative authority without the king, such per-

son shall incur all the penalties of a prcemunire.

III. We are next to examine the laws and customs relating to parliament, thus

united together, and considered as one aggregate body.

The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, (h) is so

transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or per-
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sons, within any bounds. And of this high court, he adds, it may be truly said,

" si antiquitatem species, est vetustisslma ; si dignitatem, est honoratissima ; si

jurisdictionem, est capadssima." It hath sovereign and uncontrollable author-

ity in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing,

reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denomina-

tions, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being

the place where that absolute despotic power which must in all governments

reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mis-

F *1611 cn'e^s an(^ ""grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the

L •* ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary

tribunal. It can regulate or new model the succession to the crown; as was

done in the reign of Henry VIII and William III. It can alter the established

religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances, in the reigns of King

Henry VIII and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the

constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the

act of union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It

can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore

some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omni-

potence of parliament. (15) True it is, that what the parliament doth, no

authority upon earth can undo; so that it is a matter most essential to the lib-

erties of this kingdom that such members be delegated to this important trust

as are most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge; for

(0) 4 Jan. 1648. (ft) 4 InM 36.

(13) [See this point beautifully put in the close of Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol.]

(14) By the constitution of the United States the senate is composed of two senators from each

et urgentibus, regem, statum, et defensionem regni A ngliOJ et ecclesiOJ A nglfra1ue
ooncernentilnts." And therefore lle is not bound, like a deputy in the united
provinces, to consult with, or take the advice of, his constituents upon any particular point, unless he himself thinks it proper or prudent so to do. (13)
*These are the constituent parts of a parliament; the king, the lords
[ • 160 ]
spiritual and temporal, and the commons. (14) Parts, of which each is
so necessary, that the consent of all three is required to make any new law that
shall bind the subject. Whatever is enacted for law by one, or by two only, of
the three, is no statute; and to it no regard is due, unless in matters relating to
their own privileges. For though, in times of madness and anarchy, the commons once passed a Yote, ( g) "that whatever is enacted or declared for law by
the commons in parliament assembled, hath the force of law; and all the people
of this nation are concluded thereby, alt.hough the consent and concurrence of
the king or house of peers be not had thereto;" yet, when the constitution was
restored in all its forms, it was particularly enact.00. by statute f3 Car. II, c. 1,
that if any person shall maliciously or advisedly affirm. that both or either of the
houses of parliament have any legislative authority without the king, such person shall incnr all the penalties of a prOJmunire.
III. We are next to examine the laws and customs relating to parliament, thus
united together, and considered as one aggregate body.
The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, (k) is so
transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds. And of this high court, he adds, it may be truly said,

" si antiquitatem spectes, est 11etustissfma ; si dignitatem, est lwnoratissima ~· si
jurisdictionem, est capacissima." It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing,
reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all J!Ossible denomina.tions, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or cnminal: this being
the place where that absolute despotic power which must in all governments
reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mis[ • 161 ] chiefs and *grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the
ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary
tribunal. It can regulate or new model the succession to the crown ; as wa.s
done in the reign of Henry VIII and William III. It can alter the established
religion of the land ; as was done in a variety of instances, in the reigns of King
He.nry VIII and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the
constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the
act of union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It
can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible ; and therefore
some have not scrupled w call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. (15) 'frue it ii!, that what the parliament doth, no
authority upon earth can undo; so that it is a matter most essential to the. liberties of this kingdom that such members be delegated to this important trust
as are most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge; for

state, chosen by the legislatures thereof for six years : art. 1, § 3; and the house of representa-

(g} ' Jan. i6t8.

tives of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states; art. 1, § 2. Rep-

(l) '

Inst. 86.

resentatives are apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers,

excluding Indians not taxed, and by a ratio previously fixed by congress, but not to exceed one

for everv thirty thousand. Each state is to have at least one representative. Ib.

(15) fDe Lolme has improved upon this, and has, I think, unwarrantably asserted, that "it is

a fundamental principle with the English lawyers, that parliament can dp every thine but make

a woman a man, and a man a woman." p. 134. The omnipotence of parliament signifies nothing

more than the supreme sovereign power of the state, or a power of action uncontrolled by any

superior. In this sense, the king, in the exercise of his prerogatives, and the house of lords, in

the interpretation of laws, are also omnipotent; that is, free from the control of any superior pro

vided by the constitution.]
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(Ul) [See this point beautifully put in the close of Burke's speech t.o the elect.ors of Brist.oL]
(14) By the constitution of the United States the senate is composed of two senators from ea.oh
11tste, chosen by the legislatures thereof for six yearH : art. 1, § 3; and the house of representatives of membel'I! chosen every second year by the people of the several Rt.ates; art. 1, § 2. Representative~

are apportioned among the several states according to their relilpCcti\"e numbers,
excluding Indians not taxed, and by a ratio previously fixed by congress, but not to exceed one
for e\'"ery thirty thousand. Each state is to ha>e at least one representative. lb.
(15) (De Lolme has imJ.>ro\'"ed upon this, and has, I think, unwarrantably asRHrt.ed, that "it is
a fundamental principle with the English lawyers, that parliament can do eyery thi~g but make
a woman a man, and a man a woman." p. 134. The omnipotence of parliament signifies nothing
more than the supreme sovereign power of tho state, or a power of action uncontrolled by any
1tuperior. In this senRe, tho kmg, in the exereisc of his prerogatives, and the house of lords, in
the interpretation of laws, are also omnipotent; that is, free from the control of any superior pro.
vided by the constitution.]
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it was a known apothegm of the great lord treasurer Burleigh, " that England

could never be ruined but by a parliament;" and, as Sir Matthew Hale observes,

(t) " this being the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have

jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should any way

fall upon it the subjects of this kingdom are left without all manner of remedy.

To the same purpose the president Montesquieu, though I trust too hastily, pre-

sages (k) that, as Kome, Sparta, and Carthage, have lost their liberty, and per-

ished, so the constitution of England will in time lose its liberty, will perish:

it will perish, whenever the legislative power shall become more corrupt than

the executive.

It must be owned that Mr. Locke, (Z)and other theoretical writers, have held, that

'• there remains still inherent in the people a supreme power to remove or alter

the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust

•"reposed in them; for, when such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited,

and devolves to those who gave it." But however just this conclusion

may be in theory, we cannot practically adopt it, nor take any legal steps for

carrying it into execution, under any dispensation of government at present

actually existing. - For this devolution of power, to the people at large, includes

in it a dissolution of the whole form of government established by that people;

reduces all the members to their original state of equality; and, by annihila-

ting the sovereign power, repeals all positive laws whatsoever before enacted.

No human laws will therefore suppose a case, which at once must destroy all
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law, and compel men to build afresh upon a new foundation; nor will they

make provision for so desperate an event, as must render all legal provisions

ineffectual, (m) So long therefore as the English constitution lasts, we may

venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is absolute and without control. (16)

In order to prevent the mischiefs that might arise, by placing this extensive

authority in hands that are either incapable, or else improper, to manage it, it

is provided by the custom and law of parliament, (n) that no one shall sit or

vote in either house, unless he be twenty-one years of age. This is also expressly

declared by statute 7 and 8 W. Ill, c. 25, with regard to the house of commons;

doubts having arisen from some contradictory adjudications, whether or no a

minor was incapacitated from sitting in that "house, (o) It is also enacted by

statute 7 Jac. I, c. 6, that no member be permitted to enter into the house of

commons, till he hath taken the oath of allegiance before the lord steward or

his deputy; and, by 30 Car. II, St. 2, and 1 Geo. I, c. 13, that no member shall

vote or sit in either house, till he hath in the presence of the house taken the

oath of allegiance, supremacy, and abjuration, and subscribed and repeated the

declaration against transubstantiation, (17)and invocation of saints, and the sacri-

fice of the mass. Aliens, unless naturalized, were likewise by the law of

parliament incapable to serve therein: (p) and now it is enacted, by statute 12

and 13 W. Ill, c. 2, that no alien, *even though he be naturalized, shall r *, 63 -i

be capable of being a member of either house of parliament. And there <- •"

are not only these standing incapacities; but if any person is made a peer by

(0 Of parliaments. 49. (£) Sp. L. 11. 6. (2) On Gov. p. 2. » 149, 2Z7. (m) See page 2M.

(n) Whitelocke. c. SO. 4 Inet 47. (o) Com. Journ. 16 Dec. 1690.

(p) 1 Com. Joum. 16 Mar. 1633: 18 Feb. 1626.

(16) [Locke himself qualifies his position much in the same way as it is qualified in the text.

He says," the community may he said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but as

considered under any form of government; because this power of the people can never take

place till the government is dissolved.]

it waB a known apothegm of the great lord treasurer Burleigh, " that England
could never be rumed but by a. parliament;" and, as Sir Matthew Hale observes,
( i) '' this being the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have
jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should any wai,
fall upon it the subjects of this kingdom are left without all manner of remedy.'
rro the same purpose the president Montesquieu, though I trust too hastily, presages (k) that, as Rome, Sparta, and Carthage, have lost their liberty, and perished, so the constitution of England will in time lose its liberty, will perish:
it will perish, whenever the legislative power shall become more con-upt than
the executi\-e.
It must be owned that Mr. Locke, (l)and other theoretical writers, have held, that
'" there remains still inherent in the }ltlople a supreme power to remove or alter
the legislative, when they find the legislative a.ct contrary to the trust
•reposed in them; for, when such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited, [ • 162 ]
and devolYes to those who gu.Ye it." But however just this conclusion
may be in theory, we cannot practically adopt it, nor take any legal steps for
carrying it into execution, under any dispensation of government at present
actually existing.• For this devolution of power, to the people at large, includes
in it a dissolution of the whole form of government established by that people;
reduces all the members to their original state of equality; and, by annihilating the sovereign power, repeals all positive laws whatsoever before enacted.
No human laws will therefore suppose a case, which at once must destroy all
law, and compel men to build afresh upon a new foundation; nor will they
make provision for so desperate an event, as must render all legal provisions
ineffectual. (m) So long therefore as the English constitution lasts, we ma,y
venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is absolute and without control. (16)
In order to prevent the mischiefs that might arise, by placing this extensive
authority in hands that are either incapable, or else improper, to mana~e it, it
is provided by the custom and law of parliament, (n) that no one shall sit or
vote in either house, unless he be twenty-one years of age. This is also expressly
declared by statute 7 and 8 W. III, c. 25, with regard to the house of commons;
doubts having arisen from some contradictory adjudications, whether or no a
minor was incapacitat.ed from sitting in that house. (o) It is also enacted by
statute 7 Jae. I, c. 6, that no member be permitted to enter into the house of
commons, till he hath taken the oath of allegiance before the lord steward or
his deputy; and, by 30 Car. II, St. 2, and 1 Geo. I, c. 13, that no member shall
vote or sit in either house, till he hath in the presence of the house taken the
oath of allegiance, supremacy, and abjuration, and subscribed and repeated the
declaration against transubstantiation, (17)and invocation of saints, and the sacrifice of the mass. Aliens, unless naturalized, were likewise by the law of
parliament incapable to serve therein: (p) and now it is enacted, by statute 12
and 13 W. III, c. 2, that no alien, *even though he be naturalized, shall [ • 163 ]
be capable of being a member of either house of parliament. And there
are not only these standing incapacities; but if any person is made a peer by
(il Of1Ja1'1l11ment.s, t.9.
(k) Sp. L. 11. 6.
{t) On Gov. p. 2. H 1'9, m.
(n) Whltelockc. c. llO. 4 Inst. 47.
(o) Cont. Journ, 16 Dec. 1600.
(p) 1 Com. Jouin. 16 Mar. 1623: 18 Feb. 1626.

(111) See

page 9".

No such absolute and uncontrolled authority exists in the American legislative bodies. See

notes, pp. 125 and 146. Also Cooloy, Const. Lira. 7.

(17) The acts relating to declaration against transubstantiation were repealed by Stat. 10 Geo.

IT, c. 7, which prescribes a form of oath to be taken by Roman Cathob'cs instead of the oaths

of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration. Until recently Jews could not sit in parliament

unless they could take the oath of abjuration, containing the words "upon the faith of a

Christian," but this requirement was dispensed with in 1858. The form of oath now required

by members of parliament in prescribed by Stat. 31 and 32 Vic. c. 72, § 8.
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(16) [Locke him~elf qualifies his position much in tho same way as it is qualified in the text.
He 88.)S," the commnruty may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but as
considered under any form of government; becau~e this power of the people can never take
place till the government is dissolved.]
No such absolute and uncontrolled anthority exMs in the American legislative bodies. See
notes, pp. 125 and 146. Also Cooley, Const. Lim. 7.
(17) The acts relating to cleclW'l!.tion against transubstantiation were repealed by Stat. 10 Geo.
IV, c. 7, which pre11cribes a form of oath to be taken by Roman CatholicR instead of the oaths
of alloginnce, supremacy and abjuration. Until recently Jews could not sit in parliament
unless they could take the oath of abjuration, containing the word;i "upon the faith of a
Christian," but this requirement was dispensecl with in lS:JB. The form of oath now required
by mmnbem of parliament iH prescribed by Stat. 31 and 32 Vic. c. 72, § 8.
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the king or elected to serve in the house of commons by the people, yet may

the respective houses upon complaint of any crime in such person, and proof

thereof, adjudge him disabled and incapable to sit as a member: (g) and this by

the law and custom of parliament. (18)

For, as every court of justice hath laws and customs for its direction, some

the civil and canon, some the common law, others their own peculiar laws and

customs, so the high court of parliament hath also its own peculiar law, called

the lex et consuetudo parliamenti; a law which, Sir Edward Coke (r) observes,

is " ab omnibus queer enda, a multis ignorata (19^) a paucis cognita." It will

not therefore be expected that we should enter into the examination of this

law, with any degree of minuteness: since, as the same learned author assures us,

(t) it is much better to be learned out of the rolls of parliament, and other records,

and by precedents, and continual experience, than can be expressed by any one

man. It will be sufficient to observe, that the whole of the law and custom of

parliament has its original from this one maxim," that whatever matter arises

concerning either house of parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and

adjudged in that house to which it relates, and not elsewhere." (u) Hence, for

instance, the lords will not suffer the commons to interfere in settling the elec-

tion of a peer of Scotland: the commons will not allow the lords to judge of

the election of a burgess; nor will either house permit the subordinate courts

of law to examine the merits of either case. (20) But the maxims upon which

(o) Whitelocke, of Purl. c. 102. Sec Lord's Journ. 3 Mav, 1620 ; 13 May, 1824 :26 May, 1725. Com. Journ.
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11 Feb. 1580 ; 21 Jun. lit* : 9 Nor. 21 Jan. 11M : 6 Mar. 1«7B ; 8 Mar. 1711; 17 Feb. 1769.

(r) 1 Inat. 11. (<) 4 Inst. 90. (u) 4 Iiut. 15.

(18) [This sentence was not in the first editions, but was added, no doubt, by the learned

judge, with an allusion to the Middlesex election. The circumstances of that case were briefly

these: On the 19th Jan. 1764, Mr. Wilkes was expelled the house of commons, for being the

author of a paper called the North Briton, No. 4o. At the next election, in 1768, he was

elected for the county of Middlesex; and on 3d Feb. 1769, it was resolved that John Wilkes,

K^l.. having published several libels specified in the journals, be expelled this house ; and a new

writ having been ordered for the county of Middlesex, Mr. Wilkes was re-elected without

opposition; and on the 17th Feb. 1769, it was resolved that " John Wilkes, Esq., having been

in this session of parliament expelled this house, was and is incapable of being elected a mem-

ber to serve in this present parliament;" and the election was declared void and a new writ

ordered. He was a second time re-elected without opposition, and on 17th March, 1769, the

house again declared the election void, and ordered a new writ. At the next election,

Mr. Luttrel, who had vacated his seat by accepting the Chiltem Hundreds, offered himself as

a caudate against Mr. Wilkes. Mr. Wilkes had 1143 votes, and Mr. Luttrel 296. Mr. Wilkes

was again returned by the sheriff. On the 15th April, 1769, the house resolved, that Mr.

Luttrel ought to have been returned, and ordered the return to be amended. On the 29th April,

a petition was presented by certain freeholders of Middlesex, against the return of Mr. Lnt-

trel; and on the 8th May, the house resolved that Mr. Luttrel was duly elected. On the 3d May,

1783, it was resolved, that the resolutions of the 17th Feb., 1769, should be expunged from the

journals of the house, as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this

kingdom. And at the same time it was ordered, that all the declarations, orders and resolutions

respecting the election of John Wilkes, Esq., should be expunged.]

In the United States each house of Congress judges of the election, returns and qualifica-

tions of its own members: Const, art. 1( $ 5; and its decisions are conclusive. State v. Jarrett,

17 Md. 309; People ». Mahaney, 13 Mich* 481; Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Penn. St. 336. Each house

may also determine the rules of it* proceedings, punish its members tor disorderly behavior,

and with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. Const, art. 1, $ 5. All legislative

bodies have also a common parliamentary law {tower to punish contempts either in members

or third persons, which tend to obstruct legislationi See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204;

Hiss «. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 468; Burnham v-. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226; State t>. Mathews, 37

S. H. 450.

(19) [Lord Holt has observed, that " as to what niy Lord Coke says, that the lex parliamenti

est a multis ignorata, is only because they will not apply themselves to understand it." 2 Ld.

Bay. 1114.]

(20) [The house of commons merely avails itself, when thus sitting judicially, of the maxim,

that all courts are final judges of contempts against themselves. See the case of Brass Cros-

by, 3 Wils. 188; Bl. Rep. 754, and 7 State Trials, 437; 19 State Trials, 1117; 2 Hawkins, oh.

14, $$ 72, 73, 74. And m conformity with this principle, A was determined in the cases of the

King v. Flower, 8 T. R. 314, and Biirdett. v. Abbott, 14 East) 1; Burdett v. Colman, id. 163; 4

Taunt. 401, S. C., that the privileges of parliament, whether in punishing a perwin, not one of
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they proceed, together with the method of proceeding, rest entirely in the breast

of the parliament itself; and are not denned and ascertained by any particular

stated laws. (21)

"The privileges of parliament are likewise very large and indefinite, r *, „. -,

And therefore when in 31 Hen. VI, the house of lords propounded a *• ' '

question to the judges concerning them, the chief justice, Sir John Fortescue,

in the name of his brethren, declared, " that they ought not to make answer to

that question: for it hath not been used aforetime that the justices should in

any wise determine the privileges of the high court of parliament. .For it is

so high and mighty in its nature, that it may make law: and that which is law.

it may make no law: and the determination and knowledge of that privilege

belongs to the lords of parliament, and not to the justices." (a;) Privilege of

parliament was principally established, in order to protect its members, not only

from being molested by their fellow-subjects, but also more especially from being

oppressed oy the power of the crown. If therefore all the privileges of parlia-

ment were once to be set down and ascertained, and no privilege to be allowed

but what was so defined and determined, it were easy for the executive power to

devise some new case, not within the line of privilege, and under pretence

thereof, to harass any refractory member and violate the freedom of parliament.

The dignity and independence of the two houses are therefore in great measure

preserved by keeping their privileges indefinite. (22) Some however of the

more notorious privileges of the members of either house are, privilege of
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speech, of person, of their domestics, and of their lands and goods. (23) As to

the first, privilege of speech, it is declared by the statute 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2,

as one of the liberties of the people, " that the freedom of speech, and debates,

and proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any

court or place out of parliament. And this freedom of speech is particularly

demanded of the king in person, by the speaker of the house of commons, at

(x) seM. Baronage, part. 1. c. 4.

their members, or in punishing one of their own body, are not amenable in a court of common

they proceed, together with the method of proceeding, rest entirely in the bmist
of the parliament itself; and are not defined and ascertained by any particular
st.ated laws. (21)
*The privileges of parliament are likewise very large and indefinite. [ • 164 ]
And therefore when in 31 Hen. VI, the house of lords propounded a
question to the judges concerning them, the chief justice, Sir John Fortescue,
in the name of hie brethren, declared, "that they ought not to make answer to
that question: for it hath not been used aforetime that the justices should in
any wise determine the privileges of the high court of parliament. For it is
so bigh and mighty in its nature, that it may make law : and that which is law,
it may make no law: and the determination and knowledge of that privilege
belongs to the lords of parliament, and not to the justices." (x) Privilege of
parliament was principally established, in order to protect its members, not only
from being molested by their fellow-subjects, but also more especially from being
oppressed by the power of the crown. If therefore all the privileges of parliament were once to be set down and ascertained, u.nd no privilege to he allowed
but what was so defined and detennined, it were easy for the executive power to
devise some new case, not wit.bin the line of privilege, and under pretence
thereof, to harass any refractory member and violate the freedom of parliament.
r.rhe dignity and independence of the two houses are therefore in great measure
preserved by keeping their privileges indefinite. (22) Some however of the
more notorious privileges of the members of either house are, privilege of
speech, of person, of their domestics, and of their lands and goods. (23) As to
the first, privilege of speech, it is declared by the statute 1 W. and :M. St. 2, c. 2,
as one of the liberties of the people, " that the freedom of speech, and debates,
and proceedings in parliament, ou~ht not to be impeached or questioned in any
court or place out of parliament.' And this freedom of speech is particularly
demanded of the king in person, by the speaker of the house of commons, at

law; that their adjudication ofany offence is a sufficient judgment, the warrant of the speaker a

sufficient commitment, and that outer doors may be broken open to have execution of their

(~l Seld.

process.

Baronage, part. 1. e. '·

The courts of Westminster, however, may judge of the privilege of parliament, when it is inci-

dent to a suit of which the court is possessed, and may proceed to execution between the sessions,

notwithstanding appeals lodged, <tc. 2 St. Tr. 66, 209.]

See also the recent case of Stockdale v. Hansard, 7 C. and P. 737; 9 Ad. and El., 1; and 11 Ad.

and El. 253, and the account of the result thereof in May's Const. Hist. c. 9. Also note to same

case, Broom's Const. L. 966.

(21) [This sentence aoems to imply a discretionary power in the two houses of parliament,

which surely is repugnant to the spirit of our constitution. The law of parliament is part of

the general" law of the land, and must be discovered and construed like all other laws. The

members of the respective houses of parliament are in most instances the judges of that law;

and, like the judges of the realm, when they are deciding upon past laws, they are under the

most sacred obligation to inquire and decide what the law actually is, and not what, in their

will and pleasure, or even in their reason and wisdom, it ought to be. When they are declaring

what is the law of parliament, their character is totally different from that with which, as legisla-

tors, they are invested when they are framing new laws; and they ought never to forget the

admonition of that great and patriotic chief justice, Lord Holt, viz.: " that the authority of the

parliament is from the law, and as it is circumscribed by law, so it may be exceeded; and if they

do exceed those legal bounds and authority, their acts are wrongful, and cannot be justified any

more than the acts of private men." 1 Salk. 505.]

(22) [It is a most pernicious doctrine to maintain that the privileges of either separate

branch of the legislature are arbitrary, because nowhere denned by any particular stated

laws. Precedents and law bind each house of parliament no less than each court at West-

minster. Lord Chief Justice Holt laid down the law very differently from Lord Coke. "The

authority of parliament," said -Lord Holt, "is from the law, and as it is circumscribed by the law,

so it may be exceeded, and if they do exceed those legal bounds, and authority, their acts are

wrongful and cannot be justified any more than the acts of private men." 1 Salk. 505; 2 Ld.

Eay. 1114.]

(23) [The privileges of domestics, lands and goods, are taken away by 10 Geo. HI, c. 50.]
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their members, or in punishing one of their own body, are not amenable in a court of common
law; that their edjnd1cation of any offence isa sufficient judgment, the wami.n.t of the speaker a
sufficient commitment, and that outer doors may be broken open to have execution of their
process.
The courts of Westminster, howel"er, may judge of the privilege of parliament, when it is incident to a suit of which the court is po8ReR~r.d, au<l may 12_roceed to execution between the se88ions,
notwithstanding appeals lodged, &c. 2 St. Tr. 66, 209.]
See also the recent case of Stockdale v. Hansard, 7 C. and P. 7'Sl; 9 Ad. and El., 1; and 11 Ad.
and El. 253, and the account of the result thereof in May's Const. Hist. c. 9. .Also note to same
l'.aBe, Broom's Const. L. 966.
(21) [This sentence soems to implr a discretionary power in the two honee11 of parliament,
which surely is repugnant to the i;pnit of onr con11titution. The law of parliament is part of
the general law of the land, and must be discovered and construed like all other law8. The
memben; of the respective houses of parliament are in most instances the judge:! of that law;
and, like the judges of the ree.lm, when they are deciding upon past laws, they are under the
most sacred obligation to inquire and decide what the law actually is, and not what, in their
will and pleasure, or even in their reason and wii!dom, it ought to be. When they are declaring
what is the law of parliament, their character is totally different from that with which, as legislators, thPV are invested when thev are framing new laws ; and they ought never to forget the
admonitlou of that great and patriotic chief justice, Lord Holt, viz.: "that the authority of the
parliament is from the law, and aR it is cirenmscribed by law, so it may be exceeded ; and if they
do exceed those legal bounds and authority, their act.<; are wrongful, and cannot be justified any
more than the acts of private men." 1 Salk. 505.]
(2'.l) [lt is a most pernicious doctrine to maintain that the privileges of either separate
branch of the legislature are arbitrary, because nowhere defined by any particular stated
laws. Precedents and law bind each house of parliament no less than each court at Westminster. J,ord Chief Justice Holt laid down the law very differently from Lord Coke. "The
authority of parliament," said ·Lord Holt, "is from the law, and as it is circumscribed by the law,
tlO it m_a,r be exceeded, and if they do exceed those legal bounds, and authority, their acts are
wrongfU.l and cwmot be justified any more than the acts of private men." 1 Salk. 505; 2 Ld.
Ray. 1114.]
(23) [The privileges of domestics, lnnds and goods, are ta.ken away by 10 Geo. III, c. 50.]
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the opening of every new parliament. (24) So likewise are the other privileges,

of persons, servants, lands, and goods: which are immunities as ancient as Ed-

r *i fiS 1 war<^ ^ne Confessor; in whose laws (z) *we find this precept," ad synodos

I lt)5 J venientibus, sive summoniti sint, sive per se quid agendum habuerint,

sit summapaz:" and so too in the old Gothic constitutions "extenditur hac

pax et securitas ad qttatuordecim dies convocato regni senatu." (a) This included

formerly not only privilege from illegal violence, but also from legal arrests,

and seizures by process from the courts of law. And still, to assault by violence

a member of either house, or his menial servant, is a high contempt of parlia-

ment, and there punished with the utmost severity. It has likewise peculiar

penalties annexed to it in the courts of law, by the statutes 5 Hen. IV, c. 6, and

II Hen. VII, c. 11. Neither can any member of either house be arrested and

taken into custody, unless for some indictable offence, without a breach of the

privilege of parliament (25)

But all other privileges which derogate from the common law in matters of

civil right are now at an end, save only as to the freedom of the member's per-

son : which in a peer (by the privilege of peerage) is forever sacred and inviolable;

and in a commoner (by the privilege of parliament) for forty days after every

prorogation, and forty days before the next appointed meeting; (b) which is now

in effect as long as the parliament subsists, it seldom being prorogued for more

than fourscore days at a time. As to all other privileges, which obstruct the

ordinary course of justice, they were restrained by the statutes 12 W. Ill, c, 3, 2
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and 3 Ann, c. 18, and 11 Geo. II, c. 24, and are now totally abolished by statute

10 Geo. Ill, c. 50, which enacts, that any suit may at any time be brought against

any peer or member of parliament, their servants, or any other person entitled

to privilege of parliament; which shall not be impeached or delayed by pretence

of any such privilege; except that the person of a member of the house of com-

mons shall not thereby be subjected to any arrest of imprisonment. Likewise, for

the benefit of commerce, it is provided by statute 4 Geo. Ill, c. 34, that any

(*) Cap. 3. fa) Sternh. ill- inn- Ooth. I. 3, c. 3 fbj 2 Lev. 72.

(24) But the right to freedom of speech does not protect a member in publishing afterwards

a speech which reflects injuriously upon individuals: Rex v. Lord Abingdon, 1 Esp. 226; Rex

». Creevey, 1 M. and S. 278; except possibly whore it is published bona fide for the information,

of his constituents. Davidson v. Duncan, 7 El. and Bl. 233. Upon the complete exemption of

legislators from liability for what they may do while in the discharge of their duty, see Coffin r.

Coffin, 4 Mass. 1; Jetferson's Manual. § 3; Cushing Legis, Assemb. § 602; Hosiner v. Loveland,

19 Barb. Ill; State ». Bumham, 9 ST. H. 34.

(25) [By the common law, peers of the realm of England: 6 Co. 49, a, 68, a; Hob. 61; Sty.

cient property, by which they may be compelled to appear; which privilege is extended by the

act of union with Scotland: 5 Ann. o. 8, art. 22; and see Fort. 165; 2 Str. 990; to Scotch peers

and peeresses; and by the act of union with Ireland, 39 and 40 Goo. Ill, c, 67, art 4; see 7

Taunt. 679; 1 Moore, 410, S. C.; to Irish peers and peeresses. And they are not liable to be

attached for the non-payment of money, pursuant to an order of nisi prins, which has been

made a rule of court. Ld. Falkland's case, E. 36 Geo-. Ill, K. B; 7 Dumf. and East, 171; and

see id. 448. But this privilege will not exempt them from attachments for not obeying the pro-

cess of the courts: 1 Wils. 332; Say. Rep. 50 S. C.; 1 Burr. 631; nor does it extend to peeresses

by marriage, if they afterward intermarry with commoners. Co. Lit 16; 2 lust 50; 4 Co. 118;

Dyer, 79.

Where a capias issues against a peer, the court will set aside the proceedings for irregularity.

4 Taunt. 668. But it seems that the sheriff is not a trespasser for executing it. Doug. 671.

However, all persons concerned in the arrest are liable to punishment by the respective houses of

parliament Fortescuo, 165.]

Upon the subject of exemption of legislators from arrest, see Cushing, Leg. Assemb. part 3, chap.

2, where the constitutional and statutory provisions in America are referred to.

Members of the house of commons are privileged from arrest, not only during the actual Bitting

of parliament, but for a convenient time to enable them to come from and return to any part

of the kingdom, before the first meeting and after the final dissolution of it And this con-

venient time appears to ba fixed at forty days. See Goudy v. Duncombo, 1 Exch. 430. As to

the bankruptcy of a member of the house of commons, see the New Bankruptcy Act, 32 and 33

Vic. c. 71, 5$ 120-124.
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trader, having privilege of parliament, may be served *with legal process r *-, G6 -,

for any just debt to the amount of 100?., and unless he makes satisfaction >- ••

within two months, it shall be deemed an act of bankruptcy; and that commis-

sions of bankrupt may be issued against such privileged traders, in like man-

ner as against any other.

The only way by which courts of justice could anciently take cognizance of

privilege of parliament was by writ of privilege, in the nature of a supersedeas,

to deliver the party out of custody when arrested in a civil suit, (c) For when

a letter was written by the speaker to the judges, to stay proceedings against a

privileged person, they rejected it as contrary to their oath of office, (d) But

since the statute 12 W. Ill, c. 3, which enacts that no privileged person shall be

subject to arrest or imprisonment, it hath been held that such arrest is irregular

ab initio, and that the party may be discharged upon motion, (e) (26) It is to

be observed, that there is no precedent of any such writ of privilege, but only in

civil suits; and that the statute of 1 Jac, I, c. 13, and that of King William

(which remedy some inconveniences arising from privileges of parliament,)

speak only of civil actions. And therefore the claim of privilege hath been

usually guarded with an exception as to the case of indictable crimes; (/) or,

as it has been frequently expressed, of treason, felony, and breach (or surety) of

the peace, (g) Whereby it seems to have been understood that no privilege was

allowable to the members, their families, or servants, in any crime whatsoever,

for all crimes are treated by the law as being contra pacem domini rcgis. And
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instances have not been wanting wherein privileged persons have been con-

victed of misdemeanors, and committed, or prosecuted to outlawry, even in the

middle of a session; (h) which proceeding has afterwards received the sanction

and approbation of parliament, (t) *To which may be added, that a few r *i ow n

years ago the case of writing and publishing seditious libels was resolved L •"

by both houses (k) not to be entitled to privilege; (27) and that the reasons upon

which that case proceeded, (I) extended equally to every indictable offence. So

that the chief, if not the only, privilege of parliament, in such cases, seems to

be the right of receiving immediate information of the imprisonment or deten-

tion of any member, with the reason for which he is detained; a practice that

is daily used upon the slightest military accusations, preparatory to a trial by a

court martial; (m) and which is recognized by the several temporary statutes

for suspending the habeas corpus act; (n) whereby it is provided, that no mem-

ber of either house shall be detained till the matter of which he stands suspected

be first communicated to the house of which he is a member, and the consent

of the said house obtained for his commitment or detaining. But yet the usage

has uniformly been, ever since the revolution, that the communication has been

subsequent to the arrest.

These are the general heads of the laws and customs relating to parliament

considered as one aggregate body. We will next proceed to

IV. The laws and customs relating to the house of lords in particular. These,

if we exclude their judicial capacity, which will be more properly treated of in the

third and fourth books of these Commentaries, will take up but little of our time.

One very ancient privilege is that declared by the charter of the forest, (o)

confirmed in parliament, 9 Hen. Ill, viz: that every lord spiritual or temporal sum-

to) Dyer, 59. 4 Pryn. Brat. Part. 757. (d)Latch. 48. Noy, 88. (e) Stra. 989. (/(Com. Journ. 17 Aug. 1641.'

(a) 4 Inflt. 25. Com. Jonrn. 20 May, 1078. (A) Ifich. 16 Erlui. IV. in Scaceh.—Loril Raym. 1461.

(») Com. Journ. 16 May, 1726. (t) Com. Jonrn. 24 Nov. Lord's Journ. 29 Nov. 1763.

(I) Lord's Protest. »WJ. (in) Com. Journ. 20 April, 1762. (n) Particularly 17 Gco. 11. c. 6. (o) C. 1L

(26) The privilege in these canes is the privilege not of the house merely, but of the people,

and to enable the member to discharge the trust confided to him by his constituents. Coffin

r. Coffin, 4 Mass. 27. The court from which the process issues should therefore discharge him

on motion, and any court or officer having authority to issue writs of habeas corpus might also

inquire into the case, and release the party from the unlawful restraint. Coolev Const. Liin.

134 ; Gushing Lcgis. Assemb. $ 346 to 397.

(27) [The contrary had been determined a short time before in the case of Mr. "Wilkes by the

unanimous judgment of Lord Caindcn and the court of common pleas. 2 Wils. 251.]
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moned to parliament, and passing through the king's forests, may, both in going

F *168 1 an(^ returning' kill one or ^o of the king's deer without *warrant; in

' ' -I view of the forester if he be present, or on blowing a horn, if he be

absent; that he may not seem to take the king's venison by stealth.

In the next place they have a right to be attended, and constantly are, by the

judges of the courts of king's bench and common pleas, and such of the barons

of the exchequer as are of the degree of the coif, or have been made Serjeants

at law; as likewise by the king's learned counsel, being Serjeants, and by the

masters of the court of chancery; for their advice in point of law, and for the

greater dignity of their proceedings. The secretaries of state, with the attorney

und solicitor general, were also used to attend the house of peers, and have to

this day (together with the judges, &C.) their regular writs of summons issued

out at the beginning of every parliament, (p)ad tractandum et consilium impen-

dendum, though not ad consentiendum ; but, whenever of late years they have

been members of the house of commons, (g) their attendance here hath fallen

into disuse. (28)

:an by

himself but a proxy for a multitude of other people. («) (29)

Each peer has also a right, by leave of the house, when a vote passes contrary

to his sentiments, to enter his dissent on the journals of the house, with the

reasons for such dissent; which is usually styled his protest

All bills likewise, that may in their consequences any way affect the right of

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the peerage, are by the custom of parliament to have their first rise and begin-

ning in the house of peers, and to suffer no changes or amendments in the house

of commons.

F *1C9 1 *There is also one statute peculiarly relative to the house of lords; 6

1- J Ann, c. 23, which regulates the election of the sixteen represenative

peers of North Britain, in consequence of the twenty-second and twenty-third

articles of the union: and for that purpose prescribes the oaths, &c, to be taken

by the electors; directs the mode of balloting; prohibits the peers electing from

being attended in an unusual manner; and expressly provides, that no other

matter shall be treated of in that assembly, save only the election, on pain of

incurring a prcemunire.

V. The peculiar laws and customs of the house of commons relate principally

to the raising of taxes, and the election of members to serve in parliament

First, with regard to taxes; it is the ancient indisputable privilege and right

of the house of commons, that all grants of subsidies or parliamentary aids do

begin in their house, and are first bestowed by them; (t) although their grants

(p)Stat. 31 Hen. VTO, ch. 10. Smith's Commonw. b. 2, c. 2. Moor, Ml. 4 lust. 4. Hale, of Parl. 140.

(g) See Com. Jonrn. 11 Apr. lr.it; 8 Feb. 1620; 10 Feb. 1625; 4 Inst. 48. (r) Sold. Baronage, p. l,c. i

(•) 4 lust. 12. (I) 4 Iiiht 29.

(iid) [On account of this attendance there are several resolution* before the restoration,

declaring the attorney-general incapable of sitting among the commons. Sir Heneage Finch,

member for the University of Oxford, afterwards Lord Nottingham and Chancellor, was the

first attorney-general who enjoyed that privilege. Sim. 28.1

(•£)) [Tho proxies in the English house of lords are still entered in Latin ex Ucentia rents :

this created a doubt in Uov. 1788, whether the proxies in that parliament were legal on

account of the king's illness? 1 Ld. Mountm. 342. But this I conceive is now so much a

mere form, that the license may be presumed. Proxies cannot be nsed in a committee. Ib.

106. (2 Ib. 191.)

The order that no lord should have more that two proxies was made 2 Car. I, because the

Duke of Buckingham had no less than fourteen. 1 Knshw. 269.

A similar order was made in Ireland during Lord Stafford'* lieutenancy to correct a liko

abuse.

If a peer, after appointing a proxy, appears personally in parliament, his proxy is revoked

and annulled. 4 Inst. 13. By orders of the house, no proxy shall vote upon a question

of guilty or not guilty; and a spiritual lord shall only be a proxy for a spiritual lord, and a

temporal lord for a temporal. Two or more peers may be proxy to one absent peer; but

Lork Coke is of opinion, 4 Inst. 12, that they cannot vote unless they all concur. 1 Woodd. 41.]
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are not effectual to all intents and purposes, until they have the assent of the

other two branches of the legislature. The general reason, given for this exclu-

sive privilege of the house of commons, is, that the supplies are raised upon the

body of the people, and therefore it is proper that they alone should have the

right of taxing themselves. This reason would be unanswerable, if the com-

mons taxed none but themselves: but it is notorious that a very large share of

property is in the possession of the house of lords; that this property is equally

taxable, and taxed, as the property of the commons; and therefore the commons,

not being the sole persons taxed, this cannot be the reason of their having the

sole right of raising and modelling the supply. The true reason, arising from

the spirit of our constitution, seems to be this. The lords, being a permanent

hereditary body, created at pleasure by the king, are supposed more liable to be

influenced by the crown, and when once influenced to continue so, than the

commons, who are a temporary, elective body, freely *nominated by the r *i yn i

people. It would therefore be extremely dangerous, to give the lords any L ' J

power of framing new taxes for the subject; it is sufficient that they have a

power of rejecting, if they think the commons too lavish or improvident in their

grants. But so reasonably jealous are the commons of this valuable privilege,

that herein they will not suffer the other house to exert any power but that of

rejecting; they "will not permit the least alteration or amendment to be made by

the lords to the mode of taxing the people by a money bill; under which appel-

lation are included all bills, by which money is directed to be raised upon the
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subject, for any purpose or in any shape whatsoever; either for the exigencies

of government, and collected from the kingdom in general, as the land tax; or

for private benefit, and collected in any particular district, as by turnpikes, par-

ish rates, and the like. (30) Yet Sir Mathew Hale (u) mentions one case,

founded on the practice of parliament in the reign of Henry VI, (w) wherein

he thinks the lords may alter a money bill: and that is, if the commons grant a

tax, as that of tonnage and poundage, for four years ; and the lords alter it to

a less time, as for two years; here, he says, the bill need not be sent back to the

commons for their concurrence, but may receive the royal assent without farther

ceremony; for the alteration of the lords is consistent with the grant of the

commons. But such an experiment will hardly be repeated by the lords, under

the present improved idea of the privilege of the house of commons, and, in

any case where a money bill is remanded to the commons, all amendments in

the mode of taxation are sure to be rejected.

Next, with regard to the elections of knights, citizens and burgesses; we may

observe, that herein consists the exercise of the democratical part of our consti-

tution: for in a democracy there can be no exercise of sovereignty but by

suffrage, which is the declaration of the people's will. In all democracies there-

(n) On Parliaments, 65. 66.

fir) Year book, 33 Hen. VI, 17. Bat Bee the answer to this case by Sir Heneage Finch. Com. .(num. 82

Apr. 1671.

(30) [This rule is now extended to all bills for canals, paving, provisions for the poor, and to

every bill in which tolls, rates, or duties, are ordered to be collected; and also to all bills

in which pecuniary penalties and fines are imposed for offences. 3 Hats. 110. But it should

seem it is carried beyond its original spirit and intent, when the money raised is not granted

to the crown.

TTpon the application of this rule, there have been many warm contests between the lords and

commons, in which the latter seem always to have prevailed. See many conferences collected by

Mr. Hatsel, in his appendix to the 3d volume.

In Appendix D., the conference of 20th and 22d April, 1671, the general question is debated

with infinite ability on both sides, lint particularly on the part of the commons in an argument

drawn up by Sir Heneage Finch, then attorney-general.]

The last of these contests occurred in 1860, and resulted in resolutions 5th and 6th July of

that year, in which the commons deny to the house of lords the right even to reject the bills

affecting the revenue which the commons may pass. See May Const. Hist. c. t.

In the congress of the United States, all bills for the raising of revenue must originate with

the house of representatives, though the senate may propose and concur with amendments.

Const art. 1, $ 7.
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fore it is of the utmost importance to regulate by whom, and in what manner,

f *1711 ^e 8u^ra&es are t° *'3e given- And the Athenians were so justly jealous

L J of this prerogative, that a stranger, who interfered in the assemblies of

the people, was punished by their laws with death: because such a man was

esteemed guilty of high treason, by usurping those rights of sovereignty, to

which he nad no title. In England, where the people do not debate in a collec-

tive body but by representation, the exercise of this sovereignty consists in the

choice of representatives. The laws have therefore very strictly guarded

against usurpation or abuse of this power, by many salutary provisions; which

may be reduced to these three points, 1. The qualifications of the electors. 2. The

qualifications of the elected. 3. The proceedings at elections.

1. As to the qualifications of the electors. The true reason of requiring any

qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as

are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own.

If these persons had votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them under

some undue influence or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy

man, a larger share in elections than is consistent with general liberty. If it

were probable that every man would give his vote freely and without influence

of any kind, then, upon the true theory and genuine principles of liberty,

every member of the community, however poor, should have a vote in electing

those delegates, to whose charge is committed the disposal of his property, his

liberty, and his life. But, since that can hardly be expected in persons oi
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indigent fortunes, or such as are under the immediate dominion of others, all

popular states have been obliged to establish certain qualifications; whereby

some, who are suspected to have no will of their own, are excluded from voting,

in order to set other individuals, whose wills may be supposed independent, more

thoroughly upon a level with each other. (31)

And this constitution of suffrages is framed upon a wiser principle, with us,

than either of the methods of voting, by centuries or by tribes, among the

F *172 1 Romans' In tue method *by centuries, instituted by Servius Tullms, it

L J was principally property, and not numbers, that turned the scale: in

the method by tribes, gradually introduced by the tribunes of the people, num-

bers only were regarded, and property entirely overlooked. Hemce the laws

passed by the former method had usually too great a tendency to aggrandize

the patricians or rich nobles; and those by the latter had too much of a level-

ling principle. Our constitution steers between the two extremes. Only such

are entirely excluded, as can have no will of their own: there is hardly a free

agent to be found, who is not entitled to a vote in some place or other in the

kingdom. Nor is comparative wealth, or property, entirely disregarded in

elections; for though the richest man has only one vote at one place, yet, if his

property be at all diffused, he has probably a right to vote at more places than

one, and therefore has many representatives, This is the spirit of our constitu-

tion : not that I assert it is in fact quite so perfect (x) as I have here endeav-

oured to describe it; for, if any alteration might be wished or suggested in the

(x) The candid and intelligent reader will apply this observation to many other parts of the work before

him, wherein the constitution of our laws and government are represented as nearly approaching to per-

fection; without descending to the invidious task of pointing out such deviations and corruptions, as length

of time anil a loose state or national morals have too great a tendency to produce. The Incurvations of

practice are then the most notorious when compared with the rectitude of the rnle; and to elucidate the

clearness of the spring, conveys the strongest satire on those who have polluted or disturbed it.

(31) Property qualifications in electors are not now required in the United States, except in

fore it is of the utmost importance to re.fulate by whom, and in what manner,
[ *l 7l ] the suffrages are to *be given.
nd the Athenians were so justly jealous
of this prerogative, that a stranger, who interfered in the assemblies of
the people, was punished by their laws with death : because such a man was
esteemed guilty of high treason, by usurping those rights of sovereignty, to
which he had llO title. In England, where the people do not debate in a collective body but by representation, the exercise of this sovereignty consists in the
choice of representatives. The laws have therefore very strictly guarded
against usurpation or abuse of this power, by many salutary provisions; which
may be reduced to these three points, 1. The qualifications of the electors. 2. The
qualifications of the elected. 3. The proceedings at elections.
1. As to the qualifications of the electors. The true reason of requiring any
qualification, with regard to properly, in voters, is to exclude such persons a&
are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own.
If these ptirsons had votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them under
some undue influence or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy
man, a larger share in elections than is consistent with general liberty. If it
were probable that every man would give his vote freely and without influence
of any kind, then, upon the true theory and genuine principles of liberty,
every member of the community, however poor, should have a vote in electing
those delegates, to whose charge is committed the disposal of his property, his
liberty, and his life. But, since that can hardly be expected in persons oi
indigent fortunes, or such as are under the immeclia.te dominion of others, all
popular states have been obliged to establish certain qualifications; whereby
some, who are suspected t-0 have no will of their own, are excluded from voting,
in order to set other individuals, whose wills may be supposed independent, more
thoroughly upon a level with each other. (31)
And this constitution of suffrages is framed upon a wiser principle, with us,
than either of the methods of voting, by centuries or by tribes, among the
[ • 172 ] Romans. In the method *by centuries, instituted by Servi us Tullrns, it
waa principally property, and not numbers, that turned the scale: in
the method by tribes, grad11ally introduced by the tribunes of the people, numbers only were regarded, and property entirely overlooked. Hel\Ce the laws
passed by the former method hn.d usually too great a tendency to aggrandize
the patncians or rich nobles; and those by the latter bad too much of a levelling principle. Our constitution steers between the two extremes. Only such
a.re entirely excluded, as can have no will of their own: there is hardly a. free
~ent to be found, who is not entitled to a voto in some place or other in the
kmgdom. Nor is comparative wealth, or property, entirely disregarded in
elections; for though the richest man has only one vote at one place, yet, if his
property be at all diffused, he has probably a. right to vote at more places thun
one, and therefore has many representatives, This is the spirit of our constitution: not that I assert it is in fact quite so perfect (x) as I ha.Ye here endeavoured to describe it; for, if any alteration might be wished or suggested in the
(.:11) The candid and intelligent reader will apply this observatlQ'l to many other parts of the work be!ore
him wherein the constitution of our lnws nnd gornrnment are rcprel!Cnte<i as nearly approaching to pertecdon; without descemUng to the inl'idloua task of pointing out an ch de\'latlons and corrupt.10111, as length
of time am! a loose state of national morals ha\'c too great a tendency to pro<lucc. The lncun·ations of
practice are then the most noto1io11s when complll'ed with the rectitude of the role; and to elucidate tile
cleameM of the spring, conveys the strongest satire on those who have polluted or disturbed lt.

a very few exceptional cases; and the reasoning upon which they have been demanded in

England, though accepted as more or less conclusive at an early day in America, has generally

been repudiated since. It is not now believed that the possession of wealth necessarily places

one above corruption, nor that the poor man would, as a matter of course, barter any polit-

ical power or influence he may possess for the means of support. Whether the one class or

the other is more open to temptation, may be regarded, perhaps, as a disputed question, but

the classification that admits all the one class and excludes all the other, on any such ground

as here stated by the learned commentator, is almost universally regarded in America as

vicious.
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(31) Property qualifico.tions in electors are not now required in the United States, except in

a. very few e.xceptiono.l co.ses; o.nd the reasoning upon which they ho.vo been demanded in

England, though accepted 811 more or less conclmrl"\"e at an early day in America, has generally
been repudiated since. It is not now believed that the possession of wen.Ith neceBMrily places
one above corruption, nor that the poor man would, o.s o. matter of course, barter any political power or influence he mar possess for tho means of support. Whether the one cl!W!il or
the other is more open to temptation, may be regarded, perhaps. as o. disputed question, bnt
tho cla.ssifico.tion that admits all the one class and excludes all the other, on an:y such ground
a.'! bore stated by the learned commentator, ie almost universo.lly regarded m .America as
vicious.
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present frame of parliaments, it should be in favour of a more complete repre-

sentation of the people. (32)

But to return to our qualifications; and first those of electors for knights of

the shire, 1. By statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 7, and 10 Hen. VI, c. 2, (amended by (33)

14 Geo. Ill, c. 58,) the knights of the shire shall be chosen of people whereof

every man shall have freehold to the value of forty shillings by the year within

the county; which (by subsequent statutes) is to be clear of all charges and

deductions, except parliamentary and parochial taxes. The knights of shires

are the representatives of the landholders, or landed interest of the kingdom:

their electors must therefore have estates in lands or tenements, within the

county represented: these estates must be freehold, that is, for term of life at

least; because beneficial leases for long terms of years were not in use at the

making of these statutes, and copyholders were then little better than villeins,

absolutely dependent upon their lords; this freehold must be of forty shillings

annual value; because that sum would then, with proper industry, furnish all the

"•necessaries of life, and render the freeholder, if he pleased, an independ- ,- *i 701

ent man. For Bishop Fleetwood, in his chronicon preciosum, written *- -I

at the beginning of the present century, has fully proved forty shillings in the

(32) The following is the existing state of the franchise as stated by Messrs. Broom and

Hadley:

1>resent frame of parliaments, it should be in favour of a more complete representation of the people. (32)
.
But to return to our qualifications; and first those of electors for knights of
the shire. 1. By statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 7, and 10 Hen. VI, c. 2, (amended by (33)
14 Geo. III, c. 58,) the knights of the shire shall be chosen of people whereof
every man shall have freehold to the value of forty shillings by the year within
the county; which (by subsequent statutes) is to be clear of all charges and
deductions, except parliament.ary and parochial taxes. The knights of shires
are the representatives of the landholders, or landed interest of the kin~dom :
their electors must therefore have estates in lands or tenements, withm the
county represented: these estates must be freehold, that is, for term of life at
least ; because beneficial leases for long terms of years were not in use at the
making of these statutes, and copyholders were then little better than villeins,
absolutely dependent upon their lords; this freehold must be of forty shillings
annual v~lue; ~cause that sum would then, '!ith proper indu~try, furnish all the
*necessanes of hfe, and rerrder the freeholder, if he pleased, an mdepend- [ • 173 ]
ent man. For Bishop Fleetwood, in his chronicon preciosum., written
at the beginning of the present century, has fully proved forty shillings in the

Voters at elections, or persons enjoying the franchise, may with few exceptions be divided

into two classes, viz.: voters in counties and voters in boroughs, whoso qualifications are

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

different, and principally depend upon the reform acts of 1832 and 1867.

Voters for counties comprise, first, the forty shilling freeholders, that is, those who have a

freehold property in fee simple or fee tail of that value per annum. Secondly, any person

possessing a freehold estate for life or lives of the annual value of forty shillings, but under

51. If persons of this class do not actually occupy the premises which qualify them, they

must either have possessed the estate before June 7, 1832, or they must have acquired it by

marriage, marriage settlement, devise, or by virtue of some bene'fice or office. Thirdly, any

person who possesses an estate for life or lives of any tenure, of the annual value of 5«.

Fourthly, lessees and their assignees for a term originally created for not less than sixty years

of the annual value of HI, or for a term not less than twenty years of the annual value of

501. Sub-lessees of these persons are also entitled to the franchise if they actually occupy

the premises in question. Fifthly, the occupiers of lands rated at 12J per annum.

Voters in boroughs comprise the following classes of persons. First, the rated occupiers of

dwelling houses within the borough of any value, who have duly paid their poor rates.

This qualification, granted by the reform act of 1867, does not entitle a person to a vote by

reason of his being a joint occupier of any dwelling house, but as it is expressly enacted that

the franchises conferred by that act are in addition to and not in substitution of any fran-

chises already existing, this provision does not take away the right of voting conferred by

stat. 2. Will. IV, c. 45, § 29, on all joint occupiers in a borough when the annual value of the

house divided by the number of occupiers is not less than 101.

Secondly, the rated occupiers of premises other than a dwelling house of the annual value

of 101; and in this case joint occupiers may vote if the premises divided by the number of occu-

piers be not less than 102. If it be less, none of the occupiers have any vote. Thirdly, the

occupiers of lodgings, such lodgings being part of the one and the same dwelling house, and of

the annual value of 101 if let unfurnished.

The above mentioned comprise the principal persons who are now entitled to the franchise;

the privilege is also possessed by some persons as members of certain universities, who have

a right of voting for candidates to be returned to parliament by such universities. And there

are a few other persons, such as freeholders and burgage tenants in some cities and towns

having certain estates, also freemen and liverymen in London, and freemen and burgesses by

servitude in a few other places.

To the foregoing it may be added that aliens, persons under twenty-one years of age, or of

unsound mind, or convicted of felony and undergoing a term of imprisonment, are incapable

of voting.

The qualifications of voters in Scotland and Ireland are somewhat different from those in

England. They are regulated mainly by the acts relative thereto passed in 1868.

(33) [The 14 Geo. Ill, c. 58, made the residence of the electors and the elected in their

respective counties, cities and boroughs, no longer necessary. It had been required from both

by a statute passed in the 1 Hen. V, 8 Hen. VI, c. 7, and 23 Hen. VI, c. 14. Yet in thr year 1820

it was determined by the house of commons that these statutes are only directory, and not

couclusory, and the high sheriff of Leicestershire was censured for not returning one who had

(32) The following is the existing state of the fmnehiee as stated by Me1111rs. Broom and
Badley:
Voters at electioDS, or persons enjoying the franchise, may with few exceptions be divided
into two classes, 'l"iz. : voters in counties and voters in boroughs, whose qualifications are
different, and principally depend upon the refonn acts of 1832 and 1867.
Voters for countie!! comprise, first, the forty shilling freeholders, that is, thot1e who have a
freehold property in fee simple or fee tail of that value per annum. Secondly, any person
posses.~ng a freehold efltate for life or lives of the annual value of forty shillings, but under
5l. If ;>ersous of this cla.->8 do not actually occupy the premiiies which qualify them, they
must either ha•e pos;s;eflsed the t!stat-0 before June 7, 1832, or they must have acquired it by
marriage, marriage settlement, deYifle, or by virtue of some benefice or office. Thirdly, any
person who posscAAes an estnte for life or lives of any tenure, of the annual value of 5l.
Fourthly, les!:ees and their assignees for a tenn originally created for not leAA than sixty years
of the annual nlue of 51, or for u term not le;1s than twenty years of tho nnnual "l"alue of
50l. Sub-le11sees of these persons are also entitled to the franchise if they actually occupy
the premises in quelltion. Fifthly, the occupiers of lands rated at 12l per annum.
Voters in boroughs comprise the following classes of persons. Firet, the rated occupiers of
dwelling houses within the borough of any value, who have duly paid their poor rates.
Thie qualification, granted by the reform act of 1867, doe>! not entitle a penion to a vote hv
rell.l!On of his being a joint occupier of any dwelling hou$e, bnt as it is exl?res$ly enacted that
the franchises conferred by that act are in additio~ to and not in snbst1tution of any franchises already existing, this pro¥ision does not take away the right of voting conferred by
irt.at. 2. Will. IV, c. 45, § 29, 011 all joint occupiers in a borough when the annual >nine of the
honse divided by the number of occupiers is not less than 101.
Secondly, the rated occupiurs of premfaes other than a dwelling house of the annual valne
of lOl; and in thia ca.~e joint occnpicm may vote if the premises diVJded by tho number of occupiers be not le88 tbnn 101. If it be leAA, none of the occupiers have any vote. Thirdly, the
occupiers of lodgings, ~uch lodgingii being part of the one and the same dwelling house, and of
the an11unl value of lOl if let unfurni~hed .
The above mentioned comprise the principal persoll!l who are now entitled to the franchise;
the privilege is also posseSl!ed by some pel"l!ons as members of certain universities, who have
a right of voting for candidates to be returned to parliament by such nnfrersities. .And there
are a few other peraons, such a.~ freeholders and burgago tena.nt.<1 in some cities and townR
having certain estates, also freemen and li¥erymen in London, and freemen and burgesses lly
l!en;tude in a fow other places.
•ro the foregoing it may be addc(l that aliens, persons under twenty-one years of age, or of
unwund mind, or connct~d of felony and undergoing a tenn of imprisonment, are incapable
of voting.
The qualifications of voters in Scotland and Ireland are somewhat different from those in
England. They are regulated mainly by the acts relative thereto passed in 113&3.
(33) [The 14 Geo. HI, c. 58, made the residence of the electors and the elected in their
respective counties, cities and boroughs, no longer necesBary. It had been required from both
by a statute passed in the 1 Hen. V, 8 Hen. VI, c. 7, and 23 Hen. VI, c. 14. Yet in thr year 18"20
it was determined by the house of commons that theso statutes are only directory, and not
conclusory, and the high sheriff of Leicestershire was censured for not returning one who had
a majority of rntes, because he was not resident within the county. The house declared him
to be duly elected, and ordered the return to be a.mended.
111

a majority of votes, because he was not resident within the county. The house declared him

to be duly elected, and ordered the return to bo amended.
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reign of Henry VI, to have been equal to twelve pounds per annum in the

reign of Queen Anne; and, as the value of money is very considerably lowered

since the bishop wrote, I think we may fairly conclude, from this and other cir-

cumstances, that what was equivalent to twelve pounds in his days is equivalent

to twenty at present. The other less important qualifications of the electors for

counties in England and Wales may be collected from the statutes cited in the

margin, (y) which direct, 2. That no person under twenty-one years of age

shall be capable of voting for any member. This extends to all sorts of

members, as well for boroughs as counties; as does also the next, viz.: 3. That

no person convicted of perjury, or subornation of perjury, shall be capable of

voting in any election. 4. That no person shall vote in right of any freehold,

granted to him fraudulently to qualify him to vote. Fraudulent grants are such

as contain an agreement to reconvey, or to defeat the estate granted; which agree-

ments are made void, and the estate is absolutely vested in the person to whom

it is so granted. And, to guard the better against such frauds, it is farther pro-

vided, 5. That every voter shall have been in the actual possession, or receipt of

the profits, of his freehold to his own use for twelve calendar months before;

except it came to him by descent, marriage, marriage-settlement, will, or promo-

tion to a benefice or office. 6. That no person shall vote in respect of an

annuity or rent-charge, unless registered with the clerk of the peace twelve cal-

endar months before. 7. That in mortgaged or trust estates, the person in

possession, under the above-mentioned restrictions, shall have the vote. 8. That
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only one person shall be admitted to vote for any one house or tenement, to

prevent the splitting of freeholds. 9. That no estate shall qualify a voter,

unless the estate has been assessed to some land tax aid, at least twelve months

r *, ~. -I before the election. 10. That no tenant by copy of court, roll shall *be

L J permitted to vote as a freeholder. Thus much for the electors in

counties.

As for the electors of citizens and burgesses, these are supposed to be the

mercantile part or trading interest of this kingdom. But, as trade is of a fluc-

tuating nature, and seldom long fixed in a place, it was formerly left to the

crown to summon, pro re nata, the most flourishing towns to send representa-

tives to parliament. So that, as towns increased in trade, and grew populous,

they were admitted to a share in the legislature. But the misfortune is, that

the deserted boroughs continued to be summoned, as well as those to whom

their trade and inhabitants were transferred; except a few which petitioned to

be eased of the expense, then usual, of maintaining their members: four shillings

a day being allowed for a knight of the shire, and two shillings for a citizen or

burgess: which was the rate of wages established in the reign of Ed ward III. (g)

(34) Hence the members for boroughs now bear above a quadruple proportion

dr)7and8W. m, c. 25. 10 Ann. c. 23. SIGeo. H, o. H. 3 Geo. m, c. 24. 2 Geo. II.c.Sl. ISGeo. Il,c.l8.

(*} 4 1 nst. 16.

(34) [Lord Coke, in the page referred to by the learned judge, says, that this rate of •wages

reign of Henry VI, to have been equal to twelve pounds per annum in the
reign of Queen Anne; and, as the value of money is very considerably lowered
since the bishop wrote, I think we may fairly conclude, from this and other circumstances, that what was equivalent to twelve pounds in his days is equivalent
to twenty at present. The other less important qualifications of the electors for
counties in England and Wales may be collected from the statutes cited in the
ma.rgin, (y) which direct, 2. That no person under twenty-one years of age
shall be capable of voting for any member. This extends to all sorts of
members, as well for boroughs as counties; 88 does also the next, viz.: 3. That
no person convicted of perjury, or subornation of perjury, shall be capable of
voting in any election. 4. That no person shall vote m right of any freehold,
granted to him fraudulently to qualify him to vote. Fraudulent grants are such
88 contain a.n agreement to reconvey, or to defeat the estate granted; which agreements are made void, and the estate is absolutely vested in the person to whom
it is so granted. And, to guard the better against such frauds, It is farther provided, 5. That every voter shall have been in the actual possession, or receipt of
the profits, of his freehold to his own use for twelve calendar months before;
except it came to him by descent, marriage, marriage-settlement, will, or promotion to a benefice or office. 6. That no person shall vote in respect of an
annuity or rent-charge, unless registered with the clerk of the peace twelve cal.
endar months before. 7. That in mortg~ed or trust estates, the person in
possession, under the above-mentioned restrictions, shall have the vote. 8. That
only one person shall be admitted to vote for any one house or tenement, to
prevent the splitting of freeholds. 9. That no estate shall qualify a voter,
unless the estate has been assessed to some land tax aid, at least twelve months
[ • 174 ] before the election. 10. That no tenant by copy of court. roll shall *be
permitted to vote as a freeholder. Thus much for the electore in
counties.
As for the electors of citizens and burgesses, these are supposed to be the
mercantile part or trading interest of this kingdom. But, as trade is of a fluctuating nature, and seldom long fixed in a place, it was formerly left to the
crown to summon, pro re nata, the most flourishing towns to send representatives to parliament. So that, as towns increased in trade, and grew populous.
they were admitted to a share in the legislature. But the misfortune IS, that
the deserted boroughs continued to be summoned, as well aa those to whom
their trade and inhabitants were transferred; except a few which petitioned to
be eased of the expense, then usual, of maintaining their members: four shillings
a. day being allowed for a knight of the shire, and two shillings for a citizen or
burgess: which was the rate of wages established in the reign of Edward III. (z)
(34) Hence the members for boroughs now bear above a quadruple proportion

hath been time out of mind, and that it is expressed in many records; and, for example, refers

to one in 46 Ed. Ill, where this allowance is made to one of the knights for the county of

<r> 7and8W. DI, c. 96.
l•l ' hult. 16.

lOAnn. c. !8. 81Geo. n. c. H.

aGeo:m, c. 9'.

t Geo.11,c. ti. 18Geo.11,c.1s.

Middlesex. But Mr. Prynne's fourth Register of Parliamentary Writs is confined almost

entirely to the investigation of this subject^ and contains a very particular chronological his-

tory of the writ de expensis militant, civium, ct burgensium, which was framed to enforce the

payment of these wages. Mr. Prynne is of opinion that these wages had no other origin than

that principle of natural equity and justice qui sentit commodum, debet sentire et on««. p. 5.

And Mr. Prynne further informs us, " that the first writs of this kind extant in our records

are coeval with our king's first writs of summons to elect and send knights, citizens, .and

burgesses to parliament, both of them being first invented, issued and recorded together in

49 Hen. Ill, before which there are no memorials nor evidences of either of those writs in our

historians or records," p. 2. The first writs direct the sheriff to levy from the community, i.

e. the electors of the county, and to pay the knights, rationabilts expcnsas &uas »» veniendo ad

dictum parliamentum, ibidem morando, et exinde ad propria redeuntlo. And when the writs of

summons were renewed, in the 23d of Edw. I, these writs issued again in the same form at the

end of the parliament, and were continued in the same manner till the 16 Edw. II, when Mr.

Prynue finds the " memoriable writs," which first reduced the expense of the representatives
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(34) [Lord Coke, in the /.age referred to by the learned judge, says, that this mte of wa~i;
hath been time out of min , and that it is expressed in IIlB.ny records ; and, for example, refen>
to one in 46 Ed. III, where this allowance is ma.de to one of the kni~hts for the county of
Middlesex. But Mr. Prrune's fourth Regist.er of Parliamentary Wnts is confined almost
entirely to the inveRtigat10n of this subject, and contains a very particular chronological history of the writ de t>:epcwti8 militum, civirim, ct burgemrium, which Wal! framed to enforce the
payment of these wage8. Mr. Prynne is of opinion that these wages had no other origin than
that principle of natural equity and justice qui stmtit cmnmvdu1n, debet sennre et ont1s. p. 5.
.And Mr. Prynne further informs rut, " that the first writ.II of this kind extant in our records
are coeval with uur king's first writs of summons to elect and send knight.R, citizenR, .and
burgesseR to parliament, both of them being first invented, issul'\d and recorded to~ther in
49 Hen. III, fiefore which there are no memorial<i nor evidences of either of those wnts in our
historians or records," p. 2. The fir11t writ.~ direct the sheriff to levy from the community, i.
e. the electors of the county, and to pay the knights, rati011abiks expcns<l8 8'Ua8 iit tieniendo ad
dictum parliamentum, ibidem morandt>, et exin-cle ad prnpria redeundo. .And when the writs of
11t1mmons were renewed, in the 23<1 of Edw. I, theHe writ.~ is!med ~n in the Mame form at tho
end of the parliament, and were continued in the same manner till the 16 Edw. II, when Mr.
Prynne finds the " memoriable writs," which first reduced the expense of the representatives
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to those for counties, and the number of parliament men is increased since

Fortescue's time in the reign of Henry the Sixth, from 300 to upwards of 500,

exclusive of those for Scotland. The universities were in general not empow-

ered to send burgesses to parliament; though once, in 28 Edw. I, when a

parliament was summoned to consider of the king's right to Scotland, there

were issued writs, which required the university of Oxford to send up four or

five, and that of Cambridge two or three, of their most discreet and learned

lawyers for that purpose.(o) But it was King James the First who indulged

them with the permanent privilege to send constantly two of their own body;

to serve for those students who, though useful members of the community, were

neither concerned in the landed nor the trading interest; and to protect in the

legislature the rights of the republic of letters. The right of election in boroughs

is various, depending entirely on the several charters, customs, and constitutions

of the respective places, which has occasioned infinite disputes; though now by

statute *2 Geo. II, c. 24, the right of voting for the future shall be , ^. „. ",

allowed according to the last determination of the house of commons *- •"

concerning it. (35) And by statute 3 Geo. Ill, c. 15, no freeman of any city or

borough (other than such as claim by birth, marriage, or servitude.) shall be

entitled to vote therein, unless he hath been admitted to his freedom twelve

calendar months before.(36)

2. Next, as to the qualifications of persons to be elected members of the house

of commons.(37) Some of these depend upon the law and custom of parlia-
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l«i Pryune, Part. Writs, i, 318.

to a certain gum by the day, viz: 4s. a day fur every knight, and 2s. for every citizen and

to those for counties, and the number of parliament men is increased since
Fortescue's time in the reign of Henry the Sixth, from 300 to upwards of 500,
exclusive of those for SctJltland. The uni"rersities were in general not empowered to send burgesses to parliament; though once, in 28 Edw. I, when a
parliament was summoned to consider of the king's right to Scotland, there
were issued writs, which required the university of Oxford to send up four or
five, and that of Cambridge two or three. of their most discreet and learned
lawyers for that purpose.(a) But it was King Jn.mes the First who indulged
them with the permanent privilege to send constantly two of their own bodv;
to serve for those students who, though useful members of the community, we"re
neither concerned in the landed nor the trading interest; and to protect in the
legislature the rights of the republic of letters. The right of election in boroughs
is various, depending entirely on the several charters, customs, and constitutions
of the respectiYe places, which has occasioned infinite disputes; though now by
statute *2 Geo. II, c. 24, the right of voting for the future shall be [ • 175 ]
allowed according to the last determination of the house of commons
concernin~ it. (35) And by statute 3 Geo. III, c. 15, no freeman of any city or
borough (other than such as claim by birth, marriage, or servitude,) shall be
entitled to vote therein, unless he hath been admitted to his freedom twelve
calendar months before.(36)
2. Next, as to the qualifications of persons to be elected members of the house
of commons.(37) Some of these depend upon the law and custom of parlia-

burgess; and they specified also the number of days for which this allowance was to be made,

(a) Prynue, Part. Writs, I, 344.

being more or less according to the distance between the place of meeting in parliament and the

member's residence. When this sum was first ascertained in the writ, the parliament was held

at York, and therefore the members for Yorkshire were only allowed their wages for the number

of days the parliament actually sat, being supposed to incur no expense in returning to their

respective homes; but, at the same time, the members for the distant counties had a proportion-

ate allowance in addition. Though, from this time, the number of days and a certain sum are

specifically expressed in the writ, yet Mr. Prynne finds a few instances after this where the

allowance is a less sum; and, in one where one of the county members had but :u. a day,

because he was not in fact, a knight. But, with those few exceptions, the sum and form contin-

ued with little or no variation. Mr. Prynne conjectures, with great appearance of reason, that

the members at that time enjoyed the privilege of parliament only lor the number of days for

which they were allowed wages, that being considered a sufficient time for their return to their

respective dwellings, p. 68. But this allowance, from its nature and origin, did not preclude

any other specific engagement or contract between the member and his constituents; and the

editor of Glanville's Reports has given in the preface, p. 23, the copy of a curious agreement

between John Strange, the member for Dunwich, and his electors, in the 3 Edw. IV, 1463, in

which the member covenants " whether the parliament hold long time or short, or whether it

fortune to be prorogued, that he will take for his wages only a cade and half a barrel of herrings,

to be delivered by Christmas."

In Scotland the representation of the shires was introduced or confirmed by the authority of

the legislature, in the seventh parliament of James I, anno 1427, and there it is at the same time

expressly provided, that " the commissaries sail have costagc of them of ilk shire that awe

compoirance in parliament." Murray's Stat.

It is said, that Andrew Muryell, who was member for Hull in the parliament after the restora-

tion, was the last person in this country that received wages from his constituents. Two shillings

a day, the allowance to a burgess, was so considerable a sum in ancient times, that there are

many instances where boroughs petitioned to be excused from sending members to parliament,

representing that they were engaged in building bridges, or other public works, and therefore

unable to bear such an extraordinary expense. Pryn. on 4 Inst. 32.]

(35) [This act being merely retrospective, it was provided by $ 27 of 28 Geo. Ill, o. 52, and 34

Geo. Ill, c. 83, that all decisions of committees of the house of commons, with respect to the

right of election, or of choosing or appointing the returning <>Hirer, shall be final and conclusive

upon the subject forever. ]

(36) This is called the Durham act, and it was occasioned by the corporation of Durham

having, upon the eve of an election, in order to serve one of the candidates, admitted 215 honorary

freemen.

(37.) [Any person may be elected a member of the house of commons if not affected by one

or other of certain disqualifications which depend upon the law and custom of parliament, or

upon the statute law. Whence it appears that no person included in the subjoined list is

to a. certain sum by tho day, viz : 4s. a day for every knight, and 2s. for every citizen and
burgeBs; and they specified al110 the number of days for which this allowance WM to be made,
being more or less according to the di11tance between the place of meeting in parliament and the
member's residence. When this sum was first a.'!OOrta.ined in the writ, tho parliament was held
at York, and therefore the memben! for Yorkshire were only allowed their wage:1 for I.he number
of days the parliament actually sat, being supposed to incur no expense in returning to their
re~pectivo homes; but, at the same time, the members for the distant countieH had a proportionate allowance in addition. Tbou~h, from this time, the number of days and a certain sum are
specifically expre88od in tho wnt, yet Mr. Prynno finds a few instance!! after this where the
allowance is a less sum; and, in one where one of the cowity membeni had but 3s. a day,
becanse be wa.~ not in foot, a knight. But, with thoMe few exception~, tho i;um and form continued with little or no variation. Mr. Prynne conjectures, with great a_Ppearnuco of reBi!<m, that
the memben at that time enjoyed the prfri1Pg11 of parliament only tor the number of days for
which they were allowed wages, that being com1idered a "ulficicnt time for their return to their
re8pective dwellings. p. 6d. But this alluwnuce, from it.ti nature and origin, did not preclude
other 11pccific engagement or contract lmtween the member and hi!! con8tituents; and tho
editor of Glanville's Reports h&! given iu the yrefilce, p. ~. the copy of a curious agreement
between John Strange, the member for Dunwtch, and bi11 electors, m the 3 Edw. IV, 1463, in
which the member covenants " whethtJr the pMliament hold long time or short, or whether it
fortune to be prorogued, that he will to.kc fur his wages only a ca.de and half a barrel of herrings,
to be delivered by Christma.~."
In Scotland the representation of the 11hires was introduced or confirmed b_y the authority of
the legislature, in the seventh parliament of" James I, anno 1427, and there it is at the same time
expressly provided, that " tho commissa.rie1:1 sall have costagc of them of ilk shire that awe
compoiranc~ in parliament." Murray'1:1 Stat.
It i11 said, that Andrew Murvoll, who was member for Hull in the parliament after the restoration, W88 the l81!t person in this country that received wages from his constituents. Two sbillingR
a day, the allowance to a bnrgess, W88 so considerable a sum in ancient times, that there are
many instances where boroughs petitioncd tu be excused from sending members to parliament,
representing that they were engaged in building bridge~, or other public works, and therefore
unable to bear such a.n oxtraordmary expon~. Pryn. on 4 I n11t. 3'2.]
(35) [This act being merely- retrospective, it was provided by§ 27 of 28 Geo. III, c. 52, and 34
Geo. III, c. 83, that all decisions of committees of the house of commons, with re11pect to the
right of election, or of choosing or appointing the returning officer, shall be final and conclusive
upon the subject forever.]
(36) Tbi11 is called the Dnrham act, and it W88 ooe&sioned by the corporation of Durham
having, upon the eve of an election, in order to serve one of the candidates, admitted 215 honorary
freemen.
(37.) [.Any person may be elected a member of the house of commons if not affected by one
or other of certain disqna.lificatio~s which depend npon the l~w and c"!18tom of P!l-r_liame~t, '?f
upon the statnte Jaw. Whence it appear>l that no person mcluded m the subJomod hst 111
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ment, declared by the house of commons :(b) others upon certain statutes. And

from these it appears, 1. That they must not be aliens born,(c) or mmors.(rf) 2.

That they must not be any of the twelve judges,(e) because they sit in the

lords' house; nor of the clergy,( /) for they sit in the convocation; nor persona

attainted of treason or felony,(g) for they are unfit to sit any where. 3. That

sheriffs of counties, and mayors and bailiffs of boroughs, are not eligible in their

respective jurisdictions, as being returning officers ;(7i) but that sheriffs of one

county are eligible to be knights of another.(i) 4. That, in strictness, all mem-

bers ought to nave been inhabitants of the places for which they are chosen :(/fc)

but this, having been long disregarded, was at length entirely repealed by

statute 14 Geo. Ill, c. 58. 5. That no persons concerned in the management of

any duties or taxes created since 1692, except the commissioners of the treasury,(7)

nor any of the officers following, (m) viz.: commissioners of prizes, transports,

sick and wounded, wine licences, navy, and victualling; secretaries or receivers

of prizes ; comptrollers of the army accounts; agents for regiments; governors

of plantations and their deputies; officers of Minorca or Gibraltar; officers of

r*1761 the excise and customs ; *clerks or deputies in the several offices of the

J treasury, exchequer, navy, victualling, admiralty, pay of the army or navy,

secretaries of state, salt, stamps, appeals, wine licences, hackney coaches, hawkers,

and pedlars, nor any persons that hold any new offices under the crown created

since 1705,(w) are capable of being elected or sitting as members. (38) 6. That no

< (M 4 I nst. 47, 48 (c) See page 162
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(d) Ibid. (e) Com. Journ. 9 Nov. 1605 (/) Com. Jonrn. 13 Oct. 1553; 8 Feb. 1620 ; 17 Jan. 1661.

10) Com. Jour. 21 Jan. 1B30. 4 Inst. 47.

(ft) Bro. Abr. t. Parltommt, 7. Com. Journ. 26 Juno, 1604 ; 14 April, 1814 ; 42 Mar. 1620; 2, 4, IS June, 17

NOT. 1685 ; Hale of Parl. 114. (<) 4 Inst. 48. Whitelockc of Purl: ch. 99,100.101.

(i) Stat. 1. Henry V. c. 1. 23 Hen. VI. c. 15. (1) sun. 5 and 6 W. and M. 0. 7.

(tut Stat 11 and 12 W. HI, c. 2. 12 and 13 W. III. c. 10. 6 Ann c. 7. 15 Geo. II, c. 22. (n) Stat. 6 Ann. e. 7.

eligible to sit amongst the commons: an alien bom or naturalized, an idiot or lunatic if incurable,

a person attainted of treason or convicted of felony, a peer of the realm or of Scotland, or a

representative peer of Ireland, a judge of a superior court of England, (except the master of the

rolls,) or of the court of admiralty, or in bankruptcy, or of a county court. The following

officials likewise are disqualified : a metropolitan police magistrate, a recorder for the borough

for which he is appointed, a revising barrister for any place within his district, a jndge of Scotland

or Ireland, any one ordained to the office of priest or deacon of the church of England, a minister

of the church of Scotland, or any one in holy orders in the church of Rome. Sheriffs of counties

and mayors and bailiffs of boroughs are not eligible in their respective jurisdictions, as being

returning officers, but the sheriff of one county is eligible to serve as knight for another, or for

any county of a city or borough within his county, provided the writ for the election is directed

not to himself, but to some other returning officer.

No government contractor nor person having a pension under the crown during pleasure, or for

any term of years, is qualified to be elected or to sit; nor is any person holding an office under

the crown, created since 1705, capable of being elected or of sitting, though should he do so, an

act of indemnity may perhaps bo passed by the legislature.

Innovations on the above rule have, however, been made by successive statutes with a view to

the requirements of the government and the conduct of the public service; ex. gr. as regards the

vice-president of the board of trade, the president of the poor law board, the first commissioner

of works, the vice-president of the committee of the privy council on education, and the post-

master-general.

It has been further enacted that not more than four of the principal, and four of the under-

secretaries of state shall sit at the same time in the house of commons; that the seat of any

member accepting the office of under-secretary to a principal secretary of state, there being four

under-secretaries then in the house, shall be thereupon vacated; that if at any general election

there are returned as members to serve in parliament a greater number of persons holding such

office of principal or under-secretary than are permitted to sit and vote in the house, no one of

such persons shall be capable of sitting until the number of persons returned as members and

holding the same office as himself has, by death, resignation or otherwise been reduced to the

number permitted by law to sit in the house ; and that the like rules shall apply in all cases in

which a limit is imposed upon the number of persons holding any other office who may at the

same time sit and vote as members of the house of commons.

Lastly, if any member accepts an office under the crown, except an officer in the army or navv

accepting a new commission, his seat is void; but such member is capable of being re-elected*,

provided the office be one created prior to the year 1705.]

(38) By Stat. 6 Ann. c. 7, } 26, the seat of a member is vacated if he accepts a place of honor

and profit under the crown, in existence prior to 1705.

By the custom of parliament a member cannot resign his seat. If, however, he desires to
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person having a pension under the crown during pleasure, or for any term of

years, is capable of being elected or sitting, (o) 7. That if any member accepts an

office under the crown, except an officer in the army or navy accepting a new

commission, his seat is void; but such member is capable of being re-elected, (p)

9. That all knights of the shire shall be actual knights, or such notable esquires

and gentlemen as have estates sufficient to be knights, and by no means of the

degree of yeomen, (a) This is reduced to a still greater certainty, by ordaining,

8. That every knight of a shire shall have a clear estate of freehold or copyhold

to the value of six hundred pounds per annum, and every citizen and burgess to

the value of three hundred pounds; except the eldest sous of peers, and of per-

sons qualified to be knights of shires, and except the members for the two uni-

versities : (r) which somewhat balances the ascendant which the boroilghs have

gained over the counties, by obliging the trading interest to make choice of landed

men; and of this qualification the member must make oath, and give in the

particulars in writing, at the time of his taking his seat (s) But subject to these

standing restrictions and disqualifications, every subject of the realm is eligible

of common right: though there are instances wherein persons in particular

circumstances have forfeited that common right, and have been declared ineligi-

ble/or thai parliament by vote of the house of commons, (t) or for ever by an

act of the legislature, (u) (39.) But it was an unconstitutional prohibition, which

was grounded on an ordinance of the house of lords, (w) and inserted in the

kings writs for the parliament holden at Coventry, 6 Hen. IV, that no appren-
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tice or *other man of the law should be elected a knight of the shire r +*„„ -,

therein: (x) in return for which, our law books and historians (y) have L -I

branded this parliament with the name of parliamentum indoctum, or the lack-

learning parliament; and Sir Edward Coke observes, with some spleen, (2) that

there never was a good law made thereat.

3. The third point, regarding elections, is the method of proceeding therein.

This is also regulated by the law of parliament, and the several statutes referred

to in the margin; (a) all of which I shall blend together, and extract out of them a

summary account of the method of proceeding to elections. (40)

(:>) Stat. r, Ann. c. 7. 1 Geo. c. 66. (p) Stat. 6 Ann. c. 7.

CgJ Stat. 23 Hen. VI, c. 15. (r) Stat. 9 Ann. c. 6. fXIStat. 33 Geo. H, 0. 20.

(t) See page 163. (u) Stat. 7 Geo. I, c. 28.

fvij 4 lust. 10. 48. Pryn. Plea for Lords, 379. 2 Wuitelocke, 359, 368. (x) Pryn. on 4 Inst. 13.

(y) Walgingh'. A. D. 1405. (z) 4 Inst. 48.

(a) 7 Hen. IV, c. 15. 8 Hen. VI, c. 7. 23 Hen. VI. c. 14. 1 W. and M. St. 1, o. 2. 2 W. and M. et. 1, c. 7.

6 and 8 W. anil M. c. 30. 1 W. HI, c. 4. 7 and 8 W. HI, c. 7, and c. 25. 10 and 11 W. Ill, c. 7. 12 and 13 W. m,

c. 10. 6 Ann. c. 23. 9 Ann. c. 5. 10 Ann. c. 19, andc. 33. 2 Geo. II, c. 24. 8 Geo. II, c. 30. 18 Gen. II. c. 18.

19 Goo. H, 28. 16 Geo. Ill, o. 16. 11 Geo. HI, c. 42. 14 Geo. Ill, c. 15. 16 Geo. Ill, c. 36. 28 Geo. HI, c. 62.

vacate it, he has a convenient mode of doing go, by applying for the stewardship of the Chiltern

Hundreds of Stoke, Desborongh and Borlenham, which, though a mere sinecure, is held to be a

place of honor and profit under the crown, and consequently vacates the seat. This nominal

place is hi the gift of the chancellor of the exchequer. As soon as the office is obtained, it is

resigned, that it may serve the same purpose again.

Mr. Chitty says it is a matter of course to confer this office on application, and such is the

practice; but there is one notable instance of refusal. In 1845J, while charges of corrupt prac-

tices in elections were pending hi the commons, one of the members concerned having applied

to the chancellor of the exchequer for the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, that officer,

who anticipated similar applications from others in the same situation, decided upon refusing the

appointment. This refusal created some excitement at the time, but though unprecedented, was

generally applauded hi view of the circumstances.

(39) [This clause from the word though has been added since 1769, the time when the Mid

dlesex election was discussed in the house of commons. The learned judge, upon that occasion,

maintained the incapacity of Mr. Wilkes to be re-elected to that parliament, in consequence of

his expulsion; and, as he had not mentioned expulsion as one of the disqualifications of a can-

didate, the preceding sentence was cited against him in the house of commons.]

(40) The following are the formalities of an election:

[In the case of a general election, following a dissolution of parliament, the procedure

is, after a royal proclamation to that effect, that writs are sent from the petty bag office to the

sheriff of every county, and the returning officer of every city and borough, for the election of

knights, citizens and burgesses, to serve in parliament. If a vacancy takes place during the

session the speaker, on motion made, signs a warrant to the clerk of the crown in chancery, to

issue a writ for the return of a fresh member; and the same course is pursued during the
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As soon as the parliament is summoned, the lord chancellor, or if a vacancy

happens during the sitting of parliament, the speaker by order of the house, and

without such order, if a vacancy happens by death, or the member's becoming a

peer, (41) in the time of a recess for upwards of twenty days, sends his warrant

to the clerk of the crown in chancery; who thereupon issues out writs to the

sheriffs of every county, for the election of all the members to serve for that

county, and every city and borough therein. Within three days after the receipt

of this writ, the sheriff is to send his precept, under his seal, to the proper

returning officers of the cities and boroughs, commanding them to elect their

members: and the said returning officers are to proceed to election within eight

days from the receipt of the precept, giving four day's notice of the same; (b)

and to return the persons chosen, together with the precept, to the sheriff.

But elections of knights of the shire must be proceeded to by the sheriffs

r *i 70 I themselves in person, at the next county court *that shall happen

1 J after the delivery of the writ. The county court is a court held every

month or oftener by the sheriff, intended to try little causes not exceeding the

value of forty shillings, in what part of the county he pleases to appoint for

that purpose: but for the election of knights of the shire it must be held at the

most usual place. (42) If the county court falls upon the day of delivering the

(l>) In the borough of New Shoreham, In Stuaex, wherein certain freeholders of the country are enti-

tled to vote by statute 11 Geo. Ill, c. BS, the election moat be within lm-ln: days, with eight days' notice of

As soon as the parlip.ment is summoned, the lord chancellor, or if a vacancy
happens during the sitting of parliament, the speaker by order of the house, and
without such order, if a vacancy happens by death, or the member's becoming a
peer, (41) in the time of a recess for upwards of twenty days, sends his warrant
to the clerk of the crown in chancery; who thereupon issues out writs to the
sheriffs of every county, for the election of all the members to serve for that
county, and every city and borough therein. Within three days after the receipt
of this writ, the sheriff is to send his precept, under his seal, to the proper
returning officers of the cities 1md boroughs, commanding them to elect their
members: and the said returning officers are to proceed to election within eight
days from the receipt of the precept, giving four day's notice of the same; ( b)
and to return the persons chosen, together wit.h the precept, to the sheriff.
But elections of knights of the shire must be proceeded to by the sheriff's
[ • 178 ] themselves in person, at the next county court *that shall happen
after the delivery of the writ. The county court is a. court held every
month or oftener by the sheriff, intended to try little causes not exceeding the
value of forty shillings, in what part of the county he pleases to appoint for
that purpose: but for the election of knights of the shire it must be held at the
most usual place. (42) If the county court falls upon the day of delivering the

the same.
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recess of parliament, as soon as the speaker is informed of the vacancy by the certificate of two

members. On the receipt of such writ, the sheriff, or other returning officer, is to give public

(6) In the borough of New Shoreham, In 80Bsex, wherein certain freeholders o( the country are euU·
Sled to vote by statute 11 Geo. UI, c. M, the election m11St be within hoel11e days, with efghl days• notice or

the aame.

notice that an election will be held within a certain specified time. He is also to provide for the

erection of polling booths and give public notice of the situation of each booth.

On the day of election, as soon as the writ has been read, the sheriff or other returning officer,

must take the bribery oath, after which it is usual for the respective candidates to be proposed

and seconded by electors, and if no more are proposed than can be returned they are then and

there duly elected. If there be more than the proper number, the sheriff, or returning officer,

calls for a show of hands, and pronounces the candidate or candidates duly elected for whom, in

his opinion, the largest number of hands is displayed. This decision if not questioned is conclu-

sive : but a poll is often called for, and if demanded by any candidate or elector must be granted.

The poll in most instances must commence the day or day but one after the nomination, and in

most cases can only last one day, and between the hours of eight and four.

Till 1854 every voter was obliged to take the bribery oath, if so required, but this necessity no

longer exists; there are only two questions which can now be put to an elector before he votes,

viz.: 1st., whether he be the same person whose name appears on the register, and 2d, whether

he have already voted; and if required, he must answer these questions on oath.

At the termination of the poll the poll books are to be closed and sealed, and delivered to the

sheriff or returning officer, who in counties is to keep them until the day but one, and in boroughs

till the day following the poll, when he is openly to break the seals, add up the number of votes,

then openly declare the state of the poll, and make proclamation of the member or members

duly elected. In cities and boroughs, however, the returning officer may, if he pleases, declare

the final state of the poll, and make the return immediately at the close of the poll: if he does

not do so then he must wait till the next day.

Formerly, if a candidate was considered unduly returned to parliament, the remedy was by

petition to the house of commons, on which the house appointed a committee of its own mem-

bers to try the question. But now by 31 and 32 Tic,, c, 125, the petition is to be presented to

the court of common pleas, and the case is to be tried by one of the puisne judges of the supe-

rior courts, without a jury.]

(41) [By Stat. 24 Geo. Ill, $ 2, c. 26, if during any recess any two members give notice to

the speaker, by a certificate under then- hands, that there is a vacancy by death, or that a writ

of summons has issued under the great seal to call up any member to the house of lords, the

speaker shall forthwith give notice of it to be inserted in the Gazette, and at the end of four-

teen days after such insertion, he shall issue his warrant to the clerk of the crown, commanding

him to make out a new writ for the election of another member. And to prevent any impedi-

ment in the execution of this act by the speaker's absence from the kingdom, or by the vacancy

of his seat, at the beginning of every parliament he shall appoint any number of members,

from three to seven inclusive, and shall publish the appointment in the Gazette. These mem-

bers, in the absence of the speaker, shall have the game authority as is given to him by this

statute.]

(42) The shires, and some of the boroughs, are now divided into districts for the purposes of

recess of parliament, as soon as the speaker is informed of the vacancy by the certifieate of two
members. On the receipt of such writ, the sheriff, or other returning officer, is to give public
notice that an election will be held within a certain specified time. He is also to provide for the
erection of polling booths and give public notice of the !dtuation of ea.ch booth.
On the day of election, as soon at1 thll writ has been read, the sheriff or other returning officer,
must take the bribery oath, after whieb it is usual for the respective candidates to be proposed
and seconded by elector!!, and if no more are proposed than can be returned they are then and
there duly elected. If there be more than the proper number, the sheriff, or returning officer,
calls for a show of hands, and pronounees the candidate or candidates duly elocted for whom, in
his opinion, the largest number of bands is displayed. This decision if not questioned is eonclul!ive : but a poll is often called for, and if demanded by any candidate or elector must be granted.
The poll in most instances must commence the day or day but one after the nomination, and in
most cases can only last one da.;, and between the hours of eight and four.
Till 1854 every voter waa ubhged to take the bribery oath, if so required, but this necessity no
longer exis~; there are only two que~tions whieh can now be put to an elector before he \"ot.e>!,
viz. : 1st., whether he be the same per;mn whose name appears on the register, and 2d, whether
he have already voted; and i.f reqmred, be must answer these questions on oath.
At the termination of the poll the poll books are to be cloBCd and sealed, and delivered to the
s~eriff or returnin~ officer, who in counties is to keep them until the day but one, and in boroughs
till the day followmg the poll, when he is openly to break the seals, add up the number of vote~,
then openly declare the state o.f the poll, and make proclamation of the member or members
duly elected. In cities and borough.l!, however, the returning officer may, if he pleMei:i, declare
the final state of the poll, and make the return immediately at the close of the poll : if he does
not do so then he must wait till the next day.
Formerly, if a candidate was considered unduly returned to parliament, the remedy was by
petition to the house of common11, on which the house appointed a committee of its own members to try the question. But now by 31 and 32 Vic,, c, 125, the petition is to be presented to
the court of common pleas, and the co.se is to be tried by one of the puisne judges of the superior eourts, without a jury.]
(41) [By Stat. 24 Geo. Ill, ~ 2, c. 26, if during ~ny recess any two members give notice to
the speaker, by a certificate under their hands, tliat there is a v~iµicy by death, or that a writ
of Bllillmons has issued under the great 11eal to call up any member to the houil6 of lords, the
speaker shall forthwith give notjce of it to be inserted in the Gazette, and at the end of four·
teen days after such insertion, he shall is1me his warrant to the clerk of the crown, commamlin~
him to make out a new writ for the election of another member. And to prevent any impediment in the execution of this act by the speaker's absence from the kinsdom, or by the vacancy
of his seat, at the beginning of every parliament he shall appoint any number of membeI'll,
from three to seven inclusive, and shall publish the appointment in the Gazette. These mom·
bers, in the absence of the speaker, shall have the same authority as is given to him by this
statute.]
( 42) The shires, and some of the boroughs, are now divided into districts for the purposes of
these elections.
rBy the statute of 52 Geo. Ill1 c. 144, ~ 2, the speaker of"tb.e hoUBe Qf pom.mons may, dur~
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writ, or within six days after, the sheriff may adjourn the court and election to

some other convenient time, not longer than sixteen days, nor shorter than ten;

but he cannot alter the place, without the consent of all the candidates : and,

in all such cases, ten days' public notice must be given of the time and place of

the election.

And, as it is essential to the very being of parliament that elections should

be absolutely free, therefore all undue influences upon the electors are illegal

and strongly prohibited. (43) For Mr. Locke (c) ranks it among those breaches

of trust in the executive magistrate, which, according to his notions, amount to

a dissolution of the government, " if he employs the force, treasure and offices

of the society, to corrupt the representatives, or openly to pre-engage the

electors, and prescribe what manner of person shall be chosen. For, thus to

regulate candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is

it, says he, but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very

fountain of public security ? " As soon therefore as the time and place of elec-

tion, either in counties or boroughs, are fixed, all soldiers quartered in the

place are to remove, at least one day before the election, to the distance of two

miles or more; and not to return till one day after the poll is ended. Kiots

likewise have been frequently determined to make an election void. By vote

also of the house of commons, to whom alone belongs the power of determin-

ing contested elections, no lord of parliament, or lord lieutenant of a county hath

any right to interfere in the elections of commoners; and, by statute, the lord war-
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den of the cinque ports shall not recommend any members there. If any

officer of the excise, customs, stamps, *or certain other branches of the r +,„„ -•

revenue, presume to intermeddle in elections, by persuading any voter *- J

or dissuading him, he forfeits 100Z., and is disabled to hold any office.

Thus are the electors of one branch of the legislature secured from any

undue influence from either of the other two, and from all external violence

and compulsion. But the greatest danger is that in which themselves co-operate,

by the infamous practice of bribery and corruption. To prevent which it is

enacted, that no candidate shall, after the date (usually called the teste) of the

writs, or after the vacancy, give any money or entertainment to his electors, or

promise to give any, either to particular persons, or to the place in general, in

order to his being elected: on pain of being incapable to serve for that place in

parliament And if any money, gift, office, employment, or reward be given or

promised to be given to any voter, at any time, in order to influence him to

give or withhold his vote, as well he that takes as he that offers such bribe, for-

feits 500?., and is for ever disabled from voting and holding any office in any

corporation; unless, before conviction, he will discover some other offender of

the same kind, and then he is indemnified for his own offence, (d) The first

instance that occurs, of election bribery, was so early as 13 Ehz., when one,

Thomas Longe, (being a simple man and of small capacity to serve in parlia-

ment,) acknowledged that he had given the returning officer and others of the

borough for which he was chosen, four pounds to be returned member, and was

for that premium elected. But for this offence the borough was amerced, the

member was removed, and the officer fined and imprisoned, (e) But, as this

fc> On Gov. p. 2 » 222.

fa) In like manner the Julian law de ambiiu inflicted Ones and infamy npon all who were guilty of cor-

ruption at elections ; but, if tbe person guilty convicted another offender, he wan restored to his credit

again. Ff. 48, 14. 1.

(•) 4 Inst. 23. Hale of Purl. 112. Com. Journ. 10 and 11 Hay, IKil.

ing any recess, cause a new writ to be issued for the election of another member in the room of

one who has been declared a bankrupt, and has not superseded the fiat of bankruptcy within

writ, or within six days after, the sheriff may adjourn the court and election to
some other convenient time, not longer than sixteen days, nor shorter than ten ;
but he cannot alter the place, without the consent of all the candidates: and,
in all such cases, ten days' public notice must be given of the time and place of
the election.
And, as it is essential to the very being of parliament that elections should
be absolutelv free, therefore all undue influences upon the electors are illegal
nnd strongly prohibited. (43) For Mr. Locke (c) ranks it among those breaches
of trust in the executive magistrate, which, according to his notions, amount to
a dissolution of the government, "if he emJ?loys the force, treasure and offices
of the society, to corrupt the representatives, or openly to pre-engage the
electors, and prescribe what manner of person shall be chosen. For, thus to
regulate candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is
it, says he, but to cut up the govemment by the roots, and poison the very
fountain of J!Ublic security?" As soon therefore as the time and place of election, either m counties or boroughs, are fixed, all soldiers quartered in the
place are to remove, at least one day before the election, to the distance of two
miles or more ; and not to return till one day after the poll is ended. Riots
likewise have been frequently determined to make an election void. By v?te
also of the house of commons, to whom alone belongs the power of detcrmming contested elections, no lord of parliament, or lord lieutenant of a county hath
any right to interfere in the elections of commoners; and, by statute, the lord warden of the cinqne ports shall not recommend any members there. If any
officer of the excise, customs, stamps, *or certain other branches of the [ • 179 ]
revenue, presume to intermeddle in elections, by persuading any voter
.
or dissuading him, he forfeits lOOl., and is disabled to hold any office.
Thus are the electors of one branch of the legislature secured from any
undue influence from either of the other two, and from all external violence
and compulsion. But the greatest danger is that in which themselves co-operate,
bv the infamous practice of bribery and corruption. To prevent which it is
enacted, that no candidate shall, after the date (usually called the teste) of the
writs, or after the vacaricy, give any money or cntertamment to his electors, or
promise to give any, either to particular persons, or to the place in general, in
order to his being elected: on pain of being incapable to serve for that place in
parliament. And if any money, gift, office, employment, or reward be given or
promised to be given to any voter, at any time, in order to influence him to
give or withhold his vote, as well he that takes as he that offers such bribe, forfeits 500l., and is for ever disabled from voting and holding anv office in any
corporation; unless, before conviction, he will discover some other offender of
the same kind, and then he is indemnified for his own offence. (d) The first
instance that occurs, of election bribery, was so early as 13 Ehz., when one,
Thomas Longe, (being a simple man and of small capacity to serve in parliament,) acknowledged that he had given the returning oflider and others of the
borough for which he was chosen, four pounds to be returned member, and was
for that premium elected. But for this offence the borough was amerced, the
member was removed, and the officer fined and imprisoned. (e) But, as this
(cJ On Gov. p. 2 +m.

(dJ In like manner the Jnllan law de ambUu lnft1cted tines and infamy upon all who were guilty of corr11ptlon at elections; but, it the person guilty convicted another otl'ender, he was restored to hls credit

~n.

(e) 4

Ff. 48, I•.

l.

.

lnst. 23. Hale or Parl. 112. Com. Journ. 10and11 May, u;n.

twelve months after it issued.]

(43) [By the ancient common law of the land, and by the declaration of rights, 1 W. and

M. St. 2, c. 2. The 3d Edw. I, o. 5, is also cited, but Mr. Christian observes that it related

to the election of sheriffs, coroners, <fcc., for parliamentary representation was then unknown. It

has been decided that a wager between two electors upon the success of their respective candi-

dates is illegal, because if permitted, it would manifestly corrupt the freedom of elections.

1 T. R. 55.]
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ing any recess, caut!e a new writ to be issued for the election of another member in the room of
one who has been declared a bankrupt, and has not superseded the fiat of bankruptcy within
twelve months after it issued.]
(43) [By the ancient common law of the land, and by the declaration of rights, 1 W. and
M. St. 2, c. 2. The 3d Edw. I, o. 5, is also cited, but Mr. ChriRtian observes that it relat~d
t-0 the election of 11heriffs, coroners, &o., for parliamentary representation wiM! then unknown. It
baa been decided that a wager between two electors upon the silcceSR of their respective candidates if; illegal, because if permitted, it would manifestly corrupt the freedom of elections.
1 T. R. f>f>.]
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practice hath since taken much deeper and more universal root, it hath occa-

sioned the making of these wholesome statutes; to complete the efficacy of

which, there is nothing wanting but resolution, and integrity to put them in

strict execution. (44)

T *180 1 "Undue influence being thus (I wish the depravity of mankind would

L -" permit me to say, effectually) guarded against, the election is to be pro-

ceeded to on the day appointed; the sheriff or other returning officer first tak-

ing an oath against bribery, and for the due execution of his office. The candi-

dates likewise, if required, must swear to their qualification; and the electors

in counties to theirs; and the electors both in counties and boroughs are also

compellable to take the oath of abjuration and that against bribery and corrup-

tion. And it might not be amiss, if the members elected were bound to take

the latter oath, as well as the former; which in all probability would be much

more effectual, than administering it only to the electors.

The election being closed, the returning officer in boroughs returns his pre-

cept to the sheriff, with the persons elected by the majority; and the sheriff

returns the whole, together with the writ for the county, and the knights

elected thereupon, to the clerk of the crown in chancery, before the day of

meeting, if it be a new parliament, or within fourteen days after the election, if

it be an occasional vacancy, and this under penalty of 5001. If the sheriff does

not return such knights only as are duly elected, he forfeits, by the old statutes

of Hen. VI, 100Z. and the returning officer in boroughs for a like false return
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401; and they are besides liable to an action, in which double damages shall be

recovered, by the latter statutes of King William: and any person bribing the

returning officer shall also forfeit 3001. But the members returned by him are

the sitting members, until the house of commons, upon petition, shall adjudge

the return to be false and illegal. The form and manner of proceeding upon

such petition are now regulated by statute 10 Geo. Ill, c. 16, (amended by 11

Geo. Ill, c. 42, and made perpetual by 14 Geo. Ill, c. 15,) wnich directs the

method of choosing by lot a select committee of fifteen members, who are

sworn well and truly to try the same, and a true judgment to give according to

the evidence. (45) And this abstract of the proceedings at elections of knights,

citizens and burgesses, concludes our inquiries into the laws and customs more

peculiarly relative to the house of commons.

F *1811 *VL I proceed now, sixthly, to the method of making laws, which is

L •• much the same in both houses; and I shall touch it very briefly, begin-

ning in the house of commons. But first I must premise, that for dispatch of

business each house of parliament has its speaker. The speaker of the house

of lords, whose office it is to preside there, and manage the formality of busi-

ness, is the lord chancellor, or keeper of the king's great seal, or any other

appointed by the king's commission: and, if none be so appointed, the house of

lords (it is said) may elect The speaker of the house of commons is chosen by

the house; but must be approved by the king. (46) And herein the usage

(44) [The legislature has exerted its utmost energies, especially of late years, but ineffec-

tually, to check these dangerous and demoralizing courses. At length, in the year 1854, all

existing statutes on the subject were repealed, and other provisions substituted, together with

practice hath since taken much deeper and more universal root, it hath occasioned the making of these wholesome statutes; to complete the efficacy of
which, there is nothing wanting but resolution, and integrity to put them in
strict execution. ( 44)
.
*Undue mfluence being thus (I wish the depravity of mankind would
[ • 180 ]
permit me to say, effectually) guarded against, the election is to be proceeded to on the day appointed; the sheriff or other returning officer first ta.king an oath against bribery, and for the due execution of his office. The candidates likewise, if required, must swear to their qualification; and the electors
in counties to theirs; and the electors both in counties and boroughs are also
compellable to take the oath of abjuration and that against bribery and corruption. And it might not be amiss, if the members elected were bound to take
the latter oath, as well as the former; which in all probability would be much
more effectual, than administering it only to the electors.
The election being closed, the returning officer in boroughs returns his precept to the sheriff, with the persons elected by the majority ; and the sheriff
returns the whole, together with the writ for the county, and the knights
elected thereupon, to the clerk of the crown in chancery, before the day of
meeting, if it be a new parliament, or within fourteen days after the election, if
it be an occasional vacancy, and this under penalty of' 500l. If the sheriff does
not return such knights only aa are duly elected, he forfeits, by the old statutes
of Hen. VI, 1001. and the returning officer in boroughs for a like false return
40l.; and they are besides liable t-0 an action, in which double damages shall be
recovered, by the latter statutes of King William: and any person bribing the
returning officer shall also forfeit 300l. But the members returned by him are
the sitting members, until the house of commons, upon petition, shall adjudge
the return to be false and illegal. The form and manner of proceeding upon
such petition are now regulated by statute 10 Geo. III, c. 16, (amended by 11
Geo. III, c. 42, and madt1 perpetual by 14 Geo. III, c. 15,) which directs the
method of choosing by lot a select committee of fifteen members, who are
sworn well and truly to try the same, and a true judgment to give according to
the evidence. (45) And this abstract of the proceedings at elections of knights,
citizens and burgesses, concludes our inquiries into the laws and customs more
peculiarly relative to the house of commons.
*VI. I proceed now, sixthly, to the metbod of making laws, which is
[ • 181 ]
much the same in both houses; and I shall touch it very briefly, beginnin~ in the house of commons. But first I must premise, that for dispatch of
busmess each house of parliament has its speaker. The speaker of the house
of lords, whose office it is to preside there, and manage the formality of business, is the lord chancellor, or keeper of the kin~s great seal, or any other
appointed by the king's commission: .and, if none so appointed, the house of
lords (it is said) may elect. The speaker of the house of commons is chosen by
the house; but must be approved by the king. (46) And herein the usage

ne

an entirely new mode of conducting elections, by an act entitled, " The Corrupt Practices and

Prevention Act." This statute defines carefully and comprehensively what comprehends

bribery, treating and undue influence; imposes serious penalties; totally prohibits acts for-

merly found to oe modes of exercising corrupt influence, and strictly limits legitimate expenses,

reouiriug them to be paid only through an officer called the election auditor, whose accounts are

to oe published; and finally disables a candidate, declared by an election committee guilty, by

himself or his agents, of bribery, treating or undue influence, from being elected or sitting in

the house of commons, for the place where the offence was committed, during the parliament

then in existence.]

(45> See note 40 ante.

(46) [Sir Edward Coke, upon being elected speaker in 1592, in his address to the throne,

declared, " this is only as yet a nomination, and no election, until your majesty giveth allow-

ance and approbation." 2 Hats. 154. But the house of commons at present would scarce

admit their speaker to hold such language. Till Sir Fletcher Norton was elected speaker,

118

(44) [The legislature has exerted its utruobt energies, eRpecially of late years, but inetrec-to check these do.ngeron.s and demoralizing courseR. .A.t length, in the year 1854, all
ex1i!tu~g statutes on the subject were repealed, and other provib;ons substituted, together with
an entirely new mode of conducting elections, by an act entitled, "The Corrupt Practices and
Prev1mtion .A.ct." This statute defines carefully and comprehensively what comprehends
bribery1 treating and undue influence; imposes serious pena.Ities; totally prohibits acts formerly tound to be mod68 of exercising corrupt influence, and strictly limits legitimate expenses,
reqmriug them to be paid only through an officer called the election auditor, whose account.'! aro
to be published; and finally diRables a candidate, declared by an election committee guilty, by
himself or his agents, of bribery, treating or undue influence, from being elected or sitting in
the h?use !lf commons, for the place where the offence was committed, during tho parliament
then m existence.1
( 45) See note 40 ante.
( 46) [Sir Edward Coke, upon being elected speaker in 15{r.l, in his address to the throno
declared, " this is only B.'l yt>t a nomination, and no election, until your majesty giveth a.How~
ance and approbation." 2 Hat~. 154. But the houi:;e of commons at preseut would scarce
admit their speaker to hold such langun.gu. Till Sir Fletcher Norton was elected speaker
118
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of the two houses differs, that the speaker of the house of commons cannot give

his opinion or argue any question in the house; but the speaker of the house

of lords, if a lord of parliament, may. (47) In each house the act of the major-

ity (48) binds the whole; and this majority is declared by votes openly and

publicly given: not as at Venice, and many other senatorial assemblies, privately

or by ballot. This latter method may be serviceable, to prevent intrigues and

unconstitutional combinations : but it is impossible to be practised with us; at

least in the house of commons, where every member's conduct is subject to the

future censure of his constituents, and therefore should be openly submitted to

their inspection.

To bring a bill into the house, if the relief sought by it is of a private nature,

it is first necessary to prefer a petition; which must be presented by a member,

and usually sets forth the grievance desired to be remedied. (49) This petition

(when founded on facts that may be in their nature disputed) is referred to a

committee of members, who examine the matter alleged, and accordingly report

it to the house; and then (or otherwise, upon the mere petition) leave is given

to bring in the bill. In public matters the bill is brought in upon motion made

to the house, without any petition at all. Formerly, all bills were drawn in the

form of petitions, (50) which were entered upon the parliament rolls with the

29th Nov. 1774, every gentleman who was proposed to fill that honorable office affected

great modesty, and, if elected, was almost forced into the chair, and at the same time he

of the two houses differs, that the speaker of the house of commons cannot give
his opinion or argue any question in the house; but the speaker of the house
of lords, if a lord of parliament, may. (47) In each house the act of the majority (48) binds the whole; and this majority is declared by votes openly and
publicly given: not as at Venice, and many other senatorial assemblies, prirntely
or by ballot. 'fhis latter method may be serviceable, to prevent intrigues and
unconstitutional combinations: but it is impossible to be practised with us; at
least in the house of commons, where every member's conduct is subject to the
future censure of his constituents, and therefore should be openly submitted to
their inspection.
To bring a bill into the house, if the relief sought by it is of a private nature,
it is first necessary to prefer a petition; which must be presented by a member,
and usually sets forth the grievance desired to be remedied. (49) This petition
(when founded on facts that may be in their nature disputed) is referred to a
committee of members, who examine the matter alleged, and accordingly report
it to the house; and then (or otherwise, upon the mere petition) leave is g1 ven
to bring in the bill. In public matters the bill is brought in upon motion made
to the house, without any petition at all. Formerly, all bills were drawn in the
form of petitions, (50) which were entered upon the parliament rolls with the

requested permission to plead, in another place, his excuses and inability to discharge the
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office, which he used to do upon being presented to the king. But Sir Fletcher Norton was the

first who disregarded this ceremony both in the one house and in the other. His successors,

Mr. Cornewall and Mr. Addington, requested to make excuses to the throne, but were refused

by the house,'though Mr. Addington, in the beginning of the present parliament, 26th Nov.

1790, followed the example of Sir Fletcher Norton, and intimated no wish to be excused. See

1 U'oucli I. 59. Sir John Oust was the last speaker who addressed the throne in the language

of diffidence, of which the following sentence may serve as a specimen: " I can now be an

humble suitor to your majesty, that you would give your faithful commons an opportunity of

rectifying this the only inadvertent step which they can ever take, and be graciously pleased to

direct them to present some other to your majesty, whom they may not hereafter be sorry to

have chosen, nor your majesty to have approved." 6 Nov. 1761. The chancellor used to reply

in a handsome speech of compliment and encouragement) but now he shortly informs the com-

mons that his majesty approves of their speaker, who claims the ancient privileges of the com-

mons, and then they return to their own house.]

(47) [But when the house resolves itself into a committee, the chairman regularly appointed

every new parliament presides at the table, and the speaker may then speak and vote as any one

of the other members For the time.]

(48) [In the house of commons tie speaker never votes but when there is an equality with-

out his casting vote, which in that case creates a majority; but the speaker of the house of lords

has no casting vote, but bis vote is counted with the rest of the house ; and in the case of an

equality, the non-contents or negative voices have the same effect and operation as if they were

in fact a majority. Lords' Journ. 25 June, 1661.]

(49) This, although usual in American legislative proceedings, is not a necessity. Any mem-

ber may introduce a bill, for either a public or private purpose, on leave obtained as a matter of

course, or after notice given, in the manner pointed out by the rules of the house.

(50) [The commons for near two centuries continued the style of very humble petitioners.

Their petitions frequently began with "your poor commons beg and pray," and concluded

with "for God's sake, and as an act of charity: —Vospoveres communes prient et supplientpur

Dieu et en teuvre de charite. Rot. Parl. passim. It appears that, prior to the reign of Hen. V,

it had been the practice of the kings to add and enact more than the commons petitioned for.

In consequence of this there is a very memorable petition from the commons in 2 Hen. V,

which states that it is the liberty and freedom of the commons that there should be no statute

without their assent, considering that they have ever been as well assenters as petitioners, and

therefore they pray that, for the future, there may be no additions or diminutions to their

petitions. And in answer to this, the king granted that from henceforth they should be

bound in no instance without then: assent, saving his royal prerogative to grant and deny

what he pleased of their petitions. Ruff. Pref. xv, Rot. Parl. 2 Hen. V, No. 22. It was long

after its creation, or rather separation from the barons, before the house of commons was

conscious of its own strength and dignity; and such was their modesty and diffidence, that

they used to request the lords to send them some of their members to instruct them in their

29th :Nov. 1774, every gentleman who was proposed to fill that honorable offioe affected
great modesty, and, if elected, was almost forced into the chair, and at the same time he
requested permission to plead, in another place, his excuses and inability to discharge the
office, which he used to do upon being presented to the king. But Sir Fletcher Norton was the
first who disregarded this oeremony both in the one house and in the other. His successors,
Mr. Comewall and Mr. Addington, requested to make excuses to the throne, bnt were refused
by the house,· though Mr. Addington, in the beginning of the present parliament, 26th Nov.
1790, followed the example of Sir Fletcher Norton, and intimated no wish to be excused. See
1 Woodd. 59. Sir John Cust was the last speaker who addressed the throne in the language
of diffidence, of which the following sentence may serve a:! a. specimen : "I can now be Ml
humble suitor to your majesty, that you would give your faithful commons an opportunity of
rectifying this the only inadvertent step which they can ever take, and be graciously pleased to
direct them to present some other to your majesty, whom they may not hereafter be sorry to
have chosen, nor your majesty t-o have approved.'' 6 Nov. li61. The chancellor used to reply
in a handsome speech of compliment and encouragement1 but now he shortly informs the commons that his majesty approves of. their speaker, who claims the ancient privileges of the com·
mon.<i, and then they return to thetr own house.]
(47) [But when the house resolves itself into a comniittee, the chairman regularly appointed
every new parliament presides at the tahle, and the speaker may then speak and vote as any one
of the other members for the time.]
(48) [In the house of commons the Rpeaker never votes but when there is an equality without his casting vote, which in that case creates a. majority; but the speaker of the house of lords
has no casting vote, but his vote is counted with the rest of the house J and in the case of an
equality, the non-contents or negative voices have the same effect and operation as if thoy were
in fact a majority. Lords' Journ. 25 June, 1661. J
(49) This, although Uilun.l in American legislative proceedings, is not a necessity. Any member may introduce a bill, for either a public or private purpose, on leave obtained as a matter of
course, or after notice given, in the manner pointed out by the rules of the house.
(50) [The commons for near two centuries continued the style of very humble petitioners.
Thejr petitions frequently began )Vith "your poor commons beg and pray," and oonoluded
witli. ''for God's sake, and as an a.ct of charit,v :'-Vos poveres communes prwnt et suppUent pur
Dieu et e1~ reuvre de charite. Rot. Parl. pa."Hlm. It appears that, prior to the reign of Hen. V,
it had been the practice of the kings to add and eno.ct more than the oommoIIB petitioned for.
In consequence of this there is a very memorable petition from the commonR in 2 Hen. V,
which states that it is the liberty 11ud freedom of the commonB that there Rhould be no statute
without their assent, considering that they have ever been as well assenters as petitumers, and
therefore they pray that, for the future, there may be no additions or diminutions to their
petitions. And in answer to this, the king granted that from henceforth they should be
bound in no instance without their assent, saving his roy11l prerogative to grant and deny
what he pleased of their petition:!. Ruff. Pref. xv, Rot. Parl. 2 Hen. V, No. 2'.l. It was long
after iti; creation, or rather separation from the barons, before the house of commons was
conscious of its own ~treugth and dignity ; and such was their modesty and diffidence, that
they uRed to request the lords to send them some of their members to mstruct them in their
duty, "un account of the arduousnegg of their charge, 11ud the feebleneR:1 of their own powcni
and understandings: "-pur l'arduite de l-0ur charge, et /,e foeblesce de lour poiars et sens. Rot.
Par!. 1 R II, No. 4.]

duty, " on account of the arduousness of their charge, and the feebleness of their own powers

119

and understandings:"—pur farduite de lour charge, et te foeblesce rfc lour poiars et sew. Rot.

Parl. 1 R. II, No. 4.]
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king's answer thereunto subjoined; not in any settled forms of words, but

f *1821 *as ^e circums';ances of the case required: (/) and, at the end of each

' "' " ' parliament, the judges drew them into the form of a statute, which was

entered on the statute rolls. In the reign of Henry V, to prevent mistakes and

abuses, the statutes were drawn up by the judges before the end of the parlia-

ment ; and, in the reign of Henry VI, bills m the form of acts, according to the

modern customs, were first introduced.

The persons directed to bring in the bill present it in a competent time to

the house, drawn out on paper, with a multitude of blanks, or void spaces,

where anything occurs that is dubious, or necessary to be settled by the parlia-

ment itself; (such, especially, as the precise date of times, the nature and

quantity of penalties, or of any sums of money to be raised), being indeed only

the skeleton of the bill. In the house of lords, if the bill begins there, it is

(when of a private nature) referred to two of the judges, to examine and report

the state of the facts alleged, to see that all necessary parties consent, and to

settle all points of technical propriety. (51) This is read a first time, and at a con-

venient distance a second time; and, after each reading, the speaker opens to

the house the substance of the bill, and puts the question whether it shall pro-

ceed any farther. The introduction of the bill may be originally opposed, as

the bill itself may at either of the readings; and, if the opposition succeeds,

the bill must be dropped for that session; as it must also if opposed with suc-

cess in any of the subsequent stages.
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After the second reading it is committed, that is, referred to a committee;

which is either selected by the house in matters of small importance, or else

upon a bill of consequence, the house resolves itself into a committee of the

whole house. A committee of the whole house is composed of every member;

and, to form it, the speaker quits the chair, (another member being appointed

chairman), and may sit and debate as a private member. In these committees

the bill is debated clause by clause, amendments made, the blanks filled up, and

F *1831 80metime8 the bill entirely new modelled. After it *has gone through

L -" the committee, the chairman reports it to the house, with such amend-

ments as the committee have made; and then the house reconsiders the whole

bill again, and the question is repeatedly put upon every clause and amendment.

When the house hath agreed or disagreed^ to the amendments of the committee,

and sometimes added new amendments of its own, the bill is then ordered to be

engrossed, or written in a strong gross hand, on one or more long rolls (or

presses) of parchment sewed together. When this is finished, it is read a third

time, and amendments are sometimes then made to it; and if a new clause be

added, it is done by tacking a separate piece of parchment on the bill, which is

called a rider, (g) The speaker then again opens the contents; and, holding it

up in his hands, puts the question whether the bill shall pass. If this is agreed

to, the title to it is then settled, which used to be a general one for all the acts

passed in the session, till in the first year of Henry VIII, distinct titles were

introduced for each chapter. After this, one of the members is directed to

carry it to the lords and desire their concurrence; who, attended by several

more, carries it to the bar of the house of peers, and there delivers it to their

speaker, who comes down from his woolsack to receive it.

It there passes through the same forms as in the other house, (except engross-

ing, which is already done), and, if rejected, no more notice is taken, but it

passes sub silentio, to prevent unbecoming altercations. But, if it is agreed to,

the lords send a message, by two masters in chancery, (or, upon matters of high

(f) See, among numberless other Instances, the articuli cleti, 9 Edw. II; (g) Nov. 84.

(51) [A public bill, being founded on reasons of state policy, the house, in agreeing to its

second readme, accepts and affirms those reasons; but the expediency of a private bill being

king's answer thereunto subjoined; not in any settled forms of words, but
[ • 182 ] •as the circumstances of the case required: (/) and, at the end of each
parliament, the judges drew them into the form of a statute, which was
entered on the statute rolls. In the reign of Henry V, to prevent mistakes and
abuses, the statutes were drawn up by the judges before the end of the parliament; and, in the reign of Henry VI, bills m the form of acts, according to the
modern customs, were first introduced.
The persons directed to bring in the bill present it in e. competent time to
the house, drawn out on pa:per, with a multitude of blanks, or void spaces,
where anything occurs that 1s dubious, or necessary to be settled by the parliament itself; (such, especially, as the precise date of times, the nature and
quantity of penalties, or of any sums of money to be raised), being inde,ed only
the skeleton of the bill. In the house of lords, if the bill begins there, it is
(when of a private nature) referred to two of the judges, to examine and report
the state of the facts alleged, to see that all necessary parties consent, and to
settle all points of technical propriety. (51) This is read a first time, andat a convenient distance a second time; and, after each reading, the speaker opens to
the house the substance of the bill, and puts the question whether it shall !.roceed any farther. The introduction of the bill may: be originall~ oppose , as
the bill itself may at either of the readings; and, if the opposition succeeds,
the bill must be dropped for that session; as it must also if opposed with success in any of the subseguent stages.
After the second read.mg it is committed, that is, referred to a. committee;
which is either selected by the house in matters of small importance, or else
upon a bill of consequence, the house resolves itself into a committee of the
whole house. A committee of the whole house is composed of every member;
and, to form it, the speaker quits the chair, (another member being appointed
chairman), and may sit and debate as a private member. In these committees
the bill is debated clause by clause, amendments made, the blanks filled up, and
[ • 183 ] sometimes the bill entirely new modelled. After it *has gone through
the committee, the chairman reports it to the house, with such amendments as the committee have ma.de; and then the house reconsiders the whole
bill again, and the question is repeatedly put upon every clause and amendment.
When the house ha.th agreed or disagreed to the amendments of the committee,
and sometimes added new amendments of its own, the bill is then ordered to be
engrossed, or written in a strong gross hand, on one or more long rolls (or
presses) of parchment sewed together. When this is finished, it is read a third
time, and amendments are sometimes then made to it; and if a new clause be
added, it is done by tacking a separate piece of parchment on the bill, which is
called a rider. (g) The speaker then again opens the contents; and, holding it
up in his hands, :puts the question whether the bill shall pass. If this is agreed
to, the title to it is then settled, which usecl to be a general one for all the acts
passed in the session, till in the first year of Henry VIII, distinct titles were
mtroduced for each chapter. After this, one of the members is directed to
carry it to the lords and desire their concurrence; who, attended by several
more, carries it to the bar of the house of peers, and there delivers it to their
speaker, who comes down from his woolsack to receive it.
It there passes through the same forms as in the other house, (except engrossing, which is already done), and, if rejected, no more notice is taken, but it
passes sub silentio, to prevent unbecomm~ altercations. But, if it is agreed to,
the lords send a message, by two masters m chancery, (or, upon matters of high

mainly foundea upon allegations of fact, which have not yet been proved, the house, in agree-

ing to its second reading, affirms the principle of the bill conditionally, and subject to the

( f J See, among nombcrlesa other Instances, the arlfcul( clerl, 9 Edw. II.

(g)

Noy. 8'.

proof of such allegations before the committee. Mivy, Parl. Prnct. .r>th ed> 701.]

120

(51) [A J>Ublic bill, being founded on reasons of state policy, the house, in agreeing to its
second reading, accepts and affinus thotie reasons ; but the expediency of a private bill being
mainly ~ounded upon e.IIcga.tions of fact, ~hi~h have not ~et been, pro>ed, the hous~, in agreeing to its second reading, affirms the prmC'1ple of tba bill condit10nally, and subject to the
proof of such a.llege.tions before the committee. M1iy. Parl. Pmct. f>th ed. i01.]
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dignity or importance, by two of the judges), that they have agreed to the

same; and the bill remains with the lords, if they have made no amendment to

it. But, if any amendments are made, such amendments are sent down with

the bill to receive the concurrence of the commons. If the commons disagree

to the amendments, a conference usually follows between members deputed

from each house, who, for the most part, settle and adjust the difference; but

if both houses remain inflexible, the bill is dropped. If the commons agree to

the amendments, the bill is sent back to the lords by one of the members,

*with a message to acquaint them therewith. The same forms are

observed, mutatis mutandis, when the bill begins in the house of lords.

But, when an act of grace or pardon is passed, it is first signed by his majesty,

and then read once only in each of the houses, without any new engrossing or

amendment, (h) And when both houses have done with any bill, always it is

deposited in the house of peers, to wait the royal assent; except in the case of

a bill of supply, which, after receiving the concurrence of the lords, is sent back

to the house of commons, (i)

The royal assent may DC given two ways: 1. In person; when the king

comes to the house of peers, in his crown and royal robes, and, sending for

the commons to the bar, the titles of all the bills that have passed both houses ,

are read; and the king's answer is declared by the clerk of the parliament in

Norman-French: (52) a badge, it must be owned, (now the only one remaining),

of conquest; and which one could wish to see fall into total oblivion, unless it
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be reserved as a solemn memento to remind us that our liberties are mortal,

having once been destroyed by a foreign force. If the king consents to a public

bill, the clerk usually declares, " le roy le veut, the king wills it so to be: if to

a private bill, " soil fait comme il est desire, be it as it is desired." If the king

refuses his assent, it is in the gentle language of " le roy s'avisera, (53) the king

will advise upon it." When a bill of supply is passed, it is carried up and pre-

sented to the king by the speaker of the house of commons; (&) and the royal

assent is thus expressed, " le roy remercie ses loyal subjects, accept leur benevo-

lence, et ausi le veut, the king thanks his loyal subjects, accepts their benevolence,

and wills it so to be." In case of an act of grace, which originally proceeds

from the crown, and has the royal assent in the first stage of it, the clerk of the

parliament thus pronounces the gratitude of the subject: " les prelats, seigneurs,

et commons, ence present parliament assemblees, au nom de touts vous autres sub-

jects, *remercient ires humblement votre majeste, et prient a Dieu vous r*ioc-i

donner en sante bone vie et longue ; the prelates, lords, and commons, in *• J

this present parliament assembled, in the name of all your other subjects, most

humbly thank your majesty, and pray to God to grant you in health and wealth

long to live." (1) 2. By the statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 21, the king may give his

(ft) D'Ewea' Journ. 20, 73. Com. Joura. 17 June, 1747. (4) Com. Jonrn. 24 Jal. 1660.

(i) Rot. Part. 9 Hm. II-; in Pryn. 4 Inst. 30, 31. (I) D'Ewes' Joarn. 36.

(52) [Until the reign of Bichard III, all the statutes are either in French or Latin, but

generally in French.]

(53) [The words el rot efavisera correspond to the phrase formerly used by courts of justice,

dignity or importance, by two of the judges), that they have agreed to the
same; and the bill remains with the lords, if they have made no amendment to
it. But, if any amendments are made, such amendments are sent down with
the bill to receive the concurrence of the commons. If the commons disagree
to the amendments, a conference usually follows between members deputed
from Ela.Ch house, who, for the most part, settle and adjust the difference; but
if both houses remain inflexible, the bill is dropped. If the commons agree to
the amendments, the bill is sent book to the lords by one of the members,
*with a message to acquaint them therewith. The same forms are "' .
observed, mutatis mutand~, when the bill begins in the house of lords. [ 184]
But, when an act of grace or pardon is passed, it is first signed by his majesty,
and then read once only in each of the houses, without any new engrossin~ or
amendment. (h) And when both houses have done with any bill, always it is
deposited in the house of peers, to wait the royal assent; except in the case of
a bill of suppl[, which, after receiving the concurrence of the lords, is sent back
to the house o commons. (i)
The royal assent may be given two ways: 1. In person ; when the king
comes to the house of peers, in his crown and royal robes, and, sending for
the commons to the bar, the titles of all the bills that have passed both houses ,
are read; and the king's answer is declared by the clerk of the parliament in
Norman-French: (52) a badge, it must be owned, (now the only one remaining),
of conquest; and which one could wish to see fall into total oblivion, unless it
be reserved as a solemn memento to remind us that our liberties are mortal,
having once been destroyed by a foreign force. If the kin~ consents to a r,ublic
bill, the clerk usually declares, "le roy l.e veut, the kin~ wills it so to be:' if to
a private bill, "soit fait comme il est des.fre, be it as it ls desired." If the king
refuses his assent, it is in the gentle language of "le roy s'avisera, (53) the king
will advise upon it." When a bill of supply is passed, it is carried up and presented to the king by the speaker of the house of commons; (k) ana the royal
S88ent is thus expressed, "le roy remerct'.e ses loyal .~ubjects, accept leur benevolence, et ausi le veut, the king thanks his loyal subjects, accepts their benevolence,
and wills it so to be." In case of an act of grace, which oiiginally proceeds
from the crown, a.nd has the royal assent in the first stage of it, the clerk of the
parliament thus pronounces the gratitude of the subject: "les prelats, seigneurs,
et commons, ence present parliament as.~emblees, au nom de touts vou.s autres subjects, *remerct'.ent tres humblement votre ma:feste, et prient a Di.eu vous [*185]
donner en sante bone vie et longue; the prelates, lords, and commons, in
this present parli8Illent assembled, in the name of all your other subjects, most
humbly thank your majesty, and pray to God to grant you in health and wealth
long to live." (l) 2. By the statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 21, the king may give his
(•) D'Ewet11 Journ. 201 n. Com. Joum. 17 June, 1747.
(I) Com. Jonm, MJnl. 1000.
(k) Rot. Part U Hg. Y, In Pryn. 4 Inst. 80, 31.
(l) D•Ewcs' Journ. M.

when they required time to consider of their judgment, viz.: curia advisare vult. And there

can be little doubt but originally these words implied a serious intent to take the subject under

consideration, and they only became in effect a negative when the bill or petition was annulled

by a dissolution, before the king communicated the result of his deliberation; for, in the

rolls of parliament, the king sometimes answers, that the petition is unreasonable, and cannot

be granted: sometimes he answers, that he and his council •will consider of it; as in 37 Edw.

Ill, No. 33 Quant au ceite article, il demande grand avisement, etpartant, rot se ent aviserapar

son eonseil.]

This prerogative of rejecting bills was last exercised by Queen Anne, A. D., 1707, who refused

her assent to a bill for settling • the militia in Scotland. May, Parl. I 'rue. 5th ed. 494—5,

citing 18 Lord's J. 506. William III had refused his assent, A. D. 1692, to the bill for trien-

nial parliaments. And on one occasion the prerogative of rejecting bills was exercised by

Queen Elizabeth at the close of a session, to the extent of rejecting forty-eight bills, while she

gave assent to twenty-four public and nineteen private bills, which had passed both houses of

parliament. D'Ewes, 596.
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(62) [Until the reign of Richard III, all the statutes are either in French or Latin, but.
generallJ: in French. l
(63) LThe words el rm s'aft8era correspond to the phrase formerly used by courts of justice,
when they required time to consider of their judgment, viz. : curia advi8are vult. And there
can be little doubt but originally these words implied a serious intent to take the subject under
consideration, and they only became in effect a negative when the bill or petition was annulled
by a dissolution, before the king communicated the result of his defiberation; for, in the
rolls of parliament, the king sometimes answers. that the petition is unreasonable, and cannot
be granted: sometimes he answers, that ho and his council will consider of it; as in 37 Edw.
III, No. 33 Quant a" ce'te article, il <lemande grand avi&Bnient, et partant, rm se ent at'isera par
son CQ118eil.]
This prerogative of rejecting bills was le.Rt exercised by Queen Anne, A. D., 1707, who refused
her IM!8ent to a bill for settling· the militia in Scotland. May, Parl. Prac. 5th ed. 494-0,
citing 18 Lord's J. 506. William III hMl refused his usent 1 A. D. 1692, to the bill for triennial parliamentt1. .And on one occasion the prerogative of rejP.cting bills was cxeroi1'ed by
Queen Elizabeth at tho close of a Be68ion, to the extent of rejecting forty-eight hills, while she
gave assent to twenty-four public and nineteen private bills, which had passed both houses of
parliament. D'Ewes, 596.
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assent by letters patent under his great seal, signed with his hand, and notified

in his absence, to both houses assembled together in the high house. And, when

the bill has received the royal assent in either of these ways, it is then, and not

before, a statute or act of parliament (54)

This statute or act is placed among the records of the kingdom ; there need-

ing no formal promulgation to give it the force of a law, as was necessary by the

civil law with regard to the emperor's edicts; because every man in England is,

in judgment of law, party to the making of an act of parliament, being present-

thereat by his representatives. However, a copy thereof is usually printed at

the king's press, for the information of the whole land. And formerly, before

the invention of printing, it was used to be published by the sheriff of every

county; the king's writ oeing sent to him at the end of every session, together

with a transcript of all the acts made at that session, commanding him " ut stat-

uta ilia, et omnes articulos, in eisdem contentos, in singulis ubi locis expedire

viderit, publice prodamari, et firmiter teneri et observarifaciat." And the usage

was to proclaim them at his county court, and there to keep them, that whoever

would might read or take copies thereof; which custom continued till'the reign

of Henry the Seventh, (m) (55)

An act of parliament, thus made, is the exercise of the highest authority that

this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. It hath power to bind every subject in

the land, and the dominions thereunto belonging; nay, even the king himself,

r*18fil ^ particularly named therein. And it cannot be altered, *amended, dis-
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L -I pensed with, suspended, or repealed, but in the same forms, and by the

same authority of parliament: for it is a maxim in law, that it requires the same

strength to dissolve, as to create, an obligation. It is true it was formerly held,

that the king might, in many cases, dispense with penal statutes: (ri) but now,

by statute 1 W. and M. st. 2, c. 2, it is declared that the suspending or dispens-

ing with laws by regal authority, without consent of parliament, is illegal.

VII. There remains only, in the seventh and last place, to add a word or two

concerning the manner in which parliaments may be adjourned, prorogued, or

dissolved.

An adjournment is no more than a continuance of the session from one day

to another, as the word itself signifies: and this is done by the authority of

each house separately every day; and sometimes for a fortnight or a month

together, as at Christmas or Easter, or upon other particular occasions. But

the adjournment of one house is no adjournment of the other, (o) (56) It hath

(M) 3 lost. 41. 4 lust. 26. (n) Finch. I,. 81. 234. Bacon, Minn. o. 19. (o) 4 Inrt. 38.

(54) [The 33 Geo. Ill, o. 13, directs the clerk of parliament to indorse on every act the time

it receives the royal assent, from which day it becomes operative, if no other is specified. And

by 48 Geo. Ill, c. 106, when a bill for continuing expiring acts shall not hare passed before such

assent by letters patent under his great seal, signed with his hand, and notified
in his absence, to both houses assembled together in the high house. And, when
the bill has received the royal assent in either of these ways, it is then, and not
before, a statute or act of parliament. (54)
.
'l'his statute or act is placed among the records of the kingdom ; there needing no formal promulgation to give it the force of a law, as was necessary by the
ci\·il law with regard to the emperor's edicts; because every man in Engln.nd is,
in judgment of law, party to the making of an act of parliament, being present
thereat by his representatives. However, a copv thereof is usually printed at
the king's press, for the information of the who1e land. And formerly, before
the invention of printing, it was used to be published by the sheriff of every
county; the king's writ being sent to him at the end of every session, together
with a transcript of all the acts made at that session, commanding him" ut statuta illa, et omnes artic1tlos, in eisdem contentos, in si~·nulis ubi locis expedire
viderit, publice proclamari, et firm:iter teneri et observari aciat." And the usage
was to proclaim them at his county court, and there to eep them, that whoever
would might read or take copies thereof; which custom continued till°the reign
of Henry the Seventh. (rn) (55)
An act of parliament, thus made, is the exercise of the hi~hest authority that
this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. It hath power to bmd every sub~ect in
the land, and the domimons thereunto belonging; nay, even the king himself,
[ "'lBB] if particularly named therein. And it cannot be altered, •amended, dispensed with, suspended, or repealed, but in the same forms, and by the
same authority of parliament: for it is a maxim in law, that it requires the same
str1mgth to dissolve, as to create, an obligation. It is true it was for~erly held,
that the king might, in many cases, dispense with penal statutes: (n) but now,
by statute 1 W. and M. st. 2, c. 2, it is declared that the suspending or dispensing with laws by re~al authority, without consent of parliament, is illegal.
VII. There remams only, in the seventh and last place, to add a word or two
concerning the manner in which parliaments may be adjourned, prorogued, or
dissoh·ed.
An adjournment is no more than a continuance of the session from one day
to another, as the word itself signifies: and this is clone by the authority of
each house separately every day; and somet.imes for a fortnight or a mont,h
together, as at Christmas or Easter, or upon other particular occasions. But
the adjournment of one house is no adjournment of the other. (o) (56) It hath
(Ill)

8 Inst. 41. 4 Inst. 96.

(n) Finch. L. 81, 234. Bacon, Elem. c. 19.

(o) ' I net. Sill.

acts expire, the bill, when passed into a law, shall have effect from the date of the expiration of

the act intended to be continued.]

(55) In 1809 provision was made by law for the general distribution of the published statutes

of Great Britain.

The constitution of the United States, art. 1, J 7, provides as follows: " Every bill which

shall have passed the house of representatives and the senate, shall, before it becomes a law.

bo presented to the president of the United States. If he approve, he shall siftn it; but if

not, he shall return it with his objections to that house in which it shall have originated, who

shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it If after such

reconsideration two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together

with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if

approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes

of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for

and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill

shall not be returned by the president within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have

been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it; unless con-

gress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law."

The governors of nearly all the states have a similar negative upon state legislation.

(56) By the constitution of the United States, neither house of congress can, without the

consent of tho other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that at

which the two houses may be sitting. Art. 1, $ 3. The president has power, in case of disa-

122

(54) [The 33 Geo. III, c. 13, directs the clerk of parliament to indorse on every act the time
it receives the royal &ssent, from which dar it becomeA operative, if no other is specified. And
by 48 Geo. III, c. 106, when a bill for contrnuing expiring acts shall not ha'l'e tassed before such
act.! expire, the bill, when pa.sRed into a law, sh8.ll have effect from the date o the expiration of
the act intended to be continued.]
(f>5) In 1809 provision was made by law for the general distribution of the published statutes
of Great Britain.
The constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 7, provides &11 follows: "Every bill which
shall have pW!Sed the house of representatives and the senate, shall, before it becomes a law
he presented to the president of the United States. If b apJ.lrove, he she.ll sign it; but 'ii
not, he !!hall return i~ with his objectio~ ~ that house in which it she.ll .have. origmated, who
~hall enter the objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to recorunder it. If Qft.er such
rccollilideration two·thlrds of that house shall agree to paas the bill, it she.ll be 11ent, togtither
with the objections, to the other house, by which it she.ll likewise be reconsidered, and if
o.fproved by two-thirds of that ~ouse, it shall become o. law. But in all such eMes tht; votes
o both hoUBCs shall be determmed by yeas and nays, and the names of the _Persons voting for
and against the bill she.ll be e1?tered o,n ~e journal of ef\Ch house respectively. If e.ny bill
shall not be returned by the president Withm ten d~y8 (Sundays excepted) after it she.ll have
been presented to him, the same 8hall be a law in like manner &11 if he had 8igned it; unless con·
gro1111 by their adjournment prevent ita return, in which case it shall not be a law."
The go>emors of nearlr all the states have a ~inrilar negatiT"e upon state legislation.
(56) lJy the constitut1ob. of the United States, neither house of congress can, without the
contlent of tho other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that at
which the two hous011 may be sitting. Art. 1, § 3. The president has power, in case of disa-
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also been usual, when his majesty hath signified his pleasure that both or either

of the houses should adjourn themselves to a certain day, to obey the king's

pleasure so signified, and to adjourn accordingly, (p) Otherwise, besides the

indecorum of a refusal, a prorogation would assuredly follow ; which would

often be very inconvenient to both public and private business: for prorogation

puts an end to the session ; and then such bills as are only begun and not per-

fected, must be resumed de novo (if at all) in a subsequent session: whereas, after

an adjournment, all things continue in the same state as at the time of the adjourn-

ment made, and may be proceeded on without any fresh commencement. (57)

A prorogation is the continuance of the parliament from one session to

another, as an adjournment is a *continuation of the session from day r *i g« -i

to day. This is done by the royal authority, expressed either by the I -*

lord chancellor in his majesty's presence, or by commission from the crown, or

frequently by proclamation. (58) Both houses are necessarily prorogued at the

same time; it not being a prorogation of the house of lords or commons, but

of the parliament. The session is never understood to be at an end until a pro-

rogation ; though, unless some act be passed or some judgment given in parlia-

ment, it is in truth no session at all. (q) And formerly, the usage was for the

king to give the royal assent to all such bills as he approved, at the end of every

session, and then to prorogue the parliament; though sometimes only for a day

or two; (r~) after which all business then depending in the houses was to be

begun again ; which custom obtained so strongly, that it once became a ques-
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tion, (s) whether giving the royal assent to a single bill did not of course put

an end to the session. And, though it was then resolved in the negative, yet

the notion was so deeply rooted, that the statute 1 Car. I, c. 7, was passed to

declare, that the king's assent to that and some other acts should not put an

end to the session ; and, even so late as the reign of Charles II, we find a pro-

viso frequently tacked to a bill, (t) that his majesty's assent thereto should not

determine the session of parliament. But it now seems to be allowed, that a

prorogation must be expressly made, in order to determine the session. And, if

at the time of an actual rebellion, or imminent danger of invasion, the parlia-

ment shall be separated by adjournment or prorogation, the king is empowered

(u) to call them together by proclamation, with fourteen day's notice of the time

appointed for their re-assembling. (59)

(p) Com. Jonrn. patiim; e. g. 11 June, 1872: 5 Apr. 1804; 4 Jnnc, U NOT. 18 Dec. 1621; 11 Jul. 1825; IS Sept

1660; 25 Jul. 1667; 4 Auff. 1685; 24 Feb. 1691; 21 June, 1712; 16 Apr. 1717; 3 Feb. 1741; 10 Dec. 1745; 21 May,

17G8. (g)4Inst. 28. Hale of Part. 38. Hat. 61. (r) Com. Jour. 21 Oct. 1553. («) Ibid. 21 Nov. 1554.

(!) SCat. 12Car. 11, c. 1. 22 and 23 Car. U, c. 1. (u) Stat. 30 Geo. II, c. 25.

greement between the two houses with respect to the time of adjournment, to adjourn them

to such time as he shall think proper. Art. 2, J 3. For a decision under a similar provision,

gee People v. Hatch, 33 HI. 9.

(57) [Orders of parliament also determine, by prorogation, consequently all persons taken

into custody under such orders may, after prorogation of parliament, as well as after dissolu-

tion, be discharged on a habeas corpus; generally, however, that form is not observed, as the

power of either Tiouse to hold in imprisonment expires, and the party may at once walk forth

on the prorogation or dissolution of the parliament. Com. Dig. ^Parliament, 0. 1. The state

of an impeachment is not affected by the session terminating either one way or the other :

Raym. 120 ; 1 Lev. 384 ; and appeals and writs of error remain, and are to be proceeded in,

as they stood at the last session. 2 Lev. 93; Com. Dig. Parliament, 0. 1.]

(58) [At the beginning of a new parliament, when it is not intended that the parliament

should meet at the return of the writ of summons for the dispatch of business, the practice is'

to prorogue it by a writ of prorogation, as the parliament in 1790 was prorogued twice by

writ: Com. Journ. 26th Nov. 1790; and the first parliament in this reign was prorogued by

four writs. Id. 3 Nov. 1761. On the day upon which the writ of summons is returnable, the

members of the house of commons who attend do not enter their own house, or wait for a

message from the lords, but go immediately up to the house of lords, where the chancellor

reads the writ of prorogation. Ib. And when it is intended that they should meet upon the

day to which the parliament is prorogued for dispatch of business, notice is given by a pro-

clamation. ]

(59) [By statutes 37 Geo. Ill, c. 127, and 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, e. 14, the king may at any time

by proclamation, appoint parliament to meet at the expiration of fourteen days from the date

of the proclamation ; and this without regard to the period to which parliament may stand

prorogued or adjourned.]
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A dissolution is the civil death of the parliament; and this may be effected

three ways: 1. By the king's will, expressed either in person or by represen-

tation ; for, as the king has the sole right of convening the parliament, so

F *18ft 1 a^so *^ *s a branch °f the royal prerogative, that he may whenever he

' -* pleases prorogue the parliament for a time, or put a final period to its

existence. If nothing had a right to prorogue or dissolve a parliament but

itself, it might happen to become perpetual. And this would be extremely

dangerous, if at any time it should attempt to encroach upon the executive

power: as was fatally experienced by the unfortunate King Charles the First;

who having unadvisedly passed an act to continue the parliament then in being

till such time as it should please to dissolve itself, at last fell a sacrifice to that

inordinate power, which he himself had consented to give them. It is therefore

extremely necessary that the crown should be empowered to regulate the dura-

tion of these assemblies, under the limitations which the English constitution

has prescribed: so that, on the one hand, they may frequently and regularly

come together, for the dispatch of business, and redress of grievances; and may

not, on the other, even with the consent of the crown, be continued to an

inconvenient or unconstitutional length.

2. A parliament may be dissolved by the demise of the crown. This dissolu-

tion formerly happened immediately upon the death of the reigning sovereign :

for he being considered in law as the head of the parliament, caput principimn,

et finis, that failing, the whole body was held to be extinct. But, the calling a

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

new parliament, immediately on the inauguration of the successor, being found

inconvenient, and dangers being apprehended from having no parliament in

being in case of a disputed succession, it was enacted by the statutes 7 and 8

Wm. Ill, c. 15, and 6 Ann. c. 7, that the parliament in being shall continue for

six months after the death of any king or queen, unless sooner prorogued or

dissolved by the successor; that, if the parliament be, at the time of the king's

death separated by adjournment or prorogation, it shall, notwithstanding,

assemble immediately; and that, if no parliament is then in being, the members

of the last parliament shall assemble, and be again a parliament

F *1891 *^' k^ly, a parliament may be dissolved or expire by length of time.

L -I For, if either the legislative body were perpetual, or might last for the

life of the prince who convened them, as formerly ; and were so to be sup-

plied, by occasionally filling the vacancies with new representatives; in these

cases, if it were once corrupted, the evil would be past all remedy: but when

different bodies succeed each other, if the people see cause to disapprove of the

present, they may rectify its faults in the next. A legislative assembly also, which

is sure to be separated again, (whereby its members will themselves become private

men, and subiect to the full extent of the laws which they have enacted for

others,) will think themselves bound, in interest as well as duty, to make only

such laws as are good. The utmost extent of time that the same parliament

was allowed to sit, by the statute 6 W. and M. c. 2, was three years; after the

expiration of which, reckoning from the return of the first summons, the parlia-

ment was to have no longer continuance. But, by the statute 1 Geo. I, st. 2, c.

38, (in order, professedly, to prevent the great and continued expenses of frequent

elections, and the violent heats and animosities consequent thereupon, and for

the peace and security of the government, then just recovering from the late

rebellion,) this term was prolonged to seven years: and, what alone is an instance

of the vast authority of parliament, the very same house that was chosen for

three years, enacted its own continuance for seven. So that, as our constitution

now stands, the parliament must expire, or die a natural death, at the end of

every seventh year, if not sooner dissolved by the royal prerogative. (60)

(60) In the United States each congress continues for the period for which the members of

the popular branch are chosen; that is to say, for two years. 'Within that period two sessions

are held regularly, and more may be, when extra sessions are called by the president or

A dissolution is the civil death of the parliament; and this mav be effected
three ways: 1. By the king's will, expressed either in person or by representation ; for, as the king has the sole right of convening the parliament, so
[ • 188 ] also *it is a branch of the royal prerogative, that he may whene,·er he
pleases prorogue the parliament for a time, or put a final period to its
existence. If nothing had a right to prorogue or dissolve a parliament but
itself, it might happen to become perpetual. And this would be extremely
dangerous, if at any time it should attempt to encroach upon the executive
power: as was fatally experienced by the unfortunate King Charles the First;
who having unadvisedlv passed an act to continue the parliament then in being
till such time as it shoi1ld please to dissoh-e itself, at last fell a sacrifice to that
inordinate power, which he himself had consented to give them. It is therefore
extremely necessary that the crown should be empowered to regulate the duration of these assemblies, under the limitations which the English constitution
has prescribed: so that, on the one hand, they may frequently and regularly
come together, for the dispatch of business, and redress of grievances ; and may
not, on the other, even with the consent of the crown, be continued to an
inconvenient or unconstitutional length.
2. A parliament may be dissolved by the demise of the crown. This dissolution formerly haJ?pened immediately upon the death of the reigning sovereign :
for he being considered in law as the head of the parliament, caput principimn,
et fini.11, that foiling, the whole body was held to be extinct. But, the calling a
new parliament, immediately on the inauguration of the successor, being found
inconvenient, and dangers being apprehended from having no parliament in
being in case of a disputed succession, it was enacted by the statutes 7 and 8
Wm. III, c. 15, and 6 Ann. c. 1, that the parliament in being shall continue for
six months after the death of any king or queen, unless sooner prorogued or
dissolved by the successor; that, if the parliament be, at the time of the king's
death separated by adjournment or prorogation, it shall, notwithstanding,
assemble immediately; and that, if no parliament is then in being, the members
of the last parliament shall assemble, and be again a parliament.
*3. Lastly, a parliament may be dissolved or expire by length of time.
[ • 189 ]
For, if either the legislative body were perpetual, or might last for the
life of the prince who convened them, as formerly; and were so to be supplied, by occasionally filling the var.ancies with new representatives; in these
cases, if it were once corrupted, the evil would be past all remedy : but when
different bodies succeed each other, if the people see cause to disapprove of the
present, they may rectify its faults in the next. A legislative assembly also, which
is sure to be sei;>arated again, (whereby its members will themselves become private
men, and subJcct to the full extent of the laws which they have enacted for
others,) will think themselves bound, in interest as well as duty, to make only
such laws as are good. The utmost extent of time that the same parliament
was allowed to sit, by the statute 6 W. and M. c. 2, was three years ; after the
expiration of which, reckoning from the return of the first summons, the parliament was to ha\"e no longer continuance. But, by the statute 1 Geo. I, st. 2, c.
38, (in order, professedly, to prevent the ~eat and continued expenses of frequent
elections, and the violent heats and ammosities consequent thereupon, and for
the peace and security of the government, then just recovering from the late
rebellion,) this tenn was prolonged to seven years: and, what alone is an instance
of the vast authority of parliament, the very same house that was chosen for
three years, enacted its own continuance for seven. So that, as our constitution
now stands, the parliament must expire, or die a natural death, at the end of
every seventh year, if not sooner dissolved by the royal prerogative. (60)

ordered by congress.

124

(60) In the United Sts.tel! each congrees continues for the period for which the members of
the popular branch are chosen ; that ie to say, for two years. Within that period two sessions
are held regularly, and more may be, when extra sessions are called by the president or
ordered by congress.
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CHAPTER III.

OF THE KING AND HIS TITLE.

CHAPTER III.

THE supreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in a

single person, the king or queen: for it matters not to which sex the crown

OF THE KING AND HIS TITLE.

descends; but the person entitled to it, whether male or female, is immediately

invested with all the ensigns, rights, and prerogatives of sovereign power; as is

declared by statute 1 Mar. st. 3, c. 1.

In discoursing of the royal rights and authority, I shall consider the king

under six distinct views; 1. With regard to his title. 2. His royal family.

3. His councils. 4. His duties. 5. His prerogative. 6. His revenue. And,

first, with regard to his title.

The executive power of the English nation being vested in a single person,

by the general consent of the people, the evidence of which general consent is

long and immemorial usage, it became necessary to the freedom and peace of

the state, that a rule should be laid down, uniform, universal, and permanent;

in order to mark out with precision, who is that single person, to whom are com-

mitted (in subservience to the law of the land) the care and protection of the

community; and to whom, in return, the duty and allegiance of every individual

are due. It is of the highest importance to the public tranquility, and to the

consciences *of private men, that this rule should be clear and indis- r ^gj n

putable: and our constitution has not left us in the dark upon this •- '' *

material occasion. It will therefore be the endeavour of this chapter to trace out
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the constitutional doctrine of the royal succession, with that freedom and regard

to truth, yet mixed with that reverence and respect, which the principles of lib-

erty and the dignity of the subject require.

The grand fundamental maxim upon which the jus corona, or right of suc-

cession to the throne of these kingdoms, depends, I take to be this: " that the

crown is, by common law and constitutional custom, hereditary; and this in a

manner peculiar to itself: but that the right of inheritance may from time to

time be changed or limited by act of parliament; under which limitations the

crown still continues hereditary." And this proposition it will be the business

of this chapter to prove, in all its branches; first, that the crown is hereditary;

secondly, that it is hereditary in a manner peculiar to itself; thirdly, that this

inheritance is subject to limitation by parliament; lastly, that when it is so limi-

ted, it is hereditary in the new proprietor.

1. First, it is in general hereditary, or descendible to the next heir, on the

death or demise of the last proprietor. All regal governments must be either

hereditary or elective: and, as I believe there is no instance wherein the crown

of England has ever been asserted to be elective, except by the regicides at the

infamous and unparalleled trial of King Charles I, it must of consequence be

hereditary. Yet, while I assert an hereditary, I by no means intend &jure divino,

title to the throne. Such a title may be allowed to have subsisted under the

theocratic establishments of the children of Israel in Palestine: but it never yet

subsisted in any other country; save only so far as kingdoms, like other human

fabrics, are subject to the general and ordinary dispensations of Providence.

Nor indeed have &jure divino and an hereditary right any necessary connexion

with each other; as some have very weakly imagined.. The titles of David and

Jehu were *equally^re divino, as those of either Solomon or Ahab; and r *JQO -i

yet David slew the sons of his predecessor, and Jehu his predecessor *• ' ~ '

himself. And when our kings have the same warrant as they had, whether it be

to sit upon the throne of their fathers, or to destroy the house of the preceding

sovereign, they will then, and not before, possess the crown of England by a

right like theirs, immediately derived from heaven. The hereditary right which
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THE supreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in a
single person, the king or queen : for it matters not to which sex the crown
descends; but the person entitled to it, whether male or female, is immediately
invested with all the ensigns, rights, and prerogatives of sovereign power; as is
declared by statute 1 Mar. st. 3, c. 1.
In discoursing of the royal ri~hts and authority, I shall consider the king
under six distinct views; 1. With regard to his title. 2. His royal family.
3. His councils. 4. His duties. 5. His prerogative. 6. His revenue. And,
first, with regard to his title.
'fhe executive power of the English nation being vested in a single person,
by the general consent of the people, the evidence of which general consent is
long and immemorial usage, it became necessary to the freedom and peace of
the state, that a rule should be laid down, uniform, universal, and permanent;
in order to mark out with precision, wlw is that single person, to whom are committed (in subservience to the law of the land) the care and protection of the
community; and to whom, in return, the duty and allegiance of every individual
are due. It is of the highest importance to the public tranquility, and to the
consciences *of private men, that this rule should be clear and indis- [ • 191 ]
put.able: and our constitution has not left us in the dark upon this
material occasion. It will therefore be the endeavour of this chapter to trace out
the constitutional doctrine of the royal succession, with that freedom and regard
to truth, yet mixed with that reverence and respect, which the principles of liberty and the dignity of the subject require.
The grand fundamental maxim upon which the jus coronm, or right of succession to the throne of these kingdoms, depends, I take to be this : " that the
crown is, by common law and constitutional custom, hereditary ; and this in a
manner peculiar to itself: but that the ri~ht of inheritance may from time to
time be changed or limited by act of parliament; under which limitations the
crown still continues hereditary." And this proposition it will be the business
of this chapter to prove, in all its branches; first, that the crown is hereditary;
secondly, that it is hereditary in a manner peculiar to itself; thirdly, that this
inheritance is subject to limitation by parliament; lastly, that when it is so limited, it is hereditary in the new propnetor.
1. First, it is in general hereditary, or descendible to the next heir, on the
death or demise of the last proprietor. All regal governments must be either
hereditary or elective: and, as I believe there is no instance wherein the crown
of England has ever been asserted to be elective, excel?t by the regicides at the
infamous and unparalleled trial of King Charles I, it must of consequence be
hereditary. Yet, while I assert an hereditary, I by no means intend a.Jure di,vino,
title to the throne. Such a title may be allowed to have subsisted under the
theocratic establishments of the children of Israel in Palestine: but it never yet
subsisted in any other country; save only so far as kingdoms, like other hunia11
fubrics, are subject to the general and ordinary dispensations of Providence.
Nor indeed have a.jure divino and an hereditary right any necessary connexion
with each other; as some have very weakly imagined.. The titles of David and
Jehu were *equally jttre div-ino, as those of either 8olomon or Ahab; and [ • 192 ]
yet David slew the sons of his predecessor, and Jehu his predecessor
himself. And when our kin~s have the same warrant as they had, whether it be
to sit upon the throne of their fathers, or to destroy the house of the preceding
sovereign, they will then, and not before, possess the crown of En!i'land by a
right like theirs, immediately derived from heaven. The hereditary nght which
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the laws of England acknowledge, owes its origin to the founders of our con-

stitution, and to them only. It has no relation to, nor depends upon, the civil

laws of the Jews, the Greeks, the Eomans, or any other nation upon earth : the

municipal laws of one society having no connexion with, or influence upon, the

fundamental polity of another. The founders of our English monarchy might

perhaps, if they had thought proper, have made it an elective monarchy : but

they rather chose, and upon good reason, to establish originally a succession by

inheritance. This has been acquiesced in by general consent ; and ripened by

degrees into common law : the very same title that every private man has to his

own estate. Lands are not naturally descendible any more than thrones : but

the law has thought proper, for the benefit and peace of the public, to establish

hereditary succession in the one as well as the other.

It must be owned, an elective monarchy seems to be the most obvious, and

best suited of any to the rational principles of government, and the freedom of

human nature : and accordingly we find from history that, in the infancy and

first rudiments of almost every state, the leader, chief magistrate, or prince,

hath usually been elective. And, if the individuals who compose that state

could always continue true to first principals, uninfluenced by passion or preju-

dice, unassailed by corruption, and unawed by violence, elective succession were

as much to be desired in a kingdom, as in other inferior communities. The

best, the wisest, and the bravest man, would then be sure of receiving that crown,

which his endowments have merited ; and the sense of an unbiassed majority
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f *193 1 be dutifully acquiesced in by the few who were *of different

L -1 opinions. But history and observation will inform us, that elections of

every kind (in the present state of human nature) are too frequently brought

about by influence, partiality, and artifice : and, even where the case is other-

wise, these practices will be often suspected, and as constantly charged upon the

successful, by a splenetic disappointed minority. This is an evil to which all

societies are liable ; as well those of a private and domestic kind, as the great

community of the public, which regulates and includes the rest. But in the

former there is this advantage ; that such suspicions, if false, proceed no farther

than jealousies and murmurs, which time will effectually suppress ; and, if true,

the injustice may be remedied by legal means, by an appeal to the tribunals to

which every member of society has (by becoming such) virtually engaged to

submit. Whereas in the great and independent society, which every nation com-

poses, there is no superior to resort to but the law of nature : no method to re-

dress the infringements of that law, but the actual exertion of private force. As

therefore between two nations, complaining of mutual injuries, the quarrel can

only be decided by the law of arms ; so in one and the same nation, when the

fundamental principles of their common union are supposed to be invaded, and

more especially when the appointment of their chief magistrate is alleged to be

unduly made, the only tribunal to which the complainants can appeal is that of

the God of battles, the only process by which the appeal can be carried on is that

of a civil and intestine war. An hereditary succession to the crown is therefore

now established, in this and most othef countries, in order to prevent that peri-

odical bloodshed and misery, which the history of ancient imperial Rome, and

the more modern experience of Poland and Germany, may shew us are the con-

sequences of elective kingdoms.

2. But, secondly, as to the particular mode of inheritance, it in general cor-

responds with the feudal path of descents, chalked out by the common law in

the succession to landed estates ; yet with one or two material exceptions. Like

estates, the crown will descend lineally to the issue of the reigning monarch ;

f "194 1 ** ^ ^rom ^n£ J°^n *P Richard II, through *a regular pedigree of

L -1 six lineal generations. As in common descents, the preference of males

to females, and the right of primogeniture among the males, are strictly adhered

to. Thus Edward V succeeded to the crown, in preference to Richard, his

younger brother, and Elizabeth, his elder sister. Like lands or tenements, the

crown, on failure of the male line, descends to the issue female ; according to
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the laws of England acknowledge, owes its origin to the founders of our constitution, and to them onlv. It has no relation to, nor depends upon, the ch-ii
laws of the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, or any other nation upon earth: the
municipa.l laws of one society having no connexion with, or influence upon, the
fnndan1ental polity of another. The founders of our English monarchy might
perhaps, if they had thought proper, have made it an elective monarchy: but
they rather chose, and upon good reason, to establish originally a succession by
inheritance. This has been acquiesced in by general consent; and ripened by
degrees into common law: the very same title that every private man has to his
own estate. Lands are not naturally descendible any more than thrones : but
the law has thought proper, for the benefit and peace of the public, to establish
hereditary succession in the one as well as the other.
It must be owned, an elective monarchy seems to be the most obvious, and
best suited of any to the rational principles of government, and the freedom of
human nature: and accordingly we find from history that, in the infancy and
first rudiments of almost every state, the leader, chief magistrate, or prince,
ha.th usually been elective. And, if the individuals who compose that stat~
could always continue true to first principals, uninfluenced by passion or prejudice, unassailed by corruption, and una.wed by violence, elective succession were
as much to be desired in a kingdom, as in other inferior communities. The
best, the wisest, and the bra.vest man, would then be sure of receiving that crown,
which his endowments have merited; and the sense of an unbiassed majority
[ • 193 ] would be dutifully acquiesced in by the few who were •of different
opinions. But history and observation will inform us, that elections of
every kind (in the present state of human nature) are too frequently brought
about by influence, partiality, and artifice: and, even where the case is otherwise, these practices will be often suspected, and as cons.tautly charged upon the
successful, by a splenetic disappointed minority. This is an evil to which all
societies are liable ; as well those of a private and domestic kind, as the gre.at
community of the public, which regulates and includes the rest. But in the
former there is this advantage; that such suspicions, if false, proceed no farther
than jealousies and murmurs, which time will effectually suppress; and, if true,
the injustice may be remedied by legal means, by an apteal to the tribunals to
which eve_!Y member of society has (by becoming such virtually en~ged to
submit. Whereas in the great and independent societ7, w ich every nation composes, there is no superior to resort to but the law o nature: no method to redress the infringements of that law, but the actual exertion of private force. As
therefore between two nations, complaining of mutual injuries, the quarrel can
only be decided by the law of arms; so in one and the same nation, when the
fundamental principles of their common union are supposed to be invaded, and
more especially when the appointment of their chief magistrate is alle~ed to be
unduly made, the only tribunal to which the complainants can appeal is that of
the God of battles, the only process by which the appeal can be carried on is that
of a. civil and intestine war. An hereditary succession to the crown is therefore
now established, in this and most othet countries, in order to prevent that periodical bloodshed and misery, which the history of ancient imperial Rome, and
the more modern experience of Poland and Germany, may shew us are the consequences of elective kingdoms.
2. But, secondly, as to the particular mode of inheritance, it in general corresponds with the feudal path of descents, chalked out by the common law in
the succession to landed estates ; yet with one or two material exceptions. Like
estates, the crown will descend lineally to the issue of the reigmng monarch;
[ • 194 ] as it did from King John to Richard II, through •a regular pedigree of
six lineal generations. As in common descents. the preference of males
to females, and the right of primogeniture among the males, are strictly adhered
to. Thus Edward V succeeded to the crown, in preference to Richard, his
younger brother, and Elizabeth, his elder sister. Like lands or tenements, the
crown, on failure of the ma.le line, descends to the issue female; according to
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the ancient British custom remarked by Tacitus; (a) " solent faminarum ducta

bettare, et sexum in imperils non discernere." Thus Mary I succeeded to Edward

VI; and the line of Margaret Queen of Scots, the daughter of Henry VII, suc-

ceeded on failure of the line of Henry VIII, his son. But among the females,

the crown descends by right of primogeniture to the eldest daughter only and

her issue; and not as in common inheritances, to all the daughters at once;

the evident necessity of a sole succession to the throne having occasioned the

royal law of descents to depart from the common law in this respect: and there-

fore Queen Mary on the death of her brother succeeded to the crown alone, and

not in partnership with her sister Elizabeth. Again: the doctrine of represent-

ation prevails in the descent of the crown, as it does in other inheritances;

whereby the lineal descendants of any person deceased, stand in the same place

as their ancestor, if living, would have done. Thus Richard II succeeded his

grandfather Edward III, m right of his father the Black Prince, to the exclu-

sion of all his uncles, his grandfather's younger children. Lastly, on failure

of lineal descendants, the crown goes to the next collateral relations of the late

king; provided they are lineally descended from the blood royal, that is, from

that royal stock which originally acquired the crown. Thus Henry I succeeded

to William II, John to Richard I, and James I to Elizabeth; being all derived

from the Conquerer, who was then the only regal stock. But herein there is

no objection (as in the case of common descents) to the succession of a brother,

an uncle, or other collateral relation, of the half blood; that is, where the

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

relationship proceeds not from the same couple of ancestors (which constitutes

a kinsman of the whole blood) but from a single ancestor only; as when two

persons are derived from the same father, and not from the same *mother, r*iOKI

or vice versa; provided only that the one ancestor, from whom both "- •"

are descended, be that from whose veins the blood royal is communicated to

each. Thus Mary I inherited to Edward VI, and Elizabeth inherited to Mary;

all children of the same father. King Henry VIII, but all by diiferent

mothers. (1) The reason of which diversity, between royal and common descents,

will be better understood hereafter, when we examine the nature of inheritances

in general.

The doctrine of hereditary right does by no means imply an indefeasible

right to the throne. No man will, I think, assert this, that has considered our

laws, constitution, and history, without prejudice, and with any degree of

attention. It is unquestionably in the breast of the supreme legislative

authority of this kingdom, the king and both houses of parliament, to defeat

this hereditary right; and, by particular entails, limitations, and provisions, to

exclude the immediate heir, and vest the inheritance in any one else. This is

strictly consonant to our laws and constitution; as may be gathered from the

expression so frequently used in our statute book, 01 the king's majesty, his

heirs, and successors." In which we may observe, that as the word, "heirs,"

necessarily implies an inheritance or hereditary right, generally subsisting in the

royal person; so the word, " successors," distinctly taken, must imply that this

(a) In vit. Agrlcola.

(I) It is not very easy to say whether Mary and Elizabeth took the crown by inheritance, or

special parliamentary limitation. 'When the 35 Henry Till, c. 1, passed, they had both, by a

the ancient British custom remarked by Tacitus; (a) "solent farminarum ducta
bellare, ct sexum in imperiis non d1:scernere." 'l'hus Mary I succeeded to Edward
VI ; and the line of .Margaret Qneen of Scots, the daughter of Henry VII, suc·
ceeded on failure of the hne of Henry VIII, his son. But among the females,
the crown descends by right of primogeniture to the eldest daugbter only and
her issue; and not as in common inheritances, to all the daughters at once;
the evident necessity of a sole succession to the. throne having occasioned the
royal law of descents to depart from the common law in this respect: and therefore Queen Mary on the death of her brother succeeded to the crown alone, and
not in partnership with her sister Elizabeth. Again: the doctrine of representation prevails in the descent of the crown, as it does in other inheritances;
whereby the lineal descendants of any person deceased, stand in the same place
as their ancestor, if livin~, would have done. Thus Richard II succeeded his
grandfather Edward III, m right of his father the Black Prince, to the exclu·
sion of all his uncles, his grandfather's younger children. Lastly, on failure
of lineal descendants, the crown goes to the next collateral relations of the late
king; provided they are lineally descended from the blood royal, that is, from
that royal stock which originally acquired the crown. Thus Henry I succeeded
to William II, John to Richard I, and James I to Elizabeth; being all derived
from the Conquerer, who was then the only regal stock. But herein there is
no objection (as in the case of common descents) to the succession of a brother,
an uncle, or other collateral relation, of the half blood ; that is, where the
relationship proceeds not from the same couple of ancestors (which constitutes
a kinsman of the whole blood) but from a single ancestor onlz; as when two
persons are derived from the same father, and not from the same mother, [*l95]
or vice versa; provided only that the one ancestor, from whom both
are descended, be that from whose veins the blood royal is communicated to
each. 'fhus Mary I inherited to Edward VI, and Elizabeth inherit.ed to Mary;
all children of the same father, King Henry VIII, but all by different
mothers. (1) The reason of which diversity, between royal and common descents,
will be better understood hereafter, when we examine the nature of inheritances
in general.
The doctrine of hereditary right does by no means imply an indefeasible
right to the throne. No man will, I think, assert this, that has considered our
laws, constitution, and history, without prejudice, and with any degree of
attention. It is unquestionably in the breast of the supreme legislative
authority of this kingdom, the king and both houses of parliament, to defeat
this hereditary right; and, by particular entails, limitations, and provisions, to
exclude the immediate heir, and vest the inheritance in any one else. This is
strictly consonant to our laws and constitution ; as may be gathered from the
expression so frequently used in our statute book, of the king's majesty, his
heirs, and successors." In which we may observe, that as the word, "heirs,"
necessarily implies an inheritance or hereditary right, generally subsisting in the
royal person; so the word, "successors," distinctly taken, must imply that this

preceding statute, the 28 Hen. VIII, c. 7, been declared illegitimate, and not capable of inheriting

(a)

the crown; that statute, without repealing the former, limited the succession to them and the

In tiit,

Agrico~.

heirs of their bodies respectively under certain circumstances and upon certain conditions. On

the accession of Mary the clauses in 28 Hen. VIII, c. 7, by which her illegitimacy had been

declared, were repealed : 1 M. st. 2, c. 1; and in 1 M. st. 3, c. 1, she is called "the inheritrix to

the imperial crown," but the 35 Hen. VIII, c. 1, was not formally repealed. Elizabeth did not

formally repeal the clauses of the 28 Hen. VIII, c. 7, which affected her legitimacy, but by 1

Eliz. c.~3, she was recognized as being lineally and lawfully descended of the blood royal of the

realm; at the same time, however, the limitation of the crown by the 35 Hen. VIII, c. 1, was

expressly confirmed. The inference from the whole seems to be, that though neither of them

chose to rely on the parliamentary limitation alone, neither thought it right entirely to forgo the

security which it afforded.]
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(I) It is not very easy to say whether Mary and Elizabeth took the crown by inheritance, or
special parliamentary limitation. When tho 3."> Henry VIII, c. 1, pa8sed, they had both, by a
preceding statnto, tho 28 Hen. VIII, c. 7, been declared ille~timat.e, and not capable of inheriting
the crown ; that statnt.e, without repealing the former, liIDJt.ed the succession to them and the
heirs of their bodies respectively under certain circumstances and upon certain conditions. On
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chose to rely on the parliamentary limitation alone, neither thought it right entirely to forgo the
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inheritance may sometimes be broken through; or, that there may be a succes-

sor, without being the heir, of the king. And this is so extremely reasonable,

that without such a power, lodged somewhere, our polity would be very defect-

ive. For, let us barely suppose so melancholy a case, as that the heir apparent

should be a lunatic an idiot, or otherwise incapable of reigning: how miserable

would the condition of the nation be, if he were also incapable of being set aside!

It is therefore necessary that this power should be lodged somewhere; and yet

the inheritance, and regal dignity, would be very precarious indeed, if this power

were expressly and avowedly lodged in the hands of the subject only, to be

exerted whenever prejudice, caprice, or discontent, should happen to take the

lead. Consequently it can no where be so properly lodged as in the two houses

F*196 -i of parliament, by and with the 'consent of the reigning king; who, it

' ' J is not to be supposed, will agree to any thing improperly prejudicial to

the rights of his own descendants. And therefore in the king, lords, and com-

mons, in parliament assembled, our laws have expressly lodged it.

4. But, fourthly; however the crown may be limited or transferred, it still

retains its descendible quality, and becomes hereditary in the wearer of it. And

hence in our law the king is said never to die, in his political capacity; though,

in common with other men, lie is subject to mortality in his natural: because

immediately upon the natural death of Henry, William, or Edward, the king

survives in his successor. For the right of the crown vests, eo instanti, upon

his heir; either the hceres natus, if the course of descent remains un impeached,
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or the Tueres foetus, if the inheritance be under any particular settlement. So

that there can be no interregnum; 2 but, as Sir Matthew Hale (b) observes, the

right of sovereignty is fully invested in the successor by the very descent of the

crown. And therefore, however acquired, it becomes in him absolutely heredi-

tary, unless by the rules of the limitation it is otherwise ordered and determined.

In the same manner as landed estates, to continue our former comparison, are

by the law hereditary, or descendible to the heirs of the owner; but still there

exists a power, by which the property of those lands may be transferred to

another person. If this transfer be made simply and absolutely, the lands will

be hereditary in the new owner, and descend to his heir at law: but if the

transfer be clogged with any limitations, conditions, or entails, the lands must

descend in that channel, so limited and prescribed, and no other.

In these four points consists, as I take it, the constitutional notion of heredi-

itary right to the throne: which will be still farther elucidated, and made clear

beyond all dispute, from a short historical view of the successions to the crown

of England, the doctrines of our ancient lawyers, and the several acts of parlia-

ment that have from time to time been made, to create, to declare, to confirm,

T197 1 *° ^m'*' or to bar, the hereditary *title to the throne. And in the

L -I pursuit of this inquiry we shall find, that, from the days of Egbert, the

first sole monarch of this kingdom, even to the present, the four cardinal

maxims above mentioned have ever been held the constitutional canons of suc-

cession, It is true, the succession, through fraud, or force, or sometimes through

necessity, when in hostile times the crown descended on a minor or the like,

has been very frequently suspended; but has generally at last returned back

into the old hereditary channel, though sometimes a very considerable period

has intervened. And, even in those instances where the succession has been

violated, the crown has ever been looked upon as hereditary in the wearer of it.

Of which the usurpers themselves were so sensible, that they for the most part

endeavored to vamp up some feeble shew of a title by descent, in order to

amuse the people, while they gained the possession of the kingdom. And,

when possession was once gained, they considered it as the purchase or acquisi-

(6) 1 Hist. P. C. 61.

(2) It is upon this principle that the whole period of the commonwealth is reckoned as a part

of the reign of Charles II, who was considered as succeeding to the crown immediately on the

execution of his father, though not in possession until the restoration in 1660.
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inheritance may sometimes be broken through; or, that there may be a successor, without being the heir, of the king. And this is so extremely reasonable,
that without such a power, lodged somewhere, our polity would be very defective. For, let us barely suppose so melancholy a case, as that the heir apparent
should be a lunatic an idiot, or otherwise incapable of reigning: how miserable
would the condition of the nation be, if he were also incapable of being set aside !
It is therefore necessary that this power should be lodged somewhere; and yet
the inheritance, and regal dignity, would be very precarious indeed, if this power
were expressly and avowedly lodged in the hands of the subject only, to be
exerted whenever prejudice, caprice, or discontent, should happen to take the
lead. Consequently it can no where be so properly lodged as in the two houses
[•196 ] of parliament, by and with the •consent of the reigning kin~; who, it
is not to be supposed, will agree to any thing improperly preJudicial to
the rights of his own descendants. And therefore in the king, lords, and commons, in parliament assembled, our laws have expressly lodged it.
4. But, fourthly; however the crown may be limited or transferred, it stilJ
retains its descenaiule quality, and becomes hereditary in the wearer of it. And
hence in our law the king is said never to die, in his political capacity; though,
in common with other men, he is subject to mortalit.Y in his natural: because
immediately upon the natural death of Henry, Wilham, or Edward, the king
survives in his successor. For the right of the crown vests, eo instanti, upon
his heir; either the lusres natus, if the course of descent remains unimpeached,
or the lu~res factus, if the inheritance be under any particular settlement. So
that there can be no interregnum; 2 but, as Sir Matthew Hale ( b) observes, the
right of sovereignty is fully invested in the successor by the very descent of the
crown. And therefore, however acquired, it becomes in him absolutely hereditary, unless by the rules of the limitation it is otherwise ordered and determined.
In the srune manner as landed estates, to continue our former comparison, are
by the law hereditary, or descendible to the heirs of the owner; but still there
exists a power, by which the property of those lands may be transferred tq
another person, If this transfer be made simply and absolutely, the lands will
be hereditary in the new owner, and descend to his heir at law: but if the
transfer be clogged with any limitations, conditions, or entails, the lands must
descend in that channel, so limited and prescribed, and no other.
In these four points consists, as I take it, the constitutional notion of herediitary right to the throne: which will be still farther elucidated, and made clear
beyond all dispute, from a short historical view of the successions to the crown
of England, the doctrines of our ancient lawyers, and the several acts of parliament that have from time to time been made, tu create, to declare, to confirm,
•[l9 7 ] to limit, or to bar, the hereditary *title to the throne. And in the
pursuit of this inquiry we shall find, that, from the days of Egbert, the
first sole monarch of this kmgdom, even to the present, the four cardinal
maxims above mentioned have ever been held the constitutional canons of succeBBion, It is true, the succession, through fraud, or force, or sometimes through
necessity, when in hostile times the crown descended on a minor or the like,
has been very frequently suspended; but has generally at last returned back
into the old hereditary channel, though sometimes a very considerable period
has intervened. And, even in those instances where the succession has been
violated, the crown has ever been looked upon as hereditary in the wearer of it.
Of which the usurpers themselves were so sensible, that they for the most part
endeavored to vamp up some feeble shew of a title by descent, in order to
amuse the people, while they gained the possession of the kingdom. And,
when possession was once gained, they considered it as the purchase or acquisi(b) i Hist. P. C. 61.

(2) It is upon this principle that the w~ole period of tht; commonwealth i~ recko1;1ed as a pa.rt
of the reign of. Charles II, who was. cons1der~d as s~cceedm:r to . the. cro.wn lllllllediately on the
execution of his father, though not m possession until the restoration m 1660.
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tion of a new estate of inheritance, and transmitted or endeavoured to transmit

it to their own posterity, by a kind of hereditary right of usurpation.

King Egbert, about the year 800, found himself in possession of the throne

of the West Saxons, by a long and undisturbed descent from his ancestors of

above three hundred years. How his ancestors acquired their title, whether by

force, by fraud, by contract, or by election, it matters not much to inquire; and

is indeed a point of such high antiquity, as must render all inquiries at best but

plausible guesses. His right must be supposed indisputably good, because we

know no better. The other kingdoms of the heptarchy he acquired, some by

consent, but most by a voluntary submission. And it is an established maxim

in civil polity, and the law of nations, that when one country is united to

another in such a manner, as that one keeps its government and states, and the

other loses them, the latter entirely assimilates with or is melted down in the

former, and must adopt its laws and customs, (e) And in pursuance of this

maxim there hath ever been, since the union of the heptarchy in King Egbert,

a *general acquiescence under the hereditary monarchy of the West r #, no -i

Saxons, through all the united kingdoms. L • • I

From Egbert to the death of Edmund Ironside, a period of above two

hundred years, the crown descended regularly, through a succession of fifteen

princes, without any deviation or interruption: save only that the sons of King

Ethelwolf succeeded to each other in the kingdom, without regard to the

children of the elder branches, according to the rule of succession prescribed by
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their father, and confirmed by the wittena-gemote, in the heat of the Danish

invasions; and also that King Edred, the uncle of Edwy, mounted the throne

for about nine years, in the right of his nephew, a minor, the times being very

troublesome and dangerous. But this was with a view to preserve, and not to

destroy, the succession ; and accordingly Edwy succeeded him. (3)

King Edmund Ironside was obliged, by the hostile irruption of the Danes, at

first to divide his kingdom with Canute, King of Denmark; and Canute, after

his death, seized the whole of it, Edmund^ sons being driven into foreign

countries. Here the succession was suspended by actual force, and a new

family introduced upon the throne: in whom however this new acquired throne

continued hereditary for three reigns; when, upon the death of Hardiknute, the

ancient Saxon line was restored in the person of Edward the Confessor.

He was not indeed the true heir to the crown, being tho younger brother of

King Edmund Ironside, who had a son Edward, sirnamed (from nis exile) the

outlaw, still living. But this son was then in Hungary; and, the English hav-

ing just shaken off the Danish yoke, it was necessary that somebody on the spot

should mount the throne; and the Confessor was the next of the royal line then

in England. On his decease without issue, Harold II usurped the throne; and

almost at the same instant came on the Norman invasion: the right to the

crown being all the time in Edgar, sirnamed Atheling, (which signifies in the

Saxon language illustrious, or of royal blood,) who was the son of Edward the

Outlaw, and grandson of Edmund ""Ironside; or, as Matthew Paris (d) r ,,.. «<. ^

•well expresses the sense of our old constitution, " Edmundus autem *• J

latusferreum, rex naturcdis de stirpe regum, genuit Edwardum; et Edwardus

genuit Edgarum, cui de jure debebatur regnum Anglorum."

William the Norman claimed the crown by virtue of a pretended grant from

King Edward the Confessor; a grant which, if real, was in itself utterly

invalid: because it was made, as Harold well observed in his reply to William s

demand, (e) " absque generali senalus, et populi conventu et edicto ; " which also

very plainly implies, that it then was generally understood that the king, with

consent of the general council, might dispose of the crown and change the line

(e) Puff. L. of N. and X. b. 8, c. 19, i 6. (i) A. D. 10«i. (e) William of Halnub. (. 3.

(3) There-were some other exceptions: Athelstan and Edmund Ironside were both illegitimate

sons, and both took the crown while they had legitimate brothers living.]
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tion of a new estate of inheritance, and transmitted or endeavoured to transmit
it to their own posterity, by a kind of hereditary right of usurpation.
King Egbert, about the year 800, found himself in possession of the throne
of the West Saxons, by a long and undisturbed descent from his ancestors of
above three hundred years. How his ancestors acquired their title, whether by
foree, by fmud, by contra.ct, or by election, it matters not much to inquire; and
is indeed a point of such high antiquity, as must render all inquiries at best but
plausible guesses. His right must be supposed indisputably good, because we
know no better. The other kingdoms of the heptarchy he acquired, some by
consent, but most by a voluntary submission. And it is an established maxim
in civil polity, and the law of nations, that when one country is united to
another m such a manner, as that one keeps its government and states, and the
other loses them, the latter entirely assimilates with or is melted down in the
former, and must adopt its laws and customs. (c) And in pursuance of this
maxim there hath ever been, since the union of the heptarchy in King Egbert,
a *general acquiescence under the hereditary monarchy of the West [ *l9S ]
Saxons, through all the united kingdoms.
From Egbert to the death of Edmund Ironside, a period of above two
hundred years, the crown descended regularly, through a succession of fifteen
princes, without any deviation or interruption: save only that the sons of King
Ethelwolf succeeded to each other in the kingdom, without regard to the
children of the elder branches, according to the n1le of succession prescribed by
their father, and confirmed by the wittena-gemote, in the heat of the Danish
invasions; and also that King Edred, the uncle of Edwy, mounted the throne
for a.bout nine years, in the right of his nephew, a minor, the times being Yery
troublesome and dangerous. But this was with a Yiew to preserve, and not to
destroy, the succession ; and accordingly Edwy succeeded him. (3)
King Edmund Ironside was obliged, by the hostile irruption of the Danes, at
first to divide his kingdom with Canute, King of Denmark; and Canute, after
bis death, seized the whole of it, Edmund's sons being driven into foreign
countries. Here the succession was suspended by actual force, and a new
family introduced upon the throne: in whom however this new acquired throne
continued hereditary for three reigns; when, upon the death of Hardiknute, the
ancient Saxon line was restored in the person of Edward the Confessor.
He was not indeed the trne heir to the crown, being tho younger brother of
Xing Edmund Ironside, who had a son Edward, sirnamed (from his exile) the
outlaw, still living. But this son was then in Hungary; and, the English having just shaken off the Danish yoke, it was necessnrv that somebody on the spot
should mount the throne; and the Confessor was the next of the royal line then
in England. On his decease without issue, Harold II usurped the throne; and
almost at the same instant came on the Norman invasion : the ri~ht to the
crown being all the time in Edgar, sirnamed Atheling, (which sigmfies in t.he
Saxon language illustrfou.~. or of royal blood,) who was the son of Edward the
Outlaw, and grandson of Edmund *Ironside; or, as Matthew Paris (d) [ • 199 ]
well expresses the sense of our old constitution, "Edmundus autem
latusfen·611,m, rex naturalis de stirpe regum, genuit Edwardum; et Edwardus
genuit Edgarum, cui de Jure debebatur regnum Anglorwm."
William the Norman claimed the crown by virtue of a pretended grant from
King Edward the Confessor; a grant which, if real, was in itself utterll
invalid: because it was made, as Harold well observed in his reply to Williams
demand, (e) "absiue g_enerali senatus, et populi conirentu et edicto;" which also
very plainly implies, that it then was generally understood that the king, with
consent of the general council, might dispose of the crown and change the line
(C)

PnCI'. L. of N. and N. b. 8, c. 19, f 6.

(cl) A. D. 1086.

(e) William ot Jilal1D8b. I. 3.

(3) There were eome other exoe)!tions: Atbelstan and Edmund Ironside were both illeeitimate
&0ns, and both took the crown while they had legitimate brothers living.]
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of succession. (4) William's title however was altogether as good as Harold's,

he being a mere private subject, and an utter stranger to the royal blood. Edgar

Atheling's undoubted right was overwhelmed by the violence of the times;

though frequently asserted by the English nobility after the conquest, till such

time as he died without issue: but all their attempts proved unsuccessful, and

only served the more firmly to establish the crown in the family which had

newly acquired it.

This conquest then by William of Normandy was, like that of Canute before,

a forcible transfer of the crown of England into a new family: but, the crown

being so transferred, all the inherent properties of the crown were with it trans-

ferred also. For, the victory obtained at Hastings not being (/) a victory over

the nation collectively, but only over the person of Harold, the only right that

the conqueror could pretend to acquire thereby, was the right to possess the

crown of England, not to alter the nature of the government. And therefore,

as the English laws still remained in force, he must necessarily take the crown

subject to those laws, and with all its inherent properties; the first and princi-

pal of which was its descendibility. Here then we must drop our race of Saxon

kings, at least for a while, and derive our descents from William the Conqueror

as from a new stock, who acquired by right of war (such as it is, yet still the

F *200 1 *dern'ier resort of kings) a strong and undisputed title to the inheri-

L •• able crown of England.

Accordingly it descended from him to his sons William II and Henry I.
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Kobert, it must be owned, his eldest son, was kept out of possession by the arts

and violence of his brethren ; who perhaps might proceed upon a notion, which

prevailed for some time in the law of descents, (though never adopted as the

rule of public successions,) (g) that when the eldest son was already provided

for, (as Kobert was constituted Duke of Normandy by his father's will,) in such

a case the next brother was entitled to enjoy the rest of their father's inherit-

ance. But, as he died without issue, Henry at last had a good title to the throne,

whatever he might have at first.

Stephen of Blois, who succeeded him, was indeed the grandson of the con-

queror, by Adelicia his daughter, and claimed the throne by a feeble kind of

hereditary right: not as being the nearest of the male line, but as the nearest

male of the blood royal, excepting his elder brother Theobald; who was Earl of

Blois, and therefore seems to have waived, as he certainly never insisted on, so

troublesome and precarious a claim. The real right was in the Empress Matilda

or Maud, the daughter of Henry I; the rule of succession being, (where women

are admitted at all,) that the daughter of a son shall be preferred to the son of a

daughter. So that Stephen was little better than a mere usurper; and there-

fore he rather chose to rely on a title by election, (h) while the Empress Maud

did no fail to assert her hereditary right by the sword: which dispute was

attended with various success, and ended at last in the compromise made at Wal-

lingford, that Stephen should keep the crown, but that Henry, the son of Maud,

should succeed him, as he afterwards accordingly did.

Henry, the second of that name, was (next after his mother Matilda) the

undoubted heir of William the Conqueror; but he had also another connexion

f *2011 *n blood) wnicn endeared *him still farther to the English. He was line-

L J ally descended from Edmund Ironside, the last of the Saxon race of

hereditary kings. For Edward the Outlaw, the son of Edmund Ironside, had

(besides Edgar Atheling, who died without issue) a daughter, Margaret, who

(/) Hale, Hiat. C. L. c. 5. Seld. Review of Tithes, c. 8. (g) See Lord Lytfleton'a 1.1ft of Henry n,

vol. 1. p. 467.

(ft) " Ego Stephanus Dei gratia asiensu cleri et populi in regent Anglorum electas, <f c." (Cart. A. D. 1136.

Ric. de Hagustald. 314. Hearneod Gu«. Xeubr. 711.)

(4) [Perhaps it also as plainly implies, what the coronation service and other documents,

together with the reason of the thing, raise a strong presumption of, that at this time the crown

was partly elective; elective with a restriction to one family, and a preference of primogeniture

and legitimacy.]
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was married to Malcolm king of Scotland; and in her the Saxon hereditary

right resided. By Malcolm she had several children, and among the rest Matilda

the wife of Henry I, who by him had the Empress Maud, the mother of Henry

II. Upon which account the Saxon line is in our histories frequently said to

have been restored in his person, though in reality that right subsisted in the

sons of Malcolm by Queen Margaret; King Henry's best title being as heir to

the conqueror. (5)

From Henry II the crown descended to his eldest son Eichard I, who dying

childless, the right vested in his nephew Arthur, the son of Geoffrey his next

brother: but John, the youngest son of King Henry, seized the throne; claim-

ing, as appears from his charters, the crown by hereditary right: (t) that is to

say, he was next of kin to the deceased king, being his surviving brother;

whereas Arthur was removed one degree farther, being his brother's son, though

by right of representation he stood in the place of his father Geoffrey, And

however flimsy this title, and those of William Rufus and Stephen of Blois,

may appear at this distance to us, after the law of descents hath now been set-

tled for so many centuries, they were sufficient to puzzle the understandings of

our brave, but unlettered ancestors. Nor, indeed, can we wonder at the number

of partisans who espoused the pretensions of King John in particular, since

even in the reign of his father King Henry II, it was a point undetermined, (k)

whether, ever in common inheritances, the child of an elder brother should suc-

ceed to land in right of representation, or the younger suviving brother in
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right of proximity of blood. Nor is it to this day decided, in the collateral

succession to the fiefs of the empire, whether the order of the stocks, or the

proximity of degree, shall take place. (I) However, on the death of Arthur

*and his sister Eleanor without issue, a clear and indisputable title

vested in Henry III, the son of John ; and from him to Eichard the

Second, a succession of six generations, the crown descended in the true heredi-

tary line. Under one of which race of princes (m) we find it declared in par-

liament, " that the law of the crown of England is, and always hath been, that

the children of the king of England, whether born in England or elsewhere,

ought to bear the inheritance after the death of their ancestors. Which law our

sovereign lord the king, the prelates, earls, and barons, and other great men,

together with all the commons in parliament assembled, do approve and affirm

for ever."

Upon Richard the Second's resignation of the crown, he having no children,

the right resulted to the issue of his grandfather Edward III. That king had

many children besides his eldest, Edward the black prince of Wales, the father

of Richard II; but, to avoid confusion, I shall only mention three: William his

second son, who died without issue; Lionel, duke of Clarence, his third son ;

and John of Gant, duke of Lancaster, his fourth. By the rules of succession,

therefore, the posterity of Lionel, duke of Clarence, were entitled to the throne

upon the resignation of King Richard; and had accordingly been declared by

the king, many years before, the presumptive heirs of the crown; which declara-

tion was also confirmed in parliament, (n) But Henry, duke of Lancaster, the

son of John of Gant, having then a large army in the kingdom, the pretence

of raising which was to recover his patrimony from the king, and to redress the

grievances of the subject, it was impossible for any other title to be asserted

with any safety; and he became king under the title of Henry IV. But, as Sir

Mathew Hale remarks, (o) though the people unjustly assisted Henry IV in his

usurpation of the crown, yet he was not admitted thereto until he had declared

that he claimed, not as a conqueror, (which he very much inclined to do) (p) but as

(0 - —lltijni Angliae I quod noUsiure oompttU haereditarfo." Spelm. Hist. R. John apud Wilkins, 364.

(t) Glanl. 1.7, c 3. (I) Mod. Un. Hist. xrx. S12. (m) Stttt. 28 Edw. Ill, 8t 2.

(n) Stanford's GeneaL Hist. 8«i. (o) Hlet. C. L. c. 6. (p) Seld. Tit. Hon. 1, 3.

(5) [Henry the Second crowned his eldest son Henry (who died before him) in his life-time;

another strong circumstance to show in how unsettled and precarious a state was the right of

hereditary succession in his age. See Lord Lyt book 3.]
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a successor, descended by right line of the blood royal; as appears from the rolls

of parliament in those times. And, in order to do this, he set up a show of two

F *203 1 t*^es : **ne one UP011 tne pretence of being the first of the blood royal

' '' ' in the entire male line, whereas the duke of Clarence left only one

daughter, Philippa; from which female branch, by a marriage with Edmond

Mortimer, earl of March, the house of York descended: the other by reviving

an exploded rumour first propogated by John of Gant, that Edmond, Earl 01

Lancaster, (to whom Henry's mother was heiress) was in reality the elder brother

of Edward I; though his parents, on account of his personal deformity,

had imposed him on the world fox the younger; and therefore Henry would be

entitled to the crown, either as successor to Richard II, in case the entire male

line was allowed a preference to the female; or even prior to that unfortunate

prince, if the crown could descend through a female, while an entire male line

was existing.

However, as in Edward the Third's time we find the parliament approving

and affirming the law of the crown, as before stated, so in the reign of Henry

IV, they actually exerted their right of new-settling the succession to the crown.

And this was done by the statute 7 Hen. IV, c. 2, whereby it is enacted, " that

the inheritance of the crown and realms of England and "France, and all other

the king's dominions, shall be set and remain (q) in the person of our sovereign

lord the king, and in the heirs of his body issuing;" and Prince Henry is

declared heir apparent to the crown, to hold to him and the heirs of his body
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issuing, with remainder to the Lord Thomas, Lord John, and Lord Humphry,

the king's sons, and the heirs of their bodies respectively; which is indeed

nothing more than the law would have done before, provided Henry the Fourth

had been a rightful king. It however serves to shew that it was then generally

understood, that the king and parliament had a right to new-model and regulate

the succession to the crown; and we may also observe with what caution and

delicacy the parliament then avoided declaring any sentiment of Henry's origi-

nal title. However Sir Edward Coke more than once expressly declares, (r)

\ *2041 *kat a* ^e ^me °^ *Paesin£ this act the right °f the crown was in the

L -I descent from Philippa, daughter and heir of Lionel duke of Clarence.

Nevertheless the crown descended regularly from Henry IV to his son and

grandsons Henry V and VI; in the latter of whose reigns the house of York

asserted their dormant title; and, after imbruing the kingdom in blood and

confusion for seven years together, at last established it in the person of Edward

IV. At his accession to the throne, after a breach of the succession that con-

tinued for three descents, and above threescore years, the distinction of a king

de jure and a king de facto began to be first taken; in order to indemnify such

as had submitted to th'e late establishment, and to provide for the peace of the

kingdom, by confirming all honours conferred and all acts done by those who

were now called the usurpers, not tending to the disherison of the rightful heir.

In statute 1 Edw. IV, c. 1, the three Henrys are styled, "late kings of England

successively in dede, and not of ryght." And in all the charters which I have

met with of King Edward, wherever he has occasion to speak of any of the line

of Lancaster, he calls them "nuper de facto, et non de jure, reges Angliw."

Edward IV left two sons and a daughter; the eldest of which sons, King Ed-

ward V, enjoyed the regal dignity for a very short time, and was then deposed

by Richard, his unnatural uncle, who immediately usurped the royal dignity,

haying previously insinuated to the populace a suspicion of bastardy in th'e

children of Edward IV, to make a shew of some hereditary title: after which

he is generally believed to have murdered his two nephews, upon whose death

the right of the crown devolved to their sister Elizabeth.

The tyrannical reign of King Richard III, gave occasion to Henry, earl of

Richmond, to assert his title to the crown. A title the most remote and unac-

countable that was ever set up, and which nothing could have given success to

but the universal detestation of the then usurper Richard. For, besides that he

(?) Soft myc et thmaerge. (fl 1 Inat. 37, 200.
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an exploded rumour first propogated by John of Gant, that Edmond, Earl of
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confusion for seven years together, at last established it in the person of Edward
IV. At his accession to the throne, after a breach of the succession that continued for three descents, and above threescore years, the distinction of a king
de jure and a king de facto began to be first taken ; in order to indemnify such
as had submitted to the late establishment, and to provide for the peace of the
kingdom, by confirming all honours conferred and all acts done by those who
were now called the usurpers, not tending to the disherison of the rightful heir.
In statute 1 Edw. IV, c. I, the three Henrys are styled," late kings of England
successively in dede, and not of ryght." And in all the charters which I have
met with of King Edward, wherever he has occasion to speak of any of the line
of Lancaster, he calls them" nuper de facto, et non de jure, reges Anglim."
Edward IV left two sons and a daughter; the eldest of which sons, King Edward V, enjoyed the regal dignity for a very short time, and was then deposed
by Richard, his unnatural uncle, who immediately usurped the royal dignity,
having previously insinuated to the populace a suspicion of bastardy in the
children of Edward IV, to make a shew of some hereditary title; after which
he is generally believed to have murdered his two nephews, upon whose death
the right of the crown devolved to their sister Elizabeth.
The tyrannical reign of King Richard III, gave occasion to Henry, earl of
Richmond, to assert his title to the crown. A title the most remote and unaccountable that was ever set up, and which nothing could have given success to
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claimed under a descent from John of Gant, whose title was now exploded, the

claim, (such as it was) was through John Earl of Somerset, a bastard son, begot-

ten by John of *Gant upon Catharine Swinford. It is true that, by an act |-*OOK-I

of parliament, 20 Kic. II, this son was, with others, legitimated and made >- •*

inheritable to all lands, offices, and dignities, as if lie nad been born in wedlock;

but still with an express reservation of the crown, " excepta dignitate regali." (s)

Notwithstanding all this, immediately after the battle of Bosworth Field, he

assumed the regal dignity; the right of the crown then being, as Sir Edward

Coke expressly declares, (f) in Elizabeth, eldest daughter of Edward IV; and his

possession was established by parliament, holden the first year of his reign. In

the act for which purpose the parliament seems to have copied the caution of ,

their predecessors in the reign of Henry IV; and therefore, (as Lord Bacon the

historian of this reign observes,) carefully avoided any recognition of Henry

VII's right, which indeed was none at all; and the king would not have it by

way of new law or ordinance, whereby a right might seem to be created and

conferred upon him; and therefore a middle way was rather chosen, by way (as

the noble historian expresses it,) of establishment, and that under covert and indif-

erent words, " that the inheritance of the crown should rest, remain, and abide, in

King Henry VII and the heirs of his body;" thereby providing for the future,

and at the same time acknowledging his present possession; but not determin-

ing either way, whether that possession was dejure or de facto merely. However,

he soon after married Elizabeth of York, the undoubted heiress of the conqueror,
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and thereby gained (as Sir Edward Coke (u) declares) by much his best title to

the crown. (6) Whereupon the act made in his favour was so much disregarded,

that it never was printed in our statute books.

Henry the Eighth, the issue of this marriage, succeeded to the crown by clear,

indisputable, hereditary right, and transmitted it to his three children in suc-

cessive order. But in his reign we at several times find the parliament busy in

regulating the succession to the kingdom. And, first by 'statute 25 r*oQg-i

Hen. VIII, c. 12, which recites the mishiefs which have and may ensue "- -"

by disputed titles, because no perfect and substantial provision hath been made

by law concerning the succession; and then enacts, that the crown shall be

entailed to his majesty, and the sons or heirs male of his bodv; and in default

of such sons to the Lady Elizabeth (who is declared to be the king's eldest issue

female, in exclusion of the Lady Mary, on account of her supposed illegitimacy

by the divorce of her mother Queen Catharine) and to the Lady Elizabeth s

heirs of her body; and so on from issue female to issue female, and the heirs of

their bodies, by course of inheritance according to their ages, «s the crown of

England hath been accustomed, and ought to go, in case where there be heirs

female of the same: and in default of issue female, then to the king's right heirs

for ever. This single statute is an ample proof of all the four positions we at

first set out with.

But, upon the king's divorce from Ann Boleyn, this statute was, with regard to

the settlement of the crown, repealed by statute 28 Hen. VIII, c. 7, wherein the

Lady Elizabeth is also, as well as the Lady Mary, bastardized, and the crown

settled on the King's children by Queen Jane Seymour, and his future wives;

and, in defect of such children, then with this remarkable remainder, to such

persons as the king by letters patent, or last will and testament, should limit and

appoint the same: a vast power, but notwithstanding, as it was regularly vested

in him by the supreme legislative authority, it was therefore indisputably valid.

But this power was never carried into execution; for by statue 35 Hen. VIII,

c. 1, the king's two daughters are legitimated again, and the crown is limited to

Prince Edward by name, after that to the lady Mary, and then to the lady

Elizabeth, and the heirs of their respective bodies; which succession took effect

(a) 4 Iust. 86. (t} Ibid. 87. («) Ibid. 37.

(6) [And yet it ie difficult to see what title to the crown he could have gained by marrying

tin- rightful queen.]
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appoilit the same: a vast power, but notwithstanding, as it was regularly vested
in him by the supreme legislative authority, it was therefore indisputably valid.
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c. 1, the king's two daughters are legitimated again, and the crown is limited to
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Inai. 36.

(tJ Ibid. 87.

(tJ) I

Wd. 87.

(6) [And yet it is difficult to see what title to the crown he could have gained by marrying
the rightful queen.]
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accordingly, being indeed no other than the usual course of the law, with regard

to the descent of the crown.

But lest there should remain any doubt in the minds of the people, through

this jumble of acts for limiting the succession, by statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 1,

f *207 1 Queen Marv'8 *hereditary right to the throne is acknowledged and

I -I recognized in these words: "Ihe crown of these realms is most lawfully,

justly and rightly descended and come to the queen's highness that now is, being

the very true and undoubted heir and inheritrix thereof." And again, upon the

queen's marriage with Philip of Spain, in the statute which settles the prelimi-

naries of that match, (a;) the hereditary right to the crown is thus asserted and

declared: " As touching the right of the queen's inheritance in the realm and

dominions of England, the children, whether male or female, shall succeed in

them, according to the known laws, statutes, and customs of the same." Which

determination of the parliament, that the succession sJuill continue in the nsual

course seems tacitly to imply a power of new-modelling and altering it, in case

the legislature had thought proper.

On Queen Elizabeth's accession, her right is recognized in still stronger terms

than her sister's; the parliament acknowledging, (y) "that the queen's highness

is, and in very deed and of most mere right ought to be, by the laws of God,

and the laws and statutes of this realm, our most lawful and rightful sovereign,

liege lady and queen; and that her highness is rightly, lineally, and lawfully

descended and come of the blood royal of this realm of England; in and to
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whose princely person, and to the heirs of her body lawfully to be begotten,

after her, the imperial crown and dignity of this realm doth belong." And in

the same reign, by statute 13 Eliz. c. 1, we find the right of parliament to direct

the succession of the crown asserted in the most explicit words: " If any person

shall hold, affirm, or maintain that the common laws of this realm, not altered

by parliament, ought not to direct the right of the crown of England; or that

the queen's majesty, with and by the authority of parliament, is not able to make

laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to limit and bind the crown of

this realm, and the descent, limitation, inheritance, and government thereof:

F *208 1 sucn Person>so holding, affirming, or maintaining, shall *during the life

L -1 of the queen, be guilty of high treason; and after her decease shall be

guilty of a misdemeanor, and forfeit his goods and chattels."

On the death of Queen Elizabeth, Without issue, the line of Henry VIII

become extinct. It therefore became necessary to recur to the other issues of

Henry VII, by Elizabeth of York his queen ; whose eldest daughter Margaret

having married James IV, King of Scotland, King James the Sixth of Scotland,

and of England the First, was the lineal descendant from that alliance. So that

in his person, as clearly as in Henry VIII, centered all the claims of different

competitors, from the conquest downwards, he being indisputably the lineal

heir of the conqueror. And, what is still more remarkable, in his person also

centered the right of the Saxon monarchs, which had been suspended from

the conquest till his accession. For, as was formerly observed, Margaret, the

sister of Edgar Atheling, the daughter of Edward the Outlaw, and grand-

daughter of King Edmund Ironside, was the person in whom the hereditary

right of the Saxon kings, supposing it not abolished by the conquest, resided.

She married Malcolm King of Scotland; and Henry II, by a descent from

Matilda their daughter, is generally called the restorer of the Saxon line. But

it must be remembered, that Malcolm by his Saxon queen had sons as well as

daughters; and that the royal family of Scotland, from that time downwards,

were the offspring of Malcolm and Margaret Of this royal family, King James

the First was the direct lineal heir, and therefore united in his person every possi-

ble claim by hereditary right to the English as well as Scottish throne, being

the heir both of Egbert and William the conqueror.

And it is no wonder that a prince of more learning than wisdom, who could

deduce an hereditary title for more than eight hundred years, should easily be

(*) 1 Mar. St. 2, c. 2. |y) Stat 1 Eliz. c. 8.
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accordingly, being indeed no other than the usual course of the law, with regard
to the descent of the crown.
. But lest there should remain any doubt in the minds of the people, through
this jumble of acts for limiting the succession, by statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 1,
[ • 207 ] Queen Mary's *hereditary ri~ht to the throne is acknowledged and
recognized in these words: "'Ihe crown of these realms is most lawfully,
justly and rightly de,~cended and come to the queen's highness that now is, being
the very true and undoubted heir and inheritrix thereof." And again, upon the
queen's marriage with Philip of Spain, in the statute which settles the preliminaries of that match, (x) the hereditary right to the crown is thus asserted and
declared: i; As touching the right of the queen's inheritance in the realm and
dominions of England, the children, whether male or fe~ale, shall succeed in
them, according to the known laws, statutes, and customs of the same." Which
determination of the parliament, that the succession sltall continue in the usual
course seems tacitly to imply a power of new-modelling and altering it, in case
the legislature had thought proper.
On Queen Elizabeth's accession, her right is recognized in still stronger terms
than her sist~r's; the parliament acknowledging, (y) "that the queen's highness
is, and in very deed and of most mere right ought to be, by the laws of God,
and the laws and statutes of this realm, our most lawful and rightful sovereign
liege lady and queen; and that her highness is rightly, lineally, and lawfully
descended and come of the blood royal of this realm of England; in and to
whose princely person, and to the heirs of her body lawfully to be begotten,
after her, the imperial crown and dignity of this realm doth belong." And in
the same reign, by statute 13 Eliz. c. 1, we find the right of parliament to direct
the succession of the crown asserted in the most explicit words: "If any person
shall hold, affinn, or maintain that the common laws of this realm, not altered
by parliament, ought not to direct the right of the crown of England; or that
the queen's majesty, with and by the authority of parliament, is not able to make
laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to limit and bind the crown of
this realm, and the descent, limitation, inheritance, and government thereof:
[ • 208 ] such person, so holding, affirming, or maintaining, shall *during the life
of the queen, be guilty of high treason ; and after her decease shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and forfeit his ~oods and chattels."
On the death of Queen Elizabeth, without issue, the line of Henry VIII
be.come extinct. It therefore became necessary to recur to the other issues of
Henry VII, by Elizabeth of York his queen ; whose eldest daughter Margaret
having married James IV, King of Scotland, King James the Sixth of Scotland,
and of England the First, was the lineal descendant from that alliance. So that
in his person, as clearly as in Henry VIII~ centered all the claims of different
competitors, from the conquest dowhwards, he being indis1;1utablv the lineal
heir of the conqueror. And, what is still more remarkable, m bis" person also
centered the right of the Saxon monarchs, which had been suspended from
the conquest till his accession. For, as wa.s formerly observed, Margaret, the
sister of Edgar Atheling, the daughter of Edward the Outlaw, and granddaughter of King Edmund Ironside, was the persoh in whom the hereditary
right of the Saxon king~, supposing it not abolished by the conquest, resided.
She married Malcolm Kirtg of Scotland; and Hertty II, by a descent from
Matilda their daughter, is generally called the restorer of the Saxon line. But
it must be remembered, that Malcolm by his Saxon queen had sons as well as
daughters; and that the royal family of Scotland, from that time downwards,
were the offspring of Malcolm and Margaret. Of this royal family, King James
the First was the direct lineal heir, and therefore united in his person every possible claim by hereditary right to the English as well as Scottish throne, being
the heir both of Egbert and William the conqueror.
And it is no wonder that a prince of more learning than wisdom, who could
deduce an hereditary title for more than eight hundred years, should easily be
(Z)
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taught by the flatterers of the times to believe there was something divine in

this right, and that the finger of Providence was visible in its *preserva- r ^QQ -i

tion. Whereas, though a wise institution, it was clearly a human insti- L ^

fcution ; and the right inherent in him no natural, but a positive right. (7) And

in this, and no other, light was it taken by the English parliament, who by

statute 1 Jac. I, c. 1, did " recognize and acknowledge, that immediately upon

the dissolution and decease of Elizabeth, late queen of England, the imperial

crown thereof did by inherent birthright, and lawful and undoubted succession,

descend and come to his most excellent majesty, as being lineally, justly, and

lawfully, next and sole heir of the blood royal of this realm." Not a word here

of any right immediately derived from heaven ; which, if it existed any where,

must be sought for among the aborigines of the island, the ancient Britons,

among whose princes, indeed, some have gone to search it for him. (z)

But, wild and absurd as the doctrine of divine right most undoubtedly is, it is

still more astonishing, that when so many human hereditary rights had centered

in this king, his son and heir King Charles the First should be told by those

infamous judges, who prono'unced his unparalleled sentence, that he was an

elective prince; elected by his people, and therefore accountable to them in his

own proper person, for his conduct. The confusion, instability, and madness,

which followed the fatal catastrophe of that pious and unfortunate prince, will

be a standing argument in favor of hereditary monarchy to all future ages; as

they proved at last to the then deluded people: who, in order to recover that
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peace and happiness which for twenty years together they had lost, in a solemn

parliamentary convention of the estates, restored the right heir of the crown.

And in the proclamation for that purpose, which was drawn up and attended

by both houses, (a) they declared, " that according to their duty and allegiance

they did heartily, joyfully, and unanimously acknowledge and proclaim, that

immediately upon the *decease of our late sovereign lord King Charles, r *oi Q 1

the imperial crown of these realms did by inherent birthright and law- <- *

ful and undoubted succession descend and come to his most excellent majesty

Charles the Second, as being lineally, justly, and lawfully, next heir of the blood

royal of this realm: and thereunto they most humbly and faithfully did submit

and oblige themselves, their heirs, and posterity for ever."

Thus I think it clearly appears, from the highest authority this nation ia

acquainted with, that the crown of England hath ever been an hereditary crown,

though subject to limitations by parliament. (8) The remainder of this chapter

will consist principally of those instances wherein the parliament has asserted

or exercised this right of altering and limiting the succession ; a right which,

we have seen, was oefore exercised and asserted in the reigns of Henry IV,

Henry VII, Henry VIII, Queen Mary, and Queen Elizabeth.

The first instance, in point of time, is the famous bill of exclusion, which

raised such a ferment in the latter end of the reign of King Charles the Second.

It is well known that the purport of this bill was to have set aside the king's

brother and presumptive heir, the Duke of York, from the succession, on the

score of his being a papist; that it passed the house of commons, but was

rejected by the lords; the king having also declared beforehand, that he never

(«J Elizabeth of York, the mother of Queen Margaret of Scotland, \V;H heiress of the house of Mortimer.

And Mr. Carte observes, that the house of Mortimer, in virtue of its descent from Gladys, only sister to

Llewellin ap Jorworth the great, had the true right to the principality of Wales. Hist. Eng. lit, 706.

(a) Com. Jonrn. 8 May, 1660.

(7) [It ia difficult to say in what light it was considered in that parliament which, in the

preamble to the statute, declares with nauseous pedantry, that, " upon the knees of their

hearts, they agnize their constant faith, obedience and loyalty to his majesty and his royal

progeny."]

(8) [The foregoing and subsequently related facts are evidence of the power of a legisla-

ture, and it is not easy to extract from them that any settled course of descent fundamentally

regulated or controlled that power; and it is finally seen that a legislature, viz.: a convention,

not a parliament, recalled King Charles II; it wfll as soon also be seen that another con-

vention thought it expedient to elect, in the dry meaning of the word elect, another king and

queen to replace the pertinacious, but conscientious, brother of King Charles II.]
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would be brought to consent to it. And from this transaction we may collect

two things: 1. That the crown was universally acknowledged to be hereditary;

and the inheritance indefeasible unless by parliament: else it had been needless

to prefer such a bill. 2. That the parliament had a power to have defeated the

inheritance: else such a bill had been ineffectual. The commons acknowledged

the hereditary right then subsisting; and the lords did not dispute the power,

but merely the propriety, of an exclusion. However, as the bill took no effect.

King James the Second succeeded to the throne of his ancestors; and might have

enjoyed it during the remainder of his life but for his own infatuated conduct,

which, with other concurring circumstances, brought on the revolution in 1688.

r *gjj -i *The true ground and principle upon which that memorable event

J proceeded was an entirely new case in politics, Vhich had never before

happened in our history, — the abdication of the reigning monarch, and the

vacancy of the throne thereupon. It was not a defeasance of the right of suc-

cession, and a new limitation of the crown, by the king and both houses of

parliament: it was the act of the nation alone, upon a conviction that there was

no king in being. For, in a full assembly of the lords and commons, met in a

convention upon the supposition of this vacancy, both houses (b) came to this

resolution: " That King James the Second, having endeavored to subvert the

constitution of the kingdom, by breaking the original contract between king

and people; and, by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons, having vio-

lated the fundamental laws; and having withdrawn himself out of this king-
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dom; has abdicated the government, and that the throne is thereby vacant"

Thus ended at once, by this sudden and unexpected vacancy of the throne, the

old line of succession ; which from the conquest had lasted above six hundred

years, and from the union of the heptarchy in King Egbert, almost nine hun-

dred. The facts themselves thus appealed to, the king's endeavour to subvert the

constitution by breaking the original contract, his violation of the fundamental

laws, and his withdrawing himself out of the kingdom, were evident and noto-

rious ; and the consequences drawn from these facts, (namely, that they amounted

to an abdication of the government; which abdication did not affect only the

person of the king himself, but also all his heirs, and rendered the throne abso-

lutely and completely vacant,) it belonged to our ancestors to determine. For,

whenever a question 'arises between the society at large and any magistrate vested

with powers originally delegated by that society, it must be decided by the voice

of the society itself: there is not upon earth any other tribunal to resort to.

And that these consequences were fairly deduced from these facts, our ancestors

have solemnly determined, in a full parliamentary convention representing the

f *2121 wno*e society- The "reasons upon which they decided may be found at

"- -" large in the parliamentary proceedings of the times; and may be matter

of instructive amusement for us to contemplate, as a speculative point of history.

But care must be taken not to carry this inquiry further than merely for instruc-

tion or amusement. The idea, that the consciences of posterity were concerned

in the rectitude of their ancestors' decisions, gave birth to those dangerous

political heresies, which so long distracted the state, but at length are happily

extinguished. I therefore rather choose to consider this great political measure

upon the solid footing of authority, than to reason in its favor from its justice,

moderation, and expediency: because that might imply a right of dissenting or

revolting from it, in case we should think it to have been unjust, oppressive, or

inexpedient. Whereas, our ancestors having most indisputably a competent

jurisdiction to decide this great and important question, and having in fact

decided it, it is now become our duty at this distance of time to acquiesce in their

determination; being born under that establishment which was built upon this

foundation, and obliged by every tie, religious as well as civil, to maintain it. (9)

(b) (Ann. Journ. 7 Feb. 1688.

(9) [This is not the only instance in which the learned commentator's abstract love of

liberty, coupled with his reverence for the constitution, as it is established, has involved him
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would be brought to consent to it. And from this transaction we may collect
two things: 1. That the crown was universally acknowled~ed to be hereditary;
a.nd the inheritance indefeasible unless by parliament: else it had been needless
to prefer such a bill. 2. That the parliament had a power to have defeated the
inheritance: else such a bill had been ineffectual. The commons acknowledged
the hereditary right then subsisting; and the lords did not dispute the power,
but merely the propriety, of an exclusion. However, as the bill took no effect,
King James the Second succeeded to the throne of his ancestors; and might have
enjoyed it during the remainder of his life but for hie own infatuated conduct,
which, with other concurring circumstances, brought on the revolution in 1688.
*The true ground and principle upon which that memorable event
[ ,.. 211 ]
proceeded was an entirely new case in politics, 'Which had never before
happened in our history,-the abdication of the reigning monarch, and the
vacancy of the throne thereupon. It was not a defeaaance of the right of succession, and a new limitation of the crown, by the king and both houses of
parliament: it was the act of the nation alone, upon a conviction that there was
no king in being. For, in a full assembly of the lords and commons, met in a
convention upon the supposition of this vacancy, both houses (b} came to this
resolution: "That King James the Second, having endeavored to subvert the
constitution of the kingdom, by breaking the original contract between king
and people; and, by the advice of jesuits and other wicked persons, having violated the fundamental laws; and having withdrawn himself out of this kingdom; has abdicat~d the government, and that the throne is thereby vacant."
Thus ended at once, by this sudden and unexpected vacancy of the throne, the
old line of succession; which from the conquest had lasted above six hundred
years, and from the union of the heptarchy in King Egbert, almost nine hundred. The facts themselves thus appealed to, the king's endeavour to subvert the
constitution by breaking the original contract, his violation of the fundamental
laws, and his withdrawing himself out of the kingdom, were evident and notorious; and the consequences drawn from these facts, (namely, that they amounted
to an abdication of the government; which abdication did not affect only the
person of the king himself, but also all his heirs, and rendered the throne absolutely and completelv vacant,} it belonged to our ancestors to determine. For,
whenever a question "arises between the society at large and any magistrate vested
with powers originally delegated by that society, it must be decided by the voice
of the society itself: there is not u:pon earth any other tribunal to resort to.
And that these consequences were fairly deduced from these facts, our ancestors
have solemnly determined, in a full parliamentary convention representing the
[ • 212 ] whole society. The *reasons upon which they decided may be found at
large in the parliamentary proceedings of the times; and may be matter
of instructive amusement for us to contemplate, as a speculative point of history.
But care must be taken not to carry this inquiry further than merely for instruction or amusement. The idea, that the consciences of posterity were concerned
in the rectitude of their ancestors' decisions, gave birth to those dangerous
political heresies, which so long distracted the state, but at length are happily
extinguished. I therefore rather choose to consider this great political measure
upon the solid footing of authority, than to reason in its favor from its justice,
moderation, and expediency: because that might imply a right of dissenting or
revolting from it, in case we should think it to have been unjust, oppressive, or
inexpedient. Whereas, our ancestors having most indisputably a competent
jurisdiction to decide this great and important question, and having in fact
decided it, it is now become our duty at this distance of time to acquiesce in their
determination; being born under that establishment. which was built up0n this
foundation, and obliged by every tie, religious as well as civil, to maintain it. (9)
(ll) Com. Journ. 7 Feb. 1088.

(9) [This is not the only instanre in which the learned t!Ommentator'R abstrart love of
liberty, coupled with bis reverence for the constitutiou, as it ii! established, bu.s involved him
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But, while we rest this fundamental transaction, in point of authority, npon

grounds the least liable to cavil, we are bound both in justice and gratitude to

add, that it was conducted with a temper and moderation which naturally

arose from its equity; that, however it might in some respects go beyond the

letter of our ancient laws, (the reason of which will more fully appear here-

after,) (c) it was agreeable to the spirit of our constitution, and the rights of

human nature; and that though in other points, owing to the peculiar circum-

stances of things and persons, it was not altogether so perfect as might have

been wished, yet from thence a new sera commenced, in which the bounds of

prerogative and liberty have been better defined, the principles of government

more thoroughly examined and understood, and the rights of the subject more

explicitly guarded by legal provisions, than in any other period of the English

history. In particular it is *worthy observation that the convention, in r ^-i 3 n

this their judgment, avoided with great wisdom the wild extremes into "- -"

which the visionary theories of some zealous republicans would have led them.

They held that this misconduct of King James amounted to an endeavour to

subvert the constitution; and not to an actual subversion, or total dissolution,

of the government, according to the principles of Mr. Locke: (d) which would

have reduced the society almost to a state of nature; would have levelled all

distinctions of honour, rank, offices, and property: would have annihilated the

sovereign power, and in consequence have repealed all positive laws; and would

have left the people at liberty to have erected a new system of state upon a new
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foundation of polity. They therefore very prudently voted it to amount to no

more than an abdication of the government, and a consequent vacancy of the

throne; whereby the government was allowed to subsist, though the executive

magistrate was gone, and the kingly office to remain, though King James was

no longer king, (e) And thus the constitution was kept entire; which upon

every sound principle of government must otherwise have fallen to pieces, had

so principal and constituent a part as the royal authority been abolished, or even

suspended. (10)

This single postulatum, the vacancy of the throne, being once established,

the rest that was then done followed almost of course. For, if the throne be at

any time vacant, (which may happen by other means besides that of abdication;

as if all the blood royal should fail, without any successor appointed by parlia-

ment ;) if, I say, a vacancy by any means whatsoever should happen, the right

of disposing of this vacancy seems naturally to result to the lords and com-

mons, the trustees and representatives of the nation. For there are no other

hands in which it can so properly be intrusted; and there is a necessity of its

being intrusted somewhere, else the whole frame of government must be dis-

solved and perish. The lords and commons having therefore determined this

main fundamental article, that there was a vacancy of the throne, they proceeded

to fill up that vacancy in such manner as they *judged the most proper, r #0141

And this was done by their declaration of 12 February, 1638, (/) in the «• J

(e) See Chap. 7. d) On Gov. p. 2, c. 19.

(e) Law of Ibrfeit, 118,119. (/) Com. Jonrn. 12 Feb. 1688.

in a political fallacy. By what process of reasoning it can be demonstrated, that it is our duty to

But, while we rest this fundamental transaction, in point of authority, upon
grounds the least liable to cavil, we a.re bound both in justice and gratitude to
a.!1, that it was conducted with a temper and moderation which naturally
a.rose from its equity; that, however it might in some respects go beyond the
letter of our ancient laws, (the reason of which will more fully appear hereafter,) (c) it was agreeable to the spirit of our constitution, and the rights of
human nature; and that though in other points, owing to the peculiar circumstances of things and persons, it was not altogether so perfect as might have
been wished, yet from thence a new rera commenced, in which the bounds of
prerogative and liberty have been better defined, the principles of government
more thoroughly examined and understood, and the rights of the subject more
explicitly guarded by legal provisions, than in any other period of the English
history. In particular it is *worthy observation that the convention, in [ • 213 ]
this their jud~ment, avoided with great wisdom the wild extremes into
which the visionary theories of some zealous republicans would have led them.
They held that this misconduct of King James amounted to an endeavour to
subvert the constitution ; and not to an actual subversion, or total dissolution,
of the government, according to the principles of Mr. Locke: ( d) which would
have reduced the society almost to a state of nature; would have levelled all
distinctions of honour, rank, offices, and property: would have annihilated the
sovereign power, and in consequence have repealed all positive laws; and would
have left the people at liberty to have erected a new system of state upon a new
foundation of polity. They therefore very prudently voted it to amount to no
more than an abdication of' the government, and a consequent vacancy of the
throne ; whereby the government was allowed to subsist, though the executive
magistrate was gone, and the kingly office to remain, though King James was
no longer king. (e) And thus the constitution waa kept entire; which upon
every sound principle of government must otherwise have fallen to pieces, had
so principal and constituent a part as the royal authority been abolished, or even
suspended. (10)
This single postulatum, the vaeancy of the throne, being once established,
the rest that was then done followed almost of course. For, if the throne be at
any time vacant, (which may happen by other means besides that of abdication;
as if all the blood royal should foil, without any successor appointed by parliament ;) if, I say, a vacancy by any means what.soever should happen, the right
of disposing of this vacancy seems naturally to result to the lords and commons, the trustees and representatives of the nation. For there are no other
hands in which it can so properly be intmsted; and there is a necessity of its
being intrusted somewhere, else the whole frame of government must he dissolved and perish. 'fhe lords and commons having therefore determined this
main fundamental article, that there was a vacancy of the throne, they proceeded
to fill up that vacancy in such manner as they *judged the most proper. [ • 214 ]
And this was done by their declaration of 12 February, 1688, (/) in the

acquiesce in the demonstrations of our ancestors, though they were bound by no such obligation

with regard to theirs, is not easily to be conceived. Yet such is by plain and natural inference a

(C)

See Chap. 7.

(e) Law of fbrfelt, 118, 119.

cl) On Gov. p. 2, c. 19.
(/)Com. Jonm. 12 Feb.1688.

proposition of our author. The principle that a people have the right to choose and to regulate

their own form of government, if true in 1688, does not become false, by the lapse of time; and

reasoning a priori, it may be more safely exercised now than at any antecedent period, because

the science of government is better understood. The respect and attachment due to the institu-

tions of a free state, like ours, so far from being compromised, are included and avowed in this

sentiment. And the learned commentator might have better urged the improbability of the na-

tion again having occasion to exercise this power over the constitution, than have enforced the

obligation to maintain the constitution because we are born under it. ]

(10) [The unusual combination of favorable circumstances which attended this revolution, and

the temper and moderation of its conductors, are well commented upon by Mr. Hallam. Const.

Hist. c. 14. See also Professor Smyth's Leek on Hist* No. 20.]
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in a \>olitica.l fnlla.cy. By what process of reasoning it ce.n be demonstrated, that it is our duty to
a.cqmesce in the demonstmtion11 of our anco8tors, though they were bound by no 1mch obligation
with regard to thei™, is not easily t.-0 be conceived. Yet such is by plain and natural inference a
proprniition of our author. The principle that a people have the right to choose and to regulate
their own form of government, if true in 1688, does not become false, by tho Jap..a of time ; a.ud
reasoning a priori, it may be more ~afoly exercised now than at any antecedent period, becaul!e
the science of government is better unden;t()od. The respect and atta{'hment due to the institutions of a free stat-01 like ours, so far from being compromi8ed, are included and 11vowed in this
KCntiment. .And the learned commentator might have better nrged the improbability of the nation again ha.vin~ occa;;ion to exercise this power over the conRtitution, than have enforced the
obligation to mamta.in the constitution becau11e we are born under it.]
(10) ('fhe unu:mal combination of favorable circumstances which attended this revolution, and
the temper and moderation of its conductors, are well commented upon by :Mr. Hallam. CODBt.
Hi:!t. c. 14. See alHo Profes;mr Smyth's Leet. on Hist.; No. 20.]
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following manner: " that William and Mary, prince and princess of Orange, be,

and be declared king and queen, to hold the crown and royal dignity during their

lives, and the life of the survivor of them ; and that the sole and full exercise

of the regal power be only in, and executed by, the said prince of Orange, in the

names of the said prince and princess, during their joint lives: and after their

deceases the said crown and royal dignity to be to the heirs of the body of the

said princess; and for default of such issue to the Princess Anne of Denmark

and the heirs of her body; and for default of such issue to the heirs of the body

of the said prince of Orange."

Perhaps, upon the principles before established, the convention might (if they

pleased) have vested the regal dignity in a family entirely new, and strangers to

the royal blood: but they were too well acquainted with the (benefits of heredi-

tary succession, and the influence which it has by custom over the minds of the

people, to depart any farther from the ancient line than temporary necessityand

self-preservation required. They therefore settled the crown, first on King

William and Queen Mary, King James's eldest daughter, for their joint lives:

then on the survivor of them; and then on the issue of Queen Mary: upon

failure of such issue, it was limited to the Princess Anne, King James's second

daughter, and her issue; and lastlv, on failure of that, to the issue of King

William, who was the grandson of Charles the First, and nephew as well as son-

in-law of King James the Second, being the son of Mary, his eldest sister. This

settlement included all the protestant posterity of King Charles I, except such
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other issue as King James might at any time have, which was totally omitted

through fear of a popish succession. And this order of succession took efl'ect

accordingly.

These three princes, therefore, King William, Queen Mary, and Queen Anne,

did not take the crown by hereditary right or descent, but by way of donation

F*215l orPurc^tase' M the *lawyers call it; by which they mean any method

*• J of acquiring an estate otherwise than by descent. The new settlement

did not merely consist in excluding King James, and the person pretended to

be the prince of Wales, and then suffering the crown to descend in the old hered-

itary channel: for the usual course of descent was in some instances broken

through; and yet the convention still kept it in their eye, and paid a great,

though not total, regard to it. Let us see how the succession would have stood,

if no abdication had happened, and King James had left no other issue than his

two daughters, Queen Mary and Queen Anne. It would have stood thus:

Queen Mary and her issue ; Queen Anne and her issue; King William and his

issue. But we may remember, that Queen Mary was only nominally queen,

jointly with her husband King William, who alone had the regal power; and

King William was personally preferred to Queen Anne, though his issue was

postponed to hers. Clearly, therefore, these princes were successively in posses-

sion of the crown by a title different from the usual course of descents.

It was towards the end of King William's reign, when all hopes of any sur-

viving issue from any of these princes died with the Duke of Gloucester, that

the king and parliament thought it necessary again to exert their power of

limiting and appointing the succession, in order to prevent another vacancy of

the throne; which must have ensued upon their deaths, as no farther provision

was made at the revolution than for the issue of Queen Mary, Queen Anne, and

King William. The parliament had previously, by the statute of 1 W. and M.

st. 2, c. 2, enacted, that every person who should be reconciled to, or hold com-

munion with, the see of Eiome, should profess the popish religion, or should

marry a papist, should be excluded, and be forever incapable to inherit, possess,

or enjoy the crown; and that in such case the people should be absolved from

their allegiance, and the crown should descend to such persons, being protest-

ants, as would have inherited the same, in case the person so reconciled, holding

communion, professing, or marrying, were naturally dead. To act therefore

T *21 fi 1 C0n8istently with themselves, and at the same *time pay as much regard

I -I to the old hereditary line as their former resolutions would admit, they
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following manner: "that William and Marv, prince and princess of Orange, be,
and be declared king and queen, to hold the· crown and royal dignitv during their
live.s, and the life of the survivor of them ; and that the sole and full exercise
of the regal power be only in, and executed by, the said prince of Orange, in the
names of the said prince and princess. during their joint lives: and after their
deceases the said crown and royal dignit>' to be to the heirs of the body of the
said princess ; and for default of such issue to the Princess Anne of Denmark
and the heirs of her body; and for default of such issue to the heirs of the body
of the said prince of Orange."
Perhaps, upon the principles before established, the convention might (if they
pleased) have vested the regal dignity in a family entirely new, and strangers to
the royal blood: but they were too well acquainted with the ibenefits of hereditary succession, and the 'lnfluence which it has by custom over the minds of the
people, to depart any farther from the ancient line than temporary necessity and
self-;J?reservation required. They therefore settled the crown~ first on King
Wilham and Queen Mary, King James's eldest daughter, for their joint lives:
then on the survivor of them ; and then on the issue of Queen Mary: upon
failure of such issue, it was limited to the Princess Anne, King James's second
daughter, and her issue; and lastlv, on failure of that, to the issue of King
William, who was the grandson of Charles the First, and nephew as well as sonin-law of King James the Second, being the son of Mary, his eldest sister. This
settlement included all the protestant posterity of King Charles I, except such
other issue as King James might at any time have, which was totally omitted
through fear of a popish succession. And this order of succession took effect
accordingly.
These three princes, therefore, King William, Queen Mary, and Queen Anne,
did not take the crown by hereditary right or descent, but by way of donation
*' ] or purcha:~e, as the *lawyers call it; by which they me.an any method
[ 215 of acquiring an estate otherwise than by descent. The new settlemmt
did not merely consist in excluding King James, and the person pretended to
he the prince of Wales, and then sufferin~ the crown to descend in the old lwreditary channel: for the usual course of descent was in some instances broken
through ; and yet the convention still kept it in their eve, and paid a great,
though not total, regard to it. Let us see how the succession would have stood,
if no abdication had happened, and King James had left no other issue than his
two daughters, Queen Mary and Queen Anne. It would have stood thus:
Queen Mary and her issue ; Queen Anne and her issue; King William and his
issue. But we may remember, that Queen Mary was only nominally queen,
jointly with her husband King William, who alone had the re~al power; and
King William was personally preferred t-0 Queen Anne, though his issue was
postponed to hers. Clearly, therefore, thei!e princes were successively in possession of the crown by a title different from the usual course of descents.
It was towards the end of Kin~ William's reign, when all hopes of any surviving issue from any of these pnnces died with the Duke of Gloucester, that
the king and parliament thought it necessary a.gain to exert their power of
limiting and appointing the succession, in order to prevent another vacanc.Y of
the throne ; which must have ensued upon their deaths, as no farther provision
was made at the revolution than for the issue of Queen Mary, Queen Anne, and
King William. The parliament had previously, by the statute of 1 W. and M.
st. 2, c. 2, enacted, that every person who should be reconciled to, or hold communion with, the see of Rome, should profess the popish reli~on, or should
marry a papist, should be excluded, and be forever incapable to mherit, possess,
or enjoy the crown ; and that in such case the people should be absolved from
their allegiance, and the crown should descend to such persons, being protestants, as would have inherited the same, in case the person so reconciled, holding
communion, professing, or marrying, were naturally dead. To act therefore
[ • 216 ] consistently with themselves, and at the same *time pay as much regard
to the old hereditary line as their former resolutions would admit, they
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turned their eyes on the Princess Sophia, electress and duchess dowager of

Hanover, the most accomplished princess of her age. (g) For, upon the impend-

ing extinction of the protestant posterity of Charles the First, the old law of

legal descent directed them to recur to the descendants of James the First; and

the Princess Sophia, being the youngest daughter of Elizabeth queen of

Bohemia, who was the daughter of James the First, was the nearest of the

ancient blood royal, who was not incapacitated by professng the popish religion.

On her, therefore, and the heirs of her body, being protestants, the remainder of

the crown, expectant on the death of King Willham and Queen Anne without

issue, was settled by statute 12 and 13 W. Ill, c. 2. And at the same time it

was enacted, that whosoever should hereafter come to the possession of the

crown should join in the communion of the church of England as by law

established.

This is the last limitation of the crown that has been made by parliament:

and these several actual limitations, from the time of Henry IV, to the present,

do clearly prove the power of the king and parliament to new-model or alter

the succession. And indeed it is now again made highly penal to dispute it:

for by the statute 6 Ann. c. 7, it is enacted, that if any person maliciously,

advisedly, and directly, shall maintain, by writing or printing, that the kings of

this realm with the authority of parliament are not able to make laws to bind

the crown and the descent thereof, he shall be guilty of high treason; or if he

maintains the same by only preaching, teaching, or advised speaking, he shall
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incur the penalties of a prwmunire.

The Princess Sophia dying before Queen Anne, the inheritance thus limited

descended on her son and heir King George the First; and, having on the death

of the queen taken effect in his person, from him it descended to his late

majesty King George the Second; and from him to his grandson and heir, our

present gracious sovereign, King George the Third.

*Hence it is easy to collect, that the title to the crown is at present r #2i 71

hereditary, though not quite so absolutely hereditary as formerly: and L ' J

the common stock or ancestor, from whom the descent must be derived, is also

different. Formerly the common stock was King Egbert; then William the

Conqueror; afterwards in James the First's time the two common stocks united,

and so continued till the vacancy of the throne in 1688: now it is the Princess

Sophia, in whom the inheritance was vested by the new king and parliament.

Formerly the descent was absolute, and the crown went to the next heir with-

out any restriction : but now, upon the new settlement, the inheritance is con-

ditional ; being limited to such heirs only, of the body of the Princess Sophia,

as are protestant members of the church of England, and are married to none

but protestants.

And in this due medium consists, I apprehend, the true constitutional notion

of the right of succession to the imperial crown of these kingdoms. The

extremes, between which it steers, are each of them equally destructive of those

ends for which societies were formed and kept on foot. Where the magistrate,

upon every succession, is elected by the people, and may by the express

provision of the laws be deposed (if not punished) by his subjects, this may

sound like the perfection of liberty, and look well enough when delineated on

paper; but in practice will be ever productive of tumult, contention and

anarchy. And, on the other hand, divine, indefeasible, hereditary right, when

coupled with the doctrine of unlimited passive obedience, is surely of all con-

stitutions the most thoroughly slavish and dreadful. But when such an heredi-

tary right, as our laws have created and vested iii the royal stock, is closely

interwoven with those liberties, which, we have seen in a former chapter, are

equally the inheritance of the subject; this union will form a constitution, in

theory the most beautiful of any, in practice the most approved, and, I trust, in

(g) Sandford, in his genealogical history, published A. D. 1677, speaking of the princesses Elizabeth,

Louisa, and Sophia, daughters of the queen of Bohemia, says, the first was reputed the most learned, the

second the greatest artist, and the last one of the most accomplished ladies in Europe.

L.J J

turned their eyes on the Princess Sophia, electress and duchess dowager of
Hanover, the most accomplished princess of her age. (g) For, upon the impending extinction of the protestant posterity of Charles the First, the old law of
legal descent directed them to recur to the descendants of James the First; and
the Princess Sophia, being the youngest daughter of Elizabeth queen of
Bohemia, who was the daughter of James the First, was the nearest of the
ancient blood royal, who was not incapacitated by professng the popish religion.
On her, therefore, and the heirs of her body, bein~ protestants, the remainder of
the crown, expectant on the death of King Willham and Queen Anne without
issue, was settled by statute 12 and 13 W. III, c. 2. And at the same time it
was enacted, that whosoever should hereafter come to the possession of t.he
crown should join in the communion of the church of England as by law
established.
This is the last limitation of the crown that has been made by parliament:
and these several actual limitations, from the time of Henry IV, to the present,
do clearly prove the power of the king and parliament to new-model or alter
the succession. And indeed it is now again made highly penal to dispute it:
for by the statute 6 Aun. c. 7, it is enacted, that if any person maliciously,
advisedly, and directly, shall maintain, by writing or printing, that the kings of
this realm with the authority of parliament are not able to make laws to bind
the crown and the descent thereof, he shall be guilty of high treason; or if he
maintains the same by only preaching, teaching, or advised speaking, he shall
incur the penalties of a prammnire.
The Princess So1)hia dyin~ before Queen Aune, the inheritance thus limited
descended on her son and heir King George the First; and, having on the death
of the queen taken effect in his person, from him it descended to his late
majesty King George the Second; and from him to his grandson and heir, our
present gracious sovereign, King George the Third.
*Hence it is easy to collect, that the title to the crown is at present [ • 217 ]
hereditary, though not quite so absolutely hereditary as formerly: and
the common stock or ancestor, from whom the descent must be derived. is also
different. Formerly the common stock was King Egbert; then William the
Conqueror; afterwards in James the First's time the two common stocks united,
and so continued till the vacancy of the throne in 1688: now it is the Princess
Sophia, in whom the inheritance was vested by the new king and parliament.
Formerly the descent was absolute, and the crown went to the next heir without any restriction: but now, upon the new settlement, the inheritance is conditional; being limited to such heirs only, of the body of the Princess Sophia,
as are protestant members of the church of England, and are married to none
but protestants.
And in this due medium consists, I apprehend, the true constitutional notion
of the right of succession to the imperial crown of these kingdoms. The
extremes, between which it steers, are each of them equally destmctiYe of those
ends for which societies were formed and kept on foot. Where the magistrate,
upon every succession, is elected by the people, and may by the express
provision of the laws be deposed (if not punished) by his subjects, this may
sound like the perfection of libertj, and look well enough when delineated on
paper; but in practice will be ever productive of tumult, contention and
anarchy. And, on the other hand, divme, indefeasible, hereditary right, when
coupled with the doctrine of unlimited passive obedience, is surely of all constitutions the most thoroughh• slavish and dreadful. But when such an hereditary right, as our laws have..created and vested in the royal stock, is closely
interwoven with those liberties, which, we have seen in a former chapter, are
equally the inheritance of the subject; this union will form a constitution, in
theory the most beautiful of any, m practice the most approved, and, I trust, in
(g) Sandford, In his genealogical history, publi~hed .A. D . 1677, speaking of the princesses Elizabeth,
Louisa, and Sophln, dnnghters or the queen or Bohemia, says, the first was reputed the most learned, the
BOOond the greatest artist, and the lat<t one of the most nccomplisbed ladies In l:nro)'e.
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duration the most permanent. It was the duty of an expounder of our laws to

lay this constitution before the student in its true and genuine light: it is the

duty of every good Englishman to understand, to revere, to defend it. (11)

duration the most permanent. It was the duty of an expounder of our laws to
lay this constitution before the student in its true and genuine light: it is the
duty of every good Englishman to understand, to revere, to defend it. (11)

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE KING'S ROYAL FAMILY.

The first and most considerable branch of the king's royal family, regarded

by the laws of England, is the queen.

The queen of England is either queen regent, queen consort, or queen dowager

The queen regent, regnant, or sovereign, is she who holds the crown in her own

CHAPTER IV.

right; as the first (and perhaps the second) Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, and

Queen Anne; and such a one has the same powers, prerogatives, rights, digni-

OF THE KING'S ROYAL FAMILY.

ties, and duties, as if she had been a king. This was observed in the entrance

of the last chapter, and is expressly declared by statute 1 Mar. I, st. 3, c. 1. But

the queen consort is the wife of the reigning king; and she, by virtue of'her

marriage, is participant of divers prerogatives above other women, (a)

And first, she is a public person, exempt and distinct from the king: and

not, like other married women, so closely connected as to have lost all legal or

separate existence so long as the marriage continues. For the queen is of

fa) Finch, L. 88.

(11) By the constitution of the United States the president, who is the federal executive, is

chosen by electors, who are themselves chosen by the people of the several states to perform

that duty. Each state appoints in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a num-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ber of electors equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the state

may be entitled in congress: Const, art. 2, $ 1; and those electors meet in the respective

states and vote by ballot for president and vice-president, one of the persons voted for, at

least, not being an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; the result of which voting

is transmitted to the seat of government, and canvassed in joint convention of the two houses

The first and most considerable branch of the king's royal family, regarded
by the laws of England, is the queen.

The queen of England is either queen regent, queen consort, or queen dowager
The queen regent, regnant, or sovereign, is she who holds the crown in her own
right; as the first (and perhaps the second) Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, and
Queen Anne; and such a one has the same powers, prerogatives, rights, dignities, and duties, as if she had been a king. This was observed in the entrance
of the last chaprer, and is expressly declared by statute 1 Mar. I, st. 3, c. 1. But
the queen consort is the wife of the reigning king; and she, by virtue of ·her
marriage, is participant of divers prerogatives above other women. (a)
And first, she is a public person, exempt and distinct from the king: and
not, like other married women, so closely connected as to have lost all legal or
separate existence so long as the marnage continues. For the queen is of

of congress. If no one person have a majority of all the votes cast for president, the house

(a)

Finch, L. 86.

of representatives proceeds immediately to choose a president by ballot, from the persons, not

exceeding three, having the highest number of votes; but in this election they vote by states,

the representation of each state being entitled to one vote, and a majority of all the states being

necessary to a choice. If no person has a majority of all the votes cast for vice-president, the

senate, from the two highest numbers on the list, chooses a vice-president; a majority vote of a

quorum of two-thirds of all the senators being requisite to an election. Const. 12th amendment.

No person is eligible to either of these offices except a natural born citizen, or one who was a

citizen at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and who has attained the age of thirty-five

years. Const, art. 2, J 1.

In ca.se of the removal of the president from office or of his death, resignation or inability to

discharge the powers and duties of his office, the same devolve on the vice-president. Const,

art. 2, 9 1. And in case of vacancy in the office of vice-president, then such powers and

duties devolve upon the president pro tern, of the senate, or, if there be no such officer, then

apon the speaker of the house of representatives for the time being. 1 Stat at Large, 239.

And if the house of representatives shall not choose a president when the right devolves

upon them, by the fourth day of March next following, the vice-president becomes acting

president, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the president. Const.

12th amendment. The president and vice-president, like all other civil officers, are subject to be

removed from office, on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes

and misdemeanors. Const, art. 2, J 4.

By the constitution, as originally adopted, the electors chosen in the states cast their votes

for two persons, without designating which was then- choice for president and which for vice-

president, and the persons having the highest number, if a majority of all, became president,

and the one having the next highest number, if a majority, became vice-president; but, when

party lines came to be distinctly drawn, so that the candidates of one party, in the absence of

intrigue or bad faith, were likely always to receive the same number of votes, the purpose of

this scheme of election was wholly defeated, and the constitution, after the exciting election

of Mr. Jefferson by the house of representatives over Mr. Burr, who had been candidate before

the people for the second position only, was changed as above shown.
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(11) By the constitution of the United States the president, who is the federal executive, is
chosen by electors, who are themselves chosen by the people of the several states to perform
that duty. Ea.ch state appoints in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a nnmlier of electorR eq_u&l to the whole number of senators 11I1d representatives to which the state
may be entitled m congress : Const. &rt. 2, § 1 ; 11I1d those electms meet iu the respective
states u.nd vote by ballot for president and vice-~reRident, one of the person!! voted fur, at
lesst, not being an inhabitant of the so.me 11tate with themselve.s; the result of which voting
is tre.mmritted to the seat of government, and ce.nva&<ed in joint convention of the two houses
of congress. If no one person have a majority of all the votes cast for president. the house
of representatives proceedi; immediately to choose a pref<ident bv ballot, from the persons, not
exceeding three, having the highest number of votes; but in this election they vote by states,
the representation of each state being entitled to one vote, and a majority of all the states being
nece11sary to a choice. If no person has a me.Jority of all the votes ca.st for vice·preRident, the
senate, from the two highest numbers on the hst, chooses a vice-president; a majority vote of a
quorum of two-thirds of all the senatol'I! being requisite to an election. Const. 12th amendment.
No person is eligible to either of these offices except a natural born citizen, or one who was a.
citizen at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and who has attained the age of thirty-five
years. Con11t. art. 2, § 1.
In ca.-1e of the removal of the president from office or of bis death, resignation or inability to
diseharge the powers and duties of his office, the same devolve on the vice-president. Const.
art. 2, ~ 1. And in case of va.c11I1cy in the office of vice-president, then such powers 11I1d
duties devolve upon the president pro tem. of the Renate, or, if there be no such officer, then
upon the speaker of the house of representatives for the time lieing. 1 Stat. a.t Large, 239.
.lnd if the house of representatives shall not choose a president when the right devolves
upon them, by the fourth day of Me.rch next following, the vice-president becomes acting
pre~ident, a.s in the case of the death or other constitutional disabilitr. of the president. C<lnst.
l:lth amendment. The president and vice-president, like all other civil officers. a.re subject to be
removed from office, on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors. Const. &rt. 2, § 4.
By the constitution, as ori~nally adopted, the electors chosen in the states cast their votes
for two persons, without designating which was their choice for president and which for vicepre!!ident, and the persons having the highest number, if a majority of all, became president,
and the one having the next highest number, if a majority, became vice-president; but, when
party lines came to be distinctly drawn, so t.hat the candidates of one party, in the absence of
mtrigne or bad faith, were likely always to receive the same number of votes, the purpose of
this scheme of election wa.s wholly defeated, and the constitution, after the exciting election
of Mr. J effereon by the house of representatives over Mr. Burr, who had been candidate before
the people for the 8000nd position only, WBll changed as above shown.
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OF THE QUEEN REGENT.

ability to purchase lands, and to convey them, to make leases, to grant copy-

holds, and do other acts of ownership, without the concurrence of her lord;

which no other married woman can do: (b) a privilege as old as the Saxon

era. (c) She is also capable of taking a grant from the king, which no other

wife is from her husband; and in this particular she agrees with the Augusta,

or piissima regina conjux divi imperaloris of the Boman laws; who, according

to Justinian, (d) was equally ""capable of making a grant to, and receiv- •- *OIQ 1

ing one from, the emperor. The queen of England hath separate courts L -"

and offices distinct from the king's, not only in matters of ceremony, but even

of law; and her attorney and solicitor general are entitled to a place within the

bar of his majesty's courts, together with the king's counsel, (e) She may like-

wise sue and be sued alone, without joining her husband. She may also have a

separate property in goods, as well as lands, and has a right to dispose of them

by will. In short, she is in all legal proceedings looked upon as a feme sole,

and not as a feme covert; as a single, not as a married woman. (/) For which

the reason given by Sir Edward Coke is this: because the wisdom of the com-

mon law would not have the king, (whose continual care and study is for the

public and circa ardua regni,) to be troubled and disquieted on account of his

wife's domestic affairs; and therefore it vests in the queen a power of transact-

ing^ her own concerns, without the intervention of me king, as if she was an

unmarried woman.

The queen hath also many exemptions and minute prerogatives. For instance:
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she pays no toll; (g) nor is she liable to amercement in any court. (A) But in

general, unless where the law has expressly declared her exempted, she is upon

the same footing with other subjects; being to all intents and purposes, the

king's subject, and not his equal: in like manner as, in the imperial law, "Au-

gusta legibus soluta non est." (i)

The queen hath also some pecuniary advantages, which form her a distinct

revenue: as in the first place, she is entitled to an ancient perquisite called

queen-gold, aurum regince, which is a royal revenue, belonging to every queen

consort during her marriage with the king, and due from every person who

hath made a voluntary offering or fine to the king, amounting to ten marks or

upwards, for and in consideration of any privileges, grants, licences, pardons, or

*other matter of royal favour conferred upon him by the king: and it r *oofj i

is due in the proportion of one tenth part more, over and above the entire •• -"

offering or fine made to the king; and becomes an actual debt of record to the

queen's majesty by the mere recording of the fine, (k) (1) As, if an hundred

marks of silver be given to the king for liberty to take in mortmain, or to have

a fair, market, park, chase, or free-warren: there the queen is entitled to ten

marks in silver, or (what was formerly an equivalent denomination) to one mark

in gold, by the name of queen-gold, or aurum regincs. (I) But no such payment

is due for any aids or subsidies granted to the king in parliament or convoca-

tion; nor for fines imposed by courts on offenders,.against their will; nor for

voluntary presents to the king, without any consideration moving from him to

the subject; nor for any sale or contract whereby the present revenues or posses-

sions of the crown are granted away or diminished, (m)

The original revenue of our ancient queens, before and soon after the con-

quest, seems to have consisted in certain reservations or rents out of the demesne

lands of the crown, which were expressly appropriated to her majesty, distinct

from the king. It is frequent, in domesday book, after specifying the rent

(1) 4 Rep. 23.

(e) Seld. Jan. Angl, 1, 42. The instance meant, loo. citat. u where .TCthclswitli. wife to Bnrghred, lane

of the Mercians, granted a patent to Cuthwala. (d) Cod. 5,16,26. (e) Seld, tit hon. I, 6, 7.

(>) Finch. L. 86. Co. Litt. 133. (g) Co. Utt. 133. (ft) Finch. L. 185. U) Ff. I. 3, 81.

(i) Pryn. Aur. reg. 2. (I) 12 Rep. 21. 4 Inst. 358. (m) Ibid. Pryn. 6. Madox, Hist. Exoh. 242.

(1) [Lord Littleton enters at some length into this subject of fines to the king as one con-

siderable source of the royal revenue in tne early periods of our Anglo-Norman history, and

cites from Hadox a vast number of instances, gome indeed ludicrous, but all scandalous and

ability to purchase lands, and to convey them, to make leases, to grant copyholds, and do other acts of ownership, without the concurrence of her lord;
which no other married woman can do: (b) a privilege as old as the Saxon
era. (c) She is also capable of taking a grant from the king, which no other
wife is from her husband; and in tlns particular she agrees with the Aug,usta,
or pii.~sitna regina conjux divi imperatoris of the Roman laws; who, according
to Justinian, (d) was equally *capable of making a grant to, and receiv- [ • 219 ]
ing one from, the emperor. The queen of England hath separate courts
and offices distinct from the kin~'s, not only in matters of ceremony, but even
of law; and her attorney and solicitor general are entitled to a pliwe within the
bar of his majesty's courts, together with the king's counsel. (e) She may likewise sue and be sued alone, without joining her husband. She may also have a
separate property in goods, as well as lands, and has a right to dispose of them
by will. In short, she. is in all legal proceedings looked upon as a feme sole,
and not as a feme covert; as a single, not as a married woman. (f) For which
the reason given by Sir Edward Coke is this: because the wisdom of the common law would not have the. king, (whose continual care and study is for the
public and circa ardua regni,) to be troubled and disquieted on account of his
wife's domestic affairs; and therefore it vests in the queen a power of transacting her own concerns, without the intervention of the king, as if she was an
unmarried woman.
The queen hath also many exemptions and minute prerogatives. For instance:
she pays no toll; (g) nor is she liable to amercement in any court. (h) But in
general, unless where the law has expressly declared her exempted, she is upon
the same footing with other subjects; being to all intents and purposes, the
king's subject, and not his equal: in like manner as, in the imperial law, "Augusta legibus soluta non est." (i)
The queen hath also some pecuniary advantages, which form her a distinct
reYenue: as in the first place, she is entitled to an ancient perquisite called
queen-gold, aurum reginr.e, which is a royal revenue, belonging to every queen
consort during her marriage with the kmg, and due from every person who
hath made a Yoluntary offering or fine to the king, amounting to ten marks or
upwards, for and in consideration of any privileges, grants, licences, pardons, or
*other matter of royal favour conferred upon him by the king: and it [ • 220 ]
is due in the proportion of one tenth part more, over and above the entire
offering or fine made to the king ; and becomes an actual debt of record to the
queen's majesty by the mere recording of the fine. (k) (1) As, if an hundred
marks of silYer be given to the king for liberty to take in mortmain, or to have
a fo.ir, market, park, chase, or free-warren: there the queen is entitled to ten
marks in silver, or (what was formerly an equivalent denomination) to one mark
in gold, by the name of queen-gold, or aurum reginOJ. (l) But no such payment
is due for any aids or subsidies granted to the king in parliament or convocir
ti on ; nor for fines imposed by courts on offenders,. agamst their will ; nor for
voluntary presents to the king, without any consideration moving from him to
the subject; nor for any sale or contract whereby the present revenues or possessions of the crown are granted away or diminished. (m)
The original revenue of our ancient queens, before and soon after the conquest, seems to have consisted in certain reservations or rents out of the demesne
lands of the crown, which were expressly appropriated to her majesty, distinct
from the king. It is frequent, in domesday book, after specifying the rent
(b) " Rep. ?3.

(c) Seid. Jan. Angi. 1, '2. The instance meant, Joe. citat. 11 where ..lEthelswlth, wife to Bnrghred, Jang
(d) Cod. 5, 16. ~(e) Sehl. tit. hon. I, 6, 7.
(fl Finch. L. 86. Co. Litt. llll!.
(gl Co. Litt. 133.
(h) Finch. L. 185.
(i) Ff. l. 3, Sl.
(J:) Pryn . .A.ur. rBg. 2.
(Z) 12 Rep. 21. <& Inst. 358.
(m) Ibid. Pryn. 6. Madox, Hist. Exch. ~.

or the Merclans, granted a patent to Cntbwals.

tyrannical, in which fines were paid. Henry II, book 2,]

141

(1) [Lord Littleton enters at some length into this subject of fines to the king RS one considerable sourco of the roye.I revenue in the early periods of our Anglo-Norman history, aU<l
cites from Madox a vast number of instances, some indeed ludicrous, but all scandalous and
tyrannical, in wmcQ. fines wej.'e paid. Henry II, book 2,)
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due to the crown, to add likewise the quantity of gold or other renders reserved

to the queen, (n) These were frequently appropriated to particular purposes;

to buy wool for her majesty's use, (o) to purchase oil for her lamps, (p) or to fur-

nish her attire from head to foot, (q) which was frequently very costly, as one

F *2211 8'n£'e rob6) in the fifth year of Henry II, *stood the city of London in

I- *v J upwards of fourscore pounds, (r) A practice somewhat similar to that

of the eastern countries, where whole cities and provinces were specifically

assigned to purchase particular parts of the queen's apparel. («) And, for a

further addition to her income, this duty of queen-gold is supposed to have

been originally granted; those matters of grace and favour, out of which it

arose, being frequently obtained from the crown by the powerful intercession of

the queen. There are traces of its payment, though obscure ones, in the book of

domesday, and in the great pipe-roll of Henry the First (t) In the reign of

Henry the Second the manner of collecting it appears to have been well under-

stood, and forms a distinct head in the ancient dialogue of the exchequer, (u)

written in the time of that prince, and usually attributed to Gervase of Tilbury.

From that time downwards it was regularly claimed and enjoyed by all the queen

consorts of England till the death of Henry VIII; though, after the accession

of the Tudor family, the collecting of it seems to have been much neglected:

and there being no queen consort afterwards till the accession of James I, a

period of near sixty years, its very nature and quantity became then a matter of

doubt; and, being referred by the king to the chief justices and chief baron, their
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report of it was so very unfavorable, (v) that his consort Queen Anne (though she

claimed it) yet never thought proper to exact it. In 1635,11 Car. I, a time

fertile of expedients for raising money upon dormant precedents in our old

records (of which ship-money was a fatal instance,) the king, at the petition of

his queen, Henrietta Maria, issued out his writ (w) for levying it; but after-

wards purchased it of his consort at the price of ten thousand pounds; finding

it, perhaps, too trifling and troublesome to levy. And when afterwards, at the

F *2221 re8*-oration, % *the abolition of the military tenures, and the fines that

*• "J J were consequent upon them, the little that legally remained of this

revenue was reduced to almost nothing at all, in vain did Mr. Prynne, by a

treatise which does honour to his abilities as a painful and judicious antiquary,

endeavour to excite Queen Catharine to revive this antiquated claim.

Another ancient perquisite belonging to the queen consort, mentioned by all

our old writers, (x) and, therefore only, worthy notice, is this: that, on the taking

of a whale on the coast, which is a royal fish, it shall be divided between the king

and queen; the head only being the king's property, and the toil of it the

wardrobe with whalebone. (2)

But farther, though the-queen is in all respects a subject, yet, in point of the

security of her life and person, she isput on the same footing with the king. It

is equally treason (by the statute 25 Edw. Ill,) to compass or imagine the death

(n) Bedefordeeire Maner. Lestone redd, per annum xxii lib. <fc.; ad optu regime ii ucitu rmri.—HereJord-

tcire. In '/.<•»<•, .)•<•., coniuetud. tttprcepotitut manerii veniente domino, mm (regina) in nunirr. prtetentaret d

xviU orai denar. vt eiset ipsa Into ammo. Pryn. Append, to Aur. Reg. 2, 3.

(o) Causa coadunandi tnnam regina. Dornesrt. ibid.

(p) Civitat Lundon. l*ro oleo ad lampad. regina. (Mag. rot. pip. temp. Hen. II, ibid.)

(q) Vicecomei Berke»cire. xvi 1. pro cappa regina. (Mag. rot. pip. la.—22 Ben. II, ibid.) Civitas Lund

cordulxmario regintr xx s. (Mag. rot. 2 Hen. II. Mndox. Hist. Exch. iW>.)

(r) Pro roba ad opus regime, qutiter xxl. etvi 8 viii d. (Mag. rot. 5 Hen.II, ibid. 250 )

(») Solere aiuni barbaroa regei Peraiarum ac Syrorum—uxoribui ciritates attrilntere, hoe modo i hose ctri-

tas mulieri redimiculwn prcebeat, here in collum, hoic in crines, ifc. (Cic. in Verrem, lib. 3. cap. 33.)

ft) See Madox, Diseeptat. Eptitolar. 74. Pryn. Aur. Beg. Append. 6. (u) Lib. 2, c. 26.

(v) Mr. Prynne, with some appearance of reason, insinuates that their researches were very superficial.

(Aur. Reg. 125 J

(v>) 19 Kym. Fad. 721. (x) Bracton, 1. 3, c. 3. Brltton, c 17. Flet. 1.1, c. 45 et 46.

ftJ Pryn. Aur. Reg. 127.

(2) [The reason is more whimsical than the division, for the whalebone lies entirely in the

head.]
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of our lady the king's companion, as of the king himself: and to violate, or

defile the queen consort, amounts to the same high crime; as well in the per-

son committing the fact, as in the queen herself, if consenting. A law of Henry

the Eighth (z) made it treason also for any woman, who was not a virgin, to

marry the king without informing him thereof: but this law was soon after

repealed, (3) it trespassing too strongly as well on natural justice as female

modesty. If, however, the queen be accused of any species of treason, she shall,

(whether consort or dowager) be tried by the peers of parliament, as Queen Ann

Boleyn was in 28 Hen. VIII.

The husband of a queen regnant, as Prince George of Denmark was to Queen

Anne, is her subject: and may be guilty of high treason against her: but, in

the instance of conjugal infidelity, he is not subjected to the same penal

*restrictions, for which the reason seems to be that, if a queen consort r MOO -i

is unfaithful to the royal bed, this may debase or bastardize the heirs to *• J

the crown; but no such danger can be consequent on the infidelity of the hus-

band to a queen regnant.

A queen dowager is the widow of the king, and, as such, enjoys most of the

privileges belonging to her as queen consort. But it is not high treason to con-

spire her death, or to violate her chastity, for the same reason as was before

alleged, because the succession to the crown is not thereby endangered. Yet

still, pro dignitate regali, no man can marry a queen dowager without special

licence from the king, on pain of forfeiting his lands and goods. This, Sir Ed-
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ward Coke (a) tells us, was enacted in parliament in 6 Hen. VI, though the

statute be not in print. But she, though an alien born, shall still be entitled to

dower after the king's demise, which no other alien is. (b) A queen dowager,

when married again to a subject, doth not lose her regal dignity, as peeresses

dowager do their peerage when they marry commoners. For Catherine, queen

dowager of Henry V, though she married a private gentleman, Owen ap Mere-

dith ap Theodore, commonly called Owen Tudor, yet, by the name of Catherine,

queen of England, maintained an action against the bishop of Carlisle. (4) And

so, the queen dowager of Navarre, marrying with Edmond earl of Lancaster,

brother to King Edward the First, maintained an action of dower (after the

death of her second husband) by the name of queen of Navarre, (c)

The prince of Wales, or heir-apparent to the crown, and also his royal con-

sort, and the princess royal, or eldest daughter of the king, are likewise peculiarly

regarded by the laws. For, by statute 25 Edw. Ill, to compass or conspire the

death of the former, or to violate the chastity of either of the latter, are as much

high treason as to conspire the death of the king, or violate the chastity of the

queen. And this upon the same reason as was before given: because the prince

of Wales is next in succession to the crown, and to violate his wife might taint

the blood royal with bastardy: and the eldest daughter of the king is also alone

inheritable to the *crown, on failure of issue male, and therefore more r ^^. -i

respected by the laws than any of her younger sisters, insomuch that <• " •" J

upon this, united with other (feudal) principles, while our military tenures were

in force, the king might levy an aid for marrying his eldest daughter, and her

only. The heir-apparent to the crown is usually made prince of Wales, (5) and

(*) Stat. 33 Hen. VIII, c. 21. (a) 2 Inst. 18. See JWey'sPlac. 1'ai 1.672. (6) Co. I.in. 31. b. (c) 2 lust. 90.

(3) [This was a clause in the act, which attainted Queen Catharine Howard, and her accom-

plices, for her incontinence; but it was not repealed till the 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, which abrogated

all treasons created since the memorable statute in the 25 Edw. III.]

(4) [The foregoing proposition is not really illustrated by the case of Catherine, inasmuch as

her marriage with Tudor was carefully concealed, and not discovered till after her burial, when

it produced great public excitement and uproar, as she left four children. It is needless to remind

the reader that Tudor proved the ancestor of a new dynasty of British sovereigns. ]

(5) [This creation has not been confined to the heir-apparent, for both Queen Mary and

Qneen Elizabeth were created by their father, Henry VJII, princesses of Wales, each of them

at the time (the latter after the iilegitimation of Mary) being heir presumptive to the crown. 4

Hume, 113.

Edward II was the first prince of "Wales. When his father had subdued the kingdom of
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earl of Chester, by special creation, and investiture: but, being the king's eldest

son, he is by inheritance duke of Cornwall, without any new creation. (6)

The rest of the royal family may be considered in two different lights, accord-

ing to the different senses in which the term royal family is used. The larger

sense includes all those who are by any possibility inheritable to the crown.

Such, before the revolution, were all the descendants of William the Conqueror,

who had branched into an amazing extent, by intermarriages with the ancient

nobility. Since the revolution and act of settlement, it means the protestant

issue of the Princess Sophia; now comparatively few in number, but which, in pro-

cess of time, may possibly be as largely diffused. The more confined sense includes

only those, who are within a certain degree of propinquity to the reigning prince,

and to whom, therefore, the law pays an extraordinary regard and respect; but,

after that degree is past, they fall into the rank of ordinary subjects, and are sel-

dom considered any farther, unless called to the succession upon failure of the

nearer lines. For, though collateral consanguinity is regarded indefinitely, with

respect to inheritance or succession, yet it is and can only be regarded within

some certain limits, in any other respect, by the natural constitution of things

and the dictates of positive law. (e)

The younger sons and daughters of the king, and other branches of the

royal family, who are not in the immediate line of succession, were therefore

little farther regarded by the ancient law, than to give them, to a certain degree,

precedence before all peers and public officers, as well ecclesiastical as temporal.
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F *2251 ^n*8 *8 ^one ^ the statute 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10, *which enacts that no

L -" person, except the king's children, shall presume to sit or have place at

the side of the cloth of estate in the parliament chamber; and that certain great

officers therein named shall have precedence above all dukes, except only such

as shall happen to be the king's son, brother, uncle, nephew, (which Sir Edward

Coke (/) explains to signify grandson or nepos), -or brother's or sister's son.

Therefore, after these degrees are past, peers or others of the blood royal are

entitled to no place or precedence except what belongs to them by their personal

rank or dignity: which made Sir Edward Walker complain, (a) that by the hasty

creation of Prince Kupert to be duke of Cumberland, and of the earl of Lenox

to be duke of that name, previous to the creation of King Charles' second son,

James, to be duke of York, it might happen that their grandsons would have

precedence of the grandsons of the duke of York.

Indeed under the description of the king's children his grandsons are held to

be included, without having recourse to Sir Edward Coke's interpretation of

nephew ; and therefore when his late majesty King George II created his grand-

son Edward, the second son of Frederick, prince of Wales, deceased, duke of

York, and referred it to the house of lords to settle his place and precedence,

(d)8Eep. 1. Seld. Tit. of Hon. 2, 5.

(e) Sen E*»ay on Collateral Consanguinity, in Law Tracts, 4to: Oxon.mi. (/)4last. 862. (g) Tracts, p. 301.

I "Wales, he promised the people of that country, upon condition of their submission, to give them a

prince who had been born among them, and who could speak no other language.

Upon their acquiescence with this deceitful offer, he conferred the principality of Wales upon

hia second son, Edward, then an infant. Edward, by the death of his eldest brother, Alfonso,

became heir to the crown, and from that time, this honor has been appropriated only to the eldest

sons or eldest daughters of the kings of England. 2 Hume, 243.]

(6) [The king's eldest living son and heir apparent takes, under the grant ann. 11 E. Ill, the

dukedom of Cornwall, and retains it during the king, his father's life: on the accession of such

duke to the crown, the duchy vests in the king's eldest son living, and heir-apparent. But, if

there be no eldest son and heir-apparent, the dukedom remains with the king, the heir-presump-

tive in no case being entitled to the dukedom. See 1 Ves, 294; Collin's Bar. 148. The rule may

be shortly stated: until a prince be born, the king is seized; but when bom, the prince becomes

seized in fee of the possessions; and, except as to presentations to benefices, leases jgenerally

made by the king are voidable by scire facias, sued at the instance of the prince. See Com. Dig.

tit. Eoy, Geo. V. Id. 280, 281; Ca. Ch. 215. But. as to what leases or grants made by the king

shall be good, see stat. 33 Geo. II, c. 10. If the oldest son die, and leave a son, such son would

not take; but the duchy reverts to the crown. And there is no minority with reference to the

possessions of a duke of Cornwall.
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they certified (A) that he ought to have place next to the late duke of Cumber-

land, the then king's youngest son ; and that he might have a seat on the left

hand of the cloth of estate. But when, on the accession of his present

majesty, those royal personages ceased to take place as the children, and ranked

only as the brother and uncle, of the king; they also left their seats on the side

of the cloth of estate; so that when the duke of Gloucester, his majesty's

second brother, took his seat in the house of peers, (i) he was placed on tne

upper end of the earl's bench (on which the dukes usually sit) next to his

royal highness the duke of York. And in 1718, upon a question referred to all

the judges by King George I, it was resolved, by the opinion of ten against the

other two, that the education and care of all the king's grandchildren while

minors did belong of right to his majesty, as king of this realm, even during

their father's life, (k) But they all agreed, that the care and approbation of

their marriages, when grown up, belonged to the king their grandfather. (7)

And the judges have more recently concurred in opinion, (I) that this care and

approbation extend also to the presumptive heir of the crown ; though to what

other branches of the royal family the same did extend, they did not find pre-

cisely determined. The most frequent instances of the crown's interposition

go no *farther than nephews and nieces; (m) but examples are not r ^^Q i

"wanting of its reaching to more distant collaterals. (n) And the stat- L '"' J

ute 6 Hen. VI, before mentioned, which prohibits the marriage of a queen

dowager without the consent of the king, assigns this reason for it: (8)
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" because the disparagement of the queen shall give greater comfort and example

to other ladies of estate, who are of the blood-royal, more lightly to disparage

themselves." (o) Therefore by the statute 28 Hen. VIII, c. 18, (repealed, among

other statutes of treasons, by 1 Edw. VI, c. 12,) it was made high treason, for

any man to contract marriage with the king's children, or reputed children, his

sisters or aunts ex parte paterna, or the children of his brethren or sisters;

being exactly the same degrees to which precedence is allowed by the statute 31

Hen. VIII, before mentioned. And now, by statute 12 Geo. Ill, c. 11, no

descendant of the body of King George II, (other than the issue of princesses

married into foreign families) is capable of contracting matrimony, without the

previous consent of the king signified under the great seal; and any marriage

contracted without such consent is void. Provided, that such of the said

descendants as are above the age of twenty-five may, after a twelvemonth's

notice given to the king's privy council, contract and solemnize marriage with-

out the consent of the crown; unless both houses of parliament shall, before

the expiration of the said year, expressly declare their disapprobation of such

intended marriage. And all persons solemnizing, assisting, or being present at,

any such prohibited marriage, shall incur the penalties of the statute of

prcemunire" (9)

(») Lords' Journ. 24 Apr. 17fiO. (») Lords' Journ. 10 Jan. 1765.

(t) Tortesc. Al. 401—440. (J) Lords' Journ. 28 Feb. 1772.

(m) See (besides the instances cited in Fortescue Aland) for lirotlurs and shirrs ,- under king Edward III.

4 Rym. 392, 403, 411.501,508, 512, 549,683—nnder Henry V. 9 Eym. 710. 711,741—under Edward IV. 11 Rym

564, 5ft>, 590,601—under Henry VOL 13 Rym. 249, 42S—under Edward VI. 7 St. Tr. 8, 8. For nepfteaw and

nieces; under Henry III. 1 Rvm. 852—under Edward 1. 2 Rvm. 489—nnder Edward III. 6 Rym. 661—under

Richard II. 7 Uym. 2«4—nnder Richard in. 12 Rym. 2S2, 344—under Henry VIII. 12 Rym. 26. 31.

(n) To great niece* ; under Edward II. 5 Rym. 575, 844. tojtrst cmuiiw : under Edward II. 5 Hym. 177.

To second and third cousins ; under Edward III. 5 Rym. 729—under Richard II. 7 Hym. 225—under Henry

VI. 10 Rym. 322—under HenryVn. 12 Rym. 629—under queen Elizabeth, Camd. I\nn. A. D. 1582. To

fourth cousins; nnder Henry VII. 12 Rym. 329. To the blood-royal in general; under Richard n. 7 Rym.

787. (o) EU. Plac. Parl. 672. '

(7) A foil report of the arguments of the judges may be seen in State Trials, vol. xi. 296.

(8) [The occasion of this statute was the marriage of Catharine, mother to Henry VI, with

Owen Tudor, a private gentleman. See p. 223.]

(9) In 1793 the Duke of Sussex was married while in Borne to the Lady Augusta Murray,

without the consent of the crown; and on his return to England caused the marriage to be

celebrated anew. Some question was made whether the marriage act could have any force

beyond the British dominions, and the king directed a suit for the nullity of the marriage to

be instituted. This was done accordingly, and the court of arches declared the marriage

absolutely null and void. Heseltfne »• Lady Murray, 2 Add, 400. This, however, did not put

VOL. I.—19 145

OF

227

[Book I.

THE KING'S COUNCILS.

227 OF THE KING'S COUNCILS. [Book I.

CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE COUNCILS BELONGING TO THE KING.

THE third point of view, in which we are to consider the king, is with regard

to his councils. For, in order to assist him in the discharge of his duties, the

maintenance of his dignity, and the exertion of his prerogative, the law hath

OF THE COUNCILS BELONGING TO THE KING.

assigned him a diversity of councils to advise with.

1. The first of these is the high court of parliament, whereof we have already

treated at large.

2. Secondly, the peers of the realm are by their birth hereditary counsellors

of the crown, and may be called together by the king to impart their advice in

all matters of importance to the realm, either in time of parliament, or, which

hath been their principal use, when there is no parliament in being, (a) Ac-

cordingly Bracton, (b) speaking of the nobility of his time, says they might

probably be called " consules, a consulendo ; reals enim tales sibi associant ad

consulendum." And in our law books (c) it is laid down that peers are created

for two reasons: 1, ad consulendum j 2, ad defendcndum regem: on which account

the law gives them certain great and high privileges; such as freedom from

arrests, &c., even when no parliament is sitting; because it intends, that they

are always assisting the king with their counsel for the commonwealth, or keeping

the realm in safety by their prowess and valour.

F *2281 *Instances of conventions of the peers, to advise the king, have been

•- J in former times very frequent, though now fallen into disuse by-reason
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of the more regular meetings of parliament. Sir Edward Coke (d) gives us an

extract of a record, 5 Hen. IV, concerning an exchange of lands between the

king and the earl of Northumberland, wherein the value of each was agreed to

be settled by advice of parliament, (if any should be called before the feast of

Saint Lucia), or otherwise by advice of the grand council of peers, which the

king promises to assemble before the said feast, in case no parliament shall be

called. Many other instances of this kind of meeting are to be found under our

ancient kings; though the formal method of convoking them had been so lon<£

left off, that when King Charles I, in 1640, issued out writs under the great seal

to call a great council of all the peers of England to meet and attend his majesty

at York, previous to the meeting of the long parliament, the earl of Clarendon (e)

mentions it as a new invention, not before heard of; that is, as he explains

himself, so old that it had not been practiced in some hundreds of years. But,

though there had not so long before been an instance, nor has there been any

since, of assembling them in so solemn a manner, yet in cases of emergency our

princes have at several times thought proper to call for and consult as many of

(a) Co. r.it.1.110. (/>) L. 1, c. 8. (c) 7 Rep. 34, 9 Rep. 49,12 Bep. 96. (d) 1 last. 110.

(e) Hist. b. 2.

the question at rest, and in 1843, on the death of the duke of Sussex, Sir Augustus IXEste. the

son of his royal highness by this marriage, claimed the dukedom and other honors of his

father. There was no objection to the marriage in point of form; it having been celebrated

according to the rites of the church of England, by a clergyman of the establishment, and it

•would unquestionably have been good but for the prohibition of the royal marriage act. The

THE third point of view, in which we are to consider the king, is with regard
to his councils. For, in order to assist him in the discharge of his duties, the
maintenance of his dignity, and the exertion of his prerogati'\"e, the law hath
assigned him a diversity of councils to advise with.
1. The first of these ls the high court of parliament, whereof we have already
treated at large.
2. Secondly, the peers of the realm are by their birth hereditary counsellors
of the crown, and may be called together by the king to impart their advice in
all matters of importance to the realm, either in time of parliament, or, which
hath been their principal use, when there is no parliament in being. (a) Accordingly Bracton, (b) speaking of the nobility of his time, says they might
probably be called " consules, a consulendo ; regis enim tales sibi associllnt ad
consulendum." And in our law books (c) it is laid down that peers are creatoo
for two reasons: 1, ad consulendum; 2, ad defendendum regem: on which account
the law gives them certain great and high privileges ; such as freedom from
arrests, &c., even when no parliament is sitting; because it intends, that they
a.re always assisting the king with their counsel for the commonwealth, or keeping
the realm in safety by their prowess and valour.
[ ,..228 ]
*Instances of conventions of the peers, to advise the king, have been
in former times very frequent, though now fallen into disuse by•reason
of the more regular meetings of parliament. Sir Edward Coke (d) gives us an
extract of a record, 5 Hen. IV, concerning an exchange of lands bctwe.en the
king and the earl of Northumberland, wherein the value of each wa.s agreed to
be settled by advice of parliament, (if anv should be called before the feast of
Saint Lucia), or otherwise by advice of the grand council of peers, which the
king promises to assemble before the said feast, in case no parliament shall be
called. Many other instances of this kind of meeting are to be found under our
ancient kings; though the formal method of convoking them had been so lonO"
left off, that when King Charles I, in 1640, issued out writs under the great se~
to call a great council of all the peers of England to meet and attend his majesty
at York, previous to the meeting of the long parliament, the earl of Clarendon (e}
mentions it as a. new invention, not before heard of; that is, as he explains
himself, so old that it had not been practiced in some hundreds of years. But,
though there had not so long before been an instance, nor has there be.en any ·
since, of assembling them in so solemn s manner, yet in cases of emergency our
princes have at several times thought proper to call for and consult as many of

judges were unanimously of opinion that the prohibition was personal, and Followed the

members of the royal family wherever they might go; and the house of lords concurring in

(a) Co. Litt. 110.
(el Hist. b. 2.

(bl L. 1, c. 8.

101 7 Rep. 8', 9 Rep.

•e, 12 Bep. 96.

(d) 1 Inst. 110.

this opinion, it was decided that Sir Augustus had not made out his claim. 11 Cl. and

Fin. 85.

A later statute than the one referred to in the text, 3 and 4 Tic. c. 52, $ 4, forbids a mar-

riage by the king or queen when under a regency, and before arriving at fie age of eighteen

years, without the consent in writing of the regent and the two houses of parliament; and

makes every such marriage without the required consent void, and the persons concerned

therein guilty of high treason.
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the question at rest, and in 1843, on the death of the duke of Sussex, Sir .Augustus D'Estel the
son of hi11 royal highness by this marriage, claimed the dukedom and other honon! ot his
father. There was no objection to the marriage in point of form ; it having been celebrated
according to the rites of the church of England, by a clergyman of the establishment, and it
would unque11tionably have been ~ood but for the prohibition of the royal marriage act. The
judges were unanimously of opmion that the prohibition was personal, and followed the
membel'8 of the royal family wherever they might go; and the house of lords concurring in
this opinion, it was decided that Sir .Augustus had not ma.de out his claim. 11 Cl. and
}'in. 8.')•
.A later statute than the one referred to in the text 3 and 4 Vic. c. 52, ~ 4, forbids a mar-

riage by the king or queen when under & regency, and before arriving at the age of eighte<ln
years, without the consent in writing of the regent and the two houses of parliament ; and
me.kes every such marriage without the required consent void, anll the pel'SOils c-0ncerned
therein guilt.y of high treason,
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the nobility as could easily be got together; as was particularly the case with

King James the Second, after the landing of the prince of Orange, and with

the prince of Orange himself, before he called that convention parliament,

which afterwards called him to the throne.

Besides this general meeting, it is usually looked upon to be the right of each

particular peer of the realm to demand an audience of the king, and to lay

before him, with decency and respect, such matters as he shall iudge of import-

ance to the public weal. And therefore, in the reign of Edward II, it was

made an article of impeachment in parliament against *the two Hugh r ^g -,

Spencers, father and son, for which they were banished the kingdom, L J

" that they by their evil covin would not suffer the great men of the realm the

king's good counsellors, to speak with the king, or to come near him, but only

in the presence and hearing of the said Hugh the father and Hugh the son, or

one of them, and at their will, and according to such things as pleased

them."(/)

3. A third council belonging to the king are, according to Sir Edward Coke,

(g) his j udges of the courts of law, for law matters. And this appears frequently

in our statutes, particularly 14 Edw. Ill, c. 5, and in other books of law. So

that when the king's council is mentoned generally, it must be defined, particu-

larized, and understood, secundum subjectam materiam; and, if the subject be

of a legal nature, then by the king's council is understood his council for mat-

ters of Taw, namely his judges. Therefore when by stat. 16 Ric. II, c. 5, it was
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made a high offence to import into this kingdom any papal bulls, or other pro-

cesses from Rome; and it was enacted, that the offenders should be attached by

their bodies, and brought before the king and his council to answer for such

oflfence; here, by the expression of the king's council were understood the king's

judges of his courts of justice, the subject matter being legal; this being the

general way of interpreting the word council, (h) (1)

4. But the principal council belonging to the king is his privy council, which

is generally called, by way of eminence, the council. And this, according to

Sir Edward Coke's description of it, (i) is a noble, honourable, and reverend

assembly, of the king and such as he wills to be of his privy council, in the

king's court or palace. The king's will is the sole constituent of a privy coun-

cellor; and this also regulates their number, which of ancient time was twelve

or thereabouts. Afterwards it increased to so large a number, that it was found

inconvenient for secrecy and dispatch; and *therefore King Charles the r *OQQ -j

Second in 1679 limited it to thirty; whereof fifteen were to be the princi- L *" J

pal officers of state, and those to be counsellors, virtute officii ; and the other fifteen

were composed of ten lords and five commoners of the king's choosing, (k) But

' since that time the number has been much augmented, and now continues in-

definite. (2) At the same time, also, the ancient office of lord president of the

(/) 4 lust. 68. (g) 1 lust. 110. (A) 3 lint. 125. (0 4 last. 53. (*) Temple's Mem. Fart. 8.

(1) Mr. Justice Coleridge doubts this interpretation, and is inclined to the opinion that the

tribunal referred to is that out of which subsequently grew the courts of chancery and star

the nobility as could easily be got together; as was particularly the case with
King James the Second, after the landing of the prince of Orange, and with
the prince of Orange himself, before he called that convention parliament,
which afterwards called him to the throne.
Besides this general meeting, it is usually looked upon to be the right of each
particular peer of the realm to demand an audience of the king, and to lay
before him, with decency and respect, such matters as be shall iudge of importance to the public weal. And therefore, in the reign of Edward II, it was
made an article of impeachment in parliament against *the two Hugh [ • 229 ]
Spencers, father and son, for which they were banished the kinudom,
" that they by their evil covin would not suffer the great men of the realm the
kinj{'s good counsellors, to speak with the king, or to come near him, but only
in tlie presence and hearing of the said Hugh the father and Hugh the son, or
one of them, and at their will, and according to such things as pleased
them."(/)
3. A third council belonging to the king are, according to Sir Edward Coke,
( g) his judges of the courts of law, for law matters. And this appears frequently
in our statutes, particularly: 14 Edw. III, c. 5, and in other books of law. So
that when the king's council is mentoned generally, it must be defined, particularized, and understood, secundum subjectam materiam; and, if the subject be
of a legal nature, then by the king's council is understood his council for matters of law, namely his judges. Therefore when by stat. 16 Ric. II, c. 5, it was
made a high offence to import into this kingdom any papal bulls, or other processes from Rome; and it was enacted, that the offenders should be attached by
their bodies, and brought before the king and his council to answer for such
offence ; here, by the expression of the king's council were understood the kinj{'s
judges of his courts of justice, the subject matter being legal; this being tbe
general way of interpreting the word council. (h) (1)
4. But the principal council belonging to the king is his privy council, which
is generally called, by way of eminence, tlie council. And this, according to
Sir Edward Coke9 s description of it, (i) is a noble, honourable, and reverend
assembly, of the king and such as he wills to be of his privy council, in the
king's court or palace. 'fhe king's will is the sole constituent of a privy councellor; and this also regulates their number, which of ancient time was twelve
or thereabouts. Afterwards it increased to so large a number, that it was found
inconvenient for secrecy and dispatch; and *therefore King Charles the [ • 230 ]
Second iu 1679 limited it to thirty; whereoffifteen were to be the principal officers of state, and those to be counsellors, virfote officii; and the other fifteen
were composed of ten lords and five commoners of the king's choosing. (k) But
since that time the number has been much augmented, and now continues indefinite. (2) At the same time, also, the ancient office of lord president of the

chamber. And see Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 1.

(2) In modern usage the following officers of state have seats in the Queen's chief council or

II

) ' Inst. 118.

(g) 1 Inst. 110.

(ll) S Inst.

l~.

(fl ' Inst. 68.

(kl Temple's Hem. Part. 8.

" Cabinet" as it is usually called: The first lord of the treasury, the chancellor of the exchequer,

the five principal secretaries of State, the first lord of the Admiralty, and the lord high Chan-

cellor. But it is also customary to include amone the number the lord President of the Council,

and the lord Privy Seal. Several other ministerial functionaries usually have seat* in the cabinet;

never less than three and rarely so many as seven or eight, in addition to those above mention-

ed. The selection is made either from amongst such of the principal officers, of state and heads

of departments having seats in parliament, whose rank, talents, political reputation and weight

•would be likely to render them the most useful auxiliaries, or from those whose services to then-

party while in opposition may have given them the strongest claims to this distinction. Todd.

Parl. Gov. VoL 2, p, 153.

Persons may be called to the " cabinet," however, without being incumbents of any office, as

•was the case of the earl of Carlisle in the ministry of Earl Grey. All the members are not
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(1) Mr. Justice Coleridge doubts this interpretation, and is inclined to the opinion that the
tribunal referred to is that out of which subsequently grew the courts of chancery and star
chamber. And see Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 1.
(2) In modem usage the following offioert! of state have seats in the Queen's chief council or
"Cabinet" as it is usually called: The first lord of the treasury, the chancellor of the exchequer,
the five principal secretaries of State, the first lord of the Admiralty and the lord high Chancellor. But it is also customary to include among the number the loi'.d President of the Council,
and the lord Privy Seal. Several other ministerial functionaries usually have seats in the cabinet;
never less than three and rarely so many as seven or eight, in addition to those above mentioned. The selection is made either from amongst such of the principal officers. of Rtate and hel\ds
of departments having seats in parliament, whose rank, talent.~, political reputation and weight
would be likely to render them the most useful auxiliaries, or from those whose services to their
party while in opposition may have given them the strongest claims to this distinction. Todd.
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council was revived in the person of Anthony, earl of Shaftsbnry; an officer

that by the statute of 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10, has precedence next after the lord

chancellor and lord treasurer.

Privy counsellors are made by the king's nomination, without either patent

or grant; and, on taking the necessary oaths, they become immediately privy

counsellors during the life of the king that chooses them, but subject to removal

at his discretion.

As to the qualifications of members to sit at this board: any natural born sub-

ject of England is capable of being a member of the privy council, taking the

proper oaths for security of the government, and the test for security of the

. church. (3) But, in order to prevent any persons under foreign attachments

from insinuating themselves into this important trust, as happened in the reign

of King William in many instances, it is enacted by the act of settlement, (I)

that no person born out of the dominions of the crown of England, unless born

of English parents, even though naturalized by parliament, shall be capable of

being of the privy council.

The duty of a privy counsellor appears from the oath of office, (m) which

consists of seven articles: 1. To advise the king according to the best of his

cunning and discretion. 2. To advise for the king's honour and good of the

public, without partiality through affection, love, meed, doubt, or dread.

3. To keep the king's council secret. 4. To avoid corruption. 5. To help and

T *2311 8trengthen the execution of what *shall be there resolved. 6. To with-
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*• J stand all persons who would attempt the contrary. And lastly, in

general, 7. To observe, keep, and do, all that a good and true counsellor ought

to do to his sovereign lord.

The power of the privy council is to inquire into all offences against the gov-

ernment, and to commit the offenders to safe custody, in order to take their

trial in some of the courts of law. But their jurisdiction herein is only to

inquire, and not to punish; and the persons committed by them are entitled

to their habeas corpus by statute 16 Car. 1, c. 10, as much as if committed by an

ordinary justice of the peace. And by the same statute, the court of star cham-

ber, and the court of requests, both of which consisted of privy counsellors,

were dissolved; and it was declared illegal for them to take cognizance of any

matter of property belonging to the subjects of this kingdom. But in planta-

tion or admiralty causes, which arise out of the jurisdiction of this kingdom;

and in matters of lunacy or idiocy, (ri) being a special flower of the prerogative;

with regard to these, although they may eventually involve questions of exten-

sive property, the privy council continues to have cognizance, being the court

of appeal in such cases, or rather the appeal lies to the king's majesty himself

in council. (4) Whenever also a question arises between two provinces in America

(I) Stat. 12 and IS Will. HI, c. 2. (m) 1 Inst 54. (n) S P. Wins. 108.

necessarily called to every meeting, 1ml only those are summoned whose advice and assistance

are required on the particular occasion.

In practice an administration is formed by some one selected by the queen for the purpose,

council was revived in the person of Anthony, earl of Shaftsbury; an officer
that by the statute of 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10, has precedence next after the lord
chancellor and lord treasurer.
Privy counsellors are made by the king's nomination, without either patent
or grant; and, on taking the necessary oaths, they become immediately privy
counsellors during the life of the king that chooses them, but subject to removal
at his discretion.
As to the qualifications of members to sit at this board: any natural born subject of England is capable of being a member of the privy council, taking the
proper oaths for security of the government, and the test for security of the
. church. (3) But, in order to prevent any persons under foreign attachments
from insmuating themselves 1nto this important trust, as happened in the rei~
of King William in many inst.ances, it is enacted by the act of settlement, (I)
that no person born out of the dominions of the crown of England, unle8s born
of English parents, even though naturalized by parliament, shall be capable of
being of the privy council.
The duty of a privy counsellor appears from the oath of office, (m) which
consists of seven articles: 1. To advise the king according to the best of his
cunning and discretion. 2. To advise for the king's honour and good of the
public, without partiality through affection, love, meed, doubt, or dread.
3. To keep the king's council secret. 4. To avoid corruption. 5. To help and
[ • 231 ] strengthen the execution of what *shall be there resolved. 6. To withstand all persons who would attempt the contrary. And lastly, in
general, 7. To observe, keep, and do, all that a good and true counsellor ought
to do to bis sovereign lord.
The power of the privy council is to inquire into all offences against t.he government, and to commit the offenders to safe custody, in order to take their
trial in some of the courts of law. But their jurisdiction herein is only t-0
inquire, and not to punish; and the persons committed by them are entitled
to their habeas corpus by statute 16 Car. 1, c. 10, as much as if committed by an
ordinary justice of the peace. And by the same statute, the court of st.ar chamber, and the conrt of requests, both of which consisted of privy counsellors,
were dissolved; and it was declared illegal for them to take cogiiizance of nny
matter of property belonging to the subjects of this kingdom. But in plantation or admiralty causes, which arise out of the jurisdiction of this kingdom;
and in matters of lunacy or idiocy, ( n) being a special flower of the prerogative;
with regard to these, although they may eventually involve questions of extensive property, the privy council continues to have cognizance, being the court
of appeal in such cases, or rather the appeal lies to the king's majesty himself
in council. ( 4) Whenever also a question arises between two provinces in America

•vrho is called the prime minister or premier, and who will fill the important offices of state with

those who are friendly to his policy. The jjremier himself usually becomes first lord of the

(l) Stat. 12 and 13 Will. III, c. 2.

(m)

~Inst.

M.

(n) s P. Wms. 108.

treasury, but sometimes selects some other position. The cabinet must contain members of both

houses of parliament. Sometimes a judge nas been called to a seat in the cabinet, as in the

cases of Lord Mansfield and Lord BHenborough; but this was always considered objectionable

on constitutional grounds; the theory of the constitution being that the judge should be inde-

pendent of the crown.

(3) The oath now prescribed is the very simple form given in the Promissory Oaths act 1868.

31 and 32 Vic. c. 72.

(4) This judicial tribunal wag entirely reorganized under stat. 2 and SWilL IT, c. 92; 3 and 4

"Will. IV, c. 41; and 6 and 7 Vie. e. 38. It consists now of the president of the council, the

lord chancellor, the archbishops of Canterbury and York, the lords justices of the court of
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Will: IV, o. 41; and 6 and 7 Vic. c. 38. It consists now Clf the president of the council, the
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or elsewhere, as concerning the extent of their charters and the like, the king

in his council exercises original jurisdiction therein, upon the principles of

feudal sovereignty. And so likewise when any person claims an island or a

province, in the nature of a feudal principality, by grant from the king or his

ancestors, the determination of that right belongs to his majesty in council: as

was the case of the earl of Derby with regard to the Isle of Man in the reign

of Queen Elizabeth; and the earl of Cardigan and others, as representatives of

the duke of Montague, with relation to the island of St. Vincent in 1764. But

from all the dominions of the crown, excepting Great Britain and Ireland, an

appellate jurisdiction *(in the last resort) is vested in the same tribunal; r $0321

which usually exercises its judicial authority in a committee of the *- -I

whole privy council, who hear the allegations and proofs, and make their report

to his majesty in council, by whom the judgment is finally given.

The privileges of privy counsellors, as such, (abstracted from their honorary

precedence,) (o) consist principally in the security which the law has given them

against attempts and conspiracies to destroy their lives. For, by statute 3 Hen.

VII, c. 14, if any of the king's servants of his household conspire or imagine to

take away the life of a privy counsellor, it is felony, though nothing be done

upon it. The reason of making this statute, Sir Edward Coke (p) tells us, was

because such a conspiracy was, just before this parliament, made by some of

King Henry the Seventh's household servants, and great mischief was like to

have ensued thereupon. This extends only to the king's menial servants. But
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the statute 9 Ann. c. 16, goes farther and enacts that any person that shall unlaw-

fully attempt to kill, or shall unlawfully assault, and strike, or wound, any privy

counsellor in the execution of his office, shall be a felon without benefit of

clergy. This statute was made upon the daring attempt of the Sieur Guiscard,

who stabbed Mr. Harley, afterwards earl of Oxford, with a penknife, when under

examination for high crimes in a committee of the privy council. (5)

The dissolution of the privy council depends upon the king's pleasure; and

he may, whenever he thinks proper, discharge any particular member, or the

whole of it, and appoint another. By the common law, also, it was dissolved

ipso facto by the king's demise, as deriving all its authority from him. But now,

to prevent the inconveniences of having no council in being at the accession of

a new prince, it is enacted by statute 6 Ann. c. 7, that the privy council shall

continue for six months after the demise of the crown, unless sooner determined

by the successor. (6)

(o) See page 405. fpj 3 fust. 38.

appeals in chancery, the master of the rolls, the vice chancellors, the chief justices of the

or elsewhere, as concerning the ex.tent of their charters and the like, the king
in his council exercises original jurisdiction therein, upon the principles of
feudal soyereignty. And so likewise when any person claims an island or a
province, in the nature of a feudal principality, by grant from the king or bis
ancestors, the determination of that right belongs to his majesty in council: as
was the case of the earl of Derby with regard to the Isle of Man in the reign
of Queen Elizabeth ; and the earl of Cardigan and others, as representatives of
the dnke of .Monta~ue, with relation to the island of St. Vincent in 1764. But
from all the domimons of the crown, excepting Great Britain and Ireland, an
appellate jurisdiction *(in the last resort) is vested in the same tribunal; [ • 232 ]
which usually exercises its judicial authority in a committee of the
whole privy council, who hear the allegations and proofs, and make their report
to his majesty in council, by whom the judgment is finally giyen.
The privlleges of privy counsellors, as such, (abstracted from their honorary
precedence,) (o) consist principally in the security which the law has given them
against attempts and conspiracies to destroy their lives. For, by statute 3 Hen.
VII, c. 14, if an'- of the king's servants of his household conspire or imagine to
take away the hfe of a privy counsellor, it is felony, though nothing be done
upon it. The reason of making this statute, Sir Edward Coke (p) tells us, was
because such a conspiracy was, just before this parliament, made by some of
King Henry the Seventh's household servants, and great mischief was like to
have ensued thereupon. This extends only to the king's menial servants. But
the statute 9 Ann. c. 16, goes farther and enacts that any person that shall unlawfully attempt to kill, or shall unlawfully assault, and strike, or wound, any privl
counsellor in the execution of his office, shall be a felon without benefit o
clergy. This statute was made upon the daring attempt of the Sieur Guiscard,
who stabbed Mr. Harley, afterwards earl of Oxford, with a penknife, when under
examination for high crimes in a committee of the privy council. (5)
The dissolution of the privy council depends upon the king's pleasure; and
he may, whenever he thinks proper, discharge any particular member, or the
whole of it, and appoint another. By the common law, also, it was dissolved
ipso facto by the king's demise, as deriving all its authority from him. But now,
to prevent the inconveniences of having no council in being at the accession of
a new prince, it is enacted by statute 6 Ann. c. 7, that the privy council shall
continue for six months after the demise of the crown, unless sooner determined
by the successor. (6)

queen's bench and common pleas, and chief baron of the exchequer, the judges of the courts

(0) See

of probate and admiralty, two members who have been judges in India or the colonies, all privy

page 406.

(p) 3

Inst. 88.

councillors who have held any of the other offices above mentioned, and two persons appointed

under sign manual. It is called the judicial committee of the privy council, and it hears appeals

from the colonial courts and India, and also in ecclesiastical cases. By stat. 6 and 7 Vic. c. 38,

appeals and other matters may be heard before three members. This tribunal also hears appli-

cations for the extension of letters patent, or other matters relating thereto, and for licenses to

republish books after the death of their authors.

(5) Both those statutes are repealed. See 9 Geo. IT, c. 31.

Under the government of the United States the heads of the departments consist of the

secretaries of state, of the treasury, of war, of the navy, of the interior, the attorney-general

and the postmaster-general. The constitution, art. 2, 9 2, empowers the president to require

the opinion in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any

subject relating to the duties of their respective offices. Washington originated the practice

of consulting all the heads of departments on important measures, and by later presidents

they have generally been convened for joint consultation, until "cabinet meetings, to deter-

mine the course of the administration on all questions of importance are expected as a matter

of course. The cabinet, however, as a body of councillors, has no necessary place in our con-

stitutional system, and each president will accord to it such weight and influence in his

administration as he shall see fit. The president—not the cabinet—is responsible for all the

measures of the administration, and whatever is done by one of the heads of departments is

considered as done by the president through the proper executive agent. In this fact con-

sists one important difference between the executive of Great Britain and of the United
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republish books after the death of their authors.
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THE KING'S DUTIF.S.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE KING'S DUTIES.

I PROCEED next to the duties, incumbent on the king by our constitution; in

CHAPTER VI.

consideration of which duties his dignity and prerogative are established by the

laws of the land: (1) it being a maxim in the law, that protection and subjec-

tion are reciprocal, (a) And these reciprocal duties are what, I apprehend, were

OF THE KING'S DUTIES.

meant by the convention in 1688, when they declared that King James had

broken the original contract between king and people. But, however, as the

terms of that original contract were in some measure disputed, being alleged to

exist principally in theory, and to be only deducible by reason and the rules of

natural law; in which deduction different understandings might very consider-

ably differ: it was, after the revolution, judged proper to declare these duties

expressly, and to reduce that contract to a plain certainty. So that, whatever

doubts might be formerly raised by weak and scrupulous minds about the exist-

ence of such an original contract, they must now entirely cease; especially with

regard to every prince who hath reigned since the year 1688.

The principal duty of the king is, to govern his people according to law.

Nee regibus infinita out libera potestas, was the constitution of our German

ancestors on the continent, (b) And this is not only consonant to the princi-

(a) 1 Kep. 5. (b) Tae. de Mor. Oerm. c. 7.

States; the acts of the former being considered those of his advisers, who alone are responsi-

ble therefor, while the acts of the advisers of the American executive are considered as directed
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and controlled by him. Another important difference in the cabinets is, that in the United

States there is no " premier;" no leading member of the administration who selects the others;

and though the position of secretary of state is generally considered the leading one, yet this

is not always true in fact, and the incumbent has not, in the cabinet, a recognized superiority

over t lir others. A third difference is, that the members of the American cabinet cannot hare

I PROCEED next to the duties, incumbent on the kin~ by our constitution; in
consideration of which duties his dignity and prerogative are established by the
laws of the land: (1) it being a maxim m the law, that protection and subjection are reciprocal. (a) And these reciprocal duties are what, I apprehend, were
meant by the convention in 1688, when they declared that King James had
broken the original contract between king and people. But, however, as the
terms of that original contra-0t were in some measure disputed, beini alleged to
exist principally m theory, and to be only deducible by reason and the rules of
natural law; in which deduction different understandings might very considerably differ: it w11.S, after the revolution, judged proper to declare these duties
expressly, and to reduce that contract to a plain certainty. So that, whatever
doubts might be formerly raised by weak and scrupulous minds about the existence of such an original contract, they must now entirely cease; especially with
regard t-0 every frince who hath reigned since the year 1688.
The principa clnty of the king is, to govern his people according to law.
Nee regibus in.fim'.ta aut libera potestas, was the constitution of our German
ancestors on the continent. {b} And this is not only consonant to the princi-

seats in the legislature. Const, of U. S. art. 1, $ 6. A fourth and more important difference is,

(a) 7 Rep. II.

(b) Tae. de Mor.

a-. c. 7.

that there is no constitutional principle in the American system which requires the cabinet to

be in accord with the congress or with either house thereof. The president selects for heads

of tile departments persons who concur in his own views, and he is not expected to change his

advisers because the opposition is in the ascendancy in congress. It has frequently happened

in our history that the president's friends, in one or both houses of congress, have been in a

minority for a considerable period.

(1) Some of the constitutional provisions respecting the president of the United States have

been referred to in preceding notes, but it may not be unimportant to give a summary of them

here.

He is to hold his office for four years, and at stated times receive for his services a compensa-

tion, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have

been elected, and he shall not receive during that period any other emolument from the United

States or any of them. Art. 2, $ 1.

He is to be commander-in chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of the several

states when called into the actual service of the United States: he may require the opinion in

writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments upon any subject relat-

ing to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves

and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. Art.

2, $£

He has power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, and he

appoints, with the like advice and consent, the principal judicial and other officers. He fills

vacancies during the recess of the senate by commissions which expire at the end of their next

session. Ib.

He is from time to time to give congress information of the state of the Union, and recom-

mend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. He

may on extraordinary occasions convene the two houses or either of them, and in case of dis-

agreement between them in respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such

time as he shall think proper. He is to receive ambassadors and other public ministers; to take

care that the laws be faithfully executed, and to commission all the officers of the United

States. Art. 2, $ 3.
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over the others. .A third difference is, that the members of the American cabinet cannot have
seats in the legislature. Const. of U. S. art. 1, § 6. .A fourth and more important difference is,
that there i11 no constitutional principle in the .American system which requires the cabinet to
be in accord with the congress or with either house thereof. The president selects for heads
of the departments persons who concur in his own views, and he is not exl!ected to change hi11
advisers because the opposition is in the ascendancy in congress. It has ttequently happened
in our history that the president's friends, in one or both honses of congress, have been in a
minority for a considerable period.
(1) Some of the constitutional provisions re!!pecting the president of the United States have
been referred to in preceding notes, but it may not be unimportant to give a summary of them
here.
He is to hold his office for four yest'!!, and at stated times receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have
been elected, and be shall not receive during that period any other emolument from the United
States or any of them. .Art. 2, § 1.
He is to be commander-in chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of the several
states when called into the actual service of the United States: he may require the opinion in
writing of the {>rincipal officer in each of the e.xecutive departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, aud he shall have power to grant reprieves
and pnrdons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. A.rt.
:l, § 2.
He has power, by and with the ad\tice and consent of the t1enate, to make treaties, and he
appoints, with the like advice and con1.1ent, the principal judicial and other officers. He fills
nce.ncies during the recet!H of the senate by commissions which expire at the end of their next
110ssion. lb.
He is from time to time to give congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration !:'ii.ch measures as he shall jud~e necessary and expedient. He
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pies of nature, of *liberty, of reason, and of society, but has always been .- ^34. -•

esteemed an express part of the common law of England, even when L ' ' I

prerogative was at the highest. " The king," saith Bracton, (c) who wrote under

Henry III, " ought not to be subject to man, but to God, and to the law; for the

law maketh the king. Let the king therefore render to the law, what the law

has invested in him with regard to others; dominion and power for he is not

truly king, where will and pleasure rules, and not the law." And again, (d) the

king also hath a superior, namely God, and also the law, by which he was made

a king." Thus Bracton: and Fortescue also, (e) having first well distinguished

between a monarchy absolutely and despotically regal, which is introduced by

conquest and violence, and a political or civil monarchy which arises from •

mutual consent, (of which last species he asserts the government of England

to be;) immediately lays it down as a principle, that " the king of England

must rule his people according to the decrees of the laws thereof: insomuch

that he is bound by an oath at his coronation to the observance and keeping of

his own laws." But, to obviate all doubts and difficulties concerning this mat-

ter, it is expressly declared by statute 12 and 13 W. Ill, c. 2, " that the laws of

England are the birthright of the people thereof: and all the kings and queens

who shall ascend the throne of this realm ought to administer the government

of the same according to the said laws; and all their officers and ministers

ought to serve them respectively according to the same: and therefore all the

laws and statutes of this realm, for securing the established religion, and the
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rights and liberties of the people thereof, and all other laws and statutes of the

same now in force, are ratifaed and confirmed accordingly."

And, as to the terms of the original contract between king and people, these

I apprehend to be now couched in the *coronation oath, which by the •- $0351

statute 1 W. and M. st. 1, c. 6, is to be administered to every king and *• "

queen, who shall succeed to the imperial crown of these realms, by one of the

archbishops or bishops of the realm, in the presence of all the people; who on

their parts dp reciprocally take the oath of allegiance to the crown. This coro-

nation oath is conceived in the following terms:

The archbishop or bishop shall say,—" Will you solemnly promise and swear

to govern the people of this kingdom of England, and the dominions thereto

belonging, according to the statutes in parliament agreed on, and the laws and

customs of the same ?" — The king or queen shall say, " I solemnly promise so

to do."—Archbishop or bishop, " Will you to your power cause law and justice, in

mercy, to be executed in all your judgments ?" — King or queen, " I will."—

Archbishop or bishop, " Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the

laws of God, the true profession of the gospel, and the protestant reformed

religion established by the law ? (2) And will you preserve unto the bishops and

clergy of this realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such

rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them or any of

them ?" — King or queen, " All this I promise to do." — After this the king or

queen, laying his or her hand upon the holy gospels, shall say, " The things

which I have herebefore promised I will perform and keep: so help me God:"

and then shall kiss the book. (3)

(c) L. 1, c. 8. (d) L. 2, d. 16, ( S. (e) C. 9, $ 34.

(2) During the reigns of Geo. Ill, and Geo. IV, opponents of catholic emancipation made

use of this clause of the coronation oath as a reason for rejecting that measure, •which they

declared to be violative of the spirit of the oath; aud this was a view which both these

ple!! of nature, of *liberty, of reason, and of society, but has always been [ • 234 ]
'
esteemed an express pa.rt of the common law of England, even when
prerogative was at the highest. "The king," saith Bracton, (c) who wrote under
Henry III, "ought not to be subject to man, but to God, and to the law; for the
law maketh the king. Let the king therefore render to the law, what the law
has invested in him with regard to others; dominion and power for he is not
truly king, where will and pleasure rules, and not the law." And again, (d) the
king also hath a superior, namely God, and also the law, by which he was made
a king." Thus Bracton: and Fortescue also, (e) having first well distinguished
between a monarchy absolutely and despotically regal, which is introduced by
conquest and violence, and a political or civil monarchy which ari8es from·
mutual consent., (of which last species he asserts the government of England
to be;) immediately lays it down as a principle, that "the king of England
must rule his people according to the decrees of the laws thereof: insomuch
that he is bound by an oath at his coronation to the observance and keeping of
his own laws." But, to obviate all doubts and difficulties concerning this matter, it is expressly declared by statute 12 and 13 W. III, c. 2, "that the laws of
England are the birthright of the people thereof: and all the kings and queens
who shall ascend the throne of this realm ought to administer the government
of the same according to the said laws; and all their officers and ministers
ought to serve them respectively according to the same: and therefore all the
laws and statutes of this realm, for securing the established religion, and the
rights and liberties of the people thereof, and all other laws and statutes of the
same now in force, are ratified and confirmed accordingly."
And, as to the terms of the original contract between king and people, these
I apprehend to be now couched in the *coronation oath, which by the [ ,..235 ]
statute 1 W. and M. st. 1, c. 6, is to be administered to every king and
queen, who shall succeed to the imperial crown of these realms, by one of the
archbishops or bishops of the realm, in the presence of all the people; who on
th~ir parts do reciprocall1 take the oath of allegiance to the crown. This coronation oath is conceived m the following terms :
T!te arcltbislwp or bishop shall say,-" Will you solemnly promise and swear
to govern the people of this kingdom of England, and the dominions thereto
belonging, according to the statutes in parliament agreed on, and the laws and
customs of the same ?" - The kinf!.. or queen shall say, " I solemnly promise so
to do."-Arclibislwp or bishop," Will you to your power cause law and justice, in
mercy, to be executed in all your judgments?" - King or queen, "I will."Archbishop or b-islwp, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the
laws of God, the true profession of the gospel, and the protestant reformed
religion established by the law? (~) And will you preserve unto the bishops and
clergy of this realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such
rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them or any of
them ?" - King or queen, "All this I promise to do." -After tkis the king or
queen, laying Ids or her hand upon the holy gospels, shall say, " The things
which I have herebefore promised I will perform and keep: so help me God:"
and then shall kiss the book. (3)
(CJ L. 1,

monarchs were inclined to take. See May's Const. Hist. c. 1.

c. S.

(d} L. 2, d. 16, ! S.

(e} C. 9,

4- :U.

The oath of office of the president of the United States is, " I do solemnly swear (or

affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, aud will to

the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the United States."

Const, art. 2, $ 1.

(3) [ And it is required both by the bill of rights, 1 W. and M. st. 2, c. 2, and the act of settlement,

12 and 13 W. III. c. 2, that every king and queen of the age of twelve years, either at their

coronation, or on the first day of the first parliament upon the throne in the house of peers (which

shall fiixt happen), shall repeat and subscribe the declaration against popery according to the 30

Car. II, st. 2, c. 1.]

151

(2) During the reigns of Geo. III, and Geo. IV, opponents of catholic emancipation made
use of this clause of the coronation oath e.s a reason for rejecting that measure, which they
declared to be violative of the spirit of the oath ; and this was a view which both thcso
monarchs were inclinccl to take. See May's <.Joust. Hist. c. 1.
The oath of office of the president of the United States is, "I do i:olenrnly swear (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the ofHce of president of the United States, and will to
the bc~t of my ability preserve, protect and defend the constitution C1f the United States."
Const. art. 2, ~ 1.
(3) [And it is required both by the bill of rights, 1 W. and M. st. 2, c. 2, and the oot of settlement,
12 and 13 W. III. c. 2 that every king and queen of the age of twelve years, either at their
coronation, or on the first day of the first parliament upon the throne in the house of peer:< (which
shall finlt happen), shall repeat nnd subscribe the decla.ration against popery according tu the 30
Car. II, Ht. 2, c. 1.)
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This is the form of the coronation oath, as is now prescribed by our laws;

the principal articles of which appear to be at least as an'cient as the mirror of

justices, (/) and even as the time of Bracton: (g) but the wording of it was

changed at the revolution, because (as the statute alleges) the oath itself

F *236 1 *k*^ '3een framed in doubtful words and expressions, with relation to

*- J ancient laws and constitutions at this time unknown. (A) However,

in what form soever it be conceived, this is most undisputably a fundamental

and original express contract, though doubtless the duty of protection is

impliedly as much incumbent on the sovereign before coronation as after: in

the same manner as allegiance to the king becomes the duty of the subject

immediately on the descent of the crown, before he has taken the oath of

allegiance, or whether he ever takes it at all. This reciprocal duty of the sub-

ject will be considered in its proper place. At present we are only to observe,

that in the king's part of this original contract are expressed all the duties that

a monarch can owe to his people, viz: to govern according to law; to execute

judgment in mercy; and to maintain the established religion. And, with

respect to the latter of these three branches, we may further remark, that by the

act of union, 5 Ann. c. 8, two preceding statutes are recited and confirmed; the

one of the parliament of Scotland, the other of the parliament of England:

which enact: the former, that every king at his accession shall take and sub-

scribe an oath, to preserve the protestant religion and presbyterian church gov-

ernment in Scotland; the latter, that at his coronation he shall take and sub-
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scribe a similar oath to preserve the settlement of the church of England within

England, Ireland, Wales and Berwick, and the territories thereunto belonging.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE KING'S PREROGATIVE.

IT was observed in a former chapter, (a) that one of the principal bulwarks of

civil liberty, or, in other words, of the British constitution, was the limitation

of the king's prerogative by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossi-

ble he should ever exceed them, without the consent of the people, on the

one hand; or without, on the other, a violation of that original contract, which

in all states impliedly, and in ours most expressly, subsists between the prince

and the subject. It will now be our business to consider this prerogative

minutely; to demonstrate its necessity in general; and to mark out in the most

important instances its particular extent and restrictions: from which con-

siderations this conclusion will evidently follow, that the powers which are

vested in the crown by the laws of England are necessary for the support of

society; and do not intrench any farther on our natural liberties, than is expe-

dient for the maintenance of our civil. (1)

(f) Cap. I, » 2. (a] L. S tr. 1, c. 9.

(In In the old folio abridgment of the statutes printed by Letton and Machlinla in the reign of Edward IV,

(penes me.) there ispreserved a copy of the old coronation oath ; which, as the book is extremely scarce. I will

here transcribe : Ceo eft le serement que le royjurr? a soun coronement: qtte il aardera et meintenera Ifz droitey

et lex .franchises de seynt esglise grauntes auncienment dez drotiez rays Christiens d'Knpletere. et qnil aardera

toutez sez terrez honoures et dignitees droitureljs et franks del coron du roialme d'Engletpre en tout maner

dentierte sanz null maner damenusement. et lez droitez disperges ditapidez ou perduz de la corone a soun poiair

reappeller en laitnsien estate, el quil gavdera lepeas de seynt esglise et al clergic et al people de ban aceorde, et

quu f<ice faire en toutez sezjugmentez owel et droit justice oue discrecion et miskricorde, et quti grauntera a

tenure lez leyes et custumezdu roialm, et asounpoimr lezfacegairder etqffirmerquelczgenttzdujieupltaeont

faitez, et esliez, et lez malveys leys et custumes de tout oustera. et f&rme peas et establie al people de toun

roimlme en ceo garde esgardera a soun poiair i come Dien luy aide. (Tit. sacramentum regis. fol. m. i.j) Prvnne

has also given us a copy of the coronation oaths of Richard II. (Signal Loyally, ii. «6;) Edward VI. i"i'•/•/.

2S1;) James I. and Charles I. (ilnd. m) (a) Chap. 1, page HI.

(1) [The splendor, rights, and powers of the crown, were attached to it for the benefit of

the people, and not for the private gratification of the sovereign. They are therefore to be
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There cannot be a stronger proof of that genuine freedom, which is the boast

of this age and country, than the power of discussing and examining, with

decency and respect, the limits of the king's prerogative. A topic, that in some

former ages was thought too delicate and sacred to be profaned by the pen of a

subject It was ranked among the arcana imperil: and, like the mysteries of

the bana dea, was *not suffered to be pried into by any but such as were r ^gg -•

initiated in its service: because perhaps the exertion of the one, like the ^ *" ' I

solemnities of the other, would not bear the inspection of a rational and sober

inquiry. The glorious Queen Elizabeth herself made no scruple to direct her

parliaments to abstain from discoursing of matters of state; (b) and it was the

constant language of this favourite princess and her ministers, that even that

august assembly " ought not to deal, to judge, or to meddle with her majesty's

prerogative royal." (e) And her successor, King James the First, who had

imbibed high notions of the divinity of regal sway, more than once kid it down

in his speeches, that, " as it is atheism and blasphemy in a creature to dispute

what the Deity may do, so it is presumption and sedition in a subject to dispute

what a king may do in the height of his power: good Christians," he adds, " will

be content with God's will revealed in his word; and good subjects will rest in

the king's will, revealed in Ms law." (d)

But, whatever might be the sentiments of some of our princes, this was never

the language of our ancient constitution and laws. The limitation of the regal

authority was a first and essential principle in all the Gothic systems of govern-
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ment established in Europe; though gradually driven out and overborne, by

violence and chicane, in most of the kingdoms on the continent. We have

seen, in the preceding chapter, the sentiments of Bracton and Fortescue, at the

distance of two centuries from each other. And Sir Henry Finch, under Charles

the First, after the lapse of two centuries more, though he lays down the law of

prerogative in very strong and emphatical terms, yet qualifies it with a general

restriction, in regard to the liberties of the people. " The king hath a preroga-

tive in all things, that are not injurious to the subject; for in them all it must

be remembered, that the king's prerogative stretcheth not to the doing of any

wrong." (e) Nihil enim aliudpotest rex, nisi id solum quod *deiurepotest, r $,,30 n

(/) And nere it may be some satisfaction to remark, how widely the civil L J

law differs from our own, with regard to the authority of the laws over the prince, or,

as a civilian would rather have expressed it, the authority of the prince over the laws.

It is a maxim of the English law, as we have seen from Bracton, that" rex debet

esse sub lege, quia lexfacit regem ;" the imperial law will tell us, that, " in omni-

&iis, imperatoris excipitur fortuna; cui ipsas leges Deu» subjecit." (g) We shall

not long hesitate to which of them to give the preference, as most conducive to

those ends for which societies were framed, and are kept together; especially as

the Koman lawyers themselves seem to be sensible of the unreasonableness of

their own constitution. "Decei tamen principem," says Paulus," servare leges, qui-

bus ipse solutus est." (h) This is at once laying down the principle of despotic

power, and at the same time acknowledging its absurdity.

By the word prerogative we usually understand that special pre-eminence,

which the king hath over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary

course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity. It signifies, in its ety-'

mology (from prce and rogo,) something that is required or demanded before, or]

in preference to, all others. And hence it follows, that it must be in its nature

singular and eccentrical; that it can only be applied to those rights and capaci-

ties which the king enjoys alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to those

which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects: for if once any one prerog-.

(*) I "fives. 479. (c) Ibid. 645. (d) King James1 Works. .v>7, 931. (e} Finch, L. 84. 86.

(/) Bracton, Z. 8, tr. 1, c. 9. (3) Nov. 105, } 2. (h) Ff. 32, 1,88.

guarded on account of the public; they are not to be extended further than the laws and con-

stitution of the country have allowed mem; but within these bounds they are entitled to every

protection. Lord Konyon. 4 T. K. 410; and see also Lord Hardwicke's observations in 3

There cannot be a. stronger proof of that genuine freedom, which is the boast
of this age and country, than the power of discussing and examining, with
decency and respect, the limits of the king's prerogative. A topic, that in some
former ages was thought too delicate and sacred to be profaned by the pen of a
subject. It W!l.8 ranked among the arcana imperii: and, like the mysteries of
the bona dea, was *not suffered to be pried into by any but such as were • 238 ]
initiated in its service: because perhaps the exertion of the one, like the [
solemnities of the other, would not bear the inspection of a rational and sober
inquiry. The glorious Queen Elizabeth herself made no scruple to direct her
parliaments to abstain from discoursin~ of matters of state; ( b) and it was the
constant language of this favourite pnncess and her ministers, that even that
august assembly " ought not to deal, to judge, or to meddle with her majesty's
prerogative royal." (c) And her successor, King James the First, who had
imbibed high notions of the divinity of regal sway, more than once laid it down
in his speech~s, that, " us it is atheism and blasphemy in a creature to dispute
what the Deity may do, so it is presumption and sedition in a. subject to dispute
what a king may do in the height of his power: good. Christians," he adds, " will
be content with God's will revealed in his word; and good subjects will rest in
the king's will, revealed in Ms law." (d)
But, whatever might be the sentiments of some of our princes, this was never
the language of our ancient constitution and laws. The limitation of the regal
authority was a first and essential principle in all the Gothic syst~ms of government established in Europe; though gradually driven out and overborne, by
violence and chicane, in most of the kingdoms on the continent. We have
seen, in the preceding chapter, the sentiments of Bracton and Fortescue, at the
distance of two centuries from each other. And Sir Henry Finch, under Charles
the First, after the lapse of two centuries more, though he lays down the law of
prerogative in very strong and emphatical terms, yet qualifies it with a general
restriction, in regard to the liberties of the people. "The king hath a prerogati ve in all things, that are not injurious to the subject; for in them all it must
be remembered, that the king's prerogative stretcheth not to the doing of any
wrong." ( e) Niliil enirn ali·u d potest rex, nisi id solum quod *de jure pot est. [ • 239 ]
( /) And here it may be some satisfaction to remark, how widely the civil
law differs from our own, with regard to the authority of the laws over the prince, or,
a.s a civilian would rather have expressed it, the authority of the prince over the laws.
It is a maxim of the English law, as we have seen from Bracton, that" rex debet
esse sub lege, q1tia lexfacit regem ;" the imperial law will tell us, that, " in omnibu.s, imperatoris exc-ipitur fortuna; cui ipsas leges Deus subjedt." (g) We shall
not long hesitate to which of them to give the preference, as most conducive to
those ends for which societies were framed, and are kept together; especially as
the Roman lawyers themselves seem to be sensible of the unreasonableness of
their own constitution. "Decet tamen principem," says Pll.ulus, "servare leges, quibus ipse solutus est." (k) This is at once laying down the principle of despotic
power, and at the same time acknowledging its absurdity.
~y the w?rd prerogative we usually understand that special pre-eminence,
which the kmg hath over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary
course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity. It signifies, in its ety- ·
mology (fromprm and rogo,) something that is required or demanded before, orj
in preference to, all others. And hence it follows, that it must be in its nature
singular and eccentrical; that it can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the king enjoys alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to those
which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects: for if once any one prerog-.
(b) Dewee, •79.
(c) ll>ld. 6'6.
(d) King Jamee• Works. M7, 531.
(fl Bracton, l. 8, tr. i, c. 9.
(q) Nov. 106, t 2.
(7') Ff. 32, 1,23.

(e) Finch, L. M, Sil.
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guarded on accowit of the public; they are not to be extended further than the laws and con·
;titution of the country have allowed them; but within these bounds they are entitled to every
protection. Lord Kenyon, 4 T. R. 410; end see also Lord Hardwicke's observations in 3
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ative of the crown could be held in common with the subject, it would cease to

be prerogative any longer. And therefore Finch (t) lays it down as a maxim,

that the prerogative is that law in case of the king, which is law in no case of

the subject.

Prerogatives are either direct or incidental. The direct are such positive

f *240 1 SUD8tantial parts of the royal character and *authoritv, as are rooted in

*- -" and spring from the king's political person, considered merely by itself,

without reference to any other extrinsic circumstance; as, the right of sending

embassadors, of creating peers, and of making war or peace. But such prerog-

atives as are incidental bear always a relation to something else, distinct from

the king's person; and are indeed only exceptions, in favour of the crown, to

those general rules that are established for the rest of the community; such as,

that no costs shall be recovered against the king; that the king can never be a

joint tenant; and that his debt shall be preferred before a debt to any of his

subjects. These, and an infinite number of other instances, will better be under-

stood, when we come regularly to consider the rules themselves, to which these

incidental prerogatives are exceptions. And therefore we will at present only

dwell upon the king's substantive or direct prerogatives.

These substantive or direct prerogatives may again be divided into three kinds:

being such as regard, first, the king's roval character; secondly, his royal

authority ; and, lastly, his royal income. These are necessary to secure rever-

ence to his person, obedience to his commands, and an affluent supply for the
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ordinary expenses of government; without all of which it is impossible to main-

tain the executive power in due independence and vigor. Yet, in every branch

of this large and extensive dominion, our free constitution has interposed such

reasonable checks and restrictions, as may curb it from trampling on those

liberties which it was meant to secure and establish. The enormous weight of

prerogative, if left to itself, (as in arbitrary governments it is,) spreads havoc

and destruction among all the inferior movements: but, when balanced and

regulated (as with us) by its proper counterpoise, timely and judicially applied,

its operations are then equable and certain, it invigorates the whole machine,

and enables every part to answer the end of its construction.

In the present chapter we shall only consider the two first of these divisions,

r 1241 -i *which relate to the king's political character and authority ; or, in other

L J words, his dignity and regal power; to which last the name of pre-

rogative is frequently narrowed and confined. The other division, which forms

the royal revenue, will require a distinct examination ; according to the known

distribution of feudal writers, who distinguish the royal prerogatives into the

majora and minora regalia, in the latter of which classes the rights of the rev-

enue are ranked. For to use their own words, " majora regalia imperil pr<e-

eminentiam spectant; minora vero ab commodum pecuniarium immediate atti-

nent; et hcec proprie fiscalia sunt, et ad jus fisci pertinent." (k)

First, then, of the royal dignity. Under every monarchical establishment, it

is necessary to distinguish the prince from his subjects, not only by the outward

pomp and decorations of majesty, but also by ascribing to him certain qnalities,

as inherent in his royal capacity, distinct from and superior to those of any

other individual in the nation, For though a philosophical mind will consider

the royal person merely as one man appointed by mutual consent to preside

over many others, and will pay him that reverence and duty which the princi-

ples of society demand; yet the mass of mankind will be apt to grow insolent

and refractory, if taught to consider their prince as a man of no greater perfec-

tion than themselves. The law therefore ascribes to the king, in his high polit-

ical character, not only large powers and emoluments, which form his preroga-

tive and revenue, but likewise certain attributes of a great and transcendent

nature; by which the people are led to consider him in the light of a superior

being, and. to pay him that awful respect, which may enable him with greater

(*) Finch, L. 86. ftJPertgrin, dejureJUe. 1.1, c. 1. num. 9.
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ative of the crown could be held in common with the subject, it would cea.se to
he prerogative any longer. And therefore Finch (i) lays it down a.s a maxim~
that the prerogative is that law in case of the king, which is law in no case of
the subject.
Prerogatives a.re either direct or incidental. The direct are such positive
[ • 240 ] substantial parts of the royal character and •authority, as are rooted in
and spring from the king's political person, considered merely by it.self,
without reference to any other extrinsic circumstance; as, the right of sending
embassadors, of creating peers, and of making war or peace. But such prerogatives as are incidental bear always a relation to something else, distinct from
the king's person ; and a.re indeed only exceptions, in favour of the crown, to
those general rules that are established for the rest of the community; such M,
that no costs shall be recovered against the king; that the king can never be a
joint tenant; and that his debt shall be preferred before a debt to any of his
subjects. These, and an infinite number of other instances, will better be understood, when we come regularly to consider the rules themselves, to which these
incidental prerogatives are exceptions. And therefore we will at present only
dwell upon the king's substantive or direct prero~tives.
These substantive or direct prerogatives may agam be divided into three kinds:
being such as regard, first, the king's roval character J. secondly, his royal
authority ; and, lastly, his royal income. These are necessary to secure reverence to his person, obedience to his commands, and an affluent supply for the
ordinary expenses of government; without all of which it is impossible to maintain the executive power in due independence and vigor. Yet, in every branch
of this large and extensive dominion, our free constitution has interposed such
reasonable checks and restrictions, as may curb it from trampling on those
liberties which it was meant to secure and establish. The enormous weight of
prerogative, if left to itself, (as in arbitrary governments it is,) spreads ha>oc
and destruction among all the inferior movements: but, when balanced and
regulated (as with us) by its proper counte11X>ise, timely and judicially applied,
its operations are then equable and certain, it invigorates the whole machine,
and enables every part to answer the end of its construction.
In the rresent chapter We shall only Consider the two first of these diYisions,
[ • 241 ] which relate to the king's political characte-r and autlwrity; or, in other
words, his dignity and regal power; to which last the name of prerogative is frequently narrowed and confined. The other division, which forms
the royal revenue, will re9uire a distinct examination ; according to the known
distribution of feudal wnters, who distinguish the royal prero~atives into the
majora and minora regalia, in the latter of which classes the nghts of the revenue are ranked. For to use their own words, "ma.fora rega.lia imperii prmeminentiam spectant; m-inora vero ab commodum pecuniariu,m imrMdiate attinent ; et h<Ec proprie jiscalia .<Junt, et ad jus fisci pertinent." (k)
First, then, of the royal dignity. Under every monarchical establishment~ it
is necessarv to distinguish the prince from his subjects, not only by the outward
pomp and "decorations of majesty, but also by ascribing to him certain qualities,
as inherent in his royal capacity, distinct from and superior to those of any
other individual in the nation, For though a philosophical mind will consider
the royal person merely as one man appointed by mutual consent to preside
over many others, and will pay him that reve~nce a~d duty which the. principles of society demand; yet the mass of mankmd will be apt to grow rnsolent
and refractory, if taught to consider their prince as a man of no greater perfection than themselves. The law therefore ascribes to the king, in his high political chara.ct.er, not only large powers and emoluments, which form his preroga- .
tive and revenue, but likewise certain attributes of a great and transcendent
nature; by which the people are led to consider him in the light of a superior
being, and to pay him that awful respect, which may enable him with greater
l'l Finch, L. 86.

(k)Peregrln,

~jv"~.

l. 1, c. 1. -

t.
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ease to carry on the business of government This is what I understand by the

royal dignity, the several branches of which we will now proceed to examine.

I. And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-

eminence. "Rex est vicarius," says Bracton, (I) "et minister Dei in terra:

omnis quidem sub eo est, et ipse *sub nullo, nisi tantum sub Deo." r n^o i

He is said to have imperial dignity; and in charters before the con- *• -"

quest is frequently styled basileus and imperator, the titles respectively

assumed by the emperors of the east and west, (m) His realm is declared to

be an empire, and his crown imperial, by many acts of parliament, particularly

the statutes 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12, and 25 Hen. VIII, c. 28; (n) which at the same

time declare the king to be the supreme head of the realm in matters both

civil and ecclesiastical, and of consequence inferior to no man upon earth,

dependent on no man, accountable to no man. Formerly there prevailed a

ridiculous notion, propagated by the German and Italian civilians, that an

emperor could do many things which a king could not, (as the creation of

notaries and the like,) and that all kings were in some degree subordinate and

subject to the emperor of Germany or Rome. The meaning, therefore, of the

legislature, when it uses these terms of empire and imperial, and applies them

to the realm and crown of England, is only to assert that our king is equally

sovereign and independent within these his dominions, as any emperor is in his

empire; (o) and owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate upon earth.

Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king even in civil
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matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction

implies supriority of power: authority to try would be vain and idle, without

an authority to redress; and the sentence of a court would be contemptible,

unless that court had power to command the execution of it; but who, says

Finch, (p) shall command the king ? Hence it is likewise, that by law the per-

son of the king is sacred, even though the measures pursued in his reign be com-

pletely tyrannical and arbitrary: for no jurisdiction upon earth has power to try

him in a criminal way; much less to condemn him to punishment. If any

foreign jurisdiction had this power, as was formerly claimed by the pope, the

independence of the kingdom would be no more; and, if such a power were

vested in any domestic *tribunal, there would soon be an end of the con- r ,„, „ -i

stitution, by destroying the free agency of one of the constituent parts "- ••

of the sovereign legislative power.

Are then, it may be asked, the subjects of England totally destitute of remedy,

in case the crown should invade their rights, either by private injuries, or public

oppression ? To this we may answer, that the law has provided a remedy in both

cases.

And, first, as to private injuries: if any person has, in point of property, a

just demand upon the king, he must petition him in his court of chancery,

where his chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace though not upon

compulsion, (q) (2) And this is entirely consonant to what is laid down by the

writers on natural law. " A subject," says Pufiendorf, (r) " so long as he con-

(l) L. 1. o. 8. (m) Sold. Tit.of Hon. I. Z. (n) See also Zt Geo. H. c. 24. 5 Geo. in. c. 27.

f o) Rex allegavii, good ipie omnes libertates haberet in regno tiw, qitat imperator vindicabat in imjieria.

(M. ParU, A. D. 1096. (p) Finch, L. 83. (q) Finch, L. 255. See b. III. c. 17.

ease to carry on the business of government. This is what I understand by the
royal dignity, the several branches of which we will now proceed to examine.
I. And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or preeminence. " Rex est vicarius," sals Bracton, (l) "et minister Dei in terra :
omnis quidem sub eo est, et ipse sub nullo, nisi tantu,m sub Deo." [ • 242 ]
He is said to have imperial dignity; and in charters before the conquest is frequently styled basileus and imperator, the titles respectively
assumed by the emperors of the east and west. (m) His realm is declared to
be an empire, and his crown imperial, by many acts of parliament, particularly
the statutes 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12, and 25 Hen. VIII, c. 28 ; (n) which at the same
time declare the king to be the supreme head of the realm in matters both
civil and ecclesiastical, and of consequence inferior to no man upon earth,
dependent on no man, accountable to no man. Formerly there prevailed a
ridiculous notion, propagated by the German and Italian civilians, that an
emperor could do many things which a king could not, (as the creation of
notaries and the like,) and that all kings were in some de~ee subordinate and
subject to the emperor of Germany or Rome. 'fhe meaning, therefore, of the
legislature, when it uses these terms of empire and imperial, and applies them
to the realm and crown of England, is only to assert that our king is equally
so•ereign and independent within these his dominions, as any emperor ism his
empire; (o) and owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate upon earth.
Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king even in civil
matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction
implies superiority of power: authority to try would be vain and idle, without
an authority to redress; and the sentence of a court would be contemptible,
unless that court had power to command the execution of it; but who, says
Finch, ( p) shall command the king? Hence it is likewise, that by law the person of the kin~ is sacred, even though the measures pursued in his reign be completely tyrannical and arbitrary: for no jurisdiction upon earth has power to try
him m a criminal way; much less to condemn him to punishment. If any
foreign jurisdiction had this power, as was formerly claimed by the pope, the
independence of the kingdom would be no more ; and, if such a power were
vested in any domestic *tribunal, there would soon be an end of the con- [ • 243 ]
stitution, by destroying the free agency of one of the constituent parts
of the sovereign legislative power.
Are then, it may be asked, the subjects of England totally destitute of remedy,
in case the crown should invade their rights, either by private injuries, or public
oppression? To this we may answer, that the law has provided a remedy in both
cases.
And, first, as to private injuries: if any person has, in point of property, a
just demand upon th~ king, he must petition him in his court of chancery,
where his chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace though not upon
compulsion. (q) (2) And this is entirely consonant to what is laid down by the ·
writers on natural law. "A subject," says Puffendorf, (r) "so long as he con-

(r) Law of N. and N. b. 8, c. 10.

(2) A government is not liable to be sued in its own courts except by its own consent. U. S.

v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 139; Osborn v. Bit. of U. S. 9 Wheat. 738; 9 How. 386. But in the American

states, generally, provision is made by law for such suits, except where some state board of audi-

(l} L. l. c. S.
(m) Sold. Tit.of Hon. I. 2.
(n} Sec also Z! Geo. II. c. 'U. 6 Geo. In c. 'rl.
(o} Ra allegmJll, quod tpae omnes liberlatu haberet in regno nw, qua• imperator vindicabal in imperlo.
(.H. Paris, A. D. 1095.
(p) Finch, L. 83.
(q) Finch, L. 255. See b. III. c. 17.
(r) Law of N. and N. b. 8, c. 10.
~

tors or other like tribunal is created for the hearing and adjustment of claims against the public.

And the federal government has created a court of claims for the express purpose of trying rights

asserted by individuals against the nation.

An agent of the government, known to be acting in that capacity, and not expressly making

himself liable by personal contract, is not answerable for articles furnished on his order, but the

seller must look to the government. Macheath t>. Haldimand, 1 T. R., 172; Jones v. Le Tombe,

3 Ball. 384 ; Gill T. Brown, 12 Johns. 385; Randall v. Tan Vechten, 19 Johns. 63; Brown v.

Austin, 1 Mass. 208; Adams v. Wnittlesey, 3 Conn. 560; Ghent v. Adams, 2 Kelly, 214; Parks

r. Ross, 11 How. 362.

155

(2) A government is not liable to be sued in its own courts except by its own ~onsent. U:· S.
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tinues a subject, hath no way to oblige his prince to give him his due, when he

refuses it; though no wise prince will ever refuse to stand to a lawful contract.

And, if the prince gives the subject leave to enter an action against him, upon

such contract, in his own courts, the action itself proceeds rather upon natural

equity, than upon the municipal laws." For the end of such action is not to

compel the prince to observe the contract, but to persuade him And, as to per-

sonal wrongs; it is well observed by Mr. Locke, (s) " the harm which the sover-

eign can do in his own person not being likely to happen often, nor to extend

itself far; nor being able by his single strength to subvert the laws, nor

oppress the body of the people, (should any prince have so much weakness and

ill-nature as to endeavour to do it)—the inconveniency therefore of some partic-

ular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when a heady prince comes to the

throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the public and security of the gov-

ernment, in the person of the chief magistrate, being thus set out of the reach of

danger."

r *2441 *Next, as to cases of ordinary public oppression, where the vitals of

' " -" the constitution are not attacked, the law hath also assigned a remedy.

For as a king cannot misuse his power, without the advice of evil counsellors,

and the assistance of wicked ministers, these men may be examined and pun-

ished. The constitution has therefore provided, by means of indictments, and

parliamentary impeachments, that no man shall dare to assist the crown in con-

tradiction to the laws of the land. But it is at the same time a maxim in those
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laws, that the king himself can do no wrong: since it would be a great weakness

and absurdity in any system of positive law, to define any possible wrong, with-

out any possible redress.

For, as to such public oppressions as tend to dissolve the constitution, and

subvert the fundamentals of government, they are cases, which the law will

not, out of decency, suppose: being incapable of distrusting those whom it has

invested with any part of the supreme power; since such distrust would render

the exercise of that power precarious and impracticable, (t) For, wherever the

law expresses its distrust 01 abuse of power, it always vests a superior coercive

authority in some other hand to correct it; the very notion of which destroys

the idea of sovereignty. If therefore, for example, the two houses of parliament,

or either of them, had avowedly a right to animadvert on the king, or each

other, or if the king had a right to animadvert on either of the houses, that

branch of the legislature, so subject to animadversion, would instantly cease

to be a part of the supreme power; the balance of the constitution would be

overturned; and that branch or branches, in which this jurisdiction resided,

would be completely sovereign. The supposition of law therefore is, that

neither the king nor either house of parliament, collectively taken, is capable of

doing any wrong; since in such cases the law feels itself incapable of furnishing

F *2451 anv a^e^lua''e *remedy. For which reason all oppressions which may

L J happen to spring from any branch of the sovereign power, must neces-

sarily be out of the reach of any stated rule or express legal provision; but, if

ever they unfortunately happen, the prndence of the times must provide new

remedies upon new emergencies.

Indeed, it is found by experience, that whenever the unconstitutional oppres-

sions, even of the sovereign power, advance with gigantic strides, and threaten

desolation to a state, mankind will not be reasoned out of the feelings of

humanity; nor will sacrifice their liberty by a scrupulous adherence to those

political maxims, which were originally established to preserve it. And there-

fore, though the positive laws are silent, experience will furnish us with a very

remarkable case, wherein nature and reason prevailed. When King James the

Second invaded the fundamental constitution of the realm, the convention

declared an abdication, whereby the throne was rendered vacant, which induced

(•) On Gov. p. 2, f 205.

(t) See these polnt8 more folly discussed in the Consideration! of the Lav of Forfeiture, 3d edit page 109

—126, wherein the very learned author has thrown many new and Important lights on the texture of our

happy conciliation.
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And, if the prince gives the subject leave to enter an action against him, upon
such contrad, in his own courts, the action itself proceeds rather upon natural
equity, than upon the municipal laws;'' For the end of such action is not to
compel the prince to observe the contract, but to persuade him And, as to personal wrongs; it is well observed by Mr. Locke, (s) "the harm which the sovereign can do in his own person not being likely to happen often, nor to extend
itself far; nor being able by his single strength to subvert the laws, nor
oppress the body of the people, (should any prince have so much weakness and
ill-nature as t-0 endeavour to do it)-the inconveniency therefore of some particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when a heady prince comes to the
throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the public and security of the government, in the person of the chief magistrate, being thus set out of the reach of
danger."
*Next, as to cases of ordinary public oppression, where the vitals of
[ • 244 ]
the constitution are not att.acked, the law hath also assigned a remedv.
For as a ki:r:ig cannot misuse his power, without the advice of evil counsellor°S,
and the assistance of wicked ministers, these men may be examined and punished. The constitution has therefore provided, by means of indictments, and
parliamentary impeachments, that no man shall dare to assist the crown in contradiction to the laws of the land. But it is at the same time a maxim in those
lu.ws, that the king himself can do no wrong: since it would be a great weakness
and absurditY. in any system of positive law, to define any possible wrong, without any possible redress.
For, as to such public oppressions as tend t.o dissolve the constitution, and
subvert the fundamentals of government, they are cases, which the law will
not, out of decency, suppose: being incapable of distrusting those whom it has
invested with any part of the supreme power; since such distrust would render
the exercise of that power precarious 11.nd impracticable. (t) For, wherever the
law expresses its distrust of abuse of power, it always vests a superior coercive
authority in some other hand to correct it; the very notion of which destroys
the idea of sovereignty. If therefore, for example, the two houses of parliamen~
or either of them, had avowedly a right to animadvert on the king, or each
other, or if the king had a right to animadvert on either of t.he houses, that
branch of the kgi1d&ture, so subject to animadversion, would instantly cease
t.o be a part of the supreme power; the ha.la.nee of the constitution would be
overturned; and that branch or branches, in which this jurisdiction resided,
would be completely sovereign. The supposition of law therefore is, that
neither the king nor either house of parliament, collectively taken, is capable of
doing any wrong; since in such cases the law feels itself incapable offurnishing
[ • 245 ] any adequate *remedy. For which reason all oppressions which may
happen t.o spring from any branch of the sovereign power, must necessarily be out of the reach of any stated rule or express legal provision ; but, if
ever they unfortunately hap~n, the prudence of the times must provide new
remedies upon new emergencies.
Indeed, it is found by experience, that whenever the unconstitutional oppre.ssions, even of the sovereign power, advance with gigantic stridl's, and threaten
uesolation t.o a state, mankind will not be reasoned out of the feelings of
humanity; nor will sacrifice their liberty by a scrupulous adherence to those
political maxims, which were originally established to preserve it. And therefore, though the posith·e laws are silent, experience will furnish us with a very
remarkable case, wherein nature and reason prevailed. When King James the
Second invaded the fundamental constitution of the realm, the convention
declared an abdication, whereby the throne was rendered vacant, which induced
(•) On Gov. p. 2, 1206.
See these points more Cully dlscuNed In the C~affona of tM Lmn of Forj'eUure, Sd edit. page 109
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happy constitution.
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a new settlement of the crown. And so far as this precedent leads, and no

further, we may now be allowed to lay down the law of redress against public

oppression. If* therefore, any future prince should endeavour to subvert the

constitution by breaking the original contract between king and people, should

violate the fundamental laws, and should withdraw himself out of the king-

dom ; we are now authorized to declare that this conjunction of circumstances

would amount to an abdication, and the throne would be thereby vacant. But

it is not for us to say that any one, or two, of these ingredients would amount

to such a situation ; for there our precedent would fail us. In these, therefore,

or other circumstances, which a fertile imagination may furnish, since both law

and history are silent, it becomes us to be silent too; leaving to future genera-

tions, whenever necessity and the safety of the whole shall require it, the exer-

tion of those inherent, though latent, powers of society, which no climate, no

time, no constitution, no contract, can ever destroy or diminish.

*II. Besides the attribute of sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the r +n±o i

king, in his political capacity, absolute perfection. The king can do no ^ -*

wrong; which ancient and fundamental maxim is not to be understood, as if

every thing transacted by the government was of course just and lawful, but

means only two things. First, that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of

public affairs, is not to be imputed to the king, nor is he answerable for it per-

sonally to his people: for this doctrine would totally destroy that constitutional

independence of the crown, which is necessary for the balance of power in our
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free and active, and therefore compounded, constitution. And secondly, it

means that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury: it is

created for the benefit of the people, and therefore cannot be exerted to their

prejudice, (u) (3)

The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doine wrong, but even of thinking

•wrong: he can never mean to do an improper tiling: in him is no folly or

•weakness. And, therefore, if the crown should be induced to grant any fran-

chise or privilege to a subject contrary to reason, or in any wise prejudicial to

the commonwealth or a private person, the law will not suppose the king to

have meant either an unwise or an injurious action, but declares that the king

•was deceived in his grant; and thereupon such grant is rendered void, merely

•upon the foundation of fraud and deception, either by or upon those agents

•whom the crown has thought proper to employ. For the law will not cast an

imputation on that magistrate whom it intrusts with the executive power, as if

he was capable of intentionally disregarding his trust; but attributes to mere

imposition (to which the most perfect of sublunary beings must still continue

liable) those little inadvertencies, which, if charged on the will of the prince,

might lessen him in the eyes of his subjects. (4)

*Yet still, notwithstanding this personal perfection, which the law •- #0471

attributes to the sovereign, the constitution has allowed a latitude of "- ' -*

(it) Plowd. 487.

(3) Mr. Christian saya that " perhaps this means that, although the king is subject to the

passions and infirmities of other men, the constitution has prescribed no mode by which he can

be made personally amenable for any wrong which he may actually commit. The law will

therefore presume no wrong where it has provided no remedy." But the constitution has pro-

Tided a remedy by impeachment of the king's advisers; and it therefore assumes that the execu-

tive authority can be guilty of wrong, though it holds not the nominal head of the government,

but the persons who for the time being wield the political power, responsible therefor. See Todd,

Parl. Gov. Vol. 1, p. 40. Jeremy Bentham says that our author in this chapter " in speaking of

the royal authority, has given himself up to all the puerility of fiction," Principles of Legislation.

In uie United States the president himself may be impeached. Const, art. 2, $ 4.

(4) This presumption of correct motives on the part of a co-ordinate department of the gov-

ernment is extended to the action of the legislature, and the courts will not permit the validity

of legislation to be questioned, on the ground that it was obtained by corruption in the legis-

lative body. Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 545; Johnson v. Hig-

gins, 3 Met. Ky. 566; Sunbury and Brie E. R. Co. v. Cooper, 33 Penn. St. 278; Ex parte New-

man, 9 Cal. 502.

157

247 THE KING'S PREROGATIVE. [Book I.

supposing the contrary, in respect to both houses of parliament, each of which

in its turn, hath exerted the right of remonstrating and complaining to the

king even of those acts of royalty, which are most properly and personally hia

own; such as messages signed by himself, and speeches delivered from the

throne. And yet, such is the reverence which is paid to the royal person, that

though the two houses have an undoubted right to consider these acts of state

in any light whatever, and accordingly treat them in their addresses as person-

ally proceeding from the prince, yet among themselves, (to preserve the more

perfect decency, and for the greater freedom of debate) they usually suppose

them to flow from the advice of the administration. But the privilege of can-

vassing thus freely the personal acts of the sovereign (either directly, or even,

through the medium of his.reputed advisers) belongs to no individual, but is

confined to those august assemblies; and there too the objections must be pro-

posed with the utmost respect and deference. One member was sent to the

Tower (v) for suggesting that his majesty's answer to the address of the com-

mons contained "high words to fright the members out of their duty;" and

another, (w) for saying that a part of the king's speech " seemed rather to be

calculated for the meridian of Germany than Great Britain, and that the king

was a stranger to our language and constitution." (5)

In farther pursuance of this principle, the law also determines that in the

king can be no negligence or laches, and therefore no delay will bar his right.

Nullum tempus occurnt regi has been the standing maxim upon all occasions;
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(6) for the law intends that the king is always busied for the public good, and

therefore has not leisure to assert his right within the times limited to sub-

F *2481 J60*8- (y) IQ tne king also can be no stain or corruption of *blood; for,

"- J if the heir to the crown were attainted of treason or felony, and after-

wards the crown should descend to him, this would purge the attainder ipso facto,

(z) And therefore when Henry VII, who, as earl of Richmond, stood attainted,

came to the crown, it was not thought necessary to pass an act of parliament to

reverse this attainder; because, as Lord Bacon, in his history of that prince,

informs us, it was agreed that the assumption of the crown had at once purged

all attainders. Neither can the king in judgment of law, as king, ever be a

minor or under age; and therefore his royal grants and assents to acts of par-

liament are good, though he has not in his natural capacity attained the legal age

of twenty-one, (a) By a statute, indeed, 28 Hen. VIII, c. 17, power was given to

future kings to rescind and revoke all acts of parliament that should be made

while they were under the age of twenty-four; but this was repealed by the

statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 11, so far as related to that prince; and both statutes are

declared to be determined by 24 Geo. II, c. 24. It hath also been usually

thought prudent, when the heir apparent has been very young, to appoint a pro-

re; Com. Joorn. 18 NOT. 1686. (v>) Ibid. 4 Dec. 1717. (y) Finch, L. 82; Co. Litt. 90.

(z) Finch, L. 8J. (a) Co. UK. 43. 2 Inst. proem. 8.

(5) Of late, however, freedom to discuss the speech from the throne is practically conceded,

and it is difficult to perceive why it should not be, when, in a constitutional view, it is to be

regarded as the speech of the ministry.

(6) There are many exceptions to this maxim. The right to institute criminal proceedings

is m many cases limited to a definite period by statute, and in the case of a claim to real

property, the right of the crown is also limited by statute to the same period as that of a

subject.

The maxim has been recognized in the United States, and it is held that statutes of limitations

do not run against the state, nor against the United States, unless it is expressly so provided.

Kemp t>. Commonwealth, 1 Hen. and M. 88; People ». Gilbert, 18 Johns. 228; Hardin v. Tay-

lor, 4 Monr. 516; Lindsay v. Miller's lessee, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. v. "White, 2 Hill, 59; Johnston 'v.

Irwin, 3 S. and R. 291; Madison Co. v. Bartlett, 1 Scam. 70; State Bank v. Brown, ibid. 106;

People v. Arnold, 4 N". Y. 508. "Where, however, the state is assignee of an individual, it can

claim no such exemption: U. S. «. Buford, 3 Pet. 30; and inferior municipal bodies cannot claim

it. Armstrong v. Dalton, 4 Dov. 566; Contra, Madison Co. v. Bartlett, 1 Scam. 70. Except

where they are simply trustees for the whole public, as in the case of lands dedicated to public

uses. Alton v. Illinois Trausp. Co., 12 111. 38.
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tector, guardian, or regeiit, for a limited time: but the very necessity of such

extraordinary provision is sufficient to demonstrate the truth of that maxim of

the common law, that in the king is no minority;,and therefore he hath no

legal guardian, (b) (7)

*III. A third attribute of the king's majesty in his perpetuity. The r $2491

law ascribes to him, iii his political capacity, an absolute immortality. L -•

The king never dies. Heiiry, Edward, or George, may die; but the king

survives them all. For immediately upon the decease of the reigning prince in

his natural capacity, his kingship or imperial dignity, by act of law, without

any interregnum or interval, is vested at once in his heir, who is, eo instanti,

king to all intents and purposes. And so tender is the law of supposing even

a possibility of his death, that his natural dissolution is generally called his

demise; demissio regis, vel corona: an expression which signifies merely a

transer of property; for, as is observed in Plowden, (c) when we say the demise

of the crown, we mean only that, in consequence of the disunion of the king's

natural body from his body politic, the kingdom is transferred or demised to his

successor; and so the royal dignity remains perpetual. Thus too, when Edward

the Fourth, in the tenth year of his reign, was driven from his throne for a few

months, by the house of Lancaster, this temporary transfer of his dignity was

denominated his demise; and all process was held to be discontinued, as upon

a natural death of the king, (d)

*We are next to consider those branches of the royal prerogative, r ^q-n n
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which invest thus our sovereign lord, thus all-perfect and immortal in *• J

his kingly capacity, with a number of authorities and powers; in the exertion

whereof consists the executive part of government. This is wisely placed in a

single hand by the British constitution, for the sake of unanimity, strength and

dispatch. Were it placed in many hands, it would be subject to many wills:

many wills, if disunited and drawing different ways, create weakness in a govern-

ment ; and to unite those several wills, and reduce them to one, is a work of

more time and delay than the exigencies of state will afford. The king of Eng-

land is therefore not only the chief, but properly the sole, magistrate of the nation,

all others acting by commission from, and in due subordination to him: in like

manner as, upon the great revolution in the Boman state, all the powers of the

ancient magistracy of the commonwealth were concentrated in the new emperor:

so that, as Gravina («) expresses it, " in ejus unius persona veteris reipubliccB

vis atque majestas per cumulatas maqistrdtuum potestates exprimebatur."

After what has been premised in this chapter, I shall not (I trust) be consid-

ered as an advocate for arbitrary power, when I lay it down as a principle, that

in the exertion of lawful prerogative the king is and ought to be absolute; that

(6) The methods or appointing this guardian or regent have been so various, and the duration of his power

so uncertain, that from hence alone It may be collected'that his office is unknown to the common law; and

therefore (as Sir Edward Coke aays, 4 Inst. 88,) the surest way Is to have him made by authority of the great

council in parliament. The carl of Pembroke, by his own authority, assumed, in very troublesome times,

the regency of Henry III, who was then only nine years old, but was declared of full age by the pope at

seventeen, confirmed the great charter at oign teen, and took upon him the administration of the government

at twenty. A guardian ami council of regency were named for Edward III, by the parliament, which

deposed his father; the young king being then fifteen, and not assuming the government till three years

;i i'ter. When Richard II succeeded at the age of eleven, the duke of Lancaster took upon him the manage-

ment of the kingdom, till the parliament met, which appointed a nominal council to assist him. Henry V,

on his death-bed, named a regent and a guardian for his infant son. Henry VI. then nine months old; but

tbe parliament altered his disposition, andappointcd a protector and council, with a special limited authority.

Both these princes remained In a state of pupilage till the ;iur of twenty-three. Edward V, at the age of

thirteen, was recommended by his father to the care of the diike of Gloucester, who was declared protector

by the privy council. The statutes 2.5 Hen. VIII. c 12, and 28 Hen. vm,<• 7, provided,that the successor.if a

male, anil under eighteen, or if a female and under sixteen, should be till such age in the government of

his or her natural mother, (if approved by the king^.) and such other counsellors as his majesty should by

will or otherwise appoint; and he accordingly appointed his sixteen executors to have the government of

hli son Edward VI, and the kingdom, which executors elected the earl of Hertford protector. The statute

24 Geo.II, c. 24. in case the crown should descend to any of the children of Frederick, late prince of Wales,

under the ago of eighteen, appointed the princess dowager; and that of 5 Goo. HI, c. 27, in case of a like

descent to any of his present majesty's children, empowers the king to name either the queen, the princess

dowager, or any descendant of King George II, residing in this kingdom, to be guardian and regent, till the

successor attains such age, assisted by a council of regency; the powers of them all being expressly

defined and set down In the several acts.

(c) Plowd. 177, 234. (d) M. 49 Hen. VI. pi. 1-8 (e) Orig. 1,} 103.

(7) An interesting account of the proceedings in reference to a regency during the reign of

Geo. Ill will be fonnd in May's Const. Hist. o. 3.
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is, so far absolute that there is no legal authority that can either delay or resist

him. He may reject what bills, may make what treaties, may coin what money, may

create what peers, may pardon what offences, he pleases; unless where the con-

stitution hath expressly, or by evident consequence, laid down some exception

or boundary; declaring, that thus far the prerogative shall go, and no farther.

For otherwise the power of the crown would indeed be but a name and a

shadow, insufficient for the ends of government, if where its jurisdiction is

clearly established and allowed, any man or body of men were permitted to

disobey it, in the ordinary course of law: I say in the ordinary course of law;

r *VK-\ I for I do not *now speak of those extraordinary recources to first prin-

' "" J ciples, which are necessary when the contracts of society are in danger

of dissolution, and the law proves too weak a defence against the violence of

fraud or oppression. And yet the want of attending to this obvious distinction

has occasioned these doctrines, of absolute power in the prince and of national

resistance by the people, to be much misunderstood and perverted, by the advo-

cates for slavery on the one hand, and the demagogues of faction on the other.

The former, observing the absolute sovereignty and transcendent dominion of

the crown laid down (as it certainly is) most strongly and emphatically in our

law books, as well as our homilies, have denied that any case can be excepted

from so general and positive a rule; forgetting how impossible it is, in any

practical system of laws, to point out beforehand those eccentrical remedies,

which the sudden emergence of national distress may dictate, and which that
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alone can justify. On the other hand, over-zealous republicans, feeling the

absurdity of unlimited passive obedience, have fancifully (or some times factiously)

gone over to the other extreme; and because resistance is justifiable to the

person of the prince when the being of the state is endangered, and the public

voice proclaims such resistance necessary, they have therefore allowed to every

individual the right of determining this expedience, and of employing private

force to resist even private oppression. A doctrine productive of anarchy, and,

in consequence, equally fatal to civil liberty, as tyranny itself. For civil liberty,

rightly understood, consists in protecting the rights of individuals by the

united force of society; society cannot be maintained, and of course can exert

no protection, without obedience to some sovereign power; and obedience is

an empty name, if every individual has a right to decide how far he himself

shall obey.

In the exertion, therefore, of those prerogatives which the law has given him,

the king is irresistible and absolute, according to the forms of the constitution.

And yet, if the consequence of that exertion be manifestly to the grievance or

F *2521 Dishonor °ftne kingdom, the parliament will call his advisers *to a just

' "' J and severe account. For prerogative consisting (as Mr. Locke (f) has

well defined it) in the discretionary power of acting for tne public good, where

the positive laws are silent; if that discretionary power be abused to the public

detriment, such prerogative is exerted in an unconstitutional manner." Thus

the king may make a treaty with a foreign state, which shall irrevocably bind

the nation; and yet, when such treaties have been judged pernicious, impeach-

ments have pursued those ministers, by whose agency or advice they were

concluded.

The prerogatives of the crown (in the sense under which we are now consid-

ering them) respect either this nation's intercourse with foreign nations, or its

own domestic government and civil polity.

With regard to foreign concerns, the king is the delegate or representative of

his people. It is impossible that the individuals of a state, in their collective

capacity, can transact the affairs of that state with another community equally

numerous as themselves. Unanimity must be wanting to their measures, and

strength to the execution of their counsels. In the king, therefore, ae in a centre,

all the rays of his people are united, and formed by that union, a consistency,

splendor and power, that make him feared and respected by foreign potentates;

(/) On GOT. 2,} 188.
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is, so far absolute that there is no legal authority that can either delay or resist
him. He may reject what bills, may make what treaties, may coin what money. may
create what peers, may pardon what offences, he pleases; unless where the constitution hath expressly, or by evident consequence, laid down some exception
or boundary; declaring, that thus far the prerogative shall go, and no farther.
For otherwise the power of the crown would indeed be but a name and a
shadow, insufficient for the ends of government, if where its jurisdiction is
clearly established and allowed, any man or body of men were permitted to
disobey it, in the ordinary course of law: I say in the ordinary course of law;
[ • 251 ] fur I do not *now speak of those extraordfaary recources to first principle.a, which are necessary when the contracts of society a.re in danger
of dissolution, and the law proves too weak a defence against the violence of
fraud or oppression. And yet the want of attending to this obvious distinction
has occasioned these doctrines, of absolute power in the prince and of national
resistance by the people, to be much misunderstood and perverted, by the ad.vocates for slavery on the one hand, and the demagogues of faction on the other.
The former, observing the absolute sovereignty and transcendent dominion of
the crown laid down (as it certainly is) most strongly and emphatically in our
law books, as well as our homilies, have denied that any case can be excepted
from so general and positive a rule; forgetting how impossible it is, in any
practical system of laws, to point out beforehand those eccentrical remedies,
which the sudden emergence of national distress may dictate, and which that
alone can justify. On the other hand, over-zealous republicans, feeling the
absurdity of unlimited passive obedience, have fancifully (or some times factiously)
gone over to the other extreme; and because resistance is justifiable to the
person of the prince when the being of the state is endangered, and the public
voice proclaims such resistance necessary, they have therefore allowed to every
individual the right of determining thi-s expedience, and of employing private
force to resist even private oppression. A doctrine productive of anarchy, and,
in consequence, equally fatal to civil liberty, as tyranny itself. For civil liberty,
rightly understood, consists in protecting the rights of individuals by the
united force of society; society cannot be maintained, and of course can exert
no protection, without obedience to some sovereign power; and obedience is
an empty name, if every individual has a right to decide how far he himself
shall obey.
In the exertion, therefore, of those prero~tives which the law has given him,
the king is irresistible and absolute, accordmg to the forms of the constitution.
And yet, if the consequence of that exertion be manifestly to the grievance or
[ • 252 ] dishonor of the kingdom, the parliament will call bis advisers *to a just
and severe account. For prerogative consisting (as Mr. Locke (/)has
well defined it) in the discretionary power of act.ing for the public good~ wheru
the positive laws are silent; if that discretionary power be abused to the public
detnment, such prerogative is exerted in an unconstitutional manner: Thus
the king- may make a treaty with a foreign state, which shall irrevocably bind
the nat10n ; and yet, when such treaties have been judged pernicious, impeachments have pursued those ministers, by whose agency or ad.vice they were
concluded.
The prerogatives of the crown (in the sense under which we a.re now considering them) respect either this nation's intercourse with foreign nations, or its
own domestic government and civil polio/.
·
With regard to foreign concerns, the kmg is the delegate or representative of
his people. It is impossible that the individuals of a state, in their collective
capacity, can transact the affairs of that state with another community equally
numerous as themselves. Unanimity must be wanting to their measures, and
strength to the execution of their couusels. In the king, therefore, as in a centre,
all the rays of his people are united, and formed by that union, a consistenc~·,
splendor and power, that make him feared and respected by foreign potent.at.es;
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who would scruple to enter into any engagement that must afterwards be revised

and ratified by a popular assembly. What is done by the royal authority, with

regard to foreign powers, is the act of the whole nation; what is done without

the king's concurrence, is the act only of private men. And so far is this point

carried by our law that it hath been held, (g) that should all the subjects of

England make war with a king in league with the king of England, without

the royal assent, such war is no breach of the league. And, by the statute

2 Hen. V, c. 6, any subject committing acts of hostility upon any nation in league

with the king was declared to be guilty of high treason; and, although that act

was repealed by the statute 20 Hen. VI, c. 11, so far as *relates to the r ,,053 i

making this offence high treason, yet still it remains a very great offence •- '''"'

against the law of nations, and punishable by our laws, either capitally or other-

wise, according to the circumstances of the case.

I. The king therefore, considered as the representative of his people, has the

sole power of sending ambassadors to foreign states, and receiving ambassadors

at home. This may lead us into a short digression, by way of inquiry, how far

the municipal laws of England intermeddle with or protect the rights of these

messengers from one potentate to another, whom we call ambassadors.

The rights, the powers, the duties, and the privileges of ambassadors are deter-

mined by the law of nature and nations, and not by any municipal constitutions.

For, as they represent the persons of their respective masters, who owe no sub-

jection to any laws but those of their own country, their actions are not subject
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to the control of the private law of that state wherein they are appointed to

reside. He that is subject to the coercion of laws is necessarily dependent on

that power by whom those laws were made: but an ambassador ought to be inde-

pendent of every power except that by which he is sent, and of consequence

ought not to be subject to the mere municipal laws of that nation wherein he

is to exercise his functions. If he grossly offends, or makes an ill use of his

character, he may be sent home and accused before his master; (h) who is bound

either to do justice upon him, or avow himself the accomplice of his crimes, (i)

But there is great dispute among the writers on the laws of nations, whether

this exemption of ambassadors extends to all crimes, as well natural as positive;

or whether it only extends to such as are mala prohibita, as coining, and not

to those that are mala in se, as murder, (k) Our law seems to have formerly

taken in the restriction, as well as the general exemption. *For it has r $254.1

been held, both by our common lawyers and civilians (/) that an ambas- L J

sador is privileged by the law of nature and nations; and yet, if he commits

any offence against the law of reason and nature, he shall lose his privilege; (m)

and that therefore, if an ambassador conspires the death of the Icing in whose

land he is, he may be condemned and executed for treason ; but if he commits

any other species of treason it is otherwise, and he must be sent to his own king-

dom. (11) And these positions seem to be built upon good appearance of reason.

For, since, as we have formerly shewn, all municipal laws act in subordination

to the primary law of nature, and, where they annex a punishment to natural

crimes, are only declaratory of, and auxiliary to, that law; therefore to this

natural universal rule of justice, ambassadors, as well as other men, are subject

in all countries; and of consequence, it is reasonable that, wherever they

transgress it, they shall be liable to make atonement, (o) But, however these

principles might formerly obtain, the general practice of this country, as well

as the rest of Europe, seems now to pursue the sentiments of the learned

Grotius, that the security of ambassadors is of more importance than the pun-

ishment of a particular crime. (p) And therefore few, if any, examples have

(a) 4 Inst 152.

(A) As was done with Count Qyllenberg the Swedish minister to Great Britain, A. J'. 1717.

(k) Van Lee'nwen in ff. SO, 7, 17. Barbeyrao's Puff. 1, 8, c. 9, f 9, and 17. Van Bynkershoek de foro

Ugator. c. 17,18,19.

(I) 1 Roll. Bop. 175. S Bulstr. 17. (nt) 4 Inst. 153.

(n) 1 Roll. Rep. 185. (o) Forster's Reports, 188.

(p) Securitos Mgotorvm utiNtati qua> ear poena e»t praponderat. (Dt jurf 6. q; p. 18, 4. 4.)
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happened within a, century past, where an ambassador has been punished for

any offence, however atrocious in its nature. (8)

In respect to civil suits, all the foreign jurists agree that neither an ambassa-

dor, or any of his train or comites can be prosecuted for any debt or contract in

the courts of that kingdom wherein he is sent to reside. Yet Sir Edward

Coke maintains that, if an ambassador make a contract which is good jure

gentium, he shall answer for it here, (q) But the truth is, so few cases (if any)

had arisen, wherein the privilege was either claimed or disputed, even with

regard to civil suits, that our law books are (in general) quite silent upon it

r *2'i'51 Prev'i°us to the *reign of Queen Aune; when an ambassador from Peter

L ^oo j ^ Qreat; czar Of Muscovy, was actually arrested and taken out of his

coach in London, (r) for a debt of fifty pounds which he had there contracted.

Instead of applying to be discharged upon his privilege, he gave bail to the

action, and the next day complained to the queen. The persons who were con-

cerned in the arrest were examined before the privy council (of which the Lord

Chief Justice Holt was at the same time sworn a member,) (*) and seventeen

were committed to prison; (t) most of whom were prosecuted by information in

the court of queen s bench, at the suit of the attorney general, (u) and at

their trial before the lord chief justice were convicted of the facts by the jury.

(v) reserving the question of law, how far those facts were criminal, to be after-

wards argued before the judges; which question was never determined. (9) In

(q) 4 lost. 163. (r) 21 July, 1708. Boyer's Annals of Queen \une.
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(«) 25 July, 1703. Boyer'a Annals of Queen Anne. («) 25, 29 July, 1708. Ibid.

happened within a century past, where an ambassador has been punished for
any offence, however atrocious in its nature. (8)
In respect to civil suits, all the foreign jurists agree that neither an ambassador, or any of his train or cornites can be prosecuted for any debt or contract in
the courts of that kingdom wherein he is sent to reside. Yet Sir Edwta.rd
Coke maintains that, if an ambassador make a contract which is good jure
gentium, he shall answer for it here. (q) But the truth is, so few cases (if any)
had arisen, wherein the privilege was either claimed or disputed, eYen wit.h
regard to civil suits, that our law books are (in general) quite silent upon it
[ • 255 ] previous to the *reign of Queen Anne; when an ambassador from Peter
the Great, czar of Muscovy, was actually arrested and taken out o! his
coach in London, (r) for a debt of fifty pounds which he had there contracted.
Instead of applying to be discharged upon his priYilege, he gave bail to the
action, and the next day complained to the queen. The persons who were concerned in the arrest were examined before the privy council (of which the Lord
Chief Justice Holt was at the same time sworn a member,) (s) and seventeen
were committed to \lrison; (t) most of whom were prosecuted by information in
the court of queen s bench, at the suit of the attorney general, (u) and at
their trial before the lord chief justice were convicted of the facts by the jury,
(v) reserving the question of law, how far those facts were criminal, to be afterwards argued before the judges; which question was neYer determined. (9) In

(«) 23 Oct. 1708. Ibid. (») U Feb. 1708. Ibid.

(8) [In the year 1654, during the protectorate of Cromwell, Don Pataleon Sa, the brother of

the Portuguese ambassador, who had been joined with him in the same commission, was tried,

(q) 'Inst.163.
(r) 21 July, li08. Boyer's Annnls or Queen .\.nne.
l•l iii July, 1708. Boyer's Annala of Queen Anne.
(I) 211, 29 July, 1708. Ibid.
(u) 23 Oct. 1708. Ibid.
(v) UFeb. 1708. Ibid.

fundamental laws of all society, ambassadors are certainly liable to answer in the ordinary

course of justice, as other persons offending in the like manner are;" but Mr. Hume observes

upon this case, that "the laws of nations were here plainly violated." 7vol. 237. And Vattel,

with irresistible ability, contends that the universal inviolability of an ambassador is an object

of much greater importance to the world than their punishment for crimes, however contrary to

natural justice. " A minister," says that profound writer, " is often charged with a commission

disagreeable to the prince to whom he is sent. If this prince has any po^yer over him, and

especially if his authority be sovereign, how is it to be expected that the minister can execute

his master's orders with a proper freedom of mind, fidelity and firmness? It is necessary

he should have no snares to tear, that he cannot be diverted from his functions by any

chicanery. He must have nothing to hope, and nothing to fear from the sovereign to whom

he is sent. Therefore, in order to the success of his ministry, he must be independent of the

sovereign's authority, and of the jurisdiction of the country, both civil and criminal:" B. 4, c. 7,

$ 92, where this subject is discussed in a most luminous manner. The Komans in the infancy of

their state acknowledged the expediency of the independence of ambassadors; for when

they had received ambassadors from the Tarquin princes whom they had dethroned, and had

afterwards detected those ambassadors in secretly committing acts which might have been

considered as treason against their state, they sent them back unpunished; upon which Livy

observes, et quanqvam vitti sunt commississe, ut hostium loco essent, jus tamen gentium vaba't.

Lib. 2, c. 4. When Bomilcar, qwi Romam fide publica venerat, was prosecuted as an accomplice

in the assassination of Massiva, Sallust declares, jit reus magis ex ceguo bonogue quam ex jure

gentium. Bell, Jujr. c. 35.]

When a public minister is guilty of an offence against the existence and safety of the state

where he resides, if the danger is urgent, his person and papers may be seized, and he may be

sent out of the country. Wheat. Int. law, pt. 3, c. 1, $ 15; Halleck Int. Law, 211. See an

account of the arrest of Count Gyllenberg, the Swedish minister, in 1717, in Mahon's Bast of

England, vol. 1, o. 8.

(9) [In 3 Burr. 1480, Lord Mansfield declares, that " the statute of Queen Anne was not

occasioned by any doubt whether the law of nations, particularly the part relative to public

ministers, was not part of the law of England, and the infraction criminal, nor intended to vary

an iota of it." And he proceeds to say, that Lord Talbot, Lord Hardwicke, and Lord Holt, were

clearly of the same opinion. But the infraction of the law of nations can only be a misdemeanor,

punishable at the discretion of the court by fine, imprisonment and pillory; and therefore, Lord

Mansfield says, the persons convicted were never brought up to receive judgment, for " no pun-

ishment would have been thought by the czar an adequate reparation. .Such a sentence as the

court would have given, he would have thought a fresh insult."]
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(8) [In the year 1654, during the protect.orate of Cromwell, Don Pataleon Sa, the brother of
the Portuguese ambassador, who had been joined with him in the same eommii1sion, was tried,
convicted, and executed for an atrocious murder. Lord Hale, 1 P. C. 99 approves of the
proceeding; and Mr. J. Foster, p. 188, thouFh a modem writer of law, lays it down, that" for
murder and other offences of great enonruty, which are against the light of nature and the
fundamental laws of all society, amba.~sadol"B are certainly liable t.o answer in the ordinary
course of justice, as other persons offending in the like manner are;" but Mr. Hume obi<erres
UJ?On this case that "the law11 of nations were here J?laiuly violated." 7 vol. 237. And Yattel,
with irresistible ability, contends that the universal mviolability of an ambassador is an object
of much greater importance to the world than their punh1hment for crimes, however contrary to
natural justice. ".A. minister," says that l?rofound writer, " is oft.en charged with a commission
disagreeable to the prince t.o whom he is sent. If thil! prince has any power over him, &nd
especially if his authority be sovereiini, how is it t.o be expected that the minister can execute
his master's ordel"B with a pro~er freedom of mind, fidelity and finnne~' It is necessary
he should have no snares to tear, that he cannot I.Jo diverted from his function!! by any
chicanery. He must have nothing t.o hope, and nothing to fear from the sovereign t.o whom
he is sent. Therefore, in order t.o the success of his ministry, he must be independent of the
sovereign's authority, and of the jurisdiction of the country, both civil and criminal :" B. 4, c. 7,
~ 92, where this subject is di1:1Cus8Cd in a most luminous manner. The Romam; in the infanev of
their !!tate acknowledged the expediency of the independence of ambas;;adors; for when
they had received ambe..-isadors from the Tarquin princes whom they had dethroned, and had
aflerwards detected those ambassadol"B in secretly committing acts which might have been
considered as tre&>on against their state, they sent them back unpunished; upon which Livv
obl'!crres, et quanqtuun vi.ri aunt commississe, ut hostium loco esstmt, jus tamen gentium tialuit.
Lil>. 2, c. 4. When Bomilcar, qui &mam fide publica uenerat, was prosecuted as an accomplice
in the a.BS88sina.tion of MMSiva., Sallust declares, fit retl.9 magi8 e;i; requo bmwqU6 quam e:i: jt1rt1
gentiltm. Bell, Jn~. c. 35.]
When a public mtnister is guilty of a.n offence against the existence a.nd safety of the state
where ho resides, if the danger jg urgent, his person ~nd papers may be seized, and he may be
sent out of the country. Wheat. Int. Jaw, pt. :l, c, 1, ~ 15; Halleck Int. Law, 211. See an
account of the arrest of Count Gyllenberg, the Swedish minister, in 1717, in llahon's Hist.. of
Engla.nd, vol. 1, o. 8.
(9) [In 3 Burr. 1480, Lord llansfiel4 declares, that "the statute of Queen .A.nne was not;
occasioned by any doubt whether the law of nations, J:la.rtioularly theJ.a.rt relative t.o public
miuiKtel'll, was not part of the law of England, and the illfra.ction crimin , nor intended t.o vary
an iota. of it." .A.nd he pNcocds t.o say, that Lord Ta.lbot, Lord Hardwicke, and Lord Holt, ll'CN
clearly of the same opinion. But the mfraction of the law of nations ca.n only be a misdemeanor.
puniBhable at the discretion of the court by fine, imprisonment and pillory ; and therefore, Loni
Mansfield says, the persons convicted were never brought up t.o receive judgment, for " no punishment would have been thought by the czar an adequate reparation. Sµc4 - eeutence lkl the
court would have given, he would have thought~ fresh insult."l
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the mean time the czar resented this affront very highly, and demanded that

the sheriff of Middlesex and all others concerned in the arrest should be pun-

ished with instant death, (w) But the queen (to the amazement of that despotic

court) directed her secretary to inform him, " that she could inflict no punish-

ment upon any, the meanest, of her subjects, unless warranted by the law of the

land; and therefore was persuaded that he would not insist upon impossibil-

ities." (x) To satisfy, however, the clamours of the foreign ministers (who made it a

common cause,) as"well as to appease the wrath of Peter, a bill was brought

into parliament, (y) and afterwards passed into a law, (z) to prevent and punish

such outrageous insolence for the future. And with a copy of this act, elegantly

engrossed and illuminated, accompanied by a letter from the queen, an ambassa-

dor extraordinary (a) was commissioned to appear at Moscow, (b) who declared

" that though her majesty could not inflict such a punishment as was required,

"because of the defect in that particular of the former established con- r *„,.„ -,

stitutions of her kingdom, yet with the unanimous consent of the par- •• '-'*''

liament she had caused a new act to be passed, to serve as a law for the

future." This humiliating step was accepted as a full satisfaction by the

czar; and the offenders, at his request, were discharged from all farther prose-

cution. (10)

This statute (c) recites the arrest which had been made, " in contempt of the

protection granted by her majesty, contrary to the law of nations, and in preju-

dice of the rights and privileges which ambassadors and other public ministers
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have at all times been thereby possessed of, and ought to be kept sacred and

inviolable:" wherefore it enacts, that for the future all process whereby the

person of any ambassador, or of his domestic or domestic servant, may be arrested,

or his goods distrained or seized, shall be utterly null and void; and the

persons prosecuting, soliciting, or executing such process, shall be deemed viola-

tors of the law of nations, and disturbers of the public repose; and shall suffer

such penalties and corporal punishment as the lord chancellor and the two chief-

justices, or any two of them, shall think fit. (11.) But it is expressly provided,

that no trader, within the description of the bankrupt laws, who shall be in the

service of any ambassador, shall be privileged or protected by this act; nor shall

any one be punished for arresting an ambassador's servant, unless his name be

registered with the secretary of state, and by him transmitted to the sheriffs of

London and Middlesex. Exceptions that are strictly conformable to the rights

fa) 17 Sept. 1708. IMd. (x) HJan. 1708. Ibid. Mod. Un. Hist, xxxv, «4

(y) Com. Jonrn. 23 Dec. 1708. (z) 21 Apr. 1709. Boyer. ibid. (a) Mr. Whitworth.

fbj 8 Jan. 1709. Boycr, ibid. (ctf Ann. c. 12.

the mean tim<' t.he czar resented this affront very highly, and demanded that
the sheriff of .Middlesex and a.II others concerned in the arrest should be punished with instant death. (w) But the queen (to the amazement of that despotic
court) directed her secretary to infonn him, "that she could inflict no punishment upon any, the meanest, of her subjects, unless warranted by the law of the
land; and therefore was persuaded that he would not insist upon impossibilities.'' (x) 'l'o satisfy, however, the clamours of the foreign ministei:s (who made it a
common cause,) us well as to appease the wrath of Peter, a bill was brought
into parliament, (y) and afterwards passed into a law, (z) to prevent and punish
such outrageous insolence for the future. And with a copy of this act, elegantly
engrossed and illuminated, accompanied by a letter from the queen, an ambassar.
dor extraordinary (a) was commissioned to appear at Moscow, (b) who declared
" that though her majesty could not inflict such a punishment aB was required,
*because of the defect in that particular of the former established con· [ *256 ]
stitutions of her kingdom, yet with the unanimous consent of the parliament she had caused a new act to be passed, to serve as a law for the
future." This humiliating step was accepted as a full satisfaction by the
czar; and the offenders, at his request, were discharged from all farther prosecution. (10)
This statute ( c) recites the arrest which had been made, "in contem:pt of the
protection grant:ed by her majesty, contrary to the law of nations, and m prejudice of the rights and privileges which ambassadors and other public ministers
have at all times been thereby possessed of, and ought to be kept sacred and
faviolable :" wherefore it enacts, that for the future all process whereby the
person of any ambassador, or of his domestic or domestic servant, ma_Y, be arrested,
or his goods distrained or seized, shall be utterly null and void; and the
persons prosecuting, soliciting. or executing such process, shall be deemed viola.
tors of the law of nations, and disturbers of the public repose; and shall suffer
such penalties and corporal punishment as the lord chancellor and the two chiefjustices, or any two of them, shall think fit. (11.) But. it is expressly provided,
that no trader, within the description of the bankrupt laws, who shall be in the
service of any ambassador, shall be privileged or protected by this act; nor shall
any one be punished for arresting an a.mba.ssador's servant, unless his name be
regist:ered with the secretary of state, and by him transmitted to the sheriffs of
London and Middlesex. Exceptions that a.re strictly conformable to the rights

(10) A secretary of legation is privileged against any civil or criminal prosecution in the

courts of the nation to which his superior is accredited. Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. 0. 0. 232.

But, if a privileged person commits an assault upon another, the latter is justified hi employing

the necessary force for self-defence. United States v. Liddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205.

(ttJ) 17 Sept. 1708. 1Ud.
(:e)
(1/) Com. Jonrn. 2a Dec. 1708.
(b) 8 Jau. 1700. Boyer, ibld.

11 Jan. 1708. Ibid. Mod. Un. Hist. xxxv, 4M
(•) 21 Apr. 1709. Boyer. ibid.
(a) Mr. Whitworth.
(c)1 Ann. c.12.

(11) By the act of congress of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. at Large, 117, any writ or process, sued

forth, or_prosecnted, hy any person or persons, in any of the courts of the United States or of

any particular state, for the arrest or imprisonment of any ambassador or other public minister,

or any domestic servant thereof, or against his goods and chattels, is made utterly null and void,

and persons concerned in suing out or prosecuting the same are deemed violators of the laws of

nations and disturbers of the public repose, and made liable to imprisonment not exceeding three

years, and to fine in the discretion of the court. But no citizen or inhabitant of the United States

who shall have contracted debts previous to having entered the service of an ambassador or pub-

lic minister, which debts remain unpaid, can have any benefit from the act; nor is any one liable

to punishment under the act for having prosecuted the servant of an ambassador or other public

minuter, unless the name of such servant is registered in the office of the secretary of state, and

by him transmitted to the office of the marshal of the district in which the minister resides.

The same act punishes assaults on ambassadors and other public ministers by imprisonment

not exceeding three years, and fine in the discretion of the court. '

The public ministers of other nations may bring suits as plaintiffs in the courts of the countrv

to which they are accredited, and in the United States the federal courts have jurisdiction of such.

Const, of U, 8.. art. 3, J 2.
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(10) A secretarr of legation is privileged against any civil or criminal prosecution in the
courts of the nation to which his superior is accredited. Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. C. C. 232.
But, if a privileged person commits au assault upon another, the latter is justified in employing
the necessary force for self-defence. United States"· Liddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205.
(11) By the act of congress of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. at Large, 117, any writ or process, sued
forth, or yrosecuted, by any person or pel'8ons, in any of the courts of the United St.ates or of
any particular state, for the arrest or imprisonment of any amb8R8ador or other public minister,
or any domestic servant thereof, or again11t hiR goods aud chattelt:; is made utterly null and void,
and person.'! concerned in suing out or prosecuting the 8ame are deemed violatora of the laws of
nation~ and disturbeTll of the public rt•pose, e.nd made liahle to imprisonment not exceeding three
yean;, and to fine in the discretion of the court. But no citizen or inhabit.ant of the United States
who shall have contracted debts previon11 to having entered the i;ervice of u.n ambR8Sador or pubmimster, which debts remain unpaid, can have any benefit from the act; nor is any one liable
to punishment under the act for haviug prosecuted the servant of an e.mbasr!ador or other pnblie
m.iniater, unless the name of such servant is regh!tered in the office or the secretary of st.ate, and
by him transmitted to the office of the man;hal of the district in whicfi. the minister resides.
The same act punishes assaults on ambassadors and other public ministers by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, and fine in the discretion of the court.
'
The public ministeni of other nations may bring suits 811 j>laintiffs in the courts of the countrv
to wbicn they arc acoredited, and in the United St.ates the federal courts ha.Ye jurisdiction of sue~
suits. Const. of U, B., art. 3, ~ 2.
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of ambassadors, (d) as observed in the most civilized countries. (12) And, in conse-

quence of this statute, thus declaring and enforcing the law of nations, these

F *2571 privileges are ""now held to be part of the law of the land, and are con-

*- J stantly allowed in the courts of common law. («)

II. It is also the king's prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances

with foreign states and princes. For it is by the law of nations essential to the

goodness of a league, that it be made by the sovereign power; (/) and then it is

binding upon the whole community: and in England the sovereign power.

quoad hoc, is vested in the person of the king. Whatever contracts therefore he

engages in, no other power in the kingdom can legally delay, resist or annul.

And yet, lest this plentitude of authority should be abused to the detriment of

the public, the constitution (as we hinted before) hath here interposed a check,

by the means of a parliamentary impeachment, for the punishment of such min-

isters as from criminal motives advise or conclude any treaty, which shall

afterwards be judged to derogate from the honour and interest of the nation. (13)

(d) Scepe qut&ritum est an comitvm numero etjure habendi eunt. qui legatum comittintur.non ut instructiorflat

legatio, sed unice ut lucro nuo consvlant, instiiores forte el mercatores. Et, f/iinmrit has sarpe ittj'enderint et

ccHiiitum loco luibere voltterini legaii, apparet tamen satis eo non pertinere, qui in legati Ifgntwnisce ojficio «on

sunt. Quum autem eft res nonnvnquam turbas </«/' v<7, optimo exemplo tn quibusdum aulis olim rfceptvot

/nit, uttegatui teneretur exhioere nomenclaturamcomitum nwrum. Van Byukensh. c. 15.prope flnait.

fej Fitzg. 200. Stra. 797. (f) I'uff. L. ofN. b. 8, c. 9, } 6.

(12) [And the exceptions are said to be agreeable to, and taken from, the law of nations.
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Lockwood v. Coysgame, 3 Burr. 1076.

A person claiming the benefit of the 7 Ann. o. 12, as domestic servant to a public minister,

innst be really and bona fide his servant at the time of the arrest, and must clearly show by

affidavit the general nature of his service, and the actual performance of it, and that he was

not a trader or object of the bankrupt laws. 2 Stra. 797; 2 Ld. Kaym. 1524; Fitzg. 200; S.

C., 1 Wils. 20, 78; 1 Bla. Rep. 471; S. C., 3 Burr. 1676, 1731; 3 Wils. 33, and 3 Campb. 47; 4

Burr. 2016.

This privilege extends to the servants of a public minister, being natives of the country

where he resides, as well as to his foreign servants: 3 Burr. 1676; and not only to servants

lying in his house, for many houses are not large enough to contain and lodge all the ser-

vants of some public ministers, but also to real and actual servants lying out of his house.

2 Str. 797; 3 Wils. 35; 1 Bar. and Ores. 562. Nor is it necessary to entitle them to the priv-

ilege that their names should have been registered in the secretary of state's office, and trans-

mitted to the sheriff's office: 4 Burr. 2017; 3 Term. Kep. 79; though, unless they have been

so registered and transmitted, the sheriff or his officers cannot be proceeded against for arrest-

ing them. See the statute, $ 5; 1 Wils. 20, and a modern order. And it is not to be expected,

that every particular act of service should be specified. It is enough if an actual bona fido

service be proved, and if such a service be sufficiently made out by affidavit, the court will

not, upon bare suspicion, suppose it to have been merely colorable and collusive. 3 Burr.

1481. Where the servant of an ambassador did not reside in his master's house, but rented

and lived in another, part of which he let in lodgings, it was held that his goods in that

house, not being necessary for the convenience of the ambassador, were liable to be distrained

for poor rates. Novello v. Toogood, 1 Bar. and Ores. 554. This act does not extend to eon-

suls, who are therefore liable to arrest. Viveash v. Becker, 3 Maule and Sel. 284. See 1 Chittr';!

Com. L. 69,70.]

(13) By the constitution of the United States the president has power, " by and with the con-

sent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." Art. 2,

j 1. In practice, the president, through the proper minister or secretary of state, first agrees with

the foreign power upon the terms of a treaty, and. when it is drawn up in due form, submits it

to the senate for ratification. The senate may either ratify the treaty as it stands, or reject it

altogether; or that body may ratify it with amendments, in which case the amended treaty must

be submitted to the foreign power for concurrence in the amendments.

Another clause of the constitution provides that " this constitution, and the laws of the

United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall

be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and

the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any

state to the contrary notwithstanding." Art. 6, $ 2. A treaty, although agreed to by the

president, does not become binding on the United States until ratified by the senate; but by

that ratification it becomes the " supreme law of the land," and as such binds all departments

of the government. It has sometimes been claimed, that, when a grant of money is essential

to give the treaty effect, the house of representatives can exercise their own judgment to make

the grant or refuse it; but though they nave the power to refuse, it seems clear that, under the

constitution, they have not the right. See the discussions on this subject in the house of repre-

sentatives, as connected with Jay's treaty with Oreat Britain in 1794, with the reciprocitv

convention with the same country at the close of the war of J812, and with the treaty with

Russia for Alaska in 1867.
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III. Upon the same principle the king has also the sole prerogative of making

war and peace. (14) For it is held by all the writers on the law of nature and

nations, that the right of making war, which by nature subsisted in every indi-

vidual, is given up by all private persons that enter into society, and is vested in

the sovereign power: (g) and this right is given up, not only by individuals,

but even by the entire body of people, that are under the dominion of a sover-

eign. It would indeed be extremely improper, that any number of subjects

should have the power of binding the supreme magistrate, and putting him

against his will in a state of war. Whatever hostilities therefore may be com-

mitted by private citizens, the state ought not to be affected thereby; unless

that should justify their proceedings, and thereby become partner in the guilt.

Such unauthorized volunteers in violence are not ranked among open enemies, but

are treated like pirates and robbers: according to that rule of the civil law; (h)

hastes hi sunt qui nobif, aut quibus nos, publice bellum decrevimus: cwteri

latrones aut *prcedones sunt. And the reason which is given by Gro- r ^25g -,

tins, (t) why according to the laws of nations adenunciation of war ought <• '"" '

always to precede the actual commencement of hostilities, is not so much that the

enemy may be put upon his guard, (which is matter rather of magnanimity than

right,) but that it may be certainly clear that the war is not undertaken by

private persons, but by the will of the whole community; whose right of willing

is in this case transferred to the supreme magistrate by the fundamental laws of

society. So that, in order to make a war completely effectual, it is necessary
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with us in England that it be publicly declared and duly proclaimed by the

king's authority; and, then, all parts of both the contending nations, from the

highest to the lowest, are bound by it. And wherever the right resides of

beginning a national war, there also must reside the right of ending it, or the

power of making peace. And the same check of parliamentary impeachment,

for improper or inglorious conduct, in beginning, conducting, or concluding a

national war, is in general sufficient to restrain the ministers of the crown from

a wanton or injurious exertion of this great prerogative.

IV. But, as the delay of making war may sometimes be detrimental to indi-

viduals who have suffered by depredations from foreign potentates, our laws

have in some respects armed the subject with powers to impel the prerogative;

by directing the ministers of the crown to issue letters of marque and reprisal

•upon due demand; the prerogative of granting which is nearly related to, and

plainly derived from, that other of making war; this being indeed only an incom-

¥lete state of hostilities, and generally ending in a formal declaration of war.

hese letters are grantable by the law of nations, (k) whenever the subjects of

one state are oppressed and injured by those of another; and justice is denied

by that state to which the oppressor belongs. In this case letters of marque and

reprisal (words used as synonymous; and signifying, the latter a taking in

return, the former the passing the frontiers in order to such taking,) (/) may

l»e obtained, in order to seize the bodies or goods of the subjects of the

(a) Pnff. b. 8, c. 6, > 8, and Barbejr. m lac. (h) .JJ". BO, 16, IIS. (t) Dejnn v. $p. I. 3, c. 4, > U.

(k) Ibid. I. 3: c. 2, f 4 if 6. (I) Dnfrense, tit. JUarca.

It is proper to remark in this connection, in order to keep plainly before us the distinction

between the sphere of powers of the United States as a nation, and the several states individ-

ually, that the latter are forbidden by the constitution to enter into any treatv, alliance or con-

federation, or to grant letters of marque and reprisal: art- 1, § 10; nor can they enter into any

agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power without the consent of

congress. Ibid.

(14) The power to declare war has not been confided to the president of the United States,

but is conferred npon congress. Const, of U. S. art. 1, $ 8. The president, however, is by

the same instrument made commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and it is possible for

him, in the recess of congress, if sufficiently reckless of consequences, to bring on a war with a

foreign nation, by employing armed forces against it in a hostile manner. Those who opposed
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r *2!i<) 1 on?en(^n& state, until satisfaction *be made, wherever they happen to be

L -I found. And indeed this custom of reprisals seems dictated by natuTe

herself; for which reason we find in the most ancient times very notable

instances of it. (m) But here the necessity is obvious of calling in the sovereign

power, to determine when reprisals may be made; else every private sufferer

would be a judge in his own cause. In pursuance of which principle, it is with

us declared by the statute 4 Hen. V, c. 7, that, if any subjects of the realm are

oppressed in the time of truce by any foreigners, the king will grant marque

in due form, to all that feel themselves grieved. Which form is thus directed

to be observed: the sufferer must first apply to the lord privy-seal, and he shall

make out letters of request under the privy seal; and if, after such request of

satisfaction made, the party required do not within convenient time make due

satisfaction or restitution to the party grieved, the lord chancellor shall make

him out letters of marque under the great seal; and by virtue of these he may

attack and seize the property of the aggressor nation, without hazard of being

condemned as a robber or pirate. (15)

V. Upon exactly the same reason stands the prerogative of granting safe-con-

ducts, without which by the law of nations no member of one society has a

right to intrude into another. And, therefore, Puffendorf very justly resolves, (»)

that it is left in the power of all states to take such measures about the

admission of strangers as they think convenient; those being ever excepted

who are driven on the coasts by necessity, or by any cause that deserves pity or
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compassion. Great tenderness is shown by our laws, not only to foreigners in

distress (as will appear when we come to speak of shipwrecks,; but with regard

also to the admission of strangers who come spontaneously. For so long as

their nation continues at peace with ours, and they themselves behave peace-

F *2fiO 1 akly> they are un(ler *the king's protection; though liable to be sent

L -1 home whenever the king sees occasion. But no subject of a nation at

war with us can, by the law of nations, come into the realm, nor can travel

da) See the account given by Nestor. In the eleventh book of the Iliad, of the reprisals made by himself

of the Epelan nation : from whom he took a multitude of cattle, as a satisfaction for a prize won at the Elian

games by his father Neleus, and for debts due to many private subjects of the Pylean kingdom; out of

which booty the king took three hundred head of cattle for his own demand, and the rest were equitably

divided among the other creditors.

(n) Law of N. and N. b. 3, c. 3, I 9.

(15) [This manner of granting letters of marque has long been disused, and according to the

statute of Hen. V, could only t>e granted to persons actually grieved. But if during a war, a

subject, without any commission from the king, should take an enemy's shin, the prize would

not be the property of the captor, but would be one of the droits of admiralty, and would

belong to the king, or his grantee, the admiral. Carth. 399; 2 TVopdd. 433. Therefore, to

encourage merchants and others to fit out privateers or armed ships in time of war, by

various acts of parliament, the lord high admiral, or the commissioners of the admiralty, are

empowered to grant commissions to the owners of such ships; and the prizes captured shall be

divided according to a contract entered into between the owners and the captain and crew

of the privateer. But the owners, before the commission is granted, shall give security to the

admiralty to make compensation for any Violation of treaties between those powers with whom

the nation is at peace. And by the 24 Geo. Ill, c. 47, they shall also give security that

such armed ship shall not be employed in smuggling. These commissions in the statutes,

and upon all occasions, are now called letters of marque. 29 Geo. II, c. 34; 19 Geo, III, c.

67; Molloy, c. 3, s. 8. The king has the right of releasing any prize captured by such ships

at any time previously to condemnation. 11 East, 619. "Letters of marque or general

reprisals, as these commissions are called, are only valid during the war, and may be vacated

either by express revocation, or by the misconduct of the parties, as for example, by their

cruelty. 5 Rob. Rep. 9.]

In a conference held at Paris, in 1856, it was agreed by the representatives of Austria, Prance,

Great Britain, Sardinia, Prussia, Russia and Turkey, to abolish privateering, and that in time of

war neutral flags and neutral goods should be inviolable. The United States was invited to con-

cur in this modification of international law, but declined, unless the conference would go farther,

and make all private property exempt from capture at sea. This offer was favorably received by

France and Russia, but rejected by the British government. 'There the matter rented until the

breaking out of the rebellion in America in 1861, when the government of the United States

opened negotiations with the nations represented in the Paris conference of 18ofi, and proposed to

withdraw the refusal to concur in the conclusions of that conference; but the offer elicited no

[ • 259 ] offending state, until satisfaction *be made, wherever they happen to he
found. And indeed this custom of reprisals seems dictated by natli:re
herself; for which reason we find in the most ancient times very notable
instances of it. (m) But here the necessity is obvious of calling in the sovereign
power, to determiiie when reprisals may be made; else every private sufferer
would he a judge in his own cause. In pursuance of which principle, it is with
us declared by the statute 4 Hen. V, c. 7, that, if any subjects of the realm are
oppressed in the time of truce by any forei~ers, the king will grant marque
in due form, to all that feel themselves gneved. Which form is thus directed
to be observed: the sufferer must first apply to the lord privy-seal, and he shall
make out letters of request under the privy seal; and if, after such request of
satisfaction made, the party required do not within convenient time make due
satisfaction or restitution to the party grieved, the lord chancellor shall make
him out letters of marque under the great seal; and by virtue of these he may
attack and seize the property of the aggressor nation, without hazard of being
condemned as a robber or pirate. (15)
V. Upon exactly the same reason stands the prerogative of grantin~ safe-conducts, without which by the law of nations no member of one somety has a
right to intrude into another. And, therefore, Puffendorfvcry justly resolves, (n)
thst it is left in the power of all states to take such measures about the
admission of strangers as they think convenient; those being ever excepted
who arc driven on the coasts by necessity, or by any co.use that deserves pity or
compassion. Great tenderness is shown by our laws, not only to foreigners in
distress (as will appear when we come to speak of shipwrecks,) but with regard
also to the admission of strangers who come spontaneously. For so long as
their nation continues at peace with ours, and they themselves behave peace[ • 260 ] ably, they 1ire under *the king's protection; though liable to be sent
home whenever the king sees occasion. But no subject of a nation at
war with us can, by the law of nations, come into the realm, nor can travel
(m) See the account !fiven by Nestor, In the eleventh book otthe llladi or the reprisals made by hlmaeU'
of the Epelan nation · from whom be took a mnltitude of cattle, u a satls1action for a prize won at the Elian
ga.mes by his father Neleus, and for debts due to many private subject.a of the Pylean kingdom; out of
which booty the king took three hundred head of cattle ror hie own demand, and the rest were equitably
divided among the other ..iredlton.
(n) Law of N. and N. b. 8, c. 3, t 9.
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(15) [ThiR manner of granting letters of marque has long been disused, and socording to the
i;tatute of Hen. V, could only be granted t.o persons actuii.lly grieved. But if durin~ a war, a
subject, without any oommission from the king, should take an enemy's ship, the prue would
not be the prop~rty of tb.e capt.or, but would. be one of the droits of admiralty, and would
belong to the king, or his grantee, the admiral. Ce.rth. 399; 2 W oodd. 433. Therefore, to
encourage mercha.nts and othel'8 to fit out privateers or armed ships in time of war, by
various 11Cts of parliament, the lord high admiral1 or the commh~sioners of the admiralty, are
emP?wered to grant commissions to the owners ot such ships ; a.nd the prises captured shall be
diVlded according to a. contract entered into between the owners and the captain and crew
of the privateer. But the owners, before the commission is granted, shall give 1:1ecuritv t.o the
admira.fty to make compem1ation for any \'iolation of treaties between those powers with whom
the nation is at peace. .And by the 24 Geo. III, c. 47, they shall also give securitv that
tmch armed ship shall not b~ employed in smuggling. These commissiolll! in tho s~tutes,
and upon all occ81!ions, are now called lettel'!I of marque. 29 <fflo. II, c. 34 ; 19 Geo, III. c.
67; Molloy, c. 3, s. 8. Tho king has tho right of releasin~ any prize captured by such shlpl!
at any time previously to condemnation. 11 Eo..<1t, 619. Letters of marque or general
reprisals, 88 these c.ommissions are called, are only valid during the war, and may be >acated
either by express revocation, or by the misconduct of the parties, as for example, by their
cruelty. 5 Rob. Rep. 9.]
In a confeTenco held at Paris, in 1856, it wa.~ agreed by the representatives of Austria, France
Groat Britain, Sardinia, Prussia, Rus.-iia and Turkey, to aboli11h privateering, ancl that in time of
war neutral fl~ and neutral goods should be inviolable. The United States wa.s invited to concur in this mod1fication of international law, but declined, unle~s the conference would go farther,
and make all private property exempt from capture at sea. Thi~ offer was favorably received ll\'
France and Russia, but rejected by the Briti~h govemment. 'There the matter reRted until
breaking out of the rebellion in America in 1861, when the government of tho United St.ate8
opened negotiationR with the nations represented in the Pari>i confereMe of 1856, and propo~ to
withdraw the refut!al to concur in the conclu8ions of that conference; but tho offer elicited no
fo.vorable rei<ponHe. Since the !'lose nfthe civil war in America. negotiation:l hav11 been going on
between the United State~ and the prinripn.l government;. of Europe, which bi<l fair to result in
a general agreement in suh8tm1tial accord with what h8.'! alwap1 been the Ameri1~an \;ew.
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favorable response. Since the close of the civil war in America, negotiations have been going on

between the United States and the principal governments of Europe, which bid fair to result in

a general ajrreeinent in substantial accord with what has alwavs been the American view.
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himself upon the high seas, or send his goods and merchandize from one place

to another without danger of being seized hy our subjects, unless he has letters

of safe-conduct; which, by divers ancient statutes, (o) must be granted under

the king's great seal .and enrolled in chancery, or else are of no effect: the king

being supposed the best judge of such emergencies as may deserve exception

from the general law of arms. But passports under the king's sign-manual, or

licenses from his ambassadors abroad, are now more usually obtained, and are

allowed to be of equal validity. (16)

Indeed the law of England, as a commercial country, pays a very particular

regard to foreign merchants in innumerable instances. One I cannot omit to

mention: that by magna carta (p) it is provided, that all merchants (unless

publicly prohibited before hand) shall have safe-conduct to depart from, to come

into, to tarry in, and to go through England for the exercise of merchandize,

without any unreasonable imposts, except in time of war: and, if a war breaks

out between us and their country, they shall be attached (if in England) with-

out harm of body or goods, till the king or his chief justiciary be informed how

our merchants are treated in the land with which we are at war: and, if ours be

secure in that land, they shall be secure in ours. This seems to have been a

common rule of equity among all the northern nations; for we learn from

Stiernhook, (q) that it was a maxim among the Goths and Swedes, " quam legem

exteri nobis posuere, eandem illis ponemus. But it is somewhat extraordinary,

that it should have found a place in magna carta, a mere interior treaty between
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the king and his natural-born subjects: which occasions the learned Montes-

quieu to remark with a degree of admiration, " that the English have made

*the protection of foreign merchants one of the articles of their national r *VQ-I -i

liberty." (r) But indeed it well justifies another observation which he <- J

has made (s) " that the English know better than any other people upon earth,

how to value at the same time these three great advantages, religion, liberty and

commerce." Very different from the genius of the Eoman people; who, in

their manners, their constitution, and even in their laws, treated commerce as

a dishonourable employment, and prohibited the exercise thereof to persons of

birth, or rank, or fortune; (t) and equally different from the bigotry of the

canonists, who looked on trade as inconsistent with Christianity, («) and deter-

mined at the council of Melfi, under Pope Urban II, A. D. 1090, that it was

impossible, with a safe conscience, to exercise any traffic, or follow the profession

of the law. (w)

These are the principal prerogatives of the king respecting this nation's inter-

course with foreign nations; in all of which he is considered as the delegate or

represenative of his people. But in domestic affairs he is considered in a great

variety of characters, 'and from thence there arises an abundant number of other

prerogatives.

I. First, he is a constituent part of the supreme legislative power; and, as

such, has the prerogative of rejecting such provisions in parliament as he judges

improper to be passed. The expediency of which constitution has before been

evinced at large, (x) I shall only farther remark, that the king is not bound by

(o) 16 Hen. VI. c. 3. 18 Hen. VI. c. 8. 20 Hen. Vt c. 1.

(p) C. 30. (o) De jure, S-ueon. 1. 3. c. 4. frj Sp. L. 20, IS. (I) Ibid. 20, 6.

(t) jVoWHorw natalams. et honorum luce conspicuoi, ftpatnmoniodiiiorei,pemiciosumurlnbU8mercimonium

exercere prohibfmus. C. 4. 63. 3.

i " 1 Homo mercator ri>: aut nunquam potest Deo plaeen > et idea miUus Chriatianui ilrtiet «•«« mercator ;

out n rohtfrit esse. projiciatur de. ecclffna Dei. Decret. 1. 88. 11.

(w) Falsa fit pienitentia [laM] ewm penitus ab offldo curtail vel negotiali non recedit, qua tine peccatis agi

vUa raiwne non prcevalei. Act. Coned, apud Baron, c. 16.

fxj Ch. 2, page 154.

(16) The acts imposing restraints upon aliens have been very much modified and liberalized

since these Commentaries were written, and an alien who is guilty of no breach of the munici-

pal law, is not likely to be disturbed in Great Britain.

In the United States the president is empowered, in case of war with any foreign nation, to

impose restraints upon the citizens or residents of such nation who may be within the United

States, and to remove them from the country in his discretion. 1 Stat. at Large, 577.
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any act of parliament, unless he be named therein by special and particular

words. The most general words that can be devised (" any person or persons,

F *2621 Bodies politic or corporate, &c.") affect not him in the least, if *they

i '"'"•' may tend to restrain or diminish any of his rights or interests, (y) For

it would be of most mischievous consequence to the public if the strength of

the executive power were liable to be curtailed without its own express consent,

by constructions and implications of the subject. Yet, where an act of par-

liament is expressly made for the preservation of public rights and the suppres-

sion of public wrongs, and does not interfere with the established rights of the

crown, it is said to be binding as well upon the king as upon the subject: (z)

and, likewise, the king may take the benefit of any particular act, though he be

not especially named, (a)

II. The king is considered, in the next place, as the generalissimo, or the first

in military command, within the kingdom. The great end of society is to pro-

tect the weakness of individuals by the united strength of the community; and

the principal use of government is to direct that united strength in the best and

most effectual manner to answer the end proposed. Monarchical government

is allowed to be the fittest of any for this purpose: it follows therefore, from

the very end of its institution, that in a monarchy the military power must be

trusted in the hands of the prince.

In this capacity, therefore, of general of the kingdom, the king has the sole

power of raising and regulating fleets and armies. Of the manner in which
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they are raised and regulated I shall speak more when I come to consider the

military state. We are now only to consider the prerogative of enlisting and

of governing them: which indeed was disputed and claimed, contrary to all

reason and precedent, by the long parliament of King Charles I: but, upon

the restoration of his son, was solemnly declared by the statute, 13 Car. II, c. 6.

to be in the king alone: for that the sole supreme government and command

of the militia within all his majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces

by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, ever was and is

T *2631 ^ne *un(loubted right of his majesty, and his royal predecessors, kings

L * w J and queens of England; and that both or either house of parliament

cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.

This statute, it is obvious to observe, extends not only to fleets and armies,

but also to forts and other places of strength within the realm; the sole pre-

rogative as well of erecting as manning and governing of which, belongs to the

king in his capacity of general of the kingdom: (b) and all lands were formerly

subject to a tax for building of castles wherever the king thought proper.

This was one of the three things, from contributing to the performance of

which no lands were exempted; and therefore called by our Saxon ancestors

the trinoda necessitas: sc. ponds reparatio, arcis constructio, et expeditio contra

hostem. (c) And this they were called upon to do so often, that, as Sir Edward

Coke from M. Paris assures us, (d) there were, in the time of Henry II, 1115

castles subsisting in England. The inconveniences of which, when granted ont

to private subjects, the lordly barons of those times, were severely felt by the

whole kingdom; for, as William of Newburgh remarks in the reign of King

Stephen," erant in Anglia quodammodo tot reges velpotius tyranni quot domini

castellorum:" but it was felt by none more sensibly than by two succeeding

princes, King John and King Henry III. And, therefore, the greatest part of

them being demolished in the baron's wars, the kings of after-times have been

very cautions of suffering them to be rebuilt in a fortified manner: and Sir

Edward Coke lays it down, (e) that no subject can build a castle, or house of

strength embattled, or other fortress defensible, without the license of the

king; for the danger which might ensue if every man at his pleasure might

do it.

It is partly upon the same, and partly upon a fiscal foundation, to secure

(y) 11 Ren. 74. («) Ibid. 71. (a) 7 Rep. 32. (i) 2 last. 30.

(c) Cowel's Inferpr. lit. cattellorum operatic. Sold. Jan. Angl. 1, 42. (d) -I lust. 31. (e) 1 lust. 6.
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words. The most ~eneral words that can be devised ("any person or ~rsons,
[ • 262 ] bodies politic or corporate, &c.") affect not him in the least. if *they
may tend to restrain or diminish any of his rights or interests. (y) For
it would be of most mischievous consequence to the public if the strength of
the executive power were liable to be curtailed without its own express consent,
by constructions and implications of the subject. Yet, where an act of parliament is expressly made for the preservation of public rights and the suppression of public wrongs, and does not interfere with the established rights of the
crown, it is said to be binding as well upon the king as upon the subject: (z)
and, likewise, the king may take the benefit of any particular act, though he be
not especially named. (a)
II. 'rhe king is considered, in the next place, as the generalissimo, or the first
in military command, within the kingdom. The great end of society is to protect the weakness of individuals by the united stren~h of the community; and
the principal use of government is to direct that umted strength in the best and
most effectual manner to answer the end proposed. Monarchical government
is allowed to be the fittest of any for this purpose : it follows therefore, from
the very end of its institution, that in a monarchy the military power must be
trusted in the hands of the prince.
In this capacity, therefore, of general of the kingdom, the king has the sole
power of raising and regulating fleets and armies. Of the manner in which
they are raised and regufated I shall speak more when I come to consider the
military state. We are now only to consider the prerogative of enlisting and
of governing them: which indeed was disputed and claimed, contrary t.o all
reason and precedent, by the long parliament of King Charles I: but, upon
the restoration of his son, was solemnly declared by the statute, 13 Car. II, c. 6.
to be in the king alone: for that the sole supreme government and command
of the militia within all his majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces
by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, ever was and is
[ • 263 ] the *undoubted right of his majesty, and his royal predecessors, kings
and queens of England ; and that both or either house of parliament
cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.
This statute, it is obvious to observe, extends not only to fleets and armies,
but also to forts and other places of strength within the realm; the sole prerogative as well of erecting as manning and go"\'erning of which, belongs to the
king in his capacity of general of the kingdom: (b) and all lands were formerly
subJect to a tax for building of castles wherever the king thought proper.
This was one of the three things, from contributing to the performance of
which no lands were exempted ; and therefore called by our Saxon ancestors
the trinoda necessitas: sc. pontis reparatio, arcis constructw, et expeditio contra
hostem. (c) And this they were called upon to do so often, that, as Sir Edward
Coke from M. Paris assures us, (d) there were, in the time of Henry II, 1115
castles subsisting in England. The inconveniences of which, when granted out
to private subjects, the lordly barons of those times, were severely felt by the
whole kingdom; for, as William of Newburgh remarks in the reign of King
Stephen, " erant in Anglia quodammodo tot reges 11el potius tyranni quot do-mini.
castellorum :" but it was felt by none more sensibly than by two suc~ng
princ~s, King John and King Henry III. And, therefore, the peat.est part of
them being demolished in the baron's wars, the kings of after-times have been
very cautions of suffering them to be rebuilt in a fortified manner: and Sir
Edward Coke lays it down, (e) that no subject can build a castle, or house of
strength embattled, or other fortress defensible, without the license of the
king; for the danger which might ensue if every man at his plea.sure might
do it.
It is partly upon the same, and partly upon a fiscal foundation, to secure
11 Rep. R
(Z) Ibid. 71.
(a) 7 Hep. 32.
(l>) 2 Inst. 30.
(c) Cowel's Inferpr. tU. MBte.llor1'm operatw. Seid. Jan. .A.ngl. l,
(cl) ll InBt. 31.
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his marine revenue, that the king has the *prerogative of appointing r „£,..

ports and havens, or such places only, for persons and merchandize to *- ''

pass into and out of the realm, as he in his wisdom sees proper. By the feudal

law all navigable rivers and havens were computed among the regalia, (/) and

were subject to the sovereign of the state. And in England it hath always been

hplden, that the king is lord of the whole shore, (g) and particularly is the guar-

dian of the ports and havens, which are the inlets and gates of the realm; (h)

and therefore, so early as the reign of King John, we find ships seized by the

king's officers for putting in at a place that was not a legal port, (i) These legal

ports were undoubtedly at first assigned by the crown; since to each of them a

court of portmote is incident, (/) the jurisdiction of which must flow from the

royal authority: the great ports of the sea are also referred to, as well known

and established by statute 4 Hen. IV, c. 20, which prohibits the landing else-

where under pain of confiscation; and the statute 1 Eliz. c. 11, recites, that the

franchise of lading and discharging had been frequently granted by the crown.

But though the king had a power of granting the franchise of havens and

ports, yet he had not the power of resumption, or of narrowing and confining

their limits when once established ; but any person had a right to load or dis-

charge his merchandize in any part of the haven : whereby the revenue of the

customs was much impaired and diminished by fraudulent landings in obscure

and private corners. This occasioned the statutes of 1 Eliz. c. 11, and 13 and

14 Car. II, c. 11, § 14, which enable the crown by commission to ascertain the
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limits of all ports, and to assign proper wharfs and quays in each port for the

exclusive landing and loading of merchandize. (17)

The erection of beacons, light-houses and sea-marks is also a branch of

the royal prerogative; whereof the first was *anciently used in order r *ogK i

to alarm the country, in case of the approach of an enemy; and all of >• -"

them are signally useful in guiding and preserving vessels at sea, by night, as

well as by day. For this purpose the king hath the exclusive power, by commis-

sion under his great seal, (k] to cause them to be erected in fit and convenient

places, (/) as well upon the lands of the subject as upon the demesnes of the

crown: which power is usually vested by letters patent in the office of lord high

admiral, (m) And by statute 8 Eliz. c. 13, the corporation of the trinity-house

are impowered to set up any beacons or sea-marks wherever they shall think

them necessary; and if the owner of the land, or any other person, shall destroy

them, or shall take down any steeple, tree or other known sea-mark, he shall

forfeit 1001, or in case of inability to pay it, shall be ipso facto outlawed.

To this branch of the prerogative may also be referred the power vested in his

majesty by statutes 12 Car. II, c. 4, and 29 Geo. II, c. 16, of prohibiting the

exportation of arms or ammunition out of this kingdom, under severe penal-

ties : and likewise the right which the king has, whenever he sees proper, of

confining his subjects to stay within the realm, or of recalling them when

beyond the seas. By the common law, (n) every man may go out of the realm

for whatever cause he pleaseth, without obtaining the king's leave; provided he

is under no injunction of staying at home: (which liberty was expressly declared

in King John s great charter, though left out in that of Henry III,) but because

that every man ought of right to defend the king and his realm, therefore, the

king, at his pleasure, may command him by his writ that he go not beyond the

seas, or out of the realm, without license; and, if he do the contrary, he shall'

be punished for disobeying the king's command. Some persons there anciently

were, that, by reason of their stations, were under a perpetual prohibition or

going abroad without license obtained; among which were reckoned all peers

(/) 2 Feud. t. 56; Crag. 1. 15, 15. (a) P. K. B. US. (ft) Dav. 9. 56.

i Vl Marlox, Hist. Lxcii. 530. (j) 4 I nut, 148. (i) 3 Inst. 204. 4 Inst. 148.

(1} Sot. Clata. 1 Ria. 11. m. 42. Pryn. on 4 Inst. 138. (m) Sid. 158. 4 Inn*. 149. (») F. N. B. 85.

(17) The power to regulate commerce is vested, by the constitution of the United States, in

omgress ; and incidental to this is the power to declare what ports shall be ports of entry,

and to erect and maintain beacons, light houses, etc. See Const, art. 1, { 8.
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pass into and out of the realm, as he in his wisdom sees proper. By the feudal
law all navigable rivers and havens were computed among the re,qalia, (f) and
were subject to the sovereign of the state. And in England it hath always been
holden, that the king is lord of the whole shore, (g) and particularly is the guardian of the ports and havens, which are the inlets and gates of the realm; (h)
and therefore, so early as the reign of King John, we find ships seized by the
king's officers for putting in at a place that was not a legal port. (i) These legal
ports were undoubtedly at first assigned by the crown ; since to each of them a
court of portmote is incident, (j) the jurisdiction of which must fl.ow from the
royal authority: the great ports of the sea are also referred to, as well known
and established by statute 4 Hen. IV, c. 20, which prohibits the landing elsewhere under pain of confiscation ; and the statute 1 Eliz. c. 11, recites, that the
franchise of lading and discharging had been frequently granted by the crown.
But though the king had a power of granting the franchise of havens and
ports, yet he had not the power of resumption, or of narrowing and confining
their limits when once established ; but any person had a right to load or discharge his merchandize in any part of the haven : whereby the revenue of the
customs was much imp,aired and diminished by fraudulent landings in obscure
and priYate corners. This occasioned the statutes of 1 Eliz. c. 11, and 13 and
14 Car. II, c. 11, § 14, which enable the crown by commission to ascertain the
limits of all ports, and to assign proper wharf's and quays in each port for the
exclusive landing and loading of merchandize. (17)
The erection of beacons, light-houses and sea-marks is also a branch of
the royal prerogative; whereof the first was •anciently used in order [ *265 ]
to alarm the country, in case of the approach of an enemy; and all of
them a.re signally useful in guiding and preserving vessels at sea, by night, as
well as by day. For this purpose the king hath the exclusive power, by commission under his great seal, (k) to cause them to be erected in fit and convenient
places, (l) as well upon the lands of the subject as upon the demesnes of the
crown: which power is usually vested by letters patent in the office of lord high
admiral. (m) And by statute 8 Eliz. c. 13, the corporation of the trinity-house
a.re impowered to set up any beacons or sea-marks wherever they shall think
them necessary ; and if the owner of the land, or any other person, shall destroy
them, or shall take down anv steeple, tree or other known sea-mark, he shall
forfeit lOOl, or in case of inability to pay it, shall be ipso facto outlawed.
To this branch of the prerogative may also be referred the power Yested in his
majesty by statutes 12 Car. II, c. 4, and 29 Geo. II, c. 16, of prohibiting the
exportation of arms or ammunition out of this kingdom, under severe penalties: and likewise the right which the king has, whenever be sees pro:per, of
confining his subjects to stay within the realm, or of recalling them when
beyond the seas. By the common law, (n) every man may go out of the realm
for whstever cause he pleasetb, without obtaining the king's leaYe; provided he
is under no inJnnction of staying at home: (which liberty was expressly declared
in King Johns great charter, though left out in that of Henry III,) but because
that every man ought of right to defend the king and his realm, therefore, the
king, at his pleasure, may command him by his writ that he go not beyond the
ae.as, or out of' the realm, without license ; and, if he do the contrary, he shall'
be punished for disobeying the king's command. Some persons there anciently
were, that, by reason of their stations, were nuder a perpetual prohibition of
going abroad without license obtained; among which were reckoned all peers
1/) 2 Feud. t. 56; Crag. !1 _15, 15.
(g) F. N. B. llS.
(h) Dav. 9. 116.

°""·

It) Madox. Ulst. Exch.
(j) 4 Inst. 148.
(l) Rot. Clam. 1 Rio. 11. m. 42. Pryn. on -l Inst. 136.

(k) S Inst. 204. 4 Inst. 1'8.
(m) Sid. UIS. 4 Inst. 149.

(n)

- - - -- - - - -- - - -- - -- - - - - -- - - --

F. N. B. 811.

-· - -·- -

(17) The power to rngulate commerce is vested, by tho constitution of the United States, in
1>1Dgress ; and incidental to this i11 the power to declare what ports ~hall be port.~ of entry,
1md to erc<"t and maint.itin beacons, light houses, etc. See Const. art. 1, ~ 8.
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r *2Pfi 1 on account °f their being counsellors of *the crown; all knights, who

L x!b« J were bound to defend the kingdom from invasions; all ecclesiastics, who

were expressly confined by the fourth chapter of the constitutions of Clarendon,

on account of their attachment in the times of popery to the see of Rome; all

archers and other artificers, lest they should instruct foreigners to rival us in

their several trades and manufactures. This was law in the times of Britton, (o)

who wrote in the reign of Edward I: and Sir Edward Coke (p) gives us

many instances to this effect in the time of Edward III. In the succeeding

reign the affair of travelling wore a very different aspect; an act of parliament

being made, (q) forbidding all persons whatever to go abroad without license;

except only the lords and other great men of the realm; and true and notable

merchants; and the king's soldiers. But this act was repealed by the statute

4 Jac. I, c. 1. And at present everybody has, or at least assumes, the liberty of

going abroad when he pleases. Yet, undoubtedly, if the king, by writ of ne

exeat regnum, (18) under his great seal or privy seal, thinks proper to prohibit

him from so doing; or if the king sends a writ to any man, when abroad, com-

manding his return ; (19) and, in either case, the subject disobeys; it is a high

contempt of the king's prerogative, for which the offender's lands shall be seized

till he return; and then he is liable to fine and imprisonment, (r)

III. Another capacity, in which the king is considered in domestic affairs, is

as the fountain of justice and general conservator of the peace of the kingdom.

By the fountain of justice, the law does not mean the author or original, but
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only the distributor. Justice is not derived from the king, as from his free gift;

but he is the steward of the public, to dispense it to whom it is due. (s) He is

not the spring, but the reservoir, from whence right and equity are conducted,

by a thousand channels, to every individual. The original power of judicature,

r *gg« -i by the fundamental principles of society, is *lodged in the society at

' -1 large: but as it would be impracticable to render complete justice to every

individual, by the people in their collective capacity, therefore every nation has

committed that power to certain select magistrates, who with more ease and

expedition can hear and determine complaints; and in England this authority

has immemorially been exercised by the king or his substitutes. He therefore

has alone the right of erecting courts of judicature; for, though the constitu-

tion of the kingdom hath intrusted him with the whole executive power of the

laws, it is impossible, as well as improper, that he should personally carry into

execution this great and extensive trust: it is consequently necessary that courts

should be erected, to assist him in executing this power ; and equally necessary

that, if eretced, they should be erected by his authority. And hence it is, that

all jurisdictions of courts are either mediately or immediately derived from the

crown, their proceedings run generally in the king's name, they pass under his

seal, and are executed by his officers.

It is probable, and almost certain, that in very early times, before our consti-

tution arrived at its full perfection, our kings in person often heard and deter-

mined causes between party and party. But at present, by the long and uniform

usage of many ages, our kings have delegated tneir whole judicial power to the

judges of their several courts; which are the grand depositaries of the funda-

mental laws of the kingdom, and have gained a known and stated jurisdiction,

(o)C. 123. (plSInst. 175. (q) 6 Rio. H. 0. 2. (r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 22.

(») I'/ hoe autem creatus, eat tt etectus UtjustUiam facial untoersis. Bract. 1. 3, tr. 1. c. 9.

(18) [At first this writ was employed to hinder the clergy from going to Rome ; it was

afterward extended to laymen machinating and concerting measures against the state ; and

has at length been applied to prevent a subterfuge from the justice of the nation, though in

matters of private concernment. It is now igsuable from the court of chancery, in order to

on account of their being counsellors of *the crown ; all knights, who
[ *266 l were bound to defend the kingdom from invasions; all ecclesiastics, who
were expressly coi~fined by the fourth chapter of the constitutions of Clarendon,
on account of their attachment iu the times of popery to the see of Rome; all
archers and other artificers, lest they should instmct foreigners to rival ns in
their several trades and manufactures. This was law in the times of Brit.ton, (o)
who wrote in the reign of Edward I: and Sir Edward Coke (p) gives us
many instances to this effect in the time of Edward III. In the succeeding
reign the affair of travelling wore a very different aspect; an act of parliament
being made, (q) forbidding all persons whatever to go abroad without license;
except only the lords and other great men of the realm; and true and notable
merchants; and the king's soldiers. But this act was repealed by the statute
4 Jae. I, c. 1. And at present everybody ho.s, or at least assumes, the liberty of
going a.broad when he pleases. Yet, undoubtedly, if the king, by writ of ne
exeat regnum, (18) under his great seal or privy sea.I, thinks proper to prohibit
him from so doing ; or if the king sends a. writ to any man, when abroad, commanding his return ; (19) and, in either case, the subject disobeys; it is a high
contempt of the king's prerogative, for which the offender's lands shall be seized
till he return; and tlien he is liable to fine and imprisonment. ('r)
III. Another capacity, in which the king is considered in domestic affairs, is
as the fountain of justice and general conservator of the peace of the kingdom.
By the fountain of justice, the law does not mean the autlwr or ori'.gi'.nal, but
only the distributor. Justice is not derived from the king, as from bis free g~ft;
but he is the steward of the public, to dispense it to whom it is dite. (s) He is
not the spring, but the reservoir, from whence right and equity are conducted,
by a thousand channels, to every individual. The original power of judicature,
[ • 267 ] by the fundamental principles of society, is *lodged in the society at
large: but as it would be impracticable to render complete justice to every
individual, by the people in their collective capacity, therefore every nation has
committed that power to certain select magistrates, who with more ease and
expedition can hear and determine complaints; and in England this authority
has immemorially been exercised by the king or his substitutes. He therefore
has alone the right of erecting courts of judicature; for, though the constitution of the kingdom hath intrusted him with the whole executive power of the
laws, it is impossible, as well as improper, that he should personally carry into
execution this great and extensive trust: it is consequently necessary that courts
should be erected, to assist him in executin~ this power; and equally necessary
that, if eretccd, they should be erected b>' his authority. And hence it is, that
all jurisdictions of courts are either mediately or immediately derived from the
crown, their proceedings run generally in the king's name, they pass under his
seal, and are executed by his officers.
It is probable, and almost certain, that in very early times, before our constitution arrived at its full perfection, our kings in person often beard and determined causes between party and party. But at present, by the long and uniform
usage of many ages, our kings have delegated their whole judicial power to the
judges of their several courts; which are the grand depositaries of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and have gained a known and stated jurisdiction,
(o) C. ll'3.
(Pl 8 Inst. 1711.
(q) II Ric. II. 6. 2.
(r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 22.
(a) Ad 1wc autem crMtw, ut et electiu .Uft,utitiamfaciae un"'6rlil. Bract. l. 8, tr. l. 6 . 9.

get bail for any certain, equitable and monev debt, due to a person within the jurisdiction and

~-- --- - - · ------------------------

entitled to sue the debtor for such demand, and it is granted upon affidavit of the debtor's

intention to go abroad. See 2 Haddock's Ch. Pr. 279, and Beanies on Ne Exeat Regno.]

(19) [The exercise of this prerogative has been long disused, and it is probable that it will

never be resumed. For the ancient learning upon it, see 3 Inst. c. 84.]
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(18) [.At fi.l'Rt this writ wa.~ employed to hinder the clergy from goin15 to Rome ; it was
afterward extended to laymen machinating and concerting mea.'!U1'0l! agmnst the state ; and
ha.-; at length been applied to prevent a sul)terfuge from the justice of the nation1 though in
matters of private concemmcnt. It is now issuable from the court of chancery, m order to
get bail for any cortain, equitable and money debt, due to a person within the jurisdiction and
entitled to sue the debtor for Ruch domanil, and it is granted upon affidavit of the debtor's
intention to go abroad. See 2 Maddock's Ch. Pr. 279, and Beames on Ne Exeat Regno.]
(19) [The exercise of this prerogative has been long disused, and it is probable that it will
never be resumed. For tho ancient learning upon it, 1:1ee 3 llll!t. c. 84.)
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regulated by certain and established rules, which the crown itself cannot now

alter but by act of parliament, (t) And in order to maintain both the dignity

and independence of the judges in the superior courts, it is enacted by the

statute 13 Win. Ill, c. 2, that their commissions shall be made (not, as formerly,

durante bene placiio, but) quamdiu bene se gesserint, and their salaries ascer-

tained and established ; but that it may be lawful to remove them on the address

of both houses of parliament. And now, by the noble improvements of that

law, in the statute of 1 Geo. Ill, c. 23, enacted at the earnest recommendation of

*the king himself from the throne, the judges are continued in their r *oga 1

offices during their good behavior, notwithstanding any demise of the L -"

crown, (which was formerly held (w) immediately to vacate their seats) (20) and

their full salaries are absolutely secured to them during the continuance of their

commissions; his majesty having been pleased to declare, that " he looked upon

the independence and uprightness of the judges as essential to the impartial

administration of justice; as one of the best securities of the rights and liberties

of his subjects; and as most conducive to the honor of the crown."(o;)

In criminal proceedings, or prosecutions for offences, it would be a still higher

absurdity if the king personally sate in judgment; because, in regard to these,

he appears in another capacity, that of prosecutor. All offences are either

against the king's peace, or his crown and dignity; and are so laid in every

indictment. For though in their consequences they generally seem (except in

the case of treason, and a very few others,) to be rather offences against the
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kingdom than the king, yet as the public, which is an invisible body, has delega-

ted all its power and rights, with regard to the execution of the laws to one

visible magistrate; all affronts to that power, and breaches of those rights are

immediately offences against him, to whom they are so delegated by the public.

He is therefore the proper person to prosecute for all public offences and breaches

of the peace, being the person injured in the eye of the law. And this notion

was carried so far in the old Gothic constitution, (wherein the king was bound

by his coronation oath to conserve the peace,) that in case of any forcible injury

offered to the person of a fellow-subject, the offender was accused of a kind of

perjury, in having violated the king's coronation oath, dicebatur fregisse jura

menium regis juratum. (y) And hence also arises another *branch of r *ngq -i

the prerogative, that of pardoning offences; for it is reasonable that he L J

only who is injured should have the power of forgiving. (21) Of prosecutions

and pardons I shall treat more at large hereafter: and only mention them here,

(t\ 2 Hawk. P. C. 2. (to) Lord Raym. 747. (z) Com. Journ. 8 Mar. 1761.

(</) Stlernh. dejure Goth. 1. 3, c. 3. A notion somewhat similar to this may be found in the Mirror, o. I,

and

regulated by certain
established rules, which the crown itself cannot now
alter but by a.ct of parliament. (t) And in order to maintain both the dignity
and independence of the judges in the superior courts, it is enacted by the
statute 13 Wm. III, c. 2, that their commissions shall be made (not, as formerly,
durante bene placito, but) quamdiu bene se gesserint, and their salaries aset~r
tained and established ; but that it may be lawful to remove them on the address
of both houses of parliament. And now, by the noble improvements of that
law, in the statute of 1 Geo. III, c. 23, enacted at the earnest recommendation of
*the king himself from the throne, the judges are continued in their [ • 268 ]
offices during their good behavior, notwithstanding any demise of the
crown, (which was formerly held (w) immediately to vacate their seats) (20) and
their full salaries are absolutely secured to them during the continuance of their
commissions ; his majesty havmg been pleased to declare, that " he looked upon
the independence and uprightness of the judges as essential to the impartial
administration of justice; as one of the best securities of the rights and liberties
of his subjects; and as most conducive to the honor of the crown."(x)
In crimmal proceedings, or prosecutions for offences, it would be a still higher
absurdity if the king personally sate in judgment; because, in regard to these,
he appears in another capacity, that of prosecutor. All offences are either
against the king's peace, or his crown and dignity ; and are so laid in every
indictment. For though in their consequences they generally seem (except in
the case of treason, and a very few others,) to be rather offences against the
kingdom than the king, yet as the public, which is an invisible body, has delegated all its power and rights, with regard to the execution of the laws to one
visible magistrate; all affronts to that power, and breaches of those rights are
immediately offences against him, to whom they are so delegated by the public.
He is therefore the proper person to prosecute for all public offences and breaches
of the peace, being the person injured in the eye of the law. And this notion
was carried so far in the old Gothic constitution, (wherein the king was bound
by his coronation oath to conserve the peace,) that in case of any forcible injury
offered to the person of a fellow-subject, the offender was accused of a kind of
perjury, in having violated the king's coronation oath, dicebatur fregisse }ura
mentum regis }uratum. (y) And hence also arises another *branch of [ • 269 ]
the prerogative, that of pardoning offences; for it is reasonable that he
only who is injured should have the power of forgivin5. (21) Of prosecutions
and pardons I shall treat more at large hereafter: and only mention them here,

; 5. And so also, when the Chief Justice Thorpe was condemned to be hanged for bribery, he was said

lacramentwn domini regis fregltse. Rot. Part. 25 Edw. III.

(20) [All their commissions became vacant upon the demise of the crown, till they were con-

tinued for six months longer by 1 Ann. Stat. 1, c. 8.]

(t) 2 Hawk. P. C. 2.
(to) Lord Raym. 747.
(z) Com. Journ. 8 Mar. 1761.
(y) Stlernh. dejure Goela. l. 3, c. 3. A notion somewhat similar to this may be found in the Mirror, o. 11
f 5. And so also, when the Chier Justice Thorpe was condemned to be hanged for bribery, he was sala.

.sacramrnMim dominl regia /regiau. .&t. Part. 25 Edw. III.

.

The jndges of the courts of the United States hold their offices during good behavior, and

receive for their services a compensation which cannot be diminished dunng their continuance

in office. Const, art. 3, Jl. They are appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate.

Const, art. 2, $2. They may be removed from office by the process of impeachment, like,

other civil officers, and, by an act of congress passed in 1869, they may retire after ten years

service, without diminution of salary, at the age of 70 years. The territorial judicial officers hold

only (luring pleasure.

(SJ1) [" This high prerogative is inseparably incident to the crown, and the king is intrusted

with it upon special confidence that he will spare those only whose case, could it have been fore-

seen, the law itself may be presumed willing to have excepted out of its general rules, which

the wisdom of man cannot make so perfect as to suit every particular case." Co. Lit. 114, b.;

Hal. P. C. 104 ; 3 Inst. 233 ; Show, 284. The power of the crown to pardon a forfeiture and to

grant restitution can only be exercised where things remain in statu quo, but not so as to affect

legal rights vested in third persons. Rex v. Amery, 2 Term Rep. 569. This is a personal trust

and prerogative in the king for a fountain of bounty and grace to his subjects, as he observes

them deserving or useful to the public, -which he can, neither by grant, or otherwise, extinguish:

per Holt, C. J., Ld. Raym. 214. As lie cannot but have the administration of public revenge, so

he cannot but have a power to remit it by his pardon when he judges proper. Idem.]
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(20) [.All their commissions became vacant upon the demise of the crown, till they were continued for Rix months longer by 1 Ann. Stat. 1, c. 8.]
The judges of the courts of the United States hold their offices dnrin~ good behavior, and
receive for their services a compensation which cannot be diminished dunng their continuance
in office. Const. art. 3, §1. They are appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate.
Colll!t. art. 2, § 2. They may be removed from office by the process of impcochment, like .
other civil officer;,i, and, by an act of congress passed in 1869, they may retire after ten yean1
service, without diminution of BSle.ry, at the age of 70 years. The territorial judicial officers hold
only cluring .viea.'!urc.
(Ill)['' '!'his high prerogative is inseparably incident to the crown, and the king is intrusted
with 1t upon SJ.>CCial confidence that he will spare those only whose caseL could it have been foreseen, the law itself may be pre~nmod willing to have excepted out or its general rules, which
the wisdom of man cannot make ~o perfect aa to suit every particular case." Co. Lit. 114, b. ;
Hal. P. C. 104; 3 Ini'lt. 233; Show, 284. Tho power of the crown to parclon a forfeiture and to
grant restitution ce.n only be exercised where things remain in statu quo, bnt not so as to affect
legal rights vested in third persons. Rex v. Amery, 2 Term Rep. 569. 'fhis is e. personal trust
and prerogative in the king for a fountain of bounty an<l grace to his subjects, as he observes
them deserving or useful to the public, which he can, neither by fll'.ll.llt, or otherwise, extinguish :
per Holt, C. J., .Ld. Raym. 214. As he cannot bnt have the admmistrntion of public revenge, l!O
he cannot but have a power to remit it hy hiR pardon when he judges proper. Idem.]
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in this cursory manner, to shew the constitutional grounds of this power of the

crown, and how regularly connected all the links are in this vast chain of

prerogative.

In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a peculiar body

of men, nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, con-

sists one main preservative of the public liberty which cannot subsist long in

any state unless the administration of common justice be in some degree sepa-

rated both from the legislative and also from the executive power. Were it

joined with the legislative, the life, liberty, and property of the subject would

be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regulated

only by their own opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law;

which, though legislators may depart from, yet judges are bound to observe.

Were it joined with the executive, this union might soon be an overbalance for

the legislative. For which reason, by the statute of 16 Car. I, c. 10, which

abolished the court of star chamber, effectual care is taken to remove all judi-

cial power out of the hands of the king's privy council; who, as then was

evident from recent instances, might soon oe inclined to pronounce that for law

which was most agreeable to the prince or his officers. Nothing therefore is

more to be avoided, in a free constitution, than uniting the provinces of a judge

and a minister of state. And, indeed, that the absolute power claimed and

exercised in a neighbouring nation is more tolerable than that of the eastern

empires, is in great measure owing to their having vested the judicial power in
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their parliaments, a body separate and distinct from both the legislative and

executive; and, if ever that nation recovers its former liberty, it will owe it to

the efforts of those assemblies. In Turkey, where every thing is centered in the

sultan or his ministers, *despotic power is in its meridian, and wears a

more dreadful aspect.

A consequence of this prerogative is the legal ubiquity of the king. His

majesty in the eye of the law is always present in all his courts, though he can-

not personally distribute justice, (z) His judges are the mirror by which the

king's image is reflected. It is the regal office, and not the royal person, that is

always present in court, always ready to undertake prosecutions, or pronounce

judgment, for the benefit and protection of the subject And from this ubiquity

it follows, that the king can never be nonsuit; (a) for a nonsuit is the desertion

of the suit or action by the non-appearance of the plaintiff in court. (22] For

the same reason, also, in the forms of legal proceedings, the king is not said to

appear by Ms attorney, as other men do; for in contemplation of law he is

always present in court, (b)

From the same original, of the king's being the fountain of justice, we may

also deduce the prerogative of issuing proclamations, which is vested in the king

alone. These proclamations have then a binding force, when, (as Sir Edward

Coke observes,) (c) they are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm.

For, though the making of laws is entirely the work of a distinct part, the

legislative branch of the sovereign power, yet the manner, time, and circum-

stances of putting those laws in execution must frequently be left to the dis-

cretion of the executive magistrate. And therefore his constitutions or edicts

concerning these points, which we call proclamations, are binding upon the

subject, where they do not either contradict the old laws or tend to establish

new ones; but only enforce the execution of such laws as are already in being,

in such manner as the king shall judge necessary. Thus the established law is,

that the king may prohibit any of his subjects from leaving the realm : a procla-

r *271 "1 mation therefore forbidding this in general for three weeks, by laying *au

"• J embargo upon all shipping in time of war, (d) will be equally binding

(<) Fortesc. c. 8. 2 lost 188. (a) Co. Ml I. 139. (6) Finch. 1. 81. (c) 3 Ins!. 162.

(d) 4 Mod. 177, 179.

(22) [But the attorney-general may enter a non milt prosequi, which has the effect of a non-

suit. Co. Litt. 139.]
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in this cursory manner, to shew the constitutional grounds of this power of the
crown, and how regularly connected all the links are in this vast chain of
prerogative.
In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a peculiar body
of men, nomitlated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, consists one main preservative of the public liberty which cannot subsist long in
any state unless the administration of common just.ice be in some degree separated both from the legislative and also from the executive power. Were it
joined with the legislative, the life, liberty, and property of the subject would
be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regulated
only by their own opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law;
whwh, though legislators may depart from, yet judges are bound to obserrn.
Were it joined with the executive, this union might soon be an overbalance for
the legislative. For which reason, by the statute of 16 Car. I, c. 10, which
abolished the court of star chamber, effectual care is taken to remove all judicial power ont of the hands of the kin~s privy council; who, as then was
evident from recent instances, might soon'be inclined to pronounce that for law
which was most agreeable to the prince or his officers. Nothing therefore is
more to be avoided, in a free constitution, than uniting the provinces of a judge
and a minister of state. And, indeed, that the absolute power claimed and
exercised in a neighbouring nation is more tolerable than that of the ea.stern
empires, is in great measure owing to their having vested the judicial power in
their parliaments, a body _separate and distinct from both the legislative and
executive; and, if ever that nation recovers its former liberty, it will owe it to
the efforts of those assemblies. In 'furkey, where every thing is centered in the
[ • 270 ] sultan or his ministers, *despotic power is in its meridian, and wears a
more dreadful aspect.
A consequence of this prerogative is the legal ubiquity of the kina. His
majesty in the eye of the law is always present m all his courts, though ie c.annot personally distribute justice. (z) His judges are the mirror by which the
king's image is reflected. It is the regal office, and not the royal person, that is
always present in court, always ready to undertake prosecutions, or pronounce
judgment, for the benefit and protection of the subject. And from this ubiquity
it follows, that the king can ne>er be nonsuit; (a) for a nonsuit is the desert.ion
of the suit or ndion by the non-appearance of the plaintiff in court. (22] For
the same reason, also, m the forms of legal proceedings, the king is not said t-0
appear by liis attorney, as other men do; for in contemplation of law he is
always present in court.(b)
From the same original, of the king's being the fountain of justice, we may
also deduce the prerogative of isauing proclamations, which is vested in the king
alone. These proclamations have then a binding force, when, (as Sir Edward
Coke observes,) (c) the,- are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm.
For, though the makmg of laws is entirely the work of a distinct part, the
legislative branch of the sovereign power, yet the manner, time, and circumstances of putting those laws in execution must frequently be left to the discretion of the executive magistrate. And therefore his constitutions or edicts
concerning these points, which we call proclamations, are binding upon the
subject, where they do not either contradiot the old laws or tend to establish
new ones; but only enforce the execution of such laws as arc already in heing,
in such manner as the king shall judge necessary. Th us the established law is,
that the king may prohibit an>': of his subjects from leaving the realm: a procla[ • 271 ] mation therefore forbidding this in general for three weeks, by laying *au
embargo upon all shipping in time of war, (d) will be equally binding
(a) FoTt.ellCI.

c. 8.

2 IDJlt. 188.

(a)

Co. Litt. 189.

(bl Finch. l. 81.

(o) 8

Inat. IO'J.

(d) ' Mod. lTT, 179.

(22) [But the attorney-general may enter a non 'Vult prQsequi, which has the effect of a nonsuit. Co. Litt. 139.]
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as an act of parliament, because founded upon a prior law. But a proclamation

to lay an embargo in time of peace upon all vessels laden with wheat (though

in a time of a public scarcity) being contrary to law, and particularly to statute

22 Car. II, c. 13, the advisers of such a proclamation, and all persons acting

under it, found it necessary to be indemnified by a special act of parliament,

7 Geo. Ill, c. 7. A proclamation for disarming papists is also binding, being

only in execution of what the legislature has first ordained: but a proclamation

for allowing arms to papists, or for disarming any protestant subjects will not

bind; because the first would be to assume a dispensing power, the latter a legis-

lative one; to the vesting of either of which in any single person the laws of

England are absolutely strangers. Indeed by the statute 31 Hen. VIII, c. 8, it

was enacted, that the king's proclamations should have the force of acts of par-

liament ; a statute which was calculated to introduce the most despotic tyranny,

and which must have proved fatal to the liberties of this kingdom, had. it not

been luckily repealed in the minority of his successor, about five years after, (e) (23)

IV. The king is likewise the fountain of honour, of office, and of privilege;

and this in a different sense from that wherein he is styled the fountain of jus-

tice ; for here he is really the parent of them. It is impossible that government

can be maintained without a due subordination of rank; that the people may

know and distinguish such as are set over them, in order to yield them their

due respect and obedience; and also that the officers themselves, being encour-

aged by emulation and the hopes of superiority, may the better discharge their
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functions; and the law supposes that no one can be so good a judge of their

several merits and services, as the king himself who employs them. It has,

therefore, intrusted him with the sole power of conferring dignities and honours,

in confidence that he will bestow them upon none but such as deserve them.

And therefore all degrees of *nobility, of knighthood, and other titles, r $0721

are received by immediate grant from the crown: either expressed in "•

writing by writs or letters patent, as in the creation of peers and baronets; or

by corporeal investiture, as in the creation of a simple knight (24)

From the same principle also arises the prerogative of erecting and disposing

of offices; for honours and offices are in their nature convertible and synony-

mous. All offices under the crown carry in the eye of the law an honour along

with them; because they imply a superiority of parts and abilities, being supposed

to be always filled with those that are most able to execute them. And on

the other hand, all honours in their original had duties or offices annexed to

them; an earl, comes, was the conservator or governor of a county; and a

knight, miles, was bound to attend the king in his wars. For the same reason,

therefore, that honours are in the disposal of the king, offices ought to be so

likewise; and as the king may create new titles, so may he create new offices:

but with this restriction, that he cannot create new offices with new fees annexed

to them, nor annex new fees to old offices; for this would be a tax upon the

subject, which cannot be imposed but by act of parliament. (/) Wherefore, in

13 Hen. IV, a new office being created by the king's letters patent for measuring

cloths, with a new fee for the same, the letters patent were, on account of the

new fee, revoked and declared void in parliament.

Upon the same, or a like reason, the king has also the prerogative of confer-

ring privileges upon private persons. Such as granting place or precedence to

(«) Stat. 1 Edw. VI. o. U. (/) 2 Inst. 833.

(23) [Proclamations, and what are often equivalent to them, orders of the privy council, in

respect of subjects of revenue, sometimes issue upon public grounds; but as these are always

as an act of parliament., because founded upon a prior law. But a proclamation
to lay an emuargu in time of peace upon all vessels laden with wheat (though
in a time of a public scarcity) being contrary to law, and particularly to statute
22 Car. II, c. 13, the advisers of such a proclamation, and all persons acting
under it, found it necessary to be indemnified by a special act of parliament,
7 Geo. III, c. 7. A proclamation for disarming papists is also binding, being
only in execution of what the legislature has first ordained: but a proclamation
for allowing arms to papists, or for disarminO' any protestant subjects will not
bind; because the first would be to assume a. ~ispensing power, the latter a legislative one; to the vesting of either of which in any single person the laws of
England are absolutely strangers. Indeed by the statute 31 Hen. VIII, c. B, it
was enacted, that the king's proclamations should have the force of acts of parliament; a statute which was calculated to introduce the most despotic tyranny,
and which must have proved fatal to the liberties of this kingdom, had it not
been luckily repealed in the minority of his successor, about five years after. (e) (23)
IV. '£he king is likewise the fountain of honour, of office, and of privilege;
and this in a different sense from that wherein he is styled the fountain of justice; for here he is really the parent of them. It is impossible that government
can be maintained without a due subordination of rank; that the people may
know and distinguish such as are set over them, in order to yield them their
due respect and obedience; and also that the officers themselves, being encouraged by emulation and the hopes of superiority, may the better discharge their
functions; and the law supposes that no one can be so good a judge of their
several merits and services, as the king himself who emplo~s them. It has,
therefore, in trusted him with the sole power of conferring dignities and honours,
in confidence that he will bestow them upon none but such as deserve them.
And therefore all degrees of *nobility, of knighthood, and other titles, [ • 272 ]
are received by immediute grant from the crown: either expressed in
writing by writs or letters patent, as in the creation of peers and baronets; or
by corporeal investiture, as in the creation of a simple knight. (24)
From the same principle also arises the prerogative of erecting and disposing
of offices; for honours and offices are in their nature convertible and synonymous. All offices under the crown carry in the eye of the law an honour along
with them; because they imply a superiority of parts and abilities, being supposed
to be always filled with those that are most able to execute them. And on
the other hand, all honours in their original had duties or offices annexed to
them; an earl, comes, was the conservator or governor of a c-0unty; and a
knight, miles, was bound to attend the king in his wars. For the same reason,
therefore, that honours are in the disposal of the king, offices ought to be so
likewise; and as the king may create new titles, so may he create new offices :
but with this restriction, that he cannot create new offices with new fees annexed
t-0 them, nor annex new fees to old offices ; for this would be a tax upon the
subject, which cannot be imposed but by act of parliament.(/) Wherefore, in
13 Hen. IV, a new office being created by the king's letters patent for measuring
cloths, with a new fee for the same, the letters patent were, on account of the
new fee, revoked and declared void in parliament.
Upon the same, or a like reason, the king has also the prerogative of conferring pri-vileges upon private persons. Such as granting place or precedence to

examinable in parliament, their abuse for any continued period can hardly occur; yet,

(el Stat. 1 Edw. VI. o. 12.

being the assumption of a dispensing power, vigilance on their promulgation cannot be too

(f) 2 Inst. 1133.

strict.]

(24) Titles of nobility are forbidden to be granted by the United States, or by any of the indi-

vidual states, and no person holding any office of trust or profit under them, can, without the

consent of congress, accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever,

from any king, prince or foreign state. Const, of U. S., art. li $$ 9 and 10.
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(23) [Proclamations, and what are often equivalent to them, orders of the privy council, in
respect of Rubjects of revenue, sometimes issue upon public grounds; but as these are always
examinable in parliament, their abuse for any continued period can hardly occur ; yet,
being the assumption of a dispensing power, vigilance on their promulgation cannot be too
strict.]
(~) Titles of nobility are forbidden to be granted by the United State11, or by any of the individual states, and no person holding any office of trust or profit under them, can, without thtJ
cowent ot' congress, accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind who.te\"er,
from any king, prince or foreign state. ConBt. of U.S., wt. 1, §§ 9 and 10.
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any of his subjects, (25) as shall seem good to his royal wisdom: (^g) or such as

converting aliens, or persons born out of the king's dominions into denizens ;

(26) whereby some very considerable privileges of natural-born subjects are con-

ferred upon them. Such also is the prerogative of erecting corporations;

whereby a number of private persons are united and knit together, and enjoy

r <t>a,n3 I many liberties, powers and immunities in their politic "capacity, which

L ' -1 they were utterly incapable of in their natural. (27) Of aliens, denizens,

natural-born, and naturalized subjects, I shall speak more largely in a subse-

quent chapter; as also of corporations at the close of this book of our commen-

taries. I now only mention them incidentally, in order to remark the king's

prerogative of making them; which is grounded upon this foundation, that the

king, having the sole administration of the government in his hands, is the best

and the only judge in what capacities, with what privileges, and under what

distinctions, his people are the best qualified to serve and to act tinder him.

A principle which was carried so far by the imperial law, that it was determined

to be the crime of sacrilege, even to doubt whether the prince had appointed

proper officers in the state, (h)

V. Another light in which the laws of England consider the king with

regard to domestic concerns, is as the arbiter of commerce. By commerce, I

at present mean domestic commerce only. It would lead me into too large

a field, if I were to attempt to enter upon the nature of foreign trade, its priv-

ileges, regulations, and restrictions; and would be also quite beside the purpose
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of these commentaries, which are confined to the laws of England; whereas no

municipal laws can be sufficient to order and determine the very extensive and

complicated affairs of traffic and merchandize; neither can they have a proper

authority for this purpose. For, as these are transactions carried on between

subjects of independent states, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded

by the other. For which reason the affairs of commerce are regulated by a law

of their own, called the law merchant or lex mercatoria, which all nations agree

in, and take notice of. And in particular it is held to be part of the law of Eng-

land, which decides the causes of merchants by the general rules which obtain

in all commercial countries; and that often, even in matters relating to domes-

tic trade, as for instance, with regard to the drawing, the acceptance, and the

transfer of inland bills of exchange, (i)

F *2741 *With us in England, the king's prerogative, so far as it relates to mere

L J domestic commerce, will fall principally under the following articles :

First, the establishment of public marts, or places of buying and selling, such

as markets and fairs, with the tolls thereunto belonging. These can only be set

up by virtue of the king's grant, or by long and immemorial usage and pre-

scription, which presupposes such a grant (#) The limitation of these public

resorts to such time and such place as may be most convenient for the neighbour-

hood, forms a part of economics, or domestic polity, which, considering the

kingdom as a large family, and the king as the master of it, he clearly has a

right to dispose and order as he pleases.

(o) ^ Inst. 861. (*) Ditputare de principal! judicio non oportet; lacrilegii enim instar eat, thibitare an it

digmu tit, quern Oegerit imperator. C. '.<, 28, 3. (i) Co. Liu, 172. Ld. Kayiu. 181, 1512. (i) 2 lost 230.

(25) [The king by the common law could have created a duke, earl, &c., and could have given

him precedence before all others of the same rank, a prerogative not unirequeutly exercised in

ancient times; but it was restrained by the 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10, which settles the place or pre-

any of his subjects, (25) as shall seem good to his royal wisdom: {g) or such as
converting aliens, or persons born out of the king's dominions mto denizens;
(2ti) whereby some very considerable privileges of natural-born subjects are conferred upon them. Such also is the prerogative of erecting corporations;
whereby a number of private persons are united and knit together, and enjoy
[ • 2r'l3 ] many liberties, powers and immunities in their politic *capacity, which
'
they were utterly incapable of in their natural. (27) Of aliens, denizens,
natural-born, and naturalized subjects, I shall speak more largely in a subsequent chapter; as also of corporations at the close of this book of our commentaries. I now only mention them incidentally, in order to remark the king's
prerogative of making them; which is grounded upon this foundation, that tlie
king, having the sole administration of the government in his hands, is the best
and the only judge in what capacities, with what privileges, and under whnt
distinctions, his people a.re the best qualified to serve and to act _under him.
A principle which was carried so far by the imperial law, that it was determined
to be the crime of sacrilege, even to doubt whether the prince had appointed
proper officers in the state. (h)
V. Another light in which the laws of England consider the king with
regard to domestic concerns, is as the arbiter of commerce. By commerce, I
at present mean domestic commerce only. It would lead me mto too large
a field, if I were to attempt to enter upon the nature of foreign trade, its privileges, regulations, and restrictions; and would be also quite beside the purpose
of these commentaries, which are confined to the laws of England; whereas no
municipal laws can be sufficient to order and determine the very extensive and
complicated affuirs of traffic and merchandize ; neither can they have a proper
authority for this purpose. For, as these are transactions carried on between
subjects of independent states, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded
by the other. For which reason the affairs of commerce a.re regulated by a law
of their own, called the law merchant or lex rnercatoria, which all nations a~
in, and take notice of. And in particular it is held to be part of the law of England, which decides the causes of merchants by the general rules which obtain
in all commercial countries; and that often, even in matters relating to domestic trade, as for instance, with regard to the drawing, the acceptance, and the
transfer of inland bills of exchange. (i)
*With us in England, the kin~s prerogative, so far as it relates to mere
[ • 274 ]
domestic commerce, will fall prmc1pally under the following articles :
First, the establishment of. public marts, or places of buying and selling, such
as markets and fairs, with the tolls thereunto belonging. These can only be set
up by virtue of the king's grant, or by long and immemorial usage and prescription, which presupposes such a grant. (k) The limitation of the.se public
resorts to such time and such place as may be most convenient for the nei~hbour
bood, forms a part of economics, or domestic polity, which, considermg the
kingdom as a forge family, and the king as the master of it, he clearly has a
right to dispose and order as he pleases.
(gl 'Inst. 861. (l) Diaputare tk prindpalijudicio flOfl oporld; aacrilegii enim lnltar eat, dubitare mt u
digmu rit, ~ ekgeril "11.perator.

C. II, 29, 3.

(i)

Co. Litt. 172. Ld. llaym. 181, 1M2.

(k) 2 Inst. 220.

cedence of all the nobility and great officers of state.]

(26) This power in the United States is conferred upon congress. Const, art. 1, $ 8.

(27) In America, the power to create corporations is a legislative power, and is not conferred

upon the general government in express terms in the constitution, but has been exercised as auxil-

iary to powers expressly given; as in the incorporation of the United States bank, and ill the act

under which the present national banks are organized. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.

316. TVithin the District of Columbia, congress, possessing exclusive powers of legislation, may

of course charter corporations. But there, as well as in the territories generally, this power is

allowed to be exercised by the local legislature.

In England the power to create corporations is exercised by the Legislature, and the royal

prerogative is disused.
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(25) [The king by the common law could have created a duke, earl, &c., and could have given
him precedence before all others of the 8amo ro.nk, a prerogative not unftequeutly exercised in
anuient times; but it was restrained by the 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10, which settles tho place or precedence of all the nobility and great officers of state.]
(26) This power in tho United States i1:1 conferred u:pon congress. Const. art. 1, ~ 8.
(27) In America, the power to create corporations 1s a legislative power, and is not conferred
upon the general government in express terms in tho constitution, but has been exerci11ed as aaxiliary to powers expreSilly given; EIS in the incorporation of the United States banki and iu the act
under which the present national banks are organiaed. See McCulloch"· Mary and, 4 Wheat.
al6. Within the Di~trict of Columbia, congress, possessing exclusive powers of legit<lation, ma;
of course charter corporations. But there, aH well as in the territories generally, this power is
allowed to be exercised by the local legislature.
In En~land the power to create oorporations is exercised by the Legislature, and the royal
prerogative is disused.
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Secondly, the regulation of weights and measures. These, for the advantage

of the public, ought to be universally the same throughout the kingdom; being

the general criterions which reduce all things to the same or an equivalent value.

But, as weight and measure are things in their nature arbitrary and uncertain,

it is therefore expedient that they be reduced to some fixed rule or standard;

which standard it is impossible to fix by any written law or oral proclamation ;

for no man can, by words only, give another an adequate idea of a foot-rule, or

a pound-weight. It is therefore necessary to have recourse to some visible, pal-

pable, material standard; by forming a comparison with which all weights and

measures may be reduced to one uniform size: and the prerogative of fixing

this standard our ancient law vested in the crown, as in Normandy it belonged

to the duke. (1) This standard was originally kept at Winchester; and we find

in the laws of King Edgar, (/«) near a century before the conquest, an injunction

that the one measure, which was kept at Winchester, should be observed through-

out the realm. Most nations have regulated the standard of measures of length

by *comparison with the parts of the human body; as the palm, the r inn* -i

hand, the span, the foot, the cubit, the ell, (ulna, or arm,) the pace, and *• '

the fathom. But, as these are of different dimensions in men of different propor-

tions, onr ancient historians (n) inform us, that a new standard of longitudinal

measure was ascertained by King Henry the First, who commanded that the ulna,

or ancient ell, which answers to the modern yard, should be made of the exact

length of his own arm. And, one standard of measures of length being gained,
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all others are easily derived from thence; those of greater length by multiply-

ing, those of less by subdividing, that original standard. Thus, by the statute

called compositio ulnarum et perticarum, five yards and a half make a perch;

and the yard is subdivided into three feet, and each foot into twelve inches;

which inches will be each of the length of three grains of barley. Superficial

measures are derived by squaring those of length; and measures of capacity by

cubing them. The standard of weights was originally taken from corns of

wheat, whence the lowest denomination of weights we have is still called a

grain; thirty-two of which are directed, by the statute called compositio mensu-

rarum, to compose a penny-weight, whereof twenty make an ounce, twelve

ounces a pound, and so upwards. And upon these principles the first standards

were made ; which, being originally so fixed by the crown, their subsequent reg-

ulations have been generally made by the king in parliament. Thus, under

King Kichard I, in his parliament holden at Westminster, A. D. 1197, it was

ordained that there should be only one weight and pne measure throughout the

kingdom, and that the custody ol the assize, or standard of weights and meas-

ures, should be committed to certain persons in every city and borough; (o)

from whence the ancient office of the king's aulnager seems to have been derived,

whose duty it was, for a certain fee, to measure all cloths made for sale, till the

office was abolished by the statute 11 and 12 Wm. Ill, c. 20. In King John's

time, this ordinance of King Kichard was *frequently dispensed with r „„„,, -,

for money, (p) which occasioned a provision to be made for enforcing it, <- •"

in the great charters of King John and his son. (q) These original standards

were called pondus regis, (r) and mensura domini regis; (s) and are directed b

a variety of subsequent statutes to be kept in the exchequer, and all weights

measures to be made comformable thereto, (t) But, as Sir Edward Coke ob-

serves, (u) though this hath so often by authority of parliament been enacted,

yet it could never be effected; so forcible is custom with the multitude. (28)

(J) Or. Omnium, c. 16. (TO) Cap. 8.

In) Will. Malmsb. in vita Hen. I. Spelm. lit a. I. apud Wilkins, 299. (o) Hoved. Matth. Paris.

(p) Hoved, A. D. 1201. (a) 9 Hen. III. c. 25.

(r) Plae. 36 Kdv>. I. apud Cowers Interpr. tit. pondus naif. (t) Flet. 2, 12.

(<) U Edw. III. st. 1, c. 12. 25 Edw. III. st. 8, c. 10. 16 Bio. II. c. 3. 8 Hen. VI. o. 5. 11 Hen. VI. c. 8.

U Hen. VII. c. 4. 22 Car. II. c. 8. (u) 2 Inat. U.

(28) [The regulation of -weights and measures cannot with propriety be referred to the king's

prerogative: for from mngna charta to the present time mere are above twenty acts of
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Thirdly, as money is the medium of commerce, it is the king's prerogative, as

the arbiter of domestic commerce, to give it authority or make it current.

Money is an universal medium, or common standard, by comparison with which

the value of all merchandize may be ascertained; or it is a sign which repre-

sents the respective values of all commodities. Metals are wefi calculated for

this sign, because they are durable and are capable of many subdivisions; and

a precious metal is still better calculated for this purpose, because it is the most

portable. A metal is also the most proper for a common measure, because it

can easily be reduced to the same standard in all nations: and every particular

nation fixes on it its own impression, that the weight and standard (wherein con-

sists the intrinsic value) may both be known by inspection, only.

As the quantity of precious metals increases, that is, the more of them there

is extracted from the mine, this universal medium, or common sign, will sink

in value, and grow less precious. Above a thousand millions of bullion are cal-

culated to have been imported into Europe from America within less than three

F *2771 cen';urie8» and the quantity is daily increasing. *The consequence is,

•" that more money must be jpven now for the same commodity than was

given an hundred years ago. And, if any accident were to diminish the quantity

of gold and silver, their value would proportionably rise. A horse, that was for-

merly worth ten pounds, is now perhaps worth twenty; and, by any failure of

current specie, the price may be reduced to what it was. Yet is the horse in

reality neither dearer nor cheaper at one time than another: for, if the metal
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which constitutes the coin was formerly twice as scarce as at present, the com-

modity was then as dear at half the price as now it is at the whole. (29)

The coining of money is in all states the act of the sovereign power; for the

reason just mentioned, that its value may be known on inspection. (30) And

with respect to coinage in general, there are three things to be considered there-

in ; the materials, the impression and the denomination.

parliament to fix and establish the standard and uniformity of weights and measures. A custom or

usage countervailing these statutes is void in law. On these customs, see 3 T. K. 271; 4 id. 314,

Thirdly, as money is the medium of commerce, it is the king's prerogative, as
the arbiter of domestic commerce, to give it authority or make it current.
.Money is an universal meJ.ium, or common standard, by comparison with which
the value of all mcrchandize may be ascertained; or it is a sign which represents the respective values of all commodities. :Metals are well calculated for
this si~, because they are durable and are capable of many subdiYisions; and
a precious metal is still better calculated for this purpose, because it is the most
portable. A metal is also the most proper for a common measure, because it
can easily be reduced to the same standard in all nations: and every particular
nation fixes on it its own impression, that the weight and standard (wherein consists the intrinsic value) may both be known by inS!IBction only.
As the quantity of precious metals increases, that is, the more of them there
is extracted from the mine, this universal medium, or common sign, will sink
in value, and grow less precious. Above a thousand millions of bullion are calculated to have been imported into Europe from America within less tha.n three
[ • 277 ] centuries; and the quantity is daily increasing. *The consequence is,
that more money must be given now for the same commodity than was
given an hundred years ago. And, if any accident were to diminish the quantity
of gold and silver, their value would proportionably rise. A horse, that was formerly worth ten pounds, is now perhaps worth twenty; and, by any failure of
current specie, the price may be reduced to what it was. Yet is the horse in
reality neither dearer nor cheaper at one time than another : for, if the metal
which constitutes the coin was formerly twice as scarce as at present, the commodity was then as dear at half the price as now it is at the whole. (29)
The coining of monev is in all states the act of the sovereign :power; for the
reason just mentioned, that its value may be known on inspection. (30) And
with respect to coinn.ge in general, there are three things to be considered therein ; the materials, the impression and the denomination.

150; 5 id. 353 ; 6 id. 338; 4 Taunt 102.]

In the United States, the power to regulate weights and measures, is in congress. Const, art.

1, $ 8.

(29) [In considering the prices of articles in ancient times, regard must always be had to

the weight of the shiUing, or the quantity of silver which it contained at different periods.

From the conquest till the 20th year of Edward III, a pound sterling was actually a pound troy

weight of silver, which was divided into twenty shillings; so if ten pounds at that time were the

price of a horse, the same quantity of silver was paid lor it as is now given, if its price is thirty

pounds.

This, therefore, is one great cause of the apparent difference in the prices of commodities in

ancient and modem times. About the vear 1347, Edward III coined twenty-two shillings out

of a pound; and five years afterwards he coined twenty-five shillings out of the same quan-

tity. Henry V, in the beginning of his reign, divided the pound into thirty shiUiugji, and

then, of consequence, the shilling was double the weight of a shiUing at present. Henry VII

increased the number to forty, which was the standard number tul the beginning of the

reign of Elizabeth. She then coined a pound sterling of silver into sixty-two shillings. And

now by 56 Geo. Ill, c. 68, the pound troy of standard silver, eleven ounces two pennyweights

fine, <t<s., may be coined into sixty-six shillings. See money, in the index to Hume's Hist.

Dr. Adam Smith, at the end of his first volume, has given tables specifying the average prices of

wheat for five hundred and fifty years back, and has reduced for each year the money of that

time into the money of the present day. But in his calculation he has called the pound since

Elizabeth's time sixty shillings. Taking it at that rate, we may easily find the equivalent in

modem money of any sum in ancient time, if we know the number of shillings which weighed a

pound, by this simple rule : as the number of shillings in a pound at that time is to sixty, so U

any sum at that time to its equivalent at present; as for instance, in the time of Henry V, an

thirty shillings are to sixty shillings now, so ten pounds then were equal to twenty pounds of

present money. ]

(30) The power to coin money and to regulate the value thereof, is, by the constitution ol

the United States, conferred upon congress: art. 1, $ 5; and the states, by the same instn

ment, are forbidden to make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts

Art. 1, $ 10. The question whether congress has the power to make any thing except the

coins from these metals a legal tender, has recently become an important one, and has led to

several judicial opinions whach are not harmonious. The act of congress of February 25,
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parliament to fix and establish the standard and uniformity of weights and measure11. A cuRtom or
u~age countervailing these statutes is void in law. On these customs, see 3 T. R. 271; 4 id. 314,
150 ; 5 id. 353 ; 6 id. 3.38 ; 4 Taunt. to-i.]
In the United States, the power to regulate weights and measures, is in oongress. Golll\t. art.
l, ~ 8.
(29) [In considering the prices of article:> in ancient times, regard must always be had to
the weight of the shilling, or the quantity of sil•er which it contained at different periods.
From the conquest till the l!()th year of Edwanl III, a pound Rtl'rling we..'! actually a pound troy
weight of silver, which WM di'l'"ided into twenty shillin~~; so if ten pounds at that time were the
price of a horse, the same quantity of silver was paid for it a.'! is now given, if its p1ice is thirty
pounds.
This, therefore, is one great cam~e of the apparent ditreren11e in the prices of commoditieR in
ancient and modern time11. About the vear 1347, Edward III coined twenty·two 1.1hilling<1 out.
of a pound; and five years afterwards he coined twenty-five shillings out of the same quantity. Henry V, in the beginning of hiR reign, divided the pound into thirty shiUin~, and
then, of consequence, the i;hilliug was double the weight of a shilling at present. Henry VII
increased the number to forty, which was the standard number till the beginning of the
reign of Elizabeth. She .then coined a pound sterling of silver into sixty-two shillings. And
now by 56 Geo. III, c. 68, the pound troy of standanl silver, eleven ounces two pennyweights
fine, &c., may be coined into sixty-six iihillings. See money, in the index to Hume'R ll~t.
Dr. Adam Smith, at the end of his fi111t volume, haR given tables specifying the averllg(~ prices or
wheat for five hundred and fifty year8 back, and ha.-> reduced for each year the money of that
time into the money of the pre~cnt day. But in his calculation he hai.< called the pound since
Elizabeth's time sixty shillings. Taking it at that rate, we may easily find the equivalent in
modem money of any sum in ancient t.ime, if we know the number of shillin~s which weighed a
pound, by this simple rule: RI! the number of shillings in a pound at that time is to sixty, so is
an,r sum at that time to its equivalent at present; a.'! for in:Jtance, in the time of Henry V, SA
thirty shillings are to sixty shillings now, so ten pounds then were equal to twenty poundg or
present money.]
(:jO) The power to coin money and to regulate the value thereof, i1:1, by the constitution ol
the United ::itate:1, conferred upon congre:;s: art. 1, § 5; and the statei:1, by the illlme instn
ment, are forbidden to makn uuv thin~ but gµld and flilver a legal tender in payment of deht.'l
Art. 1, § 10. '£he question wbether congre>is h1\>I the power to make &Uy thing except the
coins from the~e mHtal11 a legal tender, has recently become
important one, and has led to
~Bvl'rnl judicial opinions which are not harmonious. The act of congress of February 25,
17fi
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With regard to the materials, Sir Edward Coke lays it down, (v) that the

money of England must either be of gold or silver; and none other was ever

issued by the royal authority till 1672, when copper farthings and half-pence

were coined by King Charles the Second, and ordered bv proclamation to be

current in all payments, under the value of sixpence, and not otherwise. But

this copper coin is not upon the same footing with the other in many respects,

particularly with regard to the offence of counterfeiting it. And, as to the silver

coin, it is enacted by statute 14 Geo. Ill, c. 42, that no tender of payment in

silver money, exceeding twenty-five pounds at one time, shall be a sufficient ten-

der in law for more than its value by weight, at the rate of 5s. 2d. an ounce.

As to the impression, the stamping thereof is the unquestionable prerogative

of the crown: for, though divers bishops and monasteries had formerly the

privilege of coining money, yet, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, (tv) this was

usually done by special grant from the king or by prescription, which supposes

one; and therefore was derived from, and not in derogation of, the royal prerog-

ative. Besides that they had only the profit of the coinage, and not the power

of ""instituting either the impression or denomination ; but had usually r »3~g -•

the stamp sent them from the exchequer. *• *"" '

The denomination, or the value for which the coin is to pass current, is like-

wise in the breast of the king; and, if any unusual pieces are coined, that

value must be ascertained by proclamation. In order to fix the value, the

weight and the fineness of the metal are to be taken into consideration together.
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When a given weight of gold or silver is of a given fineness, it is then of the

true standard, (a;) and called esterling or sterling metal; a name for which there

are various reasons given, (y) but none of them entirely satisfactory. (31) And

of this sterling or esterling metal all the coin of the kingdom must be made, by

the statute 25 Edw. Ill, c. 13. So that the king's prerogative seemeth not to

extend to the debasing or enhancing the value of the coin, below or above the

sterling value, (z) though Sir Matthew Hale (a) appears to be of another

opinion. (32) The king may also, by his proclamation, legitimate foreign coin,

(t>> 2 1 n>t. 577. (KM 1 Hilt P. C. 191.

(x) This standard hath been frequently varied in former times ; but hath for many years past been thus

invariably settled. The pound troy of gold, consisting of twenty-two carats (or twenty-fourth parts, fine, and

two of alloy, is divided into forty-four guineas aud a half of the present value of 21s. each. And the pound

troy of silver, consisting of eleven ounces and two pennyweights pure and eighteen pennyweights alloy, is

divided into sixty-two shillings. (See Folkes on English Coins.)

(y) Spelm. Gloss. 203. Dufrcane, HI. 165. The most plausible opinion seems to be that adopted by those

two etymologists, that the name was derived from the Esterltngi. or Eatcrlingd; as those Saxons were

anciently called, who inhabited that district of Germany, now occupied by the Hanse Towns and their

appendages: the earliest traders in modern Europe.

(*> 2 lust. 977. (a) 1 Hal. P. C. 191.

1862, provided for a considerable issue of treasury notes, and while making them receivable for

most dues to the United States, also provided that they should be " lawful money and legal

tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States," except duties on

imports, and interest on the public debt. The constitutional validity of this act, as applied to

pre-existing debts, has frequently been before the state courts, aud has generally been sustained—

though not always on the same grounds — even when the obligation by its terms was made pay-

able in gold. See Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 X. Y. 400; Van Hnsan v. Kanouse, 13

Mieh. 303; Lick t>. Faulkner, 25 Cal. 404; Thayer v. Hedges, 23 Ind. 141; Breitenbach r. Turner,

18 Wis. 140; "Wood v. Bullens, 6 Allen, 516; Warnibold v. Schlicting, 16 Iowa, 244; George v.

Concord, 45 N. H. 434; Maynard v. Newman, 1 Neb. 271. The supreme court of the United

States has held, however, that contracts made before the act, and expressly by their terms pay-

able in gold and silver coin: Bronson c. Rodos, 7 Wai. 229; and contracts where it is the clear

intent of the parties that satisfaction should be made in such coin: Butler v. Horwitz, 7 Wai.

358; cannot be discharged by a tender of treasury notes. Afterwards that court held in Hepburn

c. Griswold, 8 Wai. 603, that all contracts entered into when coin constituted the only legal cur-

rency can only be discharged by payment in coin. But a majority of the court has since reversed

this decision, and fully sustained the constitutionality of the legal tender act. The case is not yet

reported.

(31) [But since 1816 the pound troy of standard gold has been coined into 46 89-129 sover-

eigns, or 46J. 14s. 6d. And since the same date the pound troy of silver has been coined into

sixty-six shillings. McCulloch Die. Com. sub voce, Coins.]

(32; [Lord Hale refers to the case of mixed money in Davies' Reports, 48, in support of his

opinion. A person in Ireland had borrowed 1001. of sterling money, and had given a bond to

repay it on a certain future day. In the mean time Queen Elizabeth, for the purpose of paying

her armies and creditors in Ireland, had coined mixed or base money, and by her proclamation
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and make it current here, declaring at what value it shall be taken in pay-

ments, (b) But this, I apprehend, ought to be by comparison with the standard

of our own coin ; otherwise the consent of parliament will be necessary.

There is at present no such legitimated money; Portugal coin being only cur-

rent by private consent, so that any one who pleases may refuse to take it in

payment. The king may also at any time decry, or cry down, any coin of the

kingdom, and make it no longer current, (c)

VI. The king is, lastly, considered by the laws of England as the head and

supreme governor of the national church.

To enter into the reasons upon which this prerogative is founded is matter

rather of divinity than of law. I shall therefore only observe that, by statute

28 Hen. VIII, c. 1, (reciting that the king's majesty justly and rightfully is and

f *2791 Ou8n* *t° be the supreme head of the church of England; and so had

L -1 been recognized by the clergy of this kingdom in their convocation,) it

is enacted, that the king shall be reputed the only supreme head in earth of the

church of England, and shall have, annexed to the imperial crown of this

realm, as well the title and style thereof, as all jurisdictions, authorities and

commodities, to the said dignity of the supreme head of the church appertain-

ing. And another statute to the same purport, was made, 1 Eliz. c. 1.

In virtue of this authority the king convenes, prorogues, restrains, regulates,

and dissolves all ecclesiastical synods or convocations. This was an inherent

prerogative of the crown long before the time of Henry VIII, as appears by

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 1, and the many authors, both lawyers and historians,

vouched by Sir Edward Coke, (d) So that the statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19,

which restrains the convocation from making or putting in execution any

canons repugnant to the king's prerogative, or the laws, customs and statutes

of the realm, was merely declaratory of the old common law: (e) that part of it

only being new which makes the king's royal assent actually necessary to the

validity of every canon. The convocation, or ecclesiastical synod, in England,

differs considerably in its constitution from the synods of other Christian king-

doms: those consisting wholly of bishops; whereas with us the convocation is

the miniature of a parliament wherein the archbishop presides with regal state;

the upper house of bishops represents the house of lords; and the lower house,

composed of representatives of the several dioceses at large, and of each par-

ticular chapter therein, resembles the house of commons, with its knights of

the shire and burgesses. (/) (33) This constitution is said to be owing to the

policy of Edward I, who thereby, at one and the same time, let in the inferior

F *280 1 c^erSy to the privilege of forming *ecclesiastical canons (which before

' "' •" they had not,) and also introduced a method of taxing ecclesiastical

benefices, by consent of convocation. (g)

From this prerogative also, of being the head of the church, arises the king's

right of nomination to vacant bishoprics, and certain other ecclesastical prefer-

ments; which will more properly be considered when we come to treat of the

fbj Ibid, 197. (c) 1 Hal. P. C. 197. (d) 4 Inst. 322. 323. (e) 12 i!en. 72.

(f) In the diet of Sweden, where the ecclesiastics form one of the branches of the legislature, the chamber

of the elergy resembles the convocation of England. It is composed of the bishops und superintendents ; and

and make it current here, declaring at what value it shall be taken in payments. (b) But this, I apprehend, ought to be by comparison with the standard
of our own coin; otherwise the consent of parliament will be necessary.
'rhere is at present no such legitimated money; Portugal coin being only current by private consent, so that any one who pleases may refuse to take it in
payment. The king mn.y also at any time decry, or cry down, any coin of the
kinudom, and make it no longer current. (c)
Vi. The king is, lastly, considered by the laws of England as the head and
supreme governor of the national church.
•ro enter into the reasons upon which this prerogative is founded is matt.er
rather of divinity than of law. I shall therefore only observe tha.t, by st.atute
26 Hen. VIII, c. 1, (reciting that the king's majesty justly and rightfully is and
[ • 279 ] ought •to be the supreme head of the church of England; and so had
been recognized by the clergy of this kingdom in their c-0nvocution,) it
is enacted, that the king shall be reputed the only supreme head in earth of the
church of England, and shall have, annexed to the imperial crown of this
realm, as well the title and style thereof, as all jurisdictions, authorities and
commodities, to the said dignity of the supreme head of the church appertaining. And another statute to the same purport, was made, 1 Eliz. c. 1.
In virtue of this authority the king convenes. prorogues, restrains, regulates,
and dissolves t~ll ecclesiastical synods or convocations. 'rhis was an inherent
prerogative of the crown long before the time of Henry VIII, as appears by
the statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 1, and the many authors, both lawyers and historians,
vouched by Sir Edward Coke. (d) So that the statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19,
which restrains the convocation from making or putting in execution any
canons repugnant to the kin~s prerogative, or the laws, customs and statutes
of the realm, was merely declaratory of the old common law : ( e) that part of it
only being new which makes the king's royal assent actually necessary to the
validity of every canon. The convocation, or ecclesiastical synod, in England,
differs considerably in its constitution from the synods of other Christian kingdoms: those consisting wholly of bishops; whereas with us the convocation is
the miniature of a parliament wherein the archbishop presides with regal state;
the upper house of bishops represents the house of lords; and the lower house,
composed of representatives of the several dioceses at large, and of each p<trticnlar chapter therein, resembles the house of commons, with its knights of
the shire and burgesses.(/) (33) This constitution is said to be owing to the
policy of Edward I, who thereby, at one and the same time, let in the inferior
[ • 280 ] clergy to the privilege of forming *ecclesiastical canons (which befor~
they had not,) and also introduced a method of taxing ecclesmstical
benefices, by consent of convocation. (g)
From tlus prerogative also, of being the head of the church, arises the kin~~
right of nomination to vacant bishoprics, a.nd certain other ecclesastic.al preferments; which will more properly be considered when we come to treat of the

n\io of deputies, one of which is chosen by every ten parishes or rural deanery. Mod. Un. Hist, xxxili. IS.

fgj GUb. Hist, of Exch. c. 4.

had ordered it to pass current, and had cried down the former coin. The debtor on the appointed

day tendered 1001. in this base coin; and it was determined upon great consideration that it was

a legal tender, and that the lender was obliged to receive it. Natural equity would have given

(b) Ibid, 197.
(c) l Hal. P. C. 197.
(d) -l Inst. 3'22, 3'J3.
(e} li He)>· i2.
(f} In the diet of Sweden, where the ecclesiastics form one o!the branches of the legislature, the chamber
of tho elergy resembles the convocation uf England. It is composed of the bishops und snperlntendenta : and
nlao of rteputles, one or which ia chosen by e\"e1·y ien parishes or rural deanery, Mod. Un. ll18t. mill. ls.
(g) llilli. Hist. or Exch. c. 4.

a different decision. ]

(33) [And by stat. 8 Hen. VI, c. 1, the clergy in attendance upon the convocation are privi-

leged from arrest. If not at the period specified, as head of the church, (presuming the pope.

temp. Edw. I, to have arrogated that elevated dignity,) yet as king of England, we find a

remarkable exercise of power delegated by him to the bishops: " And the kyuge hath

grautyd to all bynshoppys that twyse in a yere they may curse all men doying against these

artycles." The grcte Abregement of the Statutys of England untyll the xxij ycre of Kyng Henry

the VIII, 257. This clause is in effect found in the statute, or rather charter, Stalutum de tai-

laijio non confiedendo. 34 Edw. I, c. 6.]
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clergv. I shall only here observe that this is now done in consequence of the

statute 35 Hen. VIII, c. 20.

As head of the church, the king is likewise the dernier resort in all ecclesias-

tical causes; an appeal lying ultimately to him in chancery from the sentence

of every ecclesiastical judge: which right was restored to the crown by statute

25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, as will be more fully shown hereafter. (34)

CHAPTEE VIII.

clergy. I shall onll here obserye that this is now done m consequence of the
statute 25 Hen. VI I, c. 20.
As head of the church, the king is likewise the dernier resort in all ecclesiastical causes; an appeal lying ultimately to him in chancery from the sentence
of every ecclesiastical judge: which right was restored to the crown by statute
25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, as will be more fully shown hereafter. (34)

OF THE KING'S REVENUE.

HAVING, in the preceding chapter, considered at large those branches of the

king's prerogative, which contribute to his royal dignity, and constitute the

executive power of the government, we proceed now to examine the king's fiscal

prerogatives, or such as regard his revenue ; which the British constitution hath

vested in the royal person, in order to support his dignity and maintain his

power: being a portion which each subject contributes of his property, in order

CHAPTER VIII.

to secure the remainder.

This revenue is either ordinary or extraordinary. The king's ordinary revenue

OF THE KING'S REVENUE.

is such as has either subsisted time out of mind in the crown; or else has been

granted by parliament by way of purchase or exchange for such of the king's

inherent hereditary revenues, as were found inconvenient to the subject.

When I say that it has subsisted time out of mind in the crown, I do not

mean that the king is at present in the actual possession of the whole of this

revenue. Much (nay, the greatest part) of it is at this day in the hands of sub-
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jects ; to whom it has been granted out from time to time by the kings of Eng-

land : which has rendered the crown in some measure dependent on the people

for its ordinary support and subsistence. So that I must be obliged to recount,

as part of the royal revenue, what lords of manors and other subjects *fre- r ^go -i

quently look upon to be their own absolute inherent rights; because *• J

they are and have been vested in them and their ancestors for ages, though in

reality originally derived from the grants of our ancient princes. .

I. The hrst of the king's ordinary revenues which I shall take notice of is of

an ecclesiastical kind; (as are also the three succeeding ones) viz.: the custody

of the temporaries of bishops: by which are meant all the lay revenues, lands

and tenements (in which is included his barony,) which belong to an archbish-

op's or bishop's see. And these, upon the vacancy of the bishopric, are immedi-

ately the right of the king, as a consequence of his prerogative in church matters;

whereby he is considered as the founder of all archbishoprics and bishoprics, to

whom during the vacancy they revert. And for the same reason, before the dis-

solution of abbeys, the king had the custody of the temporalties of all such

abbeys and priories as were of royal foundation (but not of those founded by

subjects) on the death of the abbot or prior, (a) Another reason may also be

given why the policy of the law hath vested this custody in the king; because,

as the successor is not known, the lands and possessions of the see would be

liable to spoil and devastation if no one had a property therein. Therefore, the

law has given the king, not the temporalties themselves, but the custody of the

temporalties, till such time as a successor is appointed; with power of taking

to himself all the intermediate profits, without any account of the successor;

and with right of presenting (which the crown very frequently exercises)

(a) 2 Inst. 15.

(34) Appeals are now taken in these cases to the judicial committee of the privy council.
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HAVING, in the preceding chapter, considered at large those branches of the
king's prerogative, which contribute to his royal dignity, and constitute the
executive power of the government, we proceed now to examine the king's.fiscal
prerogatives, or such as regard his revenue; which the British constitution hath
vested in the royal person, in order to support his dignity and maintain his
power: being a portion which each subject contributes of his property, in order
to secure the remainder.
This revenue is either ordinary or extraordinary. The king's ordinary revenue
is such as has either subsisted time out of mind in the crown; or else has been
~nted by parliament by way of purchase or exchange for such of the king's
mherent hereditary revenues, as were found inconvenient to the subject.
When I say that it has subsisted time out of mind in the crown, I do not
mean that the king is at present in the actual possession of the whole of this
revenue. Much (nay, the gmitest part) of it is at this day in the hands of subjects; to whom it has been granted out from time to time by the kings of England: which has rendered the crown in some measure dependent on the people
for its ordinary support and subsistence. So that I must be obliged to recount,
as part of the royal revenue, what lords of manors and other subjects *fre- [ • 282 ]
quently look upon to be their own absolute inherent rights; because
they are and have been vested in them and their ancestors for ages, though in
realitv ori~inally derived from the grants of our ancient princes. •
I. 1'he first of the king's ordinary reYenues which I shall take notice of is of
an ecclesiastical kind; (as are also the three succeeding ones) viz.: the custody
of the temporalties of bishops: by which are meant all the lay revenues, lands
and tenements (in which is included his barony,} which belong to an archbishop's or bishop's see. And these, upon the vacancy of the bishopric, are immediately the right of the king, as a consequence of his prerogative in church matters;
whereby he is considered as the founder of all archbishoprics and bishoprics, to
whom during the vacancy they revert. And for the same reason, before the dissolution of abbeys, the king had the custody of the temporalties of all such
abbevs and priories as were of royal foundation (but not of those founded by
subjects) on the death of the abbot or prior. (a) Another reason may also be
given why the policy of the law hath vested this custody in the king; because,
as the successor is not known, the lands and possessions of the see would be
liable to spoil and devastation if no one had a property therein. 'fherefore, the
law has given the king, not the temporalties themselves, but the custody of the
temporalties, till such time as a successor is appointed; with power of taking
to himself all the intermediate profits, without any account of the successor;
and with right of presenting (which the crown very frequently exercises)
(a)

2 Inst. 111.
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to such benefices and other preferments as fall within the time of vacation, (d)

This revenue is of so high a nature that it could not he granted out to a sub-

ject, before, or even after, it accrued: but now by the statute 15 Edw. Ill, st.

4, c. 4 and 5, the king may, after the vacancy, lease the temporalties to the

dean and chapter; saving to himself all advowsons, escheats, and the like. Our

ancient kings, and particularly William Rufus, were not only remarkable for

F *283 1 Beeping the bishoprics a long time *vacant, for the sake of enjoying

I -I the temporalties, but also committed horrible waste on the woods and

other parts of the estate; and to crown all, would never, when the see was

filled up, restore to the bishop his temporalties again, unless he purchased

them at an exorbitant price. To remedy which, King Henry the First (c)

granted a charter at the beginning of his reign, promising neither to sell, nor

let to farm, nor take any thing from the domains of the church, till the suc-

cessor was installed. (1) And it was made one of the articles of the great

charter, (d) that no waste should be committed in the temporalties of bishop-

rics, neither should the custody of them be sold. The same is ordained by the

statute of Westminster the first; (e) and the statute 14 Edw. Ill, st. 4, c. 4,

(which permits, as we have seen, a lease to the dean and chapter,) is still more

explicit in prohibiting the other exactions. It was also a frequent abuse that

the king would, for trifling, or no causes, seize the temporalties of bishops, even

during their lives, into his own hands: but this is guarded against by statute 1

Edw. Ill, st. 2, c. 2. -
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This revenue of the king, which was formerly very considerable, is now by a

customary indulgence almost reduced to nothing: for, at present, as soon as the

new bishop is consecrated and confirmed, he usually receives the restitution of

his temporalties quite entire, and untouched, from the king; and at the same

time does homage to his sovereign: and then, and not sooner, he has a fee sim-

ple in his bishopric, and may maintain an action for the profits. (/)

II. The king is entitled to a corody, as the law calls it, out of every bishopric,

that is, to send one of his chaplains to be maintained by the bishop,"or to have

a pension allowed him till the bishop promotes him to a benefice, (g) This is

also in the nature of an acknowledgment to the king, as founder of the see,

since he had formerly the same corody or pension from every abbey or priory

F*2841 °^ r°Ja^ foundation. (2) It is, I *apprehend, now fallen into total dis-

' " -I use; though Sir Matthew Hale says, (h) that it is due of common

right, and that no prescription will discharge it.

III. The king also, as was formerly observed, (i) is entitled to all the tithes

arising in extraparochial places: (k) though perhaps it may be doubted how far

this article, as well as the last, can be properly reckoned a part of the king's own

royal revenue; since a corody supports only his chaplains, and these extraparo •

chial tythes are held under an implied trust, that the king will distribute them

for the good of the clergy in general.

IV. The next branch consists in the first-fruits, and tenths, of all spiritual

preferments in the kingdom; both of which I shall consider together.

These were originally a part of the papal usurpations over the clergy of this

kingdom; first introduced by Pandulph, the pope s legate, during the reigns of

King John and Henry the Third, in the see of Norwich; and afterwards

attempted to be made universal by the popes Clement V and John XXII, about

the beginning of the fourteenth century. The first-fruits, primitce, or annates,

fb> Stat. 17 Edw. II. c. 14. F. N. B. 32. fej Matt. Paris.

(d) 9 Hen. III. c. 6. (e) 3 Edw. I. c. 21.

(f) Co. Litt. 67, 341. (g) V. N. B. 230. (h) Notes on F. N. B. above cited. (i) Page 111.

(S) 2 Inst. 647.

to such benefices and other preferments as fall within the time of vacation. (b)
This revenue is of so high a nature that it could not be granted C1ut to a aubject, before, or even after, it accrued: but now by the statute 15 :Edw. III, st.
4, c. 4 and 5, the kins- may, after the vacancy, lease the temporalties to the
dean and chapter; su.vmg to himself all advowsons, escheats, and the like. Our
ancient kings, and particularly William Rufus, were not only remarkable for
[ • 283 ] keeping the bishoprics a long time *vu.cant, for the sake of enjoying
the temporalties, but also commitW horrible waste on the woods and
other parts of the estate; and to crown all, would never, when the see was
filled up, restore to the bishop his temporalties again, unless he purchased
them at an exorbitant price. To remedy which, King Henry the .First (c)
granted a charter at the beginning of his reign, promismg neither to sell, nor
let to farm, nor t.ake any thing from the domains of the church, till the successor was installed. (1) And it was made one of the articles of the great
charter, (d) that no waste should be committed in the temporalties of bishoprics, neither should the custody of them be sold. The su.me is ordained by the
statute of Westminster the first; (e) and the statute 14 Edw. III, st. 4, c. 4,
(which permits, 118 we have seen, a lease to the dean and chapter,) is st.ill more
explicit in prohibiting the other exactions. It was also a frequent abuse that
the king would, for trifling, or no causes, seize the temporalties of bishops, even
during their lives, into his own hands: but this is guarded against by statute 1
Edw. III, st. 2, c. 2.
'fhis revenue of the king, which was formerly very considerable, is now by a.
customary indulgence almost reduced to nothing: for, at .Present, as soon as the
new bishop is consecrated and confirmed, he usually receIVes the restitution of
bis temporalties quite entire, and untouched, from the king; and at the same
time does homage to his sovereign: and then, and not sooner, he has a foe simple in his bishopric, and may maintain an action for the profits. (/)
II. The king is entitled to a corody, as the law calls it.~ out of every bishopric,
that is, to send one of his chaplains to be maintained by the bishop, or to ban•
a pension allowed him till the bishop promotes him to a benefice. (g) This is
also in the nature of an acknowledgment to the king, as founder of the R'('•
since he had formerly the same corody or pension from every abbey or priory
[ ,.. 284 ] of royal foundation. (2) It is, I *apprehend, now fallen into total disuse; though Sir Matthew Hale says, (h) that it is due of common
right, and that no prescription will discharge it.
III. The king also, as was formerly obsen-ed, (i) is entitled to all the tithes
arising in extraparochial places: (k) though perhaps it may be doubted how far
this article, as well as the last, can be properly reckoned a part of the king's own
royal revenue; since a corody supports only his chaplains, and these extrapa.rochial tythes are held under an implied trust, that the king will distribute them
for the good of the clergy in general.
IV. 'L'he next branch consists in the first-fmits, and tenths, of all spiritual
preferments in the kingdom; both of which I shall consider together.
These were originally a part of the papal usui:rations over the clergy of this
kingdom; first introduced by Pandulph, the popes legate, during the reigns of
King John and Henry the Third, in the see of Norwich; and afterwards
attempted to be made universal by the popes Clement V and John XXII, about
the beginning of the fourteenth century. The first-fruits, primit<8, or annates,

(1) [But Qneen Elizabeth kept the see of Ely vacant nineteen years, in order to retain the

revenue. Strype, vol. 4, 351.]

(2) [So where the foundation was not royal, it was usual for the founders to give their heirs a

corody, viz.: a charge upon the particular monastery or abbey sufficient to prevent them from

starving. And those persons, disinherited of the hinds by their relations, were there subsisted

during life.]
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(bJ Stat. 17 Edw. II. c. 1'. F. N. B. 32.
(c) Matt. Parla.
9 Hen. ill. c. 6.
(e) 3 Edw. I. c. 21.

(a)

(fJ Co. Litt. b7, 8'1.
(k) 2 Inst. 6'7.

(g)

F. N. B. 7.30.

(h) Not.ca on F. N. B. above cited.

{I) Pagem.

- --·- - -------------------------(1) [But Queen Elisabeth kept the soe of Ely vacant nineteen years, in order to retain the
rc-renue. Strype, -rol. 4, 351.]
(2) [So where the foundation was not royal, it was usual for the founders to give their heirs "
corody, viz. : a. charge upon the particular monastery or abbey sufficient to prevent them from
starving. And those persons, disinherited of the l,ands by their relp.tions, were there Sij.bsisf.ed
f}uring life.]

Original from

l80

b

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

Chap. 8.] REVENUE FROM BISHOPRICS, ETC. 284

Chap. 8.]

284

REVENUE FROM BISHOPRICS, ETC.

were the first year's whole profits of the spiritual preferment, according to a rate

or valor made under the direction of Pope Innocent IV, by Walter, bishop of

Norwich, in 38 Hen. Ill, and afterwards advanced in value by commission from

Pope Nicholas III, A. D. 1292, 20 Edw. I; (I) which valuation of Pope Nicholas

is still preserved in the exchequer, (m) (3) The tenths, or decimw, were the

tenth part of the annual profit of each living by the same valuation; which

was also claimed by the holy see, under no better pretence than a strange mis-

application of that precept of the Levitical law, which directs (n) that the

Levites "should offer the tenth part of their tithes as a heave-offering to the

Lord, and give it to Aaron the high priest." But *this claim of the pope r #nox n

met with a vigorous resistance from the English parliament; and a *- c>'

variety of acts were passed to prevent and restrain it, particularly the statute of

6 Hen. IV, c. 1, which calls it a horrible mischief and a damnable custom. But

the popish clergy, blindly devoted to the will of a foreign master, still kept it

on foot; sometimes more secretly, sometimes more openly and avowedly: so that

in the reign of Henry VIII it was computed, that in the compass of fifty years

800,000 ducats had been sent to Rome for first-fruits only. And, as the clergy

expressed this willingness to contribute so much of their income to the head of

the church, it was thought proper (when in the same reign the papal power was

abolished, and the king was declared the head of the church of England,) to

annex this revenue to the crown ; which was done by statute 26 Hen. VIII, c. 3,

(confirmed by statute 1 Eliz. c. 4,) and a new valor beneficiorum was then made,
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by which the clergy are at present rated.

By these last mentioned statutes all vicarages under ten pounds a year, and

all rectories under ten marks, are discharged from the payment of first-fruits;

and if, in such livings as continue chargeable with this pavment, the incumbent

lives but half a year, he shall pay only one-quarter of nis first-fruits; if but

one whole year, then half of them; if a year and a half, three-quarters; and if

two years, then the whole; and not otherwise. Likewise by the statute 27

Hen. VIII, c. 8, no tenths are to be paid for the first year, for then the first-

fruits are due: and by other statutes of Queen Anne, in the fifth and sixth years

of her reign, if a benefice be under fifty pounds per annum clear yearly value,

it shall be discharged of the payment of first-fruits and tenths. (4)

Thus the richer clergy, being, by the criminal bigotry of their popish prede-

cessors, subjected at first to a foreign exaction, were afterwards, when that yoke

was shaken off, liable to a like misapplication of their revenues, through the

rapacious disposition of the then reigning monarch: till at length the piety of

Queen Anne restored to the church what had been *thus indirectly taken r ^gc i

from it. This she did, not by remitting the tenths and first-fruits L

entirely; but, in a spirit of the truest equity, by applying these superfluities of

the larger benefices to make up the deficiencies of the smaller. And to this end

she granted her royal charter, which was confirmed by the statute 2 Ann. c.

(I) F. N. B. 176. (n) 3 IneU 1M. (n) N iimb. xviii. 26.

(3) [There are several errors in the text, which Mr. Justice Coleridge has pointed out. The

correct account is as follows: In 1253, Pope Innocent IT granted all the first fruits and

were the first year's whole profits of the spiritual preferment, arcording to a rate
or valor made under the direction of Pope Innocent IV, by Walter, bishop of
Norwich, in 38 Hen. III, and afterwards advanced in value by commission from
Pope Nicholas III, A. D. 1292, 20 Edw. I; (l) which valuation of Pope Nichola.s
is still preserved in the exchequer. (m) (3) The tenths, or decimQ}, were the
tenth part of the annual profit of each living by the same Yaluation; which
was also claimed by the holy see, under no better pretence than a strange misapplication of that precept of the Levitical law, which directs (n) that the
Levites "should offer the tenth part of their tithes as a heave-offering to the
Lord, and give it to Aaron the liigli priest." But *this claim of the pope [ • 28 -]
met with a vigorous resistance from the English parliament; and a
<J
variety of acts were passed to prevent and restrain it, particularly the statute of
6 Hen. IV, c. 1, which calls it a horrible mischief and a damnable custom. But
the popish clergy, blindly devoted to the will of a foreign master, still kept it
on foot; sometimes more secretly, sometimes more openly and avowedly: so that
in the reig11 of Henry VIII it was computed, that in the compass of fifty yea.rs
800,000 ducats had been sent to Rome for first-fruits only. And, as the clergy
expressed this willingness t.o contribute so much of their income to the head of
the church, it was thought proper (when in the same reign the papal power was
abolished. and the king was declared the head of the church of England,) to
annex this revenue to the crown; which was done by statute 26 Hen. VIII, c. 3,
(confirmed by statute 1 Eliz. c. 4,) and a new valor beneficiorum was then made,
by which the clergy are at present rated.
By these last mentioned statutes all vicarages under ten pounds a year, and
all rectories under ten marks, are discharged from the payment of first-fruits;
and if, in such livings as continue chargeable with this pavment, the incumbent
lives but half a year, he shall pay only one-quarter of his first-fruits; if but
one whole year, then half of them; if a year and a half, three-quarters; and if
two years, then the whole; and not otherwise. Likewise by the statute 27
Hen. VIII, c. 8, no tenths are to be paid for the first year, for then the firstfruits are due: and by other statutes of Queen Anne, in the fifth and sixth years
of her reign, if a benefice be under fifty pounds per annum clear yearly value,
it shall be discharged of the payment of first-fruits and tenths. ( 4)
'rhus the richer clergy, being, by the criminal bigotry of their popish predecessors, subjected at first to a forei~n exa-Otion, were afterwards, when that yoke
was shaken off, liable to a like misapplication of their revenues, throu~h the
rapacious disposition of the then reigning monarch: till at length the piety of
Queen Anne restored to the church what had been "'thus indirectly taken [ • 286 ]
from it. 'rhis she did, not by remitting the tenths and first-fruits
entirely; but, in a spirit of the truest equity, by applying these superfluities of
the larger benefices to make up the deficiencies of the smaller. And to this end
she granted her royal charter, which was confirmed by the statute 2 Ann. c.

tenths to Henry III for three years, which occasioned a taxation in the following year, some-

times called the Norwich taxation, and sometimes Innocent's valuation. In 1288, Innocent IV

(l) F. N. B. 176.

(•) 3 Inst. 1114.

(•) Numb. xviii. 96.

(not III as stated in the text,) granted the tenths to Edward I for six years; and a new valua-

tion was commenced in the same year by the king's precept, which valuation was, so far as it

extended over the province of Canterbury, finished in 1291, and as to York, also, in the following

year: the whole being under the direction of John, bishop of "Winton, and Oliver, bishop of Lin-

coln. In 1318 a third taxation, entitled nova taxatio was made, but this only extended over some

part of the province of York.]

(4) The commissioners for the administration of what is known as Queen Anne's bounty are

incorporated, and they are pursuing a scheme for the augmentation of small livings, by which

an annual net income as nearly as may be of 150J. will be secured to the incumbent of every

benefice or church with euro of souls, being either a parish, church or chapel, with a district

legally assigned thereto, and having a population of 2000, and not being in the patronage of lay

proprietors.
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(3) [There are several errors in the text, which Mr. Justice Coleridge has pointed out. The
correct account is a.s follows: In 1253, Pope Innocent IV granted all the first fruits e.nd
tenths to Henry III for three years, which occe..'lioned a taxation in the following yeo.r, Ronietimes called the Norwich taxation, and sometimes Innocent's valuation. In 1288, Innocent IV
(not III e.H stated in the text,) granted the hmth~ t-0 Edward I for six: years; and o. new valuation was commenced in the same year by the king'>i pwcept, which valuation wa.-., ~o far a:; it
el:teuded over the province of Canterbury, finished in i~l, and a.'I to York, also, in thu following
year: the whole being under the direction of John. bit;hop of Winton, and Oliwr, bishop of Lincoln. In 1:ns a third taxation, entitled n-OVa taxatio WO..'! made, but this only extended over some
part of the proYince of York.]
( 4) The commis!<iouers for the administration of what is known as Queen .Anne's bounty o.re
incorporated, ~nd they are pursuing e. scheme for t~e augmentation of sme.11 living:>, lly which
au annual net mcome as nearly as may be of 150l. will he secured to the incumbent of every
benefice or church with cum of i>ouls, being either a parish, church or chapel, with e. district
Iegall,r M~igned thereto, and having e. population of 2000, and not being in the po.trone.ge of lay
propnetora.
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11, whereby all the revenue of first-fruits and tenths is vested in trustees forever,

to form a perpetual fund for the augmentation of poor livings. This is usually

called Queen Anne's bounty; which has been still farther regulated by subse-

quent statutes, (o)

V. The next branch of the king's ordinary revenue (which, as well as the

subsequent branches, is of a lay or temporal nature,) consists in the rents and

profits of the demesne lands of the crown. These demesne lands, terra domini-

cales regis, being either the share reserved to the crown at the original distribu-

tion of landed property, or such as came to it afterwards by forfeitures or other

means, were anciently very large and extensive; comprising divers manors,

honors, and lordships; the tenants of which had very peculiar privileges, as will

be shewn in the second book of these commentaries, when we speak of the ten-

lire in ancient demesne. At present they are contracted within a very narrow

compass, having been almost entirely granted away to private subjects. This

has occasioned the parliament frequently to interpose; and particularly, after

King William III had greatly impoverished the crown, an act passed, (p)

whereby all future grants or leases from the crown for any longer term than

thirty-one years, or three lives, are declared to be void; except with regard to

houses which may be granted for fifty years. And no reversionary lease can be

made, so as to exceed, together with the estate in being, the same term of three

lives, or thirty-one years; that is, where there is a subsisting lease of which

there are twenty years still to come, the king cannot grant a future interest,
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to commence after the expiration of the former, for any longer term than eleven

years. The tenant must also be made liable to be punished for committing

r %2g.y ] waste; *and the usual rent must be reserved, or, where there has usually

L -I been no rent, one-third of the clear yearly value, (q) The misfortune is,

that this act was made too late, after almost every valuable possession of the

crown had been granted away forever, or else upon very long leases; but may be

of some benefit to posterity, when those leases come to expire.

VI. Hither might have been referred the advantages which used to arise to

the king from tlie profits of his military tenures, to which most lands in the

kingdom were subject, till the statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, which in great measure

abolished them all: the explication of the nature of which tenures must be

postponed to the second book of these commentaries. Hither also might have

been referred the profitable prerogative of purveyance and pre-emptionVwhich

was a right enjoyed by the crown of buying up provisions and other necessaries,

by the intervention of the king's purveyors, for the use of his royal household,

at an appraised valuation, in preference to all others, and even without consent

of the ownere and also of forcibly impressing the carriages and horses of the

subject, to do the king's business on the public roads, in the conveyance of tim-

ber, baggage, and the like, however inconvenient to the proprietor, upon pay-

ing him a settled price. (5) A prerogative, which prevailed pretty generally

throughout Europe, during the scarcity of gold and silver, and the high valua-

tion of money consequential thereupon. In those early times the king's house-

hold (as well as those of inferior lords) were supported by specific renders of

corn, and other victuals, from the tenants of the respective demesnes; and there

was also a continual market kept at the palace gate to furnish viands for the

royal use. (r) And this answered all purposes, in those ages of simplicity, so

long as the king's court continued in any certain place. But when it removed

from one part of the kingdom to another, as was formerly very frequently done,

(o) 5 Ann. c. 24. 6 Ann. c. 27. 1 Geo. 1. st. 2, c. 10. 3 Gco. I. c. 10. (p) 1 Ann. st 1, o. 7.

(q) In like manner by the civil law, the inheritance or/undi pntrimanalct of the imperial crown could not

be alienated, but only let to farm. Cod. I. 11, t. 61. (r) 4 Inst. 278.

(5) [Purveyance seems t<> have been little less than a royal right of spoil, and was a very

11, whereby all the revenue of first-fruits and tenths is vested in trustees forever,
to form a perpetual fund for the augmenmtion of poor livings. This is usually
called Queen .Anne's bounty; which has been still farther regulated by subsequent statutes. (o)
V. The next branch of the king's ordinary revenue (which, as well as the
subsequent branches, is of a lay or temporal nature,) consists in the rents and
profits of the demesne lands of the crown. 'l'hese demesne lands, ternJJ dominicales regis, being either the share reserved to the crown at the ori~nal distribution of landed property, or such as came to it afterwards by forfeitures or other
means, were anciently very large and extensive ; comprising divers manors,
honors, and lordships; the tenants of which had very peculiar privileges, as will
be shewn in the second book of these commentaries, when we speak of the tenure in ancient demesne. At present they are contracted within a very narrow
compass, having been almost entirely granted a.way to private subjects. Thie
has occasioned the parliament frequently to interpose; and particularly, after
King William III had greatly impoverished the crown, an act passed, (p)
whereby all future grants or leases from t.he crown for any longer term than
thirty-one years, or three lives, are declared to be void; except with regard to
houses which may be granted for fifty years. And no reversionary lease can be
made, so as to exceed, together with the estate in being, the same term of three
lives, or thirty-one years ; that is, where there is a subsisting lease of which
there are twenty yeurs still to come, the king cannot grant a future interest,
to commence after the expiration of the former, for any longer term than eleven
years. The tenant must also be made liable to be punished for committing
*
waste; *and the usual rent must be reserved, or, where there has usuallv
[ 287 ] been no rent, one-third of the clear yearly value. (q) The misfortune is,
that this act wa.s made too late, after almost every valuable poBBession of the
crown had been granted away forever, or else upon very long leases; but may be
of some benefit to posterity, when those leases come to expire.
VI. Hither might have been refen·ed the advantages which used to arise to
the king from the profits of his military tenures, to which most lands in the
kingdom were subject, till the statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, which in great measura
abolished them all: the explication of the nature of which tenures must be
postponed to the second book of these commentaries. Hither also might have
1 been referred the profitable prerogative of purveyance an'1 pre-emption~which
was a right enjoyed by the crown of buying up provisions and other necessarie~.
by the mtervention of the king's purveyors, for the use of his royal household,
at an apprai~ valuo.tion) in preference to all others, and even without consent
of the owne , and also of forcibly impressing the carriages and horses of the
subject, to do he king's business on the public roads, in the conveyance of timber, baggage, and the like, however inconvenient to the proprietor, upon paying him a settled price. (5) A prerogative, which prevailed pretty generally
throughout Europe, during the scarcity of gold and silver, and the high valuation of money consequential thereupon. In those early times the king's household (as well as those of inferior lords) were supported by specific renders of
corn, and other victuals, from the ten an ts of the respective demesnes ; and there
was also a continual market kept at the palace gate to furnish viands for the
royal use. (r) And this answered all purposes, in those ages of simplicity, so
long as the king's court continued in any certain place. But when it removed
from one part of the kingdom to another, as was formerly very frequently done,

ancient topic of remonstrance from the house of commons. Not less than thirty-six statutes hail

been directed against it before the reign of James I. Hallain, Const. Hist, i, 414; see also Tattel's

Lav of Nations, 115, 116.]
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(o) 5 Ann . c. :U. 6 Ann. c. 27. 1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 10. 3 Geo. I. c. JO.
(pl I Ann. el I, c. 7.
(q) In like manner by the civil law, the Inheritance or ftmdi patnlflQtlalu of the Imperial crown could n°'
be alienated, but only let to farm. Cod. l. 11, t. 61.
(r) •Inst. 278.

(5) [Purn~yance 11ecm;i to have been little leRR than a royal right of sp?il, a~d was a very
11nC"ient t.1pic of remnnstrmwe from tho house of eommous. Not Je11.~ than thirt.y-SJx Rt.atuk'.!1 had
been direeted against it before the reign of J a.mes I. Ballam, Const. Hist. i, 414; see also V attel'li
LaV' of Nations, 115, 116.J
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it was found necessary to send *purveyors beforehand to get together a r „„„„ -,

sufficient quantity of provisions and other necessaries for the household: <- *

and, lest the unusual demand should raise them to an exorbitant price, the

powers before mentioned were vested in these purveyors: who in process of

time very greatly abused their authority, and became a great oppression to the

subject, though of little advantage to the crown; ready money in open market

(when the royal residence was more permanent, and specie began to be plenty)

being found upon experience to be the best proveditor of any. Wherefore

by degrees the powers of purveyance have declined, in foreign countries as well

as our own: and particularly were abolished in Sweden by Gustavus Adolphus,

towards the beginning of the last century, (s) And, with us in England, hav-

ing fallen into disuse during the suspension of monarchy, King Charles at his

restoration consented, by the same statute, to resign entirely these branches of

his revenue and power: and the parliament, in part of recompense, settled on

him, his heirs and successors, forever, the hereditary excise of fifteen pence

per barrel on all beer and ale sold in the kingdom, and a proportionable sum

for certain other liquors. So that this hereditary excise, the nature of which

shall be farther explained in the subsequent part of this chapter, now forms the

sixth branch of his majesty's ordinary revenue.

VII. A seventh branch might also be computed to have arisen from wine

licenses: or the rents payable to the crown by such persons as are licensed to

sell wine by retail throughout England, except in a few privileged places. These
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were first settled on the crown by the statute 12 Car. II, c. 25; and, together

with the hereditary excise, made up the equivalent in value for the loss sus-

tained by the prerogative in the abolition of the military tenures, and the right

of pre-emption and purveyance: but this revenue was abolished by the statute

30 Geo. II, c. 19, and an annual sum of upwards of 7,0001. per annum, issuing

out of the new stamp duties imposed on wine licenses, was settled on the crown

instead.

*VIII. An eighth branch of the king's ordinary revenue is usually r ^go i

reckoned to consist in the profits arising from his forests. Forests <- "' " '

are waste grounds belonging to the king, replenished with all manner of beasts

of chase or venary: which are under the king's protection, for the sake of his

royal recreation and delight; and, to that end, and for preservation of the

king's game, there are particular laws, privileges, courts and offices belonging to

the king's forests; all which will be, in their turns, explained in the subsequent

books of these commentaries. What we are now to consider are only the profits

arising to the king from hence, which consist principally in amercements or

fines levied for offences against the forest-laws. But as few, if any, courts of

this kind for levying amercements (t) have been held since 1632, 8 Car. I, and

as, from the accounts given of the proceedings in that court by our histories

and law books, («) nobody would now wish to see them again revived, it is need-

less, at least in this place, to pursue this inquiry any farther.

IX. The profits arising from the king's ordinary courts of justice make a

ninth branch of his revenue. And these consist not only in fines imposed upon

offenders, forfeitures of recognizances, and amercements levied upon defaulters;

but also in certain fees due to the crown in a variety of legal matters, as, for

setting the great seal to charters, original writs, and other forensic -proceedings,

and for permitting fines to be levied of lands in order to bar entails or other-

wise to insure their title. As none of these can be done without the immediate

intervention of the king, by himself or his officers, the law allows him certain

perquisites and profits, as a recompence for the trouble he undertakes for the public.

These, in process of time, have been almost all granted out to private persons,

or else appropriated to certain particular uses: so that, though our law proceed-

ings are stifl loaded with their payment, very little of them is now returned

(») Mod. Un. Hist, xxxiii, 220.

it) Roger North, In liis life of Lord Keeper North (43, 44) mentions an eyre, or iter, to have been held

south of Trent soon after the restoration: out I have met with no report of its proceedings.

(u) 1 Jones, 267, 2t>8.
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it was found necessary to send *purveyors beforehand to get together a *
sufficient quantity of provisions and other necessaries for the household: [ 288 ]
and, lest the unusual demand should raise them to an exorbitant price, the
powers before mentioned were vested in these purveyors: who in process of
time Very greatly abused their authority, and became a great Op{>ression to the
subject, though of little advantage to the crown; ready money m open market
(when the royal residence was more permanent, and specie began to be plenty)
being found upon experience to be the best proveditor of any. Wherefore
by degrees the powers of purveyance have declined, in foreign countries as well
as our own: and particularly were abolished in Sweden by Gustavus Adolphus,
towards the beginning of the last century. (s) And, with us in England, having fallen into disuse during the suspension of monarchy, King Charles at his
restoration consented, by the same statute, to resign entirely these branches of
his revenue and power: and the parliament, in part of recompense, settled on
him, his heirs and successors, forever, the hereditary excise of fifteen pence
per barrel on all beer and ale sold in the kingdom, and a proportionable sum
for certain other liquors. So that this hereditary excise, the nature of which
shall be farther explained in the subsequent part of this chapter, now forms the
sixth branch of his majesty's ordinary revenue.
VII. A seventh branch might also he computed to have arisen from wine
licenses: or the rents payable to the crown by such persons as are licensed to
sell wine by retail throughout England, except in a few privileged pla-0es. These
were first settled on the crown by the statute 12 Car. II, c. 25; and, together
with the hereditary excise, made up the equivalent in value for the loss sustained by the prerogative in the abolition of the military tenures, and the right
of pre-emption and purveyance: but this revenue was abolisheg by the statute
30 Geo. II, c. 19, and an annual sum of upwards of 1,000l. per annum, issuing
out of the new stamp duties imposed on wine licenses, was settled on the crown
instead.
*VIII. An eighth branch of the king's ordinary revenue is usually [ • 289 ]
reckoned to consist in the profits arising from his forests. Forests
are waste grounds belonging to the king, replenished with all manner of beasts
of chase or venary: which are under the king's protection, for the sake of his
royal recreation and delight; and, to that end, and for preservation of the
king's game, there are particular laws, privileges, courts and offices belonging to
the king's forests; all which will be, in their turns, explained in the subsequent
books of these commentaries. What we are now to consider are only the profits
arising to the king from hence, which consist principally in amercements or
fines levied for offences against the forest-laws. But as few, if any, courts of
this kind for levying amercements (t) have been held since 1632, 8 Car. I, and
as, from the accounts given of the proceedings in that court by our histories
and law books, (u) nobody would now wish to see them again revived, it is needless, at least in this place, to pursue this inquiry any farther.
IX. The profits arising from the king's ordinary courts of justice make a
ninth branch of his revenue. And these consist not only in fines imposed upon
offenders, forfeitures of recognizances, and amercements levied upon defaulters;
but also in certain fees due to the crown in a variety of legal matters, as, for
setting the great seal to charters, original writs, and other forensic ·proceedings,
and for permittin~ fines to be levied of lands in order to bar entails or otherwise to insure their title. As none of these can be done without the immediate
intervention of the king, by himself or his officers, the law allows him certain
perquisites and profits, as a recompence for the tronble he undertakes for the public.
'fhese, in process of time, have been almost all granted out to private persons.
or else appropriated to certain particular uses: so that, though our law proceedings are still loaded with their payment, very little of them is now returned
!•) lllod. Un. Hist. :cxxili. 220.
Ct) Ro.icer North, in his lite or Lord Keeper North (43, 44.J mentions an eyre, or tier, to have been held

south of Trent soon after the restomtton ; bnt I have met with no report or its proceedings.
(u) 1 Jones, 267, ~18.
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r *o9Q -i into the king's *exchequer; for a part of whose royal maintenance they

*• " •" were originally intended. All future grants of them, however, by the

statute 1 Ann. St. 2, c. 7, are to endure for no longer time than the prince B life

who grants them.

X. A tenth branch of the king's ordinary revenue, said to be grounded on the

consideration of his guarding and protecting the seas from pirates and robbers.

is the right to royal fish, which are whale and sturgeon: and these, when either

thrown ashore, or caught near the coast, are the property of the king, on account

(v) of their superior excellence. Indeed our ancestors seem to have entertained

a very high notion of the importance of this right; it being the prerogative of

the kings of Denmark and the dukes of Normandy; (w) and from one of these

it was probably derived to our princes. It is expressly claimed and allowed in

the statute de prarogativa reais: (w) and the most ancient treatises of law

now extant make mention of it, (a;) though they seem to have made a dis-

tinction between whale and sturgeon, as was incidentally observed in a former

chapter, (y)

XI. Another maritime revenue, and founded partly upon the same reason, is

that of shipwrecks; which are also declared to be the king's property by the

same prerogative, statute 17 Edw. II, c. 11, and were so, long before, at the com-

mon law. It is worthy observation, how greatly the law of wrecks has been

altered, and the rigour of it gradually softened in favor of the distressed proprie-

tors. Wreck, by the ancient common law, was where any ship was lost at sea,
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and the goods or cargo were thrown upon the land; in which case these goods

so wrecked were adjudged to belong to the king; for it was held that by the

loss of the ship all property was gone out of the original owner, (z) But this

was undoubtedly adding sorrow to sorrow, and was consonant neither to reason

r tog, -i nor humanity. Wherefore it was first *ordained by King Henry I, that

•• J if any person escaped alive out of the ship, it should be no wreck; (a)

and afterwards King Henry II, by his charter (J) declared, that if on the coasts

of either England, Poictou, Oleron, or Gascony, any ship should be distressed,

and either man or beast should escape or be found therein alive, the goods should

remain to the owners, if they claimed them within three months; but other-

wise should be esteemed a wreck, and should belong to the king, or other lord

of the franchise. This was again confirmed with improvements oy King Rich-

ard the First; who, in the second year of his reign, (c) not only established these

concessions, by ordaining that the owner, if he was shipwrecked and escaped,

" omnes res suas liberas et quietas haberet," but also that, if he perished, his

children, or, in default of them, his brethren and sisters, should retain the prop-

erty ; and, in default of brother or sister, then the goods should remain to the

king, (d) And the law, as laid down by Bracton m the reign of Henry ID,

seems still to have improved in its equity. For then,, if not only a dog, for

instance, escaped, by which the owner might be discovered, but if any certain

mark were set on the goods, by which they might be known again, it was held

to be no wreck, (e) And this is certainly most agreeable to reason; the rational

claim of the king being only founded upon this, that the true owner cannot be

ascertained. Afterwards, in the statute of Westminster, the first, (/) the time

of limitation of claims, given by the charter of Henry II, is extended to a year

and a day, according to the usage of Normandy; (g) and it enacts, that if a man,

a dog, or a cat escape alive, the vessel shall not be adjudged a wreck. These

animals, as in Bracton, are only put for examples; (h) for it is now held, (i)

(v) Plowd. 315. (w) Stiernh. dejnre Sueonum. 1. 2. c. 8. Or. Couftum cap. 17. (w) 17 Edw. n. c. 11.

(x) Bracton, 1. 3, c. 3. Britton, c. 17. Fleta, 1. 1, c. 4ft and 48. Memorand. Scotch. H. 24 t'.ilv: I. 37, pre-

fixed to Maynard's Tear Book of Edward II.

(y) Ch. 4, page 223. (z) Dr. and St. d. 2. c. SI. (a) Spelm. Cod. apud. Wilkins, 305.

[ ,.. 290 ] into the king's *exchequer; for a part of whose royal maintenance they
were originally intended. All future grants of them, however, by the
statute 1 Ann. St. 2, c. 7, are to endure for no longer time than the prince's life
who grants them.
X. A tenth branch of the king's ordinary revenue, said to be grounded on the
consideration of his guarding and protecting the seas from pirates and robbers.
is the right to royal fish, which are whale and sturgeon : and these, when either
thrown ashore, or caught near the coast, are the property of the king, on account
(v) of their superior excellence. Indeed our ancestors seem to have entertained
u very high notion of the importance of this right; it being the prerogative of
the kings of Denmark and the dukes of Normandy; (w) and from one of these
it was probably derived to our princes. It is expressly claimed and allowed in
the statute de prmrogafiva regis: (w) and the most ancient treatises of law
now extant make mention of it, (x) though they seem to have made a distinction between whale and sturgeon, as was incidentally observed in a former
chaP.rer. (y)
XI. Another maritime revenue, and founded partly upon the same reason, is
that of shipwrecks; which are also declared to be the king's property by the
same Jlrerogative, statute 17 Edw. II, c. 11, and were so, long before, at the common aw. It is worthy observation, how greatly the law of wrecks has been
altered. and the rigour of it gradually softened in favor of the distressed proprietors. Wreck, by the ancient common law, was where any ship was lost at sea,
and the goods or cargo were thrown upon the land; in which case these goods
so wrecked were adjudged to belong to the king; for it was held that by the
loss of the ship all property was gone out of the original owner. (z) But this
was undoubtedly adding sorrow to sorrow, and was consonant neither to reason
[ • 291 ] nor humanity. Wherefore it was first *ordained by King Henry I, that
if any person escaped alive out of the ship, it should be no wreck; (a)
and afrerwards King Henry II, by bis charter (b) declared, that if on the coasts
of either Englund, Poictou, Oleron, or Gascony, any ship should be distressed,
and either man or beast should escape or be found therein alive, the goods should
remain to the owners, if they claimed them within three months; but otherwise should be esteemed a wreck, and should belong t-0 the king, or other lord
of the franchise. This was again confirmed with improvement.s by King Richard the First; who, in the second year of his reign, (c) not only established these
concessions, by ordaining that the owner, if be was shipwrecked and escaped,
" omnes res suas libera.ir et qui'.etas haberet," but also that, if be perished, his
children, or, in default of them, his brethren and sisters, should retain the property ; and, in default of brother or sister, then the goods should remain to the
king. (d) And the law, as laid down by Bracton m the reign of Henry III,
seems still to have improved in its equity. For then,. if not only a dog, for
instance, escaped, by which the owner might be discovered, but if any certain
mark were set on the goods, by which they might be known again, it was held
to be no wreck. (e) And this is certainly most agreeable to reason; the rational
claim of the king being only founded upon this, that the true owner cannot be
ascertained. Afterwards, in the statute of Westminster, the first, (/) the time
of limitation of claims, given by the charrer of Henry II, is extended to a year
and a day, according to the usage of Normandy; (g) and it enacts, that if a man,
a dog, or a cat escape alive, the vessel shall not be adjudged a wreck. These
animals, as in Brncton, are only put for examples; (h) for it is now held, (i)

(6) 26 May. A. D. 1174. 1 Rvm. Foed 26. (c) Hog. Hoved. in Ric. I.

d'l In like manner Constantino the great, finding that by the Imperial law the revenue of wrecks was given

to the prince's treasury orflscits. restrained it by an edict (Corf. 11, 5. 1), and ordered them to remain to

the owners, ailding this humane expostulation, •• Quod enim jut luibeljftcut in aMena calamitate, ut de re

tarn ItirtiKiHii compenrlum sectetur T'

(el Bmct. 1. 3, c. 3. (/) 3 Edw. I. c. 4. (a) Or. Constant, c. 17.

(ft) Flet. 1. 1, c. 44. 2 lust. 167. 5 Rep. 107. {{} Hamilton v. Dnvies. Trin. 11 Ceo. III. B. R.
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(11) Plowd. 3111.
(tD) Stlernh. dejttre Sruonum. l. 2. c. 8. Gr. Coust"m cap. 17.
(tDl 17 Edw. IT. c. 11.
(.r) Bracton. I. 3, e. 3. Britton, 11. 17. Fleta, I. 1, c . ~and 46.
Mmwrand. Scacch. H. 2' Edw!. I. 37, pre4xed to Maynard'11 Year Book of J<:dwar<l 11.
(y) Ch. 4, page 223.
(Z) Dr; an1I St. d . 2. c. 51.
(a) StJelm; Cod. apttd. Willtins, 305.
(b) 26 May. A. D. llU. l R,·m. Jioed 26.
(Cl Rog. Roved. ut Ru:. I.
(d) In like manner Conetantlne the great, ftn<llng that tiy the lmper!nl la\\· the re1·enne of wrecks waii given
to the prince's trea.'<ury or /fsr.tts. restrained it by an edict (Cod. ll, II. 11,o and or<lered them to J"l'lll&in &o
the ownm·s. adclin.ir this tmmanc expostulation, " Qu<>d enim jm ll<t.bet flllC1'8 in au-. calamitate, vi ck n:

tam luctuoaa com~11dum aecteJ11r 1''
(el Bract: I. 3, e. 3.

(la) Flet. I. 1, c.

~.

(f) 3 E<lw. J. c. 4.
lg) Gr. Coustum, c. 17.
2 Inst. Ul7. :>Rep. 107. \l) Hamilton 1·. navies. Trin. 11 Geo. Ill. B . R.
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that not only if any live thing escape, but if proof can be made of tho

*property of any of the goods or lading which come to shore, they shall r ^-.QV i

not be forfeited as wreck. The statute further ordains, that the sheriff •• '"" " '

of the county shall be bound to keep the goods a year and a day, (as in France

for one year, agreeably to the maritime laws of Oleron, (/) and in Holland for a

year and a half,) that if any man can prove a property in them, either in hia

own right or by right of representation, (k) they shall be restored to him without

delay; but, if no such property be proved within that time, they then shall be

the king's. If the goods are of a perishable nature, the sheriff may sell them,

and the money shall be liable in their stead. (I) This revenue of wrecks is fre-

quently granted out to lords of manors as a royal franchise; and if any one be

thus entitled to wrecks in his own land, and the king's goods are wrecked thereon,

the king may claim them at any time, even after the year and day. (m)

It is to be observed, that in order to constitute a legal wreck the goods must

come to land. If they continue at sea, the law distinguishes them by the bar-

barous and uncouth appellations of jetsam, flotsam, and ligan. Jetsam is where

goods are cast into the sea, and there sink and remain under water: flotsam is

where they continue swimming on the surface of the waves; ligan is where

they are sunk in the sea, but tied to a cork or buoy, in order to be found again.

(») These are also the king's, if no owner appears to claim them; but if

any owner appears, he is entitled to recover the possession. For, even if they

be cast overboard without any mark or buoy, in order to lighten the ship, the
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owner is not by this act of necessity construed to have renounced his prop-

erty ; (o) much less can things ligan be supposed to be abandoned, since the

owner has done all in his power to assert and retain his property. These three

are therefore accounted so far a distinct thing from the former, that by the

'king's grant to a man of wrecks, things jetsam, flotsam, and ligan will r #OQQ i

not pass, (p) L • • I

Wrecks, in their legal acceptation, are at present not very frequent; for, if

any goods come to land, it rarely happens, since the improvement of commerce,

navigation, and correspondence, that the owner is not able to assert his property

within the year and day limited by law. And in order to preserve this property

entire for him, and if possible to prevent wrecks at all, our laws have made

many very humane regulations; in a spirit quite opposite to those savage laws

which formerly prevailed in all the northern regions of Europe, and a few years

ago were still said to subsist on the coasts of the Baltic sea, permitting the

inhabitants to seize on whatever they could get as lawful prize; or, as an author

of their own expresses it, " in naufragorum miseria et calamitate tancfuam vul-

tures adprcBdam currere." (q) For, by the statute 27 Edw. Ill, c. 13, if any ship

be lost on the shore, and the goods come to land, (which cannot, says the statute,

be called wreck,) they shall be presently delivered to the merchants, paying only

a reasonable reward to those that saved and preserved them, which is entitled

salvage. Also by the common law, if any persons (other than the sheriff) take

any goods so cast on shore, which are not legal wreck, the owners might have

a commission to inquire and find them out, and compel them to make restitu-

tion, (r) And by statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 18, confirmed by 4 George I, c. 12,

in order to assist the distressed and prevent the scandalous illegal practices on

some of our seacoasts, (too similar to those on the Baltic,) it is enacted, that all J

head officers and others of towns near the sea, shall, upon application made to "

them, summon as many hands as are necessary, and send them to the relief of

any ship in distress, on forfeiture of 100?., and, in case of assistance given, sal-

vage shall be paid by the owners, to be assessed by three neighbouring justices.

A.11 persons that secrete any goods shall forfeit their treble value; and if they

wilfully do any act whereby the ship is lost or destroyed, *by making ,- $0941

holes in her, stealing her pumps, or otherwise, they are guilty of felony, I -"

(}) 5 28. (k) 2 Inat. 168. (I) Plowd. 108. (m) 2 Inst. 188. Bro. Abr. W. Wreck. (n) 5 Rop. 106.

(o) Quee t nun res in tempestate* lenantlte navis causa etficiuntur. hee dominorum permanent. Qufa polam

eit, ea» nan eo animo ejici, good yuls haberc notit. Inst. 2, 1, } 48!

(P)5 Hep. 108. (q) Stfcrnh. de jure Sueon. 1, 3, c. 5. (r) F. N. B. 112.
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that not only if any live thing escape, but if proof can be made of the
*property of any of the goods or lading which come to shore, they sha.11 [ • 292 ]
not be forfeited as wreck. 'fhe statute further ordains, that the sheriff
of the county shall be bound to keep the goods a year and a. day, (as in France
for onelear, agreeably to the maritime laws of Oleron, ( .f) and m Holland for a
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own right or by right of representation, (k) they shall be restored to him without
delay; but, if no such property be proved within that time, they then shall be
the king's. If the foods are of a perishable nature, the sheriff may sell them,
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thus entitled to wrecks in his own land, and thekin~s goods are wrecked thereon,
the king may claim them at any time, even after tlie year and day. (m)
It is to be observed, that in order to constitute a legal wreck the goods must
come to land. If they continue at sea, the law distinguishes them by the barbarous and uncouth appellations of jetsam, flotsam, and ligan. Jetsam is where
goods a.re cast into the sea, aml. there sink and remain under water: flotsam is
where they continue swimming on the surfa.ce of the waves; ligan is where
they are sunk in the sea, but tied to a cork or buoy, in order to be found again.
(n) These are also the king's, if no owner appears to claim them; but if
any owner appears, he is entitled to recover the possession. For, even if they
be cast overboard without any mark or buoy, in order to lighten the ship, the
owner is not by this act of necessity construed to have renounced his property; (o) much less can things ligan be supposed to be abandoned, since the
owner has done all in his power to assert and retain his property. These three
are therefore accounted so far a distinct thing from the former, that by the
*king's grant to a man of wrecks, things jetsam, flotsam, and liga.n will [ ,..293 ]
not pass. (p}
Wreeks, in their legal acceptation, are at present not very frequent; for, if
any goods come to land, it rarely happens, since the improvement of commerce,
navi~ation, and correspondence, that the owner is not able to assert his property
withm the year and day limited by law. And in order to preserve this property
entire for him, and if possible to prevent wrecks at all, our laws have made
many very humane regulations; in a spirit quite opposite to those savage laws
which formerly prevailed in all the northern regions of Europe, and a few years
ago were still said to subsist on the coasts of the Baltic sea, permitting the
inhabit.ants to seize on whatever they could get as lawful prize; or, as an author
of their own expresses it, "in naufragorum miseria et calamitate tan'l.uam vultures ad prwdam currere." (q) For, by the statute 27 Edw. III, c. 13, if any shi1>
be lost on the shore, and the goods come to land, (which cannot, says the statute,
be called wreck,) they shall be presently delivered to the merchants, paying only
a reasonable reward to those that saved and prei;ierved them, which is entitled
salvage. A.lso by the common law, if any persons (other than the sheriff} take
any goods so ca.st on shore, which are not legal wreck, the owners might have
a commission to inquire and find them out, and compel them to make restitution. (r} And by statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 18, confirmed by 4 George I, c. 12,
in order to assist the distressed and prevent the scandalous illegal practices on
some of our seacoasts, (too similar t.o those on the Baltic,) it is enacted, that an;
head officers and others of towns near the sea, shall, upon application made to them, summon as many hands as are necessary, and send them to the relief of
•ny ship in distress, on forfeiture of 100l., and, in case of assistance given, salvage shall be paid by the owners, to be assessed by three neighbouring justices.
A.11 persons that secrete any goods shall forfeit their treble value; and if they
wilfully do any act whereby the ship is lost or destroyed, *by making • 294 ]
holes in her, stealing her pumps, or otherwise, they are guilty of felony, [
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(le) 2 Inst. 168.
(l) Plowd. 166.
(m) 2 Inst. UIS. Bro. Abr. Ht. Wreck.
(n) i'i Rop. 106.
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(p)5He!J . l08.
(q) Stfernh. dejurc S"w11. i, a, o. 5.
(r) F. N. D.112.
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without benefit or clergy. Lastly, by the statute 26 George II, c. 19, plunder-

ing any vessel either in distress, or wrecked, and whether any living creature be

on board, or not, (for, whether wreck or otherwise, it is clearly not the property

of the populace,) such plundering, I say, or preventing the escape of any person

that endeavours to save his life, or wounding him with intent to destroy him, or

putting out false lights in order to bring any vessel into danger, are all declared

to be capital felonies ; in like manner as the destroying of trees, steeples, or

other stated seamarks, is punished by the statute 8 Eliz. c. 13, with a forfeiture

of 1001 or outlawry. Moreover, by the statute of George II, pilfering any goods

cast ashore is declared to be petit larceny ; and many other salutary regulations

are made, for the more effectually preserving ships of any nation in distress.

XII. A twelfth branch of the royal revenue, the right to mines, has its original

from the king's prerogative of coinage, in order to supply him with materials ;

and therefore those mines which are properly royal, and to which the king is

entitled when found, are only those of silver and gold, (t) By the old common

law, if gold or silver be found in mines of base metal, according to the opinion

of some, the whole was a royal mine, and belonged to the king ; though others

held that it only did so, if the quantity of gold or silver was of greater value

than the quantity of base metal, (u) (7) But now by the statutes 1 W. and M.

st. 1, c. 30, and 5 W. and M., c. 6, this difference is made immaterial ; it being

enacted, that no mines of copper, tin, iron, or lead, shall be looked upon as

royal mines, notwithstanding gold or silver may be extracted from them in any
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F *29" 1 <luantitie8 j but that the king,)or *persous claiming royal mines under

' -" his authority, may have the ore, (other than tin-ore in the counties of

Devon and Cornwall, paying for the same a price stated in the act. This was

an extremely reasonable law ; for now private owners are not discouraged from

working mines, through a fear that they may be claimed as royal ones ; neither

does the king depart from the just rights of his revenue, since he may have all

the precious metal contained in the ore, paying no more for it than the value

of the base metal which it is supposed to be ; to which base metal the land-owner

is by reason and law entitled.

XIII. To the same original may in part be referred the revenue of treasure-

trove (derived from the French word trover, to find,) called in Latin thesaurus

inventus, which is where any money or coin, gold, silver, plate, or bullion, is

found hidden in the earth, (8) or other private place, the owner thereof being

unknown ; in which case the treasure belongs to the king ; but if he that hid it

be known, or afterwards found out, the owner, and not the king, is entitled to

it. (v) Also if it be found in the sea, or upon the earth, it doth not belong to

the king, but the finder, if no owner appears, (w) So that it seems it is the

hiding, and not the abandoning of it, that gives the king a property : Bracton

(x) defining it, in the words of the civilians, to be " vetus depositio pecunite."

This difference clearly arises from the different intentions, which the law implies

(B) By the civil law, to destroy persons ship-wrecked, or prevent their saving the ship, is capital. And jo

1-1 IM I even a plank from a vessel in distress or wrecked, makes the party Fiable to answer for the whole ship

nnil cargo. (Ff. 47, 9, 3.) The laws also of the WisiROths. and the most early Neapolitan constitutions,

punished with the utmost severity all those who neglected to assist any ship in distress, or plundered any

goods cnst on shore. (Lindenbrog. Cod, LL. an. tiq. 148, 716.)

(t) 2 Inst. 577. (u) Plowd. 338. (v) 3 Inst. 132. Dalt. of Sheriffs, c. 10.

(w) Britt. c. 17. Finch, L. 177. (x) L. 3, c. 3, « 4.

(6) For the statute of the United States, punishing similar oflenaes, see 4 Statutes at Lar^e, 115.

(7) And it is said, that though the king grants lands in which mines are, and all mines in

them, yet royal mines do not pass. Plowd. 336.

In California it was held, that on the organization of the state government, the right to the

precious metals in the soil of the public lands passed to the state ; Stokes v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 36 ;

and still later it was decided that when the government granted the title in fee simple to indi-

viduals, the right to the precious metals vested absolutely in the grantee. Boggs e. Merced, &c.,

Co., 14 Cal. 279; Moore ». Smaw, 17 id. 199.

(8) [Not upon the land. Staunf. PI. Cor. 39. But it Is not said to be treasure- trove if it be

other metal than gold or silver. 3 Inst. 132.]
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in the owner. The man that hides his treasure in a secret place evidently does

not mean to relinquish his property, but reserves a right of claiming it again,

when he sees occasion; and if he dies, and the secret also dies with him, the law

gives it to the king, in part of his royal revenue. But a man that scatters his

treasure into the sea, or upon the public surface of the earth, is construed to

have absolutely abandoned his property, and returned it into the common stock,

without any intention of reclaiming it; and therefore it belongs, as in a state of

nature, to the first occupant, or finder, unless the owner appear and assert his

right, which *then proves that the loss was by accident, and not with r *„„„ -,

an intent to renounce his property. ' "" ' '

Formerly all treasure-trove belonged to the finder; (y) as was also the rule

of the civil law. (z) Afterwards it was judged expedient for the purposes of the

state, and particularly for the coinage, to allow part of what was so found to the

king; which part was assigned to be all hidden treasure; such as is casually

lost and unclaimed, and also such as is designedly abandoned, still remaining

the right of the fortunate finder. And that the prince shall be entitled to this

hidden treasure is now grown to be, according to Grotius, (a) " jus commune, et

quasi gentium:" for it is not only observed, he adds, in England, but in Germany,

France, Spain, and Denmark. The finding of deposited treasure was much more

frequent, and the treasures themselves more considerable, in the infancy of our

constitution than at present. When the Romans, and other inhabitants of

the respective countries which composed their empire, were driven out by the
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northern nations, they concealed their money under-ground: with a view of

resorting to it again when the heat of the irruption should be over, and the

invaders driveii back to their deserts. But, as this never happened, the treas-

ures were never claimed; and on the death of the owners the secret also died

along with them. The conquering generals, being aware of the value of these

hidden mines, made it highly penal to secrete them from the public sen-ice. In

England, therefore, as among the feudists, (b) the punishment of such as con-

cealed from the king the finding of hidden treasure was formerly no less than

death ; but now it is only fine and imprisonment, (o)

XIV. Waifs, bona waviata are goods stolen, and waived or thrown away by the

thief in his flight, for fear of being apprehended. (9) These are given to the

king by the law, as a punishment upon the owner, for not himself pursuing the

felon, and taking away his goods from him. (d) And therefore *if the •- *og7 n

party robbed do his diligence immediately to follow and apprehend *• -I

the thief, (which is called making fresh suit,) or do convict him afterwards, or

procure evidence to convict him, he shall have his goods again, (e) Waived

goods do also not belong to the king, till seized by somebody for his use; for if

the party robbed can seize them first, though at the distance of twenty years,

the king shall never have them. (/) If the goods are hid by the thief, or left

any where by him, so that he had them not about him, when he fled, and there-

fore did not throw them away in his flight; these also are not bona waviata, but

the owner may have them again when he pleases, (g) The goods of a foreign

merchant though stolen and thrown away in flight, shall never be waifs: (h)

the reason whereof may be, not only for the encouragement of trade, but also

because there is no wilful default in the foreign merchant's not pursuing the

thief; he being generally a stranger to our laws, our usages, and our language.

XV. Estrays are such valuable animals as are found wandering in any manor

or lordship, and no man knoweth the owner of them; in which case the law

(y) Bracton, 1.3, c. 3, 3 Inst. 133.

(1) FT. 41, 1. 31. (a) Dfjur. b. <f p. I. 2, c. 8, j 7. (b) Glanv. (. 1, a. 2. Crag. 1, 16, 46.

(c) :Unst. 133. (d) Cro Eliz. 6M. (e) Finch, L. 212. (f)lbtd. (g) 5 Rep. 100.

in the owner. The man that hides his treasure in a secret place evidently does
not mean to relinquish his property, but reserves a right of claiming it again,
when he sees occasion; and if he dies, and the secret also dies with him, the law
gives it to the king, in part of his royal revenue. But a man that scatters his
treasure into the sea, or upon the public surface of the earth, is construed to
have absolutely abandoned his property, and returned it into the common stock,
without any inrention of reclaiming it; and therefore it belongs, as in a state of
nature, to the first occupant, or finder, unless the owner appear and assert his
right, which *then proves that the loss was by accident, and not with [ *2!) 6 ]
an intent to renounce his property.
Formerly all treasure-trove belonged to the finder; (y) as was also the rule
of the civil law. (z) Afterwards it was judged expedient for the purposes of the
stare, and particularly for the coinage, to allow part of what was so found to the
king; which ~art Wl\S assigned to be all Mdden treasure; such as is casually
lost and unclaimed, and also such as is des·i gnedly abandoned, still remaining
the right of the fortunate finder. And that the prince shall be entitled to this
hidden treasure is now ~rown to be, according to Grotius, (a) " fus commune, et
quasi genti·um :" for it ls not only observed, he adds, in England, but in Germany,
France, Spain, and Denmark. 'l'he finding of deposited treasure was much more
frequent, and the treasures themseh-es more considerable, in the infancy of our
constitution than at present. When the Romans, and other inhabitants of
the respective countries which composed their empire, were driven out by the
northern nations, they concealed their money under-ground: with a view of
resorting to it again when the heat of the irruption should be over, and the
invaders driveri back to their deserts. But, as this never happened, the treasures were never claimed; and on the death of the owners the secret also died
along with them. 'l'he conquering generals, being aware of the value of these
hidden mines, made it highly penal to secrete them from the public service. In
England, therefore, as amon$ the feudists, (b) the punishment of such as concealed from the king the findmg of hidden treasure was formerly no less than
death; but now it is only fine and imprisonment. (c)
XIV. Waifs, bona wav-iata are goods stolen, and waived or thrown away by the
thief in his flight, for fear of being apprehended. (9) 'l'hese are given to the
king by the law, as a punishment upon the owner, for not himself pursuing the
felon, and taking away his goods from him. (d) t\.nd therefore *if the [ *297 ]
party robbed do his diligence immediately to follow and apprehend
the thief, (which is called making fresh suit,) or do convict him afterwards, or
procure evidence to convict him, he shall have his goods again. (e) Waived
goods do also not belong to the king, till seized by somebody for his use; for if
the party robbed can seize them first, though at the distance of twenty years,
the king shall never have them. (f) If the goods are bid by the thief, or left
any where by him, so that he had them not about him, when he fled, and therefore did not throw them away in his flight; these also are not bona waviata, but
the owner may have them again when he ple11Bes. (g) The goods of a foreign
merchant though stolen and thrown away in flight, shall never be waifs: (Ii)
the reason whereof may be, not only for the encouragement of trade, but also
because there is no wilful default in the foreign merchant's not pursuing the ·.
thief; he being generally a. stranger to our laws, our usages, and our language.
XV. Estrays are such valuable animals as are found wandering in any manor
or lordship, and no man knoweth the owner of them; in which case the law

(h) Fitz. Abr. Ot. Ettray. 1. 3 Bulstr. 19.

(9) [And this though left by him at a common inn. 2 Eol. 809, o. 15. If so left to ease him

in his flight. For if he leave a stolen horse at a common inn for his meal, it is no waif.

Id. c. 10.]

This doctrine does not obtain in America. Goods waived may be reclaimed by the real

owuer. 2 Kent, 358.
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(71) Ilracton, l. 3, c. 8, 8 Inst. 13:! .

(z) Ff. 41, l. 31.
(a) ~jur. b. <f p. l. 2, c. 8,; 7.
(b) Glanv. I. l, o. 2.
(t:J :i"Inst. 133.
(d) Cro Eliz. ooC.
(e) Finch, L. 212.
(/)Ibid.
(1&) Fitz. Abr. tU. Em-a71, 1. 3 Bnlstr. 19.

Crag. 1, 16, 46.
(g)6 Rep. 100.

------·----- - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

(0) [And this thou~h left by him at a common inn. 2 Rol. 809, c. 15. If so left to ease him
iu bis flight. For if he leave a stolen horse at a oommon inn for his meal, it is no waif.
Id. c. 10.]

This doctrine does not obtain in America.
owner. 2 Kent, 358.
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gives them to the king as the general owner and lord paramount of the soil, in

recompence for the damage which they may have done therein: and they now

most commonly belong to the lord of the manor, by special grant from the

crown. But, in order to vest an absolute property in the king, or his grantees,

they must be proclaimed in the church and two market towns next adjoining to

the place where they are found : and then, if no man claims them, after procla-

mation and a year and a day passed, they belong to the king or his substitute

without redemption; (i) even though the owner were a minor, or under any

other legal incapacity, (k) A provision similar to which obtained in the old

Gothic constitution, with regard to all things that were found, which were to be

thrice proclaimed; primum coram comitibus et viatoribus obviis, deinde in prox-

F*298l l""* "'"" vel pago, postremo coram ecclesia vel judicio ; and the space

' " J of a year was allowed for the owner to reclaim his property. (/) If the

owner claims them within the year and day he must pay the charges of finding,

keeping and proclaiming them, (m) (10) The king or lord has no property till

the year and day passed: for it a lord keepeth an estray three-quarters of a

year, and within the year it strayeth again, and another lord getteth it, the first

lord cannot take it again, (n) Any beasts may be estrays that are by nature

tame or reclaimable, and in which there is a valuable property, as sheep, oxen,

swine and horses, which we in general call cattle; and so Fleta (o) defines them,

pecus vagans, quod nullus petit, sequitur vel advocat. For animals upon which

the law sets no value, as a dog or cat, and animals ferce natura, as a bear or
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wolf, cannot be considered as estrays. So swans may be estrays, but not any

other fowl; (p) whence they are said to be royal fowl. The reason of which

distinction seems to be, that, cattle and swans being of a reclaimed nature, the

owner's property in them is not lost merely by their temporary escape; and they

also, from their intrinsic value, are a sufficient pledge for tne expense of the

lord of the franchise in keeping them the year and day. For he that takes an

estray is bound, so long as he keeps it, to find it in provisions and preserve it

from damage; (a) and may not use it by way of labour, but is liable to an action

for so doing, (r) Yet he may milk a cow, or the like; for that tends to the

preservation, and is for the benefit of the animal. (*)

Besides the particular reasons before given why the king should have the

several revenues of royal fish, shipwrecks, treasure-trove, waifs, and estrays,

there is also one general reason which holds for them all; and that is, because

they are bona vacantia, or goods in which no one else can claim a property. And

therefore by the law of nature they belong to the first occupant or finder; and

f *2991 so continued under the ""imperial law. But, in settling the modern con-

L J stitutions of most of the governments in Europe, it was thought proper

(to prevent that strife and contention, which the mere title of occupancy is apt

to create and continue, and to provide for the support of public authority in a

manner the least burthensome to individuals,) that these rights should be annexed

to the supreme power by the positive laws of the state. And so it came to pass

(I) Mirr. o. \ } 19.

(k} 5 Rep. 108. Bro. Abr. tit. Ettray. Cro. Eliz. 716. (J) Stiernh. tie jur. Oothor. I. 3. c. 8.

(m) Dalt. Sh. 79. (»! Finch. L. 177. (o) L. 1, c. 43. (J>) 7 Rep. 17.

(gj 1 Roll. Abr. 889. (r) Cro. Jao. 147. (») Cro. Jac. 148. Noy. 119.

(10) [But if any other person finds and takes care of another's property, not being entitled

to it as an estray (nor being saved at sea, or in other cases where the law of salvage applies,)

the owner may recover it or its value, without being obliged to pay the expenses of keeping.

gives them to the king as the general owner and lord paramount of the soil, in
recompence for the damage which they may have done therein: and they now
most commonly belong to the lord of the manor, by special grant from the
crown. But, in order to vest an absolute property in the king, or his grantees,
they must be proclaimed in the church and two market towns next adjoining to
the place where they are found: and then, if no man claims them, after proclamation and a year and a day passed, they belong to the king or his substitute
without redemption; (i) even though the owner were a minor, or under any
other legal incapacity. (k) A provision similar to which obtained in the old
Gothic constitution, with regard t-0 all things that were found, which were to be
thrice proclaimed ; prirnurn corarn comiti'.bus et viatoribus obvi'.is, deinde in prox[ • 298 ] ima *villa vel pago, postremo coram ecclesia vel judz'.cio ; and the space
of a year was allowed for the owner to reclaim his property. (l) If the
owner claims them within the year and day he must pay the charges of findin~,
keeping and proclaiming them. (m) (10) The king or lord has no property till
the year and day passed: for if a lord keepeth an estru.y three-quarters of a
year, and within the year it strayeth again, and another lord getteth it, the first
lord cannot take it again. (n) Any beasts may be estrays that are by nature
tame or reclaimable, and in which there is a valuable property, as sheep, oxen,
swine and horses.• which we in general call cattle; and so Fleta ( o) defines them,
pecus vagans, quad nu,llu.s petit, sequitur vel advocat. For animals upon _which
the law sets no value, as a dog or cat, and animals ferw natur<B, as a bear or
wolf, cannot be considered as estrays. So swans may be estrays, but not any
other fowl; (p) whence they are said to be royal fowl. The reason of which
distinction seems to be, that, cattle and swans being of a reclaimed nature, the
owner's property in them is not lost merely by their temporary escape; and they
also, from their mtrinsic value, are a sufficient pledge for the expense of the
lord of the franchise in keeping them the year and day. For he that takes an
estray is bound, so long as he keeps it, to find it in provisions and preserve it
from damage; (q) and may not use it by way of labour, but is liable tu an action
for so doing. (r) Yet he may milk a cow, or the like; for that tends t-0 the
preservation, and is for the benefit of the animal. (s)
Besides the particular reasons before given why the king should have the
several revenues of royal fish, shipwrecks, treasure-trove, waifs, and estrays,
there is also one general reason which holds for them all; and that is, because
they are bona vacantia, or goods in which no one else can claim a property. And
therefore by the law of nature they belong to the first occupant or finder; and
[ • 299 ] so continued under the "'imperial law. But, in settling the modern constitutions of most of the governments in Europe, it was thought proper
(to prevent that strife and contention, which the mere title of occupancy is apt
to creat-0 and continue, and to provide for the support of public authority in a
manner the least burthensome to individuals,) that these rights should be annexed
to the supreme power by the positive laws of the state. And so it came to pass
(i) Mirr. o. ll, f 19.
(k) 5 Rep. 108. Bro. Abr. tit. Eatra11.
(m)
(q)

Dalt. Sh. 79.
1 Roll. Ahr. 889.

Cro. Eliz. 716.
(l) Stiemh. de jur. Ootlwr. l. 3. c. II.
(nl Finch, L. 177.
(o) L. 1, c. '3.
(p) 7 Kep. 17.
.
(r) Cro. Jae. U7.
(•) Cro. Jnc. l~. Noy.119.

2 Bl. Rep. 1117 ; 2 Hen. Bl. 254.]

By statutes in the several states of the Union, provision is made for taking charge of

estrays, either by a township officer designated for the purpose, or by the person taking them;

and after a reasonable period, and duly advertising the same, if the owner does not reclaim the

estray, it is sold to satisfy charges. Any surplus that may remain is retained for the owner,

or devoted to some charitable purpose. These statutes must be followed strictly, or the title

of the owner will not be divested by them. Newsom v. Hart, 14 Mich. 233; Hyde v. Pryor, 13

111. 64; Smith t>. Ewers, 21 Ala. 38.
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(10) [But if any other person finds and takes care of another's property, not being entitlt'd
to it as an estray (nor being saved at sea, or in other cases where the lllw of salvage appliel',)
the owner may recover it or ita value, without being obliged to pay the expenses of keeping.
2 Bl. Rep. 1117; 2 Hen. Bl. 254.)
B.r statutcR in the several ~tates of the Union, provision is made for ta.king charge of
estrnvs, either by a township officer designated for the purpose. or by the person taking them;
and after a. reasonable period, aml duly advertising the same, if the owner does not recl!l.im tho
e11tray, it is sold to 1.<ati11f;v charget<. Any ~urplus that may remain is retained for the owner.
or devoted to some chantable purpose. These statutes muMt be followed strictly, or the title
of the owner will not be dh-ested hy them. NewBOm v. Hart, 14 Mich. 233; Hyde"· Pryor, 13
Ill. 64; Smith "· Ewers, 21 Ala. 38.
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that, as Bractou expresses it, (t) hoec qua nuttius in bonis sunt, et olimfuerunt

inventoris dejure naturali, jam efficiuntur principis de jure gentium. (11)

XVI. The next branch of the king's ordinary revenue consists in forfeitures

of lands and goods for oifeiices; bona confiscata, as they are called by the civil-

ians, because they belong to the fisctis or imperial treasury; or, as our lawyers

term them, fans/octet j that is, such whereof the property is gone away or

departed from the owner. The true reason and only substantial ground of any

forfeiture for crimes consist in this: that all property is derived from society,

being one of those civil rights which are conferred upon individuals, in exchange

for that degree of natural freedom which every man must sacrifice when he

enters into social communities. If therefore a member of any national com-

munity violates the fundamental contract of his association, by transgressing

the municipal law, he forfeits his right to such privileges as he claims by that

contract; and the state may very justly resume thatportion of property, or any

part of it, which the laws have before assigned him. Hence, in every offence of an

atrocious kind, the laws of England have exacted a total confiscation of the

movables or personal estate; and in many cases a perpetual, in others only a

temporary, loss of the offender's immovables or landed property; and have

vested them both in the king, who is the person supposed to be offended, being

the one visible magistrate in whom the majesty of the public resides. The par-

ticulars of these forfeitures will be more properly recited when we treat of crimes

and misdemeanors. I therefore only mention them here, for *the sake r *QQQ -i
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of regularity, as a part of the census regalis ; and shall postpone for the L J

present the farther consideration of all forfeitures, excepting one species only,

•which arises from the misfortune rather than the crime of the owner, and is

called a deodand. (12)

By this is meant whatever personal chattel is the immediate occasion of the

death of any reasonable creature: which is forfeited to the king, to be applied

to pious uses, and distributed in alms by his high almoner; (v) though formerly

destined to a more superstitious purpose. It seems to have been originally

designed, in the blind days of poperv, as an expiation for the souls of such as

•were snatched away by sudden death; and for that purpose ought properly to

have been given to holy church: (w) in the same manner as the apparel of a

stranger, who was found dead, was applied to purchase masses for the good of

his soul. And this may account for that rule of law, that no deodand is due

•where an infant under the age of discretion is killed by a fall from a cart, or

horse, or the like, not being in motion; (x) whereas, if an adult person falls from

(!) L. 1, o. 12. (r) 1 Hal. P. C. 419. Fleta, J. 1, c. 26.

(») Fitzh. Mr. Ot. Enditement, pi. 27. Staunf. P. C. 20, 21. (z) 8 lust. 57. 1 Hal. P. C. 432.

(11) [This passage has been thought inconsistent with the doctrine stated supra p. 295, viz.:

that all things found in the sea or upon the earth belong not to the king, but to the finder,

•which is undoubtedly the general rule. But in the particular cases enumerated in the text, the

that, as Bracton expn~sses it, (t) hac qum nullius in bonis S'Unt, et olim fuerunt
inventon:s de jure naturali, jam effeci?tntur princip-is de jure gentium. (11)
XVI. The next branch of the "king's ordinary revenue consists in forfeitures
of lands and goods for offences ; bona confiscata, as they a.re called by the civilians, because they belong to the jiscus or imperial treasury; or, as our lawyers
term them, fori.~facta; that is, such whereof the property is gone away or
departed from the owner. The true re11Son and only substantial ground of any
forfeiture for crimes consist in this: that all property is derived from society,
being one of those civil rights which are conferred upon individuals, in exchange
for that degree of natural freedom which every man must sacrifice when he
enters into social communities. If therefore a member of any natione.l. community violates the fundamental contract of his association, by transgressing
the municipal law, he forfeits his right to such privileges as he claims by that
contract; and the state may very justly resume that portion of property, or any
part of it, which the laws have before assigned him. Hence, in every offence of an
atrocious kind, the laws of England have exacted a total confiscation of the
movables or personal estate ; and in many cases a perpetual, in others only a
tempomry, loss of the offender's immovables or landed property ; and have
vested them both in the king, who is the person supposed to be offended, being
the one visible magistrate in whom the majesty of the public resides. 'l'he particulars of these forfeitures will be more properly recited when we treat of crimes
and misdemeanors. I therefore only mention them here, for *the sake [ • 300 ]
of regularity, as a part of the census regalis; and shall post):>One for the
present the farther consideration of all forfeitures, exceptmg one species only,
which arises from the misfortune rather than the crime of the owner, and lS
called a deorland. (12)
By this is meant whatever personal chattel is the immediate occasion of the
death of any reasonable creature: which is forfeited to the king, to be applied
to pious uses, and distributed in alms by his high almoner; ( v) though formerly
destined to a more superstitious purpose. It seems to have been originally
designed, in the blind days of popery, as an expiation for the souls of such as
were snatched away by sudden death ; and for that purpose ought properly to
have been given to holy church: (w) in the same manner as the apparel of a.
stranger, who was found dead, was applied to purchase masses for the good of
his soul. And this may account for that rule of law, that no deodand is due
where an infant under the n.ge of discretion is killed by a fall from a cart, or
horse, or the like, not being in motion; (x) whereas, if an adult person falls from
(I) L. 1, o. 12.
(ti) 1 Ila!. P. c. '19. Fleta, l. 1, c. 211.
(to) Fitzh. .Abr. tit. EndUement, pl. 27. Staunf. P. C. 20, 21.

(z) 3 Inst. 117. 1 Hal. P. C. di.

positive law has, for certain special reasons, given the enumerated articles to the crown; and in

this passage Blackstone is merely assigning as an additional reason why the crown should have

them, this circumstance, that the operation of the general rule would confer them on the first

finder, as being bona vacantta.]

(12) [The statute of 54 Geo. Ill, e. 145, greatly relaxed the law of forfeiture, so far as landed

property is concerned; and the statute of 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 106, g. 10, is still more liberal.

No attainder ot felony now extends to the disinheriting of any heir, or to the prejudice of the

right or title of any other person than the offender, except during his natural life only. And

with respect to forfeitures of personal property, the crown exercises its rights very leniently; in

cases where indulgence to the families of offenders can reasonably be asked, a proper representa-

tion rarely (I believe never) fails to meet attention. Homicide, not felonious, now entails no for-

feiture, by virtue of the stat. 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 10.]

By the*constitution of the United States " no attainder of treason shall work corruption of

blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." Forfeitures of estate and

corruption of blood for offenses against the United States were abolished by statute in 1790:

1 Stat. at Large, 117; and although during the late civil war statutes were passed for the confis-

cation of property of persons convicted of treason, but few proceedings were nad under them, and

the property seized was for the most part relieved from them under the president's power to re-

prieve and pardon.
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(11) [This pas.'>age hn.~ been thought inconsistent with the doctrine stated supra p. 295, viz. :
that all thingi! found in the ;,oa or upon the ea.rt.b belong not to the king, but to the finder,
which is undoubtedly the gener&l rule. But in the particular 08808 enumerated in the text. the
positive law hns, for certabi special rem1om1, given the enumerated articles to the crown; and in
this pa.silage Blackstone is merely assigning as an additional reason why the crown should have
them, this circmnstance; that the operation of the geneml. rule would confer them on the first
finder, as being bona iiacantia.]
·
(12) (The statute of 54 Geo. III, c. 145, greatly relaxed the law of forfeiture, so far as landed
property is concerned; and the statute of 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, e. 10, is still more liberal.
No attainder ot folouy now extends to the dii;inheriting of any heir, or to the prejudice of the
ri~ht or title of any other person than the offender, except during his natural life only. .And
Wlth rei!pect to forfeitures of personal property, the crown exercises its rights very leniently; in
CMes where indulgence to ihe families of offenders ca.n reasonably be asked, a proper rev.resentation rarely (I believe never) fails to meet attention. Homicide, not felonious, now entruhrno for·
feiture, by yirtue of the t1tat. 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 10.]
Dy the con.-ititution of the United States "no attainder of trea.'lon shall work cormption of
blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." Forfeitures of esta.w and
corruption of blood for offenses against the United States were abolished by statute in 1790:
1 Stat. at Large, 117; and although during the late civil war Rte.tutes were pa.'lsed for the confiscation of property of persons conVIcted of tre880n, but few proceedings were bad under them, and
the property seized we.s for the most part relieved from them under the president's power to reprieve and pardon.
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thence and is killed, the thing is certainly forfeited. For the reason given by

Sir Mathew Hale seems to be very inadequate, viz.: because an infant is not

able to take care of himself; for why should the owner save his forfeiture, ou

account of the imbecility of the child, which ought rather to have made him

more cautious to prevent any accident of mischief? The true ground of this

rule seems rather to have been, that the child, by reason of its want of discre-

tion, was presumed incapable of actual sin, and therefore needed no deodand to

purchase propitiatory masses ; but every adult, who died in actual sin, stood in

need of such atonement, according to the humane superstition of the founders

of the English law.

Thus stands the law if a person be killed by a fall from a thing standing still.

F *3011 ^u^ ^ a horse, or ox» or °ther animal, *of his own motion, kill as well

1 " -" an infant as an adult, or if a cart run over him, they shall in either case

be forfeited as deodands; (y) which is grounded upon this additional reason, that

such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and there-

fore he is properly punished by such forfeiture. A like punishment is in like

cases inflicted by the Mosaical law: (z) " if an ox gore a man that he die, the ox

shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten." And, among the Athenians,

(a) whatever was the cause of a man's death, by falling upon him, was extermi-

nated or cast out of the dominions of the republic. (13) Where a thing not

in motion, is the occasion of a man's death, that part only which is the imme

diate cause is forfeited; as, if a man be climbing up the wrheel of a cart, and is
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killed by falling from it, the wheel alone is a deodand: (£) but, wherever the

thing is in motion, not only that part which immediately gives the wound, (as

the wheel, which runs over his body,) but all things which move with it and

help to make the wound more dangerous (as the cart and loading, which increase

the pressure of the wheel,) are forfeited, (c) It matters not whether the owner

were concerned in the killing or not; for, if a man kills another with my sword,

the sword is forfeited (d) as an accursed thing, (e) And therefore, in all indict-

ments for homicide, the instrument of death and the value are presented and

found by the grand jury, ^as, that the stroke was given by a certain penknife,

value sixpence,) that the king or his grantee may claim the deodand ; for it is

no deodand unless it be presented as such by a jury of twelve men. (/) No deo-

dands are due for accidents happening upon the high sea, that being out of the

F *3021 .jurisdiction °f ^ne common law: but if a *man falls from a boat or ship

*• '' J in fresh water, and is drowned, it hath been said, that the vessel and

cargo are in strictness of law a deodand. (g) But juries have of late very fre-

quently taken upon themselves to mitigate these forfeitures, by finding only some

trifling thing, or part of an entire thing, to have been the occasion of the death.

And in such cases, although the finding by the jury be hardly warrantable by

law, the court of king's bench hath generally refused to interfere on behalf of

the lord of the franchise, to assist so unequitable a claim. (A) (14)

(y) Omnla. qua movent ad mortem, svnt Deo danda. Bracton, I. 3, c. B. (t) Exod. xxi. 48.

(o) jEec.hin. cant. Ctetiph. Thus, too. by our ancient law, a well In which a person was drowned was

ordered to be filled up, under the inspection of the coroner. Kiel. 2.1, e. 25, } 10. Fitzh. Abr. t. corone

416.

(ft) 1 Hal. P. C. 422. (c) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 26.

(d} A similar rule obtained among the ancient Goths. Si qwtt, me neteiente, qnocungue meo telo rrf iiittni-

mento in perniciem tuam abutattir : rei ex aidibwi meif cadat. vel incidat in pirtaim metim, quantumris tecium

et munttum. vel in cataractam, et sub molendino meo confringatur, ipse aliqua mulcta plectar; ut in partt in.

feliatatis mem numerator, habuitse vel aedificasse aliquod quo homo periret. Sticrnhook. dejun Goth. I.

8. e. 4.

(e) Dr. and St. d. 2. c. 51. (/) 3 In»t. 67.

(0) 3 Inst. 58. 1 Hal. P. C. 423. Molloy. de Jur. Marttim. 2, 225. (h) Foster, of Homicide, 206.

t.hence and is killed, the thing is certainly forfeited. For the reason given bv
Sir Mathew Hale seems to be very inadequate, viz.: because an infant is not
able to take ca.re of himself; for wh;,: should the owner save his forfeiture, on
account of the imbecility of the child, which ought rather to have made him
more cautious to prevent any accident of mischief? The true ground of this
rule seems rat.her to have been, that the child, by reason of its want of discretion, was presumed incapable or actual sin, and therefore needed no deodand to
purchase propitiatory masses ; but every adult, who died in actual sin, stood in
need of such atonement, according to the humane superstition of the founders
of the English law.
Thus stands the law if a person be killed by a fall from a thing standing still.
[ ,..301 ] But if a horse, or ox, or other animal, *of his own motion, kill as well
an infant as an adult, or if a ca.rt run over him, they shall in either caire
be forfeited as deodands; (y) which is grounded upon this additional reason, that
such misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by such forfeiture. A like punishment is in like
cases inflicted by the l\fosaical law: (z) "if an ox gore a man that he die, the ox
shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten." And, amon~ the Athenians,
(a) whatever was the cause of a man's death, by falling upon him, was exterminated or cast out of the dominions of the republic. (13) Where a thing not
in motion, is the occasion of a man's death, that part only which is the imme .
diate cause is forfeited; as, if a man be climbing up the wheel of a cart, and is
killed by falling from it, the wheel alone is a deodand: (b) but, wherever the
thing is in motion, not only that part which immediately gives the wound, (as
the wheel, which runs over his body,) but all things which move with it and
help to make the wound more dangerous (as the cart and loading, which increase
the pressure of the wheel,) are forfeited. (c) It matters not whether the owner
were concerned in the killing or not; for, if a man kills another with my sword,
the sword is forfeited (d) as an accursed thing. (e) And therefore, in all indictments for homicide, the instrument of death and the value are presented ancl
found by the grand jury, (as, that the stroke was given by a certain penknife,
value sixpence,) that the kmg or his grantee may claim the deodand; for it is
no deodand unless it be presented as such by a jury of twelve men.(/) No deodands are due for accidents happening upon the high sea, that being out of the
[ • 302 ] jurisdiction of the common law: but if a *man falls from a boat or ship
in fresh water, and is drowned, it hat.h been said, that the vessel and
cargo are in strictness of law a deodand. ( g) But juries ham of late Yery frequently taken upon themselves to mitigate these forfeitures, by finding only some
trifling thing, or part of an entire thing, to have been the occasion of the death.
And in such cases, although the finding by the jury be ~ardly warrantable by
law, the court of king's bench hath generally refused to mterfere on behalf of
the lord of the franchise, to assist so unequitable a claim. (/1.) (14)
(f) Omnia, IJ1l«l t1WVent ad mortem, aunt DtJO d.anda. Bracton, l. S, e. ll.
(cl Exoc'I. xx!. 28.
(a) .A!:echln. cont. Ctulph. Thus, too, by onr ancient law, G well In which a person was drowned was
ordered to be filled up, under the inspection of the coroner. }'Jet. l. 1, c. 25, § 10. Fitzh. Ab1-. ~. corone.

•ts.

lb) l Hal. P. C. •22.
{cl 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 26.
(d) A similar rule obtained among the ancient Goths. Si qttla, me ne.11cimte, qt1oet1nqtU! lllM telo 11el irutrumento in perraiclem auam abutatur ; tJd e.z tl!dilm.11 mm catlat. vel inddat in puteum meum, qumitumt'U tectva
et munUum. oo in cataradam, et l1dJ molettd(no mro cOflfri.ngatur, ip1e al~ ww.ktaplectar; td in park iN·
feltcllatia mea. numF.ratur, llabtdue tiel redi.jl00$le aliqUod qua honiQ penret. St!cmhook, de jure Goth. I.
3. c. •.
(e) Dr. and St. ii. 2. c. 51.
(/l 3 ln~t. 57.
(g) S Inst. 58. 1 Hal. P. c. •23. Molloy. de Jur. MarUim. 2, 225.
(11) Foster, of llomiclde, 266.

(13) [This was one of Draco's laws ; and perhaps we may think the judgment, that a statue

should be thrown into the sea for having fallen upon a man, less absurd, when we reflect that

there ma\T be sound policy in teaching the mind to contemplate •with horror the privation of

human life, and that our familiarity even with an insensible object which has been the occasion

of death, may lessen that sentiment. Though there may be wisdom in withdrawing such a thing

from public view, yet there can be none in treating it as if it was capable of understanding the

ends of punishment.]

(14) [Deodands were abolished by stat. 9 and 10 Vic. c. 62, which enacts that " there shall be no
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(13) [This we.s one of Draco's ln.wR; and perhaps we may think the judgment, that a Rtatue
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there mav be sound policv in teaching the mind to contemplate with horror tho pri•ation of
human life, and th11t our ·familiarity even with au insen~blc object which has been the occasion
of death, mav lessen that sentiment. Though there may be wi11tlom in withdrawing such a thing
from public View, yet there can be none in treating it as if it was capable of understanding th"
eudl'I of punishment.]
(14) LDeodan4s were abolished by stat. 9and10 Vic. c. 6'.l, which enacts that" there shall be no
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EscHEATS•

Deodands, and forfeitures in general, as well as wrecks, treasure trove, royal

fish, mines, waifs, and estrays, may be granted by the king to particular subjects,

as a, royal franchise: and indeed they are for the most part granted out to the

lords of manors, or other liberties: to the perversion of their original design.

XVII. Another branch of the king's ordinary revenue arises from escheats of

lands, which happen upon the defect of heirs to succeed to the inheritance;

whereupon they in general revert to and vest in the king, who is esteemed, in

the eye of the law, the original proprietor of all the lands m the kingdom. But

the discussion of this tropic more properly belongs to the second book of these

commentaries, wherein we shall particularly consider the manner in which lands

may be acquired or lost by escheat. (15)

XVIII. I proceed therefore to the eighteenth and last branch of the king's

ordinary revenue; which consists in the custody of idiots, from whence we shall

be naturally led to consider also the custody of lunatics.

An idiot, or natural fool, is one that hath had no understanding from his

nativity; and therefore is by law presumed never likely to attain any. For

which reason the custody of "him and of his lands was formerly vested r #OAO -i

in the lord of the fee: (A) (and therefore still, by special custom, in some *- J

manors the lord shall have the ordering of idiot and lunatic copyholders,) (i)

but, by reason of the manifold abuses of this power by subjects, it was at last

provided by common consent, that it should be given to the king, as the general

conservator of his people ; in order to prevent the idiot from wasting his estate,
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and reducing himself and his heirs to poverty and distress, (k) This fiscal pre-

rogative of the king is declared in parliament by statute, 17 Edw. II, c. 9, which

directs (in affirmance of the common law,) (I) that the king shall have ward of

the lands of natural fools, taking the profits without waste or destruction, and

shall find them necessaries; and after the death of such idiots he shall render

the estate to the heirs : in order to prevent such idiots from aliening their lands,

and their heirs from being disinherited. (16)

By the old common law there is a writ de idiota inquirendo, to inquire whether

a man be an idiot or not: (m) which must be tried by a jury of twelve men:

and, if they find him purus idota, the profits of his lands, and the custody of

his person may be granted by the king to some subject, who has interest enough

to obtain them. (») This branch of the revenue hath been long considered as a

hardship upon private families: and so long ago as in the 8 Jac. I, it was under

the consideration of parliament, to vest this custody in the relations of the

party, and to settle an equivalent on the crown in lieu of it; it being then pro-

posed to share the same late with the slavery of the feudal tenures, which has

been since abolished, (o) Yet few instances can be given of the oppressive exer-

tion of it, since it seldom happens that a jury finds a man an idiot a nativitate,

(ft) Flet. 1.1. «. 11, * 10. (Q Dyer. 302. Hntt. 17. Nov. 27. (*) F. N. B, 232.

(2) 4 Uen. 126. tfanorand. Scacc.30 Edw. I. (prefixed to Maynard's Year Book ofEdw. 11.) fol. 20,14.

(m} F. 3}. B. 2S2.

Deodands, and forfeitures in general, as well as wrecks, treasure trove, royal
fish, mines, waifs, and estrays, mav be granted by the king to particular subjects,
as a royal franchise: and indeed they are for the most part granted out to the
lords of manors. or other liberties : to the perversion of their original design.
XVII. Another branch of the king's ordinary revenue arises from escheats of
lands, which hapyen upon the defect of heirs to succeed to the inheritance;
whereupon they m general revert to and vest in the kin~, who is esteemed, in
the eye of the law, the ori~inal proprietor of all the lands m the kingdom. But
the discussion of this tropic more properly belongs to the second book of these
commentaries, wherein we shall particularly consider the manner in which lands
may be acquired or lost by escheat. (15)
XVIII. I proceed therefore to the eighteenth and last branch of the king's
ordinary revenue; which consist8 in the custody of idiots, from whence we shall
be naturally led to consider also the custody of lunatics.
An idiot, or natural fool, is one that hath had no understanding from his
nativity; and therefore is by law presumed never likely to attain any. For
which reason the custody of *him and of his lands was formerly vested [ • 303 ]
in the lord of the fee: (It) (and therefore still, by special custom, in some
manors the lord shall )111.ve the ordering of idiot and lunatic copyholders,) (i)
but, by reason of the manifold abuses of this power by subjects, it was at last
provided by common consent, that it should be given to the king, as the general
conservator of his people ; in order to prevent the idiot from wasting his estate,
and reducing himself and his heirs to poverty and distress. (k) This fiscal prerogative of the king is declared in parliament by statute, 17 Ed w. II, c. 9, which
directs (in affirmance of the common law,) (l) that the king shall have ward of
the lands of natural fools, taking the profits without waste or destruction, and
shall find them necessaries ; and after the death of such idiots he shall render
the estate to the heirs : in order to prevent such idiots from aliening their lands,
and their heirs from being disinherited. (16)
By the old common law there is a writ de idiota inquirendo, to inquire whether
a man be an idiot or not: (m) which must be tried by a jury of twelve men:
and, if they find him purus idota, the profits of his lands, and the custody of
his person may be granted by the king to some subject, who has interest enough
to obtain them. (n) 'l'his branch of the revenue hath been long considered as a.
hardship upon private families: and so long ago as in the 8 Jae. I, it was under
the consideration of parliament, to vest this custody in the relations of the
party, and to settle an equivalent on the crown in lieu of it; it being then proposed to share the same fate with the slavery of the feudal tenures, which has
been since abolished. (o) Yet few instances can be given of the oppressiYe exertion of it, since it seldom happens that a jury finds a man an idiot a nativitate,

(i'i This power, though of late very rarely exerted, IB still alluded to in common speech, by that naual

expression of begging a man for a fool.

(•I) 4 In.-i. 203. Com. Journ. 1610.

forfeiture of any chattel for or in respect of the same having moved to or caused the death of

man."

lh) 'Flet. I. 1. c. II, f 10.
Ii) Dyer. atn. Hntt. 17. Nov. 'IT.
(kl F. N. B, 282.
(I) 'Rell. lj&. Memorand. Scacc.20 Edw. I. (prefixed to Maynard's Year Book ofEdw. II.) fol. 20, 2'.
(m) F. :X. B. 28'.!.
(pl Thi~ power, though oflate very rarely exerted, le still alluded to ln common speech, by tbat usual
expression of begging n. rnnn for a fool.
(o) 4' ln&t. 203. Com. Journ. 1610.

(15) Within the states of the American Union, escheats for defect of heirs are to the state in

•which the property is situate, and not to the United States.

(16) [The jurisdiction which the chancellor has generally, or perhaps always, exercised over

the persons and estates of lunatics and idiots, is not necessarily annexed to the custody of the

jjreat seal; for it has been declared by the house of lords, "that the custody of idiots and luna-

tics was in the power of the king, who might delegate the same to such person as he should

think fit." And upon every change of the great seal, a special authority under his majesty's royal

rign manual is granted to the new chancellor for that purpose. Hence no appeal lies from the

chancellor's orderu upon this subject to the house of lords, but to the king m council. Bom.

Proc. 14 Feb. 1726, 3 P. Wing. 108.]
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which the property i11 situate, and not to the United Statos.
(16) [The jurisdiction which the chancellor ha.-i generally, or perhaps always, exercised over
the persons ancl estates of lunatic1:1 and idiots, iB not necesi>arily annexed to the custody of the
great sea.I ; for it has been declared by the house of lords, "that the custody of idiots and lunatics was in the power of the king, who might delegate the same to ~uch person as he Rhould
think fit." .And upon e\·ery change of the great 1.1eal, a special authority under his majesty's royal
l!<ign mauunl is granted to the new chancellor for that purpose. Hence no appeal lieH from the
chancellor's ordero upon thiti subject to the house of lords, but to the king m council. Dom.
Proc. 14 Feb. 1726, 3 P. Wlll8. 198.]
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303 THE KING'S REVENUE. [Book I.

but only non compos mentis from some particular time; which has an operation

very different in point of law.

r *QQ , -I *A man is not an idiot, (p ) if he hath any glimmering of reason, so

' '" -1 that he can tell his parents, his age, or the like common matters. But

a man who is born deaf, dumb and blind, is looked upon by the law as in the

same state with an idiot; (q) he being supposed incapable of any understanding,

as wanting all those senses which furnish the human mind with ideas. (17)

A lunatic, or non compos mentis, is one who hath had understanding, but by

disease, grief, or other accident, hath lost the use of his reason, (r) A lunatic is

indeed properly one that hath lucid intervals ; sometimes enjoying his senses, and

sometimes not, and that frequently depending upon the changes of the moon. (18)

But under the general name of non compos mentis (which, Sir Edward Coke

says, is the most legal name,) (s) are comprised not only lunatics, but persons

under frenzies; or who lose their intellects by disease; those that grow deaf,

dumb, and blind, not being born so; or such, in short, as are judged by the

court of chancery incapable of conducting their own affairs. To these, also, as

well as idiots, the king is guardian, but to a very different purpose. For the

law always imagines, that these accidental misfortunes may be removed; and

therefore only constitutes the crown a trustee for the unfortunate persons,

to protect their property, and to account to them for all profits received, if they

recover, or after their decease to their representatives. And therefore it is

declared by the statute 17 Edw. II, c. 10, that the king shall provide for the
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custody and sustentation of lunatics, and preserve their lands and the profits of

them for their use, when they come to their right mind; and the king shall take

nothing to his own use; and, if the parties die in such estate, the residue shall

be distributed for their souls by the advice of the ordinary, and of course (by the

subsequent amendments of the law of administration,) shall now go to their exe-

cutors or administrators.

F *3051 *^n tne ^rs* at*;ac^ °f lunacJ>or other occasional insanity, while there

' -" may be hope of a speedy restitution of reason, it is usual to confine the

unhappy objects in private custody under the direction of their nearest friends

and relations; and the legislature, to prevent all abuses incident to such private

custody, hath thought proper to interpose its authority by statute 14 Geo. Ill, c.

49, (continued by 19 Geo. Ill, c. 15,) for regulating private madhouses. But,

when the disorder is grown permanent, and the circumstances of the party will

bear such additional expense, it is proper to apply to the royal authority to war-

rant a lasting confinement. (19)

The method of proving a person non compos is very similiar to that of prov-

ing him an idiot The lord chancellor, to whom, by special authority from the

king, the custody of idiots and lunatics is intrusted, (t) upon petition or infor-

mation, grants a commission in nature of the writ de idiota inquirendo, (20) to

(p) F. N. B. 233. (q) Co. Lltt 42. Flcta, 1. 0, c. 40

(r) Idiota a cant et i»jirmitntf. ( Mem. Scacch. 20 Bthe. I. In Maynard'B Tear Book of Edw. It. 20. i

(•) 1 Inst. 240. (t) 3 V. Wms. 108.

(17) This, however, is a mere presumption, and may be rebutted by evidence of capacity.

Hex v. Dyson, 7 C. and P. 305; Rex »>. Pritchard, Ibid. 303; Commonwealth v. Hill, 14 Mass.

207 ; Brower v. Fisher, 4 Johns, Ch. 441; Christmas v. Mitchell, 3 Ired. Ch. 535. Persons only

deaf and dumb, it has been declared, are to be considered idiots ; but this idea may be said to be

obsolete. See Rushton's case, 1 Leach, C. C. 455; Morrison r. Leonard, 3 C. and P. 127. Indeed

the presumption of idiocy in the case of persons born deaf, dumb and blind is a very faint one

since the capacity of this class of unfortunate persons for instruction has been so thoroughly

demonstrated of late years. See "Weir v. Fitzgerald, 2 Bradf. Sur. R. 42.

(18) [The influence of the moon upon the human mind, or rather the dependence of any state

of the human mind upon the changes of the moon, is doubted or denied by the best practical

writers upon mental disorders.]

(19) See stat. 2 and 3 Wm. IT, c. 107, and 3 and 4 Win. IT, c. 36, which are late statutes on

this subject.

(20) [Or a writ de lunatico inquirendo, which is the more common form. From the strict-

ness with which the ancient writs, and the commissions framed thereon, were worded, they

i .inul not be sustained against any person who was not, in the most absolute import of the
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inquire into the party's state of mind; and if he be found non compos, he usu-

ally commits the care of his person, with a suitable allowance for his mainte-

nance, to some friend, who is then called his committee. However, to prevent

sinister practices, the next heir is seldom permitted to be this committee of the

person; because it is his interest that the party should die. But, it hath been said,

there lies not the same objection against his next of kin, provided he be not his

heir; for it is his interest to preserve the lunatic's life, in order to increase the per-

sonal estate by savings, which he or his family may hereafter be entitled to enjoy.(«)

The heir is generally made the manager or committee of the estate, it being

clearly his interest by good management to keep it in condition: accountable,

however, to the court of chancery, and to the non compos himself, if he recovers;

or otherwise to his administrators. (21)

In this case of idiots and lunatics, the civil law agrees with ours, by assigning

them tutors to .protect their persons, and curators to manage their estates. But,

in another instance, the Eoman law goes much beyond the English. For, if a

man, by notorious prodigality, was in danger of wasting his estate, he was looked

upon as non compos, and committed to the care of curators or tutors by the

praetor, (v) And, by the laws of Solon, such prodigals were branded with

perpetual infamy, (w) But with us, when a man on an inquest of idiocy hath

been *returned an unthrift, and not an idiot, (x) no farther proceedings r *QQg -i

have been had. And the propriety of the practice itself seems to be L J

very questionable. It was doubtless an excellent method of benefiting the indi-
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vidual, and of preserving estates in families; but it hardly seems calculated for

the genius of a free nation, who claim and exercise the liberty of using their

own property as they please. " Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non Icfdas," is the only

restriction onr laws have given with regard to economical prudence. And the

frequent circulation and transfer of lands, and other property, which-cannot be

effected without extravagance somewhere, are perhaps not a little conducive

towards keeping our mixed constitution in its due health and vigour.

This may suffice for a short view of the king's ordinary revenue, or the proper

patrimony of the crown; which was very large formerly, and capable of being

increased to a magnitude truly formidable; for there are very few estates in the

kingdom that have not, at some period or other since the Norman conquest, been

vested in the hands of the king by forfeiture, escheat, or otherwise. But, for-

tunately for the liberty of the subject, this hereditary landed revenue, by a

series of improvident management, is sunk almost to nothing; and the casual

profits arising from the other branches of the census reyalis are likewise almost

all of them alienated from the crown: in order to supply the deficiencies of

which we are now obliged to have recourse to new methods of raising money,

unknown to our early ancestors; which methods constitute the king's extraor-

dinary revenue. For, the public patrimony being got into the hands of private

(tt) Z P. Wma. 638.

(t>) Solent pratores. .•

Klacerando etdissipa

ruamrtiu velfurwsufl , __, . _ _

lie) Potter. Antiq. b. l,c. 36. (x) Bro. ,11.i-. tit. Idiot, 4.

terms, an idiot or a lunatic: but in order to include parties who, although they could not

strictly be described aa idiots or lunation, were non compotes mentis, and exposed to every

species of fraud and injustice, commissions were framed in the nature only of the writ*

formerly in use. The modern commissions are made out by letters patent, under the great

seal, and are held to extend to all persons of unsound mind. Ex porte Southcote, Ambl.

Ill; Ridgeway v. Darwin, 8 Yes. 65. And by virtue of the statute of 3 and 4 "Wm. IV, o. 36,

such commissions may, if the lord chancellor thinks fit, be directed to one commissioner only,

in order to save expense. Formerly, three commissioners were held to be necessary in all

cases.]

not 1

matter of _ ,

conceded : Lady Mary Cope's Case, 2 Ch. Cas. 239; ex parte Le"Henp,*ft Ves.^27 : and personal

fitness will be principally regarded in the selection. See matter of Livingston, 1 Johns. Ch. 436.

See also, as bearing on thu point, matter of Taylor, 9 Paige, 611.
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subjects, it is but reasonable that private contributions should supply the public

service. Which, though it may perhaps fall harder upon some individuals,

whose ancestors have had no share in the general plunder, than upon others;

yet, taking the nation throughout, it amounts to nearly the same, provided the

gain by the extraordinary should appear to be no greater than the loss by the

r *jjQ,j. -i ordinary revenue. And, perhaps, if every *gentleman in the kingdom

1 -• was to be stripped of such of his lands as were formerly the property of

the crown; was to be again subject to the inconveniences of purveyance and

pre-emption, the oppression of forest laws, and the slavery of feudal tenures;

and was to resign into the king's hands all his royal franchises of waifs, wrecks,

estrays, treasure-trove, mines, deodands, forfeitures, and the like; he would find

himself a greater loser than by paving his quota to such taxes as are necessary

to the support of government. The thing therefore to be wished and aimed a't

in a land of liberty is by no means the total abolition of taxes* which would

draw after it very pernicious consequences, and the very supposition of which is

the height of political absurdity. For as the true idea of government and

magistracy will be found to consist in this, that some few men are deputed by

many others to preside over public affairs, so that individuals may the better

be enabled to attend their private concerns; it is necessary that those individuals

should be bound to contribute a portion of their private gains, in order to sup-

port that government, and reward that magistracy, which protects them in the

enjoyment of their respective properties. But the things to be aimed at are
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wisdom and moderation, not only in granting, but also in the method of raising

the necessary supplies; by contriving to do Doth in such a manner as may be

most conducive to the national welfare, and at the same time most consistent

with economy and the liberty of the subject; who, when properly taxed, con-

tributes only, as was before observed, (y) some part of his property, in order to

enjoy the rest.

These extraordinary grants are usually called by the synonymous names of

aids, subsidies, and supplies; and are granted, we have formerly seen, (z) by the

commons of Great Britain in parliament assembled: who, when they have voted

a supply to his majesty, and settled the quantum of that supply, usually resolve

themselves into what is called a committee of ways and means, to consider the

ways and means of raising the supply so voted. And in this committee every

r *QAO -i *member, (though it is looked upon as the peculiar province of the

"- J chancellor of the exchequer,) may propose such scheme of taxation as

he thinks will be least detrimental to the public. The resolutions of this com-

mittee, when approved by a vote of the house, are in general esteemed to be, as

it were, final and conclusive. For, though the supply cannot be actually raised

upon the subject till directed by an act of the whole parliament, yet no monied

man will scruple to advance to the government any quantity of ready cash, on the

credit of a bare vote of the house of commons, though no law be yet passed to

establish it.

The taxes, which are raised upon the subject, are either annual or perpetual.

The usual annual taxes are those upon land and malt.

1. The land-tax, in its modern shape, has superseded all the former methods of

rating either property, or persons in respect of their property, whether by tenths

or fifteenths, subsidies on land, hydages, scutages or talliages; a short explica-

tion of which will, however, greatly assist us in understanding our ancient laws

and history.

Tenths, and fifteenths, (a) were temporary aids issuing out of personal prop-

erty, and granted to the king by parliament. They were formerly the real tenth

or fifteeth part of all the movables belonging to the subject; when such

movables, or personal estates, were a very different and a much less considerable

thing than what they usually are at this day. Tenths are said to have been first

granted under Henry the Second, who took advantage of the fashionable zeal

for croisades, to introduce this new taxation, in order to defray the expense of a

(y) Page 282. (*) Page 188. (p) Z Inrt. 77. * Tnat. 34,
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pious expedition to Palestine, which he really or seemingly had projected against

Saladine, emperor of the Saracens; whence it was originally denominated the

Saladine tenth, (b) But afterwards fifteenths were more usually granted than

tenths. Originally the amount of these taxes was *uncertain, being r *QQQ i

levied by assessments new made at every fresh grant of the commons, a •• ' ' '

commission for which is preserved by Matthew Paris: (c) but it was at length

reduced to a certainty in the eighth year of Edward III, when, by virtue of the

king's commission, new taxations were made of every township, borough, and

city in the kingdom, and recorded in the exchequer; which rate was, at the time,

the fifteenth part of the value of every township, the whole amounting to about

29,000?., and therefore it still kept up the name of a fifteenth, when, by the alter-

ation of the value of money, and the increase of personal property, things came

to be in a very different situation: so that when, of later years, the commons

granted the king a fifteenth, every parish in England immediately knew their

proportion of it; that is, the same identical sum that was assessed by the same

aid in the eighth of Edward III; and then raised it by a rate among them-

selves, and returned it into the royal exchequer.

The other ancient levies were in the nature of a modern land-tax: for we

may trace up the original of that charge as high as to the introduction of our

military tenures; (d) when every tenant of a knight's fee was bound, if called

upon, to attend the king in his army for forty days in every year. But this per-

sonal attendance growing troublesome in many respects, the tenants found

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

means of compounding for it, by first sending others in their stead, and in pro-

cess of time by making a pecuniary satisfaction to the crown in lieu of it. This

pecuniary satisfaction at last came to be levied by assessments, at so much for

every knight's fee, under the name of scutages; which appear to have been levied

for the first time in the fifth year of Henry the Second, on account of his expedi-

tion to Toulouse, and were then, I apprehend, mere arbitrary compositions, as

the king and the subject could agree. But this precedent being afterwards

abused into a means of oppression, (in levying scutages on the landholders by

the royal authority only, whenever our kings went to war, in *order to •- *oi/\ -i

hire mercenary troops and pay their contingent expenses) it became L J

thereupon a matter of national complaint; and King John was obliged to

promise in his magna carta, (e) that no scutage should oe imposed without the

consent of the common council of the realm. This clause was indeed omitted

in the charters of Henry III, where (/) we only find it stipulated, that scutages

should be taken as they were used to be in the time of King Henry the Second.

Yet afterwards, by a variety of statutes under Edward I, and his grandson, (g)

it was provided, that the king shall not take any aids or tasks, any talliage or

tax, but by the common assent of the great men and commons in parliament.

Of the same nature with scutages upon knight's fees were the assessments of

hydage upon all other lands, and of talliage upon cities and burghs, (h) But

they all gradually fell into disuse upon the introduction of subsidies, about the

time of King Richard II, and King Henry IV. These were a tax, not imme-

diately imposed upon property, but upon persons in respect of their reputed

estates, after the nominal rate of 4s. in the pound for lands, and 2s. 8d. for

goods; and for those of aliens in a double proportion. But this assessment was

also made according to an ancient valuation ; wherein the computation was so

very moderate, and the rental of the kingdom was supposed to be so exceeding

low, that one subsidy of this sort did not, according to Sir Edward Coke, (t)

amount to more than 70,000?., whereas a modern land-tax, at the same rate, pro-

duces two millions. It was anciently the rule never to grant more than one

subsidy, and two fifteenths at a time; but this rule was broken through for the

first time on a very pressing occasion, the Spanish invasion in 1588; when the

parliament gave Queen Elizabeth two subsidies and four fifteenths. After-

eft) Hoved. A. D, 1188. Carte. 1. 719. Hume, i. 329.

(c) A. D. 1232. (d) See the second book of these Commentarlei. (c) Cap. 14.

(/) 9 Hen. Ill, o. 87. (ff) 25 Kdw. I, c. 5 and 6. 34 Edw. I, st 4. o. 1. 14 Kdw. HI, at. 8, o. 1.

(X) Madox, Hiet. Esch. 480. (0 4 Insi. 33.
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wards, as money sunk in value, more subsidies were given; and we have an

instance in the first parliament of 1640, of the king's desiring twelve subsidies

F *3111 °^ ^ne "commons, to be levied in three years; which was looked upon

1 -I as a startling proposal : though Lord Clarendon says, (k) that the

speaker, Serjeant Glanville, made it manifest to the house, Jiow'very inconsider-

able a sum twelve subsidies amounted to, by telling them he had computed

what he was to pay for them himself; and when he named the sum, he being

known to be possessed of a great estate, it seemed not worth any farther delib-

eration. And indeed, upon calculation, we shall find that the total amount of

these twelve subsidies, to be raised in three years, is less than what is now

raised in one year, by a land-tax of two shillings in the pound.

The grant of scutages, talliages, or subsidies, by the commons, did not extend

to spiritual preferments; those being usually taxed at the same time by the

clergy themselves in convocation : which grants of the clergy were confirmed in

parliament, otherwise they were illegal, and not binding: as the same noble

writer observes of the subsidies granted by the convocation, which continued

sitting after the dissolution of the first parliament, in 164-0. A subsidy granted

by the clergy was after the rate of 4s. in the pound, according to the valuation

of their livings in the king's books; and amounted, as Sir Edward Coke tells

us, (I) to about 20,000/. While this custom continued, convocations were wont to

sit as frequently as parliaments; but the last subsidies thus given by the clergy

were those confirmed by statute 15 Car. II, cap. 10, since which another method
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of taxation has generally prevailed, which takes in the clergy as well as the

laity; in recompence for which the beneficed clergy have from that period been

allowed to vote at the election of knights of the shire ; (m) and thenceforward also

the practice of giving ecclesiastical subsidies hath fallen into total disuse.

The lay subsidy was usually raised by commissioners appointed by the crown,

or the great officers of state; and therefore in the beginning of the civil wars

F *3121 ^e*weel1 Charles I and *his parliament, the latter having no other suffi-

1 " -I cient revenue to support themselves and their measures, introduced the

practice of laying weekly and monthly assessments (») of a specific sum upon the

several counties of the kingdom; to t>e levied by a pound rate on lands and per-

sonal estates; which were occasionally continued during the whole usurpation,

sometimes at the rate of 120,000/., a month, sometimes at inferior rates, (o)

After the restoration, the ancient method of granting subsidies, instead of such

monthly assessments, was twice and twice only, renewed; viz., in 1663, when

four subsidies were granted by the temporalty, and four by the clergy; and in

1670, when 800,OOOZ. was raised by way of subsidy, which was the last time of

raising supplies in that manner. (22) For the monthly assessments being now

established by custom, being raised by commissioners named by parliament, and

producing a more certain revenue; from that time forwards we hear no more

of subsidies, but occasional assessments were granted, as the national emer-

gencies required. These periodical assessments, the subsidies which preceded

them, and the more ancient scutage, hydage and talliage, were to all intents and

purposes a land-tax ; and the assessments were sometimes expressly called so. (p)

Yet a popular opinion has prevailed, that the land-tax was first introduced in

the reign of King William III; because in the year 1692 a new assessment or

<*) Hist, b. S. (J) 4 Inst 88- (m) Dalt. of Sherilft. 418. Glib. Hist, of Exch. c. 4.

(n) 29 Nov., 4 Mar. IMS.

lo) One of these bills of assessment, in 1696, is preserved in Soobell's Collection, 400.

I ?»> Com. Jonrn. X June, 9 Dec. 1678.

wards, as money sunk in value, more subsidies were given; and we have an
instance in the first parliament of 1640, of the king's desiring tweh-e subsidies
[ • 311 ] of the •commons, to be levied in three years; which '\'\'aS looked upon
as a. startling proposal : though Lord Clarendon says, (k) that the
speaker, Serjeant Glanville, made it manifest t.o the house, J10w very inconsiderable a sum twelve subsidies amounted to, by telling them lle had computed
what he was to pa.y for them himself; and when he named the sum, he being
known to be possessed of a gre.at estate, it seemed not worth any farther deliberation. And in<leed, upon calculation, we shall find that the total amount of
these twelve subsidies, to be raised in three years, is less than what is now
raised in one year, by a land-tax of two shillings in the pound.
The grant of scutages, talliages, or subsidies, by the commons, did not extend
to spiritual preferments; those being usually taxed at the same time by the
cler~y themselves in convocation: which grants of the clergy were confirmed in
parhament, otherwise they were illegal, and not bindin~: as the same noble
writer observes of the subsidies granted by the convocat10n, which continued
sitting after the dissolution of the first parliament, in 1640. A subsidy granted
by the clergy was after the rate of 4s. in the pound, according to the valuation
of their livmgs in the king's books; and amounted, as Sir Edward Coke tells
us, (l) to about 20,000l. Wnile this custom continued, convocations were wont t.o
sit as frequently as parliaments; but the last subsidies thus ~ven by the clergy
were those confirmed by statute 15 Car. II, cap. 10, since which another method
of taxation has generally prevailed, which takes in the clergy 88 well as the
laity ; in recompence for which the beneficed clergy have from that period been
allowed to vote at the election of knights of the shire; (m) and thenceforward also
the practice of giving ecclesiastical subsidies hath fallen into total disuse.
The lay subsidy was usually raised by commissioners appointed by the crown,
or the great officers of state; and therefore in the beginning of the civil wars
[ • 312 ] between Charles I and *his parliament, the latter ha.Ying no other sufficient revenue to support themselves and their measures, introduced the
practice of laying weekly and monthly assessments (n) of a specific sum upon the
several counties of the kingdom; to be leYied by a pound rate on lands and personal estates; which were occasionally continued during the whole usnrilat10n,
sometimes at the rate of 120,000l., a month, sometimes at inferior rates. (o)
After the restQration, the ancient method of granting subsidies, instead of such
monthly assessments, was twice and twice only, renewed; viz., in 1663, when
four subsidies were granted by the temporalty, and four by the clergy; and in
1670, when 800,000l. was raised by way of subsidy, which was the last time of
raisin~ supplies in that manner. (22) For the monthly assessments being now
established by custom, being raised by commissioners named by parliament, and
producing a more certain re•enue; from that time forwards we hear no more
of subsidies, but occasional assessments were granted, as the national emergencies required. These periodical assessments, the subsidies which preceded
them, and the more ancient scutage, hydage and talliage, were to all intents ancl
purposes a land-tax; and the assessments were sometimes expressly called so. (p)
Yet a popular opinion has prerniled, that the land-tax was first introduced in
the reign of King William III; because in the year 1692 a new assessment or

(22) [No subsidies were granted either by the laity or clergy after 1663. 15 Car. II, c. 9 and

lkl Hist. b. 2.
(l) ' lllst. sa·
(tnl Dalt. or Sherltlll. '18. Glib. Hist o!Exch. c. '·
(n) 211 Nov.,• Mar. i6'2.
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10. The learned judge has been misled by the title to the act of the 22 and 23 Car. n, c. 3,

in the year 1670, when he declares it was the last time of raising supplies by way of subsidy ;

for the title of it is, " An act to grant a subsidy to his majesty for supply of his eitraordinary

occasious." All the material clauses of which are copied verbatim in that of the 4 "W. and 1C.

(22) [No subsidies were granted either by the laity or clergy a.ft.er 1663. 15 Car. II, c. 9 and

c. 1 (the land-tax act); the act of Charles is not printed in the common edition of the Statutes

at Large, but it is given at length in Keble's edition. The scheme of taxing lauded property was

Dot a novelty, for it was first introduced in time of the commonwealth. ]
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valuation of estates was made throughout the kingdom; which, though by no

means a perfect one, had this effect, that a supply of 500,000?. was equal to Is.

in the pound of the value of the estates given in. And according to this enhanced

valuation, from the year 1693 to the present, a period of above fourscore years,

the land-tax has continued an annual charge upon the subject; above half the

time at 4s. in the pound, sometimes at 3s., sometimes at 2s., twice (q) at Is., but

without any total intermission. The medium has been 3s. 3d. in the pound,

being equivalent with twenty-three ancient subsidies, and amounting annually

*to more than a million and a half of money. The method of raising r *„]« -i

it, is by charging a particular sum upon each county, according to the L '

valuation given in A. D. 1692; and this sum is assessed and raised upon indi-

viduals (their personal estates, as well as real, being liable thereto) by commis-

sioners appointed in the act, being, the principal landholders of the county, and

their officers.

II. The other annual tax is the malt-tax; which is a sum of 750,000?., raised

every year by parliament, ever since 1697, by a duty of 6d. in the bushel on

malt, and a proportionable sum on certain liquors, such as cider and perry,

which might otherwise prevent the comsumption of malt. This is under the

management of the commissioners of the excise; and is, indeed, itself no other

than an annual excise, the nature of which species of taxation I shall pre-

sently explain; only premising at present, that in the year 1760 an additional

perpetual excise of 3d. per bushel was laid upon malt; to the produce of which
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a duty of 15 per cent, or nearly an additional halfpenny per bushel, was added

in 1779 ; and that in 1763 a proportionable excise was laid upon cider and perry,

but so new-modelled in 1766, as scarce to be worth collecting.

The perpetual taxes are, (23)

I. The customs; or the duties, toll, tribute, or tariff, payable upon merchan-

dize exported and imported. The considerations upon which this revenue (or

the more ancient part of it, which arose only from exports,) was invested in

the king, were said to be two: (r) 1. Because he gave the subject leave to

depart the kingdom, and to carry his goods along with him. 2. Because the

king was bound of common right to maintain and keep up the ports and

havens, and to protect the merchants from pirates. Some have imagined they are

called with us customs, because they were the inheritance of the king by

immemorial usage and the common law, and not granted him by any statute: (s)

but Sir Edward Coke hath clearly shewn, (t) that the king's first claim to them

was by *grant of parliament 3 Edw. I, though the record thereof is not now r *gi 4 n

extant. And indeed this is in express words confessed by statute 25 ^ -*

Edw. I, c. 7, wherein the king promises to take no customs from merchants with

out the common assent of the realm, " saving to us and our heirs, the customs on

wool, skins and leather, formerly granted to us by the commonalty aforesaid."

These were formerly called the hereditary customs of the crown; and were due

on the exportation only of the said three commodities, and of none other;

which were styled the staple commodities of the kingdom, because they were

obliged to be brought to those ports where the king's staple was established, in

order to be there first rated, and then exported, (u) They were denominated,

in the barbarous Latin of our ancient records, custuma, (v) not consuetudines,

which is the language of our law whenever it means merely usages. The

duties on wool, sheep-skins, or woolfells, and leather, exported, were called cus-

(9) In the years 1732 and 1733.

(r) Dyer, 165. (») Dyer, 43, pi. 24. (<) 2 Inst. 58, 59. (u) Dav. 9.

(v} Tills appellation seems to be derived from the French word cotutam or contain, which signifies toil

valuation of estates was made throughout the kingdom ; which, though by no
means a perfect one, had this effect, that a supply of 500,000l. was equal to ls.
in the pound of the value of the estates given in. And according to this enhanced
valuation, from the year 1693 to the present, a period of above fourscore years,
the land-tax has continued an annual charge upon the subject; above half the
time at 4s. in the pound, sometimes at 3s., sometimes at 2s., twice (q) at 1.s., but
without any totu.l intermission. 'l'he medium has been 3s. 3d. in the pound,
being equivalent with twenty-three ancient subsidies, and amounting annually
*to more than a million and a half of money. The method of raising [ • 313 ]
it, is by ohargin~ a particulur sum upon each county, according to the
valuation given m A. D. 1692; and this sum is assessed and raised upon individuals (their personal estates, as well as real, being liable thereto) by commissioners appointed in the act, being the principal landholders of the county, and
their officers.
.. ·
II. The other annual tax is the malt-tax; which is a sum of 750,000l., raised
every year by parliament, ever since 1697, by a duty of 6d. in the bushel on
malt, and a proportionable sum on certain liquors, such as cider and perry,
which might otherwise prevent the comsumption of malt. This is under the
management of the commissioners of the excise; and is, indeed, itself no other
than an annual excise, the nature of which species of taxation I shall presently explain ; only premising at present, that in the year 1760 an additional
perpetual excise of 3d. per bushel was laid upon malt; to the produce of which
a duty of 15 per cent. or nearly an a.dditional halfpenny per bushel, was added
in 1i79 ; and that in 1763 a proportionable excise was laid upon cider and perry,
but so new-modelled in 1766, as scarce to be worth collecting.
'fhe perpetual taxes are, (23)
I. The customs; or the duties, toll, tribute, or tariff, payable upon merchandize exported and imported. The considerations upon which this revenue (or
the more ancient part of it, which arose only from exports,) was invested in
the king, were said to be two: (r) 1. Because he gave the subject leave to
depart the kingdom, and to carry his goods along with him. 2. Because the
king was bound of common right to maintain and keep up the ports and
havens, and t-0 protect the merchants from pirates. Some have imagined they are
called with us customs, because they were the inheritance of the king by
immemorial usage and the common law, and not granted him by any statute: (s)
but Sir Edward Coke hath clearly shewn, (t) that the king's first claim to them
was by *grant of parliament 3 Ed w. I, though the record thereof is not now [ • 314 ]
extant. And indeed this is in express words confessed by statute 25
Edw. I, c. 7, wherein the king promises to take no customs from merchants with
out the common assent of the realm, "saving to us and our heirs, the customs on
wool, skins and leather, formerly granted to us by the commonalty aforesaid."
These were formerly called the hereditary customs of the crown ; and were due
on the exportation only of the said three commodities, and of none other;
which were styled the staple commodities of the kingdom, because they were
obliged t-0 be brought to those ports where the king's staple was established, in
order to be there first rated, and then exported. ( u) They were denominated,
in the barbarous Latin of our ancient records, custuma, (v) not con,~uetudines,
which is the language of our law whenever it means merely usages. The
duties on wool, sheep-skins, or woolfells, and leather, exported, ,\-ere called cus-

or tribute, and owes Its own etymolgy to the word cmist. which signifies price, charge, or. as we have

adopted it in English, cott.

(23) The land and malt taxes are now perpetual also.

An income tux of ten per cent was introduced by Mr. Pitt, in 1798, which was removed in

18fti, but again imposed under the name of property tax in 1803, and continued in force till

1816. It was re-imposed by Sir Kobert Peel in 1842, and from that time has been continued to

the present, though the rate has varied.
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(ql In the yeal"ll 1732 and 1733.
( r) Dyer, 165.
(•l Dyer, 43, pl. 24.
(t) 2 Inst. Iii!, 119.
(a) Dav. 9.
(1') This appellaUon &eems to be derived from the French word comtum or coutum, which slgnlftes toil
or trllrnte, .and owos Its own etymolgy to the word cotUt, which slgni.ftes price, charge, or, as we have
adopted it m EngJlgh, co•t.
- · - -- - ·-

- -- ---- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -

(23) The la.nd and ma.It to.xes are now perpetual also.
A,n income .tu~ of ten pt>r cent was mtroduced by Mr. Pitt, in 1798, which wa.~ removed in
lilO"-, I.mt agam ~mposed uude.r the name of property to.x in 1803, and continued in force till
ll:H6. It wtR< rn-nupotied by Sir Hobert Peel m 1!::142, and from that time bas been continued w
the pregr,nt, though the rate ha.~ >aried.
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tuma antiqua sive magna: and were payable by every merchant, as well native

as stranger; with this difference, that merchant strangers paid an additional

toll, viz.: half as much again as was paid by natives. The custuma parva et nova

were an impost of 3d. in the pound, due from merchant strangers only, for all

commodities, as well imported as exported; which was usually called the alien's

duty, and was first granted in 31 Edw. I, (to) But these ancient hereditary cus-

toms, especially those on woll and woolfells, came to be of little account, when

the nation became sensible of the advantages of a home manufacture, and pro-

hibited the exportation of wool by statute 11 Edw. Ill, c. 1.

There is also another very ancient hereditary duty belonging to the crown,

called the prisage or butlerage of wines, which is considerably older than the

customs, being taken notice of in the great roll of the exchequer, 8 Hie. I, still

exchanged into a duty of 2s. for every ton imported by merchant strangers, and

called butlerage, because paid to the king's butler, (y)

Other customs payable upon exports and imports were distinguished into sub-

sidies, tonnage, poundage, and other imposts. Subsidies were such as were

imposed by parliament upon any of the staple commodities before mentioned,

over and above the cii&luma antiqua et magna; tonnage was a duty upon all

wines imported, over and above the prisage and butlerage aforesaid: poundage

was a duty imposed ad valorem, at the rate of 12d. in the pound, on all other

merchandize whatsoever; and the other imposts Were such as were occasionally

laid on by parliament, as circumstances and times required, (z) These distinc-
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tions are now in a manner forgotten, except by the officers immediately concerned

in this department; their produce being in effect all blended together under the

one denomination of the customs.

By these we understand, at present, a duty or subsidy paid by the merchant

at the quay upon all imported as well as exported commodities, by authority of

parliament; unless where, for particular national reasons, certain rewards, boun-

ties, or drawbacks, are allowed for particular exports or imports. Those of ton-

nage and poundage, in particular, were at first granted, as the old statutes (and

particularly 1 Eliz. c. 10,) express it, for the defence of the realm, and the keep-

ing and safeguard of the seas, and for the intercourse of merchandize safely to

come into and pass out of the same. They were at first usually granted only

for a stated term of years: as, for two years in 5 Kid II; (a) but in Henry the

Sixth's time they were granted him for life by a statute in the thirty-first year of

his reign; and again to Edward IV, for the term of his life also: since which

time they were regularly granted to all his successors for life, sometimes at the

first, sometimes at other subsequent, parliaments, till the reign of Charles the

F *3161 *^rst' wnen> *? the noble historian expresses it, (b) his ministers were not

<• J sufficiently solicitous for a renewal of this legal grant. And yet these

imposts were imprudently and unconstitutionally levied and taken, without

consent of parliament, for fifteen years together; which was one of the canses

of those unhappy discontents, justifiable at first in too many instances, but

which degenerated at last into causeless rebellion (24) and murder. For as in

(ic) 4 Inst. ». (x) Madox, lli.il. Kxeli. 52ii, 532.

(y) Dav. 8. 2 Bulst. --'51. Stat. Estr. Hi Edw. 11. Com. Jonrn. 27 April, 1689.

(z) Dav. 11, 12. (a) Dav. 12. (6) Hist. Retell, b. 8.

(24) [The causes of resistance were numerous, and to the last hour of the pending treaty of

TTxbridge some of them existed. Xot one of the supposed prerogatives, against the future

exertion of which security was sought by the treaty, out had operated some grievance upon

tuma antiqua sive magna : and were payable by every merchant, as well native
as stranger; with this difference, that merchant strangers pa.id an additional
toll, viz.: half as much again as was paid by natives. The custuma parva et nova
were a.n impost of 3d. in the pound, due from merchant strangers only, for all
commodities, as well imported as exported; which was usually called the a.lien's
duty, and was first granted in 31 Edw. I, (w) But these ancient hereditary customs, especially those on woll and woolfolls, came to be of little account, when
the nation became sensible of the a.ch-ant.ages of a home manufacture, and prohibited the exportation of wool by statute 11 Edw. III, c. 1.
There is also another very ancient hereditary duty belonging to the crown,
·called the prisage or butlerage of wines, which is considerably older than the
customs, being taken notice of in the great roll of the exchequer, 8 Ric. I, still
[ ,..315 ] extant. (x) Prisage was a right of taking two tons of wine from *every
ship (English or foreign) importin~ into England twent1 tons or more,
one before and one behind the mast; which by charter of Edward I, was
exchanged into a duty of 2s. for every ton imported by merchant strangers, and
called butlernge, because paid to the king's butler. (y)
Other customs payable upon exports and imports were distinguished into subsidies, tonnage, poundage, and other imposts. Subsidies were such as were
imposed by parliament upon any of the staple commodities before mentioned,
over and above the C'ltstuma antiqua et magna; tonnage was a duty upon all
wines imported, over and above the prisage and butlerage aforesaid: poundage
was a duty imposed ad valorem, at the rate of 12d. in the pound, on all other
merchandize whatsoever; and the other imposts were such as were occasionally
laid on by parliament, as circumstances and titnes required. (z) These distinctions are now in a manner forgotten, exce:pt by the officers immediately concerned
in this department; their produce being m effect all blended together under the
one denomination of the customs.
By these we understand, at present, a duty or subsidy paid by the merchant
at the quay upon all imported as well as exported commodities, by authority of
parliament; unless where, for particular national rea.sons, certain rewards, bounties, or drawbacks, are allowed for particular exports or imports. Those of tonnage and poundage, in particular, were at first granted, as the old statutes (and
particularly 1 Eliz. c.10,) express it, for the defence of the realm, and the keepmg and safeguard of the seas, and for the intercourse of merchandize safely to
come into and pass out of the same. They were at first usually ~ranted only
for a stated term of years: as, for two years in 5 Ric. II; (a) but m Henry the
Sixth'a time they were granted him for hfe by a statute in the thirty-first year of
his reign; and again to Edward IV, for the term of his life also: since which
time they were regularly granted to all bis successors for life, sometimes at the
:first, sometimes at other subsequent, parliaments, till the reign of Charles the
[ • 316 ] *First; when, as the noble historian expresses it, (h) his ministers were not
sufficiently solicitous for a renewal of this legal grant. And yet these
imposts were imprudently and unconstitutionally levied and taken, without
consent of parliament. for fifteen years together; which was one of the causes
of those unhappy discontents, justifiable at first in too many instances, but
which degenerated at last into causeless rebellion (24) and murder. For as in

the subject. The king, at a meeting on the occasion of that treaty, had actually agreed to

sign it; but, as the discussion of its several items had been long and late, the mere signing was

adjourned to eight o'clock the next morning. The unfortunate king appeared to part -with

(ID) ' Inst. 29.
(y) Dav. 8. 2
l~)

(.r)

Madox, ltist. Exeb. 628 682.

Bulllt. 2M. Stat. Estr. 16 Edw. ll. Com. Jonrn. 27 April, 1689.
Dav. 11, 12.
(a) Dav. 12.
(b) mst. Rebt>ll. IJ. 3.

the commissioners in excellent temper and with seeming good will towards them ; they antici-

pating nothing else than the completion of the treaty. But the event showed that they were

not justified m placing any reliance upon the monarch, who, it appears, could not rely
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(24) [The causes of reRi1;tt\11ce were numerous, and to the la.~t hour of the pending treaty of
Uxbndge 1:1ome of them exi8ted. .Not one of the supposed prerogatives, ago.inst the future
exertion of which security WR.R souirht by the treaty, but had operated some grievance UJ>Oll
the subject. The king, at a meeting on the occe.-;ion of that treaty, had actually agree<! to
siim it; but, as the di1;cus~ion of its ~everal items bad been long and late, the mere ~igmng wa.->
adjourned to eight o'clock the next morning. The unfortnllllte king appeared to part with
the commissioncril in excellent temper and with seeming good will towa.rdi; them ; they ~11ti1ii
pating nothin~ eh1e than the completion of the treaty. But the e'°eut showed that they wero
nut justified m placing any reliance upon the monarch, who, it appears, could not rely
198
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every other, so in this particular case, the king (previous to the commencement

of hostilities) gave the nation ample satisfaction for the errors of his former

conduct, by passing an act, (c) whereby he renounced all power in the crown of

levying the duty of tonnage and poundage without the express consent of par-

liament; and also all power of imposition upon any merchandizes whatever.

Upon the restoration, this duty was granted to King Charles the Second for life,

and so it was to his two immediate successors; but now by three several statutes,

9 Ann. c. 6, 1 Geo. I, c. 12, and 3 Geo. I, c. 7, it is made perpetual, and mortgaged

for the debt of the public. The customs thus imposed by parliament are

chiefly contained in two books of rates, set forth by parliamentary authority; (d)

one signed by Sir Harbottle Grimston, speaker of the house of commons in

Charles the Second's time; and the other an additional one signed by Sir Spen-

ser Compton, speaker in the reign of George the First; to which also subsequent

additions have been made. Aliens pay a larger proportion than natural subjects,

which is what is now generally understood by the aliens' duty; to be exempted

from which is one principal cause of the frequent applications to parliaments for

acts of naturalization. (25)

These customs are then, we see, a tax immediately paid by the merchant,

although ultimately by the consumer. And yet these are the duties felt least by

the people; and, if prudently managed, the people hardly consider that they

pay them at all. For the merchant is easy, being sensible he does not pay them

for himself; and the consumer, who really *pays them, confounds them ,- „,„, „ -,
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with the price of the commodity; in the same manner, as Tacitus *• J

observes, that the Emperor Nero gained the reputation of abolishing the tax of

the sale of slaves, though he only transferred it from the buyer to the seller: so

that it was, as he expresses it, " remissum -magis specie, quam vi: quia, cum

venditor pendere juberetur, in partem pretii emptoribus accrescebat. (e) But

this inconvenience attends it, on the other hand, that these imposts, if too heavy,

are a check and cramp upon trade; and especially when the value of the com-

modity bears little or no proportion to the quantity of the duty imposed. This,

in consequence, gives rise also to smuggling, which then becomes a very lucra-

tive employment; and its natural and most reasonable punishment, viz.: confis-

cation of the commodity, is in such cases quite ineffectual; the intrinsic value

of the goods, which is all that the smuggler has paid, and therefore all that he

(c) 16 Car. I, c, 8. (d) Stat. IS Car. D, o. *. 11 Geo. I, c. 7. («) Hist. 1.13.

upon himself. In the night he received letters from the qneen, announcing French aid at

ew.ry other, so in this particular case, the kin~ (previous to the commencement
of hostilities) gave the nation ample satisfact10n for the e1Tors of his former
conduct, by passing an act, (c) whereby he renounced all power in the crown of
levying the duty of tonnage and poundage without the express consent of parliament; and also all power of imposit10n upon any merchandizes whatever.
Upon the restomtion, this duty was granted to King Charles the Second for life,
and so it was to his two immeCliate successors; but now by three several statutes,
9 Ann. c. 6, 1 Geo. ·1, c. 12, and 3 Geo. I, c. 7, it is made perpetual, and mortgaged
for the debt of the public. The customs thus imposed by parliament are
chiefly contained in two books of rates, set forth by parliamentary authority; (rl)
one signed by Sir Harbottle Grimston, speaker of the house of commons in
Charles the Second's time; and the other an additional one signed by Sir Spenser Compton, speaker in the reign of George the First; to which also subsequent
additions have been made. Aliens pay a larger proportion than natural subjects,
which is what is now generally understood by the aliens' duty; to be exempted
from which is one principal cause of the frequent applications to parliaments for
acts of naturalization. (2.5)
These customs are then, we see, a tax immediately paid by the merchant,
although ultimately by the consumer. And yet these are the duties felt least by
the people; and, if prudently managed, the people hardly consider that they
pay them at all. For the merchant is easy, being sensible he does not pay them
for himself; and the consumer, who really *pays them, confounds them [ • 317 ]
with the price of the commodity; in the same manner, as Tacitus
observes, thnt the Emperor Nero gained the reputation of abolishing the tax of
the sale of slaT"es, though he only transferred it from the buyer to the seller: so
that it was, as he expresses it, "remissum magis specie, quam vi : ruia, cum
venditor pendere juberetur, in partem pretii emptoribus accr<JScebat.' (e) But
this inconvenience attends it, on the other hand, that these imposts, if too heavy,
are a check and cramp upon trade; and especially when the value of the commodity bears little or no proportion to the quantity of the duty imposed. This,
in consequence, gives rise also to smuggling, which then becomes a very lucrative employment; and its natural and most reasonable punishment, viz.: confiscation of the commodity, is in such cases quite ineffectual; the intrinsic value
of the goods, which is all that the smuggler has paid, and therefore all that he

hand; and, at the time appointed in the morning for that purpose, the king refused to sign

(c) 16 Car. I, c, 8.

(d) St&t. 12 Car. Il, c. 4. 11 Geo. I, c. 7.

(e) Hist. 1. 13.

the treaty. The honse was sitting when the news of the refusal arrived; disappointment and

regret clonded every brow. The event ia too well known: The king lost his me, but he was

not murdered. It became a queston of self-preservation and of power, and Cromwell and

his supporters prevailed. If it bo conceded that the death of the first Charles shall rightly be

called a murder, how are the deaths of Lord Stafford, in the subsequent reign, and those ot

Sir Henry Vane and others, to be designated f That the king, a papist, might not seem to

favor popery, he allowed the poor old peer to be murdered; and, in violation of his word

that the life of Yane should be spared, the king permitted him to be judicially destroyed.

His noble reply, when he was urged to become a suppliant to the restored monarch, deserves

to be remembered: " If the king do not think himself more concerned for his honor and his

word, than I do for my life, they may take it." None of these judicial acts are excusable oa

any ground of justice, policy, or expediency; but Charles, had he survived and resumed his

power, would have immolated more martyrs to liberty than its champions sacrificed of those

to royalty. Let the student look at the facts; not through Hume's glazing, or Lord Clarendon's

beautiful apology, but through the public events, state papers, and proceedings of the period.

Then let him turn to the recorded deeds of the profligacy of one son, and to those indicating the

fatuity of the other; and he will not fail to perceive that the subsequent revolution became

necessary to the preservation of the state and people; and, if it was so necessary, then a justifi-

cation for the resistance, rebellion, if that word be thought more appropriate, opposed to this

family, beginning with the father, will be read.]

(25) The statutes imposing custom duties have been repeatedly modified since these Com-

mentaries were written, and are likely to be so often from time to time as to make it not worth

•while to give even a synopsis of them in a work of this character. Information concerning

them is not only obtainable iu the statutes and official publications, but also in the Encyclo-

pedias, aud other works readily accessible.
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upon himself. In the night he received letters from the queen, announcing French aid at
hand ; and, at the time appointed in the morning for that purpose, the king refmied to 11ign
the treaty. The house W88 sitting when the news of the refusal arrived; diso.pvointment and
regret clouded every brow. The event is too well known. The king lost his hfe, but he was
not murdered. It became a queston of self-preservation and of power, and Cromwell and
hi11 Kupporters prevailed. If it bo conceded that the death of the first Charles Rhall ri~btlv be
called a murder, bow are the deaths of Lord Stafford, in the. subsequent rei~n, and tho~e ot
Sir llenry Vane and othen>, to be designated t That the king, a papist, m1~ht not seem to •
farnr popery, he allowed the poor old peer to be murdered; and, in yiolat10n of hiR word
that the life of Vune should be Rpared, the king permitted him to be judicially destroyed.
His noble reply, when be was urged to become a suppliant to the restored monarch, de1mrves
to be remembered: "If the king do not think himself more concerned for his honor ancl his
word, than I do for my life, they may take it." Nono of these judicial act.a are excusnble 011
any ground of justice, policy, or expediency; but Charles, had he stirVived and resumed hit1
power, would ha'l"e immolated more martyrs to liberty than its champions sacrificed of tho~e
to royalty. Let the student look at the facts; not through Hume's glazing, or Lord Clarundon';i
beautiful apology, but through the public events, 11tate papers, and proceedings of the poriocl.
Then let him turn to the recorded deeds of thll prhfligC1Cy of one son, and to those indicating the
fatuity of the other; and he will not fail to perceive that the subsequent revolution became
necessary to tho preserration of the state and people; and, if it was t10 necessary, then a justification for the resistance, rebellion, if that word be thought more appropriate, opposed to this
family, beginning with the father, will be read.]
(25) The statutes impoHing cm1tom duties have been repeatedly modified since these Com·
mentaries were written, and arc likely to be so often from time to time a.-1 to make it not worth
while to give e'l"<m a synop11h1 of them in a work of thiH character. Information concerning
them iH not onl.r obtainable in the statutes and official publications, but also in the Encych•pe<lia.-, ancl other works readily acce--<irible.
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can lose, being very inconsiderable when compared with his prospect of advan-

tage in evading the duty. Recourse must therefore be had to extraordinary pun-

ishments to prevent it, perhaps even to capital ones; which destroys all propor-

tion of punishment, (/) and puts murderers upon an equal footing with such as

are really guilty of no natural, but merely a positive, offence.

There is also another ill consequence attending high imposts on merchandize,

not frequently considered, but indisputably certain; that the earlier any tax is

laid on a commodity, the heavier it falls upon the consumer in the end; for

every trader through whose hands it passes must have a profit, not only upon

the raw material and his own labour and time in preparing it, but also upon the

very tax itself which he advances to the government; otherwise he loses the use

and interest of the money which he so advances. To instance, in the article of

foreign paper. The merchant pays a duty upon importation, which he does not

receive again till he sells the commodity, perhaps at the end of three months,

r *qio-i He is therefore equally entitled to a profit upon that duty *which he

"- -" pays at the custom-house, as to a profit upon the original price which he

pays to the manufacturer abroad, and considers it accordingly in the price he

demands of the stationer. When the stationer sells it again, he requires a profit

of the printer or bookseller upon the whole sum advanced by him to the mer-

chant ; and the bookseller does not forget to charge the full proportion to the

student or ultimate consumer; who therefore does not only pay the original duty,

but the profits of these three intermediate traders who have successively advanced
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it for him. This might be carried much farther in any mechanical, or more com-

plicated, branch of trade.

II. Directly opposite in its nature to this is the excise duty, which is an inland

imposition, paid sometimes upon the consumption of the commodity, or fre-

quently upon the retail sale, which is the last stage before the consumption.

This is doubtless, impartially speaking, the most economical way of taxing the

subject; the charges of levying, collecting, and managing the excise duties,

being considerably less in proportion than in other branches of the revenue.

It also renders the commodity cheaper to the consumer than charging it with

customs to the same amount would do; for the reason just now given, because

generally paid in a much later stage of it But, at the same time, the rigour

and arbitrary proceedings of excise laws seem hardly compatible with the temper

of a free nation. For the frauds that might be committed in this branch of the

revenue, unless a strict watch is kept, make it necessary, wherever it is estab-

lished, to give the officers a power of entering and searching the houses of snch

as deal in excisable commodities at any hour of the day, and, in many cases,

of the night likewise. And the proceedings in case of transgressions are so

summary and sudden, that a man may be convicted in two days' time in the

penalty of many thousand pounds by two commissioners or justices of the peace,

to the total exclusion of the trial by jury, and disregard of the common law.

r „„, Q -, For which reason, though Lord *Clarendon tells us, (g) that to his

I- -I knowledge the Earl of Bedford (who was made lord treasurer by King

Charles the First, to oblige his parliament) intended to have set up the ex-

cise in England, yet it never made a part of that unfortunate prince's reve-

nue ; being first introduced, on the model of the Dutch prototype, by the par-

liament itself after its rupture with the crown. Yet such was the opinion of its

general unpopularity, that when in 1642 " aspersions were cast by malignant

persons upon the house of commons, that they intended to introduce excises,

the house for its vindication therein did declare, that these rumours were false

and scandalous, and that their authors should be apprehended and brought to

condign punishment." (h) However,its original (i) establishment was in 1643,

(/) Montesq. 8p. L. b. 18, c. 8. (a) Hist, b. 3. (») Com. Journ. 8 Oct. 164S.

(i) The translator and continnator ofl'etaYliiB's Chronological History (Lonil. 1659, fol.) informs us that it

was first moved fbr 28 Mar. 1643. by Mr. Prynne. And it appears from the journals of the commons that on

that dav the house resolved itself into a committee to consider of raising money, in consequence of which

the excise was afterwards voted But Mr. Prynne was not n member of parliament till 7 Nov. 16*$; and

published in 1654, •' A protestation against the Illegal, detestable, and oft-condemned tax and extortion of

excise in general." It is probably therefore a mistake of the printer for Mr. Pymme, who was intended

for chancellor of the exchequer under the Karl of Bedford. Lord Claf. b. 7.
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and its progress was gradual; being at first laid upon those persons and com-

modities where it was supposed the hardship would be least perceivable, viz.

the makers or venders of beer, ale, cider, and perry, (k) and the royalists at

Oxford soon followed the example of their brethren at Westminster by impos-

ing a similar duty; both sides protesting that it should be continued no longer

than to the end of the war, and then be utterly abolished. (I) But the parlia-

ment at Westminster soon after imposed on it flesh, wine, tobacco, sugar, and

such a multitude of other commodities, that it might fairly be denominated

general: in pursuance of the plan laid down by Mr. Pymme, (who seems to have

been the father of the excise,) in his letter to Sir John Hotham, (m) signifying

" that they had proceeded in the excise to many particulars, and intended to go

on farther: but that it *would be necessary to use the people to it by r ^on i

little and little." And afterwards, when the nation had been accus- L "'"

tomed to it for a series of years, the succeeding champions of liberty boldly and

openly declared, " the impost of excise to be the most easy and indifferent levy

that could be laid upon the people;" (n) and accordingly continued it during

the whole usurpation. Upon King Charles's return, it having then been long

established, and its produce well known, some part of it was given to the crown,

in 12 Car. II, by way of purchase (as was before observed) for the feudal tenures

and other oppressive parts of the hereditary revenue. But, from its first origi-

nal to the present time, its very name has been odious to the people of England.

It has nevertheless been imposed on abundance of other commodities in the
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reigns of King William III, and every succeeding prince, to support the enor •

mous expenses occasioned by our wars on the continent. Thus brandies and

other spirits are now excised at the distillery; printed silks and linens, at the

printer's; starch and hair powder, at the maker's; gold and silver wire, at the

wire-drawer's; plate, in the hands of the vendor, who pays yearly for a license

to sell it; lands and goods sold by auction, for which a pound-rate is payable by

the auctioneer, who also is charged with an annual duty for his license; and

coaches and other wheel carriages, for which the occupier is excised, though not

with the same circumstances of arbitrary strictness, as in most of the other

instances. To these we may add coffee and tea, chocolate, and cocoa paste, for

which the duty is paid by the retailer; all artificial wines, commonly called

sweets; paper and paste-board, first when made, and again if stained or printed;

malt, as before mentioned; vinegars, and the manufacture of glass; for all which

the duty is paid by the manufacturer; hops, for which the person that gathers

them is answerable; candles and soap, which are paid for at the maker's; malt

liquors brewed for sale, which are excised at the brewery; cider and perry, at the

vendor's; and leather and skins, at the tanner's. A list, which no friend to his

country would wish to see farther increased.

*III. I proceed therefore to a third duty, namely, that upon salt; r $goi -i

•which is another distinct branch of his majesty's extraordinary revenue, *• •"

and consists in an excise of 3s. 4rf. per bushel imposed upon all salt, by several

statutes of King William and other subsequent reigns. This is not generally

called an excise, because under the management of different commissioners:

but the commissioners of the salt duties have, by statute 1 Ann. c. 21, the same

powers, and must observe the same regulations, as those of other excises. This

tax had usually been only temporary; but by statute 26 Geo. II, c. 3, was made

perpetual. (26)

ft) Com. Jonrn. 17 May, 1643. (I) Lord Clar. b. 7.

(m) 30 May, 1643. Dugdale, of the Troubles, 180. (v) Orel. 14 Aug. 1640, c. M. Soobel, 453.

(26) The duty has since been made almost nominal.

and its progress was gradual; being at first laid upon those persons and commodities where it was supposed the hardship would be least perceivable, viz.
the makers or venders of beer, ale, cider, and perry, (k) and the royalists at
Oxford soon followed the example of their brethren at Westminster by imposing a similar duty; both sides protesting that it should be continued no longer
than to the end of the war, and then be utterly abolished. (l) But the parliament at Westminster soon after im~osed on it flesh, wine, tobacco, sugar, and
such a multitude of other commodities, that it might fairly be denominated
general: in pursuance of the plan laid down by Mr. Pymme, (who seems to have
been the father of the excise,) in his letter to Sir John Hotham, (m) signifying
"that they had proceeded in the excise to many particulars, and mtended to go
on farther: but that it *would be necessary to use the people to it by [ • 320 ]
little and little." And afterwards, when the nation had been accus·
tomed to it for a series of years, the succeeding champions of liberty boldly and
openly declared, " the impost of excise to be the most easy and indifferent levy
that could be laid upon the people;" (n) and accordingly continued it during
the whole usurpation. Upon King Charles's return, it having then been long
established, and its produce well known, some part of it was given to the crown,
in 12 Car. II, by way of purchase (as was before observed) for the feudal tenures
and other oppressive parts of the hereditary revenue. But, from its first original to the present time, its very name has been odious to the people of England.
It has neverthele§B been imposed on abundance of other commodities in the
reigns of King William III, and every succeeding prince, to support the enor ·
mous expenses occasioned by our wars on the continent. Thus brandies and
other spirits are now excised at the distillery; printed silks and linens, at the
printer's; starch and hair powder, at the maker's; gold and silver wire, at the
wire-drawer's; plate, in the hands of the vendor, who pays yearly for a license
to sell it; lands and goods sold by auction, for which a pound-rate is payable by
the auctioneer, who also is charged with an annuul duty for his license; and
coaches and other wheel carriages, for which the occupier is excised, though not
with the same circumstances of arbitrary strictness, as in most of the other
instances. To these we may add coffee and tea, chocolate and cocoa paste, for
which the duty is paid by the retailer; all artificial wines, commonly called
sweets; paper and paste-board, first when made, and again if stained or printed;
malt, as before mentioned; vinegars, and the manufacture of glass; for all which
the duty is paid by the manufacturer; hops, for which the person that gathers
them is answerable; candles and soap, which are paid for at the maker's; malt
liquors brewed for sale, which are excised at the brewery; cider and perry, at the
vendor's; and leather and skins, at the tanner's. A list, which no friend to his
country would wish to see farther increased.
*III. I proceed therefore to a third duty, namely, that upon salt; [ • 321 ]
which is another distinct brunch of his mu.jest(s extraordinary revenue,
and consists in an excise of 38. 4d. per bushe imposed upon all salt, by several
statutes of King William and other subsequent reigns. This is not generally
called an excise, because under the management of different commissioners :
but the commissioners of the salt duties have, by statute 1 Ann. c. 21, the same
powers, and must observe the same regulations, as those of other excises. This
tax had usually been only temporary; but by statute 26 Geo. II, c. 3, was made
perpetual. (26)

It may be proper to give in this place a brief statement of the revenue system of the United

States.

(le)
(m)

Com . Joum. 17 May. JIUS.
(l) Lord Clar. b. 7.
30 May, 16'3. Dugdale, of the Troubles, 120.

(A) Ord. H Aug. 1649, o. llO.

Soobel, 4.53.

Congress has power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; but all duties,

imposts and excises must be uniform throughout the United States. Const, of U. S. art. 1, $ 8.

No capitation or other direct tax can be laid, unless in proportion to representative population,

and no tax or duty can be laid on articles exported Koin any state. Ibid. art. 1, 5 9. No
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(26) The duty has since been made almost nominal.
It may be proper to give in this place a brief statement of the revenue system of the United
States.
Congress has power to Jay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; but all duties,
imposts and excises must be uniform throughout the United States. Const. of U. S. art. 1, ~ 8.
No capitation or other direct tax ~an be laid, unless in proportion to representative population,
a.nd no tax or duty can be laid on articles exported from any state. Ibid. art. 1, ~ 9. No
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IV. Another very considerable branch of the revenue is levied with greater

cheerfulness, as, instead of being a burden, it is a manifest advantage to the

public. I mean the post-office, or duty for the carriage of letters. As we have

traced the original of the excise to the parliament of 1643, so it is but justice

to observe that this useful invention owes its first legislative establishment to

the same assembly. It is true, there existed postmasters in much earlier times.

but I apprehend their business was confined to the furnishing of post-horses to

persons who were desirous to travel expeditiously, and to the dispatching of

extraordinary pacqnets upon special occasions. King James I originally erected

iv post-office under the control of one Matthew De Quester, or De 1'Equester, for

the conveyance of letters to and from foreign parts; which office was afterwards

claimed by Lord Stanhope, (o) but was confirmed and continued to William

Frizell and Thomas Witherings by King Charles I, A. D. 1632, for the better

accommodation of the English merchants. (p) In 1635 the same prince erected

a letter-office for England and Scotland, under the direction of the same Thomas

Witherings, and settled certain rates of postage : (q) but this extended only to

a few of the principal roads; the times of carriage were uncertain, and the post-

masters on each road were required to furnish the mail with horses at the rate

T *3221 °^ ^^'a m^e- *Witherings was superseded for abuses in the exertion

*• -1 of both his offices, in 1640; and they were sequestered into the hands

of Philip Burlamachy, to be exercised under the care and oversight of the

king's principal secretary of state, (r) On the breaking out of the civil war,
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great confusions and interruptions were necessarily occasioned in the conduct

of the letter-office. And, about that time, the outline of the present more

extended and regular plan seems to have been conceived by Mr. Edmond

Prideaux, who was appointed attorney-general to the commonwealth after the

murder of King Charles. He was chairman of a committee in 1642 for con-

sidering what rates should be set upon inland letters; (s) and afterwards

appointed postmaster by an ordinance of both the houses, (() in the execution

of which office he first established a weekly conveyance of letters into all parts

of the nation; (u) thereby saving j;o the public the charge of maintaining post-

masters to the amount of 70001. per annum. And, his own emoluments being

probably very considerable, the common council of London endeavoured to

(o) Latch. Rep. 87. (p] 19 Rym. Foal. 885. (a) Ibid. 650. 20 Rym. 192.

(r) 3J itym. 429. (I) Com. Jonrn. 23 Mar. 1642. (*; Ibid. 7 Sept 1644. (H) Ibid. 21 Mar. 1649.

state can, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports,

except what may bo absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce

of all duties and imposts laid by any state on imports or exports shall be for the use of the trea-

sury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of con-

gress. Ibid. art. 1, $ 10. The general policy of the country has been to make the duties on

imports produce sufficient revenue for the ordinary wants of the government, and but little reli-

ance has been placed on other sources of revenue, except when the pressure of national necessi-

ties has been unusually great, and tin- expenditures extraordinary. Excise duties, and other

internal taxes, were levied during the administrations of Washington and John Adarns, while the

weight of the revolutionary debt was still oppressive, and again during the war of 1812 : but

from 1817 to 1861 the country enjoyed relief from this species of taxation. When the civil war

broke out, resort to extraordinary means of taxation became a necessity, and an elaborate scheme

of excise and stamp duties was devised, which, with many modifications, is still in force. The

customs duties were also increased generally, and an income tax was imposed of five per cent,

upon net incomes, after allowing a deduction of $600—afterwards increased to $1,000—and also

deductions for taxes paid, repairs on dwellings, and interest on indebtedness. This tax was

reduced to two and a half per cent, in 1870, and the exemption increased to $2,000, besides taxes,

tfcc. After 1871, it is to be wholly discontinued. It has been decided by the United States

supreme court that a tax on carriages was not a " direct tax," which, under the constitution, was

required to be apportioned among the states. Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171. Also that

the income tax was not a direct tax. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wai. 433. The state courts

decided that it was not competent for congress to require writs issued by state courts to be

stamped; Warren v. Paul, iW Ind. 279; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 Wis. 369; Fifield v. Close,

15 Mich. 509; Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 325; and congress seems to have accepted

these decisions by repealing the provisions of the statute which required such stamping. It was

also intimated in Massachusetts that congress had no power to provide that unstamped contracts

should not be admissible in evidence in the state courts. Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452. And

see note ante, page xiii.
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cheerfulness, as, instead of being a. burden, it is a. manifest advantage to the
public. I mean the post-office, or duty for the carriage of letters. As we have
traced the original of the excise to the parliament of 1643, so it is but justice
to observe that this useful invention owes it.s first legislative establishment to
the same assembly. It is true, there existed postmasters in much e.arlier times.
but I apprehend their business was confined to the furnishing of post-horses to
persons who were desirous to travel expeditiously, and to t.11e dispatching of
extraordinary pacquets upon special occasions. Kmg James I originally erected
a post-office under the control of one Matthew De Quester, or De l'Equester, for
the conveyance of letters to and from foreign parts; which office was afterwards
claimed by Lord Stanhope, (o) but was confirmed and continued to William
Frizell and Thomas Witherings by King Charles I, A. D. 1632, for the better
accommodation of the English merchants. ( p) In 1635 the same prince erected
a letter-office for England and Scotland, under the direction of the same Thomas
Witherings, and settled certain rates of posta~e: (q) but this extended only to
a few of the principal roads; the times of carriage were uncertain, and the postmasters on each road were required to furnish the mail with horses at the rate
[ *322 ] of 2-!d. a mile. *Witherings was superseded for abuses in the exertion
of both his offices, in 1640; and they were sequestered into the hands
of Philip Burlamachy, to be exercised under the care and oversight of the
king's principal secretary of state. (r) On the breaking out of the civil war,
great confusions and interruptions were necessarily occasioned in the conduct
of the letter-office. And, about that time, the outline of the present more
extended and regular J?lan seems to have been conceived by Mr. Edmond
Prideaux, who was appomted attorney-~eneral to the commonwealth after the
murder of King Charles. He was cha1rman of a committee in 1642 for considering what rates should be set upon inland letters; (s) and afterwards
appointed postmaster by an ordinance of both the houses, (t) in the execution
of which office he first established a weekly conveyance of letters into a.ll parts
of the nation; (u) thereby saving to the public the charge of maintaining postmasters to the amount of 7000l. per annum. And, his own emoluments being
probably very considerable, the common council of London endeavoured to
(o) t..atch. Rep. 87.
Ir) iORym. •i9.

(p) 19 Rym. Foe<l. ~.
(•I Com. Jonm. 2S .Mar.16'2.

(ql 1 bid. MO. iO Rym. 19'2.
{t; Ibid. 7 Sept. 16".
(U) Ibid. 21 Mar. 16'9.

Rtate can, without the consent of congress, la.y a.ny imposts or dutie.~ on imports or exports,
except wha.t ma.y bo l\hsolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; a.nd the net produce
of a.11 unties a.nu imposts le.id by a.ny state on imports or exports sha.ll be for the use of the treafiury of the United States; a.nd a.11 such la.ws shall be subject to the revision and control of conpes!I. Ibid. art. 1, § 10. The general policy of the country has been to make the duties on
unports produce sufficient revenue for the ordinary wants of the government, a.nd but little reliance has been placed on other sources of revenue, except when the pressure of na.tiona.I necessities ha.i; been unusually great, a.nd the expenditures extraordinary. Excise duties, and other
internal taxes, were levied during the administrations of W ashin~n a.nd John Adam!!, while the
weight of the revolutionary debt was still oppressive, and a.gam during the wa.r of 1812 : bnt
from 1817 to 1861 the country enjoyed relief from this specie~ of taxation. When the civil war
hroke out, resort to extraordinary mea.nR of taxation became a. necessity, a.nd an elaborate schemu
of excise and 1:1tamp duties was devised, which, with many modifications, is still in force. The
customs duties were also increased generally, and an income tax was imposed of five per cent.
upon net incomes, after allowin~ a. deduction of 9600--afterwards increased to tl,000-a.nd also
deductions for taxes paid, repairs on dwellings, a.nd interest on lndebtedne88. This tax was
reduced to two and a half per cent. in 1870, and the exemption increased to $2,000, be..<Udes taxes,
&{). After 1871, it is to be wholly dificontinued. It has been decided by the United States
iiupreme court tha.t a. tax on carriage1:1 ws..~ not a. "direct tax," which, under the constitution, was
required to be apportioned among the states. Hylton v. United States, 3 Da.11. 171. Also that
the income tax was not a direct tax. Pa.cific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wal. 433. The state courts
decided tha.t it was not competent for congress to require writs issued by state courts to be
stnmpcd; Warren v. Paul, 2"..! Ind. \?79; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 Wis. 369 ; Fifield r.. Close,
15 Mich. 509; Union Ba.nk v. Hill, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 3"25; and congress seems to have accepted
the110 decisions by repealing the provisions of the l!tatute which required such stamping. It was
a.lso intimated in .MasROOhu~ett.~ tha.t congress ha.d no power to provide that unstamped contracts
should not be admissible in e\'idence in the state court.~. Carpenter ti. Snelling, fJ1 Ka&l. 452. And
see note ante, page xiii.
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erect another post-office in opposition to his; till checked by a resolution of the

house of commons, (to) declaring that the office of postmaster is and ought to

be in the sole power and disposal of the parliament This office was afterwards

farmed by one Manly in 1654. (x) But, in 1657, a regular post-office was erected

by the authority of the protector and his parliament, (27) upon nearly the same

model as has been ever since adopted, and with the same rates of postage as

continued to the reign of Queen Anne, (y) After the restoration a similar

office, with some improvements, was established by statute 12 Car. II, c. 35, but

the rates of letters were altered, and some farther regulations added, by the

statutes 9 Ann. c. 10; 6 Geo. I, c. 21; 26 Geo. II, c. 12; 5 Geo. Ill, c. 25; and 7

Geo. Ill, c. 50; and penalties were enacted in order to confine the carriage of

letters to the public office only, except in some few cases: a provision which is

absolutely necessary; for nothing but *an exclusive right can support r *•>%<> n

an office of this sort: many rival independent offices would only serve •- ^

to ruin one another. The privilege of letters coming free of postage, to and

from members of parliament, was claimed by the house of commons, in 1660,

when the first legal settlement of the present post-office was made; (z) but

afterwards dropped (a) upon a private assurance from the crown, that this pri-

vilege should be allowed the members, (b) (28) And accordingly a warrant was

constantly issued to the postmaster-general, (c) directing the allowance thereof,

to the extent of two ounces in weight; till at length it was expressly confirmed

by statute 4 Geo. Ill, c. 24; which adds many new regulations, rendered neces-
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sary by the great abuses crept into the practice of franking; whereby the

annual amount of franked letters had gradually increased from 23,600^., in the

year 1715, to 170,7002., in the year 1763. (d) There cannot be devised a more

eligible method than this of raising money upon the subject: for therein both

the government and the people find a mutual benefit. The government acquires

a large revenue; and the people do their business with greater ease, expedition,

and cheapness, than they would be able to do if no such tax (and of course no

such office) existed. (29)

(w) Ibid, 24 Mar. 1649 (a) Scobell, 358. (y) Com. Jonrn. 9 Jane, 1697. Soobell.Sll.

(«) Com. Jonrn. 17 Dec. 1660. (a) Ibid. & Deo. 1660. (6) IMd. 16 Apr. 1739.

erect another post-office in opJ.>Osition to his; till checked by a resolution of the
house of commons, (w) declanng that the office of postmaster is and ought to
be in the sole power and disposal of the parliament. This office was afterwards
farmed by one Manly in 1654. (x) But, m 1657, a regular post-office was erected
by the authority of the protector and his parliament, (27) upon nearly the same
model as has been ever since adopted, and with the same rates of postage as
continued to the reign of Queen Anne. (y) After the restoration a similar
office, with some improvements, was estahhshed by statute 12 Car. II, c. 35, but
the rates of letters were altered, and some farther regulations added, by the
statutes 9 Ann. c. 10; 6 Geo. I, c. 21 ; 26 Geo. II, c. 12; 5 Geo. III, c. 25; and 1
Geo. III, c. 50 ; and penaltiP,s were enacted in order to confine the carriage of .
letters to the public office only, except in some few cases: a provision which is
absolutely necessary ; for nothing but *an exclusive right can support [ ,..323 ]
an office of this sort: many rival independent offices would only serve
to ruin one another. The privilege of letters coming free of postage, to and
from memherB of parliament, was claimed by the house of commons, in 1660,
when the first legal settlement of the present post-office was made; (z) but
afterwards dropped (a) upon a privu.te assurance from the crown, that this privilege should be allowed the members. (b) (28) And accordingly a warrant was
constantly issued to the postmaster-general, (c) directing the allowance thereof,
to the extent of two ounces in weight; till at length it was expressly confirmed
by statute 4 Geo. III, c. 24; which adds many new regulations, rendered necessary by the great abuses crept into the pmctice of' franking; whereb.Y the
annual amount of franked letters had gradually increased from 23,6001., m the
year 1715, to 170,7001., in the year 1763. ( d} There cannot be devised a more
eligible method than this of raising money upon the subject: for therein both
the government and the people find a mutual benefit. The government ~uires
a large revenue; and the people do their business with greater ease, expechtion,
and cheapness, than they would be able to do if no such tax (and of course no
such office) existed. (29)

(c Ibid. 26 Feb. 1734. (d) IMd. 23 Mar. 1764.

(27) [The preamble of the ordinance states, that the establishing one general post-office,

besides the benefit to commerce and the convenience of conveying public dispatches, " will bo

Ibid, 2' Mar. 1649
(z) Com. Joum. 17 Dee. 1680.
(c Ibid. 26 Feb. 173'.

(10)

(z) Scobell, 358.
(1() Com. Jonrn. 9 June, 1M7. Soobell, 611.
(al Ibid. ~ Deo. 1680.
(bJ Ibid. 16 A.pr. 1786.
(d)Ibid. 211Mar.176'.

the best means to discover and prevent many dangerous and wicked designs against the com-

monwealth."

The policy of having the correspondence of the kingdom under the inspection of govern-

ment is still continued; for, by a warrant from one of the principal secretaries of state, letters

may be detained and opened; but if any person shall wilfully detain or open a letter delivered

to the post-office without such authority, he shall forfeit 2(M. and be incapable of having any

future employment in the post-office. '9 Ann. c. 10, s. 40. But it has been decided that

no person is subject to this penalty but those who are employed in the post-office. 5 T. R.

101.]

The post-office is no longer regarded in England as a means of detecting conspiracies. Letters

passing through the mails are sometimes still opened on the warrant of the secretary of state,

bnt the occurrence is very rare, and would be sanctioned by public opinion only in extreme cases.

See May's Const. Hist., c. 11. No officer in America has a rigl.il. to open letters addressed to other

persons and deposited in the post-office;

(28) [The following account of it in the 23 vol. Parl. Hist. p. 56, is curious, and proves what:

originally were the sentiments of the two houses respecting this privilege. " Col. Titus reported ;

the bill for the settlement of the post-office, with the amendments: Sir Walter Carle delivered a

proviso for the letters of all members of parliament to go free during their sitting: Sir Heneage

Pinch Raid, It was a poor mendicant proviso, and below the honor of the Aoiwe. Mr. Prynne

spoke also against the proviso : Mr. Bunckley, Mr. Boscawen, Sir George Downing, and Serjeant

Charlton for it; the latter saying, ' The council's letters went free.' The question being called

for, the speaker, Sir Harbottfe Grimstone, was unwilling to put it; saying, he was ashamed of it;

nevertheless, the proviso was carried, and made part of the bill, which was ordered to be engross-

ed." This proviso the lords disagreed to, and left it out of the bill: and the commons agreed to

their amendment. 3 Hats. 82.]

(29) In 1849 a great experiment was made in Great Britain, by the reduction of pe>stiige on

letters within the United Kingdom to a uniform rate of one penny for a single half ounce,

(27) [The preamble of the ordinance states, that the establishing one ~eneral post-office,
bel!ides the benefit to commerce and the convenience of conYeying public dispatches, "will bo
the best means to discover and prevent many dangerous and wicked designs ag&ini1t the commonwealth."
The policy of having the correspondence of the kingdom under the inspection of government is still continued ; for, by a warrant from one of the principal secretaries of state, letters
may be detained and opened ; but if o.nl person shall wilfully detain or open a letter delivered
to the poRt-office without snch authonty, he shall forfeit 20l. and be incapable of having any
future employment in the post-office. 9 .Ann. c. 10, s. 40. But it has been decided that
no per~on is subject to this panalty but those who are employed in the post-office. 5 T. R.
101.)

The post-office is no longer regarded in England as a means of detecting conspirBCies. Letters
passing through the m&ils are sometimes still opened on the warrant of the secretary of state,
but the occurrence is very rare, and would be sanctioned by public opinion only in extreme cases.
See May'I! Const. Hist., o. 11. No officer in .America has anght to open lettersaddresaed to other
persons and deposited in the post-office,
(28) [The following account of it in the 23 ;ol. Parl. Hist. p. 56, is curious, and J>roves what ·
originally were the sentimentR of the two houses respecting this privilege. " Col. Titus reported ,
the bill for the settlement of the pmit-offic~, with the amendments: Sir Walter Carle delivered a
proviso for the letter8 of all members of parliament to go free during their sitting: Sir Heneage
Finch 68id, It WRA a poor mendicant provi.~o, and below the hoiior of the houJJe. Mr. Prrnue
spoke also against the proviso: Mr. Bunckley, Mr. Boscawen, Sir George Downing, and Se!Jeant
Charlton for it; the latter Raying, •The council's letters went free.' The question being called
for, the speaker, Sir Harbottle Grim8tone, was unwilling to put it; saying, M 1oas ashamed of it;
nevertheless, the proviso was carried, and made part of the bill, which WIJ.8 ordered to be engrossed.'' This proviso the lords disagreed to, and left it out of the bill: and the commonR agreed to
their a.mendment. 3 Hats. 82.]
(29) In 1849 a great experiment was made in Great Britain, by the reduction of pol:1tage on
lettem within the United Kin~dom to a uniform rate of one penny for a single half ounce,
and by a proportionate reduction on letters to the colonies, and on booki;, lll~pers, &c. The
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V. A fifth branch of the perpetual revenue consists in the stamp duties,

which are a tax imposed upon all parchment and paper whereon any legal pro-

ceedings, or private instruments of almost any nature whatsoever, are written ;

and also upon licenses for retailing wines, letting horses to hire, and for certain

other purposes; and upon all almanacks, newspapers, advertisements, cards,

dice, and pamphlets containing less than six sheets of paper. These imposts

are very various, according to the nature of the thing stamped, rising gradually

from a penny to ten pounds. This is also a tax, which, though in some instances

it may be heavily felt, by greatly increasing the expense of all mercantile ae well

as legal proceedings, yet if moderately imposed, is of service to the public

F *324 1 m £eneral by authenticating 'instruments, and rendering it much

J more difficult than formerly to forge deeds of any standing ; since, as

the officers of this branch of the revenue vary their stamps frequently, by marks

perceptible to none but themselves, a man that would forge a deed of King Wil-

liam's time, must know and be able to counterfeit the stamp of that date also.

In France and some other countries the duty is laid on the contract itself, not

on the instrument in which it is contained ; (as, with us too, besides the stamp

on the indentures, a tax is laid by statute 8 Ann. c. 9, of 6d. in the pound, upon

every apprentice-fee, if it be 501. or under ; and 1*. in the pound, if it be a

greater sum ;) but this tends to draw the subject into a thousand nice disquisi-

tions and disputes concerning the nature of his contract, and whether taxable

or not ; in which the farmers of the revenue are sure to have the advantage.(e)

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Our general method answers the purposes of the state as well, and consults the

ease of the subject much better. The first institution of the stamp duties was

by statutes 5 and 6 W. and M. c. 21, and they have since in many instances been

increased to ten times their original amount.

VI. A sixth branch is the duty upon houses and windows. As early as the

conquest, mention is made in domesday book of fnmage or fuage, vulgarly called

smoke farthings ; which were paid by custom to the king for every chimney in

the house. And we read that Edward the Black Prince (soon after his successes

in France) in imitation of the English custom, imposed a tax of a florin upon

every hearth in his French dominions. (/) But the first parliamentary estab-

lishment of it in England was by statute 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 10, whereby an

hereditary revenue of 2*. for every hearth, in all houses paying to church and

poor, was granted to the king forever. And, by subsequent statutes for the

more regular assessment of this tax, the constable and two other substantial

inhabitants of the parish, to be appointed yearly, (or the surveyor, appointed by

the crown, together with such constable or other public officer,) were once in

r $QOK -i every *year empowered to view the inside of every house in the parish.

' "'* J

But, upon the revolution, by statute 1 W. and M. st. 1, c. 10, hearth-

money was declared to be "not only a great oppression to the poorer sort, but a

badge of slavery upon the whole people, exposing every man's house to be

entered into, and searched at pleasure, by persons unknown to him ; and there-

fore, to erect a lasting monument of their majesties' goodness in every house in

the kingdom, the duty of hearth-money was taken away and abolished." This

monument of goodness remains among us to this day : but the prospect of it

was somewhat darkened, when in six years afterwards, by statute 7 \V m. Ill, c,

18, a tax was laid upon all houses (except cottages) of 2s. now advanced to 3s.

per annum, and a tax also upon all windows, if they exceeded nine, in such house.

Which rates have been from time to time, (g ) varied, being now extended to all

windows exceeding six: and power is given to surveyors, appointed by the

(«) Sp. of L. li. xlli. c. !). (/) Mod. Un. Hist, xxviii. 463. Spclm. Gloss, tit. Fuage.

(g) Slat. 20 Geo. II, c. 3. 31 Geo. II c. 22. 2 Geo. m, c. 8. 6 Geo. Ill, c. 38.

hope of those who favored this reduction was, that the increase in correspondence in conse-

quence would be so great, that the government would actually be gainer thereby; and this

hope has been fully justified by the result. Mr. Rowland Hill was the person principally

V. A fifth branch of the perpetual revenue consists in the stamp duties,
which are a tax imposed upon e.ll parchment and paper whereon any legal proceedings, or private instruments of almost any nature whatsoever, are written;
and also upon licenses for retailing wines, letting horses to hire, and for certain
other purposes; and upon all almana.cks, newspapers, advertisements, cards,
dice, and pamphlets containing less than six sheets of paper." These imposts
are very various, according: to the nature of the thing stamped, rising ~radually
from a penny to ten pounds. This is also a tax, which, though in some mstances
it may be heavily felt, by greatly increasin~ the expense of all mercantile as well
as legal proceedings, yet if moderately imposed, is of service to the public
[ • 324 ] m general by authenticating *instruments, and rendering it much
more difficult than formerly to forge deeds of any standing; since, as
the officers of this branch of the revenue vary their stamps frequently, by marks
perceptible to none but themselves, a man that would forge a deed of King William's time, must know and be able to counterfeit the stamp of that date also.
In France and some other countries the duty is laid on the contract itself, not
on the instrument in which it is contained; (as, with us too, besides the stamp
on the indentures, a tax is laid by statute 8 Ann. c. 9, of 6d. in the pound, upon
every apprentice-fee, if it be 501. or under; and ls. in the pound, if it be a
greater sum;) but this tends to draw the subject into a thousand nic~ disquisitions and disputes concerning the nature of his contract, and whether taxable
or not; in which the farmers of the revenue are sure to haYe the advautage.(e)
Our general method answers the purposes of the state as well, and consults the
ease of the subject much better. The first institution of the stamp duties was
by statutes 5 and 6 W. and M. c. 21, and they have since in many instances been
increased to ten times their original amount.
VI. A sixth branch is the duty upon houses a.nd windows. As early as the
conquest, mention is made in domesday book of fumage or fuage, vulgarly called
smoke farthings; which were paid by custom to the kmg for every chimney in
the house. And we read that Eu ward the Black Prince (soon after his successes
in France) in imit.ation of the English custom, imposed a tax of a florin upon
every hearth in his French dominions.(/) But the first parliamentary establishment of it in England was by statute 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 10, whereby an
hereditary revenue of' 2s. for every heart.h, in all houses paying to church and
poor, was granted to the king forever. And, by subsequent statutes for the
more regular assessment of this tax, the constable and two other substantial
inhabitants of the parish, to be appointed yearly, (or the surveyor, appointed hy
the crown, together with such constable or other public officer,) were once in
[ • 325 ] every •year empowered. to view the inside of every house in the parish.
But, upon the revolution, by statute 1 W. and M. st. 1, c. 10, hearthmoney was declared to be "not only a great oppression to the poorer sort, but a.
badge of slavery upon the whole people, exposing every man's house to be
entered into, and searched at plea£ure, b.Y persons unknown to him; and therefore, to erect a lasting monument of their majesties' goodness in every house in
the kingdom, the duty of hearth-money was taken away and abolished." This
monument of goodness remains among us to this day: but the pro~ct of it
was somewhat darkened, when in six years afterwards, by statute 7 Wm. III, C\
18, a tax was laid upon all houses (except cottages) of 2s. now advanced to 3s.
per annum., and a tax also upon all windows, if they exceeded nine, in such house.
Which rates have been from time to time, ( g ) varied, being now extended to all
windows exceeding six: and power is given to surveyors, appointed by the
(t)
(g)

Sp. or L. b. xiii. c. !I.
Stat. 20 Geo. II, c. 3.

(fl Mod. Un. Hist. xxvlii. '63. Spelm. Glau. HI. Puage.
c. 22. 2 Ueo. III, c. 8. 6 Geo. Ill, c. 38.

ai Geo. II

entitled to the credit of this reform. The franking privilege was at the same time abolished.
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crown, to inspect the outside of houses, and also to pass through any house two

days in the year, into any court or yard, to inspect the windows there. A new

duty from 6d. to Is. in the pound, was also imposed by statutes 18 Geo. Ill, c.

26. and 19 Geo. Ill, c. 59, on every dwelling-house inhabited, together with the

offices and gardens therewith occupied: which duty as well as the former, is

under the direction of the commissioners of the land-tax.

VII. The seventh branch of the extraordinary perpetual revenue is a duty of

21*. per annum for every male servant retained or employed in the several capaci-

ties specifically mentioned in the act of parliament, and which almost amount

to an universality, except such as are employed in husbandry, trade or manufac-

tures. This was imposed by statute 17 Geo. Ill, c. 39, amended by 19 Geo. Ill,

c. 59, and is under the management of the commissioners of the land and win-

dow tax.

VIII. An eighth branch is the duty arising from licenses to hackney coaches

and chairs in London, and the parts adjacent. In 1654 two hundred hackney

coaches were allowed within London, Westminster, and six miles round, under

the direction of the court of aldermen, (h) By statute 13 and 14 Gar. II, c. 2,

four hundred were licensed; and the money arising thereby was applied to

repairing the streets, (i) This number was increased to seven hundred by stat-

ute 5 W. and M. c. 22, and the duties vested in the crown: and by the statute 9

Ann. c. 23, and other subsequent statutes for their government (j) there are

now a thousand coaches and four hundred chairs. This revenue is governed by
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commissioners of its own, and *is, in truth, a benefit to the subject; as r *gog -,

the expense of it is felt by no individual, and its necessary regulations *• v *

have established a competent jurisdiction whereby a very refractory race of men

may be kept in some tolerable order.

IX. The ninth and last branch of the king's extraordinary perpetual revenue

is the duty upon offices and pensions; consisting in an annual payment of Is.

in the pound (over and above all other duties) (k) out of all salaries, fees, and

perquisites, of offices and pensions payable by the crown, exceeding the value

of 100Z. per annum. This highly popular taxation was imposed by statute

31 Geo. II, c. 22, and is under the direction of the commissioners of the

land-tax.

The clear net produce of these several branches of the revenue, after all

charges of collecting and management paid, amounts at present annually to

about seven millions and three quarters sterling; besides more than two mil-

lions and a quarter raised by the land and malt tax. How these immense sums

are appropriated is next to be considered. And this is, first and principally, to

the payment of the interest of the national debt.

In order to take a clear and comprehensive view of the nature of this national

debt, it must first be premised, that after the revolution, when our new connex-

ions with Europe introduced a new system of foreign politics, the expenses of

the nation, not only in settling the new establishment, but in maintaining long

wars, as principals, on the continent, for the security of the Dutch barrier, reduc-

• ing the French monarchy, settling the Spanish succession, supporting the house

of Austria, maintaining the liberties of the Germanic body, and other purposes,

increased to an unusual degree: insomuch that it was not thought advisable to

raise all the expenses of any one year by taxes to be levied within that year,

lest the unaccustomed weights of them should create murmurs among the peo-

ple. It was therefore the policy of the times to anticipate the revenues of their

posterity, by borrowing immense sums for the current service of the state, and

to lay no more taxes upon the subject than would suffice to pay the annual

(ft) Scobell, 313. (fl Com. Journ. H Feb. 1681.

(j) 10 Ann. c. 19, } 168. 12 Geo. I, c. 18. 7 Geo. HI. c. 44. 10 Geo. in, c. 44. 11 Geo. ffl, c. 24, 28. 12

Geo. HI, c.,49.

(*) Previous to this, a deduction of M. In the pound was charged on all pensions and annuities, and all

salaries, fees, and wages of all offices of profit granted by or derived from the crown; in order to pay the

interest at the rate of three per cent, on one million, which was raised for discharging the debts ontnc civil

list, by statutes 7 Geo. 1, st. 1, c. 47. 11 Geo. I, c. 17, and 12 Geo. I, c. 2. This million, being charged ou

this particular fund is not considered :is any part of the national debt,
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crown, to inspect the outside of houses, and also to pass through any house two
days in the year, into any court or yard, to i.nspect the windows there. A new
dutv from 6d. to ls. in the pound, was also imposed by statutes 18 Geo. III, c.
26. and 19 Geo. III, c. 59, on every dwelling-house inhabited, t-0gether with the
otlices and gardens therewith occupied: which duty as well as the former, is
under the direction of the commissioners of the land-tax.
VII. 'fhe seventh branch of the extraordinary perpetual revenue is a duty of
21s. per annum for every male servant retained or employed in the several capacities specifically mentioned in the act of parliament, and which almost amount
to an universality, except such as are employed in husbandry, trude or manut'a<!tures. '!'his was imposed by statute 17 Geo. III, c. 39, amended by 19 Geo. III,
c. 59, and is under the management of the commissioners of the land and window tax.
VIII. An eighth branch is the duty a.rising from licenses to hackney coaches
and chairs in London, and the parts adjacent. In 1654 two hundred hackney
coaches were allowed within London, Westminster, and six miles round, under
the direction of the court of' aldennen. (h) By statute 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 2,
four h nndred were licensed; and the money arising thereby was applied to
repairing the streets. (i) This number was increased to seven hundred by statute 5 W. and M. c. 22, and the duties vested in the crown: and by the statute 9
Ann. c. 23, and other snbsequent statutes for their ~overnment (j) there are
now a thousand coaches and four hundred chairs. 'fh1s revenue is governed by
commissioners of it.c; own, and *is, in truth, a benefit to the subject ; as [ ,..326 ]
the expense of it is felt by no individual, and its necessary regulations
have established a competent jurisdiction whereby a very refractory race of men
may be kept in some tolerable order.
IX. The ninth and last branch of the king's extra.-0rdinary perpetual revenue
is the duty upon offices and pensions; consisting in an annual payment of ls.
in the pound (over and above all other duties) (k) out ofall salaries, fees, and
perquisites, of offices and pensions payable by the crown, exceeding the value
of 1001. per annum. This highly popular taxation was imposed by statute
31 Geo. II, c. 22, and is under the direction of the commissioners of the
land-tax.
The clear net produce of these several branches of the revenue, aft.er all
charges of collecting and management paid, amounts at present annually to
about seven millions and three quarters sterling; besides more than two millions and a quarter raised by the land and malt tax:. How these immense sums
are appropriated is next to be considered. And this is, first and principally, to
the payment of the interest of the national debt.
In order to take a clear and comprehensive view of the nature of this national
debt, it must first be premised, that after the revolution, when our new connexions with Europe introduced a new system of foreign politics, the expenses of
the nation, not only in settling the new establishment, but in maintaining long
wars, as principals. on the continent, for the security of the Dutch barrier, reduc. ing the French monarchy~ settling the Spanish succession, supporting the house
of Austria, maintaining the liberties of the Germanic body, and other purposes,
increased to an unusual degree: insomuch that it was not thoug-ht advisable to
raise all the expenses of any one year by taxes to be levied within that year,
le.st the unaccustomed weights of them should create murmurs among the people. It was therefore the policy of the times to anticipate the revenues of their
posterity, by borrowing immense sums for the current service of the state, and
to lay no more taxes upon the subject than would suffice to pay the annual
(Ill Scobell, 313.
(i) Com. Joum. 14 Feb. 1661.
(jl 10 Ann. c. 19. J 168. 12 Geo. I , c. lli. 7 Geo. III, c. '4. 10 Geo. m, c. «. 11 Geo. m, e. lK, 28. 12
G e o. III, c .. t9.
lkl Previous to this, a rlednctlon or 6d. ln the pound was ohar$'erl on all pensions anri l\noulties, and all
1111larl66. fe(!S, and wages of 1111 .olDcea of profit granted by or denved from the crown; In order to pay the
l!1terest at tbe rate of three per amt. on one million, which was raised for discharging the debts on the cl"il
116t. by 11tatute6 7 Geo. I, st. 1, c. -n. 11 Geo. I, c. 17, and 12 Goo. I, c. 2. This million, being charged ou
this 1iarLicular t\ind i8 not conaide1-ed aai any parL or the national llebt.
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T *327 1 res °f the sums s° borrowed : by this means converting *the prin-

•• J cipal debts into a new species of property, transferable from one man to

another at any time and in any quantity. A system which seems to have had.

its original in the state of Florence, A. D. 1344 : which government then owed

about 60,000*". sterling ; and being unable to pay it, formed the principal into

an aggregate sum, called metaphorically a mount or bank, the shares whereof

were transferable like our stocks, with interest at five per cent., theprices vary-

ing according to the exigencies of the state. (I) The policy of the English par-

liament laid the foundation of what is called the national debt : for a few long

annuities created in the reign of Charles II, will hardly deserve that name.

And the example then set has been so closely followed during the long wars in

the reign of Queen Anne, and since, that the capital of the national debt (funded

and unfunded) amounted, at the close of the session in June, 1777, to about an

hundred and thirty-six millions : (30) to pay the interest of which together with

certain annuities for lives and years, and the charges of management, amount-

ing annually to upwards of four millions and three-quarters, the extraordinary

revenues just now enumerated (excepting only the land-tax and annual malt-

tax,) are in the first place mortgaged, and made perpetual by parliament Per-

petual, I say ; but still redeemable by the same authority that imposed them :

which, if it at any time can pay off the capital, will abolish those taxes which are

raised to discharge the interest.

By this means the quantity of property in the kingdom is greatly increased
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in idea, compared with former times ; yet, if we coolly consider it, not at all

increased in reality. We may boast of large fortunes, and quantities of money

in the funds. But where does this money exist ? It exists only in name, in

paper, in public faith, in parliamentary security ; and that is undoubtedly suffi-

cient for the creditors of the public to rely on. But then what is the pledge

which the public faith has pawned for the security of these debts ? The land,

the trade, and the personal industry of the subject; from which the money

must arise that supplies the several taxes. In these, therefore, and these only,

r fcooo i *ne property of the public ""creditors does really and intrinsically exist ;

' "'"' J and of course the land, the trade, and the personal industry of indi-

viduals, are diminished in their true value just so much as they are pledged to

answer. If A.'s income amounts to 100*". per annum ; and he is so far indebted

to B. that he pays him 50Z. per annum for his interest ; one-half the value of

A.'s property is transferred to B., the creditor. The creditor's property exists hi

the demand which he has upon the debtor, and no where else ; and the debtor

is only a trustee to his creditor for one-half of the value of his income. In

short, the property of a creditor of the public consists in a certain portion of

the national taxes : by how much therefore he is the richer, by so much the

nation, which pays these taxes, is the poorer.

The only advantage that can result to the nation from the public debts is the

increase of circulation, by multiplying the cash of the kingdom, and creating a

new species of currency, assignable at any time and in any quantity; always

therefore ready to be employed in any beneficial undertaking, by means of this

its transferable quality, and yet producing some profit even when it lies idle and

unemployed. A certain proportion of debt seems therefore to be highly useful

to a trading people; but what that proportion is, it is not for me to determine.

Thus much is indisputably certain, that the present magnitude of our national

(I) Pro tempore, pro ipe, pro commodo, minuitur corum pretittm atqtte augesctt.

Hist, xxxvi. 116.

Ariilin. See Mod. Un

[ • 327 ] interest of the sums so borrowed: by this means converting *the principal debts into a new species of property, transferable from one man to
another o.t any time and in any quantity. A system which seems to have hnd
its original in the state of :Florence, A. D. 1344: which government then owed
about 60,000l. sterling; and being unable to pay it, formed the principal into
an aggregate sum, called metaphorically a mount or bank, the aha.res whereof
were transferable like our stocks, with mterest at five per cent., the prices varying according to the exi~encies of the state. (l) 'l'he :policy of the English parliament laid the foundation of what is called the national debt: for a few long
annuities created in the reign of Charles II, will hardly deserve that name.
And the example then set ha!! been so closely followed during the long wars in
the reign of Queen Anne, and since, that the capital of the national debt (funded
and unfunded) amounted, at the close of the session in June, 1777, to about an
hundred and thirty-six millions: (30) to pay the interest of which together with
certain annuities for lives and years, and the charges of management, amounting annually to upwards of four millions and three-quarters, the extraordinary
revenues just now enumerated (excepting only the land-tax and annual malttax,) are in the first place mortgaged, and made perpetual by parliament. Perpetual, I say; but still redeemable by the same authority that imposed them:
which, if it at any time can pay off the capital, will abolish those taxes which a.re
raised to discharge the interest.
By this means the quantity of property in the kingdom is greatly increased
in idea, compared with former times; yet, if we coolly consider it, not at all
increased in reality. We may boast of large fortunes, and quantities of money
in the funds. But where does this money exist? It exists only in name, in
paper, in public faith, in parliamentary security; and that is undoubtedly sufficient for the creditors of the public to rely on. But then what is the pledge
which the public faith has pawned for the security of these debts? The land,
the trade, and the personal industry of the subJect; from which the money
must arise that supplies the several taxes. In these, therefore, and these only,
[ • 328 ] the property of the public *creditors does really and intrinsically exist;
and of course the land, the trade, and the personal industry of individuals, are diminished in their true value just so much as they arc pledged to
answer. If A.'s income amounts to lOOl. per annum; and he is so far indebted
to B. that he pays him 501. per annum for his interest; one-half the value of
A.'s property is transferred to B., the creditor. 'l'he creditor's property exists in
the demand which he has upon the debtor, and no where else; and the debtor
is only a trustee to his creditor for one-half of the value of his income. In
short, the property of a creditor of the public consists in a certain portion of
the national taxes: by how much therefore he is the richer, by so much th~
nation, which pays these taxes, is the poorer.
The only advantage that can result to the nation from the public debts is the
increase of circulation, by multiplying the cash of the kingdom, and creating a
new species of currency, assignable at any time and in any quantity; always
therefore ready to be employed in any beneficial undertaking, by means of this
its transferable quality, and yet producing some vrofit even when it lies idle and
unemployed. A certain proportion of debt seems therefore to be highly useful
to a tradmg peovle; but what that proportion is, it is not for me to determine.
Thus much is indisputably certain, that the present magnitude of our national

(30) [The national debt in 1755, previous to the French war, was 72,289,000*.; interest,

2,654,000*.

(l) Pro

tempore, pro rpe, pro commodo, mfmdtur oorum pretium

Bl.et. xxxvi. 116.

at~

augucU. .AreUu. See Mod. Un

In January, 1776, before the American war, it was 123,964,000?.; interest, 4,411,000*.

In 1786, previous to which the whole debt of the last war was not funded, it was 239,154,000*.:

interest, 9,275,000*. Exclusive of a capital of 1,991,000*., granted by parliament to the

American loyalists, as a compensation for their loss of property. Brief. Exam. 10.]

The funded national debt of Great Britain on March 31, 1869, was 741,190,3281.
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(30) [The national debt in 1755, previous to the French war, was 72,289,000l. ; interest,
2,654,000l.

In January, 1776, hefore the .American war, it was 123,964,0007.; interest, 4,411,000l.
In 1786, previous to which the whole debt of the le.st war was not funded, it was 239,154,0001. :
interest, 9,~5,000l. Exclusive of a eapital of l,~1,0001., granted by parliament to the
.American loyalists, as a compensation for their loss. o.f property. Briof. Exam. 10.]
The funded national deht of Great Briµi.in on March :n, 1869, was 741,190,328l.
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incumbrances very far exceeds all calculations of commercial benefit, and is pro-

ductive of the greatest inconveniences. For, first, the enormous taxes, that are

raised upon the necessaries of life for the payment of the interest of this debt,

are a hurt both to trade and manufactures, by raising the price as well of the

artificer's subsistence as of the raw material, and of course in a much greater

proportion, the price of the commodity itself. Nay, the very increase of paper

circulation itself, when extended beyond what is requisite for commerce or for-

eign exchange, has a natural tendency to increase the price of provisions as well

as of all other merchandize. For, as its effect is to multiply the cash of the

kingdom, and this to such an extent that much must remain unemployed, that

cash (which is the ""universal measure of the respective values of all other r ^^a i

commodities) must necessarily sink in its own value, (m) and every thing L '*" '

grow comparatively dearer. Secondly, if part of this debt be owing to foreign-

ers, either they draw out of the kingdom annually a considerable quantity of

specie for the interest, or else it is made an argument to grant them unreason-

able privileges, in order to induce them to reside here. Thirdly, if the whole

be owing to subjects only, it is then charging the active and industrious subject,

who pays his share of the taxes, to maintain the indolent and idle creditor who

receives them. Lastly, and principally, it weakens the internal strength of a

state, by anticipating those resources which should be reserved to defend it in

case of necessity. The interest we now pay for our debts would be nearly suffi-

cient to maintain any war that any national motives could require. And if our
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ancestors in King William's time had annually paid, so long as their exigencies

lasted, even a less sum than we now annually raise upon their accounts, they

would in the time of war have borne no greater burdens than they have be-

queathed to and settled upon their posterity in time of peace, and might have

been eased the instant the exigence was over.

The respective produces of the several taxes before mentioned were originally

separate and distinct funds; being securities for the sums advanced on each

several tax, and for them only. But at last it became necessary, 'in order to

avoid confusion, as they multiplied yearly, to reduce the number of these sepa-

rate funds, by uniting and blending them together; superadding the faith of

parliament for the general security of the whole. So that there are now only

three capital funds of any account, the aggregate fund, and the general fund, so call-

ed from such union and addition; and the south sea fund, being the produce of

the taxes appropriated to pay the interest of such part of the national debt as

•was advanced by that company and its annuitants. Whereby the separate funds,

•which were thus united, are become mutual securities for each other; and the

whole produce of them, thus aggregated, liable to pay such interest or annui-

ties as were *formerly charged upon each distinct fund; the faith of the r ^OOQ n

legislature being moreover engaged to supply casual deficiencies. (31) L ''" I

The customs, excises, and other taxes, which are to support these funds,

depending upon contingencies, upon exports, imports, and consumptions, must

necessarily be of a very uncertain amount; but though some of them have

proved unproductive, and others deficient, the sum total hath always been con-

siderably more than sufficient to answer the charge upon them. The surpluses

therefore of the three great national funds, the aggregate, general, and south

sea funds, over and above the interest and annuities charged upon them, are

directed, by statute 3 Goo. I, c. 7, to be carried together, and to attend the dispo-

sition of parliament; and are usually denominated the sinking fund, because

originally destined to sink and lower the national debt To this have been since

added many other entire duties, granted in subsequent years; and the annual

(m) See page 276.

(31) The m-oss revenue of Great Britain for the year ending March 31, 1869, was 72,680,197?.

of which 22,422,472 was from customs, 41,827,604 from excise, stamp, income and other internal

taxes, 4,553,580 from the post-office, 446,174 from crown lands, and 3,555,992 from miscellaneous

incumbrances very for exceeds all calculations of commercial benefit, and is prouuetive of the greatest inconveniences. For, first, the enormous taxes, that are
mii;ed upon the necessaries of life for the payment of the interest of this debt,
are a hurt both to trade and manufactures, by raising the price as well of the
artificer's subsistence as of the raw material, and of course in a much greater
proportion, the price of the commodity itself. Nay, the very increase of paper
circulation itself, when extended beyond what is requisite for commerce or foreign exchange, has a natural tendency to increase the price of provisions as well
as of all other merchandize. For, as its effect is to multiply the cash of the
kingdom, and this to such an extent that much must remain unemployed, that
cash (which is the *universal measure of the respective values of all other [ • 329 ]
commodities) must necessarily sink in its own value, (m) and every thing
grow comparatively dearer. Secondly, if part of this debt be owing to foreigners, either they draw out of the kingdom annually a considerable quantity of
specie for the mterest, or else it is made an argument to grant them unreasonable privileges, in order to induce them to reside here. Thirdly, if the whole
be owing to subjects only, it is then charging the active and industrious subject,
who pays his share of the taxes, to maintain the indolent and idle creditor who
receives them. Lastly, and principally, it weakens the internal strength of a
state, by anticipating those resources which should be reserved to defend it in
case of necessity. The interest we now pay for our debts would be nearly sufficient to maintain any war that any national moti"rns could require. And if our
ancestors in King William's time had annually paid, so long as their exigencies
lasted, even a less sum than we now annually raise upon their accounts, they
would in the time of war have borne no greater burdens than they have bequeathed to and settled upon their posterity in time of peace, and might have
been eased the instant the exigence was over.
The respective produces of the several taxes before mentioned were originally
separate and distinct funds; being securities for the sums advanced on each
several tax, and for them only. But at last it becaqie necessary, 'in order to
avoid confusion, as they multiplied yearly, to reduce the number of these separate fnnds, by uniting and blending them together; superadding the faith of
parliament for the general security of the whole. So that there are now only
three capital funds of any account, the a.q,qregate. fund, and the general fund, so called from such union and addition; and the south sea fund, being the produce of
the taxes appropriated to pay the interest of such part of the national debt as
was advanced by that company and its annuitants. Whereby the separate funds,
which were thus united, are become mutual securities for ea.ch other; and the
whole produce of them, thus aggregated, liable to pay such interest or annuities as were *formerly charged upon each distinct fund; the faith of the [ • 330 ]
legislature being moreover engaged to supply casual deficiencies. (31) . '
The customs, excises, and other taxes, which are to support these funds,
depending upon contingencies, upon exports, imports, and consumptions, must
necessarily be of a very uncertain amount; but though some of them have
proved unproductive, and others deficient, the sum total hath always been considerably more than sufficient to answer the charge upon them. The surpluses
therefore of the three great national funds. the a~gregate, general, and south
sea funds, over and above the interest and annuities charged upon them, are
directed, by statute 3 Geo. I, c. 7, to be carried together, and to attend the disposition of parliament ; and are usually denominated the si.nking fund, because
originally destined to sink and lower the national debt. To this have been since
added many other entire duties, granted in subsequent years; and the annual
(•) Bee page 276.

•onrcea.

207

(31) The gross revenue of Great Britain for the year ending March 31, 1869, was 72,680,1971.
of which 22,i2'2,472 was from oust.oms, 41,827,604 from excise, stamp, income and other internal
taxe11, 4,553,580 from the post-office, 446,174 from crown lands, and 3,555,992 from miscellaneous
llOllTC8!1.
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interest of the sums borrowed on their respective credits is charged on and pay-

able out of the produce of the sinking fund. However, the net surpluses and

savings, after all deductions paid, amount annually to a very considerable sum.

For as the interest on the national debt has been at several times reduced, (by

the consent of the proprietors, who had their option either to lower their inter-

est or be paid their principal,) the savings from the appropriated revenues came

at length to be extremely large. This sinking fund is the last resort of the

nation ; its only domestic resource on which must chiefly depend all the hopes

we can entertain of ever discharging or moderating our incumbrance. And

therefore the prudent and steady application of the large sums now arising from

this fund, is a point of the utmost importance, and well worthy the serious

attention of parliament ; which was thereby enabled, in the year 1765, to reduce

above two millions sterling of the public debt ; and several additional millions

in several succeeding years.

But, before any part of the aggregate fund (the surpluses whereof are one of

r fcggj -i the chief ingredients that form the sinking *fund) can be applied to

1 " * -I

diminish the principal of the public debt, it stands mortgaged by par-

liament to raise an annual sum for the maintenance of the king's household

and the civil list. For this purpose, in the late reigns, the produce of certain

branches of the excise and customs, the post-office, the duty on wine licenses,

the revenues of the remaining crown lands, the profits arising from courts of
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justice, (which articles include all the hereditary revenues of the crown,) and

also a clear annuity of 120,0001. in money, were settled on the king for life, for

the support of his majesty's household, and the honour and dignity of the

crown. And, as the amount of these several branches was uncertain, (though

in the last reign they were computed to have sometimes raised almost a million,)

if they did not arise annually to 800,OOOZ. the parliament engaged to make up

the deficiency. But his present majesty having, soon after his accession, spon-

taneously signified his consent that his own hereditary revenues might be so

disposed of as might best conduce to the utility and satisfaction of the public ;

and, having graciously accepted the limited sum of 800,OOOZ. per annum for the

support of his civil list, the said hereditary and other revenues were carried into

and made a part of the aggregate fund, and the aggregate fund was charged, (M)

with the payment of the whole annuity to the crown of 800,OOOZ., which, being

found insufficient, was increased in 1777 to 900,00(W. per annum. Hereby the

revenues themselves, being put under the same care and management as the

other branches of the public patrimony, produced more, and are better collected,

than heretofore ; and the public is still a gainer of near 100,OOOZ. per annum by

this disinterested conduct of his majesty. The civil list, thus liquidated, to-

gether with the four millions and three-quarters interest of the national debt,

and more than two millions produced from the sinking fund, make up the seven

millions and three-quarters per annum, net money, which were before stated to

be the annual produce of our perpetual taxes ; besides the immense, though

uncertain, sums arising from the annual taxes on land and malt, but which at

F *332 1 an avera£e "may be calculated at more than two millions and a quarter ;

' '"'"' " -I and, added to the preceding sum, make the clear produce of the taxes

(exclusive of the charge of collecting) which are raised yearly on the people of

this country, amount to about ten millions sterling.

The expenses defrayed by the civil list are those that in any shape relate to

civil government; as, the expenses of the royal household ; the revenues allotted

to the judges, previous to the year 1758 ; all salaries to officers of state, and

every of the king's servants; the appointments to foreign ambassadors; the

maintenance of the queen and royal family; the king's private expenses, or

privy purse ; and other very numerous outgoings, as secret service money, pen-

sions, and other bounties ; which sometimes have so far exceeded the revenues

appointed for that purpose, that application has been made to parliament to

discharge the debts contracted on the civil list ; as particularly in 1724, when

(nj Stat. 1 Geo. Ill, r. I .

208

interest of the sums borrowed on their respective credits is charged on and payable out of the produce of the sinking fund. However, the net surpluses and
savings, after all deductions paid, amount annually to a very considerable sum.
For as the interest on the national debt has been at several times reduced, (by
the consent of the proprietors, who had their option either to lower their interest or be paid their principal,) the savings from the appropriated revenues came
at length to be extremely large. This sinking fund is the last resort of the
nation; its only domestic resource on which must chiefly depend all the hopes
we can entertain of ever dischargin~ or moderating our incumbrance. And
therefore the prudent and steady application of the large sums now arising from
this fund, is a point of the utmost importance, and well worthy the serious
attention of ~rliament; which was thereby enabled, in the year 1765, to reduce
above two millions sterling of the public debt; and several additional millions
in severs.I succeeding years.
But, before any part of the aggregate fund (the surpluses whereof are one of
[ • 331 ] the chief ingredients that form the sillking *fund) can be applied to
diminish the principal of the public debt, it stands mortgaged by parliament to raise an annual sum for the maintenance of the king's household
and the civil list. For this purpose, in the late reigns, the produce of certain
branches of the excise and customs, the post-office, the duty on wine licenses,
the revenues of the remaining crown lands, the profits arismg from courts of
justice, (which articles include all the hereditary revenues of the crown,) and
also a clear annuity of 120.000l. in money, were settled on the king for life, for
the support of his majesty's household, and the honour and dignity of the
crown. And, as the amount of these several branches was uncertain, (though
in the last reign they were computed to have sometimes raised almost a million,)
if they did not a.rise annually to 800,000l. the parliament en~aged to make up
the deficiency. But his present majesty having, soon after his accession, spontaneously signified his consent that his own hereditary revenues might be so
disposed of as might best conduce to the utility and satisfaction of the public;
and, having graciously accepted the limited sum of 800,000l. per annum for the
support of his civil list, the said hereditary and other revenues were carried into
and made a part of the aggregate fund, and the aggregate fund was charged, ( n)
with the payment of the whole annuity to the crown of 800,000l., which, being
found insufficient, was increased in 1777 to 900,000l. per annum. Hereby the
revenues themselves, bein~ put under the same care and management as the
other branches of the pubhc patrimony, produced more, and are better collected,
than heretofore; and the public is still a gainer of ne,ar 100,0001. per annum by
this disinterested conduct of his majesty. The civil list, thus liquidated, together with the four millions and three-quarters interest of the national debt,
and more than two millions produced from the sinking fund, make up the seven
millions and three-quarters per annum, net money, which were before stated to
be the annual produce of our perpetual taxes; besides the immense, though
uncertain, sums arising from the annual taxes on land and malt, but which at
[ • 332 ] an average *may be calculated at more than two millions and a quarter;
and, added to the preceding sum, make the cle,ar produce of the taxes
(exclusive of the charge of collecting) which are raised yearly on the people of
this country, amount to about ten millions sterling.
The expenses defrayed by the civil list are those that in any shape relate to
civil government; as, the expenses of the royal household; the revenues allotW
to the judges, previous to the ye,ar 1758 ; all salaries to officers of state, and
every of the km~s servants; the appointments to foreign ambu.ssadors; the
maintenance of the queen and royal family; the king's private expenses, or
privy purse; and other very numerous outgoings, as secret service money, pensions, and other bounties; which sometimes have so far exceeded the revenues
appointed for that purpose, that application has been made to parliament to
discharge the debts contracted on the civil list; as particularly in 1724, when
(n)

Stat. 1 Geo. ill, e. I.
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one million (o) was granted for that purpose by the statute 11 Geo. I, c. 17, and

in 1769 and 1777, when half a million and 600,000?. were appropriated to the

like uses by the statutes 9 Geo. Ill, c. 34, and 17 Geo. Ill, c. 47.

The civil list is indeed properly the whole of the king's revenue in his own

distinct capacity; the rest being rather the revenue of the public or its credit-

ors, though collected and distributed again in the name and by the officers of

the crown: it now standing in the same place as the hereditary income did

formerly; and, as that has gradually diminished, the parliamentary appoint-

ments tiave increased. The whole revenue of Queen Elizabeth did not amount

to more than 600,0001. a year: (p) that of King Charles I, was (q) 800,0002., and

the revenue voted for King Charles II, was (r) 1,200,000?., though complaints

were made (in the first years at least) that it did not amount to so much, (s)

But it must be observed, that under these sums were included all manner of

public expenses; among which Lord Clarendon, in his speech to parliament,

computed that the charge of the navy and land forces amounted annually to

800,000?., which was ten times *more than before the former troubles, (t) r *OOQ1

The same revenue, subject to the same charges, was settled on King I- -1

James II: (u) but, by the increase of trade and more frugal management, it

amounted on an average to a million and a half per annum, (besides other

additional customs, granted by parliament, (v) which produced an annual reve-

nue of 400,000/.) out of which his fleet and army were maintained at the yearly

expense of (w) 1,100,000?. After the revolution, when the parliament took into
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its own hands the annual support of the forces, both maritime and military, (32)

s civil list revenue was settled on the new king and queen, amounting, with the

hereditary duties, to 700,000?. per annum ; (x) and the same was continued to

Queen Anne and King George I. (y) That of King George II, we have seen,

was nominally augmented to (zj 800,000?., and in fact was considerably more;

and that of his present majesty is avowedly increased to the limited sum of 900,-

000?. And upon the whole it is doubtless much better for the crown, and also

for the people, to have the revenue settled upon the modern footing rather than

the ancient. For the crown, because it is more certain, and collected with

greater ease: for the people, because they are now delivered from the feudal

hardships, and other odious branches of the prerogative. And though com-

plaints have sometimes been made of the increase of the civil list, yet if we

consider the sums that have been formerly granted, the limited extent under

•which it is now established, the revenues and prerogatives given up in lieu of it

by the crown, the numerous branches of the present royal family, and, above all,

the diminution of the value of money, compared with what it was worth in the

(0) See page 827. (p) Lord Clar. Continuation. 163. (?) Com. Journ. 4 Sept. 160ft. (r) JIM.

(1) Com. Journ. 4 Jim. 1663. Lord Clar. Continuation, 163.

(t) Lord Clar. 165. (u) Stat. Uac. II, e. 1. (») Ibid, c. 3 and 4.

one million (o) was granted for that purpose bv the statute 11 Geo. I, c. 17, and
in 1769 and 1777, when half a million and 600,000l. were appropriated to the
like uses bv the statutes 9 Geo. III, c. 34, and 17 Geo. III, c. 47.
The civi1 list is indeed properly the whole of the king's revenue in his own
distinct capacity; the rest being rather the revenue of the public or its creditors, though collected and distnbnted a.gain in the name and by the officers of
the crown: it now standing in the same place as the hereditary income did
formerly; and, as that has gradually diminished, the ;J?arliamentary appointments have increased. The whole revenue of Queen Elizabeth did not amount
to more than 600,0001. a year: ( p) that of King Charles I, was (q) 800,000l., and
the revenue voted for Kmg Charles II, was (r) 1,200,000l., though complaints
were made (in the firstl.e.ars at least) that it did not amount to so much. (s)
But it must be observe , that under these sums were included all manner of
public expenses; among which Lord Clarendon, in his speech to parliament,
computed that the charge of the navy and land forces amounted annually to
800,000l., which was ten times •more than before the former troubles. ( t) [ • 333 ]
The same revenue, subject to the same charges, was settled on King
James II: (it) but, by the increase of trade and more frugal management, it
amounted on an average to a million and a half per annum, (besides other
additional customs, granted by parliament, (ii) which produced an annual revenue of 400,000l.) out of which his fleet and army were maintained at the yearly
expense of (w) 1,100,0001. After the revolution, when the parliament took into
its own hands the annual support of the forces, both maritime and military, (32)
a civil list revenue was settled on the new king and queen, amounting, with tho
hereditary duties, to 700,000l. per annum; (x) and the same was continued to
Queen Anne and King George I. (y) That of King George II, we have seen,
was nominally augmented to (z) 800,000l., and in fact was considerably more;
and that of his present majestv is avowedly increased to the limited sum of 900,0001. And upon the whole it 'ls doubtless much better for the crown, and also
for the \>eople, to have the revenue settled upon the modern footing rather than
the ancient. For the crown, because it is more certain, and collected with
greater ease: for the people, because they are now delivered from the feudal
hardships, and other odious branches of the prerogative. And though complain ts have sometimes been made of the increase of the civil list, yet if we
consider the sums that have been formerly granted, the limited extent under
which it is now established, the revenues and prerogatives given up in lien of it
by the crown, the numerous branches of the present royal family, and, above all,
the diminution of the value of money, compared with what it was worth in the

(w) Com. Journ. 1 Mar..20Mar. 1688. (x) Ibid. 14 Mar. 1701.

(y) Ibid. 17 Mar. 1701, li Ang. 1714. (z) Stat. 1 Geo. U, c. 1.

(32) [This great principle that parliamentary grants may be appropriated by the parlia-

ment, and if appropriated can only be applied by tfie treasury to the specified items of expen-

diture, was introduced in the reign of Charles II, and with the exception of the parlia-

to) 8ee p~ 3'¥1.
(p) Lord Clar. Continuation. 168.
(f) Com. Journ. 4 Sept. 1000.
(•) Com. Joum. 4. Jun. 1663. Lord Clar. Continuation, 163.
ttl Lord Clar. 1811.
(u) Stat. 1 Jae. II. e. 1.
(til Ibid. e. 8 and 4..
(IP) Com. Joum. 1 Mar. 20Mar.11188.
(Z) IWd. 14. Mar. 1701.
(J'l IWd.17 Mar. 1701, Ii Aug. 1714.
(11) Stat. 1 Geo. Il, c. l.

(r)

IWd.

ment of 1685, has been universally followed by succeeding parliaments. The lords of the

treasury, by a clause annually repeated in the appropriation act of every session, are forbid-

den, nnder severe penalties, to issue any warrants ordering the payment of any moneys out

of the exchequer except for the purposes to which such moneys had been appropriated by the

parliament; the officers of the exchequer being also forbidden to obey any such warrant if

issued. In time of war, or when the house is apprehensive of war breaking out during the

recess of parliament, it has not been very uncommon to grant considerable snrns on a vote of

credit, to oe applied by the crown at its discretion. Mr. Hallam remarks: Const. Hist. Ill,

159; that it is to this transference of the executive government (for the phrase is hardly too

strong) from the crown to the house of commons, that we owe the proud altitude which

Knglond has maintained in the eyes of Europe since the revolution; so extraordinarily dis-

similar to her condition under the Stuarts; the supplies which were meted out with niggardly

caution by former parliaments to sovereigns whom they could not trust, having flowed wiui

redundant profuseness when parliament could judge of their necessity and direct their

application.]
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(32) [Thie great principle that parliamentary grants may be appropriated by the parliament, and if a;ipropnated can only be applied by the treasury to the ~pecilied items of expenditure, was mtroduoed in the reign of Charles II. aud with the exception of the parliament of 1685, bas been universally followed by succeeding parliaments. The lords of the
treasury, by a clause annually re,Peated in the appropriation act of every seS11ion, are forbidden, under severe penalties, to issue any Wl\l'l'ants ordering the payment of wiy moneys out
of the exchequer except for the purpot1et1 to which 1mch moneys had been appropriated by the
J>arliament; the officers of the exchequer being ali!O forbidden to obey any such warrant if
1seued. In time of war, or when the house is apprehenb;ve of war breaking out during the
recees of parliament, it has not ~n very uncommon to grant considerable sum11 on a vote of
credit, to be applied by the crown at its discretion. Mr. Ballam remarks : Const. Hist. 111,
159; that it is to this tnmsferrence of the executive government (for the phrase is hardly too
strong) from the crown to the house of commons, that we owe the proud altitude which
England has maintained in the eyCI! of Europe since the revolution ; 80 extraordinarily dit1·
similar to her condition under the Stuarts; the supplies which were meted out with niggardly
caution by former parliaments to sovereiguM whom they could not truRt, having flowed wit.h
redundant profuseness when parliament could judge of their necessity and direct theif
application.]
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last century, we must acknowledge these complaints to be void of any rational

foundation; and that it is impossible to support that dignity, which a king of

Great Britain should maintain, with an income in any degree less than what is

now established by parliament.

F *3341 *Thi8 "finishes our inquiries into the fiscal prerogatives of the king, or

I -I his revenue, both ordinary and extraordinary. We have therefore now

chalked out all the principal outlines of this vast title of the law, the supreme

executive magistrate, or the king's majesty, considered in his several capacities

and points of view. But, before we entirely dismiss this subject, it may not be

improper to take a short comparative review of the power of the executive

magistrate, or prerogative of the crown, as it stood in former days, and as it

stands at present. And we cannot but observe, that most of the laws for ascer-

taining, limiting, and restraining this prerogative have been made within the

compass of little more than a century past; from the petition of right in 3 Car.

I, to the present time. So that the powers of the crown are now to all appear-

ance greatly curtailed and diminished since the reign of King James the First;

particularly by the. abolition of the star chamber and high commission courts in

the reign of Charles the First, and by the disclaiming of martial law, and the

power of levying taxes on the subject, by the same prince; by the disuse of

forest laws for a century past; and by the many excellent provisions enacted

under Charles the Second, especially the abolition of military tenures, purvey-

ance, and pre-emption, the habeas corpus act and the act to prevent the discon-
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tinuance of parliaments for above three years; and since the revolution, by the

strong and emphatical words in which our liberties are asserted in the bill of

rights and act of settlement; by the act for triennial, since turned into septen-

nial, elections; by the exclusion of certain officers from the house of commons;

by rendering the seats of the judges permanent, and their salaries liberal and

independent; and by restraining the king's pardon from obstructing parliament-

ary impeachments. Besides all this, if we consider how the crown is impover-

ished and stripped of all ancient revenues, so that it must greatly rely on the

liberality of parliament for its necessary support and maintenance, we may per-

haps be led to think that the balance is inclined pretty, strongly to the popular

scale, and that the executive magistrate has neither independence nor power

enough left to form that check upon the lords and commons which the founders

of our constitution intended.

f *S351 *But °n the other hand, it is to be considered that every prince, in the

' ""' -1 first parliament after his accession, has by long usage a truly royal addi-

tion to his hereditary revenue settled upon him for his life; and has never any

occasion to apply to parliament for supplies, but upon some public necessity of

the whole realm. This restores to him that constitutional independence which

at his first accession seems, it must be owned, to be wanting. And then, with

regard to power, we may find perhaps that the hands of government are at least

sufficiently strengthened; and that an English monarch is now in no danger of

being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The instruments of power

are not perhaps so open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the

less liable to jealous and invidious reflections, but they are not the weaker upon

that account. In short, our national debt and taxes (besides the inconveniences

before mentioned) have also in their natural consequences thrown such a weight

of power into the executive scale of government as we cannot think was intended

by our patriot ancestors, who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then

formidable parts of the prerogative, and, by an unaccountable want of foresight,

established this system in their stead. The entire collection arid management

of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rise to

such a multitude of new officers created by and removable at the royal pleasure,

that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of

the nation. Witness the commissioners and the multitude of dependents on

the customs, in every port of the kingdom; the commissioners of excise, and

their numerous subalterns, in every inland district; the post-masters, and their
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servants, planted in every town, and upon every public road: the commissioners

of the stamps, and their distributors, which are full as scattered, and full as

numerous; the officers of the salt duty, which, though a species of excise, and

conducted in the same manner, are yet made a distinct corps from the ordinary

managers of that revenue; the surveyors of houses and windows; the receivers

of the land-tax; the managers of lotteries, (33) and the commissioners of hack-

ney coaches; all of which *are either mediately or immediately appointed r ^op n

by the crown, and removable at pleasure, without any reason assigned: *- l" *

these, it requires but little penetration to see, must give that power on which

they depend for subsistence an influence most amazingly extensive. To this

may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligation, by

preference in loans, subscriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money trans-

actions, which will greatly increase this influence; and that over those persons

whose attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most desirable.

All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen, consequence of erecting

our funds of credit, and to support them, establishing our present perpetual taxes:

the whole of which is entirely new since the restoration in 1660, and by far the

greatest part since the revolution in 1688. And the same mav be said with

regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places whicn the army has

created. All which put together give the executive power so persuasive an

energy with respect to the persons themselves, and so prevailing an interest with

their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the loss of external
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prerogative.

But, though this profusion of offices should have no affect on individuals,

there is still another newly acquired branch of power; and that is, not the

influence only, but the force of a disciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by

the people, but immediately by the crown: raised by the crown, officered by the

crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot, it is true, only from

year to year, and that by the power of parliament; but during that year they

must, by the nature of our constitution, if raised at all, be at the absolute dis-

posal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonstrate how great a

trust is thereby reposed in the prince by his people; a trust that is more than

equivalent to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives.

Add to all this, that, besides the civil list, the immense revenue of almost seven

millions sterling which is annually paid to the creditors of the public, or car-

ried to the sinking *fund, is first deposited in the royal exchequer, and r ,„„- -.

thence issued out to the respective offices of payment. This revenue *• '*' ' '

the people can never refuse to raise, because it is made perpetual by act of parlia-

ment ; which also, when well considered, will appear to be a trust of great deli-

cacy and high importance.

Upon the whole, therefore, I think it is clear, that whatever may have become

of the nominal^ the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by

any transactions in the last century. Much is indeed given up; but much is

also acquired. The stern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder

voice of influence; the slavish and exploded doctrine of non-resistance has

given way to a military establishment by law; and to the disuse of parliaments

Has succeeded a parliamentary trust of an immense perpetual revenue. When,

indeed by the free operation of the sinking fund, our national debts shall be

lessened; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the universal introduction of

a well-planned and national militia, will suffer our formidable army to be

thinned and regulated; and when, in consequence of all, our taxes shall be

gradually reduced; this adventitious power of the crown will slowly and imper-

ceptibly diminish, as it slowly and imperceptibly rose. But till that shall hap-

pen, it will be our especial duty, as good subjects and good Englishmen, to

reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and servile influence from

those who are intrusted with its authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and

(33) Lotteries are now abolished.
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of the nomina~ the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by
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indeed by the free operation of the sinking fund, our national debts shall be
lessened; when the posture of forei~n affairs, and the universal introduction of
a well-planned and nationq,l militia, will suffer our formidable army to be
thinned and regulated; and when, in consequence of all, our taxes shall be
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yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long,

continue to be governed by a sovereign who, in all those public acts that have

personally proceeded from himself, hath manifested the highest veneration for the

free constitution of Britain; hath already in more than one instance remark-

ably strengthened its outworks; and will, therefore, never harbour a thought,

or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public

liberty.

CHAPTER IX.

OP SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES.

yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long,
continue to be governed by a sovereign who, in all those public acts that have
personally proceeded from himself, hath manifested the highest veneration for the
free constitution of Britain ; ha.th already in more than one instance remarkably strengthened its outworks; and will, therefore, never harbour a thought,
or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public
liberty.

IN a former chapter of these Commentaries (a) we distinguished magistrates

into two kinds: supreme, or those in whom the sovereign power of the state

resides; and subordinate, or those who act in an inferior secondary sphere. We

have hitherto considered the former kind only: namely, the supreme legislative

power or parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king: and

CHAPTER IX.

are now to proceed to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal sub-

ordinate magistrates.

OF SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES.

And herein we are not to investigate the powers and duties of his majesty's

great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the principal secre-

taries, or the like; because I do not know that they are, in that capacity, in any

considerable degree the objects of our laws, or have any very important share

of magistracy conferred upon them: except that the secretaries of state are

allowed the power of commitment, in order to bring offenders to trial, (b)
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Neither shall I here treat of the office and authority of the lord chancellor, or

the other judges of the superior courts of justice; because they will find a more

proper place in the third part of these Commentaries. Nor shall I enter into

any minute disquisitions with regard to the rights and dignities of mayors and

f *VW 1 *aldermen, or other magistrates of particular corporations; because

L -I these are mere private and strictly municipal rights, depending entirely

upon the domestic constitution of their respective franchises. But the magis-

trates and officers, whose rights and duties it will be proper in this chapter to

consider, are such as are generally in use, and have a jurisdiction and authority

dispersedly throughout the kingdom: which are, principally, sheriffs, coroners,

justices of the peace, constables, surveyors of hignways, and overseers of the

poor. In treating of all which I shall inquire into, first, their antiquity and

original; next, the manner in which they are appointed and may be removed;

and, lastly, their rights and duties. And first of sheriffs.

I. The sheriff is an officer of very great antiquity in this kingdom, his name

being derived from two Saxon words JCIJIC gejiej«ii, the reeve, bailiff, or officer of

the shire. He is called in Latin, vice-comes, as being the deputy of the earl or

comes ; to whom the custody of the shire is said to have been committed at the

first division of this kingdom into counties. But the earls in process of time,

by reason of their high employments and attendance on the king's person, not

being able to transact the business of the county, were delivered of that burden:

(c) reserving to themselves the honour, but the labour was laid on the sheriff.

So that now the sheriff does all the king^s business in the county; and though

he be still called vice-comes, yet he is entirely independent of, and not subject to,

the earl; the king by his letters patent committing custodian comitatus to the

sheriff, and him alone.

(a) Ch. ii. p. 146. (b) 1 Leon. 73. SLeon. 175, Comb. 1«. 6 Mod. 84. Sulk. 147. Csrth. 291,

(••) Dalton <>r SliuriOk, c. 1.

Ix a former chapter of these Commentaries (a) we distinguished magistrates
into two kinds: supreme, or those in whom the sovereign power of the state
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power or parliament, and the supreme executive/ower, which is the king: and
are now to proceed to inquire into the rights an duties of the principal subordinate magistrates.
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Sheriffs were formerly chosen by the inhabitants of the several counties. In

confirmation of which it was ordained by statute 28 Edw. I. c. 8, that the people

should hare election of sheriffs in every shire where the shrievalty is not of

inheritance. For anciently in some counties the sheriffs were hereditary; as I

apprehend they were in Scotland till the statute 20 Geo. II, c. 43; and still

continue in the county of Westmoreland to this day; *the city of r *OAQ -i

London having also the inheritance of the shrievalty of Middlesex *- -"

vested in their body by charter, (d) The reason of these popular elections is

assigned in the same statute, c. 13, " that the commons might choose such as

would not be a burden to them." And herein appears plainly a strong trace

of the democratical part of our constitution ; in which form of government it

is an indispensable requisite, that the people should choose their own magis-

trates, (e) This election was in all probability not absolutely vested in the

commons, but required the royal approbation. For, in the Gothic constitution,

the judges of the county courts (which office is executed by our sheriff) were

elected by the people, but confirmed by the king: and the form of their election

was thus managed, the people, or incolee terntorii, chose twelve electors, and

they nominated three persons, ezquibus rex unum confirmabat. (/) But with us

in England these popular elections, growing tumultuous, were put an end to by

the statmte 9 Edw. II, st. 2, which enacted that the sheriffs should from thence-

forth be assigned by the chancellor, treasurer, and the judges; as being persons

in whom the same trust might with confidence be reposed. By statutes 14 Edw.
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Ill, c. 7, 23 Hen. VI, c. 8, and 21 Hen. VIII, c. 20, the chancellor, treasurer,

president of the king's council, chief justices, and chief baron are to make this

election; and that on the morrow of All Souls in the exchequer. And the king's

letters patent, appointing the new sheriffs, used commonly to bear date the 6th

day of November, (g) The statute of Cambridge, 12 Ric. II, c. 2, ordains, that

the chancellor, treasurer, keeper of the privy seal, steward of the king's house,

the king's chamberlain, clerk of the rolls, the justices of the one bench and the

other, barons of the exchequer, and all other that shall be called to ordain, name,

or make justices of the peace, slwriffs, and other officers of the king, shall be

sworn to act indifferently, and to appoint no man that sueth either privily or

openly to be put in office, but such only as they shall judge to be the best and

most sufficient. And the custom now is (and has been at least *ever r ao^i -i

since the time of Fortescue, (h) who was chief justice and chancellor L -"

to Henry the Sixth) that all the judges, together with the other great officers

and privy counsellors, meet in the exchequer on the morrow of All Souls yearly,

(which day is now altered to the Morrow of St Martin by the last act for abbre-

viating Michaelmas term,) and then and there the judges propose three persons,

to be reported (if approved of) to the king, who afterwards appoints one of them

to be sheriff. (1)

This custom, of the twelve judges proposing three persons, seems borrowed from

the Gothic constitution before mentioned; with this difference, that among the

(d) 3 Rep. 72. (e) Hontesq. Sp. L. b. 2, o. 3.

(/JSUernh. de jure Goth. 1.1, c. 3. (g) Stat. 12 Edw. IV, c. 1. (ft) I)e L. L. o. 24.

(1) The following is the present mode of appointing the sheriffs: On the morrow of St. Martin, (12

Sheriffs we:re formerly chosen by the inhabitants of the several counties. In
confirmation of which it was ordained by statute 28 Edw. I. c. 8, that the people
should have election of sheriffs in every shire where th~ shrievalty is not of
inheritance. For anciently in some counties the sheriffs were hereditary; as I
apprehend they were in Scotland till the statute 20 Geo. II, c. 43 ; and still
continue in the county of Westmoreland to this day; *the city of [ • 340 ]
I..ondon having also the inheritance of the shrievalty of Middlesex
vested in their body by charter. (d) The reason of these ~pular elections is
assigned in the same stature, c. 13, "that the commons might choose such as
would not be a burden to them." And herein appears plainly a strong trace
of the democratical part of our constitution ; in which form of government it
is an indispensable requisite, that the people should choose their own magistrates. (e) This elect10n was in all probability not absolutely Yested in the
commons, but required the royal approbation. For, in the Gothic constitution,
the judges of the county courts (which office is executed by our sheriff) were
elected by the people, but confirmed by the kin~: and the form of their election
was thus managed, the people, or incol<B terntorii, chose twelve electors, and
they nominated three persons, ex qitibus rex unum con.firmabat. (f) But with us
in England these popular elections, growing tumultuous, were put an end to by
the stat•t.e 9 Edw. II, st. 2, which enacted that the sheriffs should from thenceforth be assigned by the chancellor, treasurer, and the judges; as being persons
in whom the same trust might with confidence be reposed. By statutes 14 Edw.
III, c. 7, 23 Hen. VI, c. 8, and 21 Hen. VIII, c. 20, the chancellor, treasurer,
president of the king's council, chief justices, and chief baron are to make this
election ; and that on the morrow of All Souls in the exchequer. And the king's
letters patent, appointing the new sheriffs, used commonly to bear date the 6th
day of November. (g) The statute of Cambridge, 12 Ric. II, c. 2, ordains, that
the chancellor, treasurer, keeper of the privy seal, steward of the kinl?'s house,
the king's chamberlain, clerk of the rolls, the justices of the one bencli and the
other, barons of the exchequer, and all other that shall be called to ordain, name,
or make justices of the peace, sheriffs, and other officers of the king, shall be
swo:rn to act indifferently, and to appoint no man that sueth either privily or
openly to be put in office, but such onl:y as they shall judge to be the best and
most sufficient. And the custom now is (and has been at least *ever *
]
Bince the time of Fortescue, (h) who was chief justice and chancellor [ 341
to Henry the Sixth) that all the judges, together with the other great officers
and privy counsellors, meet in the excheqne:r on the morrow of All Souls yearly,
(which day is now altered to the Morrow of St. Martin by the last act for abbreviating Michaelmas term,) and then and there the judges propose three persons,
to be reported (if approved of) to the king, who afterwards appoints one of them
to be sheriff. (1)
This custom, of the twelve judges 11roposing three persons, seems borrowed from
the Gothic constitution before mentioned; with this difference, that among the

Kov.) the lord chancellor, first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, and the

judges of the superior courts of the common law, meet in the exchequer chamber, the chan-

cellor of the excnequer presiding. The judges then report the names of three fit persons in

3 Rep. 72.
(el Montesq. Sp. L. b. II, o. 2.
If) Stiemh. de }we GoUI. i. 1, o. 3.
(g) Stat. 12 Edw. IV, c. 1.

(d)

(A)

De L. L. o. 2'.

each county, and of theso the first on the list is chosen, unless he assigns good reasons for exemp-

tion. The list thus made is again considered at a meeting of the cabinet held on the morrow of

purification, (3 Feb.,) at the president of the council's, and attended by the clerks of the council,

•when the excuses of the parties nominated are again examined, and the names are finally deter-

mined on for approval of the queen, who, at a meeting of the privy council, pierces the parchment

with a punch opposite the name of the person selected for each county ; and hence has arisen the

expression of " pricking the sheriffs." The judges annually add to their lists the requisite num-

ber, bv inserting those recommended by the retiring sheriff.

In Westmoreland the office of sheriff is hereditary in the family of the Earl of Thanet.

213

(1) The following is the present mode of appointing the sheriffs: On the morrow of St. Hartin. (12
Nov.) the lord chancellor, first lord of the tre88ury and chancellor of the exchequer, and th1:1
judges of the superior conrtil of the common law, meet in the exchequer chamber, the chancellor of the exchequer presiding. The judges then report the names of three fit pen!oni! in
ea.ch count.v, and of theso the first on the list l8 chosen; uilless he as8i~s good reasons for exemption. The li~t thu~ made is again c.onsidered at a meeting of the cabmet held on the morrow of
puriDcation, (3 Feb.,) at the president of the council's, and attended by the clerks of the cotwcil,
when the excn8es of thr. parties nominated are again examined, and the names are finally determined on for approv.al of the queen, who, at a meeting of the privy council, pierces the par:chment
with a punch oppo111te the name of the penmn ~elected for each county ; and hence has a.nsen the
express10n of "pricking the sheriff:;." The jud~es annually add to their liBt.s the requisite numl1er. h\' inserting those recommended by the retiring sheriff.
Ill \Vt•11tmoreland the office of sheriff is hereditary in the family of the Earl of Thanet.
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fBook I.

Goths the twelve nominora were first elected by the people themselves. And

this usage of ours at its first introduction, I am apt to believe, was founded upon

some statute, though not now to be found among our printed laws ; first, because

it is materially different from the direction of all the statutes before mentioned :

which it is hard to conceive that the judges would have countenanced by their

concurrence, or that Fortescue would have inserted in his book, unless by the

authority of some statute: and also, because a statute is expressly referred to in

the record, which Sir Edward Coke tells us, (t) he transcribed from the council

book of 3 March, 34 Henry VI, and which is in substance as follows. The king

had of his own authority appointed a man sheriff of Linconshire, which office

lie refused to take upon him: whereupon the opinions of the judges were taken

what should be done in this behalf. And the two chief justices, Sir John For-

tescue and Sir John Prisot, delivered the unanimous opinion of them all; " that

the king did an error when he made a person sheriff, that was not chosen and

presented to him according to the statute; that the person refusing was liable

to no fine for disobedience, as if he had been one of the three persons chosen

according to the tenor of the statute; (2) (that they would advise the king

to have recourse to the three persons that were chosen according to the statute,

or that some other thrifty man be entreated to occupy the office for this year;

and that, the next year, to eschew such inconveniences, the order of the statute

in this behalf made be observed." But notwithstanding this unanimous reso-

r ,,040 i lution of *all the judges of England thus entered in the council book,
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L "**• J and the statute 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 26, § 61, which expressly recog-

nizes this to be the law of the land, some of our writers (_/) have affirmed, that

the king, by his prerogative, may name whom he pleases to be sheriff, whether

chosen by the judges or no. This is grounded on a very particular case in the

fifth year of Queen Elizabeth, when, by reason of the plague, there was no

Michaelmas term kept at Westminster; so that the judges could not meet there

in crastino animarum to nominate the sheriffs: whereupon the queen named

them herself, without such previous assembly, appointing for the most part one

of the two remaining in the last year's list, (k) And this case, thus circum-

stanced, is the only authority in our books for the making these extraordinary

sheriffs. It is true, the reporter adds, that it was held that the queen by her

prerogative might make a sheriff without the election of the judges, non obstante

aliquo statuto in contrarium: but the doctrine of non obstante's, which sets the

prerogative above the laws, was effectually demolished by the bill of rights at

the revolution, and abdicated Westminster-hall when King James abdicated the

kingdom. However, it must be acknowledged, that the practice of occasionally

naming what are called pocket-sheriffs, by the sole authority of the crown, hat h

uniformly continued to the reign of his present majesty; in which, I believe,

few, (if any) compulsory instances have occurred. (3)

(i) 2 Inat. 659. tj) Jenkins, 229. (ft) Dyer, 225.

(2) [In The King r. "Woodrow, 2 T. R. 731, aii information was granted against a person so

rc'i'iisin^. and the reason assigned was, " because the vacancy of the office occasioned a stop oi

public justice." It should also seem, that indictment would properly have lain, but that the

information was granted because the year would be nearly expired before the indictment could

Goths the twelve nominors were first elected by the people themselves. And
this usage of ours at its first introduction, I am apt to believe, was founded upon
some statute, though not now to be found among our printed. la.we; first, because
it is materially different from the direction of all the statutes before mentioned:
which it is hard to conceive that the judges would have countenanced by their
concurrence, or that Fortescue would have inserted in his book, unless by the
authority of some statute: and also, because a statute is expressly referred. to in
the record, which Sir Edward Coke tells us, (i) he transcribed from the council
Look of 3 March, 34 Henry VI, and which is in substance as follows. The king
had of his own authority appointed a man sheriff of Linconshire, which offioe
he refused to take upon him: whereupon the opinions of the judges were ta.ken
what should be done in this behalf. And the two chief justices, Sir John Fortescue and Sir John Prisot, delivered the unanimous opinion of them all; "that
the king did an error when he ma.de a. person sheriff, that was not chosen and
presented to him according to the statute; that the person refusing was liable
to no fine for disobedience, as if he had been one of the three persons chosen
according to the tenor of the statute; (2) (that they would advise the king
to have recourse to the three persons that were chosen according to the statute,
or that some other thrifty man be entreated to occupy the office for this year ;
and that, the next year, to eschew such inconveniences, the order of the statute
in this behalf made be observed." But notwithstanding this unanimous reso[ • 342 ] lution of •all the judges of England thus entered in the council book,
and the statute 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 26, § 61, which expressly recognizes this to be the law of the land, some of our writers (j) have affirmed, that
the king, by his prerogative, may name whom he pleases to be sheriff, whether
chosen by the judges or no. 'l'his is grounded on a very particular case in the
fifth year of Queen Elizabeth, when, by reason of the plague, there was no
Michaelmas term kept at Westminster; so that the judges could not meet there
in crastino aniuuzrum to nominate the sheriffs : whereupon the queen named
them herself, without such previous assembly, appointing for the most part one
of the two remaining in the last year's list. (k) And this case, thus circumstanced, is the only anthority in our books for the making these extraordinary
sheriffs. It is true, the reporter adds, that it was held that the queen by her
prerogative mi~ht make a sheriff without the election of the judges, non obstant8
aliquo statuto in contrarium: but the doctrine of mm obstante's, which sets the
prerogative above the laws, was effectually demolished by the bill of rights a.t
the revolution, and abdicated Westminster-hall when King James abdicated the
kingdom. However, it must be acknowledged, that the practice of occa.sionally
naming what are called pocket-sheriffs, by the sole authority of the crown, hath
uniformly continued to the reign of his present majesty; in which, I believe,
few, (if any) compulsory instances have occurred. (3)
(.t) Dyer, Bl.
('l ll lnat. 1169.
{j) Jenkins, m.

be tried.]

(3) [When the king appoints a person sheriff who is not one of the three nominated in the

exchequer, he is called a pocket-sheriff. It is probable* that no compulsory instance of the

appointment of a pocket-sheriff ever occurred; and the unanimous opinion of the judges, pre-

served in the record cited by the learned commentator from 2 Inst. 559, precludes the possibility

of such a case. Formerly, if a person refused to take upon him the office of sheriff, he was

punished in the star-chamber; but now, if he refuses to take the office^ or the oaths, or officiates

as sheriff before he has qualified himself, he may be proceeded against by information in the

king's bench : Carth. 307 ; 3 Lev. 116 ; 2 Mod. 300 ; Dyer, 167 ; and this though he was excom-

municated, whereby he cannot take the test to qualify himself; 2 Mod. 300 : or was not qualified

bv taking the sacrament within a year preceding. Vide 4 Mod. 269; Salk. 167. 1 Ld. Raym. 29.

8 Tent. 248.]

The sacramental test is no longer required. Stat. 31 and 32 Vic. c. 72.

214 ;

(2) [In The King ti. Woodrow, 2 T1 R. 731, an information was granted against a. person so
and the reason assigned was, " because tho vacancy of the office occasioned a stop of
public JUBtice." It should also seem, that indictment would properly have lain, but that the
mformation was granted because the year would be nearly exptred before the indictment could
be triM.]
(3) [When the king appoints a person sheriff who is not one of the three nominated in the
exchequer, he is called a pocket-t:lheriff. It is probable; that no com;pulsory instance of the
appointment of a pocket-sheriff ever occnlTed ; and the unanimous opmion of the judges, pre11erved in the record cited by the learned commentator from 2 Inst. 559, preclude;i the possibility
of such a Clll!e. Formerly, if a pcrwn refused to take upon him the office of sheriff, be was
punished in the star-chamber; but now, if he refuses to take the office, or the oathll, or offici&W.s
M l!heriff before he ha.~ qnnlified himself. ho may be proceeded against by information in the
king's bench : Uarth. 307 ; :I Lev. 116; 2 Mod. 300 ; D:rer, 167 ; and this though he was excommunic~t<id, whereby hu cn1,1111!t take the te~t ~qualify him~elf; 2 Mod. 300: or Wik\ not qualifioo
hy taking the sacrament withm a year precedmg. V1dc 4 Mod. 269 ; Salk. 167. 1 Ld. Raym. :.?9.
2 Vent. 248.]
The sacrament.al test is no longer required. Stat. 31 and 32 Vic. c. 72.
refullin~,
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Sheriffs, by virtue of several old statutes, are to continue in their office no

longer than one year : and yet it hath been said (1) that a sheriff may be appoin-

ted durante bene placito, or during the king's pleasure ; and so is the form of

the royal writ, (m) Therefore, till a new sheriff be named his office cannot be

determined, unless by his own death, or the demise of the king ; in which last

case it was usual for the successor to send a new writ to the old sheriff ; (ri) but

now by statute 1 Ann. st. 1, c. 8, all officers appointed by the *preceding r +„,„ -,

king may hold their offices for six months after the king's demise, im- L c> '"' J

less sooner displaced by the successor. We may farther observe, that by statute

1 Ric. II, c. 11, no man that has served the office of sheriff for one year, can be

compelled to serve the same again within three years after.

We shall find it is of the utmost importance to have the sheriff appointed

according to law, when we consider his power and duty. These are either as a

judge, as the keeper of the king's peace, as a ministerial officer of the superior

courts of justice, or as the king s bailiff.

In his judicial capacity he is to hear and determine all causes of forty shillings

value and under, in bis county court, of which more in its proper place ; and he

has also a judicial power in divers other civil cases, (o) He is likewise to decide

the elections of knights of the shire, (subject to the control of the house of com-

mons,) of coroners, and of verderors ; to judge of the qualification of voters (4)

and to return such as he shall determine to be duly elected.

As the keeper of the king's peace, both by common law and special commis-
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sion, he is the first man in the county, and superior in rank to any nobleman

therein, during his office, (p ) He may apprehend, and commit to prison, all

persons who break the peace, or attempt to break it ; and may bind any one in a

recognizance to keep the king's peace. He may, and is bound ex officio to pur-

sue, and take all traitors, murderers, felons, and other misdoers, and commit them

to gaol for safe custody. He is also to defend his county against any of the king's

enemies when they come into the land : and for this purpose, as well as for

keeping the peace and pursuing felons, he may command all the people of his

county to attend him ; which is called the posse comitatus, or power of the

county : (q) and this summons every person above fifteen years old, and under

the degree of a peer, is bound to attend upon warning, (r) ""under pain r #njj -i

of fine and imprisonment, (s) But though the sheriff is thus the prin- •- •"

cipal conservator of the peace in his county, yet by the express directions of the

great charter, (t) he, together with the constable, coroner, and certain other offi-

cers of the king, are forbidden to hold any pleas of the crown, or, in other words,

to try any criminal offence. For it would be highly unbecoming, that the exe-

cutioners of justice should be also the judges ; should impose, as well as levy,

fines and amercements : should one day condemn a man to death, and personally

execute him the next. Neither may he act as an ordinary justice of the peace

during the time of his office : («) for this would be equally inconsistent ; he being

in many respects the servant of the justices.

In his ministerial capacity the sheriff is bound to execute all process issuing

from the king's courts of justice. (5) In the commencement of civil causes, he

is to serve the writ, to arrest, and to take bail ; when the cause comes to trial,

-. (m) Dalt. of Sheriffs, 8. (nl Dalt. of Sheriffs, 7;

foj Dalt c. 4. (p) 1 Roll. Rep. 237. (q) DalL c. 96.

(r) Lamb. Eircn. 315. (») Stat. Hen. V, c. 8. (t) Cap. 17. (u) Stat. 1 Mar. st 2. c. 8.

Sheriffs, by virtue of several old statutes, are to continue in their office no
longer than one year: and yet it hath been said (l) that a sheriff may be appointed dttrante bene placito, or during the king's pleasure; and so is the form of
the royal writ. (m) 'l'herefore, till a new sheriff be named his office cannot be
determined, unless by his own death, or the demise of the king; in which last
case it was usual for the successor to send a new writ to the old sheriff; ( n) but
now by statute 1 Ann. st. 1, c. 8, aH officers appointed by the *preceding [ • 343 ]
king may hold their offices for six months after the kmg's demise, unless sooner displaced by the successor. We may farther obsenc, that by statute
1 Ric. II, c. 11, no man that bas served the office of sheriff for one year, can be
compelled to serve the 8ame again within three years after.
We shall find it is of the utmost importance to have the sheriff appointed
according to law, when we consider his power and duty. These are either as a
judge, as the keeper of the kin~'s peace, as a ministerial officer of the superior
courts of justice, or as the kings bailiff.
In his judicial capacity he is to hear and determine all causes of forty shillings
value and under, in bis county court, of which more in its proper place; and he
has also a. judicial power in divers other civil cases. (o) He is likewise to decide
the elections of kmghts of the shire, (subject to the control of the house of commons,) of coroners, and of vcrderors; to judge of the qualification of voters (4)
and to return such as he shall determine to be duly elected.
As the keeper of the king's peace, both by common law and special commission, he is the first man in the county, and supocior in rank to any nobleman
therein, during his office. (p) He may apprehend, and commit to prison, all
persons who break the peace, or attempt to break it; and may bind any one in a
recognizance to kee.P the king's peace. He may, and is bound ex officio to pursue, and take all traitors, murderers, felons, and other misdoers, and commit them
to gaol for safe custody. He is also to defend his count.Y against any of the king's
enemies when they come into the land: and for this purpose, as well as for
keeping the peace and pursuin~ felons he may command all the people of his
county to attend him ; which is called the posse comitatus, or power of the
county: (q) and this summons every person above fifteen years old, and under
the degree of a peer, is bound to attend upon warning, (r) *under pain * 44 ]
of fine and imprisonment. (s) But though the sheriff is thus the prin- [ 3
cipal conservator of the peace in his county, yet by the express directions of the
gre.at charter, (t) he, together with the constable, coroner, and certain other officers of the king, are forbidden to hold any pleas of the crown, or, in other words,
to try any criminal offence. For it would be highly unbecoming, that the executioners of justice should be also the judges; should impose, as well as levy,
fines and amercements: should one day condemn a man to death, and personally
execute him the next. Neither may be act as an ordinary justice of the peace
during the time of his office: (u) for this would be equally inconsistent; he being
in many respects the servant of the justices.
In his ministerial capacity the sheriff is bound to execute all process issuing
from the king's courts of justice. (5) In the commencement of civil causes, he
is to serve the writ, to arrest, aua to take bail; when the cause comes to trial,

(4) This duty no longer devolves upon the sheriff.

(5) [By the common law sheriffs are to some purposes considered as officers of the courts,

as the constable is to the justices of the peace. Salt. 175; 2 Lord. Ray. 1195; Fortes. 129;

(I)
(o)
(r)

t Rep. 32.
Dalt. c. 4.

(m)
(p)

Lamb. Elrcn. 311>.

Dalt. ofSherift's, 8.
(n) Dalt. of Sherurs, j,
l Roll. Rep. 237.
(q) .Dalt. c. 95.
(•)Stat. Hen. V, c. 8.
OJ Cap. 17.

(u)

Stat. I Mar. st 2. c. 8.

Tidd. 8 ed. 52. As writs and process are directed to the sheriff, neither he nor his officers are to

dispute the authority of the court out of which they issue, but he and his officers are at their

penl truly to execute the same, and that according to the command of the said writs, and here-

unto they are sworn : Dalt. 104 ; and he must do the duty of his office and show no favor, nor

be guilty of oppression. Bait. 109. But the sheriff ought to be favored before any private per-

son. 4 Co. 33.]

215

(4) This duty no longer devolves upon the sherift.
(5) [By the common law sheriff" a.re to some purposes considered as officers of the coum,
as the c1.1nstahle is to the justiceR of the :peace. Salk. 175; 2 Lord. Ray. 1195; Fortes. 129;
Tidd. 8 ed. 52. As writs and process are directed to the sheriff, neither he nor his officers are to
dis:1;mte the authority of the court out of which they h!sue, but he and his officers are 11t their
pen) truly to execnt-0 the same, and that according to the command of the said writs, and herew1t-0 they are sworn : Dalt. 104 ; and he must do the duty of his offiee and i;how no favor, nor
be guilty of oppression. Dalt. 109. But the Rheriff ought to be favored before any private person. 4 Co. 33.]
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he must summon and return the jury; when it is determined, he must see the
judgment of the court carried into execution. In criminal matters, he also
arrests and imprisons, he returns the jury, he has the custody of the delinquent,
and he executes the sentence of the court, though it extend to death itself.
As the king's bailiff, it is his business to preserve the rights of the king within
his bailiwick; for so his county is frequently called in the writs; a word introduced by the princes of the Norman line; in imitation of the French, whose
territory is divided into bailiwicks, as that of England into counties. (w) He
must seize to the kin~s use all lands devolved to the crown by attainder or
escheat; must levy ail fines and forfeitures; must seize and keep all waifs,
wrecks, estrays, and the like, unless they be granted to some subject; and must
also collect the king's rents within the bailiwick, if commanded by process from
the exchequer. (x)
[ • 345 ]
*To execute these various offices, the sheriff has under him many inferior officers; an under-sheriff, bailiffs, and gaolers; who must neither
buy, sell, nor form their offices, on forfeiture of 500l. (y) (6)

he must summon and return the jury; when it is determined, he must see the

judgment of the court carried into execution. In criminal matters, he also

arrests and imprisons, he returns the jury, he has the custody of the delinquent,

and he executes the sentence of the court, though it extend to death itsel£

As the king's bailiff, it is his business to preserve the rights of the king within

his bailiwick; for so his county is frequently called in the writs; a word intro-

duced by the princes of the Norman line; in imitation of the French, whose

territory is divided into bailiwicks, as that of England into counties, (to) He

must seize to the king's use all lands devolved to the crown by attainder or

escheat; must levy all fines and forfeitures; must seize and keep all waifs,

wrecks, estrays, and the like, unless they be granted to some subject; and must

also collect the king's rents within the bailiwick, if commanded by process from

the exchequer, (z)

F *3451 *^0 execu^e these various offices, the sheriff has under him many in-

"- -" ferior officers; an under-sheriff, bailiffs, and gaolers; who must neither

buy, sell, nor farm their offices, on forfeiture of 5001. (y) (6)

(wj Fortesc. de L. L. o. 24. (x) Dalt. c. 9. fgj Stat. 3 Geo. I, c. 15.

Although a sheriff is not, in general, to dispute the authority of the court of which he is an offi-

(tD)

cer, yet if the court should assume to act in a case in which it had no jurisdiction, he could not

Fortesc. de L. L. c. 'U.

f:e) Dalt.

c. 9.

(J)

Stat. 8 Geo. I, e. 16.

be made liable for refusing to serve the process. Earl ». Camp, 16 Wend. 562; Loom is ?•. Wheeler,

21 Wig. 271. Indeed, if a sheriff should seize property on a writ issued by a court without juris-

Although a. 11heriff is not, in general, to dispute the authority of the court of which he is an officer, yet ifthe court should SBBnme to act in a. case in which it had no jurisdiction, he could not
be made liable for refusing to serve the process. Earl v. Ca.mp, 16 Wend. 562; Loomis v. Wheeler,
21 Wis. 2il. Indeed, if a. sheriff t'hould sefae property on a. writ issued by a. court without juri&diction of the case, the 11herifl' could' not, under his writ, defend his poBBeRBion of the property as
against replevin by tho true owner. Beach v. Botsford, 1 Doug. Mich. 199. Buta.nofficer, in an
action of trespass, is protected by procesa which, on its face, apprises him of no defect of authority in the court issuing it. Fox v. Wood, 1 Rawle, 143; Ortman v. Greenman, 4 Mich. 91 ; Foster v. Pettibone, 20 Barb. 350; Brown v. Ma.son, 40 Vt. 157 ; Chase v. Inplls, 97 Ma.ss. 524.
(6) [The sheriff is not bound to make a.n under-sheriff: Hob. 13, eeif vid. 1 and 2 P. and M.
o. 12; and the sheriff may remove him when he ple81!6s, and this though he makes him irremovable. Id. The under-sheriff is appointed by deed, which is afterwards filed in the kinJtl
remembrancer's office in the exchequer. Hob. 12. By the 2i Elis. c. 12, the under-sheriff,
except of countieli in Wales and county Pa.la.tine of Chester, must take an oath which is now
prescribed by the 3 Geo. I, o. 15. He wa.s formerly re<Juired a.lHO to take the oaths of allegiance, &c., m the same m8.11Iler a.a the high-sheriff, and within the ea.me time ; but those a.re not
DOW required.
For security to the sheriff, the under-sheriff usually gives a. bond of indemnity to l!&Ve the
sheriff harmless; to make accollllt in the exchequer, and procure the high-sheriff's discharge, to
return juries with the privity of the sheriff, to excute no process of weight without the sheriff's
privity, to account to the sheriff and attend him, t.o be ready to attend the sheriff; for hie good
behavior in his office, to take or use no extortion, to give attendance at the king'!! court. See
Da.lt. o. 2, ~· 20. To indemnify him from esca.~s. Hob. 14. But a bond or covenant that the
under-11heriff shall not execute process, &c., Wlthout the sheriff's consent, ie void; for, when the
sheriff appoints his llllder-sheriff, he consequently gives him authority to exerciee all the ordinary
office of the high-sheriff himself. Hob. 13.
The under-sheriff may do all that the sheriff himself can do exce11t that which the sherift'
himself ought to do in person, 88 to execute a. writ of waste, redisseism, partition, dower, &c. :
6 Co. 12 ; Hob. 13 ; Da.lt. 34 ; J enk. 181 ; for in a.Il ca.;ies where the writ commands the sheriff'
to go in person there the writ is his commission, from which he c8.11Ilot deviate. Dalt. 34.
The under-sheriJr ha.th not, nor ought to have, any interest in the office itself, neither may he do
any tiling in hill own name : Sa.lk. 96 ; but only in the name of the high sheriff, who is answerable for him, because the writs a.re directed to the high-sheriff. If the sheriff dies before
his office is expired, his under-sheriff or deputy shall continue in office, and execute the same
in the deceased sheriff's name until e. new sheriff be sworn, a.nd he shall be s.nswerable, and the
security given by the under-sheriff to the deceased sheriff is to continue during the interval.
3 Geo. I, c. 15, I!. 8.
By 3 Geo. I, c. 15, none shall 11ell, buy, let or take to fa.rm the office of under-sheriff, &c., or
other office belonging to the office of high-sheriff, nor contract for the same for money or other
consideration directly or indirectly, <t-0., on pain of 5001., a moiety to the king and a. moiety t-0
him who shall sue, provided the suit be in two yea.rs; provided that nothing in that act shall prevent the sheriff, under-sheriff, &c., from ta.king the just fees e.nd perquisites of hi.- office, or froUl
accounting for them to the sheriff, or giving security to do so, or from giving, ta.king, or securing
a. salary or recompense to the under-Bheriff, or from the under-sheriff m ca.se of sheriff's dee.th
from constituting a deputy. Dalt. a, 514; Hob. 13; 2 Brown!. 281.
If s.n action ill brought for a breach of duty in the office of 11heriff, it should be again.'!t the
high-sheriff, as for an 11.et. done by him, and not against the under·l'.lheritf; and if it proc<'<'ds
from a fault of the undl!t•11heriff or bailiff, that is IL matter to be t'ettled between them a.nd the

diction of the case, the sheriff could'not, under his writ, defend his possession of the property as
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against replevin by the true owner. Beach r. Botsford, 1 Doug. Mich. 199. But an officer, in an

action of trespass, is protected by process which, on its face, apprises him of no defect of author-

ity in the court issuing it. Fox v. Wood, 1 Rawle, 143; Ort man c. Greenman, 4 Mich. 91; Fos-

ter v. Pettibone, 20 Barb. 350; Brown v. Mason, 40 Vt. 157; Chase ». Ingalls, 97 Mass. 524.

(6) [The sheriff is not bound to make an under-sheriff: Hob. 13, sed vid. 1 and 2 P. and M.

c. 12; and the sheriff may remove him when he pleases, and this though he makes him irremov-

able. Id. The under-sheriff is appointed by deed, which is afterwards filed in the king's

remembrancer's office in the exchequer. Hob. 12. By the 27 Eliz. c. 12, the under-shenff,

except of counties in Wales and county Palatine of Chester, must take an oath which is now

prescribed by the 3 Geo. I, c. 15. He was formerly required also to take the oaths of alle-

giance, Ac., in the same manner as the high-sheriff, and within the same time; but those are not

now required.

For security to the sheriff, the under-sheriff usually gives a bond of indemnity to save the

sheriff harmless; to make account in the exchequer, and procure the high-sheriff's discharge, to

return juries with the privity of the sheriff, to excute no process of weight without the sheriff's

privity, to account to the sheriff and attend him, to be ready to attend the sheriff; for his good

behavior in his office, to take or use no extortion, to give attendance at the king's court. See

Dalt. c. 2, p. 20. To indemnify him from escapes. IIoh. 14. But a bond or covenant that the

under-shenff shall not execute process, Ac., without the sheriff's consent, is void; for, when the

sheriff appoints his under-sheriff, he consequently gives him authority to exercise all the ordinary

office of the high-sheriff himself. Hob. 13.

The under-Bheriff may do all that the sheriff himself can do except that which the sheriff

himself ought to do in person, as to execute a writ of waste, redisseisin, partition, dower, Ac.:

6 Co. 12; Hob. 13; Dalt. 34; Jenk. 181; for in all cases where the writ commands the sheriff

to go in person, there the writ is his commission, from which he cannot deviate. Dalt. 34.

The under-sheriff hath not, nor ought to have, any interest in the office itself, neither may he do

any thing in his own name: Salk. 96; but only in the name of the high sheriff, who is an-

swerable for him, because the writs are directed to the high-sheriff. If the sheriff dies before

his office is expired, his under-shenff or deputy shall continue in office, and execute the same

in the deceased sheriff's name until a new sheriff be sworn, and he shall be answerable, and the

security given by the nnder-sheriff to the deceased sheriff is to continue during the interval.

3 Geo. I, c. 15, s. 8.

By 3 Geo. I, c. 15, none shall sell, buy, let or take to farm the office of under-sheriff, Ac., or

other office belonging to the office of high-sheriff, nor contract for the same for money or other

consideration directly or indirectly, Ac., on pain of 500k, a moiety to the king and a moiety to

him who shall sue, provided the suit be in two years; provided that nothing in that act shall pre-

vent the sheriff, under-sheriff, Ac., from taking the just fees and perquisites of his office, or from

accounting for them to the sheriff, or giving security to do so, or from giving, taking, or securing

a salary or recompense to the under-sheriff, or from the under-sheriff in case of sheriff's death

from constituting a deputy. Dalt. 3, 514; Hob. 13; 2 Brownl. 281.
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If an action is brought for a breach of duty in the office of sheriff, it should be against the

high-sheriff, as for an act done by him, and not against the under-sheriff; and if it proceeds

from a fault of the under-sheriff or bailiff, that is a matter to be settled between them and the
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The under-sheriff usually performs all the duties of the office; (7) a very few

only excepted, where the personal presence of the high sheriff is necessary. But

no under-sheriff shall abide in his office above one year; (z) and if he does, by

statute 23 Hen. VI, c. 8, he forfeits 200/., a very large penalty in those early days.

And no under-sheriff or sheriff's officer shall practice as an attorney, during the

time he continues in such office: (a) (8) for this would be a great inlet to par-

tiality and oppression. But these salutary regulations are shamefully evaded,

by practicing in the names of other attorneys, and putting in sham deputies by

way of nominal under-sheriffs; by reason of which, says Balton, (b) the under-

sheriffs and bailiffs do grow so cunning in their several places, that they are able

to deceive and, it may well be feared, that many of them do deceive, both the

king, the high-sheriff, and the county.

Bailiffs, or sheriff's officers, are either bailiffs of hundreds, or special bailiffs. (9)

Bailiffs of hundreds are officers appointed over those respective districts by the

sheriffs, to collect fines therein; to summon juries; to attend the judges and

justices at the assizes, and quarter sessions; and also to execute writs and pro-

cess in the several hundreds, But, as these are generally plain men, and not

thoroughly skillful in this latter part of their office, that of serving writs, and

making arrests and executions, it is now usual to join special bailiffs with them ;

who are generally mean persons, employed bv the sheriffs on account only of

their adroitness and dexterity in hunting and seizing their prey. The sheriff

being *answerable for the misdemeanors (10) of these bailiffs, they are r *o j g i
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therefore usually bound in an obligation with sureties for the due execu- •• ••

tiou of their office, and thence are called bound-bailiffs; which the common

people have corrupted into a much more homely appellation.

Gaolers are also the servants of the sheriffs, and he must be responsible for

their conduct. (11) Their business is to keep safely all such persons as are

(*) Stat. 42 Ed. in, c. 9. (a) sut. 1 Hen. V, c. 4. (») Of Sheriffs, c. 115.

high-sheriff. Cowj>. Rep. 403. In Ireland, however, this is otherwise, except the wrong com-

plained of was the immediate act or default of the high-sheriff. 57 Geo. Ill, c. 68, s. 9.

The under-sheriff usually performs all the duties of the office; (7) a very fow
only excepted, where the personal presence of the high sheriff is necessarv. But
no under-sheriff shall abide in his office above one year; (z) and if he does, by
statute 23 Hen. VI, c. 8, he forfeits 200l., a very lar~e penalty in those early days.
And no under-sheriff or sheriff's officer shall practice as an attorney, during the
time he continues in such office: (a) (8) for this would be a great inlet to partiality and oppression. But these salutary regulations are shamefully evaded,
by practicin~ m the names of other attorneys, and putting in Etham deputies by
way of nommal under-sheriffs; by reason of which, says Dalton, (b) the undersheriffs and bailiffs do grow so cunning in their several places, that they are able
to deceive and, it may well be feared, that many of them do deceive, both the.
king, the high-sheriff, and the county.
Bailiffs, or sheriff's officers, are either bailiffs of hundreds, or special bailiffs. (9)
Bailiffs of hundreds are officers appointed over those respective districts by the
sheriffs, to collect fines therein ; to summon juries ; to attend t.he judges and
justices at the assizes, and quarter sessions; and also to execute writs and process in the several hundreds, But, as these are generally plain men, and not
thoroughly skillful in this latter yart of their office, that of serving writs, and
making arrests and executions, it 1s now usual to join special bailiffs with them;
who are generally mean persons, employed bv the sheriffs on account only of
their adroitness and dexterity in hunting ancl seizing their prey. The sheriff
being *answerable for the misdemeanors (10) of these bailiffs, they are [ • 346 ]
therefore usually bound in an obligation with sureties for the due execution of their office, and thence are called bound-bailiffs; which the common
people have corrupted into a much more homely appellation.
Gaolers are also the servants of the sheriffs, and he must be responsible for
their conduct. {11) Their business is to keep safely all such persons as are
(•) Stat. '2 Ed. m, c. 9.
(a) Stat.1 Hen. V, c • .&.
(1>) 01 Sherla'l!, c. 116,

If the attorney for the defendant was under-sheriff, that would be ground of challenge to

the array, but not for a motion for a new trial. 1 Smith's Rep. 304.]

(7) [In Laicock's case, 9 R. 49, Latch. 187, 8. c. the action was brought against the under-

sheriff for a false return of HUH est inventus. It appeared that while the writ was pending,

and before the return, the under-sheriff had sight of the defendant; but ruled, that the action

did not lie against the under-sheriff, for the high-sheriff only is chargeable, and not the under-

sheriff.]

(8) There is no such prohibition now in the case of under-sheriffs. See statute 6 and 7

Vic. c. 73. And deputy sneriffs are now appointed in England with general power to execute

and return process. Statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, o. 42.

(9) [No sheriff's officer, bailiff, or other person, can be bail in any action: R. M. 14 Geo. II;

2 Strange, 890; 2 Bla. Rep. 797; Loft. 155; see Tidd. 8th ed. 79; nor take any warrant of attor-

ney : R. E. 15 Car. II.

Of the duties of bailiffs, see Impey, Off. of Sheriff, 43; Hawk. P. C. Index, tit. Bailiff.

If the sheriff appoint a special bailiff to arrest defendant at request of plaintiff, he cannot be

ruled to return the writ: 4 T. R. 119; 1 Chitty's Rep. 613; but he is, notwithstanding, respon-

sible for the safe custody of defendant after arrested, ti Term Rep. 505.]

(10) [See Drake v. Sykes, 7 T. R. 113; Doe d. James v. Brawn, 5 B. and A. 243.]

(11) [The keeper must not put prisoners in irons, unless in case of necessity. 4 Geo. IV, c.

64, 8. 10 ; and see as to this 1 Hale, 601; 2 Hawk. c. 22, s. 32; 2 Inst. 381.

In some cases gross cruelty on the part of the galoer causing death would amount even to

murder. See Post. 322; 17 How. St. Tri. 398; 2 Stra. 856; 1 East, P. C. 331; Fost 321; Hale,

432; 2 id. 57 ; 1 Russel on Crimes, 667.

In criminal cases, if a gaoler assist & felon in making an actual escape, it is felony at com-

mon law: 2 Leauh, 671; and in some cases, it is an escape to suffer a prisoner to have greater

liberty than can be by law allowed him, as to admit him to bail at law, or suffer him to go

beyond the limits of the prison. Hawk. b. 2, c. 19, s. 5.

A voluntary escape amounts to the same kind of crime, and is punishable in the same way

as the original offender, whether he be attainted, indicted, or only in custody on suspicion.

1 Hale, 234; 2 Hawk. c. 19, s. 22. And a person who wrongfully takes on himself the office

of gaoler is as much liable as if he were duly appointed. 1 Hale, 594.

But no one can be punishable in this degree for the default of a deputy. 1 Salk. 272, note.

Nor can any gaoler be a felon, in respect of a voluntary escape, unless at the time the offence

hlgh-sheriff. CoWJ?. Rep. 403. In Ireland, however, this is otherwise, except the wrong complained of was the immediate l\Ct or default of the high-sheriff. 57 Geo. III, c. 68, a. 9.
If the attorney for the defendant wag under-sheriff, that would be ground of challenge to
the array, bnt not for a motion for a new trial. 1 Smith's Rep. 304.]
(7) [ln Laicock'!! case, 9 R. 49, Latch. 187, s. c. the action was brought against the undersheriff for a false return of mm est im•entus. It appeared that while the writ waa pending,
and before tho return, tho under-sheriff had sight of the defendant ; but rul.ed, that the action
did not lie against the under-sheriff, for the hlgh-11heriff only is chargeable, and not the undersheriff.]
(8) There is no such prohibition now in the oase of under-sheriffs. See statute 6 and 7
Vic. c. 73. And deputy sheriffs ti.re now appointed in England with general power to execute
and return process. Statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, o. 42.
(9) [.N"o sheriff's officer, bailiff, or other person, can be bail in any action: R. Y. 14 Geo. II;
2 Strange, 890; 2 Bla. Rep. 7f!'l; Loft. 155; see Tidd. 8th ed. 79; nor take any warrant of attorney : R. E. 15 Car. II.
Of the duties of bailiffs, see Impel, Off. of Sheriff, 43; Hawk. P. C. Index, tit. Bailift'.
If the sheriff appoint a special bailiff to arrest defondant at request of plaintiff, he cannot be
ruled to return the writ: 4 T. R. 119; 1 Chitty's Rep. 613; but he is, not'\\;thstanding, reBpOniDble for the l!llfe cwitody of defendant after arrested. 8 Term Rep. 505. l
(10) [See Drake v. Sykes, 7 T. R. 113; Doe d. James tl. Brawn, 5 B. and A. 243.]
(11) [The keeper must not put priRonen; in irons, unless in case of necessity. 4 Geo. IV, c.
64, i;. lU ; and 11ee lli' to this 1 Hlilo, 601 ; 2 Hawk. c. 2'2, s. 32; 2 Inst. 381.
In somo cases gro?~ cruelty on the part of the galoer causing death wo!1ld amount even w
murder. See I<'oiit. 3:C2; 17 How. St. Tn. 398; 2 Stra. 856; 1 East, P. C. 331; Fost. 321; Hale,
432; 2 id. 57 ; 1 Ru~sfll on Crimes, 667.
In criminal caseii, if a gaoler assist r. felon in making an a.ctual escape, it is felony at common law : 2 Leauh, 671 ; and in some eases, it is au escape to suffer a prisoner to have great.er
liberty than can be by law allowed him, 118 to admit him to bail at law, or 11u1fer him to go
beyond the limits of the prison. Hawk. b. 2, c. 19, s. 5.
A voluntary escape amount.ci to the same kind of crime, and is punishable in the same way
BM the original offender, whether he he att.ainted, iudicted, or only in cust.ody on BllSpioion.
1 Hale, 234; 2 Hawk. c. 19, s. 2'..!. .And a perROn who wrongfully takes on himself tho office
of gaoler is as much liable as if he were duly appoiuted. 1 Hale, 594.
But no one can be punishable in this degree for the default of a deputy. 1 Salk. Z72, note.
Nor can any gaoler be a folon, in re,;pect of a voluntary escape, unless at the time the oifonce
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346 SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES. [Book I.

committed to them by lawful warrant; and, if they suffer any such to escape,

the sheriff shall answer it to the king, if it be a criminal matter; or, in a civil

case, to the party injured, (c) And to this end the sheriff must (d) have lands

sufficient within the county to answer the king and his people. The abuses of

gaolers and sheriff's officers, toward the unfortunate persons in their custody,

are well restrained and guarded against by statute 32 ueo. II, c. 28, and by stat-

ute 14 Geo. Ill, c. 59, provisions are made for better preserving the health of

prisoners, and preventing the gaol distemper. (12)

The vast expense, which custom has introduced in serving the office of high-

sheriff, was grown such a burthen to the subject, that it was enacted, by statute

13 and 14 Car. II, c. 21, that no sheriff (except of London, Westmoreland, and

towns which are counties of themselves) should keep any table at the assizes,

except for his own family, or give any presents to the judges or their sen-ants,

or have more than forty men in livery ; yet, for the sake of safety and decency,

he may not have less than twenty men in England and twelve in Wales; upon

forfeiture, in any of these cases, of 2001.

II. The coroner's is also a very ancient office at the common law. He is called

coronor, coronator, because he hath principally to do with pleas of the crown,

or such wherein the king is more immediately concerned, (e) And in this light

the lord chief justice of the king's bench is the principal coroner in the king-

dom ; and may, if he pleases, exercise the jurisdiction of a coroner in any part of

r ,,„ j 7 -i the realm. (/) But *there are also particular coroners for every county
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' ' -"of England, usually four, but sometimes six, and sometimes fewer, (ff)

This office- (h) is of equal antiquity with the sheriff; and was ordained to-

gether with him to keep the peace, when the earls gave up the wardship of

the county.

He is still chosen by all the freeholders in the county-court; (13) as by the

(c) Dalt. c. 118. 4 Kep. 84.

(d} Stat,. 9 Edw. II, at. 1. 2 Edw. Ill, c. 4. 4 EUw. HI, c. 9. 6 Edw. m,e. 4- 13 •»* M c»r- n' °- 21. * "*•

(e) 2 lost. 31. 4 Inst. 271. (/) I Kep. 67. (g) F. N. B. 163. (h) Mirror, c. 1, fS.

of his prisoner was felony, and cannot be made so by its becoming so afterwards. 1 Hale, 591.

Neither can he be thus indicted till after the attainder of the principal: Hawk. b. 2, c. 19, g.

26; though he may be fined for the misprision. Id.

A negligent escape may be punished by fine at common law: 2 Hawk. c. 19, s. 31; and a

sheriff is thus liable for the default of his duty. Id. One instance of such negligence does not

amount to a forfeituie of the gaoler's office, though a repetition of such misfeasance will

enable the court to oust him in their discretion. Hawk. b. 2, c. 19, s. 30. "When a gaol is

broken by thieves the gaoler is answerable; not so if broken by king's enemies. 3 Inst. 52.

The king may pardon a voluntary escape before it is committed: 2 Hawk. o. 19, s. 32: and

see further as to prison breach and rescue, post, book 4,130, 131.

In oivil cases, if the sheriff's gaoler suffer a prisoner to escape, the action must be brought

against the sheriff, not against the gaoler; for an escape out of the gaoler's custody is, by

intendment of law, out of the sheriff's custody. 2 Lev. 159; 2 Jones, b. 2 ; 2 Mod. 124 ; 5

id. 414, 416. But an action lies against a gaoler for a voluntary escape, as well as against

the sheriff, it being in the nature of a rescne: 2 Salk. 441; 3 id. 18; and see further as to

the action for escape, post, book 3, 165.]

(12) The general powers and duties of sheriffs in the United States are much the same as in

England ; their liabilities also correspond. In the United States, however, this officer is

chosen by popular vote. The statutes generally allow him to appoint as many general depu-

ties as he sees fit, and also an under-sheriff, who, besides possessing the powers of a general

deputy, will succeed the sheriff in case of vacancy until an election can be had under the law.

The sheriff may also depute persons for the service of particular process, whose powers will

be limited to snch service. A general deputy cannot appoint a deputy, but it seems that he

mav authorize a person to serve a particular writ. Hunt v. Burrel, 5 Johns. 137.

'f he sheriff is liable for all neglects of duty by the under-sheriff and deputies, and for all

acts colore offlcii. Mclntyre c. Trambull, 7 Johns. 35; Knowlton v. Bartlett, 1 Pick. 271. And

this even though they may be trespasses; as whore, on a writ against one person, he seizes the

poods of another. Ackworth v. Kempe, Doug. 40; Grinnell v. Phillips, 1 Mass. 530; Tuttle v.

Cook, 15 "Wend. 274. And actions for breach of duty must be brought against tie sheriff, and

not against a deputy. Paddock u. Cameron, 8 Cow. 212; Harlan v. Lumsden, 1 Duvall, 86.

The oflScer who serves the process of the federal courts is called a marshal. He is

appointed by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate; he appoints deputies,'

and his powers, duties and liabilities correspond to those of sheriff.

(13) The statnte 7 and 8 Tic. c. 92, regulates the election.
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policy of our ancient laws the sheriffs, and conservators of the peace, and all

other officers were, who were concerned in matters that affected the liberty of

the people; (i) and as verderors of the forest still are, whose business it is to

stand between the prerogative and the subject in the execution of the forest

laws. For this purpose there is a writ at common law de coronaiore eligendo ; (j)

in which it is expressly commanded the sheriff " qiwd talem eligi faciat, qui

melius et sciat, et velit, et possit, officio illi intendere." And in order to effect

this the more surely, it was enacted by the statute (k) of Westm. 1, that none

but lawful and discreet knights should be chosen: and there was an instance in

the 5 Edw. Ill, of a man being removed from this office, because he was only a

merchant. (I) But it seems it is now sufficient if a man hath lands enough to

be made a knight, whether he be really knighted or not: (m) for the coroner

ought to have an estate sufficient to maintain the dignity of his office, and

answer any fines that may be set upon him for his misbehavior; (n) and if he

hath not enough to answer, his fine shall be levied on the county as the punish-

ment for electing an insufficient officer. (0) Now indeed, through the culpable

neglect of gentlemen of property, this office has been suffered to fall into disre-

pute, and get into low and indigent hands, so that, although, formerly no

coroners would condescend to be paid for serving their country, and they were,

by the aforesaid statute of Westm. 1, expressly forbidden to take a 'reward, r $0401

under pain of a great forfeiture to the king; yet for many years past L J

they have only desired to be chosen for the sake of their perquisites: being
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allowed fees for their attendance by the statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 1, which Sir

Edward Coke complains of heavily; (p) though, since his time, those fees have

been much enlarged, (q) (14)

The coroner is chosen for life; but may be removed, either by being made

sheriff, or chosen verderor, which are offices incompatible with the other; or, by

the king's writ de coronatore ezonerando, for a cause to be therein assigned, as

that he is engaged in other business, is incapacitated by years or sickness, hath

not a sufficient estate in the county, or lives in an inconvenient part of it. (r)

And by the statute 25 Geo. II, c. 29, extortion, neglect, or misbehaviour, are also

made causes of removal.

The office and power of a coroner are also, like those of the sheriff, either judi-

cial or ministerial; but principally judicial. This is in great measure ascer-

tained by statute 4 Edw. I, de officio coronatoris ; and consists, first, in inquiring,

when any person is slain, or dies suddenly, or in prison, concerning the manner

of his death. And this must be "super visum corporis;" (s) (15) for, if the

body be not found, the coroner cannot sit (t)

(i) 2 Inat. 588. (}) F. N. B. 163. (i) 8 Edw. I, o. 10.

(Z) 2 lost. 32. (in) F. N. B. 163. 164. (n) Ibid. (o) MIrr. c. 1,1 3. 2 Inst. 175.

(p) 2 Inat. 216. (q) Stat. 26 Geo. II, c. 29. (r) F. N. B. 163, 1U4. («) 4 Inst. 271.

! t) Thus, in the Gothic constitution, before any fine was payable by the neighborhood, for the slaughter

of a man therein, "<to corpora delicti constoire oportebat; '/. e. non tarn fuixse aliquem in territorio teto

mortuum inrentum, <f<iam vulneratum et co-sum. J'oteft mini homo etiam ex alia causa subito mori." Stiern-

hook de Jure Gollwr, 1. 3. c. 4.

(14) Fees are now abolished, and coroners are paid by salary. Statute 23 and 24 Yic. o.

Ho. And it may be added that the office is usually held by men of respectable character and

standing.

(15) [When an unnatural death happens, the township are bound, under pain of amerce-

ment, to give notice to the coroner. 1 Burn. J. 25th ed. 786. Indeed, it seems indictable to bury

a party who died an unnatural death, without a coroner's inquest: Id.; and if the township

suffer the body to putrify, without sending for the coroner, they shall be amerced. Id. "When

notice is given to the coroner, he should issue a precept to the constable of the four, five or

six next townships, to return a competent number of good and lawful men of their town-

ships, to appear before him in such a place, to make an inquisition touching that matter; or

he may send his precept to the constable of the hundred. 2 Hale, 59; 4 Edw. I, st. 2; Wood.

Inst. b. 4, c. 1. As to form of inquisition, see 2 Lord Ray. 1305; Burn, J. 1 vol. 25th ed. 787,

789. If the constable make no return, or the jurors returned appear not, they may be amerced.

2 Hale, 59. It seems that a coroner ought to execute his office in person, and not by deputy,

for he is a judicial officer. Id. 58; Wood. Inst. b, 4, c. 1; 1 Burn, J. 24th ed. 787, 789; 3 Barn,

and Aid. 260. The jury appearing is to be sworn, and charged by the coroner to inquire,
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He must also sit at the very place where the death happened; (16) and his

inquiry is made by a jury from four, five or six, of the neighboring towns, orer

whom he is to preside. If any be found guilty by this inquest, of murder or other

homicide, he is to commit them to prison for farther trial, and is also to inquire

concerning their lands, goods, and chattels, which are forfeited thereby: but

whether, it be homicide or not, he must inquire whether any deodand has

F *3491 accrue^ t° the king, or the *lord of the franchise, by this death ; and

L *' ' « must certify the whole of this inquisition (under his own seal and the

seals of his jurors, («) together with the evidence thereon,) to the court of king's

bench, or the next assizes. Another branch of his office is to enquire concern-

ing shipwrecks; and certify whether wreck or not, and who is in possession of

the goods. Concerning treasure-trove, he is also to inquire who were the finders,

and where it is, and whether any one be suspected of having found and con-

cealed a treasure; " and that may be well perceived (saith the old statute of

Edw. I,) where one liveth riotously, haunting taverns, and hath done so of

long time:" whereupon he might be attached, and held to bail, upon this sus-

picion only.

The ministerial office of the coroner is only as the sheriff's substitute. For

when just exception can be taken to the sheriff, for suspicion of partiality, (as

that he is interested in the suit, or of kindred to either plaintiff or defendant,)

the process must then be awarded to the coroner, instead of the sheriff, for exe-

cution of the king's writs, (v) (17)
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III. The next species of subordinate magistrates, whom I am to consider, are

justices of the peace; the principal of whom is the oustos rotulorum, or keeper

of the records of the county. The common law hath ever had a special care

and regard for the conservation of the peace; for peace is the very end and foun-

dation of civil society. And therefore, before the present constitution of justices

was invented, there were peculiar officers appointed by the common law for the

maintenance of the public peace. Of these some had, and still have, this power

annexed to other offices which they hold; others had it merely by itself, and were

thence named custodes, or conservatores pads. Those that were so, virtute

officii, still continue; but the latter sort are superseded by the modern justices.

(«) Suit, 38 Hen. VIII, o. 12. 1 and 2P. and M. c. 13. '2 West. Symbol. » 310. Crump. S64. T remain P.

C. 621. (v) 1 lost. 27L

upon the view of the body, how the party came by his death. 2 Hale, 60. See form of charge,

4 Edw. I, St. 2, called the statute de officio coronatops. 1 Bum, J. 24th ed. 789.

The coroner must hear evidence on all hands, if offered to them, and that upon onth. 2

Hale, 157; 1 Leach, 43.

When the inquest is determined, the body may be buried 4 Edw. I, at. 2.

As to the manner of holding inquests, Ac., on parties dving in prisons, see TTmfreville's Coron.

212; 2 Hale, 61; 1 Bum, J. 24th ed. 789; 3 B. and A. 260. If the body be interred before the

coroner come, he must dig it up; which may be done lawfully within any convenient time, as in four

teen days. 2 Hawk. c. 9, s. 23; 1 Burn, J. 24th ed. 787. If the body cannot be viewed, the

coroner can do nothing: but the justices of the peace, or of oyer and terminer, may inquire of it.

1 East, P. C. 379; Hawk. b. 1, c. 27, s. 12,13; 1 Burr. 17.

But it is not necessary that the inquisition be taken at the same place where the body was

viewed: but they may adjourn to a place more convenient. 2 Hawk. o. 9, s. 25.]

(16) [It seems probable that in ancient times the whole inquisition was taken with the body

lying before the coroner and jury, or at least that the body was not buried till the inquisition

was concluded. Now, however, it is sufficient if the coroner and jury have together a view

of the body (such a view as enables them to ascertain whether there are any marks of violence

on it, or any appearances explanatory of the cause of death), and the latter are there sworn by the

former in the presence of the body. These two, however, are indispensable conditions to the

proceeding by the coroner: see R. v. Ferrand, 3 B. and A. 260: where, therefore, circumstances

render a compliance with them impossible, the coroner cannot inquire, unless indeed he have a

epecial commission for the purpose; bnt justices of the peace, or of oyer and terminer may. 2

Hawk. P. C. c. 9, s. 26.]

(17) In the United States coroners are generally chosen in the same manner as sheriffs, and

possess powers and duties corresponding to those of coroners in England. There is no similar

office under the federal system, but for the service of process, when the marshal is disqualified, a

special designation is made of a disinterested person by the court or a judge thereof. 1 Stat. at

Large 87.
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The king's majesty (w) is, by his office and dignity royal, the principal con-

servator of the peace within all his dominions; *and may give authority

to any other to see the peace kept, and to punish such as break it: hence

it is usually called the king's peace. The lord chancellor, or keeper, the lord

treasurer, the lord high steward of England, the lord mareschal, the lord high

constable of England, (when any such officers are in being,) and all the justices

of the court of king's bench, (by virtue of their offices,) and the master of the

rolls (by prescription) are general conservators of the peace throughout the

whole kingdom, and may commit all breakers of it, or bind them in recog-

nizances to keep it: (a;) the other judges are only so in their own courts. The

coroner is also a conservator of the peace within his own county; (y) as is also

the sheriff; (z) and both of them may take a recognizance or security for the

peace. Constables, tything-men, and the like, are also conservators of the peace

within their own jurisdictions; and may apprehend all breakers of the peace and

commit them, till they find sureties for their keeping it. (a)

Those that were, without any office, simply and merely conservators of the

peace, either claimed that power by prescription; (b) or were bound to exercise it

by the tenure of their lands; (c) or lastly, were chosen by the freeholders in full

county court before the sheriff; the writ for their election directing them to be

chosen " de probioribus et potentioribus comitatus sui in custodes pads." (d)

But when Queen Isabel, the wife of Edward II, had contrived to depose her hus-

band by a forced resignation of the crown, and had set up his son Edward III,
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in his place; this, being a thing then without example in England, it was feared

would much alarm the people: especially as the old king was living, though

hurried about from castle to castle, till at last he met with an untimely death.

To prevent therefore any risings or other disturbance of the peace, the new king

sent writs to all the sheriffs in England, the form of which is preserved by

*Thomas Walsingham, (e) giving a plausible account of the manner of his r ,,0=11

obtaining the crown, to wit: that it was done ipsius patris beneplacito «• -"

and withal commanding each sheriff that the peace be kept throughout his baili-

wick, on pain and peril of disinheritance, and loss of life and limb. And in a

few weeks after the date of these writs, it was ordained in parliament, (/) that

for the better maintaining and keeping of the peace in every county, good men

and lawful, which were no maintainers of evil, or barretors in the country, should

be assigned to keep the peace. And in this manner, and upon this occasion,

was the election of the conservators of the peace taken from the people, and

given to the king; (g) this assignment being construed to be by the king's per-

mission. (/*) But still they were only called conservators, wardens, or keepers of

the peace, till the statute 34 Edw. Ill, c. 1, gave them the power of trying felonies;

and then they acquired the more honourable appellation of justices, (t)

These justices are appointed by the kinrs special commission under the

great seal, the form of which was settled by all the judges, A. D. ] 590. (j) This

appoints them all, (k) jointly and severally, to keep the peace, and any two or

more of them to inquire of and determine felonies and other misdemeanors: in

which number some particular justices, or one of them, are directed to be

always included, and no business to be done without their presence; the words

of the commission running thus, " quorum aliquem vestrum A. B. C. D. &c.

unuin esse volumus j" whence the persons so named are usually called justices of

the quorum. And formerly it was customary to appoint only a select number

of justices, eminent for their skill and discretion, to be of the quorum ; but now

the practice is to advance almost all of them to that dignity, naming them all

over again in the quorum clause, except perhaps only some one inconsiderable

person for the sake of propriety; and no exception is now allowable, *for •- *QKO -i

not expressing in the form of warrants, &c., that the justice who issued *- J

(to) Larobard, Elrenarch. 12. (as) Lamb. 12. (;/) Brill.m, S. (*) F. N. B. 81.

(a) Lamb. 14. (b) lamb. 15. (c) Lamb. 17. (d) Lamb. 16.

(e) lIL-t. A. D. 1327. (/) Stat. 1 Edw. III, c. 16. (g) Lamb. 20.

<*) Stat. 4 Edw. HI, c. 2. 18 Edw. Ml, Bt. 2. c. 2. (<) Lamb. 23.

The king's majesty (w) is, by his office and dignity royal, the principal conservator of the peace within all his dominions; *and may give authority [ • 350 ]
to any other to see the peace kept, and to punish such ss break it: hence
it is usually called the king's peace. The lord chancellor, or keeper, the lord
treai>urer, the lord high steward of England, the lord mareschal, the lord high
constable of England, (when any such officers are in being,) and all the justices
of the court of king's bench, (by virtue of their offices,) and the master of the
rolls (by prescription) are general conservators of the peace throughout the
whole kingdom, and may commit all breakers of it, or bind them in recognizances to keep it: (x) the other judges are only so in their own courts. 'rhe
coroner is also~ conservator of the peace within his own county; (y) as is also
the sheriff; (z) and both of them may take a. recognizance or security for the
peace. Constables, tything-men, and the like, are also conservators of the peace
within their own jurisdictions; and may apyrehend all breakers of the peace and
commit them, till they find sureties for their keeping it. (a)
Those that were, without any office, simply and merely conservators of the
peace, either claimed that power by prescription; (b) or were bound to exercise it
by the tenure of their lands; (c) or lastly, were chosen by the freeholders in full
county court before the sheriff; the writ for their election directing them to be
chosen "de probioribus et potentioribus cornitatu$ sui in eustodes pacis." (d)
But when Queen Isabel, the wife of Edward II, had contrived to depose her husband by a forced resignation of the crown, and had set up hie son Edward III,
in his place; this, being a thing then without example in England, it was feared
would much alarm the people: especially ss the old king was living, though
hurried about from castle to castle, till at last he met with an untimely death.
To prevent therefore any risin~s or other disturbance of the peace, the new king
sent write to all the sheriffs m England, the form of which is preserved by
*Thomae Walsingham, (e) giving a plausible account of the manner of his [ • 351 ]
obtaining the crown, to wit: that it was done ipsius patris beneplacito
and withal commanding each sheriff that the peace be kept throughout hie bailiwick, on pain and peril of disinheritance, and 1088 of life and limb. And in a
few weeks after the date of these writs, it was ordained in parliament, (/) that
for the better maintaining and keeping of the peace in every county, good men
and lawful, which were no maintainers of evil, or barretors in the country, should
be assigned to keep the peace. And in this manner, and upon this occasion,
was the election of the conservators of the peace taken from the people, and
given to the king; (.q) this assignment being construed to be by the king's permission. (It} But still they were only called conservators, wardens, or keepers of
the peace, till the statute 34 Edw. III, c. 1, gave them the power of trying felonies;
and then they acquired the more honourable appellation of justices. (i)
These justices are appointed by the kinl?:'s special commission under the
great seal, the form of which was settled by all the judges, A. D. 1590. (j} This
appoints them all, (k) jointly and severally, t-0 keep the peace, and any two or
more of them to inquire of and determine felonies and other misdemeanors: in
which number some particular justices, or one of them, are directed to be
always included, and no business to be done without their presence; the words
of the commission running thus, "quorum aliquem vestrum A. B. 0. D. &c.
unum esse volwnu8 ;" whence the persons so named are usually called justices of
the quorum. And formerly it was customary to appoint only a select number
of justices, eminent for their skill and discretion, to be of the quontm; but now
the practice is to advance almost all of them to that dignity, naming them all
over again in the quor·u m clause, except perhaps only some one inconsiderable
person for the sake of propriety ; a.nd no exception is now allowable, *for [ • 352 ]
not expressing in the form of warrants, &c., that the justice who issued

(j) Lamb. 43. (k) See the form itself. Lamb. 35. Bnrn. tit. Justices, {1.

(tO) Lambard, Elrenarch 12.
(x) Lamb. 12.
(I/') Britton, 8.
(•IF. N. B. 81.
(a) Lamb. I,,
(b) Lamb. Ill.
(c) Lamb. 17.
(dl Lamb. 16.
(el HM. A. D. 1327.
(fl Stat. 1 Edw. Ill, c. 16.
(g) J..aml!. iO.
(l) Stat. f Edw. III, c. 2. 18 Edw. Ill, at. 2. c. 2.
l•l Lainb. 23.
(j) Lamb. 43.
(kl See the fonn' ltaelf, Lamb. 35. Bnrn. tit. Just.ices, t 1.
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them is of the quorum. (I) When any justice intends to act under this commis-

sion, he sues out a writ of dedimus potestatem, from the clerk of the crown in

chancery, empowering certain persons therein named to administer the usual

oaths to him; which done, he is at liberty to act.

Touching the number and qualifications of these justices, it was ordained by

statute 18 Edw. Ill, c. 2, that two or three, of the best reputation in each county,

shall be assigned to be keepers of the peace. But these being found rather too

few for that purpose, it was provided by statute 34 Edw. Ill, c. 1, that one lord,

and three or four of the most worthy men in the county, with some learned in

the law, shall be made justices in every county. But afterwards the number of

justices, through the ambition of private persons, became so large, that it was

thought necessary, by statute 12 Eic. II, c. 10, and 14 Ric. II, c. 11, to restrain

them at first to six, and afterward to eight only. But this rule is now dis-

regarded, and the cause seems to be (as Lambard observed long ago,) (•///) that

the growing number of statute laws, committed from time to time to the charge

of justices of the peace, have occasioned also (and very reasonably) their increase

to a larger number. And as to their qualifications, the statutes just cited

direct them to be of the best reputation, and most worthy men in the county;

and the statute 13 Ric. II, c. 7, orders them to be of the most sufficient knights,

esquires, and gentlemen of the law. Also by statute 2 Hen. V, st 1, c. 4, and st.

2, c. 1, they must be resident in their several counties. And because, contrary

to these statutes, men of small substance had crept into the commission, whose
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poverty made them both covetous and contemptible, it was enacted by statute

18 Hen. VI, c. 11, that no justice should be put in commission if he had not

lands to the value of 201. per annum. And, the rate of money being greatly

altered since that time, it is now enacted by statute 5 Geo. II, c. 18, that every

r *„,.„ -1 justice, except *as is therein excepted, shall have 100J.per annum clear

' """' J of all deductions; and, if he acts without such qualification, he shall

forfeit 1001. This qualification (n) is almost an equivalent to the 201. per

annum required in Henry the Sixth's time; and of this (o) the justice must now

make oath. Also it is provided by the act 5 Geo. II, that no practicing attorney,

solicitor, orproctor, shall be capable of acting as a justice of the peace. (18)

As the office of these justices is conferred by the king, so it subsists only dur-

ing his pleasure; and is determinable, 1. By the demise of the crown; that is,

J) Stat. 26 Geo. U., c. 27. See also etat. 7 Geo. Ill, c. 21. (m) Lamb. 34.

(n) See Bishop Fleetwood's calculations in bis chronicon pretiomm. (o) Slat. 18 Geo. n, o. 30.

them is of the quoriim. (l) When any justice intends to act under this commission, he sues out a writ of dedimus potestatem, from the clerk of the crown in
chancet)', empowering certain persons therein named to administer the usual
oaths to him; which done, he is at liberty to act.
Touching the number and qualifications of these justices, it was ordained by
statute 18 Edw. III, c. 2, that two or three, of the best reputation in each county,
shall be assigned to be keepers of the peace. But these being found rather too
few for that purpose, it was provided by statute 34 Edw. III, c. 1, that one lord,
and three or four of the most worthy men in the county, with some learned in
the law, shall be made justices in every county. But afterwards the number of
justices, through the ambition of private persons, became so large, that it was
thought necessary, by statute 12 Ric. II, c. 10, and 14 Ric. II, c. 11, to restrain
them at first to six, and afterward to eight only. But this rule is now disregarded, and the cause seems to be (as Lambard observed long a.go,) (m) that
the growing number of statute laws, committed from time to time to the charge
of justices of the peace, have occasioned also (and very reasonably) their increase
to a larger number. And as to their qualifications, the statutes just cited
direct them to be of the best reputation, and most worthy men in the county;
and the statute 13 Ric. II, c. 7, orders them to be of the most sufficient k.Iiights,
esquires, and gentlemen of the law. Also by statute 2 Hen. V, st. 1, c. 4, and st.
2, c. 1, they must be resident in their several counties. And because, contrary
to these statutes, men of small substance had crept into the commission, whose
poverty made them both covetous and contemptible, it was enacted by statute
18 Hen. VI, c. 11, that no justice should be put in commission if he had not
lands to the value of 20l. per annum. And, the rate of money being greatly
altered since that time, it is now enacted by statute 5 Geo. II, c. 18, that every
[ • 353 ] justice, except *as is therein excepted, shall have 1001. per annum clear
of all deductions; and, if he acts without such qualification, he shall
forfeit 100l. This qualification (n) is almost an equivalent to the 201. per
annum required in Henry the Sixth's time; and of this (o) the justice must now
make oath. Also it is provided by the act 5 Geo. II, that no practicing attorney,
solicitor, or proctor, shall be capable of acting as a justice of the peace. (18)
As the office of these justices is conferred by the kin~, so it subsists only during his pleasure ; and is determinable, 1. By the demise of the crown ; that is,

(18) By the 18 Geo. II, c. 20, a party, to become a justice of the peace, must have in pos-

session, either in law or equity, for his own use and benefit, a freehold, copyhold, or custom-

ary estate for life, or for some greater estate, or an estate for some long term of years,

l) Stat. 26 Geo. II, c. '¥1. See also etat. 7 Geo. ill, c. 21.
(m) Lamb. 8'.
(n) See Bishop Fleetwood's calculatlone in hie chroniccm prdionm.
(o) Stat. 18 Geo. II, o. SID.

determinable upon one or more life or lives, or for a certain term originally created for twenty-one

years, or more, in lands, tenements, or hereditaments, in England, or Wales, of the clear yearly

value of 1002. above all incumbrances, Ac., or else must be entitled to the immediate reversion

or remainder of and in such lands, Ac., leased for one or more lives, or for a term determinable

on the death of one or more lives, upon reserved rents of the yearly value of 300k, and he must

take the the oath thereby prescribea of his being so qualified, and if he be not so qualified, he

forfeits 10(M. for acting. But by sec. 13, 14, 15, there is a proviso, that this act does not extend

to corporation justices, to peers, <te., or tie eldest son or heir apparent of any peer or person

qualified to serve as a knight of the shire or to officers of the board of green cloth, Ac., or to the

principal officers of the navy, under secretaries of state, heads of college, or to the mayors of

Cambridge and Oxford.

It has been decided that a person to be qualified for the office must have a clear estate of 1001.

per annum in law or equity, for his own use, in possession. Holt. C. N. P. 458.

The acts of a justice of the peace, who has not duly qualified, are absolutely void; and there-

fore, persons seizing goods under a warrant of distress, signed by a justice who had not taken the

oaths at the general sessions, nor delivered in the certificate required, are not trespassers, though

the magistrate be liable to the penalty, and to be indicted. 3 B. and A. 266.

So much of 5 Geo. II, c. 18, as excludes attorneys and solicitors from acting as justices of the

peace, was repealed by 6 and 7 Tic. c. 73, s. 1; but by s. 33, of the same act, this prohibition was

renewed, with a proviso, s. 34, that it should not extend to any city, town, cinque port or liberty,

having justices of the peace within their respective limits and precincts by charter, commission

or otherwise. And under the corporation reform act, 5 and 6 wm. IV, c. 76, borough justices

are not required to have any qualification by estate.
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(18) B:y the 18 Geo. II, c. 20, a pa.rty, to become a justice of the peace, must have in possession, either in law or equity, for bis own use and benefit, a freehold, copyhold, or c.ust-0mary estate for life, or for some greater estate, or an estate for some long term of years,
determinable upon one or more life or lives, or for a certain term originally created for twenty-one
years, or more, in lands, tenements, or hereditaments, in England, or Wales, of the clear yearlv
value of 1001. above all incumbrances, &c., or else must be entitled to the immediate reven;ion
or remainder of and in such lands, &c., leased for one or more lives, or for a term determinable
on the death of one or more lives, upon reserved rents of the yearly value of 300l., and he must
take the the oath thereby prescribed of his being so que.lified, and if he be not so qualified, he
forfeits 1001. for acting. But by sec. 13, 14, ir,, there 1s a proviso, that this act does not extend
to corporation justices, to peers, &c., or the eldest t!On or heir apparent of any peer or person
qualified to serve as a knight of the shire or to officers of the board of green cloth, &c., or to the
principu.l officers of the navy, under secretaries of state, heads of college, or to the mayors of
Cambridge and Oxford.
It has been decided that a person to be que.lified for the office must have a clear estate of lOOZ.
per annum in law or equity, for his own use, in posse1:11:1ion. Holt. C. N. P. 458.
The acts of a ju~tice of the peace, who has not duly CJ.Ualified, are absolutely void; and there·
fore, persons seizing goodt1 under a warrant of distress1 signed by a jul!tice who had not taken the
oaths at the general sessions, nor delivered in the certificate required, are not trespassers, though
the magistrate be liable to the penalty, and to be indicted. 3 B. and A. 266.
So much of 5 Geo. II, c. 18, as excludes attorneys and l!O!icitors from acting as justices of the
peace, was repealed by 6 and 7 Vic. c. i3, 8. 1 ; but by s. 33, of the same act, this prohibition was
renewed, with a proviso, 11. 34, that it 8hould not extend to any city, town, cinque port or liberty,
hanngjm1tices of the pea<:e within their respective limits and precincts by charter, oommi&!ion
or otherwise. .And under the corporation reform act, 5 and 6 Wm. IV, c. 76, borough justices
are uot required to have any qualification by estate.
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in six months after, (p) But if the same justice is put in commission by the

successor, he shall not be obliged to sue out a new dedimus, or to swear to his

qualification afresh: (q) nor, by reason of any new commission, to take the oaths

more than once in the same reign, (r) 2. By express writ under the great seal, (s)

discharging any particular person from being any longer justice. 3. By super-

seding the commission by writ of supersedeas, which suspends the power of

all the justices, but does not totally destroy it; seeing it may be revived again

by another writ called &procedendo. 4. By a new commission, which virtually,

though silently, discharges all the former justices that are not included therein;

for two commissions cannot subsist at once 5. By accession of the office of

sheriff or coroner, (t) Formerly it was thought, that if a man was named

in any commission of the peace, and had afterwards a new dignity conferred

upon him, that this determined his office; he no longer answering the descrip-

tion of the commission; but now («) it is provided, that, notwithstanding a

new title of dignity, the justice on whom it is conferred shall still continue a

justice.

The power, office, and duty, of a justice of the peace depend on his commis-

sion, and on the several statutes which *have created objects of his juris- *•- „-. -•

diction. His commission, first, empowers him singly to conserve the *- -"

peace; and thereby gives him all the power of the ancient conservators at the

common law, in suppressing riots and affrays, in taking securities for the peace,

and in apprehending and committing felons and other inferior criminals. It also
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empowers any two or more to hear and determine all felonies and other offenses;

which is the ground of their jurisdiction at sessions, of which more will be said

in its proper place. And as to the powers, given to one, two, or more justices

by the several statutes, which from time to time have heaped upon them such

an infinite variety of business, that few care to undertake, and fewer understand,

the office; they are such and of so great importance to the public, that the coun-

try is greatly obliged to any worthy magistrate that, without sinister views of

his own, will engage in this troublesome service. And therefore if a well-mean-

ing justice makes any undesigned slip in his practice, great lenity and indul-

gence are shewn to him in the courts of law; and there are many statutes made

to protect him in the upright discharge of his office; (w) (19) which, among

other privileges, prohibit such justices from being sued for any oversights without

notice beforehand; (20) and stop all suits begun, on tender made of sufficient

(p) Stat. 1 Ann. c. 8. (q) Stat. 1 Geo. in. o. 13. (r) Stat 7 Geo. m, c. 9. (>) Lamb. 87.

(t) Stat. 1 Mar. st. 1, c. 8. (uj Stat. 1 Edw. VI, c. 7.

(w) Stot. 7Jao. I, 0. 8; 21Jao. I, c. 12 ; 24 Geo. H, c 14.

in six months after. (p) But if the same justice is put in commission by the
successor, he shall not be obliged to sue out a new dedimus, or to swear to his
qualification afresh: (q) nor, by reason of any new commission, to take the oaths
more than once in the same reign. (r) 2. By express writ under the great seal, (s)
discharging any particular person from being any longer justice. 3. By superseding the commission by writ of supersedeas, which suspends the power of
all the justices, but does not totally destroy it; seeing it may be revived age.in
by another writ called aprocedendo. 4. By a new commission, which virtually,
though silently, discharges all the former Justices that are not included therein;
for two commissions cannot subsist at once 5. By accession of the office of
sheriff or coroner. (t) Formerly it was thought, that if a man was named
in any commission of the peace, and had afterwards a new dignity conferred
upon him, that this determined his office ; he no longer answering the description of the commission; but now (u) it is provided, that, notwithstanding a
new title of dignity, the justice on whom it lS conferred shall still continue a
justice.
The power, office, and duty, of a justice of the peace depend on his commission, and on the several statutes which *have created objects of his juris- *[ 354 ]
diction. His commission, first, empowers him singly to conserve the
peace; and thereby gives him all the power of the ancient conservators at the
common law, in suppressing riots and affrays, in takin~ securities for the peace,
and in apprehending and committing felons and other mferior criminals. It also
empowers any two or more to hear and determine all felonies and other offenses;
which is the ground of their jurisdiction at sessions, of which more will be said
in its proper place. And as to the powers, given to one, two, or more justices
by the several statutes, which from time to time have heaped upon them such
an infinite variety of business, that few care to undertake, and fewer understand,
the office; they a.re such a.nd of so great importance to the public, that the country is greatly obliged to any worthy magistrate that, without sinister views of
his own, will engage in this troublesome service. And therefore if a well-meaning justice makes an>" undesigned slip in his practice, great lenity and indulgence are shewn to him in the courts of law; and there are many statutes made
to protect him in the upright discharge of his office; (w) (19) which, among
other privileges, prohibit such justices from being sued for any oversights without
notice beforehand; (20) and stop all suits begun, on tender made of sufficient

(19) The principal statute now in force on this subject is 11 and 12 Tic. o. 44; which is even

more liberal than the statutory provisions mentioned in the text.

(20) [A justice of the peace acts ministerially or judicially. Ministerially, in preserving the

(p) Stat. l Ann. c. 8.
(q) Stat. 1 Geo. III1 c. 13.
(t) Stat. l Mar. st. 1, c. 8.
(u) Stat. l Eaw. VI, c.
(ta) Slat. 7 Jae. I, c. ~ i 21 Jae. I, c. 12 ; 2l Geo. II, c. '4.

7.

(r)

Stat. 7 Geo. ID, c. 9.

(•) Lamb. frl.

peace, hearing charges against offenders, issuing summons or warrants thereon, examining the

informant and his witnesses and taking their examinations, binding over the parties and wit-

nesses to prosecute and give evidence, bailing the supposed offender, or committing him for

trial, Ac. See the conduct to be observed: I Chilly's Criin. L. 31 to 116. In cases where a

magistrate proceeds ministerially, rather than judicially, if he acts illegally he is liable to an

action at the suit of the party injured; as if he maliciously issues a warrant for felony, with-

out previous oath of a felony having been committed. 2 T. R. 225; 1 East, 64; Sir W. Jones,

178; Hob. 53; 1 Bulst. 64. So if he refuse an examination on the statute hue and cry.

1 Leon. 323. Judicially, as when he convicts for an offence. His conviction, drawn up in due

form, and unappealed against, is conclusive, and cannot be disputed in an action. 1 Brod. and

Bing. 432; 3 Moore, 294; 16 East, 13; 7 T. R. 633, n. a.; though if the commitment thereon

was illegal, trespass lies: Wicks v. Clutterbucfc, M. T. 1824; J. B. Moore's Rep. C. P.; and if

he corruptly and maliciously, without due ground, convict a party: Rex. v. Price, Caldecot,

305; or refuse a license, he is punishable by information or indictment, though not by action.

1 Burr. 556; 2id. 653; Sid. 1317, 1716, Bac. Ab. Justices of the Peace, F.; 1 Chilly's Grim.

L. 873 lo 877. So an information will be granted for improperly granting an ale license. See

1 T. R. 692'; J. Bum, J. 24th ed. 48, tit. Alehouses; 4 T. R. 451. In some cases a mere

improper interference appears to be thus punishable: Ihus, where Iwo sets of magistrates

have a concurrent jurisdiction, and one set appoint a meeting to license alehouses, Iheir juris-

diction allaches so as to exclud t ho olherg, though they may all meet together on the first

223

(19) The principal statute now in force on this subject is 11 and 12 Vic. o. 44; which is even
more liberal than tho statut-Ory provisions mentioned iu the text.
(20) [A justice of the peace actH ministerially or judicially. Ministerially, in preserving the
J>C!We, hearing charges age.inst offenders, issuing summons or warrants thereon, examining the
infonuant and his witnesses and taking their examinations, binding over the parties and witne~ses to prosecute and give evidence, bailing the supposed offender, or committing him for
trial, &c. Sec the conduct to be obt!Crved: 1 Chitty's Crim. L. 31 to 116. In cases where a
mapstrate proceeds ministerially, rather than judicially, if he acts illegally he is liable to an
action e.t the suit of the party injured ; as if he maliciously issues a we.rront for felony, without previous oath of a felony havin~ been committed. 2 T. R. 225; 1 J<Jast, 64; Sir W. Jone$,
178; Hob. 53; 1 Buist. 64. So 1f he refuse an examination on the st.atute hue and cry.
1 Leon. 323. J11dicially, as when he convicts for an offence. His conviction, drawn up in due
form, and unappcaled age.inst, is conclusive, and cannot be disputed in an action. 1 Brod. and
Bing. 432; 3 Moore, 294; 16 Ea.st, 13; 7 T. R. 633, n. a. ; though if the commitment thereon
was illegal trespa.;;s lies: Wicks v. Clutterbuck, M. T. 1824; J. B. Moore's Rep. C. P.; 8Dd if
he corruptfy and maliciousl;r, without due ground, convict a party: Rex. v. Price, Caldecot,
305; or refuse a license, he is pnnishable by information or indictment, though not by action.
1 Burr. 556; 2 id. 653; 3 id. 1317, 1716, Bae. Ab. Justices of the Peace, F. ; 1 Chitty's Crim.
L. 873 to 877. So an information will be granted for improperly granting an ale license. See
1 T. R. 69'..r; J. Burn, J. 24th ed. 48, tit. .Alehouses; 4 T. It 451. In some CBl!ei! a mere
improper interference appears to be thu.; punishable : thus, where two sets of ma~stmte~
have a concurrent jurisdiction, and one set appoint a meeting to license alehouses, their jurisdiction attaches so as to exclud the others, though they may all meet together on the firilt
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amends. But, on the other hand, any malicious or tyrannical abuse of their office

is usually severely punished; and all persons who recover a verdict against a

justice, tor any wilful or malicious injury, are entitled to double costs. (21)

It is impossible upon our present plan to enter minutely into the particulars

of the accumulated authority thus committed to the charge of these magistrates.

I must therefore refer myself at present to such subsequent part of these Com-

mentaries, as will in their turns comprise almost every object of the justices'

jurisdiction; and, in the mean time recommend to the student the perusal of

Mr. Lambard's Eirenarcha, and Dr. Burn's Justice of the Peace, wherein he

will find every thing relative to this subject, both in ancient and modern prac-

tice, collected with great care and accuracy, and disposed in a most clear and

judicious method.

r *QCK -I *I shall next consider some officers of lower rank than those which

I • J have gone before, and of more confined jurisdiction; but still such aa

are universally in use through every part of the kingdom.

IV. Fourthly, then, of the constable. The word constable is frequently said

to be derived from the Saxon, koning 'ffSQ apel, and to signify the support of

the king. But, as we borrowed the name as well as the office of constable from

the French, I am rather inclined to deduce it, with Sir Henry Spelman and Dr.

Cowel, from that language; wherein it is plainly derived from the Latin comes

stabuli, an officer well known in the empire ; so called because, like the great

constable of France, as well as the lord nigh constable of England, he was to
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regulate all matters of chivalry, tilts, tournaments, and feats of arms, which

were performed on horseback. This great office of lord high constable hath

been disused in England, except only upon great and solemn occasions, as the

king's coronation and the like, ever since the attainder of Stafford duke of Buck-

day ; and if, after guoh appointment, the other get meet, and grant licenses on a subsequent day,

theproeeeding is illegal and subjects them to an indictment. 4 Term Rep. 451.

Where a criminal information is applied for against a magistrate, the question for the court

is not whether the act done be found on investigation to be strictly right or not, but whether it

proceeded from an unjust, oppressive, or corrupt motive, (amongst which fear and favor are

generally included,) or from mistake or error only. In the latter case, the court will not grant

the rule. 3 B. and A. 432; and see 1 Burr. 556; 2 id. 1162; 3 id. 1317, 1716; 1 Wils. 7; 1

Term Rep. 692.

In general the court will not grant a criminal information, unless an application for it is made

within the second term after the offence committed, there being no intervening assises, and

notice of the application be previously given to the justice. 13 East, 270. And the court

will not grant a rule nisi for a criminal information against a magistrate, so late in the second

term after the imputed offence, as to preclude him from the opportunity of showing cause

against it in the same term. 13 East, 322. And in a case where the facts tending to criminate

a magistrate took place twelve months before the application to the court, they refused to

grant a criminnl information, though the prosecutor, in order to excuse the delay, stated that

ilii' facts had not come to his knowledge till very shortly previous to the application. 5 B. and

A. 612.

In an action against a magistrate for a malicious conviction, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff

to show that he was innocent of the offence of which he was convicted, but he must also prove,

from what passed before the magistrate, that there was a want of probable cause for the magis-

trate to convict. 1 M.ii-sh. 220.]

(21) [It has been held in many cases that if the defendant honestly intended to act as a mag-

istrate, and the act done was in a matter within the jurisdiction of magistrates, he is within the

protection of the statutes, though he exceeded his powers and transgressed the law. Briggs r.

Evelyn, 2 H. Black. 114; WelTer v. Toke, 9 East, 364.]

The authority of a justice of the peace is special and limited, and he must obtain jurisdiction

of each particular case in the manner prescribed by law, or his proceedings will be void, and he

will be liable to an action. Johnson v. Thompson. 1 Bald. 571; Bigelow v. Steams, 19 Johns.

39; Adkins v. Brewer, 3 Cow. 206; Evertson v. Sutton, 5 "Wend, ifel; Spencer ». Spencer, 4

Shop. 255; State ». Hartwell, 35 Me. 129; Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug. Mich. 390. And if he loses

jurisdiction.of a case by the service of certiorari, and takes any action therein afterward, he id

equally liable. Case v. Shepherd, 2 Johns. Cas. 27.

But where he has jurisdiction, he is not liable for irregularities or errors of judgment, unless

he acts corruptly or maliciously. Horton ». Auchmoody, 7 Wend. 200; Little v. Moore, 1 South.

74; Gregory ». Brown, 4 Bibb, 28; Bullitt v. Clement, 16 B. Monr. 193; Hetfield «. Towsley, 3

Greene, Iowa, 584.
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ingham under King Henry VIII ; as in France it was suppressed about a century

after by an edict of Louis XIII : (x) but from his office, says Lambard, (y) this

lower constableship was at first drawn and fetched, and is, as it were, a very finger

of that hand. For the statute of Winchester, (z) which first appoints them, directs

that for the better keeping of the peace, two constables in every hundred and

franchise shall inspect all matters relating to arms and armour.

Constables are of two sorts, high constables and petty constables. The former

were first ordained by the statute of Winchester, as before mentioned; are

appointed at the court leets of the franchise or hundred over which they pre-

side, or, in default of that, by the justices at their quarter sessions; and are

removable by the same authority that 'appoints them, (a) (22) The r ^KC i

-'

petty constables are inferior officers in every town and parish, subordi-

nate to the high constable of the hundred, first instituted about the reign of

Edw. Ill, (b) These petty constables have two offices united in them : the one

ancient, the other modern. Their ancient office is that of headborough tithingman,

or borsholder, of whom we formerly spoke, (c) and who are as ancient as the

time, of King Alfred : their more modern office is that of constable merely ;

which was appointed, as we observed, so lately as the reign of Edward III, in

order to assist the high constable, (d) And in general the ancient headboroughs,

tithing-men, and borsholders, were made use of to serve as petty constables ;

though not so generally, but that in many places they still continue distinct offi-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

cers from the constable. They are all chosen by the jury at the court leet; or,

if no court leet be held, are appointed by two justices of the peace, (e)

The general duty of all constables, both high and petty, as well as of the other

officers, is to keep the king's peace in their several districts ; and to that purpose

they are armed with very large powers, of arresting and imprisoning, of break-

ing open houses, and the like ; of the extent of which powers, considering what

manner of men are for the most part put into these offices, it is perhaps very

well that they are generally kept in ignorance. (23) One of their principal duties,

(x) Phillip's Life of Pole, ii. 111. (y) Of Constables, 8. (z) 13 Edw. I, 0. 8. (a) Salk. 150.
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ingham under King Henry VIII; as in France it WllB suppressed about a century
after by an edict of Louis XIII: (x) but from his office, says Lambard, (y) this
lower constableship was at first drawn and fetched, and is, as it were, a very finger
of that hand. For the statute of Winchester, (z) which first appoints them, directs
that for the better keeping of the peace, two constables in every hundred and
franchise shall inspect all matters relating to a~ and arrn01tr.
Constables are of two sorts, high constables and petty constables. The former
were first ordained by the statute of Winchester, as before mentioned; are
appointed at the court leets of the franchise or hundred over which they preside, or, in default of that, by the justices at their quarter sessions; and are
removable by the same authority that *appoints t.hem. (a) (22) The [ • 356 ]
petty constables are inferior officers in every town and parish, subordinate to the high constable of the hundred, first instituted about the reign of
Edw. III, (b) These petty constables have two offices united in them: the one
ancient, the other modern. Their ancient office is that ofheadborough tithingman,
or borsholder, of whom we formerly spoke, (c) and who are as ancient as the
time, of King Alfred : their more modern office is that of constable merely ;
which was appointed, as we observed, so lately as the reign of Edward III, in
order to assist the high constable. (d) And in general the ancient headboroughs,
tithing-men, and borsholders, were made use of to serve as petty constables:
though not so generally, but that in many places they still continue distinct officers from the constable. They are all chosen by the jury at the court leet; or,
if no court leet be held, are appointed by two justices of the peace. (e)
The general duty of all constables, both high and petty, as well as of the other
officers, is to keep the king's peace in their several districts; and to that purpose
they are armed with very large powers, of arresting and imprisoning, of breaking open houses, and the like; of the extent of which powers, considering what
manner of men are for the most part put into these offices, it is perhaps very
well that they are generally kept in ignorance. (23) One of their principal duties,

(b) Spelm. Gloss. 148. (<•> Page, IIS. (d) Lamb. I). (e) suit. 14 and 13 Car. II, c. 12.

(22) [It should seem that a constable cannot, in case of an nlVmy, arrest without a warrant

(z) Phillip's Life of Pole, Ii. 111.

(b) Spelm. GIOBB. 148.

(y) Of Constables, Ii.
(c) Page, lU.
(d) Lamb. U.

(z) 13 Edw. I, o. 6.
(a) Salk. ll!O.
(e) Stat. 1' and Ui Car. Il, o. 12.

from a magistrate, unless an actual breach of the peace be committed in his presence, or in other

•words, flagrante deUeto. He cannot arrest of his own authority, after the affray is over. 2

Camp. 367, 371; 2 Lord Bay. 1296; 1 Russell, book 3, c. 3, on manslaughter, to sec. 4; and see 2

Bar. and Ores. 699; and see further as to the powers and duties of constables acting with-

out warrants, or otherwise, post, book 4, 292 ; 1 Chit. Crirn. Law, 20 to 24.

A constable executing his warrant out of his district was formerly a trespasser : 1 H. Bin. 15 :

and in a late case it was held, that where a warrant was directed " to A. B., to constables, of W.,

and to all other his majesty's officers," the constables of "W. (their names not being inserted in

the warrant) could not execute it out of that district. 1 Bar. & C. 288. But now, by 5 Geo. IV,

c. 18, constables may execute warrants out of their precints, provided it be within the jurisdic-

tion of the justice granting or backing the same.

It is the duty of a constable to present a highway within his district for non-repair, and he is

entitled to the costs of the prosecution. 3 M. and S. 465.]

Petty constables are now to great extent superseded by a county constabulary.

(23) [Every one who reflects upon the subject must surely dissent from the proposition in the

text; which contains by implication, a censure both upon the legislature and the executive. It

is manifestly absurd to presume, that a man who is ignorant of the extent of his authority is less

likely to abuse it than he who clearly understands its due limit. Admitting that the ignorant

officer from fear, or from a more laudable motive, restricts himself within bounds much more con-

tracted than the law has prescribed, it is clear he must sometimes fail in the discharge of his

duty, to the great detriment of public justice. How much better would it be that the duty of

these officers should be accurately defined, and that they should be chosen from among men of

intelligence, who would have the good sense to know the extent of their power, and the good

feeling not to exceed it.]

A constable has not t he rig^ht to break open houses for the service of civil process generally,

but he may do so in the service of search warrants, which specially direct it, and he may also do

so for the service of other criminal process upon the occupant, but not against the will of the

occupant to search for a third person against whom he has a warrant. See Hawkins v. Common-

wealth, 14 B. Monr. 395.

If a private individual makes an arrest without warrant, on a charge of felony, he may jus-

(22) [It sbonld seem that a constable cannot, in case of an affray, arrest without a warrant
from a magistrate, unless an actual breach of the peace be committed in bis pre!«lncc, or in other
wonis, flagrante deUcto. Ho cannot arrest of bfa own authority, after tho affray is over. 2
Camp. 30'7, 371; 2 Lord Ray. 1296; 1 Russell, book 3, c. 3, on manslaughter, to sec. 4; and see 2
Bar. and Cres. 699 ; and sec further 88 to the powers and duties of constables acting without warrants or otherwise, post, book 4, 29'2; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, li!O to 24.
.A constable executing his warrant out of bis district We.8 formerly a tresp68Ber: 1 H. Bia. 15:
and in a late cai;o it was held, that where a warrant was directed" to .A. B., to constable11, of W.,
and to all other his majesty's officet'll," the constables of W. (their names not being inserted in
the warrant) conld not execute it out of that dil:\trict. 1 Bar. & C. 288. But now, by 5 Geo. IV,
c. 18, constables may execute warrants out of their precints, provided it be within the jurisdiction of the justice granting or backing the same.
It is the duty of a constable to present a highway within his district for non-repair, and he is
entitled to the costs of the prosecution. 3 M:. and S. 465.]
Petty constables are now to great extent superseded by a county cotllltabnlary.
(23) [Every one who reflects upon the subject must surely dissent from the proposition in the
text; which contains by implicat10n, a cenRure both upon the legislature and the executive. It
is manifestly absurd to presume. that a man who is ignorant of the extent of his authority is lesii
likely to abnse it than be who clearly understands its due limit. Admitting that the ignorant
officer from fear, or from a more laudable motive, restricts himself within bounds much more contracted than the Jaw ha!< pre8cribed, it is clear he must sometimes fail in the discharge of bis
duty, to the great detriment of public jm1tice. How much better wonld it be that the duty of
these officers should be accurately defined, and that they should be chosen from among men of
intelligence, who would have the good sense to know the extent of their power, and the good
feeling not to exceed it. 1
A constable bas not the right to break open houses for the service of civil process generally,
bot he may do so in the service of search warrnntR, which specially direct it, and he may also do
so for the service of other criminal procei'l!l upon the occupant, but not against the will of the
occupant to search for a third pen!On against whom be has a warrant. See Hawkins 11. Commonwealth, 14 B. M:onr. 395.
If a private individual makes an arrest without warrant, on a charge of felony, be may justify the arrest if a felony bas actu~y been committeQ i but a cons~ble baa broader protecVo L. 1.-29
~2fi
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arising from the statute of Winchester, which appoints them, is to keep watch

and ward in their respective jurisdiction. Ward, guard, or custodia, is chiefly

applied to the daytime, in order to apprehend rioters, and robbers on the high-

ways; the manner of doing which is left to the discretion of the justices of the

peace and the constable: (/) the hundred being however, answerable for all

robberies committed therein, by daylight, for having kept negligent guard.

Watch is properly applicable to the night only, (being called among our Teu-

r *<*57 i tonic ancestors waehf. or watca, (g) and it *begins at the time when

•- J ward ends, and ends when that begins: for, by the statute of Winchester,

in walled towns the gates shall be closed from sunsetting to sunrising, and watch

shall be kept in every borough and town especially in the summer season, to ap-

prehend all rogues, vagabonds, and night-walkers, and make them give an

account of themselves. The constable may appoint watchmen at his discretion,

regulated by the custom of the place; and these, being his deputies, have for the

time being the authority of their principal. But, with regard to the infinite

number of other minute duties that are laid upon constables by a diversity of

statutes, I must again refer to Mr. Lambard and Dr. Burn; in whose compila-

tions may be also seen what powers and duties belong to the constable or tithing-

man indifferently, and what to the constable only; for the constable may do

whatever the tithiug-man may; but it does not hold e converse, the tithing-man

not having an equal power with the constable.

V. We are next to consider the surveyors of the highways. Every parish is
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bound of common right to keep the high roads that go through it in good and

sufficient repair; unless, by reason of the tenure of lands or otherwise, this care

is consigned to some particular private person. From this burthen no man was

exempt by our ancient laws, whatever other immunities he might enjoy: this

being part of the trinoda necessitas to which every man's estate was subject, viz.:

cxpeditio contra hostern, arcium constructio, et pontium reparatio. For, though

the reparation of bridges only is expressed, yet that of roads also must be under-

stood ; as in the Eoman law, ad instructiones reparationesque itinerum et pon-

tium, nullum genus hominum, nulliusque dignitatis ac venerationis meritis,

censure oportet. (h) And indeed now, for the .most part, the care of the roads

only seems to be left to parishes, that of bridges being in great measure devolved

upon the county at large, by statute 22 Hen. v III, c. 5. If the parish neglected

these repairs, they mignt formerly, as they may still, be indicted for such their

F *3581 neS^ec^: but it was not then *incumbent on any particular officer to call

' '*'' -1 the parish together, and set them upon this work ; for which reason, by

the statute 2 and 3 Ph. and M. c. 8, surveyors of the highways were ordered to be

chosen in every parish, (i)

These surveyors were originally, according to the statutes of Phillip and Mary,

to be appointed by the constable and church-wardens of the parish: but now

they are constituted by two neighbouring justices, out of such inhabitants or

others, as are described in statute 13 Geo. Ill, c. 78, and may have salaries

alloted them for their trouble. (24)

Their office and duty consists in putting in execution a variety of laws for the

repairs of the public highways; that is, of ways leading from one town to

another: all which are now reduced into one act by statute 13 Geo. Ill, c. 78,

which enacts, 1. That they may remove all annoyances in the highways, or give

(/)Dalt. Just. o. 104.

(o) Excubitu et explanation** qunt toactai vacant. Capitular. Sludov. PH. Cap. 1. A. D. 815.

(ft) C. 11. 74, 4.

(f) This office, Mr. Dalton (Just. cap. BO,) says, exactly answers that of the curatora rinmm of the

Romans: but it should seem that theirs was an office of rather more dignity and authority than ours ; not

only from comparing the method of making and mending the Roman ways with those of our country pa-

rishes ; but also because one Thermus. who was the curator of the Flamlnlan way, was candidate for the

consulship with Julius Cesar. (Cic. adMtic. 1.1. ep. 1.)

tion, and is justified if he had information of a felony which he had reason to rely upon. Holley

t\ Mix, 3 Wend. 350; Rnssel «. Shnster, 8 W. and S. 308; Rohan v. Sawin, 5 Cosh. 281: Beck-

wit h v. Philby, 6 B. and C. 605; Davis v. Russell, 5 Bing. 354.

i •.' I) These officers are now chosen annually by the inhabitants.
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notice to the owner to remove them; who is liable to penalties on non-compli-

ance. 2. They are to call together all the inhabitants and occupiers of lands,

tenements, and hereditaments within the parish, six days in every year, to labour

in fetching materials, or repairing the highways; all persons keeping draughts,

(of three horses, &c.) or occupying lands, being obliged to send a team for every

draught, and for every 50?. a year which they keep or occupy: persons keeping

less than a draught, or occupying less than 501. a year, to contribute in a less

proportion; and all other persons chargeable, between the ages of eighteen and

sixty-five, to work or find a labourer. But they may compound with the sur-

veyors, at certain easy rates established by the act And every cartway leading

to any market-town must be made twenty feet wide at the least, if the fences

will permit; and may be increased by two justices, at the expense of the parish,

to the breadth of thirty feet. 3. The surveyors may lay out their own money in

purchasing materials for repairs, in erecting guide-posts and making drains, and

shall be reimbursed by a rate to be allowed at a special sessions. *4. In case r *QKQ -i

the personal labour of the parish be not sufficient, the surveyors with the •- ' •«

consent of the quarter sessions, may levy a rate on the parish, in aid of the per-

sonal duty not exceeding, in any one year, together with the other highway rates,

the sum of 9rf. in the pound; for the due application of which they are to

account upon oath. As for turnpikes, which are now pretty generally intro-

duced in aid of such rates, and the law relating to them, these depend principally

on the particular powers granted in the several road acts, and upon some gen-
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eral provisions which are extended to all turnpike roads in the kingdom, by

statute 13 Geo. Ill, c. 84, amended by many subsequent acts, (k)

VI. I proceed therefore, lastly, to consider the overseers of the poor; their

original, appointment and duty.

The poor of England, till .the time of Henry VIII, subsisted entirely upon

private benevolence, and the charity of well disposed Christians. For, though

it appears by the mirror, (I) that by the common law the poor were to

be " sustained by parsons, rectors of the church, and the parishioners, so that

none of them die for default of sustenance;" and though, by the statutes 12

Kic. II, c. 7, and 19 Hen. VII, c. 12, the poor are directed to abide in the cities

or towns wherein they were born, or such wherein they had dwelt for three

years, (which seemed to be the first rudiments of parish settlements,) yet, till the

statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 55,1 find no compulsory method chalked out for this

purpose; but the poor seem to have been left to such relief as the humanity of

their neighbours would afford them. The monasteries were, in particular, their

principal resource ; and, among other bad effects which attended the monastic

institutions, it was not perhaps one of the least (though frequently esteemed

quite otherwise) that they supported and fed a very numerous and very idle

poor, whose sustenance depended upon what was daily distributed in alms at the

gates *of the religious houses. But, upon the total dissolution of these r*Qgoi

9ie inconvenience of thus encouraging the poor in habits of indolence L '

and beggary was quickly felt throughout the kingdom; and abundance of stat-

utes were made in the reign of King Henry the Eighth, and his children, for pro-

viding for the poor and impotent; which, the preambles to some of them recite,

had of late years greatly increased. These poor were principally of two sorts:

sick and impotent, and therefore unable to work; idle and sturdy, and there-

fore able, but not willing, to exercise any honest employment. To provide in

some measure for both of these, in and about the metropolis, Edward the Sixth

founded three royal hospitals; Christ's and St. Thomas's, for the relief of the

impotent through infancy or sickness; and Bridewell, for the punishment and

employment of the vigourous and idle. But these were far from being sufficient

for the care of the poor throughout the kingdom at large; and therefore, after

many other fruitless experiments, by statute 43 Eliz. c. 2, overseers of the poor

•were appointed in every parish.

By virtue of the statute last mentioned, these overseers are to be nominated

(I) stiit. 14 Geo. Ill, 0. U, 86, 57, 32. IB Qeo. III, o. 89. ]8 <ieo. Ill, c. 28. (1) Q. 1, J 3.
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notice to the owner to remove them; who is liable to penalties on non-compliance. 2. They are to call together all the inhabitants and occupieri of lands,
tenements, ana hereditaments within the parish, six days in every year, to labour
in fetching materials, or repairing the highways; all persons keeping draughts,
(of three horses, &c.) or occupying lands, being obliged to send a team for every
clmnght, and for every 501. a year which they keep or occupy: persons keeping
less than a <lranght, or occupymg less than 50l. a year, to contribute in a less
Jlfoportion ; and all other persons chargeable, between the ages of eighteen and
sixty-five, to work or find a labourer. But they may compound with the sur,·eyors, at certain easy rates established by the act. And every cartway leading
to any market-town must be made twenty feet wide at the least, if the fence1:1
will permit; and may be increased by two justices, at the expense of the parish,
to the breadth of thirty feet. 3. The surveyors may lay out their own money in
purchasin~ mat~rials for repairs, in erecting guide-posts and making drains, and
shall be reimbursed by a rate to be allowed at u. special sessions. *4. In case [ • 359 ]
the personal labour of the parish be not sufficient, the surveyors with the
consent of the quarter sessions, may levy a rat-0 on the parish, in aid of the personal duty not exceeding, in any one year, together with the other highway rates,
the sum of 9d. in the pound; for the due application of which they are to
account upon oath. As for turnpikes, which are now pretty generally introduced in aid of such rates, and the law relating to them, these depend principally
on the particular powers granted in the several road acts, and upon some general provisions which are extended to all turnpike roads in the kingdom, by
statute 13 Geo. III, c. 84, amended by many subsequent acts. (k)
VI. I proceed therefore, lastly, to consider the overseers of the poor; their
original, appointment and duty.
The poor of England, till .the time of Henry VIII, subsisted entirely upon
private benevolence, and the charity of well disposed Christians. For, though
1t appears by the mirror, ( l) that by the common law the poor were to
be "sustained by parsons, rectors of the church, and the parishioners, so that
none of them die for default of sustenance;" and though, by the statutes 12
Ric. II, c. 7, and 19 Hen. VII, c.12, the poor a.re directed to abide in the cities
or towns wherein they were born, or such wherein they had dwelt for three
years, (which seemed to be the first rudiments of parish settlements,) yet, till the
statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 55, I find no compulsory method chalked out for this
pur_Pose; but the poor seem to have been left to such relief as the humanity of
their neighbours would afford them. The monasteries were, in particular, their
principal resource; and, among other bad effects which attended the monastic
mstitutions, it was not perhaps one of the least (though frequently esteemed
quite otherwise) that they supported and fed a very numerous and very idle
poor, whose sustenance depended upon what was daily distributed in alms at the
gates *of the religious houses. But, upon the total dissolution of these [*360 )
the inconvenience of thus encouraging the poor in habits of indolence
and beggary was quickly felt throughout the kingdom; and abundance of statutes were made in the reign of King Henry the Eighth, and his children, for providing for the poor and impotent; which, the preambles to some of them recite,
had of late years greatly increased. 'l'hese poor were principally of two sorts:
sick and impotent, and therefore unable to work ; idle and stlll'dy, and therefore able, but not willing, to exercise any honest employment. To provide in
some measure for both of these, in and about the metropolis, Edward the Sixth
founded three royal hospitals; Christ's and St. Tbomas's, for the relief of the
impotent through infancy or sickness; and Bridewell, for the punishment and
employment ofthe vigourous and idle. But these were far from being sufficient
for the care of the poor throughout the kingdom at large; and therefore, after
many other fruitless experiments, by statute 43 Eliz. c. 2, overseers of the poor
were appointed in every parish.
By virtue of the statute last mentioned, these overseers are to be nominate(\
(I:)

Stat. H Geo.

m, c. H, 86, 67, 32.

1ze

16 Geo. III, c. 89. 18 ~· qi, o, 28. (l) C.
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yearly in Easter-week, or within one month after, (though a subsequent nom-

ination will be valid,) (m) by two justices dwelling near the parish. They must

be substantial householders, and so expressed to be in the appointment of the

justices, (n)

Their office and duty, according to the same statute, are principally these :

first, to raise competent sums for the necessary relief of the poor, impotent, old,

blind, and such other, being poor and not able to work : and secondly, to provide

work for such as are able, and cannot otherwise get employment : but this latter

part of their duty, which, according to the wise regulations of that salutary

statute, should go hand in hand with the other, is now most shamefully neglected.

•- *of>i -i However, for these joint purposes, they are empowered to *make and

L •* levy rates upon the several inhabitants of the parish, by the same act

of parliament ; which has been further explained and enforced by several subse-

quent statutes.

The two great objects of this statute seem to have been, 1. To relieve the

impotent poor, and them only. 2. To find employment for such as are able to

work ; and this principally, by providing stocks of raw materials to be worked

up at their separate homes, instead of accumulating all the poor in one common

workhouse ; a practice which puts the sober and diligent upon a level (in point

of their earnings) with those who are dissolute and idle ; depresses the laudable

emulation of domestic industry and neatness, and destroys all endearing family

connections, the only felicity of the indigent. Whereas, if none were relieved
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but those who are incapable to get their livings, and that in proportion to their

incapacity ; if no children were removed from their parents, but such as are

brought up in rags and idleness ; and if every poor man and his family were

regularly furnished with employment, and allowed the whole profits of their

labour ; — a spirit of busy cheerfulness would soon diffuse itself through every

cottage ; work would become easy and habitual, when absolutely necessary for

daily subsistence ; and the peasant would go through his task without a murmur,

if assured that he and his children, when incapable of work through infancy,

age, or infirmity, would then, and then only, be entitled to support from his

opulent neighbours.

This appears to have been the plan of the statute of Queen Elizabeth ; in

which the only defect was confining the management of the poor to small paro-

chial districts ; which are frequently incapable of furnishing proper work, or

providing an able director. However, the laborious poor were then at liberty to

seek employment wherever it was to be had : none being obliged to reside in the

places of their settlement, but such as were unable or unwilling to work ; and

f *362 1 those pl*068 °f settlement being only such where they *were born or

L J had made their abode, originally for three years, (o) and afterwards (in

the case of vagabonds) for one year only. ( »)

After the restoration, a very different plan was adopted, which has rendered

the employment of the poor more difficult, by authorizing the subdivisions of

parishes ; has greatly increased their number, by confining them all to their

respective districts ; has given birth to the intricacy of our poor laws, by multi-

plying and rendering more easy the methods of gaining settlements ; and, in

consequence, has created an infinity of expensive law-suits between contending

neighborhoods, concerning those settlements and removals. By the statute 13

and 14 Car. II, c. 12, a legal settlement was declared to be gained by birth, or by

inhabitancy, apprenticeship, or service for forty days : within which period all

intruders were made removable from any parish by two justices of the peace,

unless they settled in a tenement of the annual value of 101. The frauds, natu-

rally consequent upon this provision, which gave a settlement by so short a

residence, produced the statute 1 Jac. II, c. 17, which directed notice in writing

to be delivered to the parish officers, before a settlement could be gained by such

residence. Subsequent provisions allowed other circumstances of notoriety to

(«i Stra. 1123. (n) 2 Lord Hiiym. 1394.

(o) Stat. 19 Hen. VII, c. 12. 1 Edw. TI, c, 8. 3 K.lw. VI, o, 16, It EMz. o. 5. Ij,) Slut. 30 K!i/ , c. 4,
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be equivalent to such notice given; and those circumstances have from time to

time been altered, enlarged or restrained, whenever the experience of new incon-

veniences, arising daily from new regulations, suggested the necessity of a rem-

edy. And the doctrine of certificates was invented, by way of counterpoise, to

restrain a man and his family from acquiring a new settlement by any length

of residence whatever, unless in two particular excepted cases; which makes

parishes very cautious of giving such certificates, and of course confines the poor

at home, where frequently no adequate employment can be had.

The law of settlements may be therefore now reduced to the following general

heads; or, a settlement in a parish may be acquired, 1. By birth; for,

wherever a child is first known *to be, that is always prima fade the r *nen -i

place of settlement, until some other can be shewn, (a) This is also *• '"'"' '

generally the place of settlement of a bastard child; (r) for a bastard having in

the eye of the law no father, cannot be referred to his settlement as other chil-

dren may. (s) But, in legitimate children, though the place of birth be prima

facie the settlement, yet it is not conclusively so; for there are, 2. Settlements

by parentage, being the settlement of one's father or mother: all legitimate

children being really settled in the parish where their parents are settled, until

they get a new settlement for themselves, (t) A new settlement may be acquired

several ways; as, 3. By marriage. For a woman marrying a man that is settled

in another parish changes her own settlement: the law not permitting the separ-

ation of husband and wife. («) But if the man has no settlement, hers is sus-
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pended during his life, if he remains in England and is able to maintain her;

but in his absence, or after his death, or during, perhaps, his inability, she may

be removed to her old settlement, (v) The other methods of acquiring settle-

ments in any parish are all reducible to this one, of. forty days' residence therein:

but this forty days' residence (which is construed to be lodging or lying there)

must not be by fraud or stealth, or in any clandestine manner; but made

notorious by one or other of the following concomitant circumstances. The

next method therefore of gaining a settlement is, 4. By forty days' residence,

and notice. For if a stranger comes into a parish, and delivers notice in writing

of his place of abode, and number of his family, to one of the overseers (which

must be read in the church and registered,) and resides there unmolested for

forty days after such notice, he is legally settled thereby, (w) For the law pre-

sumes that such a one at the time of notice is not likely to become chargeable,

else he would not venture to give it; or that, in such case, the parish would

take care to remove him. But there are also other circumstances equivalent to

such notice: therefore, 5. Renting for a year *a tenement of the yearly r *op j n

value of ten pounds, and residing forty days in the parish, gains a settle- *- J

ment without notice; (a;) upon the principle of having substance enough to gain

credit for such a house. 6. Being charged to and paying the public taxes and

levies of the parish ; excepting those for scavengers, highways, (y) and the duties

on houses and windows; (z) and, 7. Executing, when legally appointed, any pub-

lic parochial office for a whole year in the parish, as churchwarden, &c., are

both of them equivalent to notice, and gain a settlement, (a) if coupled with a

residence of forty days. 8. Being hired for a year, when unmarried and child-

less, and serving a year in the same service; and 9. Being bound an apprentice,

give the servant and apprentice a settlement without notice, (b) in that place

wherein they serve the last forty days. This is meant to encourage application

to trades, and going out to reputable services. 10. Lastly, the having an estate

of one's own, and residing thereon forty days, however small the value may be,

in case it be acquired by act of law, or of a third person, as by descent, gift,

devise, &c., is a sufficient settlement: (c) but if a man acquire it by his own act,

as by purchase, (in its popular sense, in consideration of money paid,) then

(a) Garth. 433. Comb. 3M. Salk. 485. 1 Lord Raym. 667. (r) Seep. 489. (») Salk. 427.

«! Sulk. 628. 2 Lord Baym. 1473. (uJStra. 844. (t>) Foley, 249, 251,462. Burr. Set. C. 370.

(to) Stat. 13 and 14 Cur. u, c. 12. 1 Jac. n, c. 17. 8 and 4 W. and Mar. c. 11.

(x] Stat. 13 and 14 Cnr. n, c 12. (//} Stat. 9 Geo. I, c. 7. i 8.

!z) Stat. 21 Geo. 11. c. 10. 18 Ueo. Ill, c. 28. (a) Stat. 9 ana 4 W. and M. c. 11.

(6) Stat. Sand 4 W. audit, c. 11. 8 and 9 W. HI, c. 10. 30 Geo. H, c. 11. (c) Salk. 521.
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be equivalent to such notice given; and those circumstances have from time to
time been altered, enlarged or restmined, whenever the experience of new inconveniences, arising daily from new regulations, sug~ested the necessity of a remedy. And the doctrine of certificates was invent~d., by way of counterpoise, to
restrain a man and his family f'rom acquiring a new settlement by any length
of residence whatever, unless in two particular excepted cases; which makes
parishes very cautious of giving such certificates, and of course confines the poor
ut home, where frequently no adequate employment can be had.
The law of settlements may be thert>fore now reduced to the following general
heads; or, a settlement in a parish may be acquired, 1. By !Jirtlt; for,
whereYer a child is first known •to be, that is always prima facie the [ • 363 ]
place of settlement, until some other can be shewn. (q) 'l'his is also
generally the place of settlement of a bastard child; (r) for a bastard having in
the eye of the law no father, cannot be reforred to Ids settlement as other children 'may. (s) But, in legitimate children, though the place of birth be prim,a
facie the settlement, yet it is not conclusively so; for there are, 2. Settlements
by parentaf!e, being the settlement of one's father or mother: all legitimate
children bemg really settled in the f,arish where their parents are settled, until
they get a new settlement for themse ves. ( t) A new settlement may be acquired
several ways; as, 3. By marriage. For a woman mnrrying a man that is settled
in another parish changes her own settlement: the law not permitting the separ·
ation of husband and wife. (u) But if the man has no settlement, hers is suspended during his life, if he remains in England and is able to maintain her;
but in his absence, or after his death, or during, perhaps, his inability, she may
be removed to her old settlement. (v) The other methods of acquiring settle·
men ts in any parish are all reducible to this one, of forty days' residence therein:
but this forty days' residence (which is construed to be lodging or lying there)
must not be by fraud or stealth, or in any clandestine manner; but made
notorious by one or other of the following concomitant circumstances. The
next method therefore of gaining a settlement is, 4. By forty days' residence,
and notice. For if a stranger comes into a parish, and delivers notice in writing
of his place of abode, and number of his family, to one of the overseers (which
must be read in the church and registered,) and resides there unmolested for
forty days after such notice, he is legally settled thereby. (1.0) For the law pre·
sumes that such a one at the time of notice is not likely to become chargeable,
else he would not venture to give it; or that, in such case, the parish would
take care to remove him. But there are also other circumstances equivalent to
such notice: therefore, 5. Renting for a year *a tenement of the yearly [ • 364 ]
value of ten pounds, and residing forty days in the parish, gains a settlement without notice; (x) upon the principle of having substance enough to gain
credit for such a house. 6. Being charged to and paying the public taxes and
levies of the parish; excepting those for scavengers, highways, (y) and the duties
on houses and windows; (z) and, 7. Executing, when legally appoin~d, any pub·
lie parochial office for a whole year in the parish, as churchwarden, &c., are
both of them equivalent to notice, and gain a settlement, (a) if coupled with a
residence of forty days. 8. Being hired for a year, when unmani.ed and childless, and 11erm'.ng a year in the same service; and 9. Being bound an apprentice,
give the servant and apprentice a settlement without notice, (b) in that place
wherein they serve the last forty days. This is meant to encourage application
to trades, and going out to reputable services. 10. Lastly, the having an estate
of one's own, and residing thereon forty days, however small the value may be,
in case it be acquired by act of law, or of a third person, as by descent, gift,
devise, &c., is asufficient settlement: (c) but if a man acquire it by his own act,
as by purchase, (in its popular sense, in consideration of money paid,) then
(q) Carth. 433. Comb. 361. !'.'nlk. '811. 1 Lord Raym. 1167.
(r) Seep. 49;
I•) Salk. 427.
2 Lonl Ra''m. 1473.
(u) Stra. ~.
(t1) F oley, :U9, ~l, 252. Burr. Set. C. 370.
(TO) Stat. 13 l\tlfl 14 Cttr. IT, c. 12. 1 Jae. Il, c. 17. 8 and -l W . anti Mar. c. 11.
(If) Stat. 9 Geo. I, c. 7. ~ 6.
IZ) Stat. 18 and H Cnr. n, c 12.
:zl Stat. 21 Geo. U. c. JO. 18 Cleo. Ill, c. 26.
(a) Stat. Sand 4 W. and M. c . 11.
\b) l:itat. 3and 4 W. and M. c. 11. II and 9 W. ill, c. 10. 30 Gt'o. II, c. 11.
(c) Salk. 112l.
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unless the consideration advanced bona fide be 30Z., it is no settlement for any

longer time than the persons shall inhabit thereon, (d) He is in no case remov-

able from his own property; but he shall not, by any trifling or fraudulent pur-

chase of his own, acquire a permanent and lasting settlement.

All persons, not so settled, may be removed to their own parishes, on com-

plaint of the overseers, by two justices of the peace, if they shall adjudge

them likely to become chargeable to the parish into which they have intruded:

unless they are in a way of getting a legal settlement, as by having hired a

F *3651 house of 101. per annum, or living in an *annual service; for then

L J they are not removable, (e) And in all other cases, if the parish to which

they belong will grant them a certificate, acknowledging them to be their

parishioners, they cannot be removed merely because likely to become charge-

able, but only when they become actually chargeable, (f) But such certificated

person can gain no settlement by any of the means above mentioned, unless by

renting a tenement of 10Z. per annum, or by serving an annual office in the

parish being legally placed therein; neither can an apprentice or servant to

such certificated person gain a settlement by such their service, (g)

These are the general heads of the laws relating to the poor, which, by

the resolutions of the courts of justice thereon within a century past, are

branched into a great variety. (25) And yet, notwithstanding the pains that

have been taken about them, they still remain very imperfect, and inadequate to

the purposes they are designed for: a fate that has generally attended most of
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our statute laws, where they have not the foundation of the common law to

build on. When the shires, the hundreds, and the tithings were kept in the

same admirable order in which they were disposed by the great Alfred, there

were no persons idle, consequently none but the impotent that needed relief:

and the statute of 43 Eliz. seems entirely founded on the same principle. But

when this excellent scheme was neglected and departed from, we cannot but

observe with concern what miserable shifts and lame expedients have from time

to time been adopted in order to patch up the flaws occasioned by this neglect.

There is not a more necessary or more certain maxim in the frame and consti-

tution of society, than that every individual must contribute his share in order

to the well-being of the community: and surely they must be very deficient in

sound policy, who suffer one-half of a parish to continue idle, dissolute, and

unemployed; and are at length amazed to find that the industry of the other

half is not able to maintain the whole.

(d) siai, 0 Geo. I, c. 7. (e) Salt. 472. (/) Slut.. 8 and 9 W. 111, c. 30. («/) Slut. 12 Ann. o. 18.

(25) [The duty of relieving or removing our poor formerly devolved on the overseers, but by

the 4 and 5 "Wm. IV, c. 76, the poor law commissioners, and by the 12 and 13 Vic. o. 103, the

poor law board were empowered to consolidate any number of parishes into one union for the

unless the consideration advanced bona fide be 30l., it is no settlement for a.ny
longer time than the persons shall inhabit thereon. (d) He is in no case removable from his own property; but he shall not, by any trifling or fraudulent purchase of his own, acquire a permanent and lasting settlement.
All persons, not so settled, may be removed to their own parishes, on complaint of the overseers, by two justices of the peace, if they shall adjudge
them likely to become chargeable to the parish into which they have intruded:
unless they are in a way of getting a le~al settlement, as by having hired a
[ ...365 ] house of 101. per annum, or livmg in an *annual service; for then
they are not removable. (e) And in all other cases, if the parish tow hi ch
they belong will grant them a certificate, acknowledging them to be thefr
parishioners, they cannot be removed merely because likely to become chargeable, but only when they become actually chargeable.(/) But such certificated
person can gain no settlement by any of the means above mentioned, unless by
renting a tenement of lOl. per annum, or by serving an annual office in the
parish being legally placed therein; neither can an apprentice or servant to
such certificated person gain a settlement by such their service. (g)
These are the general heads of the laws relating to the poor, which, by
the resolutions of the courts of justice thereon within a century pa.st, are
branched into a great variety. (25) And yet, notwithstanding the pains that
have been taken about them, they still remain very imperfect, and inadequate to
the purposes they are designed for : a fate that has generally attended most of
our statute laws, where they have not the foundation of the common law to
build on. When the shires, the hundreds, and the tithings were kept in the
same admirable order in which they were disposed by the great Alfred, there
were no persons idle, consequently none but the impotent that needed relief:
and the statute of 43 Eliz. seems entirely founded on the same principle. But
when this excellent. scheme was neglected and departed from, we cannot but
observe wit.h concern what miserable shifts and lame expedients have from time
to time been adopted in order to patch up the flaws occasioned by this neglect.
There is not a more 'necessary or more certain maxim in the frame and constitution of society, than that every individual must contribute his share in order
to the well-being of the community: and surely they must be very deficient in
sound policy, who suffer one-half of a parish to continue idle, dissolute, and
unemploved ; and are at length amazed to find that the industry of the other
half is not able to maintain the whole.
(e) Salk. 472.
(/)Stat. 8 and 9 W. m, c. 30.
(g) Stat. lt.Ann. c. 18.
(d) St.at. 9 Geo. I, c. 7.

relief of the poor. This being done, each parish has to elect one or more guardians, who act for

the relief of the poor in the union, subject to the rules of the poor law board. In this case the over-

seers have nothing to do with giving relief, except in cases of sudden emergencies; they have,

however, certain duties to perform in relation to the election of guardians. They are bound to

make and levy the poor rates, and have other duties imposed upon them, most of which, how-

ever, may be discharged by an assistant overseer, a paid officer whom the inhabitants of each

parish may appoint if they think fit.]

In the United States the care of the dependent poor devolves upon the individual states, and

provision is made in them all for that object. Township and county officers are chosen to admin-

ister the public bounty, and asylums are provided for those who need permanent relief. Tho

reader will consult the statutes of his state for information concerning ihi- system of relief for

the poor there established.
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(25) [The duty of relieving or removing onr :i:ioor formerly devolved on the overseers, but by
the 4 and 5 Wm. IV, c. 76, the poor law commissioners, and by the 12 and 13 Vic. o. 103, the
poor law board were empowered to colltlolidate any number of parishes into one union for the
relief of the poor. This bein~ done, each parish has to elect one or more guardiani>, who act for
the relief of the poor in the umon, subject to the rules of the poor law board. In this c.a.se the overseers have nothing to do with giving relief, except in ca.-.es of sudden t>mergencies; they have,
however, certain duties to perform in relation to the election of guardians. They a.re bound to
make and levy the poor rates, and have other duties im_P.Osed upon them, most of which, ho,,....
ever, may be dil\Che.rged by an assistant overseer, a pe.id officer whom the inhabit.ants of each
parish may appoint if they think fit.]
In the United States the care of the dependent poor devolves upon the individual states, and
provision is made in them all for that object. Township and county officers are chosen to adminIi!ter the public bounty, e.nd asylums are provided for those who need perme.nent relief. Tho
reader will oommlt tho statutes of his state for informstion concerning the system of relief for
the poor there established.
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CHAPTER X.

OF THE PEOPLE, WHETHER ALIENS, DENIZENS OR NATIVES.

HAVING, in the eight preceding chapters, treated of persons as they stand in

the public relations of -magistrates, I now proceed to consider such persons as fall

under the denomination of the people. And herein all the inferior and subordi-

nate magistrates treated of in the last chapter are included.

The first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural-

born subjects. (1) Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the domin-

ions of the crown of England; that is, within the ligeance, or, as it is generally

called, the allegiance of the king; and aliens, such as are born out of it.

Allegiance is the tie, or ligamen, which binds the subject to the king, in return

for that protection which the king affords the subject. The thing itself, or sub-

stantial part of it, is founded in reason and the nature of government; the

name and the form are derived to us from our Gothic ancestors. Under the

feudal system, every owner of lands held them in subjection to some superior or

lord, from whom or whose ancestors the tenant or vassel had received them;

and there was a mutual trust or confidence subsisting between the lord and

vassal, that the lord should protect the vassal in the enjoyment of the territory

he had granted him, and, on the *other hand, that the vassal should be r +gg~ -j

faithful to the lord, and defend him against all his enemies. This obli- <- -"

gation on the part of the vassal was calledfidelitas, or fealty; and an oath of

fealty was required, by the feudal law, to be taken by all tenants to their land-
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lord, which is couched in almost the same terms as our ancient oath of alle-

giance ; («) except that in the usual oath of fealty there was frequently a saving

or exception of the faith due to a superior lord by name, under whom the land-

lord himself was perhaps only a tenant or vassal. But when the acknowledg-

ment was made to the absolute superior himself, who was vassal to no man, it

was no longer called the oath of fealty, but the oath of allegiance; and therein

the tenant swore to bear faith to his sovereign lord, in opposition to all men,

without any saving or exception: "contra omnes homines fidelitatem fecit." (b)

Land held by this exalted species of fealty was called feudum ligium, a liege fee;

the vassals homines ligii, or liege men; and the sovereign their dominus ligius,

or liege lord. And when sovereign princes did homage to each other, for lands

held under their respective sovereignties, a distinction was always made between

simple homage, which was only an acknowledgment of tenure, (c) and liege

(a) 2 Fend, r,, 6, 7. Ch) 2 Fend. 99. (c) 7 Bep. Calvin's case, 7.

(\) [Natural-born subjects are persons bom within the allegiance, power, or protection of

the crown of England, which terms embrace not only persons born within the dominions of

his majesty, or ot his homagers and the children of subjects in the service of the king abroad,

and the king's children, and the heirs of the crown, aU of whom are natural-born subjects

b}' the common law; but also under various statutes, all persona, though born abroad, whose

father and grandfather by the father's side were natural-born subjects at common law, unless

the father or paternal grandfather, through whom the claim is made, was at the time of the

birth of such children liable, in case of his return into this country, to the penalties of treason

or felouv, or was in the actual service of any foreign prince then at enmity with the crown of

England.

Persons born in transmarine territories belonging to the king of England, in any other right

than that of the English crown, as for instance, the Hanoverians, and persons doing service to

the king, as officers of such transmarine territories, are not natural-born subjects. See

Vaughan, 286.

A child born put of the allegiance of the crown of England is not entitled to be deemed a

natural-born subject, unless the father be at the time of the birth of the child not a subject

only, but a subject by birth. Therefore, children born in the United States of America, since

the recognition of their independence, of parents born there before that time, and continuing

to reside there afterwards, are aliens, and cannot inherit lands here. 2 Bar. and Ores. 779; 4

D. and It. 394, S. C.
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homage, which included the fealty before mentioned, and the services consequent

upon it. Thus when our Edward III, in 1329, did homage to Philip \ I, of

France, for his ducal dominions on that continent, it was warmly disputed of

what species the homage was to be, whether liege or simple homage, (d) But

with us in England, it becoming a settled principle of tenure that all lands in

the kingdom are holden of the king as their sovereign and lord paramount, no

oath but that of fealty could ever be taken to inferior lords, and the oath of

allegiance was necessarily confined to the person of the king alone. By an

easy analogy, the term of allegiance was soon brought to signify all other

engagements which are due from subjects to their prince, as well as those duties

which were simply and merely territorial. And the oath of allegiance, as admin-

f *368 1 i^red f°r *upwards of six hundred years, (e) contained a promise " to

L *' ' -1 be true and faithful to the king and his heirs, and truth and faith to bear

of life and limb and terrene honour, and not to know or hear of any ill or dam-

age intended him, without defending him therefrom." Upon which Sir Mat-

thew Hale (/) makes this remark, that it was short and plain, not entangled

with long or intricate causes or declarations, and yet is comprehensive of the

whole duty from the subject to his sovereign. But at the revolution, the terms

of this oath being thought perhaps to favour too much the notion of non-

resistance, the present form was introduced by the convention parliament, which

is more general and indeterminate than the former ; the subject only promising

" that he will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the king," without mention-
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ing " his heirs," or specifying in the least wherein that allegiance consists. The

oath of supremacy is principally calculated as a renunciation of the pope'spre-

tended authority; and the oath of abjuration, introduced in the reign of King

William, (g) very amply supplies the loose and general texture of the oath of

allegiance; it recognizing the right of his majesty, derived under the act of

settlement ; engaging to support him to the utmost of the juror's power; prom-

ising to disclose all traitorous conspiracies against him ; and expressly renounc-

ing any claim of the descendants of the late pretender, in as clear and explicit

terms as the English language can furnish. This oath must be taken by all per-

sons in any office, trust, or employment ; and may be tendered by two justices

of the peace to any person whom they shall suspect of disaffection, (h) And the

oath of allegiance may be tendered (t ) to all persons above the age of twelve

years, whether natives, denizens, or aliens, either in the court-leet of the manor,

or in the sheriff's tourn, which is the court-leet of the county. (2)

But, besides these express engagements, the law also holds that there is an

T *369 1 original, and virtual allegiance, *owing from every subject to

L J his sovereign, antecedently to any express promise ; and although the

subject never swore any faith or allegiance in form. For as the king, by the

very descent of the crown, is fully invested with all the rights, and bound to all

(d) 2 Cart. 401. Hod. Un. Hist, xzlll. 420.

(t) Mirror, c. 3, ( 35. Fleta, 3, 18. Britton, o. 29. 7 Rep. Calvin's case, 6. (f) \ Hal. P. C. 83.

(<i) Stat. 13 W. Ill, c. 6. (h) Stat. I, Geo. I, c. 13. 6 (Jeo. Ill, o. S3. (I) 2 but. 121. 1 Hal. P.O. 81.

(2) As regards these oaths great changes have from time to time been made by statute,

•which it wifi not be necessary for ns to follow here. The subject is now covered by statute

31 and 32 Tic. c. 72, under which no person can be "required or authorized to take the oaths

of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration, or any of such oaths, or any oath substituted for

such oaths or any of them," except the persons indicated in that act, in the Clerical Subscrip-

tion Act, 1865," (as to which see neit chapter) and the " Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866." The

general purpose of the statute 31 and 32 Vic. c. 72, as well as of other statutes which preceded

it, was to relieve Roman Catholics and other persons having^ religions scruples which pre-

cluded their taking the oaths formerly required, from the disabilities under which they lay in

consequence, and to enable them to serve the state in positions of honor and responsibility in

common with their fellow subjects. The oath of allegiance now required is simply that the

juror "will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and

successor* according to law ; " and the oath required of officers generally is, that they will well

and truly serve her majesty in their respective offices ; while judicial officers are to add to the

same a further pledge, that they " will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages

of this realm, without fear or favor, affection or ill will."
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the duties, of sovereignty, before his coronation; so the subject is bound to his

prince by an intrinsic allegiance, before the superinduction of those outward

bonds of oath, homage, and fealty; which were only instituted to remind the

subject of this his previous duty, and for the better securing its performance, (k)

The formal profession, therefore, or oath of subjection, is nothing more than a

declaration in words of what was before implied in law. Which occasions Sir

Edward Coke very justly to observe, (1) that " all subjects are equally bounden

to their allegiance as if they had taken the oath ; because it is written by the

finger of the law in their hearts, and the taking of the corporal oath is but an

outward declaration of the same." The sanction of an oath, it is true, in case of

violation of duty, makes the guilt still more accumulated, by superadding per-

jury to treason: but it does not increase the civil obligation to loyalty; it only

strengthens the social tie by uniting it with that of religion.

Allegiance, both express and implied, is however distinguished by the law into

two sorts or species, the one natural, the other local; the former being also per-

petual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men

born within the king's dominions immediately upon their birth, (m) For,

immediately upon their birth, they are under the king's protection: at a time,

too, when (during their infancy) they are incapable of protecting themselves.

Natural allegiance is therefore a debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited,

cancelled, or altered by any change of time, place, or circumstance, nor by any

thing but the united concurrence of the legislature, (n) An Englishman who
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removes to France, or to China, owes the same allegiance *to the king r *„„,. -•

of England there as at home, and twenty years hence as well as now. <- *

For it is a principal of universal law, (o) that the natural-born subject of one

prince cannot by any act of his own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another,

put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former : for this natural alle-

giance was intrinsic, and primitive, and antecedent to the other; and cannot be

divested without the concurrent act of that prince to whom it was first due. (3)

Indeed the natural-born subject of one prince, to whom he owes allegiance, may

be entangled by subjecting himself absolutely to another; but it is nis own act

that brings him into these straits and difficulties, of owing service to two mas-

ters ; and it is unreasonable that, by such voluntary act of nis own, he should be

able at pleasure to unloose those bands by which he is connected to his natural

prince. (4)

ft) 1 Hal. P. C. 81. (I) Zlnst. 121. (m) 7 Eep. 7. (n) 2 P. Wing. 124. (o) 1 Hal. P. C. 68.

(3) [And this seems to have guided the courts both of England and America, since the

the duties, of sovereignty, before his coronation; so the subject is bound to his
prince by an intrinsic allegiance, before the superinduction of those outward
bonds of oath, homage, and fealty; which were only instituted to remind the
subject of this his previous duty, and for the better securing its performance. (k)
'rhe formal profession, therefore, or oath of subjection, is nothing more than a.
declaration in words of what was before implied in law. Which occasions Sir
Edward Coke very justly to observe, (l) that "all subjects are equally bounden
to their allegiance as if they had taken the oath ; because it is written by the
finger of the law in their hearts, and the taking of the corporal oath is but an
outward declaration of the same." The sanction of an oath, it is true, in case of
violation of duty, makes the guilt still more accumulated, by superadding perjury to treason : but it does not increase the civil obligation to loyalty; it only
strengthens the social tie by uniting it with that of relivion.
Allegiance, both express and implied, is however distmguished by the law into
two sorts or species, the one natural, the other local ; the former being also perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men
born within the kin(s dominions immediately uPon their birth. (m) For,
immediatelY. u~n their birth, they are under the kmg's protection: at a time,
too, when (durmg their infancy) they are incapable of protecting themselves.
Natural allegiance is therefore a debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited,
cancelled, or altered by any change of time, place, or circumstance, nor by any
thing but the united concurrence of the legislature. (n) An Englishman who
removes to France, or to China., owes the same allegiance •to the king [ • 370 ]
of England there as at home, and twenty years hence as well as now.
For it is a principal of universal law, (o) that the natural-born subject of one
prince cannot by any act of his own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another,
put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former: for this natural allegiance was intrinsic, and primitive, and antecedent to the other; and cannot be
divested without the concurrent act of that prince to whom it was first due. (3)
Indeed the natural-born subject of one prince, to whom he owes allegiance, may
be entangled by subjecting himself absolutely to another; but it is his own act
that brings him into these straits and difficulties, of owing service to two masters; and it is unreasonable that, by such voluntary act of his own, he should be
able at :pleasure to unloose those bands by which he is connected to his natural
prince. (4)

peace between these powers, which ended in the declaration and acknowledgment of the

independence of America. It has been determined that the effect of the concurrent acts of the

(k)

1 Hal. P. C. 81.

(l)

21nst. 121.

(m) 7 Rep. 7.

(n) 2 P. Wm1. UN.

(o) I Hal. P. C. 68.

two governments was to divest a natural-born subject of the British king, adhering to the United

States of America, of his right to inherit land in England; and so in K. B., it has been deter-

mined that the treaty virtually prevented Americans adhering to the crown from inheriting lands

in America. See the English case, Doe d. Thomas v. Acklam, 2 B. and C. 779, which cites 7

"WTieaton'B R. 535.]

(4) [Sir Michael Foster observes, that " the well-known maxim, which the writers upon our

law have adopted and applied to this case, nemo potest exuere patriam, comprehendeth the

whole doctrine of natural allegiance." Fost. 184. And this is exemplified by a strong instance

in the report which that learned judge has given of >Eneas Macdonald's case. He was a

native of Great Britain, but had received his education from his early infancy in France, had

spent iiU riper years in a profitable employment in that kingdom, and had accepted a com-

mission in the service of the French king; acting under that commission, he was taKen in arms

against the king of England, for which he was indicted and convicted of high treason; but

was pardoned upon condition of his leaving the kingdom, and continuing abroad during his life.

Ib. 59.]

The doctrine here stated has been accepted by the courts of America as a part of our

inheritance of the common law of England. See the cases of Talbot r. Janson, 3 Dall. 133;

Isaac Williams's Case, 2 Cranch, 82; Murray v. The Charming Betsey, Id. 124; United States ».

Gillies, 1 Pet. C. C. 159; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat 283 ; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242;

AinslJe v. Martin, 9 Mass. 461. To say however th»t it is "a principle of universal law," is to

occupy disputed ground. Chancellor Kent, who declared and defended the doctrine, admits

that the writers on public law have generally spoken in favor of the right of a subject to
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(3) [And this seems to have guided the courts both of England and America, since the
peace between theRe powel'l1, which ended in the decln.ration and acknowledgment of the
mdepeudence of America. It has been determined that the effect of the concurrent acts of the
two governments was to divest a. natural-born suhject of the Briti~h king, adhering to the United
States of .America, of hi~ right to inherit land in England ; and 1.10 in K. B., it has been determiued that the treaty virtually prevented Americans adhering to the crown from inheriting lands
in .America. See the English case, Doe d. Thomas ti. Acklam, 2 B. and C. 779, which cites 7
Wheaton's R. 535.]
( 4) [Sir Michael Foster observes, that "the well-known maxim, which the writer!! upon our
law have adopted and applied to this case, nem-0 potest exuere patriam, comprehendeth the
whole doctrine of natural allegiance." Fost. 184. And this is exemplified by a fltrong instance
in the report which that learned judge has ¢ven of 1Eneas .Macdonald's case. He W88 a
native of Great Britain, but had received his education from his early infancy in France, had
spent hi-i riper ye8I'8 in a profitable employment in that kingdom, and had accepted a commission in the service of the French king ; acting under that commission, he wa.~ taken in arms
against the king of Eu~laud, for which he was indicted and convicted of high trea.'!on ; but
was pardoned npon condition of his leaving the kingdom, and continuing abroad during his life.
lb. 59.]
The doctrine here stated ha.~ been accepted by the courts of America os a part of our
inheritrumi of the common Jaw of England. See the easel! of Talbot "· Janson, 3 Dall. 133;
Isaac Williams's Ce.ee,2 Cranch, 8'2; Murray v. The Charming Betsey, Id. 124; United States v.
Gillie;i, 1 Pet. C. C. 159; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat 28'J ; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242;
Ainttlie v. Martin, 9 Mas11. 461. To tmy however that it iii "a/rinciple of univer~al law," is to
occupy di~puted ground. Chancellor Kent, who declared an defended the doctrine, admits
that the writers on public Jaw have generally spoken in favor of the right of a subject to
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Local allegiance is such as is due from an alien or stranger born, for so long

time as he continues within the king's dominion and protection: (p) and it

ceases the iiistaut such stranger transfers himself from this kingdom to

another. Natural allegiance is therefore perpetual, and local, temporary only;

and that for this reason, evidently founded upon the nature of government;

that allegiance is a debt due from the subject, upon an implied contract with the

prince, that so long as the one affords protection, so long the other will demean

himself faithfully. As therefore the prince is always under a constant tie to

protect his natural-born subjects, at all times and in all countries, for this reason

their allegiance due to him is equally universal and permanent But, on the

other hand, as the prince affords his protection to an alien, only during his resi-

dence in this realm, the allegiance of an alien is confined, in point of time, to the

duration of such his residence, and, in point of locality, to the dominions of the

British empire. From which considerations Sir Mathew Hale (q) deduces this

consequence, that though there be an usurper of the crown, yet it is treason for

any subject, while the usurper is in full possession of the sovereignty to

F *3711 *Practlce anv thing against his crown and dignity; wherefore, although

" " J the true prince regain the sovereignty, yet such attempts against the

usurper (unless in defence or aid of the rightful king) have been afterwards pun-

ished with death ; because of the breach of that temporary allegiance, which was

due to him as king de facto. And upon this footing, after Edward IV recovered

the crown, which had been long detained from his house by the line of Lancas-
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ter, treasons committed against Henry VI were capitally punished, though Henry

had been declared an usurper by parliament.

This oath of allegiance, or rather the allegiance itself, is held to be applicable

not only to the political capacity of the king, or regal office, but to his natural

person and blood-royal; and for the misapplication of their allegiance, viz.: to

the regal capacity or crown, exclusive of the person of the king, were the Spen-

cers banished in the reign of Henry II. (r) And from hence arose that principle

of personal attachment, and affectionate loyalty, which induced our forefathers

(and, if occasion required, would doubtless induce their sons) to hazard all that

was dear to them, life, fortune, and family, in defence and support of their liege

lord and sovereign.

This allegiance, then, both express and implied, is the duty of all the king^s

subjects, under the distinctions here laid down, of local and temporary, or uni-

versal and perpetual. Their rights are also distinguishable by the same

criterions of time and locality; natural-born subjects having a great variety of

(p) 7 Hep. 6. (q) 1 Hal. P. C. 60. (r) 1 Hal. P. C. 67.

emigrate and abandon his native country, unless there is some positive restraint by law, or he

Local allegiance is such as is due from an alien or stranger born, for so Jong
time as he continues within the king's dominion and protection: (P) and it
cew:ies the instant such stranger transfers himself from this kmgdom to
another. Natural allegiance is therefore perpetual, and local, temporarv only;
and that for this reason, evidently founded upon the nature of government;
that allegiance is a debt due from the subject, upon an implied contract with the
prince, that so long as the one affords protection, so long the other will demean
himself faithfully. As therefore the JJrince is always under a constant tie t.o
protect his natural-born subjects, at al times and in all countries, for this reason
their allegiance due to him is equally universal and :permanent. But, on the
other hand, as the prince affords his protection to an a.hen, only during his residence in this realm, the allegiance of an alien is confined, in point of time, to the
duration of such his residence, and, in point of locality, to the dominions of the
British empire. From which considerations Sir Mathew Hale (q) deduces this
consequence, that though there be an usurper of the crown, yet it is treason for
any subject, while the usurper is in full possession of the sovereignty to
[ • 371 ] *practlCe any thing against his crown und dignity; wherefore, although
the true prince regain the sovereignty, yet such attempts against the
usurper (unless in defence or aid of the rightful kmg) have been afterwards punished with death ; because of the breach of that temporary allegiance, which was
due to him as king de facto. And upon this footing, after Edward IV recovered
the crown, which had been long detained from his house by the line of Lancaster, treasons committed against Hen-ry VI were capitally punished, though Henry
had been declared an usurper by parliament.
This oath of aJle~ance, or rather the allegiance itself, is held to be applicable
not only to the political capacity of the king, or regal office, but to his natural
person and blood-royal; and for the misapplication of their allegiance, viz.: to
the regal capacity or crown, exclusive of the person of the king, were the Spencers banishe<l in the reign of Henry II. (r) And from hence arose that principle
of personal attachment, and affectwnate loyalty, which induced our forefathers
(and, if occasion re9.nired, would doubtless induce their sons) to hazard all that
was dear to them, hfe, fortune, and family, in defence and support of their liege
lord and sovereign.
This allegiance, then, both express and implied, is the duty of all the king's
subjects, under the distinctions here laid down, of local and ttlmporary, or universal and perpetual. Their rights are also distinguishable by the same
criterions of time and locality; natural-born subjects having a great variety of

is at the time in possession of a public trust, or unless his country is in distress or in war, and

{p) 7

stands in need of his assistance. And he quotes the declaration of Cicero, that it was the

Bep. 6.

(q) 1 Bal. P. C. 80.

(r)

1 Hal. P. C. trl.

immutable foundation of Roman liberty, that every man is master of his rights of citizenship,

and may retain or renounce them at his pleasure. " Ne guts invitus civitate mutetur : nece in

civitate maneat invitus. Hcec gunt etvim fundamenta firmissima nostrce libertatw, svi quemqvc

juris et retinendi et dimittendi esse dominum." Mr. Lawrence, in his edition of "Wneaton's

International Law has discussed this subject on general principles, taking a view opposed to

that of the English and American courts, and more in harmony with that which has gener-

ally prevailed among the American people and in the executive councils. The claim on the part

of Great Britain of a right to search American vessels for British seamen, which brought on

the war of 1812, was based upon this doctrine of perpetual allegiance, and though resisted on

other grounds, wag denied also as inconsistent with a general principle of international law,

which permitted expatriation where emigration was not forbidden. The supreme court of Ken-

tucky has declared the right of expatriation to be a practical and fundamental American doc-

trine, and that where no statute regulation on the subject exists, the citizen may in good faith

abjure his country and his allegiance, and the assent of the government was to be presumed.

Alsberry v. Hawking, 9 Dana, 178. This view is in harmonv with the prevailing American sen-

timent, to which the government is at this time endeavoring to give effect Ly treaties with

European nations. Negotiations were opened with the European courts, with this end in view,

during the administration of President Johnson, and at the present time there is every prospect

of their being generally successful.
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emigre.te e.nd e.be.ndon his ne.tive conntry, unless there is some positive restraint by le.w, or he
is e.t the time in posaession of e. public trust, or nnle88 his conntry is in distress or in war, and
stands in need of his e.ssistance. And he quotes the doole.re.tion of Cicero, the.t it was the
immutable founde.tion of Rome.n liberty, the.t every man is master of his rights of citizenship,
and may retain or renonnce them at his pleasure. "Ne qui8 in'flitw citlftate nitif.etur ; ncre in
r.-i·i'itate maneat in.'flitua. Hrec sunt miim fundamenta firmissima nostrre libertatis, 8fl.i quemq1w
juri.~ et retinendi et dimitten.di esse d<>minum."
Mr. Le.wronce, in his edition of Wheatflo';.
Internatione.l Law has discussed this subject on genere.l principleR, raking a view opposed to
that of the English e.nd .Americe.n courts, e.nd more in harmony with that which has generally prevailed ainong the American people and in the executive councilt1. The cle.im on the part
of Great Britain of a right to i>earch American vessels for Britit;1h seamen, which brought on
the war of 1812, we.a be.sed upon thifl doctrine of ~rpet.ual allegiance, and though resisted on
other groundR, we.: denied also as inconsil'<tent with a general principle of international law,
which permitted expatriation where emi~ntion we.s not forbidden. The supreme court of Kentncky hM declared the right of expatrie.t10u to be a. practical and funde.mental American doctrine, and that where no statute regulation on the 1mbject exists, the citizen may in good faith
abjure his country and his allegiance, and the RSsent of the government w~ to be presumed.
.AiSberry fl. Hawkins, 9 De.nB, 178. This view is in harmony with the prevailing American sentiment, to which the government is at this time endeavoring to give effect by treatie11 with
European nations. Negotiations were opened with the European oourt.s, with this end in view.
durin~ the adminii;tration of President Johnson, and at the present time there is every prospect
of thell' being generally s1Icce88fnl.
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rights, which they acquire by being born within the king's ligeance, and can

never forfeit by any distance of place or time, but only by their own misbehaviour;

the explanation of which rights is the principal subject of the two first books of

these Commentaries. The same is also in some degree the case of aliens ;

though their rights are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by resi-

dence here, and lost whenever they remove. I shall however here endeavour to

chalk out some of the principal lines, whereby *they are distinguished from r 1.3172 1

natives, descending to farther particulars when they come in course. ' '

An alien born may purchase lands, or other estates: but not for his own use,

for the king is thereupon entitled to them.(s) (5) If an alien could acquire a

permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance, equally permanent with

that property, to the king of England, which would probably be inconsistent

with that which he owes to his own natural liege lord: besides that thereby the

nation might in time be subject to foreign influence, and feel many other incon-

veniences. Wherefore by the civil law such contracts were also made void: (t)

but the prince had no such advantage of forfeiture thereby, as with us in Eng-

land. Among other reasons which might be given for our constitution, it seems

to be intended by way of punishment for the alien's presumption, in attempting

to acquire any lauded property; for the vendor is not affected by it, he having

resigned his right, and received an equivalent in exchange. Yet an alien may

acquire a property in goods, money and other personal estate, or may hire a

house for his habitation: (u) for personal estate is of a transitory and movable
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nature; and besides, this indulgence to strangers is necessary for the advance-

ment of trade.(6) Aliens also may trade as freely as other people, only they are

subject to certain higher duties at the custom-house ;(7) ana there are also some

obsolete statutes of Sen. VIII prohibiting alien artificers to work for themselves

in this kingdom; but it is generally held that they were virtually repealed by

statute 5 Eliz. c. 7. Also an alien may bring an action concerning personal

property, and make a will, and dispose of his personal estate: (w) not as it is in

France, where the king at the death of an alien is entitled to all he is worth,

bythedroitd'aubaineoTJusalbinatus, (x) unless he has a peculiar exemption.(S)

When I mention these rights of an alien, I must be understood of alien friends

only, or such whose countries are in peace with ours; for alien enemies have no

•"rights, no privileges, unless by the King's special favour, during the r M7o -,

timeofwar.(9) I"""5 I

When I say, that an alien is one who is born out of the king's dominions, or

allegiance, this also must be understood with some restrictions. The common

(si Co. LItt. 2. (<) Cod. 1. 11, tit. M. (iii 7 Rep. 17. (w) l.ntw. 84.

(x} A word derived from alibi natut. Spelm. Gl. 24.

(5) The lands which aliens take, by deed or devise, they may hold as against all persons

except the sovereign. People v. Coupling, 2 Hill, 67; Wadsworth v. "Wadsworth, 12 N. T.

376; Wright v. Saddler, 20 id. 320; Cross v. De Valle, 1 Wai. 1; Wilbur r. Tobey, 16 Pick. 179.

rights, which they acquire by being born within the kin~'s ligeance, and can
never forfeit by any distance of place or time, but only by their own misbehaYiour;
the explanation of which rights is the principal subject of the two first books of
these Commentaries. The same is also in some degree the case of aliens ;
though their rights are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence here~ and lost whenever they remove. I shall however here endeavour to
chalk out some of the principal lines, whereby *they are distin~ished from [ • 372 ]
nafrves, descending to farther particulars when they come m course.
An alien born may purchase lands, or other estates: but not for his own use,
for the king is thereupon entitled to them.(s) (5) If an alien could acquire a
permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance, equally permanent with
that property, to the king of England, which would probably be inconsistent
with that which he owes to his own natural liege lord: besides that thereby the
nation might in time be subject to foreign influence, and feel many other inconveniences. Wherefore by the civil law such contracts were also made void: (t)
but the prince had no such advantage of forfeiture thereby, as with us in England.. Among other reasons '_Vhich might be giyen. for our eo~stit~tion, it se~rns
to be mtended by way of pumshment for the ahen s presumpt10n, m attemptmg
to acquire any landed property ; for the vendor is not affected by it, he having
resigned his right, and received an equivalent in exchange. Yet an alien may
acquire a. property in goods, money and other persona.I estate, or may hire a
house for his habitation : (u) for personal estate is of a transitory and movable
nature; and besides, this indulgence to strangers is necessary for the advance·
ment of trade.(6) Aliens also may trade as freely as other people, only they a.re
subject to certain higher duties at the custom-house ;(7) and there are also some
obsolete statutes of Hen. VIII prohibiting alien artificers to work for themselves
in this kingdom; but it is generally held that they were virtually repealed by
statute 5 Eliz. c. 7. Also an a.lien may bring an action concerning personal
property, and make a will, and dispose of his personal estate : (w) not as it is in
France, where the king a.t the death of an alien is entitled to all he is worth,
by the droit d'aubaine orjus albinatus, {x) unless he has a. peculiar exemption.(8)
When I mention these rights of an ahen, I must be understood of alien friends
only, or such whose countries a.re in peace with ours; for alien enemies have no
*.rights, no :privileges, unless by the king's special favour, during the [ • 373 ]
time of war.( 9)
When I say, that an alien is one who is born out of the king's dominions, or
allegiance, this also must be understood with some restrictions. The common
(1)
{:i:)

Co. Litt. 2.
(t) Cod. I. 11, tit. M.
(u; 7 Rep. 17.
.A. word derived Crom alibi natua. Spelm. GI. 24.

(to)

Lutw. 3'.

Whether inquest of office is necessary, see book 2, p. 249, n. (10).

An alien has no inheritable blood through which title may be deduced, and consequently

one cannot take lands by descent who must, claim by representation through an alien. Jack-

son «. Green, 7 Wend. 333; Levy «. McCartee, 6 Pet. 102. But one brother may inherit from

another, notwithstanding the father is an alien; the descent as to the brothers being imme-

diate. Collingwood v. Pace, Sid. 193.

Some of the American states have abolished the disability of aliens to hold lands, which,

as to those states, rest upon no sound reasons.

(6) By statute 7 and 8 Vic. c. 66, an alien friend may hold every species of personal

property except chattels real, and may take and hold any lands, houses and other tenements for

the purpose of residence or occupation, or for the purpose of any business, trade or manufac-

ture, for any term not exceeding twenty-one years.

(7) [Repealed, except as to some city duties, by statute 24 Geo. II, st. 2, c. 16.]

(8) [But by the Code Civile the droit <?aiiba\ne does not exist against natives of countries

wherein such right is not enforced against Frenchmen.]

(9) During the late civil war in the United States, it was held that the people within the

limits occupied by the insurgents, and controlled by their military forces, were to be regarded

as being, and as having the rights only of, alien enemies, irrespective of their sympathies as

between the belligerents, Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wai. 404.

235

(5) The lands which aliens take, by deed or devise, they may hold as agBinst all persons
except the sovereign. People ti. Conkling, 2 Hill, <>'7; Wudsworth i•. Wadsworth, 12 N. Y.
376; Wri~ht ti• .Saddler, 20 id. 320; Cross ti. De Valle, 1 Wal. 1 ; Wilbur v. Tobey, rn Pick. 179.
Whether mquest of office is necessary, see book 2, p. 249, n. (10).
.A.n alien has no inheritable blood thtongh which title may be deduced, and consequently
one cannot take lands by descent who must claim by repreo;entation through an alien. Jackson v. Green, 7 Wend. 333; Levy ti. McCartee, 6 Pet. 10'.l. But one brother may inherit from
another, notwithstanding the father is an alien ; the descent as to the brothers being immediate. Collingwood v. Pace, Sid. 193.
Some of the .American statet1 ha;e abolished the disability of aliens to hold lands, which,
as to those states, rest upon no sound reB11on11.
(6) By statute 7 and i3 Vic. c. 66, an alien friend may hold every Apecies of personal
property except chattel~ real, and may take and hold any lands, houses and other tenements for
the purpose of l'Cl!idence or oreupation. or for the purpose of any busine;,s, trade or manufacture, for any tenn not exceeding twenty-one years.
(7) [Repealed, except 11.8 to ~ome eity duties, by statute 24 Geo. II, st. 2, c. 16.]
(1') [But by the Code Citiile the droit d'aubaine does not exist against natives of countries
wherein such right is not enforced again~t Frenchmen.]
(9) Durin~ the late civil war in tho United Statei:l, it was held that the people within the
limit!: occupied by the insurgents, and controlled by their military forces, were to be regarded
8.'l being, and a.'! having the right.'! only of~ alien enemies, irrespective of tlwir symputhie8 as
between the belligerent.~. Alex1mder":; Cotton, 2 Wal. 404.
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law, indeed, stood absolutely so, with only a very few exceptions; so that a par-

ticular act of parliament became necessary after the restoration,(y) " for the

naturalization of children of his majesty's English subjects, born in foreign

countries during the late troubles." And this maxim of the law proceeded upon

a general principle, that every man owes natural allegiance where he is born,

and cannot owe two such allegiances, or serve two masters, at once. Yet the

children of the king's ambassadors born abroad were always held to be natural

subjects:(«) for as the father, though in a foreign country, owes not even a local

allegiance to the prince to whom he is sent; so, with regard to the son also, he

was held (by a kind of postliminium) to be born under the king of England's

allegiance, represented by his father the ambassador. To encourage also foreign

commerce, it was enacted by statute 25 Edw. Ill, st. 2, that all children born

abroad, provided both their parents were at the time of the birth in allegiance to

the king, and the mother had passed the seas by her husband's consent, might

inherit as if born in England; and accordingly it hath been so adjudged in De-

half of merchants.(a) But by several more modern statutes (b) these restrictions

are still farther taken off; so that all children, born out of the king's ligeance,

whose fathers (or grandfathers by the father's side) were natural-born subjects,

are now deemed to be natural-born subjects themselves to all intents and pur-

poses ; unless their said ancestors were attainted, or banished beyond sea, for high

treason; or were at the birth of such children in the service of a prince at

enmity with Great Britian.(lO) Yet the grandchildren of such ancestors shall
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not be privileged in respect of the alien's duty, except they be protestants, and

actually reside within the realm; nor shall be enabled to claim any estate or

interest, unless the claim be made within five years after the same shall accrue.

The children of aliens, born here in England, are, generally speaking, natural-

F *3741 born subjects, and entitled to all the *privileges of sucn.(ll) In which

L J the constitution of France differs from ours; for there, by their jus albi-

natus, if a child be born of foreign parents, it is an alien.(e) (12)

A denizen is an alien born, but who has obtained ex donations regis letters

patent to make him an English subject: a high and incommunicable branch of

the royal prerogative.^) A denizen is in a kind of middle state, between an

alien and natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them. He may take

land by purchase or devise, which an alien may not; but cannot take by inher-

itance :(e) for his parent, through whom he must claim, being an alien, had no

inheritable blood; and therefore could convey none to the son. And, upon a

like defect of hereditary blood, the issue of a denizen, born before denization,

cannot inherit to him; but his issue born after may.(/) A denizen is not ex-

cused (g) from paying the alien's duty, and some other mercantile burthens.

And no denizen can oe of the privy council, or either house of parliament, or

have any office or trust, civil or military, or be capable of any grant of lands,

&c., from the crown.(A)

Naturalization cannot be performed but by act of parliament: for by this an

alien is put in exactly the same state as if he had been born in the king's lige-

(y) Stat. 29 Car. II, c. 6. (*) 7 Bep. 18. (a) Cro. Car. 601. Mar. 91. Jenk. Cent. 3.

(0) 7 Ann. c. 5. 4 On. II, c. 21, and 13 Geo. III. c. 21. (ci Jenk. Cent. 3, cites Treasure Francois, 313

(d) 7 Rep. Calvin's case, 26. fe( 11 Rep. 67. (/) Co. Litt. 8. Vaugh. 285.

(g} Stat. 22 Hen. VIII c. 8. (») Stat. II W. in, o. 3.

(10) By statute 7 and 8 Vic. o. 66, s. 3, every person born abroad, of a mother who is a

natural-bom subject of the United Kingdom, is " capable of taking to him, his heirs, execu-

tors or administrators, any estate, real or personal, by devise or purchase, or inheritance of

succession."

(11) And they may trace title by inheritance through ancestors born out of the allegiance.

Statute 11 and 12 Win. Ill, c. 6, and 25 Geo. II, c. 39.

By statute 21 and 22 Tic. o. 20, a proceeding is allowed to be had in the court for divorce

and matrimonial causes, for determining the right of any person to be deemed a natural-born

subject of the crown; but the proceeding will not affect the right of third persons not cited

or made parties thereto.

(12) [" In this respect there is not any difference between our laws and those of France. In

each country birth confers the right of naturalization." 1 Woodd. 386.]
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ance; except only that he is incapable, as well as a denizen, of being a member

of the privy council, or parliament, holding offices, grants, &c. (i) No bill for

naturalization can be received in either house of parliament without such disa-

bling clause in it: (_;') nor without a clause disabling the person from obtaining

any immunity in trade thereby in any foreign country, unless he shall have

resided in Britain for seven vears next after the commencement of the session

in which he is naturalized, (k) Neither can any person be naturalized or

restored in blood unless he hath received the sacrament of the Lord's supper

within one month before the bringing in of the bill; and unless he also takes

the oaths of allegiance and supremacy in the presence of the parliament. (I)

But these provisions have been usually dispensed with by special acts of (m)

parliament, previous to bills of naturalization of any foreign princes or prin-

cesses. (13)

*These are the principal distinctions between aliens, denizens, and r +n~r -,

natives: distinctions, which it hath been frequently endeavoured since "- J

the commencement of this century to lay almost totally aside, by one general

naturalization act for all foreign protestants. An attempt which was once car-

ried into execution by the statute 7 Ann. c. 5; but this, after three years' exper-

ience of it, was repealed by the statute 10 Ann. c. 5, except one clause, which

was just now mentioned, for naturalizing the children of English parents born

abroad. However, every foreign seamen, who in time of war serves two years

on board an English ship, by virtue of the king's proclamation, is ipso facto nat-
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uralized under the like restrictions as in statute 12 Wm. Ill, c. 2; (») and all for-

eign protestants, and Jews, upon their residing seven years in any of the Amer-

ican colonies, without being absent above two months at a time, and all foreign

protestants serving two years in a military capacity there, or being three years

employed in the whale fishery, without afterwards absenting themselves from the

king's dominions for more than one year, and none of them falling within the

incapacities declared by statute 4 Geo. II, c. 21, shall be, (upon taking the oaths

of allegiance and abjuration, or in some cases, an affirmation to the same effect)

naturalized to all intents and purposes, as if they had been born in this king-

dom ; except as to sitting in parliament or in the privy council, and holding

offices or grants of lands, &c., from the crown within tne kingdoms of Great

Britain or Ireland, (o) They therefore are admissible to all other privileges,

which protestants or Jews born in this kingdom are entitled to. What those

privileges are, with respect to Jews (p) in particular, was the subject of very

high debates about the time of the famous Jew-bill; (q) which enables all Jews

to prefer bills of naturalization in parliament, without receiving the sacrament,

as ordained by statute 7 Jac. I. (14) It is not my intention to revive this contro-

versy again; for the act lived only a few months, and was then repealed: (r)

therefore peace be now to its manes. (15)

ft} Ibid. fjj Stat. 1 Goo. I, o. 4. (k) Stat. 14 Geo. in, c. M. (I) Stat.7 Jac. I. c. 2.

(m) Stat. 4 Ann. c. 1. 7 Geo. II, c. 3. 9 Geo. II, c. 24. 4 Geo. Ill, o. 4. (n) Stat. 12 Geo. U, c. 3.

(o) Stat. 12 Geo. II, c. 7. 20 Geo. in, c. 44. 22 Geo. H. o. 45. 2 Geo. HI, c. 25. 13 Goo. m, c. 25.

(p) A pretty accurate account of the Jews till their banishment in 8 Edward I, may be found in Prynne's

Demurrer, and in Molloy dejvre Maritime, b. 3, c. 6.

(q) Stat. 26 Geo. II, c. 28. (r) Stat. 27 Geo. H, c. 1.

(13) [And now an alien is enabled, on complying with the provisions of the recent statute 7

ance; except only that he is incapable, as well as a denizen, of being a member
of the privy council~ or parliament, holding offices, grants, &c.(i) No bill for
naturalization can be receiYed in either house of parliament without such disabling clause in it: (j) nor without a clause disabling the person from obtaining
any immunity in trade thereby in any foreign country, unless he shall have
resided in Britain for seven vears next after the commencement of the session
in which he is naturalized. (k) Neither can any person be naturalized or
restored in blood unless he hath received the sacrament of the Lord's supper
l\ithin one month before the bringing in of the bill; and unless he also takes
the oaths of allegiance and supremacy in the presence of the parliament. (l)
But these provisions have been usually dispensed with by special acts of (m)
parliament, previous to bills of naturalization of any foreign princes or princesses. (13)
*These are the principal distinctions between aliens, denizens, and [ • 37 r.]
natives: distinctions, which it hath been frequently endeavoured since
"
the commencement of this century to lay almost totally aside, by one general
naturalization act for all foreign protestants. An attempt which was once carried into execution by the statute 7 Ann. c. 5; but this, after three years' experience of it, was repealed by the statute 10 Ann. c. 5, except one clause, which
was just now mentioned, for naturalizing the children of English parents born
abroad. However, cver.y foreign seamen, who in time of war serves two years
on board an English ship, by virtue of the king's proclamation, is ipso facto naturalized under the like restrictions as in statute 12 Wm. III, c. 2; (n) and all foreign prorestants, and Jews, upon their residing seven years in any of the American colonies, without being absent above two months at a time, and all foreign
protestants serving two years in a military capacity there, or being three years
employed in the whale fishery, without afterwards absenting themselves from the
king's dominions for more than one year, and none of them falling within the
incapacities declared by statute 4 Geo. II, c. 21, shall be, (upon taking the oaths
of allegiance and abjuration, or in some cases, an affirmation to the same effect)
naturalized to all intents and purposes, as if they had been born in this kingdom; except as to sitting in parliament or in the privy council, and holding
offices or grants of lands, &c., from the crown withm the kingdoms of Great
Britain or Ireland, (o) They therefore are admissible to all other privileges,
which protestants or Jews born in this kingdom are entitled to. What those
privileges are, with respect to Jews (p) in particular, was the subject of ,·ery
high debates about the time of the famous Jew-bill; (q) which enables all Jews
to prefer bills of naturalization in parliament, without receiving the sacrament,
as ordained by statute 7 Jae. I. (14) It is not my intention to revive this controYersy again; for the act lived only a few months, and was then repealed: (r)
therefore peace be now to its manes. (15)
fi) Ibid.
(m) Stat. 4

(}) Stat. I Geo. I, c. •.
(k) Stat. u Geo. Inf c. 84.
Ann. c. 1. 7 Geo. II, c. 8. 9 Geo. Il.1. c. 24. 4 Geo. 11, c. 4.

(l) Stat.7 Jae. I. c. 2.
(n) Stat.
Geo. II, c. 3.

n

(o) ~tat. 12 Gen II, c. 7. 20 Geo. III. c . .U. 22 ueo. 11\c. 46. 2 Geo. III, c. 25. 13 Goo. III, c.
(p) A pretty accurate account of the Jews till their ban shment In 8 Edward I, may Ile found In

Demurrer, and lo Molloy ckju.re Maritime, b . S, c. 6.
(q) Stat. 26 Geo. II, c. 26.
(r) Stat. Z7 Geo. Il, c. 1.

25.
Prynne's

and 8 Vic. c. 66, to obtain from a principal secretary of state a certificate of naturalization, con-

ferring upon him all the rights and capacities of a natural-born British subject, except the

capacity of being a member of the privy council, or of either house of parliament, and such rights

and capacities, if any, as may be specially excepted in the certificate. By the same statute it is

moreover enacted that any woman married or who shall be married to a natural-born subject or

person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and shall have all the

rights and privileges of a natural-born subject.]

(14) Jews were excluded from holding civil offices, not by any direct enactment, but solely by

the form of the asseveration appended to the abjuration oath, and the declaration required by 9

Geo. IV, c. 17, which was to be made " upon the true faith of a Christian." By statute 8 and 9

Vic. c. :>•', this declaration was dispensed with in the case of corporate offices, and under statute

23 and 24 Vic. c 63, Jews are now admitted to the house of commons.

(15) By the constitution of the United States, congress is empowered "to establish an

uniform rule of naturalization." Art 1. $ 8. The requirement of uniformity necessarily
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uniform rule of naturalization." Art. 1, ~ 8. The requirement of uniformity necel!Bllrily

237

Dig ize b

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

376 OF THE CLERGY. [Book I.'

376

[Book I.'

OF THE CLERGY.

•

CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XI.

• OF THE CLERGY-

THE people, whether aliens, denizens, or natural-born subjects, are divisible

into two kinds; the clergy and laity : the clergy, comprehending all persons in

OF THE CLERGY.

holy orders, and in ecclesiastical offices, will be the subject or the following

chapter. (1)

excludes legislation by the states on the same subject. It is competent for congress, however,

when they nave established an uniform rule, to give to the state courts jurisdiction under it.

State c. Penney, 6 Eng. 621.

The following are the provisions of congressional legislation now in force :

THE people, whether aliens, denizens, or natural-born subjects, are divisible
into two kinda; the clergy a.nd laity: the clergy, comprehending all persona in
holy orders, and in ecclesiastical offices, will be the subject of the following
chapter. (1)

T!:;ii any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to become a citiien of the United

States, or any of them, on the following conditions, and not otherwise :

First. That he shall have declared on oath or affirmation, before the supreme, superior, district

or circuit court of some one of the states, or of the territorial districts of the United States, or a

circuit or district court of the United States, or a clerk of any such court, two years at least

before his admission, that it was bonafide his intention to become a citizen of the United States,

and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or

sovereignty whatever, and particularly the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty whereof such

alien may at the time be a citizen or subject.

Second. That he shall at the time of hi- application to be admitted declar e on oatb or affirma-

tion, before some one of the courts aforesaid, that he will support the constitution of the United

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

States, and that he doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity

to every foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty whereof he was before a citizen or

subject.

Third. He must satisfy the court by evidence that he has resided within the United States five

years at least, and within the state or territory where the court is held one year at least, and dur-

ing that time behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of tile consti-

tution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same.

Fourth. He shall at the time renounce any hereditary title or order of nobility, if any such he

may have or belong to.

Any alien, being a free white person and a minor under the age of twenty-one years, who shall

have resided in the United States three years next preceding his arriving at the age of twenty-

one years, and who shall continue to reside therein to the time of making application, may, after

becoming twenty-one, and after having resided five years within the United States, including the

three years of minority, be admitted a citizen without the preliminary declaration hereinbefore

mentioned.

Any alien of the ago of twenty-one years and upwards, who enlisted or shall enlist in the armies

of the United States, either the regular or volunteer forces, and has been or shall be honorably

discharged therefrom, may be admitted to become a citizen without any previous declaration, and

on proof of one year's residence within the United States.

The children of parents duly naturalized, being under the age of twenty-one at the time of such

naturalization, shall, if dwelling within the United States, be considered as citizens.

If an alien who shall have declared his intentions shall die before he is actually naturalized, his

widow and children shall be considered as citizens on taking the oaths prescribed by law.

No alien who shall be a citizen, denizen or subject of any country, state or sovereign with whom

the United States shall be at war at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to be a

citizen of the United States.

The statutes establishing the foregoing regulations, and also special regulations for classes

of aliens resident within the country prior to the 18th day of June 1812, will DO found as follows-

Act of April 14, 180-2, 2 Statutes at Large, 315 ; act of March 26, 1804, 2 id. 292 ; act of March 3,

1813, 2 id. 811 ; act of March 22, 1816, 3 id. 259; act of 26 May, 1824, 4 id. 69; act of 24 Mar,

1828, id. 310 ; act of 26 June, 1848, 9 id. 240 ; act of July 17, 1862, id. 1861-2, Little & Brown's

ed. 597.

If an alien is naturalized, he thereby acquires all the rights of a natural born citizen, including

the right to take real property by descent. Ainslie v. Martin, 9 Mass. 454. A married woman

may be naturalized without the concurrence of her husband. Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend. 617.

The residence and good moral character of the applicant cannot be proved by affidavits taken out

of court; the witnesses must be present for examination. Anonymous, 7 Hill, 137. The

naturalization of a father ipso facto, makes his son, then residing in the United States and a minor,

a citizen. State r. Penney, 5 Eng. 621.

Distinctions of color, so far us they are made important by the statutes above referred to,

are perhaps inconsistent with the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the United

States, and are abolished by act of Congress of July 14, 1870.

(1) Most of what is said in this chapter is entirely inapplicable in the United States, where no

established church exists.
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This venerable body of men, being separate and set apart from the rest of the

people, in order to attend the more closely to the service of Almighty God, have

thereupon large privileges allowed them by our municipal laws: and had form-

erly much greater, which were abridged at the time of the reformation on

account of the ill use which the popish clergy had endeavoured to make of them.

For, the laws having exempted them from almost every personal duty, they

attempted a total exemption from every secular tie. But it is- observed by Sir

Edward Coke, (a) that, as the overflowing of waters doth many times make the

river to lose its proper channel, so in times past ecclesiastical persons, seeking

to extend their liberties beyond their true bounds, either lost or enjoyed not

those which of right belonged to them. The personal exemptions do indeed

for the most part continue. A clergyman cannot be compelled to serve on a jury,

nor to appear at a court-leet or view of frank-pledge; which almost every other

(a) 2 Inst. 4.

The constitution of the United States expressly prohibits congress passing any law respect-

ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof? 1st amendment. The

several state constitutions also contain provisions on the same subject, some of which are still

more comprehensive, but the general purpose of all is the same. Complete separation of church

and state, and complete freedom in religious worship and in the expression of religious belief,

are the rale throughout the states. In none of them can preferences of one religions sect over

another be established by law, nor compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious

•worship, or attendance thereon, be required, or restraints upon the free exercise of religion
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according to the dictates of the conscience be imposed. Nevertheless, the common law of the

land recognizes the fact that the prevailing religion is Christian, and it will not suffer one with

impunity to shock the moral sense by utterances which a Christian community would regard

as profane or blasphemous. Updegraph c. Commonwealth, 11 S. and B. 394; People v. Bug-

gies, 8 Johns. 293; State «. Chandler, 2 Harr. 555; Commonwealth, v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 234.

Nor is the recognition of religion and of a superintending providence by the appointment of

chaplains for the army and navy and for legislative bodies and the like, opposed to the constitu-

tional provisions referred to, though the spirit of those provisions would require impartiality as

between religious denominations in making such appointments. Kor are laws for the compul-

sory observance of the Christian Sabbath unconstitutional. Commonwealth ». "Wolf, 3 S. and

K. 50; Commonwealth v. Lisher, 17 id. 160; Shover «. State, 5 Eng. 559; Cincinnati ». Rice, 15

Ohio, 225; State v. Ainbs, 20 Mo. 214; Toglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 112; Frolickstein v. Mayor of

Mobile, 40 Ala. 725.

The religious societies which exist throughout the states are quite different in their organi-

ization from those which exist in England, and still more different in the relations they

sustain to the state. They are for the most part formed under general laws, which permit

the voluntary incorporation of societies of attendants upon religious worship, under snch

regulations as they shall see fit to establish for themselves, and with power to nold real and

personal property for the purposes of their organization, but for no other purpose. Trustees

of Quaker Society v. Dickinson, 1 Dov. 189. Chancellor Walworth described such a society

as consisting of " a voluntary association of individuals or families, united for the purpose

of having a common place of worship, and to provide a proper teacher to instruct them in

religious doctrines and duties, and to administer the ordinances of baptism, <fcc. Although a

church or body of professing Christians is almost uniformly connected with such a society or

congregation, the members of the church have no other or greater rights than any other

members of the society who statedly attend with them for the purposes of divine worship.

Over the church, as such, the legal or temporal tribunals of the state do not profess to have

any jurisdiction whatever, except so far as is necessary to protect the civil rights of others,

and to preserve the public peace. All questions relating to the faith and practice of the

church and its members belong to the church judicatories, to which they have voluntarily

subjected themselves. But, as a general principle, those ecclesiastical judicatories cannot

interfere with the temporal concerns of the congregations, or society, with which the church

or the members thereof are connected." Baptist Church v. "Witherell, 3 Paige, 301. Such a

society, when duly incorporated, is not an ecclesiastical, but a private civil corporation, the

members of the society being the corporators, and the trustees the managing officers, with

such powers as the statute confers, and the ordinary discretionary powers of officers in civil

corporations. Robertson ». Bullions, 11 N". T. 243. The church connected with the society,

if any there be, is not recognized in the law; the corporators in the society are not necessarily

members thereof, and the society may change its government, faith, form of worship, disci-

pline and ecclesiastical relations at will, subject only to the restraints imposed by their

articles of association and to the general laws of the state. Robertson «. Bullions, 11 N. Y.

243; Parish of Bellport ». Tooker, 29 Barb. 256; same case, 21 N. Y. 267; Burrel v. Associated

Reform Church, 44 Barb. 282. The articles of association will determine who shall vote

where the state law does not prescribe qualifications: State ». Crowell, 4 Hiilst. 390; and the
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F *3771 Person ifi obliged to do: (5) but if a layman is *summoned on a jury,

' J and before the trial takes orders, he shall notwithstanding appear and

be sworn, (c) Neither can he be chosen to any temporal office; as bailiff, reeve,

constable, or the like: in regard of his ow* continual attendance on the sacred

functioned) During his attendance on divine service he is privileged from

arrests in civil suits.(e) In cases also of felony, a clerk in orders shall have

the benefit of his clergy, without being branded in the hand; and may likewise

have it more than once, (2) in both which particulars he is distinguished from a

layman. (/) But as they have their privileges, so also they have their disabili-

ties, on account of their spiritual avocations. Clergymen, we have seen, (a) are

incapable of sitting in the house of commons; and, by statute 21 Hen. VIII, c.

13, are not, in general, allowed to take any lands or tenements to farm, upon

pain of 101. per month, and total avoidance of the lease; (3) nor upon like pain

to keep any tanhouse or brewhouse; nor shall engage in any manner of trade,

nor sell any merchandize, under forfeiture of the treble value: which prohibi-

tion is consonant to the canon law.

In the frame and constitution of ecclesiastical polity there are divers ranks

and degrees; which I shall consider in their respective order, merely as they are

taken notice of by the secular laws of England: without intermeddling with

the canons and constitutions, by which the clergy have bound themselves. And

under each division I shall consider, 1. The method of their appointment. 2.

Their rights and duties: and 3. The manner wherein their character or office
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may cease.

L An archbishop or bishop is elected by the chapter of his cathedral church,

by virtue of a license from the crown. Election was, in very early times, the

usual mode of elevation to the episcopal chair throughout all Christendom; and

this was promiscuously performed by the laity as well as the clergy: (h) till at

T *3781 len&th becoming tumultuous, the *emperors and other sovereigns of the

L '° J respective kingdoms of Europe took the appointment, in some degree,

into their own hands, by reserving to themselves the right of confirming these

elections, and of granting investiture of the temporalties, which now began

almost universally to be annexed to this spiritual dignity; without which con-

firmation and investiture, the elected bishop could neither be consecrated nor

(&) F. N. B. 100. 2 Inet. 4. (cl 4 Leon. 190.

(.,') Finch. L. 88. (e) Slut. 30 Edw. Ill, c. 5. 1 Ric. II, c. 16.

(/) 2 Inst. GST : stat. i Hen. VII, o. 13, and 1 Edw. VI, c. 12. (g) Page 175.

(A) l'ir Clerum et populum. Palm. 25. 2 Roll. Kep. 102. M. Paris, A. D. Wff.i.

society may establish such rules as they may think proper for preserving order when met for

public worship, and use the necessary force to remove a person who is disturbing the society by

[*
] person is obliged to do: (b) but if a layman is *summoned on a jury,
377 and before the trial takes orders, he shall notwithstanding appear and
be sworn. (c) Neither can he be chosen to any temporal office; as bailiff, reew.
constable, or the like: in regard of his owa continual attendance on the sacred
function.( d) During his attendance on divine service he is privileged from
arrests in civil suits.(e) In cases also of felony, a clerk in orders shall have
the benefit of his clergy, without being branded in the hand; and may likewise
have it more than once, (2) in both which particulars he is distinguished from a
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taken notice of by the secular laws of England: without intermeddling with
the canons and constitutions, by which the clergy ha,·e bound themselves. And
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'£heir rights and duties: and 3. The manner wherein their character or office
may cease.
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this was promiscuously performed by the laity as well a.a the clergy: '(It) till at
[ • 378 ] length becoming tumultuous, the *emperors and other sovereigns of the
respective kingdoms of Europe took the appointment, in some degree,
into their own hands, by reserving to themselves the right of confirming these
elections, and of grantmg investiture of the temporalties, which now began
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(g) Page 1711.
(It) Per Clt:rum et populum. Palm. 25. 2 Holl. Hep. lO'l. M. Parle, A. D. 1006.

willful violation of these rules. McLain «. Matlock, 7 Ind. 525. If there should be a disrup-

tion of the society, the title to the corporate property will remain with that part of it which is

acting in harmony with its own law; seceders will be entitled to no part of it. UcGinuis r.

"Watson, 41 Pcnn. St. 9; M. E. Church of Cincinnati ». Wood, 5 Ohio, 283; Keyser ». Stanaifer,

6 Ohio, 363; Ferraria v. Vasconcelles. 23 111. 456. And this will be true, notwithstanding a

change in doctrine on the part of the controlling majority. Keyser ». Stansifer, 6 Ohio,

363. The courts of the state do not interfere with the control of these corporations, or with the

administration of church rules or discipline, unless civil rights become involved, and then only

for the protection of such rights. Hendrickson t>. Decow, Sax. Ch. 577; Baptist Church r.

"WithereU, 3 Paige, 301. But it is very common to provide by statute that the real estate of

such corporations shall only be sold by the trustees, alter obtaining a license from some designa-

ted court of record.

It is not necessary that churches should be incorporated in order to become the beneficiarios

of gifts to charitable uses; as to which see Hill on Trustees, 99 and note; Adams' Equity, 66

and note; Story Eq. Juris. $ 1137, et aeq.; Tiffany and Bullard on Trusts, 232.

(2) Benefit of clergy was abolished in England by statutes 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, and in Ire-

land by statute 9 Geo. IT, c. 54, and the learning on this subject has ceased to be of practical

importance. Besides what our commentator has on the subject in book 4, o. 38, the curious

reader will peruse with interest, Hale, P. C. c. 45; Barrington's Observations on the statutes;

Hobart's Kep. 288; State Trials, vol. 12, p. 631, note; vol. 13, p. 1015; vol. 20, p, 650, note.

(3) The law on this subject has recently been consolidated and amended by statutes 1 and 2

Vic. c. 106; 2 and 3 Vic. c. 49; and 3 and 4 Vic. c. 86. See Hale v. Hale, 4 Beav. 369; Hall r.

Franklin, 3 M. and W. 259; Lewis v. Bright, 4 El. and Bl. 917.
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Hoba.rt'11 Rep. 2&J; State Trialil, vol. l:.l, p. 631, note; vol. 13, p. 1015; vol. 20, p, 650, note.
.(3) The law on t.his ~ubject ha11 recently bc~n consolidated and amended by statutes 1 and :.!
Vic. c. 106; 2 and 3 Vic. c. 49; and 3 and 4 Vic. c. 86. See Hale v. Hale, 4 Beav. 369; Hall r.
fr&.nklin, 3M. and W. 259; Lewis v. Bright, 4 El. and BL 917.
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receive any secular profits. This right was acknowledged in the Emperor Char-

lemagne, A. D. 773, by Pope Hadrian I, and the council of Lateran, (i) and

universally exercised by other Christian princes: but the policy of the court of

Rome at the same time began by degrees to exclude the laity from any share in

these elections, and to confine them wholly to the clergy, which at length was

completely effected; the mere form of election appearing to the people to be a

thing of little consequence, while the crown was in possession of ail absolute

negative, which was almost equivalent to a direct right of nomination. Hence

the right of appointing to bishopricks is said to have been in the crown of Eng-

land (£) (as well as other kingdoms of Europe) even in the Saxon times; be-

cause the rights of confirmation and investiture were in effect, though not in

form, a right of complete donation. (I) But when, by length of time, the cus-

tom of making elections by the clergy only was fully established, the popes began

to except to the usual method of granting these investitures, which was per

annulum et baculum, by the prince's delivering to the prelate a ring, and pastoral

staff or crosier; pretending that this was an encroachment on the church's

authority, and an attempt by these symbols to confer a spiritual jurisdiction: and

Pope Gregory VII, towards the close of the eleventh century, published a bull

of excommunication against all princes who should dare to confer investitures,

and all prelates who should venture to receive them, (m) This was a bold step

towards effecting the plan then adopted by *the Roman see, of rendering r *„„(. -,

the clergy entirely independent of the civil authority: and long and L -I
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eager were the contests occasioned by this papal claim. But at length, when the

Emperor Henry V agreed to remove all suspicion of encroachment on the spirit-

ual character, by conferring investitures for the future per sceptrum and not per

annulum et baculum; and when the kings of England and France consented

also to alter the form in their kingdoms, and receive only homage from the

bishops for their temporalties, instead of investing them by the ring and cro-

sier ; the court of Rome found it prudent to suspend for a while its other

pretensions, (n)

This concession was obtained from King Henry the First in England, by

means of that obstinate and arrogant prelate, Archbishop Anselm: (o) hut King

John, about a century aftewards, in order to obtain the protection of the pope

against his discontented barons, was also prevailed upon to give up by a char-

ter, to all the monasteries and cathedrals in the kingdom, the free right of

electing their prelates, whether abbots or bishops: reserving only to the crown

the custody of the temporalties during the vacancy; the form of granting a

license to elect, (which is the original of our conge d'eslire,) on refusal whereof

the electors might proceed without it; and the right of approbation afterwards,

which was not to be denied without a reasonable and lawful cause, (p) This

grant was expressly recognized and confirmed in King John's magna carta (q)

and was again established by statute 25 Edw. Ill, st. 6, § 3.

But by statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 20, the ancient right of nomination was, in

effect, restored to the crown; (4) it being enacted, that at every future avoid-

ance of a bishoprick, the king may send the dean and chapter his usual license

to proceed to election; which is always to be accompanied with a letter missive

from the king, containing the name of the person whom he would have them

elect: and, if the dean and chapter delay their election above twelve days, the

(i) Decret. 1 dist. 83, c. 22. (t) Palm. 88.

(I) '' A ////a electio prtEkitorum (sunt verba- Inaulphi) erat mere tibera et canonica i fed omnes dignitatem tarn

fpixr.oporum, quam abbatum, per annulum et baculum regia curia pro aua comptoccntia conSerebat." Penef

clerico.i et moaacluiKj'nit electio, »ed electum a rtge pontulabunt. Selaen, Jan. Ana. L. 1, J 39.

(m) Decret. 2 cam. 16. qu. 7. c. 12 and 13. ' (n) Mod. Un. Hist. XXT. 363, xxix. IIS.

(0) M. Paris, A. D. 1107. (p) M. Paris, A. D. 12U. 1 Rym. Foed. 198. (q) Cap. 1, Edit. Oxon. 1769.

(4) [This statute was repealed by 1 Bdw. VI, c. 2, but revived by 1 and 2 P. and M. e. 8,

and 1 Eliz. c. 1. See 12 Rep. 7; Co. Litt. 134, a. n. 5; 26 and 27 Tic. c. 125.]

But the bishoprics of the new foundation, that is to say, Gloucester and Bristol, (now united)

Peterborough, Oxford, Chester, Hipun and Manchester, have been and still are donative.
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F*380l *nommati°n shall devolve to the king, who may by letters patent ap-

1 '" J point such person as he pleases. This election or nomination, if it be

of a bishop, must be signified by the king's letters patent to the archbishop of

the province; if it be of an archbishop, to the other archbishop and two bishops,

or to four bishops; requiring them to confirm, invest, and consecrate the person

so elected: which they are bound to perform immediately, without any applica-

tion to the see of Home. After which the bishop elect shall sue to the king for

his temporalties, shall make oath to the king and none other, and shall take

restitution of his secular possessions out of the king's hands only. And if such

dean and chapter do not elect in the manner by this act appointed, or if such

archbishop or bishop do refuse to confirm, invest, and consecrate such bishop

elect, they shall incur all the penalties of a prcemumre. (5)

An archbishop is the chief of the clergy in a whole province; (6) and has the

inspection of the bishops of that province, as well as of the inferior clergy, and

may deprive them on notorious cause, (r) The archbishop has also his own dio-

cese, wherein he exercises episcopal jurisdiction; as in his province he exercises

archiepiscopal. As archbishop he, upon receipt of the king's writ, calls the bish-

ops and clergy of his province to meet in convocation: but, without the king's

writ, he cannot assemble them, (s) To him all appeals are made from inferior

jurisdictions within his province; and, as an appeal lies from the bishops in

person to him in person, so it also lies from the consistory coxirts of each dio-

cese to his archiepiscopal court. During the vacancy of any see in his province,
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he is guardian of the spiritualities thereof, as the king is of the temporalties:

and he executes all ecclesiastical jurisdiction therein. If an archiepiscopal see

be vacant, the dean and chapter are the spiritual guardians, ever since the office

of prior of Canterbury was abolished at the reformation, (t) The archbishop is

entitled to present by lapse to all the ecclesiastical livings in the disposal of his

F *3811 '"diocesan bishops, if not filled within six months. And the archbishop

L J has a customary prerogative, when a bishop is consecrated by him, to

name a clerk or chaplain of his own to be provided for by such suffragan bishop ;

in lieu of which it is now usual for the bishop to make over by deed to the

archbishop, his executors and assigns, the next presentation of such dignity or

benefice in the bishop's disposal within that see, as the archbishop himself shall

choose; which is therefore called his option: (u) which options are only binding

on the bishop himself who grants them, and not on his successor. (7) The pre-

rogative itself seems to be derived from the legatine power formerly annexed by

the popes to the metropolitan of Canterbury, (to) And we may add, that the

papal claim itself (like most others of that encroaching see) was probably set up

in imitation of the imperial prerogative called prima or primaries preces ;

whereby the emperor exercises, and hath immemonally exercised, (z) a right of

naming to the first prebend that becomes vacant after his accession in every

church of the empire, (y) A right that was also exercised by the crown of Eng-

r) Lord Raym. 541. Is) 4 Inst. 322,323.

[«) 2 Roll. Vbr. 22. («) Cowell's Interp. tit. option. (w) Sherlock of Options, 1.

(x) Goldaet Conftit. Imper.tom. 3, page 406. (y) Dufresne V. 806. Mod. Univ. Hist. xxlz. 5.

[ • 38 ] *nomination shall devolve to the king, who may by letters patent apO point such person as he pleu.ses. '!'his election or nomination, if it be
of a bishop, must be signified by the king's letters patent to the archbishop of
the province; if it be of an archbishop, to the other archbishop and two bishops,
or to four bishops; requiring them to confirm, invest, and consecrate the person
so elected: which they are bound to perform immediately, without any application to the see of Rome. After which the bishop elect shall sue to the king for
his teinporalties, shall make oath to the king and none other, and shall take
restitution of his secular possessions out of the king's hands only. And if such
dean and chapter do not elect in the manner by this act appointed, or if such
archbishop or bishop do refuse to confirm, invest, and consecrate such bishop
elect, they shall incur all the penalties of a prremunire. (5)
An archbishop is the chief of theclergy in a whole pro,·ince; (6) and has the
inspection of the bishops of that province, as well as of the inferior clergy, and
may deprive them on notorious cause. (r) The archbishop has also his o"~n diocese, wherein he exercises episcopal jurisdiction; as in his province he exercises
archiepiscopal. As archbishop he, upon receipt of the king's writ, calls the bishops and clergy of his province to meet in convocation: but, without the king's
writ, he cannot assemble them. (s) To him all appeals are made from inferior
jurisdictions within his province; and, as an appeal lies from the bishops in
person to him in person, so it also lies from the consistory courts of each diocese to his archiepiscopal court. During the vacancy of any see in his province,
he is guardian of the spiritualities thereof, as the king is of the tempornlties;
and he executes all ecclesiastical jurisdiction therein. If an archiepiscopal see
be vacant, the dean and chapter are the spiritual guardians, ever since the office
of :prior of C1mterbury was abolished at the reformation. (t) The archbishop is
entitled to l?resent by lapse to all the ecclesiastical livings in the disposal of his
[ • 381 ] *d10cesan bishops, if not filled within six months. And the archbishop
has a customary prerogative, when a bishop is consecrated by him, to
name a clerk or chaplain of his own to be proYided for by such suffragan bishop:
in lieu of which it is now usual for the bishop to make over by deed to t I: c'
archbishop, his executors and assigns, the next presentation of such dignity or
benefice in the bishop's disposal within that see, as the archbishop himself shall
choose; which is therefore called his option: (u) which options a.re only binding
on the bishop himself who grants them, and not on bis successor. (7) The prerogative itself seems to be derived from the legatine power formerly annexed by
the popes to the metropolitan of Canterbury. (w) And we may add, that the
papal claim itself (like most others of that encroaching see) was probably set up
m imitation of the imperial prerogative called .frinuB or primari<B preces;
whereby the emperor exercises, and hath immemonally exercised, (x) a nght of
naming to the first prebend that becomes vacant after bis accession in every
church of the empire. (y) A right that was also exercised by the croirn of Eng-

(5) [In Reg.v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 11 Q. B. 483, the question whether, under the

above statute, it is imperative on the metropolitan to confirm the bishop designate without

taking notice of objections put forward thereto, was discussed on an application for a mandamus,

,., Lord Raym. Ml.
2 Roll . .\.br. 22.
(z) Goldast ConatU.

(t)

l•l 4 Inst. 822,m.
(u) Cowell's Interp. tit. optWn.
(tll) Sherlock or Options, 1.
knn. S, page '°6.
(I/) Dufresne V. 806. Mod. Univ. Hlat. xm. G.

Im~

but the court being equally divided, no order was made.]

(6) [The archbishop of Canterbury hath the precedency of all the clergy; next to him the

archbishop of York; next to him the bishop of London ; next to him the bishop of Durham;

next to him the bishop of Winchester; and then all the other bishops of both provinces after the

seniority of their consecration; but if any of them be a privy councillor he takes place after

the bishop of Durham. Stat. 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10; Co. Litt. 94.]

(7) [Options seem however to have been abolished, perhaps undesignedly, by statutes 3 and

4 Vic. c. 113, B. 42, which enacts that " it shall not be lawful for any spiritual person to sell or

assign any patronage or presentation belonging to him by virtue of any dignity or spiritual

office held by him, and that every such sale or assignment shall be null and void to all intents

and purpose."]

242

(5) [In Reg. v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 11 Q. B. 483, the question whether, under the
above statute, it is imperative on the m11tropolitan to oonfirm the bishop designate without

taking notice of objections put forward thereto, WBll discuesed on an application for a mandamus,
but tlie court being equally divided, no order was made.)
(6) [The archbishop of Canterbury hath the precedency of all the clergy; next to him the
archbisho,P of York; next t-0 him the biRhop of London ; next to him the bishop of Durham;
next to him the bishop of Winchester; and then all the other bishops of both prnvmces after the
senio!1ty of their consecration; but if any of them be 8: privy councillor he takes place after
the bishop of Durham. Stat. 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10; Co. Litt. 94.)
(7) [Options seem however to have been abolished, perhaps undesignedly, by statutes 3 and
4 Vic. c. 113, s. 42, which enacts that " it shall not be lawful for any spiritual i;iel'80n to :iell or
e.si,;ign any patronage or presentation belonging to him by virtue of any digmty or SJ?iritual
office held by him, e.nd that every such sale or !loBSignment shall be n-q].1 anq V9t!l W W-1 Jntenta
and purpose.")
~4~
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land in the reign of Edward I; (2) and which probably gave rise to the royal

corodies which were mentioned in a former chapter.(a) It is likewise the privi-

lege, by custom, of the archbishop of Canterbury, to crown the kings and queens

of this kingdom. And he hath also, by the statute 2o Hen. VIII, c. 21, the power

of granting dispensations in any case, not contrary to the holy scriptures and

the law of God, where the pope used formerly to grant them: which is the

foundation of his granting special licenses, to marry at any place or time, to hold

two livings,(8) and the like; and on this also is founded the right he exercises

of conferring dcgrees,(9) in prejudice of the two universities.(i)

"The power and authority of a bishop, besides the administration of r *ogo n

certain holy ordinances peculiar to that sacred order, consist principally L ° " '

in inspecting the manners of the people and clergy, and punishing them in order

to reformation, by ecclesiastical censures.(10) To this purpose he has several

courts under him, and may visit at pleasure every part of his diocese. His

chancellor is appointed to hold his courts for him, and to assist him in matters

of ecclesiastical law; (11) who, as well as all other ecclesiastical officers, if lay or

married, must be a doctor of the civil law, so created in some university.(c) It

is also the business of a bishop to institute, and to direct induction, to all eccle-

siastical livings in his diocese.

Archbishopricks and bishopricks may become void by death, deprivation for

any very gross and notorious crime, and also by resignation. All resignations

must be made to some superior.(d) Therefore a bishop must resign to his
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metropolitan ; but the archbishop can resign to none but the king himself.

II. A dean and chapter are the council of the bishop, to assist him with their

advice in affairs of religion, and also in the temporal concerns of his see.(e)

When the rest of the clergy were settled in the several parishes of each diocese,

as hath formerly (/) been mentioned, these were reserved for the celebration of

divine service in the bishop's own cathedral; and the chief of them, who pre-

sided over the rest, obtained the name of decamts or dean, being probably at

first appointed to superintend ten canons or prebendaries.

All ancient deans are elected by the chapter, by conge d' eslire from the king,

and letters missive of recommendation ; in the same manner as bishops: (12)

but in those chapters, that were founded by Henry VIII out of the spoils of the

dissolved monasteries,the deanery is donative,and the installation*merely r *ogo -i

by the king's letters patent.(g) The chapter, consisting of canons or I- •"

prebendaries, are sometimes appointed by the king, sometimes by the bishop,

and sometimes elected by each other.

The dean and chapter are, as was before observed, the nominal electors of a

bishop. The bishop is their ordinary and immediate superior; and has, gen-

erally speaking, the power of visiting them, and correcting their excesses and

enormities. They had also a check on the bishop at common law; for till the

(*) !:>,<•. [jV., salutem. Scrttatis Episcopo Karl quod—Roberto de Icard pcnsionem tuam, guam ad preces

reqis pratdtcto Roberto concessit. de catero lolrat; et de proximo ecclesia vacatura de coUaiione prirdicti

epmcopi, quam ipse Robertut acceptamrit. respiciat. Breo. 11 Edw. I. 8 Pryn. 1204. (o) Ch. Till, page 284

((•) See the biabop of Chester's case. Oxon, 1721. (c) Stnt. 37. Hen. Vin, c. 17.

(d) Gibs. Cod. 822. (e) 3 Rep. 75. Co. Lit. 103, 300. (/) Pago 113,114. (g) Gibs. Cod. 178.

(8) [Now regulated by statute 1 and 2 Vio. c. 106, ss. &-7.]

(9) [But although the archbishop can confer all the degrees which are taken in the nniver-

nities, yet the graduates of the two universities, by various acts of parliament and other regu-

lations, are entitled to many privileges which are not extended to what is called a Lambeth

degree ; as, for instance, those degrees which are a qualification for a dispensation to hold two

livings are confined by 21 Hen. Till, c. 13, s. 23, to the two universities.]

(10) For proceedings by the bishop in the case of clergymen charged with offiences against

the laws ecclesiastical, or concerning whom there may exist scandal or evil report, see 3 and 4

Tic. c. 86.

(11) [Besides his chancellor, the bishop has his archdeacon, dean and chapter, and vicar

general to assist him. Every bishop may retain four chaplains. 21 Hen. Till, c. 13, s. 16; 8

Eliz. c. 1.]

(12) [The ancient deaneries are now, however, by statutes 3 and 4 Tic. c. 113, s. 24, in the

direct patronage of the queen, who appoints thereto by letters patent.]
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statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28, his grant or lease would not have bound his succes-

sors, unless confirmed by the dean and chapter.(h)

Deaneries and prebends may become void, like a bishoprick, by death, by

deprivation, or by resignation to either the king or the bishop.(j) Also I may

here mention, once for all, that if a dean, prebendary, or other spiritual person

be made a bishop, all the preferments of which he was before possessed are void ;

and the king may present to them in right of his prerogative royal. But they

are not void by the election, 'but only by the consecration.(/)

III. An archdeacon hath an ecclesfastical jurisdiction, immediately subor-

dinate to the bishop, throughout the whole of his diocese, or in some particular

part of it. (13) He is usually appointed by the bishop himself; and hath a.

kind of episcopal authority, originally derived from the bishop, but now inde-

pendent and distinct from his.(&) He therefore visits the clergy; and has his

separate court for punishment of offenders by spiritual censures, and for hearing

all other causes of ecclesiastical cognizance.

IV. The rural deans are very ancient officers of the church,(I) hut almost

grown out of use ; though their deaneries still subsist as an ecclesiastical divis-

ion of the diocese, or archdeaconry- They seem to have been deputies of the

F *3841 *bishop, planted all round his diocese, the better to inspect the conduct

*• ' -1 of the parochial clergy, to inquire into and report dilapidations, and to

examine the candidates for confirmation ; and armed, in minuter matters, with

an inferior degree of judicial and coercive authority.(wi) (14)
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V. The next, and indeed the most numerous, order 01 men in the system of

ecclesastical polity, are the parsons and vicars of churches: in treating of whom

I shall first mark out the distinction between them; shall next observe the

method by which one may become a parson or vicar; shall then briefly touc! i

upon their rights and duties; and shall, lastly, shew how one may cease to lw

either.

A parson, persona eeclesia, is one that hath full possession of all the rights of

a parochial church. He is called parson, persotia, because by his person the

church, which is an invisible body, is represented ; and he is in himself a body

corporate, in order to protect and defend the rights of the church, which he per-

sonates, by a perpetual succession.(w) He is sometimes called the rector, or

governor, of the church : but the appellation of parson, however it may bo

depreciated by familiar, clownish, and indiscriminate use, is the most legal, most

beneficial, and most honorable title that a parish priest can enjoy ; because-

such a one, Sir Edward Coke observes, and he only is said vicem sen personam

ecclesicB gerere. A parson has, during his life, the freehold in himself of the par-

sonage house, the glebe, the tithes, and other dues. But these are sometimes

appropriated ; that is to say, the benefice is perpetually annexed to some spirit-

ual corporation, either sole or aggregate, being the patron of the living ; which

the law esteems equally capable of providing for the service of the church, as

any single private clergyman. This contrivance seems to have sprung from th?

policy of the monastic orders, who have never been deficient in subtle inven-

tions for the increase of their own power and emoluments. At the first estab-

lishment of parochial clergy, the tithes of the parish were distributed in a

(A) Co. Lit. 103. (i) Plowd. 488.

fi) Bro. Abr. t. presentation, 3. 61. Cro. EUz. 542, 790. » Boll. Abr. 382. 4 Mod. 200. Salk. 137.

i/.-) 1 Bum. Eccl. Law, 68, 69. (I) Kennet, Par. AnUq. 838. (m) Gibs. Cod. 972, I960,

(n) Co. I.itt. 300.

(13) II an archdeaconry be in the gift of a layman, the patron presents to the bishop, who

institutes in like manner as to another benefice, and then the dean and chapter induct him;

that is, after some ceremonies, place him in a stall in the cathedral church to which he belongs,

statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28, his grant or lease would not have bound his succe~
sors, unless confirmed by the <lean and chapter.(11)
Deaneries and prebends may become void, like a bishoprick, by death, hy
deprivation, or by resignation to either the king or the bishop.(i) Also I may
here mention, once for all, that if a dean, prebendary, or other spiritual person
be made a bishop, all the preferments of' which he was before possessed are \"oid ;
and the king may present to them in right of his prerogative royal. But they
arc not void by the election, ·but only bv the consecration.(j)
III. An archdeacon hath an ecclesiastical jurisdiction, immediat.ely snbordimite to the bishop, througbont the whole of his diocese, or in some particular
part of it. (13) He is usually appointed by the bishop himself; and hath a
kind of' episcopal authority, originally derived from the bishop, but now independent and distinct from his.(k) He therefore visits the clergy ; and has his
separate court for punishment of' offenders by spiritual censures, and for he.aring
all other csuat>s of ecclesiastical cognizance.
IV. The rural deans a.re very ancient officers of the church,(/) but almost
srown out of use; though their deaneries still subsist as an ecclesiastical di'"is1on of the diocese, or archdeaconry. They seem to have been deputies of the
[ • 384 ] *bishop, planted all round his diocese, the better to inspect the conduct
of the parochial clergy, to inquire into and revort dilapidations, and to
examine the candidates for confirmation; and armed, m minuter matt.era, with
an inferior degree of judicial and coercive authority.(m) (14)
V. The next, and mdeed the most numerous, order of men in the system of
ecclesasticsl polity, are the parsons and vicars of churches: in treating of whom
I shall first mark out the distinction between them ; shall next observe the
method by which one may become a parson or vicar; shall then briefly tonc~i
upon their rights and duties; and shall, laatly, shew how one may cease to he
either.
A parson, persona ecclesiOJ, is one that hath full possession of all the rights of
e. parochial church. He is called parson, persona, because by his person the
church, which is an invisible body, is represented; and he is in himself a bod v
corporate, in order to protect and defend the rights of the church, which he pe17sonat.es, by a perpetual succession.( n) He is sometimes called the rector, or
governor, of the church : but the appellation of parson, however it may be
depreciat.ed by familiar, clownish, and indiscriminat.e use, is the most legal, most
beneficial, and most honorable title that a parish priest can enjoy ; becau.;c
such a one, Sir Edward Coke observes, and he only lS said vicem seu persouam
ecclesiOJ gerere. A parson has, during his life, the freehold in himself of the parsonage house, the glebe, the tithes, and other dues. But these are sometimes
appropriated; that is to say, the benefice is perpetually annexed to some spiritual corporation, either sole or aggregate, being the patron of the living; which
the law est.cems equally capable of providing for the service of the cnurch, as
anv single private clergyman. This contrivance seems to have sprung from ibe
policy of the monastic orders, who have never been deficient in subtle inventions for the increase of their own power and emoluments. At the first establishment of parochial clergy, the tithes of the parish were distributed in a
(11)
(j)

Co. Lit. 103.

11') Plowd. 498.

Bro. .Abr. t. pruentatlon, 3, 61. Cro. Ell:i. M2, 790. t RolL Abr. 852. 4 Hod. l!OO. Salk. 18'7.
<l:J l Bum. Eccr. Law, 68, 69.
(l) Kennet, Par. Antiq. e38.
(wt) Glbs. Cod. ll7i, IMO.
(n) Co. Litt. 300.

whereby he is said to have a place in the choir. "Wats. o. 15.

An archdeacon is a ministerial officer, and cannot refuse to swear a churchwarden elected

by the parish. Lord Ray. 138.]

'(14) [But this office, decanus ruralis, is wholly extinguished, if it ever had separate exist-

ence ; and now the archdeacon, and chancellor of the diocese, execute the authority formerly

attached to it.]
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(13) If an archdeaconry be in the gift of a layman, the patron presents to the bishop, who
im;titutes in like manner ae to another benefice, and then the dean anli chapter induct him ;
that iR, after some ceremonies, place him in a stall in the cathedral church to which he belongs,
whereby he is i'&id to have a place in the choir. Wat.I!. o. 15.
.An archdeacon iR a ministerial officer, and cannot refuse to ewear a churchwarden elected
b.r the parish. Lord Ray. 138.)
(14) [But this office, decanua rural'8, is wholly extinguished, if it ever had separat.e exii;tence ; and now the arcbdeaoon, and ehancel!.or of the diocese, exeoute the autbority fmmerlr
attached to it.]
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fourfold division: one, for the use of the bishop; another, for maintaining

*the fabric of the church ; a third, for the poor ; and the fourth, to pro- r #g,,g -i

l> '

vide for the incumbent When the sees of the bishops became other-

wise amply endowed, they were prohibited from demanding their usual share of

these tithes, and the division was into three parts only. And hence it was in-

ferred by the monasteries, that a small part was sufficient for the officiating priest ;

and that the remainder might well be applied to the use of their own fraterni-

ties, (the endowment of which was construed to be a work of the most exalted

piety,) subject to the burthen of repairing the church and providing for its con-

stant supply. And therefore they begged and bought, for masses and obits, and

sometimes even for money, all the advowsons within their reach, and then appro-

priated the benefices to the use of their own corporation. But, in order to

complete such appropriation effectually the king's license, and consent of the

bishop, must first be obtained : because both the King and the bishop may some

time or other have an interest, by lapse, in the presentation to the benefice ;

which can never happen if it be appropriated to the use of a corporation, which

never dies : and also because the law reposes a confidence in them, that they

will not consent to any thing that shall be to the prejudice of the church. The

consent of the patron also is necessarily implied, because, as was before observed,

the appropriation can be originally made to none, but to such spiritual corpo-

ration as is also the patron of tjie church ; the whole being indeed nothing else,
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but an allowance for the patrons to retain the tithes and glebe in their own

hands, without presenting any clerk, they themselves undertaking to provide

for the service of the church, (o) When the appropriation is thus made, the

appropriators and their successors are perpetual parsons of the church ; and

must sue and be sued, in all matters concerning the rights of the church, by the

name of parsons.(»)

This appropriation may be severed, and the church become disappropriate,

two ways : as, first, if the patron or appropriates presents a clerk, who is insti-

tuted and inducted *to the parsonage ; for the incumbent so instituted r *ggg -,

and inducted is to all intents and purposes complete parson ; and the "- 0< ' •'

appropriation, being once severed, can never be re-united again, unless by a

repetition of the same solemnities, (q) And, when the clerk, so presented, is

distinct from the vicar, the rectory thus vested in him becomes what is called a

sinecure ; because he hath no cure of souls, having a vicar under him to whom

that cure is committed, (r) Also, if the corporation which has the appropria-

tion is dissolved, the parsonage becomes disappropriate at common law ; because

the perpetuity of person is gone, which is necessary to support the appropriation.

In this manner, and subject to these conditions, may appropriations be made

at this day : and thus were most, if not all, of the appropriations at present

existing originally made; being annexed to bishopricks, prebends, religous

houses, nay even to nunneries, and certain military orders, all of which were

spiritual corporations. At the dissolution of monasteries by statutes 27 Hen.

VIII, c. 28, and 31 Hen. VIII, c. 13, the appropriations of the several parson-

ages, which belonged to those respective religious houses, (amounting to more

than one third of all the parishes in England) (s) would have been by the rules

of the common law disappropriated, had not a clause in those statutes inter-

vened, to give them to the king in as ample a manner as the abbots, &c., formerly

held the same, at the time of their dissolution. This, though perhaps scarcely

defensible, was not without example ; for the same was done in former reigns,

when the alien priories, that is, such as were filled by foreigners only, were dis-

solved and given to the crown, (t) And from these two roots have sprung all the

lay appropriations or secular parsonages, which we now see in the kingdom ;

they having been afterwards granted out from time to time by the crown. («)

(o) Plowd, 490-500. ( p) Hob. 307. (?) Co. Litt. 46.

(r) Sinecures might also be created by other means. 2 Bnrn's Eccl. Law, 3*7.

(«) Selil. Review of Tith. f. 9 ; Spelm. Apology. -16. (t) 1 Inst. 684.

fourfold division: one, for the use of the bishop; another, for maintaining
*the fabric of the church; a third, for the poor; and the fourth, to pro- [ *385 ]
vide for the incumbent. When the sees of the bishops became otherwise amply endowed, they were prohibited from demanding their usual share of
these tithes, and the division was into three parts only. And hence it was inferred by the monasteries, that a small part was sufficient for the officiating priest ;
and that the remainder might well be applied to the use of their own fraternities, (the endowml'nt of which was construed to be a work of the most exalted
piety,) subject to the burthen of repairing the church and providing for its constant supply. And therefore they begged and bought, for masses and obits, and
sometimes e\en for money, all the advowsons within their reach, and then appropriated the benefices to the use of their own corporation. But, in order to
complete such appropriation effectually the king's license, and consent of the
bishop, must first be obtained: because both the king and the bishop may some
time or other have an int€rest, by lapse, in the presentation to the benefice;
which can never happen if it be appropriated to the use of a corporation, which
never dies : and also because the law reposes a. confidence in them, that they
will not consent to any thing that shall be t.o the prejudice of the church. The
consent of the patron also is necessarily implied, because, as was before observed,
the appropriation can be originally made to none, but to such spiritual corporation as is also the patron of tJie church ; the whole being indeed nothing else,
but an allowance for the patrons to retain the tithes and glebe in their own
hands, without presenting any clerk, they themselves undertaking to provide
for the service of the church. (o) When the apyropriation is thus made, the
appropriators and their successors are perpetua parsons of the church ; and
must sue and be sued, in all matters concerning the rights of the church, by the
name of parsons.( v)
This appropriation may be severed, and the church become disappropriate,
two ways: as, first, if the patron or appropriator presents a clerk, who is instituted and inducted •to the parsonage; for the incumbent so instituted [ • 386 ]
and inducted is to all intents and !.urposes complete parson ; and the
appropriation, being once severe , can never be re-united again, unless by a
repetition of the same solemnities. (q) And, when the clerk, so presented, is
distinct from the vicar, the rectory tlius vested in him becomes what is called a
sinecure; because he hath no cure of souls, having a vicar under him to whom
that cure is committed. (r) Also, if the corporat10n which has the appropriation is dissolved, the parsonage becomes disappropriate at common law; because
the perpetuity of person is gone, which is necessary to support the appropriation.
In this manner, and subject to these conditions, may appropriations be made
at this day: and thus were most, if not all, of the appropnations at present
existing originally made; being annexed to bishopricks, prebends, religous
houses, nay even to nunneries, and certain military orders, all of which were
spiritual corporations. At the dissolution of monasteries by statutes 27 Hen.
VIII, c. 28, and 31 Hen. VIII, c. 13, the appropriations of the several parsonages, which belonged to those respective religious houses, (amounting to more
than one third of all the parishes in England) (s) would have been by the rules
of the common law disappropriated, had not a clause in those statutes intervened, to give them to the king in as ample a manner as the abbots, &c., formerly
held the same, at the time of their dissolution. This, though perhaps scarcely
defensible, was not without example; for the same was done in former reigns,
when the alien priories, that is, such as were filled by foreigners only, were dissolved and given to the crown. (t) And from these two roots have sprung all the
lay appropriations or secular parsonages, which we now see in the kingdom;
they having been afterwards granted out from time to time by the crown. (u)

(u) Sir H. Spelman (of tithes, c. 29,) says, these are now called impropriations, as being improperly In

the lands of laymen.
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(o) Plowd, -iOO-.'iOO.
( p) Hob. 007.
(q) Co. Litt. 46.
(r) Slner.nres might nlR<> be created by other means. 2 Bum's Eccl. Law, 3'7.
l•l Sehl. Rm·lew ofTlth. c. 9; Spelm. .ApoiOltY. :!6.
(C) 2 Inst. ~Sir H. Spelnmn (of tithes. c. 29,) says, Uleee are now called improprlatlons,
the anrl1 oflaymcn.
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f *387 1 *These appropriating corporations, or religious houses, were wont to

' ' J depute one of their own body to perform divine service, and administer

the sacraments, in those parishes of which the society was thus the parson.

This officiating minister was in reality no more than a curate, deputy, or vice-

gerent of the apprppriator, and therefore called vicarius, or vicar. His stipend

was at the discretion of the appropriator, who was however bound of common

right to find somebody, qui illi de temporalibus, episcopo de spiritualibus, debeat

respondere. (w) But this was done in so scandalous a manner, and the parishes

suffered so much by the neglect of the appropriators, that the legislature was

forced to interpose: and accordingly it is enacted by statute 15 Ric. II, c. 6, that

in all appropriations of churches, the diocesan bishop shall ordain, in propor-

tion to the value of the church, a competent sum to be distributed among

the poor parishioners anually: and that the vicarage shall be sufficiently

endowed. It seems the parishes were frequently sufferers, not only by the want

of divine service, but also by withholding those alms, for which, among other

purposes, the payment of tithes was originally imposed: and therefore in this

act a pension is directed to be distributed among the poor parochians, as well

as a sufficient stipend to the vicar. But he, being liable to be removed at

the pleasure of the appropriator, was not likely to insist too rigidly on the

legal sufficiency of the stipend: and therefore, by statute, 4 Hen. IV, c. 12,

it is ordained, that the vicar shall be a secular person, not a member of any

religious house; that he shall be vicar perpetual, not removable at the caprice
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of the monastery ; and that he shall be canonically instituted and inducted,

and be sufficiently endowed, at the discretion of the ordinary, for these three

express purposes; to do divine service, to inform the people, and to keep

hospitality. The endowments in consequence of these statutes have usually

been by a portion of the glebe, or laud, belonging to the parsonage, and a par-

ticular share of the tithes, which the appropriators found it most troublesome to

[ *'388 I co^ec^» an(l which are therefore generally called privy or small tithes;

'• "' J the greater, or predial, tithes being still reserved to their own use. But

one and the same rule was not observed in the endowment of all vicarages.

Hence some are more liberally, and some more scantily, endowed; and hence the

tithes of many things, as wood in particular, are in some parishes rectorial, and

in some vicarial tithes.

The distinction therefore of a parson and vicar is this: the parson has for

the most part the whole right to all the ecclesiastical dues in his parish: but a

vicar has generally an appropriator over him, entitled to the best part of the

profits, to whom he is in 'effect perpetual curate, with a standing salary. (15)

Though in some places the vicarage nas been considerably augmented by a large

share of the great tithes; which augmentations were greatly assisted by the

statute 29 Car. II, c. 8, enacted in favour of poor vicars and curates, which ren-

dered such temporary augmentations, when made by the appropriators, per-

petual. (16)

The method of becoming a parson or vicar is much the same. To both there

are four requisites necessary; holy orders, presentation, institution, and induc-

tion. The method of conferring the holy orders of deacon and priest, according

to the liturgy and canons, (x) is foreign to the purpose of these Commentaries;

any farther than as they are necessary requisites to make a complete parson or

vicar. By common law, a deacon of any age might be instituted and inducted

to a parsonage or vicarage; but it was ordained by statute 13 Eliz. c. 12, that no

(m) Seld. Tith. o. 11, 1. (*) See 2 Burn.Eccl. Law, 103.

(15) The law upon the mibject of this and the preceding paragraph has been greatly changed

by a series of statutes which are collected in Cripp's Law of Church and Clergy, It It ed. v»l.

3, c. 1.

*These appropriating corporations, or religious houses, were wont to
depute one of their own body to ~rform divine service, and administer
the sacraments, in those parishes of which the society was thus the parson.
This officiating minister was in reality no more than a curate, deputy, or vicegerent of the appropriator, and therefore called ·uicarius, or vicar. His stipend
was at the discretion of the appropriator, who W88 however bound of common
right to find somebody, <(Ui illi de te-mporalibus, episcopo de spiritualibm, ~
respondere. (w) But this was done in so scandalous a manner, and the parishes
suffered so much by the neglect of the appropriators, that the legislature wa.s
forced to interpose: and accordingly it is enacted by statute 15 Ric. II, c. 6, that
in all appropriations of churches, the diocesan bishop shall ordain, in proportion to the value of the church, a. competent sum to be distributed among
the poor parishioners anus.Uy : and that the vicarage shall be sufficiently
endowed. It seems the parishes were frequently sufferers, not only by the want
of divine service, but also by withholdin~ those alms, for which, among other
purposes, the payment of tithes was origmally imposed: and therefore in this
act a pension is directed to be distributed among the poor pa.rochia.ns, as well
as a sufficient stipend to the vicar. But he, being liable to be removed a.t
the plea.sure of the appropriator, was not likely to insist too rigidly on the
legal sufficiency of the stipend: and therefore, by statute, 4 Hen. IV, c. 12,
it is ordained, that the vicar shall be a secular person, not a member of any
religious house; that he shall be vicar perpetual, not removable at the caprice
of the monastery ; and that he shall be canonically instituted and inducted,
and be sufficiently endowed, at the discretion of the ordinary, for these three
express purposes; to do divine service, to inform the people, and to keep
hospitality. 'l'he endowments in consequence of these statutes have usually
been by a portion of the glebe, or land, belonging to the parsonage, and a particular share of the tithes, which the appropriators found it most troublesome to
[ ... 88 ] collect, and which are *therefore generally called privy or small tithes;
·)
the greater, or predia.l, tithes being still reserved to their own use. But
one and the same rule was not observed in the endowment of all vicarages.
Hence some a.re more liberally, and some more scantily, endowed; and hence the
tithes of many things, as wood in particular, are in some parishes rectorial, and
in some vicaria.l tithes.
The distinction therefore of a parson and Yi car is this : the parson has for
the most part the whole right to all the ecclesiastical dues in his parish: but a
vicar has generally an appropriator over him, entitled to the best pa.rt of the
profits, to whom he is in .effect perpetual curate, with a standing salary. (15)
Though in some places the vicarage has been considerably augmented by a large
share of the great tithes; which augmentations were greatly assisted by the
statute 29 Car. II, c. 8, enacted in favour of poor vicars and curates, which rendered such temporary augmentations, when made by the appropriators, perpetual. (16)
The method of becoming a. parson or vicar is much the same. To both there
a.re four requisites necessary; holy orders, presentation, institution, and induction. The method of conferring the holy orders of deacon and priest, according
to the liturgy and canons, (x) is foreign to the purpose of these Commentaries;
any farther than as they are necessary requisites to make a. complete parson or
vicar. By common law, a deacon of any as-e might be instituted and inducted
to a parsonage or vicarage; but it was ordamed by statute 13 Eliz. c. 12, that no
[ • 387 ]

(1r) Sehl.
·· - - --- -·-----

(16) A radical change in the law of tithes was introduced by statutes 6 and 7 "William IT, c.

adjusted to the average price f corn. Tbe commutation, if not made voluntarily, might be

compulsory, under the direction of (it/ e commissioner*.
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Tith. o. 11, J.

(z) See 2 Bum.Eccl.

L&,,..,

108.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -

71, the purpose of which was to commute this Vexatious and irritating burden into a rent charge,

(15) The law upon the 1mbject of this aml the preceding paragraph has been greatly change.d
by a series of statutes which are oollect.ed in Cripp'e Law of Church and Clergy, 4th ed. vol.
3' c16~·A radical change in the law of tithes was introduced by RtatnteR 6 and 7 William IV, c.
71, the pnrpo!!c of which wM to commute this \"eimtiom~ and irritating burden into a rent char~,
adjusted to the avcragn pri,~c .f t"lffll. The comlllutation> if not made voluntarily, might l>e
compitlsorv, under the direction 11" Ii:.' e commisMione~.
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person under twenty-three years of age, and in deacon's orders, should be pre-

sented to any benefice with cure; and if he were not ordained priest within one

year after his induction, he should be ipso facto deprived ; and now, by statute

13 and 14 Car. II, c. 4, no person is capable to be admitted to any benefice, unless

he hath been first ordained a priest; (17) and then he is, in the language of the

law, a clerk in orders. But if he obtains orders, or a license *to preach, i- *ogg -i

bv money or corrupt practices, (which seems to be the true, though not L '" ' '

the common, notion of simony,) the person giving such orders forfeits (y) 402.

and the person receiving 102., and is incapable of any ecclesiastical preferment

for seven years afterwards.

Any clerk may be presented (z) to a parsonage or vicarage; that is, the patron

to whom the advowson of the church belongs, may offer his clerk to the bishop

of the diocese, to be instituted. Of advowsons, or the right of presentation, be-

ing a species of private property, we shall find a more convenient place to treat

in the second part of these Commentaries. But when a clerk is presented, the

bishop may refuse him upon many accounts. As, 1. If the patron is excom-

municated, and remains in contempt forty days, (a) Or, 2. If the clerk be unfit:

(b) which unfitness is of several kinds. First, with regard to his person ; as if

he be a bastard, an outlaw, an excommunicate, an alien, under age, or the like, (e)

Next, with regard to his faith or morals; as for any particular heresy, or vice

that is malum in se ; but if the bishop alleges only in generals, as that he is

schismaticus inveteratus, or objects a fault that is malum prohibitum merely, as
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haunting taverns, playing at unlawful games, or the like; it is not good cause

of refusal, (d) Or, lastly, the clerk may be unfit to discharge the pastoral office

for want of learning. In any of which cases the bishop may refuse the clerk.

In case the refusal is for heresy, schism, inability of learning, or other matter of

ecclesiastical cognizance, there the bishop must give notice to the patron of such

his cause of refusal, who, being usually a layman, is not supposed to have knowl-

edge of it, else he cannot present by lapse; but, if the cause be temporal, there

he is not bound to give notice, (e)

*If an action at law be brought by the patron against the bishop for r *QQQ -i

refusing his clerk, the bishop must assign the cause. If the cause be of ^ J

a temporal nature, and the fact admitted, (as, for instance, outlawry,) the judges

of the king's courts must determine its validity, or, whether it be sufficient cause

of refusal; but, if the fact be denied, it must be determined by a jury. If the

cause be of a spiritual nature, (as heresy, particularly alleged,) the fact, if denied,

shall also be determined by a jury; and, if the fact be admitted or found, the

court, upon consultation and advice of learned divines, shall decide its sufficien-

cy, (f) If the cause be want of learning, the bishop need not specify in what

points the clerk is deficient, but only allege that he is deficient: (a) for the stat-

ute 9 Edw. II, st. 1, c. 13, is express, that the examination of the fitness of a

person presented to a benefice belongs to the ecclesiastical judge. But, because it

would be nugatory in this case to demand the reason of refusal from the ordi-

nary, if the patron were bound to abide by his determination, who has already

pronounced his clerk unfit: therefore, if the bishop returns the clerk to be

minus suffidens in literatura, the court shall write to the metropolitan to re-ex-

amine him, and certify his qualifications; which certificate of the archbishop is

final, (h)

If the bishop hath no objections, but admits the patron's presentation, the

clerk so admitted is next to be instituted by him, which is a kind of investiture

(y) Slat. 31 Eliz. c. 0.

(*) A layman may also bo presented ; but be mnst take priest's orders before his admission. 1 Burn 103.

(a) 2 Boll. Abr. 355. (6) Glanv. L. 13. c. 20.

(c) 2 Roll. Abr. 356. 2 Inst. 632 Stat. 3 Ric. I!. c. 3. 7 Ric. It, c. 12. (d) 5 Rep. 58.

}lerson under twenty-three years of age, and in deacon's orders, should be presented to any benefice with cure; and if he were not ordained priest within one
vear after his induction, he should be ipso facto deprived ; and now, by statute
i:3 and 14 Car. II, c. 4, no person is capable to be admitted to any benefice, unless
he hath been first ordained a priest; (17) and then he is, in the language of the
law, a clerk in orders. But if he obtains orders, or a license *to preach, [ • 389 ]
hy money or corrupt practices, (which seems to be the true, though not
the common, notion of simony,) the :person giving such orders forfeits (y) 4:0l.
and the person receiving lOl., and is mcapable of any ecclesiastical preferment
for seven years afterwards.
Any clerk may be presented (z) to a parsonage or vicarage; that is, the patron
to whom the advowson of the church belongs, may offer his clerk to the bishop
of the diocese to be instituted. Of advowsons, or the right of presentation, being a species of private property, we shall find a more convenient place to treat
in the second part of these Commentaries. But when a clerk is presented, the
bishop may refuse him upon many accounts. As, 1. If the patron is excommunicated, and remains in contempt forty days. (a) Or, 2. If the clerk be unfit:
(b) which unfitness is of several kinds. First, with regard to his person; as if
he be a bastard, an outlaw, an excommunicate, an alien, under age, or the like. (c)
Next, with regard to his faith or morals; as for any particular heresy, or vice
tlrnt is malum in se; but if the bishop alleges only in generals, as that he is
.sd1ismaticus 1'.nveteratus, or objects a fault that is malum prohiMtum merely, as
haunting taverns, playing at unlawful games, or the like; it is not good cause
of refusal. (d) Or, lastly, the clerk may be unfit to discharge the pastoral office
for want of learn in~. In any of which cases the bishop may refuse the clerk.
In case the refusal is for heresy, schism, inability of learning, or other matter of
ecclesiastical cognizance, there the bishop must give notice to the patron of such
his cause of refusal, who, being usually a. layman, is not supposed to have knowl~dge of it, else he cannot present by lapse; but, if the cause be temporal, there
he is not bound to give notice. (e)
*If an act.ion at law be brought by the patron against the bishop for [ • 390 ]
refusing his clerk, the bishop must assign the cause. If the cause be of
a temporal nature, and the fact admitted, (as, for instance, outlawry,) the judges
of the king's courts must determine its validity, or, whether it be sufficient cause
of refusal; but, if the fact be denied, it must be determined by a jury. If the
cause be of a spiritual nature, (as heresy, particularly alleged,) the fact, if denied,
shall also be det~rmined by a JUry; and, if the fact be admitted or found, the
court, upon consultation and advice of learned divines, shall decide its sufficiency. (.f) If the cause be want of lea.ming, the bishop need not specify in what
points the clerk is deficient, but only allege that he is deficient: (g) for the statute 9 Edw. II, st. 1, c. 13, is express, that the examination of the fitness of a
person presented to a benefice belongs to the ecclesiastical judge. But, because it
would be nugatory in this case to demand the reason of refusal from the ordinary, if the patron were bound to abide by his determination, who has already
pronounced his clerk unfit : therefore, if the bishop returns the clerk to be
minus sufficiens in literatura, the court shall write to the metropolitan to re-examine him, and certify his qualifications; which certificate of the archbishop is
final. (h)
If the bishop hath no objections, but admits the patron's presentation, the
clerk so admitted is next to be instituted by him, which is a kind of investiture

(e) 2 Inst. 632. (/) 2 Inst 632. (</) 5 Rep. 58. 3 Ler. 313. (ft) 2 Inst. 632.

(17) [By canon 34, no one shall be admitted to the order of a deacon till he be twenty-three

years old; and by that canon, and also by 13 Eliz. e. I2f rio" one can take the order of a pneat till

he bo full fonr and twenty yearn old. 3 Burn's EC. L. 27.]
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(!f) Stat. Sl Eliz. c. 6.

(z) A layman may also bo presented ; but he must take priest's onlera before his admil!slon. I Burn lOS.
(a) 2 Roll. Ahr. ~.
(b) Glanv. L. 13. o. 20.
(c) 2 Roll. Ahr. 356. 2 Inst. 63'J Stat. 3 Rio. Il, o. 3. 7 Ric. Il, o. 12.
(d) 11 Rep. 158.
(el 2 Inst. 632.
(f) 2 InsL 632.
(g) 6 Reµ. 158. 3 Lev. 313.
(la) 2 Inst. 632.

(17) [By canon 34, no one shall be admitted to the order of a deacon till he be twent;v-three
yc11m old ; and by that eanon, and nlso by 13 Eliz. o. 12r riei one can take tho order of a pne11t till
he he full four nnd twenty yl'11r11 old. 3 Burn'8 Ee. L. 27.]
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of the spiritual part of the benefice; for by institution the care of the souls of

the parish is committed to the charge of the clerk. When a vicar is instituted,

he, besides the usual forms, takes, if required by the bishop, an oath of perpetual

residence; (18) for the maxim of law is, that vicarius non habit vicarium: and

as the non-residence of the appropriators was the canse of the perpetual estab-

lishment of vicarages, the law judges it very improper for them to defeat the end

of their constitution, and by absence to create the very mischiefs which they

F *3911 were appointed *to remedy: especially as, if any profits are to arise

*• J from putting in a curate and living at a distance from the parish, the

appropriator, who is the real parson, has undoubtedly the elder title to them.

When the ordinary is also the patron, and confers the living, the presentation

and institution are one and the same act, and are called a collation to a benefice.

By institution or collation the church is full, so that there can be no fresh pre-

sentation till another vacancy, at least in the case of a common patron; but the

church is not full against the king till induction; nay, even if a clerk is insti-

tuted upon the king^s presentation, the crown may revoke it before induction,

and present another clerk, (i) Upon institution, also, the clerk may enter on

the parsonage-house and glebe, and take the tithes; but he cannot grant or let

them or bring an action for them, till induction.

Induction is performed by a mandate from the bishop to the archdeacon, who

usually issues out a precept to other clergymen to perform it for him. It is done

by giving the clerk corporal possession of the church, as by holding the ring of
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the door, tolling a bell, or the like; and is a form required by law, with intent

to give all the parishioners due notice, and sufficient certainty of their new min-

ister, to whom their tithes are to be paid. This therefore is the investiture of

the temporal part of the benefice, as institution is of the spiritual. And when a

clerk is thus presented, instituted, and inducted into a rectory, he is then, and

not before, in full and complete possession, and is called in law persona imper-

sonata, or parson imparsonee. {k)

The rights of a parson or vicar, in his tithes and ecclesiastical dues, fall more

properly under the second book of these Commentaries: and as to his duties,

they are principally of ecclesiastical cognizance; those only excepted which are

laid upon him by statute. And those are indeed so numerous, that it is imprac-

ticable to recite them here with any tolerable conciseness or accuracy. Some

f *S921 °^ them we mav remark, as they *arise in the progress of our inquiries;

' ' -I but for the rest I must refer myself to such authors as have compiled

treatises expressly upon this subject. (/) I shall only just mention the article of

residence, upon the supposition of which the law doth style every parochial

minister an incumbent. (19) By statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 13, persons wilfully

absenting themselves from their benefices, for one month together, or two

months, in the year, incur a penalty of 51. to the king, and 51. to any person that

will sue for the same, except chaplains to the king, or others therein men-

tioned, (m) during their attendance in the household of such as retain them: and

also except (n) all heads of houses, magistrates, and professors in the universities,

and all students under forty years of age residing there, bona fide, for study.

Legal residence is not only in the parish, but also in the parsonage house, if

there be one: for it hath been resolved, (o) that the statute intended residence,

(i) Co. Litt. S44. fkj Co. LItt. 300.

(I) These are very numerous : bnt there are few which can be relied on with certainty. Amonft these

are Bishop Gibson's Codex, Dr. Burn's Ecclesiastical Law. and the earlier editions of the Clergyman"! Law,

published under the name of Dr. Watson, bnt compiled by Mr. Place, a barrister.

fmj Stat. 25 Hen. VIII, c. 10. 33 Hen. VIII c. 28. (n) Stat. 28 Hen. VIII, c. IS. (o) 6 Rep. Jl.

(18) This oath is no longer required. See statutes 1 and 2 Tie. c. 106, s. 61. The oath to be

taken is prescribed by the " clerical nubscription act, 1865."

(19) Although an oath of residence is not now required, yet any spiritual person holding a

benefice, who absents himself therefrom for any period exceeding three months, forfeits

thereby a portion of the annual value, varying from one-third to three-fourths of the whole,

according to the time of absence. See statutes 1 and 2 Vic. c. 106, and 13 and 14 Vic. c. 98. In

particular cases the bishop may grant licenses for non-residence. See the statutes above cited

for the law as to pluralities.
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not only for serving the cure, and for hospitality; but also for maintaining the

house, that the successor also may keep nospitality there: and, if there be no

parsonage house, it hath been holden that the incumbent is bound to hire one,

in the same or some neigbouring parish, to answer the purposes of residence.

For the more effectual promotion of which important duty among the 'parochial

clergy, a provision is made by the statute 17 Geo. Ill, c. 53, for raising money

upon ecclesiastical benefices, to be paid off by annually decreasing instalments,

and to be expended in rebuilding or repanng the houses belonging to such

benefices.

We have seen that there is but one way whereby one may become a parson or

vicar: there are many ways by which one may cease to be so. 1. By death.

2. By cession, in taking another benefice. For, by statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 13,

if any one having a benefice of 81. per annum, or upwards (according to the

present valuation in the king's books) (p) accepts any other, the first shall be

adjudged void unless he obtains a dispensation which no one is entitled to have,

but the chaplains of the king and others therein mentioned, the brethren and

sons of lords and knights, and doctors and bachelors of divinity and law

admitted by the universities of this realm. And a vacancy thus made, for want

of a dispensation, is called cession, (20) 3. By consecration; for, as was men-

tioned before, when a clerk is promoted to a bishoprick, all his other *pre- r *ggg -i

ferments are void the instant that he is consecrated. But there is a ^ ''' '

method by the favour of the crown, of holding such livings in commendam.
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Commenda, or ecclesia commendata, is a living commended by the crown to the

care of a clerk, to hold till a proper pastor is provided for it. This may be tem-

porary for one, two, or three years; or perpetual: being a kind of dispensation

to avoid the vacancy of the living, and is called a commenda retinere. (21)

There is also a commenda recipere, which is to take a benefice de novo, in the

bishop's own gift, or the gift of some other patron consenting to the same; and

this is the same to him as institution and induction are to another clerk, (q)

4. By resignation. But this is of no avail, till accepted by the ordinary; into

whose hands the resignation must be made, (r) 5. By deprivation; either, first

by sentence declaratory in the ecclesiastical court, for fit and sufficient causes

allowed by the common law; such as attainder of treason or felony, (*) or con-

viction of other infamous crime in the king's courts; for heresy, infidelity, (t)

gross immorality, and the like; or, secondly, in pursuance of divers penal statutes,

which declare the benefice void, for some nonfeasance or neglect, or else some

malfeasance or crime: as, for simony; (u) for maintaining any doctrine in

derogation of the king's supremacy, or of the thirty-nine articles, or the book of

common-prayer; (v) for neglecting after institution to read the liturgy and

articles in the church, or make the declarations against popery, or take the abju-

ration oath; (w) for using any other form of prayer than the liturgy of the

church of England; (x) or for absenting himself sixty days in one year from a

benefice belonging to a popish patron, to which the clerk was presented by either

of the universities; (y) in all which, and similar cases, (z) the benefice is ipso

facto void, without any formal sentence of deprivation.

VI. A curate is the lowest degree in the church; being in the same state that

a vicar was formerly, an officiating temporary minister, instead of the proper

<p) Cro. Car. 466. (?) Hob. U4. (r) Cro. Jac. 198. '

(•) Over, 103. Jcnk. 210. It) Fltz. Ahr tit. Trial, 34, («) Stat 31 Eliz. c. 6. 12 Ann. c. 12.

(») Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 1 and 2. 13 Bliss, c. 12. (to) Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 12. 14 Car. II, c 4. 1 tieo. I, c. 6.

not only for serving the cure, and for hospitality; but also for maintaining the
house, that the successor also may keep hospitality there: and, if there be no
parsonage house, it hath been holden that the incumbent is bound to hire one,
m the same or some neigbouring parish, to answer the purposes of residence.
For the more effectual promotion of which important duty among the i.mrochial
clergy, a provision is made by the statute 17 Geo. III, c. 53, for ra.isiug money
upon ecclesiastical benefices, to be pa.id off by annually decreasing instalments,
and to be expended in rebuilding or reparmg the houses belonging to such
benefices.
We have seen that there is but one way whereby one may become a parson or
vicar: there are many ways by which one may cease to be so. 1. By death.
2. By cession, in taking another benefice. For, by statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 13,
if any one having a benefice of Bl. per annum, or upwards (according to the
present valuation in the king's books) (p) accepts anv other, the first shall be
adjudged void unless he obtains a. dispensation which no one is entitled to have,
but the cha.plains of the king and others therein mentioned, the brethren and
sons of lords and knie-hts, and doctors and bu.chelors of divinity and law
admitted hy the universities of this realm. And a vacancJ thus made, for want
of a dispensation, is called cession, (20) 3. By consecration; for, as was mentioned before, when a clerk is promoted to a bishoprick, all his other *:pre- [ • 393 ]
ferments are void the instant that he is consecrated. But there is a
method by the favour of the crown, of holding such livings in commendam.
Oom:menda, or ecclesia commenclata, is a living commended by the crown to the
care of a clerk, to hold till a proper pastor is proyiclcd for it. This may be temporary for one, two, or three years; or perpetual: being a kind of dispensation
to avoid the vacancy of the living, and is called a. commenda retinere. (21)
There is also a comm.enda recipere, which is to take a benefice de novo, in the
bishop's own gift, or the gift of some other patron consenting to the same; and
this is the same to him as institution and induction are to another clerk. (q)
4. By resignation. But this is of no avail, till accepted by the ordinary; into
whose hands the resignation must be made. (r) 5. By deprivation; either, first
by sentence declaratory in the ecclesiastical court, for fit and sufficient causes
allowed by the common law; such as attainder of treason or felony, (s) or con·
viction of other infamous crime in the king's courts; for heresy, mfidelity, (t)
gross immorality, and the like; or, secondly, in pursuance of divers penal statutes,
which declare the benefice void, for some nonfeasance or neglect, or else some
malfeasance or crime : as, for simony; (u) for maintaining any doctrine in
derogation of the king's supremacy, or of the thirty-nine articles, or the book of
common-prayer; (ii) for neglecting after institution to read the liturgy and
articles in the church, or make the declarations against popery, or take the abjuration oath; (w) for using any other form of prayer than the liturgy of the
church of England; (x) or for absenting himself sixty days in one year from a
benefice belon~ng to a popish patron, to which the clerk was presented by either
of the universities; (y) in all which, and similar cases, (z) the benefice is ipso
facto void, without any formal sentence of deprivation.
VI. A curate is the lowest degree in the church; being in the same state that
a ,;car was formerly, an officiating temporary minister, instead of the proper

(z) Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 2. (y) Stat. 1 W. and M. c. 26. (z) 6 Rep. 29. 30.

(Pl Cro. Car. 466.
(q) Hob. l'•·
(r) Cru. Jae. 198.
:
I•) Dyer, 108: Jcnk. 210.
• \ll Fitz. Abr. tit. Trial, M.
. (u) Stat. 81 !filz· c. 6. 12 Au~. c.12.
(o) Stat. 1 Ehz. e. 1 and 2. 13 Khz. c. 12.
(10) Stat. lS Ehz. e. 12. 14. car. II, c 4.. 1 Geo. I, e. 6;
lZ) Stat. I Eliz. e. 2.
,,,, Stl\t. 1 w. and M. c. 26.
(Z) 6 Rep. 29. 80.

(20) By 3.11 of 1 and 2 Tic. c. 106, tho acceptance of preferment by any spiritual person hold-

ing any other preferment or benefice, vacates the former preferment. In general two livings

cannot now be held by the same person, unless the benefices be within ten miles of each other,

or, if the population of one such beuefico exceed 3000, or their joint yearly value exceed IOOOL,

unless the yearly value of one be less than 1501. and its population more than 2000, in which case

the two may be held jointly. See statutes above mentioned.

(21) Those commeudams are now abolished. Statutes 6 and 7 Wm. IV, c. 77.
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- -- - - - -(20) Bys. 11of1 and 2 Vic. c. 106, the acceptance of preferment by any spiritual person holding any other preferment or benefice, vacates the former preferment. In genera.I two livings
cannot now be held by the same penion, unless the benefices be within ten miles of each other,
or, if tho population of one such benefice exceed 3000, or their Joint yearly value exceed 10001.,
unless the yearly value of one lie less than 1501. and its populat10n more than 2000, in which case
the two may be held jointly. See ~tntntes above ment10ned.
(21) 'fhel\l' commendamH are now abolished. Statute11 6 and 7 Wm. IV, c. 77.
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f *394 1 incumDenk Though *there are what are called perpetual curacies,

J where all the tithes are appropriated, and no vicarage endowed, (being

for some particular reasons («) exempted from the statute of Hen. IV,) but,

instead thereof, such perpetual curate is appointed by the appropriator. With

regard to the other species of curates, they are the objects of some particular

statutes, which ordain, that such as serve a church during its vacancy shall be

paid such stipend as the ordinary thinks reasonable, out of the profits of the

vacancy : or, if that be not sufficient, by the successor within fourteen days after

he takes possession : (b) and that, if any rector or vicar nominates a curate to the

ordinary to be licensed to serve the cure in his absence, the ordinary shall settle

his stipend under his hand and seal, not exceeding 601. per annum, nor less than

201. and on failure of payment may sequester the profits of the benefice.

Thus much of the clergy, properly so called. There are also certain inferior

ecclesiastical officers of whom the common law takes notice ; and that princi-

pally to assist the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, where it is deficient in powers. On

which officers I shall make a few cursory remarks.

VII. Churchwardens are the guardians or keepers of the church, and repre-

sentatives of the body of the parish, (d) They are sometimes appointed by the

minister, sometimes by the parish, sometimes by both together, as custom

directs. (23) They are taken, in favour of the church, to be for some purposes

a kind of corporation at the common law ; that is, they are enabled by that

name to have property in goods and chattels, and to bring actions for them, for
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the use and profit of the parish. Yet they may not waste the church goods, but

may be removed by the parish, and then called to account by action at the com-

mon law ; but there is no method of calling them to account but by first

removing them ; for none can legally do it but those who are put in their place.

r *OQK -i *As to lands, or other real property, as the church, churchyard,

' ""' •" &c., they have no sort of interest therein ; but, if any damage is done

thereto, the parson only or vicar shall have the action. Their office also is to

repair the church, and make rates and levies for that purpose : but these are

recoverable only in the ecclesiastical court. (24) They are also joined with the

overseers in the care and maintenance of the poor. They are to levy (e) a shil-

ling forfeiture on all such as do not repair to church on Sundays and holidays,

and are empowered to keep all persons orderly while there ; to which end it has

been held that a churchwarden may justify the pulling off a man's hat, without

being guilty of either an assault or trespass. (/) (25) There are also a multi-

tude of other petty parochial powers committed to their charge by divers acts of

parliament. (g)

VIII. Parish clerks, and sextons are also regarded by the common law as per-

sons who have freeholds in their offices ; and therefore though they may be pun-

ished, yet they cannot be deprived, by ecclesiastical censures.(A) (26) The par-

tat 1 r.imfs Eccl. Law, 427. (fc) Stat. 28 Hen. V 11 [, o. 11. (c) Slat. 12 Ann. si. 2, o. 12.

(d) In Sweden they have similar officers, whom they call kiorckiotoariandet. SUernhook. L. 3, o. 7.

(e) Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 2. (/) 1 Lev. 190.

(g) See Lambard of Churchwardens, at the end of his Eirenarcha ; and Dr. Burn, tit. Church, Church-

wardens. Vititations.

(Ii: 2 Uoll. Ah,-, 234.

(22) Upon this general subject see statutes 1 and 2 Vic. c. 106, and 31 and 32 Tic. c. 117.

(23) [2 Atk. 650; 2 Stra. 1246; 1 Tent. 267. But -where there is no such custom, the elec-

the minister and the parishioners, if it may be; but if they cannot agree upon such choice,

then the minister is to choose one, and the parishioners another; and without such joint or

several choice, none shall take upon themselves to be churchwardens. Gibs. Cod. 241: 1

Stra. 145; 2 id. 1246.]

(24) The payment of these is no longer compulsory. Statutes 31 and 32 Tic. c. 109.

(25) See Hawe «. Planner, 1 Saund. 13; Burton ». Henson, 10 M. and W. 105.

(26) These are removable for wilful neglect or misbehaviour under statute 7 and 8 Tic. c. 59.

The parish clerk, if in orders, is licensed and removable in like manner as a stipendiary curate.

Ibid. A woman may hold the office of sexton'. Str. 1114.
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* ] incumbent. Though •there are what are called perpetual curacies,
[ 394 where all the tithes are appropriated, and no vicarage endowed, (being
for some particular reasons (a) ex<.>mpted from the statute of Hen. IV,) but,
instead thereof, such perpetual curate is appointed by the appropriator. With
regard to the other species of curates, they are the objects of some particular
statutes, which ordain, that such as serve a church during its vacanc1 shall be
paid such stipend as the ordinary thinks reasonable, out of the profits of the
vacancy: or, if that be not sufficient, by the successor within fourteen days after
he takes possession: (b) and that, if any rector or vicar nominates a curate to the
ordinary to be licensed to serve the cure in his absence, the ordinary shall settle
his stipend under his hand and seal, not exceeding 50l. per annum, nor less than
20l. and on failure of payment may sequester the pr9fits of the benefice.
(c) (22)
Thus much of the clergy, properly so called. There are also certain inferior
ecclesiastical officers of whom the common law takes notice ; and that principally to assist the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, where it is deficient in powers. On
which officers I shall make a few cursory remarks.
VII. Churchwardens are the ~uardians or keepers of the church, and representatives of the body of the parish. (<l) They are sometimes appointed by the
minister, sometimes by the parish, sometimes by both together, as custom
directs. (23) They are taken, in favour of the church, to be for some purposes
a kind of corporation at the common law ; that is, they are enabled by that
name to have property in goods and chattels, and to bring actions for them, for
the use and profit of the parish. Yet they may not waste the church goods, but
may be removed by the parish, and then called to account by action at the common law; but there is no method of calling them to account but by first
removing them; for none can legally do it but those who are put in their place.
[ ,..395 ] •As to lands, or other real property, as the church, churchyard,
&c., they have no sort of interest therein; but, if any damage is done
thereto, the parson only or vicar sh!lll have the action. Their office also is to
repair the church, and make rates and leTies for that purpose: but these a.re
recoverable only in the ecclesiastical court. (24) They are also joined with the
overseers in the care and maintenance of the poor. They are to levy (e) a shilling forfeiture on all such as do not repair to church on Sundays and holidays,
and are empowered to keep all persons orderly while there; to which end it lias
been held that a churchwarden may justify the pulling off a man's hat,, without
being guilty of either an assault or trespass.(/) (25) There are also a multitude of other rtty parochial powers committed to their charge by divers acts of
parliament. (g
VIII. Pansh clerks, and sextons are also regarded by the common law as persons who have freeholds in their offices; and therefore though theY. may be punished, yet they cannot be deprived, by ecclesiastical censures.(h) (26) The par(al i Bnrn'e Eccl. Law, m.
(b) Stat. 28 Hen. Vl1!1 c. 11.
(c) Stat. 12 Ann. et. 2L o. 12.
(d) In Sweden they have similar oftleera, whom they cau ~(e) St.at. 1 Eliz. c. 2.
lfl 1 Lev. 198.
(g) See LAmbanl of Churchwardens, at the end of his Elrflflllrcha 1 and Dr.
warM?u. J'iritatlona.
{ll) 2 Uoll.

tion must be according to the directions of the canons of the church (can. 89, 90), which direct

that all churchwardens or quest men in every parish shall be chosen by the joint consent of
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Stlernhook,

. S, c. 7.

Bum, Ut. Church, CAvrcA-

Abr, 2M.
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('22) Upon thit:1 general subject see statutes 1 and 2 Vic. c. 106, and 31 and 32 Vic. c. 117.
[2 Atk. 650; 2 Stra. 1246; 1 Vent. 2b'7. But where there is no such custom, the elt>etion must be according to the directioDB of the canons of the church (can. 89, 90), which direet
that all churchwardens or quest men in every parish shall be chosen by the joint consent of
the minister and the parishioners, if it may be ; but if they cannot agree upon such choiee,
then the minister is to choose one, and the parishionel'll another; and without such joint or
sc\·eral choice, none ~hall take upon themselves to be churchwardens. Gibs. Cod. 241; 1
Stra. 14.'l; 2 id. 1246.]
(24) The payment of theiie is no longer compulsory. Statutes 31 and 32 Vic. c. 109.
(25) See Hawe"· Planner, 1 So.und. 13; Burton v. Henson, 10 M. and W. 105.
(26) These are removable for wilful neglect or misbehaviour under statute 7 and 8 Vic. c. 59.
The parish clerk, if in orders, is licensed and removable in like manner as a stipendiary curate.
Ibid. .A. woman may hold the office of sextou. Str. 1114.
(~)

250

Original from

NE YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

Chap. 12.]

OF

3!)[)

THE CIVIL STATE.

Chap. 12.] OF THE CIVIL STATE. 395

ish clerk was formerly very frequently in holy orders, and some are so to this

day. He is generally appointed by the incumbent, but by custom may be

chosen by the inhabitants; and, if such custom appears, the court of king's

bench will grant a mandamus to the archdeacon to swear him in, for the estab-

lishment of the custom turns it into a temporal or civil right, (i)

ish clerk was formerly very frequently in holy orders, and some are so to this
day. He is generally appointed by the incumbent, but by custom may be
chosen by the inhabitants ; and, if such custom appears, the court of king's
bench will grant a mandamus to the archdeacon to swear him in, for the establishment of the custom turns it into a temporal or civil right. (i)

CHAPTER XII.

OF THE CIVIL STATE.

THE lay part of his majesty's subjects, or such of the people as are not com-

prehended under the denomination of clergy, may be divided into three distinct

states, the civil, the military, and the maritime.

That part of the nation which falls under our first and most comprehensive

CHAPTER XII.

division, the civil state, includes all orders of men from the highest nobleman

to the meanest peasant, that are not included under either our former division,

OF THE CIVIL STATE.

of clergy, or under one of the two latter, the military and maritime states: and

it may sometimes include individuals of the other three orders; since a noble-

man, a knight, a gentleman, or a peasant, may become either a divine, a soldier,

or a seaman.

The civil state consists of the nobility and the commonalty. (1) Of the

nobility, the peerage of Great Britain, or lords temporal, as forming, together

with the bishops, one of the supreme branches of the legislature, I have before

sufficiently spoken: we are here to consider them according to their several

degrees, or titles of honour.
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All degrees of nobility and honour are derived from the king as their foun-

tain : (a) and he may institute what new titles he pleases. Hence it is that all

degrees of nobility are not of equal antiquity. Those now in use are dukes,

marquesses, earls viscounts and barons. (5) (2)

*1. A duke, though he be with us, in respect of his title of nobility, r *ogiy -i

inferior in point of antiquity to many others, yet is superior to all of "- "' ' '

them in rank; his being the first title of dignity after the royal family, (c)

Among the Saxons, the Latin name of dukes, duces, is very frequent, and* sig-

nified, as among the Romans, the commanders or leaders of their armies, whom,

in their own language, they called Jjejiocoja j (d) and in the laws of Henry

I, as translated by Lam bard, we find them called hereiochii. But after the Nor-

man conquest, which changed the military polity of the nation, the kings

themselves continuing for many generations dukes of Normandy, they would

(i) Cro. Car. 889. (a) 4 lust. 863.

(6) For the original oftbese titles on tbe continent of Europe, nod their subsequent introduction Into this

island, see Mr. Selden's Titles of Honour.

(c) Camden, Britan. lit. Ortlinet.

(a) This is apparently derived from the same root as tho German hertsogeti. the ancient appellation of

(hikes In that country. Sold. tit. Hon. 2, 1, 12.

(1) A decided jealousy of titles, as inconsistent with our institutions and dangerous to lib'

erty, has always appeared in America. By the constitution of the United States, both the

national and state governments are forbidden to grant titles of nobility. Art. 1, $§ 9 and 10.

And no person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, can accept an

office or title of any kind, from any king, prince or foreign state, unless by the consent of con-

gress. Art. 1, $ 9. Any alien possessing a foreign title, or belonging to an order of nobility, is

required to renounce the same before being admitted to citizenship. Act of Congress of April 14,

1802, 1 Story's Laws, 850.

THE lay part of his majesty's subjects, or such of the ~ple as are not comprehended under the denomination of clergy, may be diVlded into three distinct
states, the civil, the military, and the maritime.
That part of the nation which falls under our first and most comprehensive
division, the civil state, includes all orders of men from the higheat nobleman
to the meanest pe.asa.nt, that are not included under either our former division,
of clergy, or under one of the two latter, the military and maritime states : and
it may sometimes include individuals of the other three orders; since a nobleman, a knight, a gentleman, or a peasant, may become either a divine, a soldier,
or a seaman.
The civil state consists of the nobility and the commonalty. (1) Of the
nobility, the peerage of Great Britain, or lords temporal, as forming, together
with the bishops, one of the supreme branches of the legislature, I have before
sufficiently spoken : we are here to consider them oocording to their several
degrees, or titles of honour.
All degrees of nobility and honour are derived from the king as their fountain: (a) and he may institute what new titles he pleases. Hence it is that all
degrees of nobility are not of equal antiquity. Those now in use are dukes,
marquesses, earls viscounts and barons. (b) (2)
*1. A duke, though he be with us, in respect of his title of nobility, [ • 391 ]
inferior in point of antiquity to man1 others, yet is superior to all of
them in rank; his being the first title of dignity after the royal family. (c)
Among the Saxons, the Latin name of dukes, duces, is very frequent, and signified, as among the Romans, the commanders or leaders of their armies. whom,
in their own language, they called .heJlBcop; (d) and in the laws of Henry
I, as translated by La.mbard, we find them called heretockii:. But after the Norman conquest,. which changed the military polity of the nation, the kings
themselves continuing for many generations duke6 of Normandy, they would
(i) Cro. Car. 689.
(a) 4 Inat. 363.
( b) For the original of these titles on the
lsland1 see Mr. Sehlen's 'l'Ules of Honour.
(c) Camden, Britan. IU. Ordlnu.

continent or Europe. Mid their subseqt1<1nt Introduction Into this
·

(d) Thi~ Is appnrenUy derived fl·om the same root as the German hertzoge11. the ancient appellation of
dukes In that country. Seid. tit. Hon. 2, I, 12.

Perhaps the jealousy spoken of was never more forcibly illustrated than in the debates in con-

gress at the time the government was first put in operation, respecting the proper formula of

address to the president. See 4 Hildreth's U. S. 59; Annals of Congress, vol. 1, pp. $247, 318;

Benton's Abridgement of Debates, vol. 1, p. 11, et setji

(2) See further upon this subject Hallam's ii iilcllr Ages, eh. 2, part 1.
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(1) A decided jealousy of titles, as inconsistent with our inl!titutions and dangerouR to libf
erty, hai; always appeared in America. By the constitution of the United Stateii. both the
na.tiono.l and state government!! are forbidden to grant titles of nobility. Art. 1, §§ 9 and 10.
.And no person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, can acceft an
office or title of any kind, from any king, prince or foreign state, unleRB by the COD.Bent o congreAA. .Art. 1, § 9. .Any alien posseAAing a foreign title, or belonging to an order of nobility, ii!
required to r~nounce th! same before being admitted to citizenship. Act of Congreea of .April 14,
1802, 1 Story s Laws, 850.
Perhaps the jealonsy ~poken of was never more forcibly ilmi>trated than in the clehatefl in congres11 at the time the government was fil'Bt put in operation, re~pecting the proper formuli1 of
addre~s to the pre!<ident. See 4 Hildreth's U.S. 59; Annals of Congrel!ll, vol. 1, pp. ~47, :ns;
Benton'A Abridgement of Dehat.eA, vol. 1, p. 11, et seq.
(2) See furthur upon thi~ ~ubjcct Hallam's Middle Ages, ch. 2, part 1.
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not honour any subjects with the title of duke, till the time of Edward III,

who claiming to be king of France, and thereby losing the ducal in the royal

dignity, (3) in the eleventh year of his reign created his son, Edward the Black

Prince, duke of Cornwall: and many, of the royal family especially, were after-

wards raised to the like honour. However, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, A.

D. 1572, (e) the whole order became utterly extinct; but it was revived about

fifty years aftewards by her successor, who was remarkably prodigal of honours,

in the person of George Villers, duke of Buckingham.

2. A marquess, marchio, is the next degree of nobility. His office formerly

was (for dignity and duty were never separated by our ancestors) to guard the

frontiers and limits of the kingdom ; which were called the marches, from the

Teutonic word, marche, a limit: such as, in particular, were the marches of

Wales and Scotland, while each continued to be an enemy's country. The per-

sons who had command there were called lords marchers, or marquesses, whose

authority was abolished by statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 27, though the title had long

before been made a mere ensign of honour; Robert Vere, earl of Oxford, being

created marquess of Dublin by Richard II, in the eighth year of his reign. (/)

f *398 1 *^° ^n ear^ ls a ^e °^ Bounty so ancient, that its original cannot

L ' -I clearly be traced out. Thus much seems tolerably certain ; that among

the Saxons they were called ealdormen, quasi elder men, signifying the same

as senior or senator among the Romans; and also schiremen, because they had

each of them the civil government of a several division or shire. On the irrup-
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tion of the Danes, they changed the name to eorks, which according to

Camden, (g) signified the same in their language. In Latin they are called

comites (a title first used in the empire) from being the king's attendants: " a

societate nomen sumpserunt, reges enim tales siM associant." (h) After the

Norman conquest, they were for some time called counts or countees, from the

French; but they did not long retain that name themselves, though their shires

are from thence called counties to this day. The name of earls or comites is

now become a mere title, they having nothing to do with the government of

the county; which, as has been more than once observed, is now entirely

devolved on the sheriff, the earl's deputy, or vice-comes. In writs and commis-

sions, and other formal instruments, the king, when he mentions any peer of

the degree of an earl, usually styles him "trusty and well-beloved cousin" an

appellation as ancient as the reign of Henry IV, who being either by his wife,

his mother, or his sisters, actually related or allied to every earl then in the king-

dom, artfully and constantly acknowledged that connexion in all his letters and

other public acts; from whence the usage has descended to his successors, tnough

the reason has long ago failed.

4. The name of vice-comes or viscount, was afterwards made use of as an arbi-

trary title of honour, without any shadow of office pertaining to it, by Henry

the Sixth; when, in the eighteenth year of his reign, he created John Beau-

mont a peer, by the name of Viscount Beaumont, which was the first instance

of the kind, (i)

5. A barows is the most general and universal title of nobility; for originally

F *399 1 eTerv one °f ^ne P661"8 °f superior rank *had also a barony annexed to his

L J other titles.(£) (4) But it hath sometimes happened that, when an an-

te) Camden, Britan. tit. Online*. Siiclmavi, Olo»t. 191. (/) 2 lust. 5. (<;) Briton, tit. Online.

(h) Bracton, 1.1, c. 8. Flet. 1.1, c. 8. (i) 2 Inst. 6. ft) 2 Inet. 8,«.

(3) [Com. Die. Dignity, B. 2; 9 Co. 49, a. This order of nobility was created before Edward

not honour any subjects with the title of duke, till the time of Edward III,
who claiming to be king of France, and thereby losin~ the ducal in the royal
dignity, (3) in the eleventh year of his reign cr~ted his son, Edward the Black
Prince, duke of Cornwall : and many, of t.he royul family especiallv, were afterwards raised to the like honour. However. in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, A.
D. 1572, (e) the whole order became utterly extinct; but it was revived about
fifty years aftewards by her successor, who was remarkably prodigal of honours,
in the person of George Villers, duke of Buckingham.
2. A marquess, marchio, is the next degree of nobility. His office formerly
was (for dignity and duty were never separated by our ancestors) to guard the
frontiers and hmits of the kingdom ; which were called the marches, from the
•reutonic word, marche, a limit: such as, in particular, were the marches of
Wales and Scotland, while each continued to be an enemy's country. The persons who had command there were called lords marchers, or marquesses, whose
authority was abolished by statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 27, though the title had long
before been made a mere ensign of honour; Robert Vere, earl of Oxford, being
created marquess of Dublin by Richard II, in the eighth year of his reign. (f)
[ *'JCJS ]
•3. An ea1·l is a title of nobility so ancient, that its original cannot
'·
clearly be traced out. Thus much seems tolerably certain; that among
the Saxons they were called ealdormen, quasi elder men, signifying the same
as senior or senat<Jr among the Romans; and also scMremen, because they had
ea.ch of them the civil government of a several division or shire. On the irruption of the Danes, they changed the name to eorles, which according to
Camden, (g) signified the same in their language. In Latin they are called
comUes (a. title first used in the empire) from being the king's attendants: "a
societate nom.en sumpserunt, reges enim tales 81.:hi associant." (It) After the
Norman conquest, they were for some time called counts or countee.s, from the
French; but they did not long retain that name themselves, though their shires
are from thence called counties to this day. The na.me of earls or comites is
now become a mere title, they having uothmg to do with the government of
the county; which, as has been more than once observed, is now entirely
devolved on the sheriff, the earl's deputy, or vice-corn.es. In writs and commissions, and other formal instruments, the king, when he mentions any peer of
the degree of an earl, usually styles him "trusty and well-beloved cou.~in," an
appellation as ancient as the reign of Henry IV, who being either by his wife,
his mother, or his sisters, actually related or allied to every earl then in the kingdom, artfully and constantly acknowledged that connexion in all his letters and
other public acts; from whence the usage has descended to his successors, t'hough
the reason has long ago failed.
.
4. The name of vice-comes or viscount, was afterwards made use of as an arbitrary title of honour, without any shadow of office pertaining t.o it, by Henry
the Sixth; when, in the eighteenth year of his reign, he created John Beaumont a peer, by the name of Viscount Beaumont, which was the first instanc.e
of the kmd. ~i)
5. A barons is the most general and universal title of nobility; for originally
*
one of the peers of superior rank *had also a barony annexed to his
[ 399 ] every
other titles.(k) (4} But it hath sometimes happened that, when an an-

assumed the title of king of France. Dr. Henry, in his excellent history of Borland, informs us,

that " about a year before Edward III assumed the title of king of France, he introduced a new

(el Camden, Brltnn. tie. OrtUnu. RJ>elman, <Roll. 191.
(h) Hracton, l. 1, c. 8. Flet. l. 1, c. 8.
(I) 2 Inst. 6.

(/) 2 Inst. 6.
(I) Brltan. tU. Ord4-.
(k) 2 Inst. 6, 6.

order of nobility, to inflame the military ardor and ambition of nis earls and barons, by creating

his eldest son, Prince Edward, duke of Cornwall. This was done with great solemnity in fuU

parliament at Westminster, March 17. A. D. 1337."]

(4) [At the time of the conquest, the temporal nobility consisted only of earls and barons;

ana by whatever right the earls and the mitred clergy before that time might have attended

the great council of the nation, it abundantly appears* that they afterwards sat in the feudal

parliament in the character of barons. It has been truly said, that, for some time after the
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(3) [Com. Dig. Dignity, B. 2 ; 9 Co. 49, a. This order of nobilit,r was crested before Edward
SBRumed the title of kin1t of France. Dr. Henry, in his excellent history of En~land, infonu::1 ue,
thst " about a year before Edward III 888um00 the title of king of France, he mtrodnced a new
order of nobility, to inflame the military arclor and ambition of his earls and barons, by creating
biH 1>ldest Ron, Prince Edward, duke of Cornwall. This was done with great solemmty in full
parliament at Westminster, March i7. A. D. 1337."]
(4) [At the time of the conque1:1t, the temporal nobility consisted only of earls and barons;
and by whatever right the earls and the mitred clergy before that time might have attended
the great council of tho nation, it abundantly appears that they afterwards sat in the feudal
parliament in the chlll'8Cfor of barons. It has been truly said, that, for some time after the
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cient baron hath been raised to a new degree of peerage, in the course of a few

generations the two titles have descended differently; one perhaps to the male

descendants, the other to the heirs general; whereby the earldom or other supe-

rior title hath subsisted without a barony; and there are also modern instances

where earls and viscounts have been created without annexing a barony to their

other honours : so that now the rule doth not hold universally, that all peers are

barons. The original and antiquity of baronies has occasioned great inquiries

among our English antiquaries. The most probable opinion seems to be, that

they were the same with our present lords of manors; to which the name of

court baron (which is the lord's court, and incident to every manor,) gives some

countenance. (5) It may be collected from King John's magna carta, (I) that

originally all lords of manors, or barons, that held of the king in capite, had

seats in the great council or parliament; till about the reign of that prince the

conflux of them became so large and troublesome, that the king was obliged to

divide them, and summon only the greater barons in person; leaving the small

ones to be summoned by the sheriff, and, as it is said, to sit by representation in

another house; which gave rise to the separation of the two houses of parlia-

ment, (m) By degrees the title came to be confined to the greater barons, or

lords of parliament onlv; and there were no other barons among the peerage but

such as were summoned by writ, in respect of the tenure of their lands or baro-

nies, till Richard the Second first made it a mere title of honour, by conferring

it on divers persons by his letters patent, (n)
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(I) Cap. 14 (m) Gilb. Hist, of Exch. c. 8. Said. Tit. of Hon. 3, 5. 21.

cient baron ha.th been raised to u. new degree of peerage, in the course of a few
generations the two titles have descended differently; one perhaps to the male
descendants, the other to the heirs general; whereby the earldom or other superior title hath subsisted without a. barony; and there are also modern instances
where earls and viscounts have been created without annexing a barony to their
other honours: so that now the rule doth not hold universally, that all peers are
barons. The original and antiquity of baronies has occasioned great inquiries
among our English antiquaries. The most probable opinion seems to be, that
they were the same with our present lords of manors; to which the name of
court baron (which is the lord's court, and incident to every manor,) gives some
countenance. (5) It may be collected from King John's magna carta. (l) that
originally all lords of manors, or barons, that held of the king in capite, had
seats in the great council or parliament ; till about the reign of that prince the
conflux of them became so large and troublesome, that the king was obliged to
divide them, and summon only the greater barons in person; leaving the small
ones to be summoned by the sheriff, and, as it is said, to sit by representation in
another house; which gave rise to the separation of the two houses of parliament. (m) By degrees the title came to be confined to the greater barons, or
lords of parliament only; and there were no other barons amon~ the peerage but
such as were summoned by writ, in respect of the tenure of their lands or baronies, till Richard the Second first made it a mere title of honour, by conferring
it on divers persons by his letters patent. (n)

(n) 1 Inst. 9. Seld. Jan. Angl. 2, * 66.

conquest, wealth was the only nobility, as there was little personal property at that time, and

a right to a seat in parliament was entirely territorial, or depended upon the tenure of landed

Cap. U
(•) Glib. Hist. of Exch. o. 8. Seid. Tll o!Hon. 9, 6. U.
( n) 1 Ins&. 9. Seid. Jan. Af&QI. 2, t 118.

(l)

property. Ever since the conquest, it is true that all land is held either immediately or

mediately of the king; that is, either of the king himself, or of a tenant of the king, or it

might be after two or more subinfeudations. And it was also a general principle in the feudal

svstem, that every tenant of land, or land owner, had both a right and obligation to attend

tne court of his immediate superior. Hence every tenant in capita, i. e., the tenant of the

king, was at the same time entitled and bound to attend the king's court or parliament, being

the great court baron of the nation. It will not be necessary here to enlarge farther upon the

original principles of the feudal system, and upon the origin of peerage; but we will briefly

abndge the account which Selden has given in the second part of his Titles of Honor, c. 5,

beginning at the 17th section, being perhaps the clearest and most satisfactory that can be

found. He divides the time from the conquest into three periods: 1. From the conquest to the

latter end of the reign of King John. 2. From that time to the llth of Richard II. 3. From that

period to the time he is writing, which may now be extended to the present time. In the first

period, all who held any quantity of land of the king had, without distinction, a right to be

summoned to parliament; and this right being confined solely to the king's tenants, of conse-

quence all the peers of parliament during that period sat by virtue of tenure and a writ of

summons.

In the beginning of the second period, that is, in the last year of the reign of King John, a dis-

tinction, very important in its consequences (for it eventually produced the lower house of par-

liament), was introduced, viz.: a division of these tenants into greater and lesser barons: for

King John, in his magna charta, declares fatiemus summoneri archiepiscopos, tpiscopos, abates,

cmnites et majores barones regni sigillatim perliteras nostras, et praiterea faciemus summoneri in

generaliper vicecomites et battivos nostros omnes aUos, qiti in capite tenent de nobis ad cerium

diem, $c. It does not appear that it ever was ascertained what constituted a greater baron, and

it probably was left to the king's discretion to determine; and no great inconvenience could have

resulted from its remaining indefinite, for those who had not the honor of the king's letter would

have, what in effect was equivalent, a general summons from the sheriff. But in this second

period, tenure began to be disregarded, and persons were summoned to the parliament by writ,

who held no lands of the king. This continued to be the case till the llth of Richard II, when

the practice of creating peers by letters patent first commenced.

In that year John de Beauchamp, steward of the household to Richard II, was created by patent

Lord Beauchamp, baron of Kidderminster in tail male; and since that time peerages have been

created both by writ and patent, without any regard to tenure or estate.]

(5) [Lords of manors, who had granted to others, by snbinfeudation, part of that estate which

they held of the king, would necessarily be barons; but it does not tollow conversely that a

conqnest, wealth wae the only nobility, ae there wae littJe personal property at that time, a.nd
e. right to a. seat in parliament Wa.B entirely territorial, or depended upon the tenure of landed
property. Ever since the conquest, it is troe that all land is held either immediately or
mediately of the king; that is, either of the king himself, or of a tenant of the king, or it
might be after two or more subinfeudations. .And it was also a general principle in the feudal
l!Vl!tem, that every tenant of land, or land owner, had both a right and obligation to attend
the conrt of hi11 immmlie.te superior. Hence every tenant in capite, i. e., the tenant of the
king, Wllil at the 1:1ame time entitled and bound to attend the king's court or parliament, being
the great court baron of the nation. It will not be necessary here to enlarge farther upon the
oriiPnal principles of the feudal system, and upon the origm of peerage; but we will briefly
abndge the account which Selden has given in the second part of his Titles of Honor, c. 5,
beginning at .t~e 17th ~ec.tion. being perhaps _the clearest l;Wd most i;atisfactory that can be
found. He divides the time from the conquest mto three penods : 1. From the conqnel!t to tho
latter end of the reign of King J obn. 2. From that time to the 11th of Richard II. 3. From that
period to the time he is writing, which may now be extended to the present time. In the first
period, all who held any quantity of land of the king bad, without distinction, a right to be
summoned to parliament; and this right being confined solely to the king'i; tenants, of consequence all the peers of parliament during that period sat by virtue of tenure and a writ of
summons.
In the beginning of the i;econd period, that is. in the last year of the reign of King John, a distinction, very important in it.'! consequences (for it eventuallr produced the lower house of' parliament), was introduced, viz.: a divil:rion of thet<o tenants mto greater and lesger barons : for
King John, in bis magna charta, decle.reefaciem1'8 summ011eri archiepisco;pos, fTpisoopos, abates.
cmnites et majMes barones regni .'?igillatim perliteras fWBtras, et prreterea faciemus sum11Wn(,'f'i in
ge11erali per viceoomites et ballit•os nostros omnes aUos, qtti in capite tenent d6 nobts ad certum
diem, <fc. It does not appear that it ever was ascertained what constituted a greater baron, and
it probably was left to the kin~s diS-Oretion to determine ; and no great inconvenience could have
relltllted from itll remaining inaefinite, for those who had not the honor of the king's letter would
have, what in effect was equivalent, a general summons from the sheriff. But in this second
period, tenure began to be disregarded, and p01'80ns were summoned to the parliament by writ,
who held no lands of the king. This continued to be the case till the 11th of Riche.rd II, when
the practice of creating pee111 by letters patent first commenced.
In that year J oho de Beauchamp, steward of the household to Riche.rd II, was created by patent
Lord Beauchamp, baron of Kidderminster in tail male; and since that time peerages have been
created both by writ and patent, without any regard to tenure or estate.]
(5) [Lords of ma.nors, who had granted to others, by subinfeude.tion, part of that estate which
they held of the kin~, would neceSll6rily be barons; ~ut it does not follow . conversely that a
baron was of nece11R1ty a lord of a manor, for the king's tenant, who retamed all the estate
granted him, and alienated no part of it, would certainly be as complete a b~on as a lord of u.
manor.

baron was of necessity a lord of a manor, for the king's tenant, who retained all the estate
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granted him, and alienated no part of it, would certainly be as complete a baron as a lord of a

manor.
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Having made this short inquiry into the original of our several degrees of

nobility, I shall next consider the manner in which they may be created. The

right of peerage seems to have been originally territorial; that is, annexed to

lands, honours, castles, manors, and the like, the proprietors and possessors of

r * ,QQ -, which were, in right of those estates, allowed to be *peers of the realm,

L J and were summoned to parliament to do suit and service to their sov-

ereign ; and, when the land was alienated, the dignity passed with it as appen-

dant. Thus the bishops still sit in the house of lords in right of succession to

certain ancient baronies annexed, or supposed to be annexed, to their episcopal

lands; (o) and thus, in 11 Hen. VI, the possession of the castle of Arundel was

adjudged to confer an earldom on its possessor. (p) But afterwards, when alien-

ations grew to be frequent, the dignity of peerage was confined to the lineage of

the party ennobled, and instead of territorial became personal. Actual proof of

a tenure by barony became no longer necessary to constitute a lord of parlia-

ment ; but the record of the writ of summons to him or his ancestors was

admitted as a sufficient evidence of the tenure.

Peers are now created either by writ, or by patent: for those who claim by

prescription must suppose either a writ or patent made to their ancestors;

though by length of time it is lost. The creation by writ, or the king's letter, is

a summons to attend the house of peers, by the style and title of that barony,

which the king is pleased to confer; that by patent is a royal grant to a subject

of any dignity and degree of peerage. The creation by writ is the more ancient
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way; but a man is not ennobled thereby, unless he actually take his seat in

the house of lords: (6) and some are of opinion that there must be at least two

writs of summons, and a sitting in two distinct'parliaments, to evidence an hered-

itary barony: (q) and therefore the most usual, because the surest, way is to

grant the dignity by patent, which enures to a man and his heirs, according to

the limitations thereof, though he never himself makes use of it (r) Yet it is

frequent to call up the eldest son of a peer to the house of lords by writ of

summons in the name of his father's barony; because in that case there is no

danger of his children's losing the nobility in case he never takes his seat; for

they will succeed to their grandfather. (7) Creation by writ has also one advan-

tage over that by patent: for a person created by writ holds the dignity to him

F *4011 anc^ '"'* *^ri>> (8) without any words to that purport in the writ; but

' -I in letters patent there must be words to direct the inheritance, else the

dignity enures only to the grantee for life, (s) For a man or woman may be

created noble for their own lives, and the dignity not descend to their heirs at

all, or descend only to some particular heirs: as, where a peerage is limited to a

man, and the heirs male of his body by Elizabeth, his present lady, and not to

such heirs by any former or future wife. (9)

foj Glan. 1.7, c. 1. (p) Seld. Tit. of lion. b. 2, o. 9, I 6. (q) Whitlockg of Purl, eh. 144.

(r) Co. Lltt. 16. (I) Co. Lltt. 9,10.

(6) See the "Wharton Peerage case 12 CL and Fin. 295.

Having made this short inquiry into the original of our several degrees of
nobility, I shall next consider the manner in which they may be created. The
right of peerage seems to have been originally territonal; that is, annexed to
lauds, honours, castles, manors, and the hke, the proprietors and possessors of
[ ,..400 ] which were, in right of those est.ates, allowed to be *peers of the realm,
and were summoned to parliament to do suit and service to their sovereign; and, when the land was alienated, the dignity passed with it as appendant. Thus the bishops still sit in the house of lords in right of succession to
certain ancient baronies annexed, or supposed to be annexed, to their episcopal
lands; (o) and thus, in 11 Hen. VI, the possession of the castle of Arundel was
adjudged to confer an earldom on its possessor. (p) But afterwards, when alienations grew to be frequent, the dignity of peerage was confined to the lineage of
the party ennobled, and instead of territorial became personal. Actual proof of
a tenure by barony became no longer necessary to constitute a lord of parliament; but the record of the writ of summons to him or his ancestors was
admitted as a sufficient evidence of the tenure.
Peers a.re now created either by writ, or by patent: for those who claim by
prescription must suppose either a writ or pa.tent made to their ancestors;
though by length of time it is lost. The creation by writ, or the king's letter, is
a summons to attend the house of peers, by the style and title of that barony,
which the king is pleased to confer; that by patent is a royal grant to a subject
of any dignity and degree of peerage. The creation by writ is the more ancient
way; but a man is not ennobled thereby, unless he actually take his seat in
the house of lords: (6) and some are of opinion that there must be at least two
writs of summons, and a sitting in two distinct.parliaments, to evidence an hereditary barony: (q) and therefore the most usual, because the surest, wav is to
grant the dignity by patent, which enures to a man and his heirs, accordin~ to
the limitations thereof, though he never himself makes use of it. (r) Yet 1t is
frequent to call up the eldest son of a peer to the house of lords by writ of
summons in the name of his father's barony; because in that case there is no
danger of his children's losing the nobility in case he never takes his seat; for
they will succeed to their ~andfather. (7) Creation by writ baa also one advantage over that by patent: lor a person created by writ holds the dignity to him
[ ,.. 401 ] and Ms *hefr,q, (8) without any words to that purport in the writ; but
in letters patent there must be words to direct the inheritance, else the
dignity ennres only to the grantee for life. (s) For a man or woman may be
created noble for their own lives, and the dignity not descend to their heirs at
all, or descend only to some particular heirs: as, where a peerage is limited to a
man, and the heirs male of his body by Elizabeth, his present lady, and not to
such heirs by any former or future wife. (9)

(7) [And where the father's barony is limited by patent to him and the heirs male of his body,

and his eldest son is called up to the house of lords by writ with the title of this barony,

(o)
(r)

Gian. 1. 7, c. 1.
Co. Litt. 16.

(p) Seld. Tit. or Hon.
(1) Co. Utt. 9, 16.

b. !, c. 9, f 11.

(q) Whitlocks or

Parl. ch. JU.

the writ in this case will not create a fee or a general 'estate tail, so as to make a female

capable of inheriting the title, but upon the death of the father the two titles unite, or become one

and the same. Case of the claim to the barony of Sidney of Penshurst disallowed Dom. Proc. 17

June, 1782.]

(8) [But every claimant of the title must be descended from the person first ennobled. 1

Woodd. 37.]

(9) [Peerage may be gained for life by act of law, as if a duke take a wife, she is a duchess in

law by the intermarriage; so of a marquess, earl, <fec. Co. Litt. 16, b. Also the dignity of an

earl may descend to a daughter, if there be no son, who shall be a countess; and if there are

many daughters, it is said the king shall dispose of the dignity to which daughter he pleases.

Co. Litt. 1K5, a. If a person has been summoned as a baron to parliament by writ, and after git-

ting, die, leaving two or more daughters, who all die, one of them only leaving issue, a son, such

issue has a right to demand a seat in the house of peers. Skin. 441.]

The practice of granting peerages for life was never common in England, and in a debate

in parliament on the subject in 1856, jt was stated that for four hundred years there was no
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(6) See the Wharton Peerage case 12 CL and Fin. 295.
(7) L.A.nd where the father's barony i~ limited by patent to him and the heirs male of his bod>,
and his eldest son is oalled up to the house of lords by writ with the title of this barony,
the writ in this case will not create a fee or a general estate tail, so a..i to make a female
capable of inheriting the title, but upon the death of the father the two titles unite, or become one
and the same. CMe of the claim to the barony of Sidney of Penshurst disallowed Dom. Proc. 17
June, 178'2.]
(8) [But every claimant of the title must be descended from the person first ennobled. 1
Woodd. 37.]
(9) [Peerage me.y be gained for life by act of law, as if a duke take e. wife, she is a duoh688 in
law by the intermo.rrie.ge; so of n. marquess, earl, &-0. Co. Litt. 16, b. Also the dignity of &n
earl may descend to a d1iughter. if ther11 Ile no s<m, who shall be a eounte:is; and if there are
many du.ught.t'r8, it iK ~u.id the ~ing MhQ.Jl dispose of the dignity to which daughter he 2lce.se...~
Co. Litt. lt>5, 11.. If a persun has been summoned as a baron t<> parliamcmt by writ, and a.ft.er sitting, die, leaving two or more dau~hte111, who a.II die, one of them only leaving i!!11ue, a son, such
j;;,;ue ho..~ n right to demand a 8eat m the house of peel'i!. Skin. 441.]
'fhe practice of granting peerage11 for !.ife was never common in England, and in a debate
in 1111.rliawont on the r:ubject in 1856, j~ was stated that for four hundred years there was no
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Let us next take a view of a few of the principal incidents attending the no-

bility, exclusive of their capacity as members of parliament, and as hereditary

counsellors of the crown ; both of which we have before considered. And first

we must observe, that in criminal cases a nobleman shall be tried by his peers. (10)

The great are always obnoxious to popular envy: were they to be judged by the

people, they might be in danger from the predjudiceof their judges ; and would,

moreover, be deprived of the privilege of the meanest subject, that of being

tried by their equals, which is secured to all the realm, by magnet carta, c. 29. It

is said, that this does not extend to bishops; who, though they are lords of par-

liament, and sit there by virtue of their baronies, which they hold jure ecclesice,

yet are not ennobled in blood, and consequently not peers with the nobility, (t) (11)

As to peeresses, there was no precedent for their trial when accused of treason

or felony, till after Eleanor, duchess of Gloucester, wife to the lord protector,

was accused of treason, and found guilty of witchcraft, in ecclesiastical synod

through the intrigues of Cardinal Beaufort. This very extraordinary trial gave

occasion to a special statute, 20 Hen. VI, c. 9, which declares (u) the law to be, that

peeresses, either in their own right or by marriage, shall be tried before the same

ftJUlaat. 30,31. fuj Moor, 769. 2 Inst. 60. 6Bep. 52. Stanndf. P. C. lfl».

instance on record in which any man had been admitted to a seat in the house of lords as a

Let us next take a view of a few of the principal incidents attending the nobility, exclusive of their capacity as members of parliament, and as hereditary
counsellors of the crown ; both of which we have before considered. And first
we must observe, that in criminal cases a nobleman shall be tried by his peers. (10)
The great are always obnoxious to popular envy: were they to be judged by the
people, they might be in danger from the predjudice of their judges; and would,
moreover, be deprived of the privilege of the meanest subject, that of being
tried by their equals, which is secured to all the realm, by magna carta, c. 29. It
is said, that this does not extend to bishops ; who, though they are lords of parliament, and sit there by virtue of their baronies, which they hold .fure ecclesim,
yet are not ennobled in blood, and consequently not peers with the nobility. (t) (11)
As to peeresses, there was no precedent for their trial when accused of treMon
or felony, till after Eleanor, duchess of Gloucester, wife to the lord protector,
was accused of treason, and found guilty of witchcraft, in ecclesiastical synod
through the intrigues of Cardinal Beaufort. This very extraordinary trial gave
occasion to a special statute, 20 Hen. VI, c. 9, which declares (u) the law to be, that
peeresses, either in their own right or by marriage, shall be tried before the same

peer for life. Many life peerages however had been created, principally by Charles II, and

the first two Georges. In the year above mentioned it was proposed to increase the judicial

(I)

8 Inst. 30, SI.

(u)

Moor, 769. 2 lnst. 60. 6Rep.112. Stanmlt. P. C. lM.

strength of the house of peers by admitting some of the more eminent judges to seats there for
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life only, and Sir James Parke received letters patent creating him Lord Wensleydale for life. But

the right to a seat under these letters was disputed, and the question referred to a committee of

the house, upon whose report it was resolved, after full examination of precedents, that

" neither the letters patent, nor the letters patent with the usual writ of summons issued in

pursuance thereof, can entitle the grantee to sit and vote in parliament." The crown was

forced to submit to this decision, and Lord "Wenslcydale soon after took his seat under a new

patent, as hereditary peer. Later than this the lords resolved to empower the queen by stat-

ute to confer life-peerages with seats in parliament upon two judges, but the commons refused

their assent. See Hansard's Debates, 3d series, vol. 160, p. 1152, et seq.; id. vol. 16SJ, pp. 780,

899, 1059; id. vol. 163, pp. 428, 583, 613. Also 5 H. L. Gas. 958.

(10) [But this is only in treason, felony, and misprision of the same. See magna charta, 9

Henry III, 29; 2 lust. 49. And a peer, it seems, cannot waive the trial by his peers. Kel. 56;

1 State Trials 265; 2 Rush. 64. And, if he refuse to put himself on his peers, he may be

dealt with as one who stands mute: yet if one who has a title to peerage be indicted and

arraigned as a commoner, and plead not guilty, and put himself upon the country, he cannot

afterwards suggest he is a peer, and pray trial by his peers. 2 Hawk. P. C. e. 44, s. 19; and

see further, po-tt, book 4, 260.

In all misdemeanors, as libels, riots, perjury, conspiracies, &<•.. a peer is tried like a com-

moner by a jury: 3 Inst. 30; Hawk. P. C. b. 2, c. 44, ss. 13. 14. So in case of an appeal

of felony he is to be tried by a jury : 9 Co. Rep. 30; 2 Inst. 49 ; and the indictments of peers

for treason or felony, are to be found by freeholders of the county, and then the peers are to

plead before the high steward, <te. 1 Inst. 156; 3 id. 28.

Peers (Fortesc. 359) and members of parliament have no exemption from arrest in case of

treason, felony, or actual breach of the peace. 4 Inst. 24, 25; 2 Wils. 159, 160; 11 Hargr. St.

Tr. 305. But a peer menacing another person, whereby the latter fears his life is in danger,

no writ of suplicavit, but a subpoena issues, and when the peer appears, instead of surety, he

only promises to keep the peace. 35 Hen. VI.

The privilege of ]

„ -' peers d°es not extend to foreign noblemen, who have no more privileges

here than commoners. Co. Litt. 156; 2 Inst. 48; Lex. Const. 80, 81.

The peers of Scotland or Ireland had no privilege in this kingdom before the union; but,

by clauses in the respective articles of union, the elected peers have all the privileges of peers

of parliament; also all the rest of the peers of Scotland and Ireland have all the privileges

of the peerage of England, excepting only that of sitting and voting in parliament; and Irish

peers, who are members of the house of commons, are not entitled to the privilege of peerage.

All Irish peer ought not to serve upon a grand jury unless he is a member of the house of

commons. Russell <fc Ryl. Cro. C. 117. ]

(11) [The bishops being summoned to parliament as peers might thereby have become enti-

tled to trial by peers; but, unless bishops were to try bishops, none others are properly peers

of bishops. These peers of lords are peculiarly designated spiritual. It may be observed

instance on record in which sny man hu.d been u.dmitted to a seat in the house of lonls 88 a
peer for life. Many life peersge11 however bu.d been created, principally by Charles II, and
the first two Georges. In the year above mentioned it was proposed to increMe the jndieisl
strength of the house of peen1 by admitting some of the more eminent judges to seats there for
life only, snd Sir J amEll! Parke recei¥ed letters patent cresting him Loni Wensleydale for life. But
the right to a ~eat nnder these letters wa.11 disputed, and the question referred to a committee of
the house, upon who86 report it was r080lved, after fnll examination of precedents, that
"neither the letters patent, nor the letters patent with the usual writ. of summons is1med in
pursuance thereof, cru1 entitle the grantee to sit and vote in parliament." The crown wae
forced to Aubmit to thiR dcch<ion, and Lord W enslcyda.le soon after took his seat under a new
patent, as hereditary peer. Later than this the lords reimlved to empower the queen by statute to confer life-peerages with seat.'! in parliament upon two judges, but the commons refused
their asi;ent. See HalIB8Td's Debates, 3d series, vol. 160, p. 1152, et seq.; id. vol. 162, pp. 780,
899, 1059 ; id. vol. 163, pp. 428, 583, 613. .Also 5 H. L. CB.'!. !Y'J8.
(10) [Ilut this is only in treo..'ion, felony:, and misprision of the ssme. See magna charts, 9
Henry III, 29; 2 In~t. 49. .And a peer, it seems, csnnot waive the trial by his peers. Kel. 56;
1 State Trials 265 ; 2 Rush. 64. A.nd, if he refuse to put himself on hi1.1 peel"ll, he may be
dealt with ae one who stands mute : yet if one who has a title to peerage be indicted and
arraigned as a commoner, and plead not guilty, and put himself upon the country, he cannot
afterwards suggest he is s Reer, and pray trial by his peers. 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 44, s. 19; and
see further, po11t, book 4, 260.
In s!l misdemesnors. 88 libels, riots, perjury, conspiracies, &c., a peer is tried like a commoner by a jury : 3 Inst. 30; Hawk. P. C. b. 2, c. 44, se. 13. 14. So in case of an appeal
of felony he i:i to be tried by a jury: 9 Co. Rep. 30; 2 Inst. 49; and the indictments of peers
for tre880n or felony, are to be found by freeholders of the county, snd then the peers are to
pleu.d before the high steward, &c. 1 Inst. 156; 3 id. 28.
Peers (Fortesc. 35\l) cmd membera of parliament have no exemption from srre~t in cBBe of
tres.~ou, felony, or actual breach of the peiw:e. 4 Inst. 24, 25; 2 Wils. 159, 160; 11 Hargr. St.
Tr. 305. But a peer menacing another person, whereby the latter fesr11 hi1:1 life is in danger,
no writ of suplicavit, but a subprnns issues, snd when the peer appears, in8tuu.d of surety, he
only promise:i to keep the peace. 35 Hen. VI.
'rhe privilege of peers does. not extend to foreign noblemen, who have no more privileges
here than commoners. Co. Litt. 156; 2 In>lt. 48; Lex. Corn1t. 80, 81.
The peen! of Scotland or Ireland had no privilege in thi11 kingdom before the union; but,
by clauses in the respective articles of union, the elected peers have all tho prfrilcge:1 of peen!
of parliament; alKo all the rest of tbe peers of Scotland and Ireland have all the privile~es
of the peerage of Engla.nd, excepting oll.ly that of sitting snd voting in parliament; and In1:1h
peers, who arc members of the house of commons, a.re not entitled to the privilege of peerage.
An Irish peer ought not to eerve upon a grand jury unless he is a member of the house of
commons. RUl!l!ell & Ryl. Cro. C. 117.]
(11) [The bishops being summoned to parliament ae peers might thereby have become entitled to trial by peers ; but, unless bishops were to try bishops, none othcl"!I are properly peers
of bishops. Theee peers of lords are peculiarly designated spiritual. It may be observed
that, although lords of parliament, they never sit upon matters of treason or of blood; and it
wonlcl be a 11trange anomaly, that upon a bishop sll other lords of parliament, save bishops,
who are also lords, might, in capital C88681 pasejudgment of death. Bishops Cranmer and .l!'ii;her
were t.ried by jury.]
· ·

that, although lords of parliament, they never sit upon matters of treason or of blood; and it

would be a strange anomaly, that upon a bishop all other lords of parliament, save bishops,

who are also lords, might, in capital cages, pass judgment of death. Bishops Cranmer and Fibber

were tried by jury.]
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judicature as other peers of the realm. If a woman, noble in her own right,

marries a commoner, she still remains noble, (12) and shall be tried by her peers :

but, if she be only noble by marriage, then, by a second marriage with a com-

moner, she loses her dignity ; for as by marriage it is gained, by marriage it is

also lost, (v) (13) Yet if a duchess dowager marries a baron, she continues a

F *402 1 Duchess st^ > *or a^ *ne *n°bility are pares, and therefore it is no deg-

L J radation. (w) A peer, or peeress, either in her own right or by marriage,

cannot be arrested in civil cases : (a;) and they have also many peculiar privi-

leges annexed to their peerage in the course of judicial proceedings. (14) A peer,

sitting in judgment gives not his verdict upon oath, like an ordinary juryman,

but upon his honour: (y) he answers also to bills in chancery upon nis honour,

and not upon his oath ; (z) but, when he is examined as a witness either in civil

or criminal cases, he must be sworn : (a) for the respect which the law shows to

the honour of a peer, does not extend so far as to overturn a settled maxim, that

in judicio non creditur nisi juratis. (b) The honour of peers is, however, so

highly tendered by the law, that it is much more penal to spread false reports of

them and certain other great officers of the realm, than of other men : scandal

against them being called by the peculiar name of scandalum magnatum, and

subjected to peculiar punishments by divers ancient statutes, (c)

A peer cannot lose his nobility, but by death or attainder; though there was

an instance in the reign of Edward the Fourth, of the degradation of George

Nevile, duke of Bedford, by act of parliament, (d) on account of his poverty,
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which rendered him unable to support his dignity, (e) But this is a singular

instance, which serves at the same time, by having happened, to shew the power

of parliament; and by having happened but once, to shew how tender the

parliament hath been in exerting so high a power. It hath been said, indeed, (f)

that if a baron wastes his estate so that he is not able to support the degree, the

king may degrade him : but it is expressly held by later authorities, (g) that a

peer cannot be degraded but by act of parliament.

T *403 1 *rJ1he commonalty, like the nobility, are divided into several degrees ;

L J and, as the lords, though different in rank, yet all of them are peers in

respect of their nobility, so the commoners, though some are greatly superior to

others, yet all are in law peers, in respect of their want of nobility, (h)

The first name of dignity, next beneath a peer, was anciently that of mdamef,

vice-domini, or valvasors : (i) who are mentioned by our ancient lawyers (/) as

viri magnm dignitatis : and Sir Edward Coke (k) speaks highly of them. Yet

they are now quite out of use ; and our legal antiquaries are not agreed upon

even their original or ancient office.

Now, therefore, the first personal dignity, after the nobility, is a knight of the

order of St George, or oftlw garter; first instituted by Edward III, A. D. 1344. (?)

Next, (but not till after certain official dignities, as privy-counsellors, the chan-

cellors of the exchequer and duchy of Lancaster, the chief justice of the king's

bench, the master of the rolls, and the other English judges,) follows a knight

(v) Dyer, 79. Co. Litt. 10. (w) 2 Inat. 80. (x) Finch. 1. 355. 1 Vcntr. 288.

(y) 2 Inst. 49. (z) 1 P. Wms. 1*6 (a) Salk. 512. (b) Cro. Car. 64.

fcj Edw. I, c. 31. 2 Uic. II, st. 1, o. S. 12 Ric. II, o. 11. (d) 4 lust. 356.

(e) The premable to the act is remarkable : '• Forasmuch as oftentimes it is seen, that when any lord is

called to high estate, and hath not convenient livelihood to support the same dignity, it induceth great pov-

erty and indigence, and causeth oftentimes grant extortion, embracery, and maintenance to be lu.l. to

the great trouble 01 all such countries where such estate shall happen to be : therefore," *c.

(f) Moor. 678. (g) 12 Rep. 107. 12 Mod. 66. (kj 2 Inst. 29. (i) Camden, Britan. t. Online*.

(j) Bracton, I. I, c. 8. (k) 2 Inat. 667. (I) Seld. Tit. of Hon. 2, S, 41.

(12) [But she communicates no rank or title to her husband. Harg. Co. Litt. 326, b.]

judicatnre as other peers of the realm. If a woman, noble in her own right,
marries a commoner, she still remains noble, (12) and shall be tried by her peers:
but, if she be only noble by marriage, then, by a secon<l marriage with a commoner, she loses her dignity; for as by marriage it is gained, by ma.rri~e it is
also lost. (v) (13) Yet if a duchess dowager marries a baron, she contmues a
[ • 402 ] duche.ss still ; for all the *nobility are pares, and therefore it is no degradation. (w) A peer, or peerel!S, either in her own right or by manfage,
cannot be arrested in civil cases: (x) and they have also many peculiar privileges annexed to their peerage in the course of judicial proceedings. (14) A peer,
sitting in judgment gives not his verdict upon oath, like an ordinary juryman,
but upon his honour: (y) he answers also to bills in chancery upon his honour,
and not upon his oath; (zi but, when he is examined as a witness either in civil
or criminal cases, he must be sworn: (a) for the respect which the law shows to
the honour of a peer, does not extend so far as to overturn a settled maxim, that
in judicio non creditur ni8i juratis. (b) The honour of peers is, bowe,·er, so
highly t.endered by the law, that it is much more penal to spread false reports of
them and certain other great officers of the realm, than of other men: scandal
against them bein$ called by the peculiar name of scandalum rnagnatum, and
subjected to peculiar punishments by divers ancient statutes. (c)
A peer cannot lose his nobility, but by death or attainder; though there was
an instance in the reign of Edward the Fourth, of the degradation of George
Nevile, duke of Bedford, by act. of parliament, (d) on account of his poverty,
which rendered him unable to support his dignity. (e) But this is a singular
instance, which serves at the same time, by having happened, to shew the power
of parliament; and by having happened but once, to shew how tender the
parliament hath been in exerting so high a power. It hath been said, indeed,(/)
that if a baron wastes his estate so that he is not able to support the degree, the
king may degru.de him: but it is expressly held by later authorities, (g) that a
peer cannot be degraded but by act of parliament.
*The commonalty, like the nobility, are divided into several degrees;
[ • 403 ]
and, as the lords, though different in rank, yet all of them are peers in
respect of their nobility, so the commoners, though some are gre.atly superior t-0
others, yet all are in law peers, in respect of their want of nobility. (lt)
The first name of dignity, next beneath a peer, was anciently that of vidanu.s,
vice-domini, or valvasors: (i) who are mentioned by our ancient lawyeri3 (j) as
viri magn<s dignitatis: and Sir Edward Coke (k) speaks highly of them. Yet
they are now quite out of use; and our legal antiquaries are not agreed upon
even their original or ancient office.
Now, therefore, the first personal dignity, after the nobility, is a lcnigltt of the
order of St Geor~e, or oftlw garter; first institut.ed by Edward III, A. D. 1344. (l)
Next, (but not till after certain official dignities, as priv,r-counsellors, the chancellors of the exchequer and duchy of Lancaster, the chief justice of the king's
bench, the master of the rolls, and the other English judges,) follows a kmglil
(v) Dyer, 79. Co. Litt. IG.
(tD) 2 Inst. 60.
(z) Finch. l. SM. 1 Ventr. 2118.
(IJ) 2 Inst. t!l.
{te) 1 P. Wms. 1"6
(a) Salk. 612.
(b) Cro. Car. 6'.
(c) Edw. I, c. al. 2 Uic. II, st. 1, c. II. 12 Ric. If, o. 11.
{d) ( lnst. 366.
(e) The premablt> to the act le remarkable: "1''or1111mnoh M oftAlntimes It is seen, Chat when

any lonl fa
called to high estate, and hath not oonvenlont livelihood to suppurt the same dignity. it lnduceth 3reatpoTcrty 1md Indigence, and causeth ot\entimos great extortion, eml.rracery. anit maintenance to b6 had; &o
the peat tron!Jle ofall such countries where such estate shall happen to be: therefore," .!tc.
( f) l\loor. 678.
(gJ 12 ReJ!. 107. 12 Mod. 116.
(h) 2 I1111t. 29.
(i) Camden, Bni-. i. ~( j) BrACton, I. 1, c. 8.
(k) 2 lnilt. 667.
{l) 8eld. Tit. of Hon. 2, II, il.

(13) [Yet she is commonly called and addressed by the style and title which she bore before

her second marriage, but this is only by courtesy ; as the daughters of dukes, marquesses, and

earls, are usually addressed by the title of 'lady, though in law they are commoners.

Dyer, 79.]

(14) [See Tidd, 8th ed. 194. This privilege does not protect them from attachments for not

obeying the process of the courts : 1 Wils. 332 ; nor does it extend to peeresses by marnajre.

if they afterwards intermarry with commoners. Co. Litt. 16. The servants of peers are liable

to arrest. 10 Geo. Ill, c. 50. And see 1 Chit. Rep. 83. Peers of the realm cannot be bail.

2 Marsh. 232. And see 1 D. and R. 126.]
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(12) [But i;he communicates no rank or title to her husband. Har~. Co. Litt. 3"26, b.]
(13) [Yet she is commonly called sud addressed by the style and title which she bore before
her second me.rrie.ge, but this is only by courtesy; as the daugh:ters of dukes, marqueases, aod

earl:i, are usually add1-essed by the title of lady, though m law they are commoners.
Dyer, 71!.]
(H) [Sec Tidd, 8th ed. 194. Thie priV"ilege doe11 not protect them from attachments fo~ oot.
obrying the proco~-; of the con~: 1 Wils. 332; nor ~oes it ext.end to peerei!Ses by m~.
if they aftcrwo.rdi; mtermarry with commoners. Co. L1tt. 16. The servants of peers are liable
to urrest. 10 Geo. III, c. 50. .And eee 1 Chit. Rep. t:!3. Peel'll of the realm cannot be bail.
2 Marsh. 23'2. .And see 1 D. and R. 126.]
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banneret; who indeed by statutes 5 Eic. II, st. 2, c. 4, and 14 Ric. II, c. 11, is

ranked next after barons: and his precedence before the younger sons of

viscounts was confirmed to him by order of King James I, in the tenth year

of his reign. (»i) But, in order to entitle himself to this rank, he must have

been created by the king in person, in the field, under the royal banners, in time

of open war. («) Else he ranks after baronets, who are the next order; which

title is a dignity of inheritance, created by letters patent, and usually descendi-

ble to the issue male. It was first instituted by King James the First, A. D.

1611, in order to raise a competent sum for the reduction of the province of

Ulster in Ireland; (15) for which reason all baronets have the arms of Ulster

superadded to their family coat Next follow knights of the bath ; an order insti-

tuted by King Henry IV, *and revived by King George the First. They r ^ ,Q , -i

are so called from the ceremony of bathing the Knight before their crea- <- *

tion. The last of these inferior nobility are knights bachelors ; the most ancient

though the lowest, order of knighthood amongst us: (16) for we have an instance

(o) of King Alfred's conferring this order on his son Athelstan. The custom of

the ancient Germans was to give their young men a shield and a lance in the

great council: this was equivalent to the toga virilis oLthe Romans: before this

they were not permitted to bear arms, but were accounted as part of the father's

household; after it, as part of the community. (p) Hence, some derive the usage

of knighting, which has prevailed all over the western world, since its reduction

by colonies from those northejrn heroes. Knights are called in Latin equites
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aurati: aurati, from the gilt spurs they wore; and equites, because they always

served on horseback: for it is observable, (q) that almost all nations call their

knights by some appellation derived from an horse. They are also called in our

law milites, because they formed a part of the royal army, in virtue of their

feudal tenures; one condition of which was, that every one who held a knight's

fee immediately under the crown, which in Edward the Second's time (r)

amounted to 20Z. per annum, was obliged to be knighted, and attend the king

in his wars, or fine for his non-compliance. The exertion of this prerogative,

as an expedient to raise money in the reign of Charles the First, gave great

offence; though warranted by law, and the recent example of Queen Elizabeth;

(17) but it was, by the statute 16 Car. I, c 16, abolished; and this kind of knight-

hood has, since that time, fallen into great disregard.

These, Sir Edward Coke says, (s) are all the names of dignity in this kingdom,

esquires and gentlemen being only names of worship. But before these last (t)

(m) Ibid. 2.11. 3. (Hj4Inst.fi. (o) Will. Malmsb. lib. 2. (p) Tac. de Aforib. Germ. 13.

('/} Uorad. ihiil. Co. l.itt. 74. (r) Stat. de MUU. 1 Edw. II. («) 2 Inst. 667.

(t) The rules of prenedence in England may be roilucetl to the following table : in which those marked *

are entitled to the runk here allotted them, by statute 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10 ; marked t, by statute 1 W. and

H. c. 21; marked II. by letters patent, 9,10, and 14 Jac. I, which see in Seld. Tit. of Hon. ii. 5, 46, and II.

11, 3 ; marked t. by ancient usage and established custom ; for which see. among others, Camdon'a Bri-

tannia, Tit. Ordinei. MUles's Catalogue of Honour, edit, kiln; and Chamberlayne's Present State of Eng

land, b. 3, ch. 3.

TABLE OF PRECEDENCE.

The king's children and grandchildren.

Lord Great Chamberlain. But 1

orotiirtn.

uncics.

Mve all peers of the!

Archbishop of Canterbury (18)

Lord Chancellor or Keeper, if a baron.

Archbishop of York.

Lord Treasurer l

Lord President of the Council, > if barons.

Lord Privy Seal, >

Lord Admiral! j

Lord Steward of the household

Lord Chamberlain of the house- 1

hold,

DokM.

Marquesses.

(15) [One hundred gentlemen advanced each one thousand pounds; for which this title was

conferred upon them. 2 Rap. 185, fo.]

(16) [There are also other orders of knights; as knights of the chamber; knights of the order

of St. John of Jerusalem; knights of Malta; knight marshal; knights of the Rhodes; knights

of the shire; knights templars; knights of the thistle, and knights of St. Patrick.]

(17) [Considerable fees accrued to the king upon the performance of the ceremony.]

(18) [It is said, that before the conquest, by a constitution of Pope Gregory, the two arch-
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r *^Qg -1 the heralds rank all *colonels, sergeants at law, and doctors in the three

•• J learned professions.

T *406 1 *Esquires and gentlemen are confounded together by Sir Edward

' •* Coke, who observes, (u) that every esquire is a gentleman, and a gentle-

man is defined to be one qui arma c/erit, who bears coat armour, the grant of

which adds gentility to a man's family: in like manner as civil nobility, among

the Romans, was founded in the jus imaginum, or having the image of one an-

cestor at least, who had borne some curule office. It is indeed a matter some-

what unsettled, what constitutes the distinction, or who is a real esquire ; for it

is not an estate, however large, that confers this rank upon its owner. Camden,

who was himself a herald, distinguishes them the most accurately; and he reckons

up four sorts of them: (v) 1. The eldest sons of knights, and their eldest sons in

perpetual succession : (w) 2. The eldest sons of younger sons of peers, and their

eldest sons in like perpetual succession: both which species of esquires Sir

Henry Spelman entitles armiqeri natalitii. (x) 3. Esquires created by the king's

letters patent, or other investiture; (19) and their eldest sons. 4. Esquires by

t Dukes' eldest BODS.

* Earls.

J Marquesses' eldest sans.

t Dukes' younger sous.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

* VlcounU.

i Earls' eldest son*.

t Marquesses' younger sons.

Secretary of State, If a bishop.

Bishop of London.

Durham.

Winchester.

Bishops.

Secretary of State, If a barou.

Barons.

{Speaker of the House of Commons.

Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal.

I Viscounts' eldest sons.

Earls' younger sous.

[ • 405 ] the heralds rank all *colonels, sergeants at law, and doctors in the three
learned professions.
[ • 406 ]
*Esquires and gentlemen are confounded together by Sir Edward
Coke, who observes, (u) that every esquire is a gentleman, and a gentleman is defined to be one qui arma ,qerit, who bears coat armour, the grant of
which adds gentility to a man's family: in like manner as civil nobilit.y, among
the Romans, was founded in the jus imaginum, or having the image of one anceator at least, who had borne some curule office. It is indeed a matter somewhat unsettled, what constitutes the distinction, or who is a real esquire; for it
is not an estate, however large, that confers this rank upon its owner. Camden,
who was himself a herald, distinguishes them the most accurately; and he reckons
up four sorts of them : ( v) 1. The eldest sons of knights, and their eldest sons in
perpetual succession : ( w) 2. The eldest sons of younger sons of peers, and their
eldest sons in like perpetual succession: both which species of esquires Sir
Henry Spelman entitlelil armip_eri natalilii. (x) 3. Esquires created by the king's
letters patent, or other investiture; (19) and their eldest sons. 4. Esquires by

**
**
***

Duke.' eldeat eou.

lilaater of the Rolla.
Chief Jnetloe ot the Common P l Chl"f Barou ot the Bxch~uer.
Dukea' younger aoDL
Judgea, and Barona ot the C-ott.
Vlcounta.
Knight.a Banner..ta, roJIJ.
Barie' eldeat aonL
Vlaoounta' younger aoDL
Marquee11ea' younger eonL
Barone' younger aoDL
Baronet&
• Beeretaq' ot State, It a blllhop.
• Biehopo1 London.
Knlghta Banneret..
• - - - Durham.
Knight.a ot the Bath.
* - - - Wlncheater.
Knight• BachelorL
* Blahops.
Baronet•' elde1t aouL
• Secretary of State, if a baron.
Kulghtl' eldeat aouL
• BarouL
Baronet.' younger aoDL
t 8peAker ot the HoDM! of CommouL
Knight'• younger aoDL
t Lorda Commlulouera of the Great Seal.
ColonelL
t Vlecountll' eldeat aoDL
8erjeant.e-at.-law.
B&rl1' young"r aonL
i Doctora.
f Barona' eldeat aonL
Baqulrea.
Knight.a ot the Garter.
Gentlemen.
Privy Conn11ellore.
f Yeomen.
Chancellor ot the Exchequer.
t Tradeemeu.
Chancellor of the Duchy.
f Arttflcera.
Chief Jmtloe ot tho Klnll'a Rench.
f Labourera. (20]
• B. Married women ana widows are entitled to the aame rank among each other, aa their huabanda would
reopectlvely have borne between them11elvee, exoept such rank le merely proteaelooal or oftlotal: and unmarried
women to the aame rank aa their eldeat brothera would bt,ar among men, dnrlng the llvea of their tathera.
B&rlL

Marqu-· eldellt MDL

I
*

*
**

*

l

(u) 2 Inst. 668.

(1')

2 lust. OOS.

(ta) 2

Inst. 667.

(z) GIOBB. '3.

Barons' eldest sons.

Knights of the Garter.

Privy Counsellors.

Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Chancellor of the Duchy.

Master of the Rolls.

Chief Justice of the Common Pleas.

Chief Baron of the Exchequer.

Judges, and Btirous of the Coif.

Knights Bannerets, royal.

Viscounts' younger sons.

Barons' younger sons.

Baronets.

Knights Bannerets.

Knights of the Bath.

i Knights Baehelors.

Baronets' eldest sons.

Knights' eldest sons.

Baronets' younger sons.

Knight's younger sons.

Colonels.

SerJeanU-at-law.

I Doctor*.

i Enquires.

t Gentlemen,

i Yeomen.

the matter to the king and barons ; and in a council held at Windsor-castle, they decided in
favor of the archbishop of Canterbury. Godw. Comm. de Prresul. 665.
But the archbishops of York long afterwards refused to acquiesce in this decision1 for bishop
Godwin relates a curioull and ludicrous struggle which took place in the reign or Henry II,
above one hundred yea.rs afterwards, between Roger, archbislio/? of York, and Richard archbishop of Canterbury, for the chair on the right hand of the pope s legate. lb. 79. Perhaps to
this decision, and their former equality, we may refer the present distinction between them ; vis. :
that the archbi:ihoJ> of Canterbury is primate of a.Il England, and the archbishop of York is primate of England.]
(19) Now disused.
(20) The present order of precedence is as follows:
Dukes.
The Prince of Wales.
The Sovereign'11 younger lions and grandsons. Marquises.
"
"
brothers.
Dukes' eldest eons
"
"
nephews.
Earls.
"
"
uncles.
Marquises' eldest eone.
Dukes' youngest eons.
.Archbishop of Canterbury.
Lord Chancellor.
Viscounts.
Earl's eldest sons.
Archbishop of York.
"
" Armagh.
Marquises' younger eons,
"
" Dubllii.
Bishop of London.
Lord President of the Council, ~ if a baron.
"
" Durham.
S
" " Winchester.
Lord Privy Seal,
Lord Great Chamberlain,
} bo a.Il Bishops.
of Secretary of State, if a baron.
Earl Manibal,
a
Lord Steward of the household,
Barone.
Lord Chamberl&in of the hoUS&- .
own Speaker of House of Oommone,
hold,
· ·
agree, ~r pf the 4o~4ol4,

the.drt::!

i Tradesmen.

» Artificers.

Labourers. [20]

.

Chief Justice of the King's Bench. .

. B. Married women and widows are entitled to the same rank among each other, as their husbands would

respectively have borne between themselves, except such rank is merely professional or official ; and unmarried

~58
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virtue of their offices; as justices of the peace, and others who bear any office

Chap. 13.]

406

MILITARY AND MARITIME STA.TES.

of trust under the crown. To these may be added, the esquires of knights of

the bath, each of whom constitutes three at his installation; and all foreign,

nay, Irish peers; for not only these, but the eldest sons of peers of Great Britain,

though frequently titular lords, are only esquires in the law, and must be so

named in all legal proceedings, (y) As for gentlemen, says Sir Thomas Smith, (z)

they be made good cheap in this kingdom: for whosoever studieth the laws

of the realm, who studieth in the universities, who professeth the liberal sci-

ences, and, to be short, who can live idly, and without manual labor, and will

bear the port, charge, and countenance of a gentleman, he shall be called master,

and shall be taken for a gentleman. (21) A yeoman is he that hath free land of

forty shillings by the year; who was aUciently thereby qualified to serve on juries,

vote for knights of the *shire, and do any other act, where the law re- p ,Q~ -•

quires one that isprobus etlegalis homo, (a) ' "" ' '

The rest of the commonalty are tradesmen, artificers, and labourers ; who, as

well as all others, must in pursuance of the statute 1 Hen. V, c. 5, be styled by

the name and addition of their estate, degree, or mystery, and the place to which

they belong, or where they have been conversant, in all original writs of actions

personal, appeals, and indictments, upon which process of outlawry may be

awarded; in order, as it should seem, to prevent any clandestine or mistaken

outlawry, by reducing to a specific certainty the person who is the object of its

process. (22)
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CHAPTEK XIII. t

OF THE MILITARY AND MARITIME STATES.

THE military state includes the whole of the soldiery; or such persons as are

virtue of their offices; as justices of the peace, and others who bear any office
of trust under the crown. To these may be added, the esquires of knights of
the bath, each of whom constitutes three at his installation; and all forei~n,
nay, Irish peers; for not only these, but the eldest sons of peers of Great Britam,
though frequently titular lords, are only esquires in the law, and must be so
named in all legal proceedings. (y) As for gentlemen, says Sir Thomas Smith, (z)
they be made good cheap in this kingdom: for whosoever studieth the laws
of the realm, who studieth in the universities, who professeth the liberal sciences, and, to be short, who can live idly, and without manual labor, and will
bear the port, charge, and countenance of a gentleman, he shall be called master,
and shall be taken for a gentleman. (21) A yeoman is he that hath free land of
forty shillings by the year; who was a'1ciently thereby qualified to serre on juries,
vote for knights of the *shire, and do any other act, where the law re- [* 407 ]
quires one that is probus et legalis liomo. (a)
The rest of the commonalty are tradesmen, artificers, and l<ibourers ~· who, as
well as all others, must in pursuance of the statute 1 Hen. V, c. 5, be styled by
the name and addition of their estate, degree, or mystery, and the pla-0e to which
they belong, or where they have been conversant, in all original writs of actions
personal, appeals, and indictments, upon which process of outlawry may be
awarded; in order, as it should seem, to prevent any clandestine or mistaken
outlawry, by reducing to a specific certainty the person who is the object of its
process. (22)

peculiarly appointed among the rest of the people, for the safeguard and defence

of the realm.

In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the

(y) 3 Inst. 30. 2 Inst. 667. (z) Uommonw. of Eng. b. 1, c. 20. (a) 2 Inst. 688.

CHAPTER XIII.

Comptroller of the household. Knights banuerets royal.

if aster of the horse. Viscounts' younger sons.

O;F THE MILITARY AND MARITIME STATES.

Vice-Chamberlain of the household. Barons' younger sons.

Secretary of State if not a baron. Baronets.

Viscounts' eldest sons. Knights bannerets.

Earls' younger sons. Knights of the bath.

Barons' eldest sons. Knights bachelors.

Knights of the garter. Baronets' eldest sons.

THE military state includes the whole of the soldiery ; or such persons as are
peculiarly appointed among the rest of the people, for the safeguard and defence
of the realm.
In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the

Privy Councillors. Knights' oldest sons.

(11) 3

Inst. SO. 2 Inst. l.'RT.

(z) Uommonw.

of Eng. b. 1, c. 20.

(a) 2

Inst. 668.

Chancellor of the Exchequer. Baronets' younger sons.

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. -^Knights' younger sons.

Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench. Sergeants at Law.

Master of the Rolls. Masters in Lunacy.

Chief Justice of the Common Fleas. Doctors of Divinity.

Chief Baron of the Exchequer. " " Law.

Lords Justices. " Medicine.

Vice Chancellors. Esquires.

Judges of the Queen's Bench. Gentlemen.

" " Common Pleas. Yeomen.

Barons of the Exchequer. Tradesmen.

Judge of the Court of Probate. Artificers.

Commissioners in Bankruptcj. Laborers.

(21) [The eldest son has no prior claim to the degree of gentlemen; for it is the text ol Lit-

tleton, that " every son is as great a gentleman as the eldest." Sect. 210.]

(22) Professor Christian adds in this place a somewhat lengthy note, which we may perhaps

with propriety omit. Its purpose is to show the unsoundness of a proposition that " has

lately been industriously propagated," "in order to excite discontent and stir up rebellion

against all good order and peaceful government," namely; '• that all men are by nature equal,"

259

Comptroller of the household.
Knight:! bannerets royal.
Master of the horse.
Viscounts' younger sons.
Vice-Chamberlain of the household.
Barons' younger sons.
Secretary of State if not a. baron.
Baronets.
Viscount!!' eldest sons.
Knights ba.n.nerets.
Earls' younger sons.
Knights of the bath.
Baron.~' eldest sons.
Kujghts bachelors.
Kniizhts of the garter.
Baronets' eldest sons.
Privy Councillors.
Knights' oldest sons.
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Baronets' younger sons.
Chancellor of the Durhy of Lancaster.
/"'lrllights' younger sons.
Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench.
Sergeants a.t Law.
Master of the Rolls.
Mastera in Lunacy.
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas.
Doctors of Divinity.
Chief Baron of the Exchequer.
" " Law.
Lords Justices.
" Medicine.
Vice Chancellors.
Esquires.
Jud~es of the Queen's Bench.
Gentlemen.
Yeomen.
'
"
Common Plea.a.
Barons of the Exchequer.
Tradesmen.
Judge of the Court of Probate.
.Artificers.
Commissioners in Bankruptcy.
La.borers.
(21) [The eldest son hat1 no prior claim to the degree of gentlemen; for it is the text ot Littleton, that "every son is as great a gentleman a.s the eldest." Sect. 210.]
(22) Profesi;or Christian adds in this place a. somewhat lengthy note, which we may perhaps
with propriety omit. Its purpose is to show the unsoundness of a. proposition that "has
lately been industriously propagated," "in order to excite discontent and stir up rebellion
against all good order and peaceful government," namely; '· th~t ~l men ar~ by nature equal,1.1
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MILITARY AND MARITrnE STATES.

profession of arms. (1) In absolute monarchies this is necessary for the safety

of the prince, and arises from the main principle of their constitution, which is

that of governing by fear: but in free states the profession of a soldier, taken

singly and merely as a profession, is justly an object of jealousy. In these no

man should take up arms, but with a view to defend his country and its laws:

he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp ; but it is because he is a

citizen, and would wish to continue so, that he makes himself for a while a sol-

dier. The laws therefore and constitution of these kingdoms know no such

state as that of a perpetual standing soldier, bred up to no other profession than

that of war; and it was not till the reign of Henry VII, that the kings of Eng-

land had so much as a guard about their persons.

In the time of our Saxon ancestors, as%ppears from Edward the Confessor's

laws, (a) the military force of this kingdom was in the hands of the dukes or

heretochs, who were constituted through every province and county in the

kingdom ; being taken out of the principal nobility, and such as were most re-

markable for being " sapientes, fideles, et animosi." Their duty was to lead and

regulate the English armies, with a very unlimited power; "prout eis visum

F *4091 fuer^> ud honorem *coron(B et utilitatem regni." And because of this

L J great power they were elected by the people in their full assembly, or

folkmote, in the same manner as sheriffs were elected: following still that old

fundamental maxim of the Saxon constitution, that where any officer was

entrusted with such power, as if abused might tend to the oppression of the peo-
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ple, that power was delegated to him by the vote of the people themselves, (b) So

too, among the ancient Germans, the ancestors of our Saxon forefathers, they had

their dukes, as well as kings, with an independent power over the military, as

the kings had over the civil state. The dukes were elective, the king's hereditary;

for so only can be consistently understood that passage of Tacitus, (c) " reges ex

nobilitate, duces ex virtute summit; in constituting their kings, the family or

blood royal was regarded, in choosing their dukes or leaders, warlike merit: just

as Csesar relates of their ancestors in his time, that whenever they went to war,

by way either of attack or defence, they elected leaders to command them, (d)

(a) C. de fferetochiis.

(b) '• liti vero viri eligtintur per commune contiUum, pro comnmni tttUitate regni, per provincial el patria*

ttnirerms, etper singvloa comitatus, in plena foUemote,8icut et vicccomitei, provmcwrum et comitaiuttm eliyi

profession of arms. (1) In absolute monarchies this is necessary for the safety
of the prince, and arises from the main principle of their constitution, which is
that of governing by fear: but in free states the profession of a soldier, taken
singly and merely as a profession, is justly an object of jealousy. In these no
man should take up arms, but with a view to defend his country and its laws:
he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp; but it is because he is a.
citizen, and would wish to continue so, that he makes himself for a while a soldier. The laws therefore and constitution of these kingdoms know no snch
state as that of a perpetual standing soldier, bred up to no other profession than
that of war; and it was not till the reign of Henry VII, that the kings of England had so much as a guard about their persons.
In the time of our Saxon ancestors, as-appears from Edward the Confessor's
laws, (a) the military force of this kingdom was in the hands of the dukes or
heretochs, who were constituted through every_ province and county in the
kingdom ; bein~ taken out of the principal nobility, and such as were most remarkable for bemg "sapientes,fideles, et animosi." Their duty was to lead and
regulate the English armies, with a very unlimited power; "prout e-is v1:s-um
[ ,..409 ] fuerit, ad honorfJrn *coroncs et utilitatem regn1:." And because of this
great power they were elected by the people in their full assembly, or
folkmote, in the same manner as sheriffs WE;"re elected : following still that old
fundamental maxim of the Saxon constitution, that where any officer was
entrusted with such power, as if abused might tend to the oppression of the people, that power was delegated to him by the vote of the people themselvE>s. (b) So
too, among the ancient Germans, the ancestors of our Saxon forefathers, they had
their dukes, as well as kings, with an independent power over the military, as
the kings had over the civil state. The dukes were elective, the king's hereditary;
for so only can be consistently understood that passage of Tacitus, (c) "reges ex
nobilitate, duces ex vfrtu.te s1tmunt; in constituting their kings, the family or
blood royal was regarded, in choosing their dukes or leaders, warlike merit: just
as Cresar relates of their ancestors in his time, that whenever they went to war,
by way either of attack or defence, they elected leaders to command them. ( d)

detent." LL. Kiln: Confess, ibid. See also Bede, Eccl. Hist. I. 5, c. 10.

(c) De Mortb. Germ. 7.

(a) " 1,1/1 a in helium civitas out ittatum. defendii aut infert, magiitratui gui ei beUopraiint delianntur.''

De Bell. Oatt. I. 6, c. 22.

(1) The constitutional jealousy of standing armies, always so observable in England, and

especially, in modern times, during the reign of "William III, has found expression in several

(a) C. th Herdochiill.
·
(b) "/Bti vero mri ellgtintur per commune cvMZium, pro communi utUUate regni, per pro11inciaaelpatritu
t1nltier1aa, et per 8'ngulos comilatua, in pkoofoU.-mote,Bicut d t'icecomltu, pr()llinc\arum d C(>lllitaluttm ellgi
cUbenl." LL. Edw. Co71fu1. ibid. See aL!o Belle, Eccl. Hut. l. 5, c. 10.
(CJ De .Vorlb. Germ. 7.

(d) "Quum bellum ciriUu aut illatvm, defendU aut '1ifert, magtltrahu qui
De lJeU. Gall. l. 6, c. 2'l.

~

bello pnuint deligvnt11r."

provisions in the constitution of the United States. " A well regulated militia being necessary

to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-

fringed." 2d amendment. " Congress shall have power to raise and support armies, but no

appropriation to that use shall be for a longer time than two years." Art. 1, $ 8. " No soldier

shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the" consent of the owner, nor in time

of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law." 3d amendment. The purpose has beeu to

hold the military at all times in complete subordination to the civil power, and the regular army

which is maintained is only that which is deemed necessary to garrison forts, and preserve the

peace with the Indians. The whole available military force of the United States at the time

of the breaking out of the recent civil war, was only 16,006 men; a number surprisingly small

when we consider the vast extent of our country, and the long frontier line bordered by tribes

of savages. Immediately on the restoration of peace the immense armies in the field were lor

the most part disbanded, and the force reduced by September 30, 1867, to 56,815. This was still

further reduced the next year to 43,741. The constitutional provision inhibiting appropriations

for the army for a longer period than two years makes the executive, as commander-in-chief,

at all times dependent upon the legislative department, and his power is further restricted by

another provision which confers upon congress the authority to make rules for the government

of the army and navy, and for the militia of the states when called into the service of the nation.

Art. 1, $ 8.

The division of powers between the nation and the states being such as to vest in the former

authority over all those subjects falling within the province of international law, the states are

forbidden, without the consent of congress, to keep troops or ships of war in the time of peace,

or to engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will nut admit of

delay. Const, of U. S., art. 1, $ 10.
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(1) The constitntional jealou~y of standing armies, a.lwa.ys so observable in En~la.n<l, aud
especially, in modern time;;, during the reign of William III, has found exyression m se-veral
provii;ions in the constitution of the United States. "A well regulated militia being neceRsary
to the f!ecurity of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms i;ha.ll not he infringed.'" 2d amendment. "CongrellS shall have power to ra.iRe and supfort armies, but no
appropriation to tha.t use shall be for a longer time tho.n two yea.rs.'' Art. , § 8. "No soldier
shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time
of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law." 3d amendment. The purpose has been to
hold the militarr at all time:i in complete subordination to the civil power, and the regular army
which is maintained is only that whieh is deemed necessary to garrison forts, and preserve the
peace with the Indians. The whole available military force of the United States at the time
of the breaking out of the recent civil war. we.a only 16,006 men; a number surprisingly small
when we consider the va.'!t extent of our country, and the long frontier line bordered by tribes
of savages. Immediately on the restoration of peace tho immense armies in the field were for
the most part disbanded, and the force redueed by September 30, 1867, to 56,815. This was still
further reduced the next year to 43,741. The constitutional provision inhibiting approI_>riations
for the army for a longer period than two years makes the executive, as commander-m-chief,
at all times dependent upon the legislative department, and his power is further restricted by
another provis10n which confers upon congret!S the authority to make rules for the go~rnmcnt
of the army and navy, and for the militia of the states when called into the service of the nation.
Art. 1, § 8.
The division of powers between the nation and the states being such as to vest in the former
authority over all those subjects falling within the provinc~ of international law, the states are
forbidden, without the consent of congress, to keep troops or ships of war in the time o. f pooce.!
or to engage in war unless actually invaded, or in SQ.Ch ~en~ danger as will no~ admit OJ
delay. Const. of U. S., art. 1, § 10,
·
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This large share of power, thus conferred by the people, though intended to pre-

serve the liberty of the subject, was perhaps unreasonably detrimental to the

prerogative of the crown ; and accordingly we find ill use made of it by Edric,

duke of Mercia, in the reign of King Edmund Ironside; who, by his office of

duke or heretoch, was entitled to a large command in the king's army, and by

his repeated treacheries at last transferred the crown to Canute, the Dane.

It seems universally agreed by all historians, that King Alfred first settled a

national militia in this Kingdom, and by his prudent discipline made all the

subjects of his dominion soldiers: but we are unfortunately left in the dark as

to the particulars of this his so celebrated regulation; though, from what was

last observed, the dukes seem to have been left in possession of too large and

independent a power; which *enabled Duke Harold, on the death of r *,,Q -•

Edward the Confessor, though a stranger to the royal blood, to mount >• J

for a short space the throne of this kingdom, in prejudice of Edgar Atheling,

the rightful heir.

Upon the Norman conquest the feudal law was introduced here in all its

rigour, the whole of which is built on a military plan. I shall not now enter

into the particulars of that constitution, which belongs more properly to the

next part of our Commentaries; but shall only observe, that, in consequence

thereof, all the lands in the kingdom were divided into what were called knights'

fees, in number above sixty thousand; and for every knight's fee a knight or

soldier, miles, was bound to attend the king in his wars, for forty days in a
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year; (2) in which space of time, before war was reduced to a science, the cam-

paign was generally finished, and a kingdom either conquered or victorious, (e)

By this means the king had, without any expense, an army of sixty thousand

men always ready at his command. And accordingly we find one, among the

laws of William the Conquerer, (f) which in the king's name commands and

firmly enjoins the personal attendance of all knights and others: " quod habeant

et teneant se semper in armis et equis, ut decet et oportet: et quod semper sint

prompti et parati ad servitium suum integrum nobis explendum et peragendum,

cum opus adfuerit, secundum quod debent defeodis et tenementis suis dejure nobis

facer e." This personal service in process of time degenerated into pecuniary

commutations or aids, and at last the military part (3) of the feudal system was

abolished at the restoration, by statute 12 Car. II, c. 24.

In the mean time we are not to imagine that the kingdom was left wholly

without defence in case of domestic insurrections, or the prospect of foreign

invasions. Besides those who by their military tenures were bound to perform forty

days' service in the field, first the assize of arms, enacted 27 Hen. *II, (h) r *. * * -,

and afterwards the statute of Winchester, (i) under Edward I, obliged "- J

every man, according to his estate and degree, to provide a determinate quan-

tity of such arms as were then in use, in order to keep the peace: and constables

were appointed in all hundreds by the latter statute, to see that such arms were

provided. These weapons were changed, by the statute 4 and 5 Ph. and M. c. 2,

into others of more modern service; but both this and the former provisions

were repealed in the reign of James I. (k) While these continued in force, it

was usual from time to time for our princes to issue commissions of array, and

send into every county officers in whom they could confide, to muster and array,

or set in military order, the inhabitants of every district; and the form of the

commission of array was settled in parliament in the 5 Hen. IV, so as to prevent

(e) The Poles are, even at this day, so tenacious of their ancient constitution, that their pospolite, or mili-

tia, cannot be compelled to serve above six weeks, or forty days in a year. Mod. Un. Hist, xxxiv. 12.

----- - -r -• - ' • o .iisi. (») 13 Edw. I. c. 6.

la. cannot be compelled to serve above six weeks, or forty day

This large share of power, thus conferred by the people, though intended to preserve the liberty of the subject, was perhaps unreasonably detrimental to the
prerogative of the crown ; and accordingly we find ill use made of it by Edric,
duke of Mercia, in the reign of King Edmund Ironside; who, by his office of
duke or heretoch, was entitled to a large command in the king's army, and by
his repeated treacheries at last transferred the crown to Canute, the Dane.
It seems uniYersally agreed by all historians, that King- Alfred first settled a
national militia in this kingdom, and by his prudent discipline made all the
subjects of his dominion soldiers: but we are unfortunately left in the dark as
to the particulars of this his so celebrated regulation; though, from what was
last observed, the dukes seem to have been left in possession of too large and
independent a power; which *enabled Duke Harold, on the death of [ • 410 ]
Edward the Confessor, though a stranger to the royal blood, to mount
for a short space the throne of this kingdom, in prejudice of Edgar Atheling,
the rightful heir.
Upon the Norman conquest the feudal law was introduced here in all its
rigour, the whole of which is built on a military plan. I shall not now ent.er
into the particulars of that constitution, which belongs more ~roperly to the
next part of our Commentaries; but shall only observe, that, m consequence
thereof, all the lands in the kingdom were divided into what were called knights'
fees, in number above sixty thousand; and for every knight's fee a knight or
soldier, miles, was bound to attend the king in his wars, for forty days in a
year; (2) in which space of time, before war was reduced to a science, the campaign was generally finished, and a kingdom either conquered or victorious. (e)
By this means the king had, without any expense, an army of sixty thousand.
men always ready at his command. And accordingly we find one, among the
laws of William the Conquerer, ( f) which in the king's name commands and
firmly enjoins the personal attendance of all knights and others: "quod ha-Oeant
et teneant se semper bi armis et equis, ut decet et oportet : et quod semper sint
prompti et parati ad servitium suum integrum nobis explendum et peragendum,
cum opus adfuerit, secundum quod debent de feodis et tenementis siti<~ de Jure nob-is
facere." This personal service in process of time degenerated into pecuniary
commutations or aids, and at last the military part (3) of the feudal system was
abolished at the restoration, by statute 12 Car. II, c. 24.
In the mean time we are not to imagine that the kingdom was left wholly
without defence in case of domestic insurrections, or the prospect of foreign
invasions. Besides those who by their military tenures were bound to perform forty
days' senrice in the field, first the assize of arms, enacted 27 Hen. *II, (h) [ • 411 ]
and afterwards the statute of Winchester, (i) under Edward I, obliged
every man, according to his estate and degree, to provide a determinate quantity of such arms as were then in use, in order to keep the peace: and constables
were appointed in all hundreds by the latter statute, to see that such arms were
provided. 'fhese weapons were changed, by the statute 4 and 5 Ph. and M. c. 2,
into others of more modern service; but both this and the former provisions
were repealed in the reign of James I. (k) While these continued in force, it
was usual from time to time for our princes to issue commissions of array, and
send into every county officers in whom they could confide, to muster and array,
or set in military order, the inhabitants of every district; and the form of the
commission of array was settled in parliament in the 5 Hen. IV, so as to prevent

(/) C. 58. See Co. Litt. 75,76. (ft) Hoved. A. D 1181.

('.-I Stat. 1 Joe. I, c. 25. 21 Jac. I, c. 28.

(2) [We frequently read of half a knight, or other aliquot part, as for go much land three

(e) The Poleii are, even at this day, so tenacious of their ancient constitution, that their pospolite, or militia. co.nno! be compelled to sc!:ve above six weeks1 or forty days In a yi;sr. Mod. Un. Hist. xxxiv. 12.
(fl C. 6.~. See Co. LIU. 75, .6.
(h) Ho\·ea. A. 0 . 1181.
(1) 13 Edw. I. c. 6.
(l:) Stat. 1 Jae. I, c. 26. 21 Jae. I, c. 'lS.

knights and a half, <tc., were to be returned: the fraction of a knight was performed by a whole

knight who served half the time, or other due proportion of it.]

(3) [The military or warlike part of the feudal system was abolished, when personal service

•was dispensed with for a pecuniary commutation, as early as the reign of Henry II. But the

military tenures still remained till 12 Car. II, c. 24. See book 2, p. 77.]

(2) [We frequentlv read of half a knight, or other aliquot part, as for RO much laud three
knights a.nd a half, &c., were to be returned: the fraction of a. knhi:ht was performed by a. whole
~
lmip:ht who i<erved half the time, or other due proportion of it.]
(:J) [The military or warlike part of the feudal system was abolished, when personal ilervice
wa.-1 dhq1en!'erl with for a pecuniary commutation, as early as the reign of Henry II. But the
military tenures still remn.incd till 12 Car. II, c. 24. See book 2, p. 77.]
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the insertion therein of any new penal clauses. (I) But it was also provided (m)

that no man should be compelled to go out of the kingdom at any rate, nor out of

his shire but in cases of urgent necessity; nor shouldprovide soldiers unless by

consent of parliament. About the reign of King Henry the Eighth, or his

children, lieutenants began to be introduced, (n) as standing representatives of

the crown, to keep the counties in military order; for we find them mentioned

as known officers in the statute 4 and 5 Ph. and M. c. 3, though they had not

been then long in use, for Camden speaks of them (o) in the time of Queen Eliza-

beth, as extraordinary magistrates constituted only in times of difficulty and

danger. But the introduction of these commissions of lieutenancy, which con-

tained in substance the same powers as the old commissions of array, caused the

latter to fall into disuse.

In this state things continued till the repeal of the statutes of armour in the

reign of King James the First: after which, when King Charles the First had,

during his northern expeditions, issued commissions of lieutenancy, and exerted

some military powers, which, having been long exercised, were thought to belong

to the crown, it became a question in the long parliament, how far the power of

the militia did inherently reside in the king; being now unsupported by any

statute, and founded only upon immemorial usage. This question, long agitated

r *41 o I with great heat and resentment on both *sides, became at length the

L -I immediate cause of the fatal rupture between the king and his parliament;

the two houses not only denying this prerogative of the crown, the legality of
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which perhaps might be somewhat doubtful, but also seizing into their own

hands the entire power of the militia, of the illegality of which step could never

be any doubt at all.

Soon after the restoration of King Charles the Second, when the military

tenures were abolished, it was thought proper to ascertain the power of the

militia, to recognize the sole right of the crown to govern and command them,

and to put the whole into a more regular method of military subordination: (p )

and the order, in which the militia now stands by law, is principally built upon

the statutes which were then enacted. It is true the two last of them are appar-

ently repealed; but many of their provisions are re-enacted, with the addition

of some new regulations, "by the present militia laws, (4J the general scheme of

which is to discipline a certain number of the inhabitants of every county,

chosen by lot for three years, and officered by the lord lieutenant, the deputy

lieutenants, and other principal landholders, under a commission from the crown.

They are not compellable to march out of their counties, unless in case of inva-

sion or actual rebellion within the realm (or any of its dominions or territories),

(q) nor in any case compellable to march out of the kingdom. They are to be

exercised at stated times; and their discipline in general is liberal and easy; but

when drawn out into actual service, they are subject to the rigours of martial

law, as necessary to keep them in order. This is the constitutional security which

our laws (r) have provided for the public peace, and for protecting the realm,

against foreign or domestic violence. (5)

(I) Bushworth. parts, pages 662. 667. See 8 Kvni. 374, Ac.

(m) Stat. 1 Edw. Ill, ot. 2, o. 6 and 7. 25 Kdw. IH. et. 5, o. 8. (n) 15 Ryro. 75.

foj Brit. KB. Edit. 15W. (p) 13 Car. II, c. 6. It Car. H, 0. 3. 15 Car. n, o. 4. (q) Stat. 16 Qeo.

III. c. 3.

(r) 2 Geo. m, c. 20. 9 Geo. m, c. 42. 16 Geo. HI, c. 3. 18 Geo. Ill, c. H and 50. 19 Geo. HI, c. 78.

(4) [The present militia system is mainly regulated by 42 Geo. Ill, c. 90, as altered and

amended by many subsequent acts, the last of which is 32 and 33 Tie. c. 13. The general

scheme of the legislature has been to discipline a certain number of the inhabitants of every

county, chosen by lot for five years, and officered by the lord lieutenant, the deputy lieutenants,

and other principal land owners under a commission from the crown.]

(5) In the United States the individual states discipline and officer the militia, but congress

may provide therefor, and also for calling them forth to execute the laws of the Union, sun-

press insurrections and repel invasions. Const, art. 1, $ 8. When thus called forth the presi-

dent is commander-in-chief: art. 2, § 2; and congress may provide for their government

Art. 1, $ 8. By the act of Feb. 28, 1795, the president was empowered to call forth the militia

to repel invasions, or, in imminent danger thereof, to put down insurrections or enforce the

2G2

Chap. 13.] MILITARY AND MARITIME STATES. 412

Chap. 13.]

412

MILITARY AND MARITIME STATES.

When the nation was engaged in war, more veteran troops and more regular

discipline were esteemed to be necessary than could be expected from a mere

militia. And therefore at such times more rigorous methods were put in use

for the *raising of armies, and the due regulation and discipline of the r #,, o -i

soldiery: which are to be looked upon only as temporary excrescences L •"

bred out of the distemper of the state, and not as any part of the permanent

and perpetual laws of the kingdom. For martial law, which is built upon no

settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is, as Sir Matthew

Hale observes, (s) in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather

than allowed as a law. (6) The necessity of order and discipline in an army is

the only thing which can give it countenance ; and therefore it ought not to be

permitted in time of peace, when the king's courts are open for all persons to

receive justice according to the laws of the land. Wherefore, Thomas, earl of

Lancaster, being condemned at Pontefract, 15 Edw. II, by martial law, his

attainder was reversed, 1 Edw. Ill, because it was done in time of peace. (() (7)

(») Hist. C. L. o. 2. (t) a Brad. Appen. 59.

laws against obstructions or combinations. 1 Statute at Large, 424. Under this statute it

When the nation was engaged in war, more veteran troops and more regull\r
discipline were esteemed to be necessary than could be expected from a mere
militia. And therefore at such times more ri~orous methods were put in use
for the •raising of armies, and the due regulat10n and discipline of the [ • 413 ]
soldiery: which are to be looked upon only as temporary excrescences
bred out of the distemper of the state, and not as any part of the permanent
and perpetual laws of the kin~dom. For martial law, which is built upon no
settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is, as Sir Matthew
Hale observes, (s) in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather
than allowed as a law. (6) The necessity of order and discipline in an army is
the only thing which can give it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be
permitted in time of peace, when the king's courts are open for all persons to
receive justice according to the laws of the land. Wherefore, Thomas, earl of
Lancaster, being condemned at Pontefract, 15 Edw. II, by martial law, his
attainder was reversed, 1 Edw. III, because it was done in time of peace. (t) (7)
(1)

belongs to the president exclusively to determine when the contingency has arisen which

Hist. C. L. o. i.

(I) i Brad .

.Appen. 119.

makes the calling forth of the militia necessary. Martin r. Mott, 12 "Wheat. 29.

(6) [This censure is by no means merited at the present day, whatever may have been the fact

when Sir Matthew Hale wrote. ]

(7) Military and martial law are frequently confounded, though the distinction between
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them is very plain and broad. Military law is that portion of the law of the land prescribed

by the government to regulate the conduct of the citizen in his character as soldier. It is

administered by military tribunals, and is equally in force in peace and in war. But it does

not supersede the civil laws of the land, for any breach of which the soldier is liable to the

same trial and punishment as the civilian. Martial law, on the other hand, is denned as being

that military rule and authority which exists in time of war, and is cpnferreti by the laws of

war, in relation to persons and things under and within the scope of active military opera-

tions in carrying on the war, and which extinguishes or suspends civil rights, and the reme-

dies founded upon them, for the time being, so far as may appear to be necessary in order to the

full accomplishment of the purpose of the war. It is the application of military government—the

government of force—to persons and property within the scope of it, according to the laws and

usages of war, to the exclusion of the municipal government in all respects where the latter

would impair the efficiency of military law or military action. Benet, Military Law, 14. And see

1 Kent, 341, note; 2 H. Bl. 98, per Lord Longhborongh.

The occasions to consider the extent and force of martial law have happily not been nu-

merous in America, but it may be useful to refer to the most noted of them. The case of

the declaration of martial law by Gen. Jackson at Tfew Orleans, at the time of the attempt

upon that city by the British forces in 1814-15, and the legal proceedings which grew out of

it, will be remembered by all readers of American history, but the correctness, respectively, of

the conduct of the general, and that of the judge who imposed a fine upon him for contempt

of court, never received any more authoritative examination than that which it had in con-

gress at the time the fine was refunded in 1842. See 2 Benton's Thirty Years' View, 599. It

is settled in the United States that the legislature of a state may declare martial law through-

out the state whenever in their opinion it may be necessary to thwart the purposes of those

who are attempting, in an irregular manner, to revolutionize the state government; and that

the military officers are exempt from civil responsibility for enforcing the declaration. Luther

v. Borden, 7 How. 1. In this case and that of ex parte Mulligan, 4 "Wai. 2, a very full and

elaborate examination of the whole subject may be found. The facts in the case last men-

tioned were these: On the fifth day of October, 1864, Mulligan, who was a citizen of the

United States, resident within the state of Indiana, was seized at his home in that state, by

order of the United States military officer commanding therein, and on the 21st day of the same

month, bv order of such commander, put on trial before a military commission at Indianapolis,

on the following charges:

1. Conspiring against the government of the United States.

2. Affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States.

3. Inciting insurrection.

4. Disloyal practices.

5. Violation of the laws of war.

Under these charges there were various specifications, the substance of which was, the join-

ing and aiding, at different times, between October 1863 and August 1864, a secret society known

laws against obstructions or combinations. 1 Statnte at Large, 424. Under this statute it
belongs to the president exclusively to determine when the contingency has arisen which
makes the calling forth of the militia necessary. Martin ti. Mott, 12 Wheat. 29.
(6) [This ccniiure is by no means merited at the present day, whatever may have been the fact
when Sir Matthew Halo wrote.]
(7) Military and martial law are frequently confounded, though the distinction between
them is very plain and broad. Military law is that portion of the law of the land prescribed
by the govemmmt to regulate the conduct of the citizen in his character as soldier. It is
adminiswred by military tribunals, and is equally in force in peace and in war. But it does
not supersede the civil laws of the land, for any breach of which the soldier is liable to the
same trial and punishment as the civilian. Martial law, on the other hand, is defined ag being
that military rule and authority which exists in time of war, and is cc;inferreo by the laws of
war, in relation to per~ons and thingi! under and within the scope of active military operations in carrying on the war, and wliich extinguishes or suspendH civil rights, and the remedies founded upon them, for the time being, so far as may appear to be nece>Jtiary in order to the
full accompli~hment of the purpose of the war. It is the application of military government-the
government of force-to persons and propertr within the scope of it, according to the Jaws and
usages of war, to the excfusion of the municipal government in all respectR where the latter
would impn.ir the efficiency of military law or riillit6ry' action. Benet, Military Law, 14. And see
1 Kent, 341, note; 2 H. Bl 98, per Lord Loughborough.
The occasions to consider the extent and fotce of martial law have happily not lieen numerous in America, but it may be useful to refer to the most noted of them. The case of
the declaration of martial law by Gen. Jackson at New Orleans, at the time of the attempt
upon that city by the British forces in 1814-15, and the legal proceedings which grew out of
it, will be remembered by all readers of American history" but the correctness, respectively, of
the condnct of the ~eneraJ, and that of the judge who lIDJ,lOBed a fine upon him for contempt
of court, never received any more authoritative examination than that which it had in conf!l'es11 at the time the fine was refunded in 1842. See 2 Benton's Thirty Years' View, 599. It
IS settled in the United States that the legislatnre of a state may declare martial law throughout the state whenever in their o.einion it may lie necessary to thwart the purpOl'1es of those
who are attempting, in an irregular manner, to revolutionize the state government ; and that
the military officem are exemvt from civil responsibility for enforcing tho declaration. Luther
v. Borden, 7 How. 1. In thhl case and that of ex parte Mulligan, 4 Wal. 2, a very full and
elaborate examination of the whole subject may be found. The facts in tho case last mentioned were these : On the fifth day of October, 1864, Mulligan, who was a citizen of the
United States, resident within the state of Indiana, was seized at his home in that 8tate, by
onler of the Ullited States military officer commanding therein, and on the 21st day of the same
month, by order of l'luch commander, put on trial before a military commission at Indianapolis,
on the following charges :
1. Con~piring against the government of the United StateR.
2. Affonling aid and c-0mfort to rebels against the authority of the United States.
3. Inciting irnmrrection.
4. Di:doyal practices.
5. Violation of the laws of war.
Under theioe chars:eR there were various specifications, the substance of which was, the joining and aiding, at different timei1, between October 1863 and August 18f>4, a. secret society known
a.<i the order of .American Knights or Sons of Liberty, for the purpose of overthrowing the
government and duly conHtituted authorities of the United States; holdinir communication
with the enemy; conspiring to seize munitions of war stored in tho United States arscnah1, to
liberate prisoners of war, &c., reHisting tho draft, &c., at or near Indianapolis, aforesaid, in
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as the order of American Knights or Sons of Liberty, for the purpose of overthrowing the

government and duly constituted authorities of the United States; holding communication

with the enemy; conspiring to seize munitions of war stored in the United States arsenals, to

liberate prisoners of war, Ac., resisting the draft, <tc., at or near Indianapolis, aforesaid, in
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And it is laid down, (u) that if a lieutenant, or other, that hath commission of

martial authority, doth in time of peace hang or otherwise execute any man by

colour of martial law, this is murder; for it is against magna carta. (v) The

petition of right (w) moreover enacts, that no soldier shall be quartered on the

subject without his own consent, (x) and that no commission shall issue to pro-

ceed within this land according to martial law. And whereas, after the restora-

tion, King Charles the Second kept up about five thousand regular troops, bv

his own authority, for guards and garrisons; which King James the SeconS

by degrees increased to no less than thirty thousand, all paid from his own civil

list; it was made one of the articles of the bill of rights, (y) that the raising or

keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with

consent of parliament, is against law.

But, as the fashion of keeping standing armies, which was first introduced by

Charles VII, in France, A. D. 1445, (z) has of late years universally prevailed

F *414 1 over -^ur°Pe» (though *some of its potentates, being unable themselves

L J to maintain them, are obliged to have recourse to richer powers, and

receive subsidiary pensions for that purpose,) it has also for many years past

been annually judged necessary by our legislature, for the safety of the kingdom,

the defence of the possessions of the crown of Great Britain, and the preserva-

tion of the balance of power in Europe, to maintain even in time of peace a

standing body of troops, under the command of the crown; who are, however,

ipso facto disbanded at the expiration of every year, unless continued by par-
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liament. And it was enacted by statute 10 Wm. Ill, c. 1, that not more than

twelve thousand regular forces should be kept on foot in Ireland, though paid

at the charge of that kingdom; which permission is extended by statute 8 Geo.

Ill, c. 13, to 16,235 men, in time of peace. (8)

fa) 3 Inst. 62. (i-) Cap. 29. (v>) 3 Car. I. See also stat. SI Car. II, c. 1.

(x) Thus in Poland no soldier can be quartered upon the gentry, the only freemen in that republic. Hod.

Univ. Hist, xxxiv. 23.

(y) Stat. 1 W. and M. st. 2, c. «. (z) Boberteon, Cha. V, 1. 94.

Indiana, a state " within the military lines of the army of the United States and the theatre of

And it is laid down, (te) that if a lieutenant, or other, that hath commission of
martial authority, doth in time of peace hang or otherwise execute any man by
colour of martial law, this is murder; for it is against magna carta. (ti) The
petition of right (w) moreover enacts, that no soldier shall be quartered on the
subject without his own consent, (x) and that no commission shall issue to proceed within this land according to martial law. And whereas, after the restoration, King Charles the Second kept up about five thousand regular troops, bv
hie own authority, for guards and garrisons; which Kin~ Jamee the Secon(l
by de~reee increased to no less than thirty thousand, all pa.id from his own civil
list ; it was made one of the articles of the bill of rights, (y) that the raising or
keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with
consent of parliament, is against law.
But, as the fashion of keeping standing armies, which was first introduced by
Charles VII, in Prance, A. D. 1445, (z) has of late years unirnrsally prevailed
[ • 414 ] over Europe, (though *some of its potentates, being unable themselves
to maintam them, are obliged to have recourse to richer powers, and
receive subsidiary pensions for that purpose,) it has also for many years past
been annually judged ne.cessary by our legislature, for the safety of the kingdom,
the defence of the possessions of the crown of Great Britain, and the preservation of the balance of power in Europe, to maintain even in time of peace a.
standing body of troops, under the command of the crown; who are, however,
i,pso facto disbanded at the expiration of every year, unless continued by parliament. And it was enacted by statute 10 Wm. III, c. 1, that not more than
twelve thousand regular forces should be kept on foot in Ireland, though paid
at the charge of that kingdom ; which permission is extended by statute 8 Geo.
III, c. 13, to 16,235 men, in time of peace. (8)
(u) 8 Inst. 112.
(11) Cap. 29.
(t11) S Car. I. See also atat. 81 C&r. Il, e. 1.
(z) Tb us In Pohmd no aoldler ean be quartered upon the gentry, the only freemen ID that republle. Koci.
Univ. Hist. xxxlv. 23.
(VJ Stat. 1 W. and H. st. 2, o. II.
(•) Robertson, Cha. V, i. 9'.

military operations, and which had been and was constantly threatened to be invaded by the

enemy." On all these charges Mulligan was fonnd guilty by the commission and sentenced to

be hanged, and the sentence was approved by the president.

The validity of these proceedings was questioned in the supreme court of the United States,

on a writ of habeas corpus. It appeared in the case that, during the period of the alleged offenses

and of the sitting of the commission, the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended

Tinder the permission of an act of congress, in the case of all persons held in custody by military

officers by authority of the president, out it also appeared that the courts of the United States

for the district of Indiana were open and unobstructed in the performance of their duties, and

that a grand jury was summoned and sat in said court during the time when Mulligan was held

in confinement awaiting trial.

Upon these facts it was decided by the supreme court of the United States that Mulligan was

entitled to his liberty. That military commissions organized during the civil war, in a state not

invaded and not engaged in rebellion, in which the federal courts were open, and in the proper

and unobstructed exercise of their functions, had no jurisdiction to try, convict or sentence, for

any criminal offense, a citizen who was neither a resident of a rebellious state, nor a prisoner of

war, nor a person in the military and naval service; and that congress could not invest them with

any such power. And it was further held, that the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury was

intended for a state of war, as well as a state of peace, and was equallv binding upon'rulers and

people at all times and under all circumstances. See further, In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359; Todd,

Par. Gov. vol. 1, p. 342.

Respecting martial law the judicial decisions are numerous, and cover a great mum points.

The civil courts, however, exercise no supervision over the military except to see that ttey keep

within their jurisdiction.

(8) [It is perfectly lawful to employ soldiers to preserve the peace at home; but this should be

done with great caution, and not without an absolute necessity. " Magistrates," said Lord Chan-

cellor Hardwicke, " have a power to call any subject to their assistance to preserve the peace and

execute the process of the law ; and why not soldiers as well as other men f Our soldiers are

our fellow-citizens. They do not cease to be so by putting on a red coat and carrying a musket."

The military act, on such occasions, not qua military, but simply in aid of and in obedience to

tho civil power, which " calls them in." To quote again Lord Chancellor Hardwiekp, " as armed

Indiana, a state "within the military lines of the army of the United States and the theatre of
military operations, and which had been and was constantly threatened to be invaded by the
enemy." On all the11e charges Mulligan was found guilty by the commission and sentenced to
be hanged, and the sentence was approved by the president.
The validity of these proceedings was questioned in the supreme court of the United States,
on a writ of habeas corpus. It appeared in the case that, during the period of the alleged offenses
and of the sitting of the commission, the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus waa suspended
under the permission of an act of congress, in the c8Be of all persons held in custody by military
officers by authority of the president, but it also appeared that the courts of the United Stat.ea
for the district of Indiana were open and unobstructed in the performance of their duties, and
that a grand jury was mmmoned and sat in said court during the time when Mulligan was held
in coniinement awaiting trial.
Upon these facts it was decided by the supreme court of the United States that Mulligan was
entitlecl to hie liberty. That mill~ oommi11tilons organized during the civil wa.r, in a state not
invaded and not eng~ed in rebelhon, in which the federal courts were open, and in the proper
and unobstructed exercise of their functions, had no jurisdiction to try, convict or t1entence, for
any criminal offense, a citizen who was neither a resident of a rebellious state, nor a priwner of
war, nor a person in the military and naval service; and that congress could not invest them with
any such power. .A.nd it was further held, that the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury was
intended for a. state of war, as well as a state of peace, and was equally binding upon ntlers and
people at all times and under all circumstances. See further, In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359; Todd,
Par. Gov. vol. 1, p. 342.
Respecting martial law the judicial decisions are numerous, and cover a. great manv points.
The civil courts, however, exercise no supervision over the military except to see that they keep
within their jariK<liction.
(8) [It is perfectly lawful t'> employ soldiers to preserve the peace at home; but this should be
done with great caution, and not without an absolute nece88ity. ".Magistra.tell,'' said Lord Chancellor Ha.rdwicke, " have a. power to call any subject to their a..-ssistance to preserve the peace and
execute the process of the law ; and why not soldiers o.s well 11.'l other men t Our wldiers a.re
our fellow-citizens. They do not cease to be so by putting on a red coat and c8lTpng a musket."
The military act, on sueh occa..~ion~, not q?1a military, but simply in aid of and m obedience to
tho civil power, whirh ''cull~ them in." To quote again Lord Chancellor Hardwi<>kl', "a..~ ar11JtM
citizens, often saving the cffu~iou of innocent blood and pret1en-ing the dominion of the law.")

264

citizens, often saving the effusion of innocent blood and preserving the dominion of the law."]
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To prevent the executive power from being able to oppress, says Baron Mon-

tesquieu, (a) it is requisite that the armies with which it is entrusted should con-

sist of the people, and have the same spirit with the people; as was the case at

Home, till Marius new-modelled the legions by enlisting the rabble of Italy, and

laid the foundation of all the military tyranny that ensued. Nothing, then,

according to these principles, ought to be more guarded against in a free state,

than making the military power, when such a one is necessary to be kept on foot,

a body too distinct from the people. Like ours, it should wholly be composed

of natural subjects; it ought only to be enlisted for a short and limited time;

the soldiers also should live intermixed with the people; no separate camp, no

barracks, no inland fortresses should be allowed. And perhaps it might be still

better if, by dismissing a stated number, and enlisting others at every renewal

of their term, a circulation could be kept up between the army and the people,

and the citizen and the soldier be more intimately connected together.

To keep this body of troops in order, an annual act of parliament likewise

passes," to punish mutiny and desertion, *and for the better payment r *4i 5 n

of the army and their quarters." This regulates the manner in which L -*

they are to be dispersed among the several innkeepers and victuallers through-

out the kingdom; and establishes a law martial for their government. By this,

among other things, it is enacted, that if any officer or soldier shall excite, or

join any mutiny, or, knowing of it, shall not give notice to the commanding

officer: or shall desert, or list in any other regiment, or sleep upon his post, or
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leave it before he is relieved, or hold correspondence with a rebel or enemy, or

strike or use violence to his superior officer, or shall disobey his lawful com-

mands : such offender shall suffer such punishment as a court martial shall

inflict, though it extend to death itself.

However expedient the most strict regulations may be in time of actual war,

yet in times of profound peace a little relaxation of military rigour would not,

one should hope, be productive of much inconvenience. And upon this prin-

ciple, though by our standing laws (b) (still remaining in force, though not

attended to,) desertion in time of war is made felony, without benefit of clergy,

and the offence is triable by a jury and before justices at the common law: yet,

by our militia laws before mentioned, a much lighter punishment is inflicted

for desertion in time of peace. So, by the Roman law also, desertion in time of

war was punished with death, but more mildly in time of tranquility. (c) But

our mutiny act makes no such distinction: for any of the faults above men-

tioned are, equally at all times, punishable with death itself, if a court martial

shall think proper. This discretionary power of the court martial is indeed to

be guided by the directions of the crown; which, with regard to military

offences, has almost an absolute legislative power, (d) " His majesty," says the

act, " may form articles of war, and constitute courts martial, with power to try

any crime by such articles, and inflict penalties by sentence or judgment of the

same." A vast and most important trust! an unlimited power to create crimes,

and annex to them any punishments, not extending to life or limb! These are

indeed forbidden to be inflicted, *except for crimes declared to be so r * ,jg -,

punishable by this act; which crimes we have just enumerated, and L ' 1

among which we may observe that any disobedience to lawful commands is one.

Perhaps in some future revision of this act, which is in many respects hastily

penned, it may be thought worthy the wisdom of parliament to ascertain the

limits of military subjection and to enact express articles of war for the gov-

ernment of the army, as is done for the government of the navy: especially as

by our present constitution, the nobility and gentry of the kingdom, who serve

their country as militia officers, are annually subjected to the same arbitrary

rule during their time of exercise.

One of the greatest advantages of our English law is, that not only the

crimes themselves which it punishes, but also the penalties which it inflicts, are

(a) Sp. L. ll.G. (6) Stat. 18 Hen. VI, c. 19. 2 and 8 Edw. VI. c. 2. (c) Ff. 49, 16, 5.

(d) A like power over the marines is given to the lords of the admiralty, by another annual act " for the

regulation ol° hid majesty's marine forces while on shore."
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To prevent the executive power from being: able to oppress, says Baron .Montesquieu, (a) it is requisite that the armies with which it is entrusted should consist of the people, and have the same spirit with the people; as was the case at
Rome, till Marius new-modelled the legions by enlisting the rabble of Italy, and
laid the foundation of all the military tyranny that ensued. Nothing, then,
according to these principles, ought to be more guarded against in a free state,
than making the military power, when such a one is necessary to be kept on fo1Jt,
a body too distinct from the peof,le. Like ours, it should wholly be composed
of natural subjects; it ought on y to be enlisted for a short and limited time;
the soldiers also should live intermixed with the people; no separate camp, no
barracks, no inland fortresses should be allowed. And perhaps it might be still
better if, by dismissing a stated number, and enlisting others at every renewal
of their term, a circulation could be kept up between the army and the people,
and the citizen and the soldier be more mtimately connected together.
To keep this body of troops in order, an annual act of parliament likewise
passes, "to punish mutiny and desertion, *and for the better .Payment [ • 415 ]
of the army and their quarters." This regulates the manner m which
they are to be dispersed among the several innkeepers and victuallers throughout the kingdom; and establishes a law martial for their government. By this,
among other things, it is enacted, that if any officer or sol<lier shall excite, or
join any mutiny, or, knowing of it, shall not give notice to the commanding
officer: or shall desert, or list in any other regiment, or sleep upon his post, or
leave it before he is relieved, or hold correspondence with a rebel or enemy, or
strike or use violence to his superior officer, or shall disobey his lawful commands: such offender shall suffer such punishment as a court martial shall
inflict, though it extend to death itself.
However expedient the most strict regulations may be in time of actual war,
yet in times of profound peace a little relaxation of military rigour would not,
one should hope, be productive of much inconvenience. And upon this principle, though by our standing laws (b) (still remaining in force, though not
attended to,) desertion in time of war is made felony, without benefit of clergy,
and the offence is triable by a jury and before justices at the common law: yet,
by our militia laws before mentioned, a much lighter punishment is inflicted
for desertion in time of peace. So, by the Roman law also, desertion in time of
war was punished with death, but more mildly in time of tranquility. (c) But
our mutiny act makes no such distinction: for any of the faults above mentioned are, equally at all times, punishable with death itself, if a court martial
shall think proper. This discretionary power of the court martial is indeed to
be guided by the directions of the crown; which, with regard to military
offences, has almost an absolute legislative power. (d) "His majesty," says the
act, "may form articles of war, and constitute courts martial, with power to try
any crime py such articles, and inflict penalties by sentence or judgment of the
same." A vast and most impJrtant trust! an unlimited power to create crimes,
and annex to them any punishments, not extending to life or limb I These are
indeed forbidden to be inflicted, *except for crimes declared to be so [ • 4161
punishable by this act; which crimes we have just enumerated, and
among which we may observe that any disobedience to lawful commands is one.
Perhaps in some future revision of this act, which is in many respects hastily
penned, it may be thought worthy the wisdom of parliament to ascertain the
limits of military subjection and to enact express articles of war for the goTernment of the army, as is done for the government of the navy: especially as
by our present constitution, the nobility and gentry of the kingdom, who serve
their country as militia officers, are annually subjected to the same arbitrary
rule during their time of exercise.
One of the greatest advantages of our English law is, that not only the
crimes themselves which it punishes, but also the penalties which it inflicts, are
(a) 8p. J,. 11. G.
(b) Stnt. 18 Hen. VI, c. 19. 2 and 8 Edw. VI[ c. 2.
(c) Ff. 49, 16, 15.
(d) A like 11ower 0>·e1· Lhe marines is gi ,·en to the lords of the l\dm ralty, by another annual net '• for the
rcgnlation ol" hid ml\jesty's murine forces while on shore."
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ascertained and notorious; nothing is left to arbitrary discretion: the king by

his judges dispenses what the law has previously ordained; but is not himself

the legislator. How much therefore is it to be regretted that a set of men,

whose bravery has so often preserved the liberties of their country, should be

reduced to a state of servitude in the midst of a nation of freemen! for Sir

Edward Coke will inform us, (<?) that it is one of the genuine marks of servi-

tude, to have the law, which is our rule of action, either concealed or preca-

rious : " misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incognitum." Nor is this

state of servitude quite consistent with the maxims of sound policy observed by

other free nations. For the greater the general liberty is which any state

enjoys, the more cautious has it usually been in introducing slavery in any par-

ticular order or profession. These men, as Baron Montesquieu observed, (f)

seeing the liberty which others possess, and which they themselves are excludm

from, are apt (like eunuchs in the eastern seraglios) to live in a state of per-

petual envy and hatred towards the rest of the community, and indulge a

malignant pleasure in contributing to destroy those privileges to which they can

never be admitted. Hence have many free states, by departing from this rule,

F *417 1 ^een endnngered by the revolt of *their slaves; while in absolute and

-" depotic governments, where no real liberty exists, and consequently no

invidious comparisons can be formed, such incidents are extremely rare. Two

precautions are therefore advised to be observed in all prudent and free govern-

ments : 1. To prevent the introduction of slavery at all; or, 2. If it be already
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introduced, not to intrust those slaves with arms; who will then find themselves

an overmatch for the freemen. Much less ought the soldiery to be an exception

to the people in general, and the only state of servitude in the nation.

But as soldiers, by this annual act, are thus put in a worse condition than any

other subjects; so by the humanity of our standing laws they are in some cases

put in a much better. By statute 43 Eiiz., c. 3, a weekly allowance is to be>

raised in every county for the relief of soldiers that are sick, hurt and maimed f

not forgetting the royal hospital at Chelsea for such as are worn out in theii

duty. (9) Ofhcers and soldiers that have been in the king's service are, by sev-

eral statutes enacted at the close of several wars, at liberty to use any trade or

occupation they are fit for in any town in the kingdom (except the two univer-

sities), notwithstanding any statute, custom, or charter to the contrary. And

soldiers in actual military sen-ice may make nuncupative wills, and dispose of

their goods, wages, and other personal chattels, without those forms, solemnities,

and expenses, which the law requires in other cases. (</) Our law does not

indeed extend this privilege so far as the civil law; which carried it to an

extreme that borders upon the ridiculous. For if a soldier, in the article of

death, wrote any thing in bloody letters on his shield, or in the dust of the field

with his sword, it was a very good military testament (h) And thus much for

the military state, as acknowledged by the laws of England.

The maritime state is nearly related to the former, though much more agree-

f *418 1 a^e to ^e Prmciples °f ^ur free constitution. *The royal navy of

-" England hath ever been its greatest defence and ornament; it is its

ancient and natural strength; the floating bulwark of the island; an army

from which, however strong and powerful, no danger can ever be apprehended

to liberty; and accordingly it has been assiduously cultivated even from the

earliest ages. To so much perfection was our naval reputation arrived in the

twelfth century, that the code of maritime laws, which are called the laws of

(t) 4 Inst. 352. (f) Sp. L. IS, 12. (g) Stat. 29 Car. H. o. 3 ; 8 W. HI, 0. 21. t 8.

(h) Si mUilet quid in clypeo Merit tnnguine tvo rutilantibut aanotaverint. aut in pvlvtre inicripmriat

ylndio »«o, ipso tempore quo, inpralio, vita lortcm derelinquunt, hvjuimodi voluntatemttabilemau oportet.

Cod. 6, 21, 15.

(9) [Liberal pensions have been paid in the United States under various acts of congress, to

the soldiers who have served honorably in their wars, and to the families of those who were

killed or died in service. Military and naval hospitals have also been provided at the public

ascertained aJ;J.d notorious; nothing is left to arbitrary discretion: the king by
his judges dispenses what the law ha.a previously ordained; but is not himself
the legislator. How much therefore is it to be regretted that a set of men,
whose bra'fery has so often preserved the liberties of their country, should he
reduced to a state of servitude in the midst of a nation of freemen! for Sir
Edward Coke will inform us, (e) that it is one of the genuine marks of servitude, to have the law, which is our rule of action, either concealed or precarious: "rnisera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incognUum." Nor is this
state of servitude quite consistent with the maximi, of sound policy observed by
other free nations. For the greater the general liberty is which any state
enjoys, the more cautious has it usually been in introducing slavery in any particular order or profession. These men, as Baron Montesquieu obscn·es, ( f)
seeing the liberty which others possess, and which they themselves are excluded
from, a.re a.pt (like eunuchs in the eastern seraglios) to live in a state of perpetual envy and hatred towards the rest of the community, and indulge a
malignant pleasure in contributing to destroy those prfrileges to which they can
never be admitted. Hence have many free states, by departing from this rule,
[ • 417 ] been endangered by the revolt of *their slaves; while in absolute and
depotic governments, where no real liberty exists, and consequently no
invidious comparisons can be formed, such incidents are extremely rare. Two
precautions art> therefore advised to be observed in all prudent and free goYernments: 1. To prevent the introduction of slavery at all; or, 2. If it be already
introduced, not to in trust those slaves with arms; who will then find themsehes
an overmatch for the freemen. Much less ought the soldiery to be an exc.eption
to the people in general, and the only state of servitude in the nation.
But as soldiers, by this annual act, are thus put in a worse condition than any
other subjects; so by the humanity of our standing laws they are in some cases
put in a much better. By statute 43 Eiiz., c. 3, a weekly allowance is to bu
raised in every county for the relief of soldiers that are sick, hurt and maimed;
not forgettin~ the royal hospital at Chelsea for such as are worn out in thei1
duty. (9) Officers and soldiers that have been in the king's service arc, by several statutes enacted at the close of several wars, at liberty to use any trade or
occupation they are fit for in any town in the kingdom (except the two univer8it.ies), notwithstanding any statute, custom, or charter to the contrary. And
soldiers in actual military sen·ice may make nuncupative wills, and dispose of
their goods, wages, and other personal chattels, without those fonns, solemnities,
and expenses, which the law requires in other cases. (g) Our law does not
indeed extend this privilege so far as the civil law; which carried it to an
extreme that borders upon the ridiculous. For if a soldier, in the article of
death, wrote any thing in bloody letters on his shield, or in the dust of the field
with his sword, it was a very good military testament. (Ii) And thus much for
.
the military state, as acknowledged by the laws of England.
The maritime state is nearly related to the former, though much more agree[ *418 ] able to the principles of our free constitution. *The royal navy of
England hath ever been its greatest defence and ornament; it is its
ancient and natural strength ; the floating bulwark of the island ; an anny
from which, however strong and powerful, no danger can ever be apprehended
to liberty; and accordingly it ha.a been assiduously culti•ated even from the
earliest ages. To so much perfection was our naval reputation arrived in the
twelfth century, that the code of maritime laws, which are called the laws of
(e) 4 Inst. 352.
(f) Sp. L. 111, 12.
(g) Stat. 29 Car. U 1 o. 3; II W. III, o. 21. j 8.
(h) Si mililu qufd 'n clweo llteril 1angul~ BUo rutilantUnu nanolarierlnt. aut In ptil~ itucripam..t
gladio mo, 'p•o tempore quo, In prmUo, vftm •ortem tkrelirtquunt, htQunaodi t1olm1taka dabUeslt eue OflOr'lft.
Cod. 6, 21, 16.

expense.
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(9) [Liberal pensions have been paid in the United States under various acta of con~S!I, t-0
the 11oldiers who have served honorably in their wars, e.nd to the families of those who W'ere
killed or died in service. Military lllld naval bospituls have also been provided at the public
expense.
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Oleron, and are received by all nations in Europe as the ground and substruc-

tion of all their maritime constitutions, was confessedly complied by our King

Richard the First at the Isle of Oleron, on the coast of France, then part of the

possessions of the crown of England.(t) (10) And yet, so vastly inferior were

our ancestors in this point to the present age, that, even in the maritime reign

of Queen Elizabeth, Sir Edward Coke (k) thinks it matter of boast that the

royal navy of England then consisted of three and thirty ships. The present

condition of our marine is in great measure owing to the salutary provisions of

the statutes called the navigation acts, (11) whereby the constant increase of

English shipping and seamen was not only encouraged, but rendered unavoid-

ably necessary. By the statute 5 Eic. II, c. 3, in order to augment the navy of

England, then greatly diminished, it was ordained that none of the king's liege

people should ship any merchandize out of or into the realm, but only in ships

of the king's ligeance, on pain of forfeiture. In the next year, by statute 6

Ric. II. c. 8, this wise provision was enervated, by only obliging the merchants

to give English ships, if able and sufficient, the preference. But the most bene-

ficial statute for the trade and commerce of these kingdoms is that navigation

act, the rudiments of which were first framed in 1650, (I) with a narrow, partial

view: being intended to mortifv our own sugar islands, which were disaffected

to the parliament, and still held out for Charles II, by stopping the gainful

trade which they then carried on with the Dutch; (m) and at the same time to

clip the wings of those our opulent and aspiring neighbours. This prohi-
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bited all ships of foreign nations from trading with any English plantations

*without license from the council of state. In 1651 (n) the prohibition r #4-101

was extended also to the mother country; and no goods were suffered to L ' I

be imported into England, or any of its dependencies, in any other than Eng-

lish bottoms; or in the ships of that European nation of which the merchan-

dize imported was the genuine growth or manufacture. At the restoration, the

former provisions were continued, by statute 12 Car. II, c. 18, with this very

material improvement, that the master and three-fourths of the mariners shall

also be English subjects.

Many laws have Seen made for the supply of the royal navy with seamen; for

their regulation when on board; and to confer privileges and rewards on them

during and after their service.

1. First, for their supply. The power of impressing seafaring men for the

sea service by the king's commission, has been a matter of some dispute, and

submitted to with great reluctance; though it hath very clearly and learnedly

been shewn, by Sir Michael Foster, (o) that the practice of impressing, and

granting powers to the admiralty for that purpose, is of very ancient date, and

(«) 4 Inst. 144. Covtvmes de la Ifer. 2. It) 4 Inst. 60. (I) Scobell, 132.

(MM Mod. ().. Hist. xli. a<!i. (n) ScobeU, 170. (o) Rep. 1S4.

(10) [The French writers attribute these laws to Eleanor, duchess of Guienne, the king's

mother. She had previously been the wife of Louis VII, king of Prance; but divorced from

fhat monarch, she married Prince Henry, afterwards Henry II, Richard's father. She was a

Oleron, and are received by all nations in Europe as the ground and su\;>strnction of all their maritime constitutions, wa.s confessedly complied by our King
Richard the First at the Isle of Oleron, on the coast of France, then part of the
possessions of the crown of England. ( i) (10) And yet, so vastly inferior were
our ancestors in this point to the present age, that., even in the maritime reign
of Queen Elizabeth, Sir Edward Coke (k) thinks it matter of boast that the
royal navy of England then consisted of three and tliirty ships. The present
condition of our marine is in ~t. measure owing to the salutary provisions of
the statutes called the navigation acts, (11) whereby the constant increase of
English shipping and seamen wa.s not on1y encouraged, but rendered unaYoidably necessary. ~y the statute 5 Ric. II, c. 3, in order to augment the navy of
England, then greatly diminished, it was ordained that none of the kin~s liege
people should ship any merchandize out of or into the realm, but only m ships
of the king's ligeance, on ~min of forfeiture. In the next year, by statut~ 6
Ric. II, c. 8, this wise provision was enerrnted, by only obliging the merchants
to give English ships, if able and sufficient, the preference. But the most beneficial statute for the trade and commerce of these kin~doms is that navigation
act, the rudiments of which were first framed in 1650, l) with a narrow, partial
view: being intended to mortify our own sugar islan s, which were disaffected
to the parliament, and still held out for Charles II, by stopping the ~ainful
trade which they then carried on with the Dutch; (m) and at the same time to
clip the wings of those our opulent and aspiring neighbours. This prohibited all ships of foreign nations from trading with any English plantations
*without license from the council of state. In 1651 (n) the prohibit.ion [ • 419 ]
was extended also to the mother country; and no goods were suffered to
be importoo into England, or any of its de11endencies, in any other than English bottoms; or in the ships of that European nation of which the merchandize imported was the genuine growth or manufacture. At the restoration, the
former provisions were continued, by statute 12 Car. II, c. 18, with this very
material improvement, that the master and three-fourths of the mariners shall
also be English subjects.
Many laws have .l>een made for the supply of the royal navy with seamen; for
their regulation wnen on boa.rd; and to confer privileges and rewards on them
during and after their service.
1. First, for their supply. The power of impressing seafaring men for the
sea service by the king's commission, has been a matter of some dispute, and
submitted to with great reluctance; thongh it hath very clearly and learnedly
been shewn, by Sir Michael Foster, (o) that the practwe of impressing, and
granting powers to the admiralty for that purpose, is of very ancient date, and
( i) 4 Inst. 1«. CourumM de la Mer. 2.
(.I:) 4 Inst. ISO.
(l) Scobell, 13'.
1.. 1 Mod. Un. Hist. xll. :l89.
(n) Scobell, 17U.
(o) Rep. lM.

•woman of considerable talent, and Oleron was a part of Guienne. The probability is, that these

laws were compiled under the joint auspices of her husband and her son ; at all events, the pro-

mulgating them was the act of Richard. For the learning upon this curious question, sec Scld.

Mare Cl. 2 and 24; and how oppugned by the French writers, see Mr. Justice Park's System of-.

Marine Insurance, Introduction, p^ 28.]

See also 1 Duer Mar. Ins., where that learned author declares, that, at whatever time or by

whatever authority the laws of Olcron were first published, the internal evidence compels him to

believe that they were intended to apply exclusively to French vessels and French navigation.

And he further declares that while they contain some just and salutary regulations, yet, consid-

ered as a whole, his unfeigned surprise is created that learned jurists and enlightened scholars

have deemed them worthy of their admiration and praise. Taken collectively they bear most

evident traces of the nideness and barbarism of the age in which they were compiled. Many pro-

visions violate the plainest rules of natural justice; some by their positive absurdity provoke

mirth, and some by their atrocity excite and merit detestation.

(11) The protective navigation acts are now repealed. See statutes 16 and 17 Vic. c. 107, and

17 and 18 Vic. c. 5.
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(10) [The French writers attribute these laws to Eleanor, duchesl! of Guienne, the king's
mother. She had previously been the wife of Louis VII, king of France; but divorced from
J:.bat monarch, sho married Prince Henry, afterwardR Henry II, Richard's father. She WM a.
woman of considerable talent, and Oleron was a part of Guienne. Tho probability ii!, that thetle
laws were compiled under the joint auspices of her husband and her son ; at all events, the promulgating them was the act of Richard. For the learning upon this curious question, sec Seid.
Mare Cl. 2 and 24; 1md bow oppugned by the French writers, see Mr. Justice Park's System of-;.
Marine Insurance, Introduction, p. 28.]
Sec also 1 Duer Mar. Ins., where that learned author declares, that, at whatever time or by
whatever authority the laws of Oleron were first J!Ublished, the internal evidence compel11 him to
believe that they wcro intended w npply exclusively to French vet!Sels and French navigation.
.And ho further dednres that while they conta.in some just and salutary regulations, yet, considered as a whole, his unfeigned surprise is created tho.t learned jurit1ts and enlightened l!Cbolare
have deemed them worthy of theU" admiration and praise. To.ken collectively they bear most
1n-ident traces of the mdenesR and barbarism of the n.ge in which they were compiled. Many provi;rjons violate the plainest rules of natural justice; some by their positive absurdity provoke
mirth, and ~ome bv their atrocitv excite and merit deteKtation.
(11) The protective navigatiot1 act.A are now repealed. See statutes 16 l\nd 17 Vic. c. 107, and
17 and 18 Vic. c. 5.
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hath been uniformly continued by a regular series of precedents to the present

time ; whence he concludes it to be part of the common law. (p) (12) The diffi-

culty arises from hence, that no statute has expressly declared this power to be

in the crown, though many of them very strongly imply it The statute 2 Ric.

II, c. 4, speaks of mariners being arrested and retained for the king's service as

of a thing well known, and practised without dispute; and provides a remedy

against their running away. By a later statute, (q) if any waterman who uses

the river Thames shall hide himself during the execution of any commission of

pressing for the king's service, he is liable to heavy penalties. By another, (r)

no fisherman shall be taken by the queen's commission to serve as a mariner;

but the commission shall be first brought to two justices of the peace, inhabit-

ing near the seacoast where the mariners are to be taken, to the intent that the

r JMOQ ] justices may *choose out and return such a number of able-bodied men,

L J as in the commission are contained, to serve her majesty. And by

others (s) especial protections are allowed to seamen in particular circumstances,

to prevent them from being impressed. And ferrymen are also said to be privi-

leged from being impressed at common law. (t) All which do most evidently

imply a power of impressing to reside somewhere; and, if anywhere, it must,

from the spirit of our constitution, as well as from the frequent mention of the

king's commission, reside in the crown alone. (13)

But, besides this method of impressing, which is only defensible from public

necessity, to which all private considerations must give way, there are other ways
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that tend to the increase of seamen, and manning the royal navy. Parishes

may bind out poor boys apprentices to masters of merchantmen, who shall be

protected from impressing for the first three years; and, if they are impressed

afterwards, the masters shall be allowed their wages; (wj great advantages in

point of wages are given to volunteer seamen in order to induce them to enter

into his majesty's service; (v) and every foreign seamen, who during a war shall

serve two years in any man of war, merchantman, or privateer, is naturalized

ipso facto, (w) About the middle of King William's reign, a scheme was set on

foot (x) for a register of seamen to the number of thirty thousand, for a constant

and regular supply of the king's fleet; with great privileges to the registered

men, and, on the other hand, heavy penalties in case of their non-appearance

when called for: but this registry, being judged to be ineffectual as well as

oppressive, was abolished by statute 9 Ann; c. 21.

2. The method of ordering seamen in the royal fleet, and keeping up a regu-

lar discipline there, is directed by certain express rules, articles, and orders, first

enacted by the authority of parliament soon after the restoration; (y) but since

F *4211 new-mo(lelled and altered, after the peace of Aix-la-ChapeUe, (z) to

I ' J J remedy some defects; which were of fatal consequence in conducting the

preceding war. In these articles of the navy almost every possible offence is set

down, and the punishment thereof annexed: in which respect the seamen have

much the advantage over their brethren in the land service, whose articles of war

are not enacted by parliament, but framed from time to time at the pleasure of

the crown. Yet from whence this distinction arose, and why the executive

power, which is limited so properly with regard to the navy, should be so exten-

sive with regard to the army, it is hard to assign a reason : unless it proceeded

from the perpetual establishment of the navy, which rendered a permanent law

for their regulation expedient; and the temporary duration of the army, which

(p) See alao Comb. 248. Barr. 3U (?) Stat. 2 and3 Ph. and M. o. 16. (r) Stat. 5 Eliz. o. S.

(•) See stat. 7 and 8 W. III. c. 21. 2 Ann. o. 6. 4 and6 Ann. c. 19. IS Geo. II, o. 17. 2 <;<•<>. III. c. 15. 11

Geo. in, c. 38. 19 Geo. in, c. 78, Ac.

(t) Sav. 14. («) Stat. 2 Ann. c «. (v) Stat. 31 Geo. II. c. 10. (v) Stat. IS Geo.n , o. S.

(x) Stat. 7 and 8 W. Ill c. 21. (y) Stat. 13 Car. II. si. l,c. 9.

(*) Stat. 22 Geo. II, c. 23, amended by 19 Geo. Ill, c. 17.

(12) It is not a part of the common law of America, and would be illegal and unconstitutional

in that country.

(13) As to the legality of impressment see also Cowp. 517; 5 T. R., 276; Comb. 245; Broom's

Const. Law, 116-119.
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subsisted only from year to year, and might therefore with less danger be sub-

jected to discretionary government. But, whatever was apprehended at the

first formation of the munity act, the regular renewal of our standing force at

the entrance of every year has made this distinction idle. For, if from experi-

ence past we may judge of future events, the army is now lastingly ingrafted

into the British constitution, with this singularly fortunate circumstance, that

any branch of the legislature may annually put an end to its legal existence, by

refusing to concur in its continuance.

3. With regard to the privileges conferred on sailors, they are pretty much

the same with those conferred on soldiers; with regard to relief when maimed,

or wounded, or superannuated, either by county rates, or the royal hospital at

Greenwich; with regard also to the exercise of trades, and the power of mak-

ing nuncupative testaments (14) and, farther, (a) no seaman aboard his majesty's

ships can be arrested for any debt, unless the same be sworn to amount to at

least twenty pounds; though, by the annual munity acts, a soldier may be

arrested for a debt which extends to half that value, but not to a less amount.

CHAPTER XIV.
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refusin~ to concur in its continuance.
3. With regard to the privileges conferred on sailors, they are pretty much
the same with those conferred on soldiers; with regard to relief when maimed,
or wounded, or superannuated, either by county rates, or the royal hospital at
Greenwich; with regard also to the exercise of trades, and the power of makin~ nuncupative testaments (14) and, farther, (a) no seaman aboard his majesty's
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HAVING thus commented on the rights and duties of persons, as standing in

the public relations of magistrates and people, the method I have marked out

now leads me to consider their rights and duties inprivate economical relations.

The three great relations in private life are, 1. That of master and servant;
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which is founded in convenience, whereby a man is directed to call in the assist-

ance of others, where his own skill and labour will not be sufficient to answer

CHAPTER XIV.

the cares incumbent upon him. 2. That of husband and wife; which is founded

in nature, but modified by civil society: the one directing man to continue and

OF MASTER AND SERVANT.

multiply his species, the other prescribing the manner in which that natural

impulse must be confined and regulated. 3. That of parent and child, which

is consequential to that of marriage, being its principal end and design: and it

is by virtue of this relation that infants are protected, maintained, and educated.

But, since the parents, on whom this care is primarily incumbent, may be

snatched away by death before they have completed their duty, the law has there-

fore provided a fourth relation; 4. That of guardian and ward, which is a kind

of artificial parentage, in order to supply the deficiency, whenever it happens,

of the natural. Of all these relations in their order.

*In discussing the relation of master and servant, I shall, first, con- r *,„„ i

aider the several sorts of servants, and how this relation is created and L ''""' '

destroyed; secondly, the eflect of this relation with regard to the parties them-

selves ; and lastly, its effect with regard to other persons.

I. As to the several sorts of servants: I have formerly observed (a) that pure

and proper slavery does not, nay cannot, subsist in England: such I mean, where-

by an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life and

fortune of the slave. And indeed it is repugnant to reason, and the princi-

(«) St:it. 31 Qeo. II, c. 10. (a) Pa. 137.

(14) See statutes 28 and 29 Vic. c. 73. The power to make nuncupative wills in the United

States has been the subject of statutory regulation in the several status. Soldiers and sailors are

allowed to make them, under restrictions imposed to guard against fraud, one of the chief of which

respects the amount of property which may be thus disposed of.
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the public relations of magistrates and people, the method I have marked out
now leads me to consider their rights and duties in private economical relations.
The three great relations in private life are, 1. That of master and servant;
which is founded in convenience, whereby a man is directed to call in the assistance of others, where his own skill and labour will not be sufficient to answer
the cares incumbent upon him. 2. That of husband and wife; which is founded
in nature, but modified by civil society: the one directing man to continue and
multiply his species, the other prescribing the manner in which that natural
impulse must be confined and regulated. 3. That of rarent and child, which
is consequential to that of marriage, being its principa end and design: and it
is by virtue of this relation that infants are protected, maintained, and educated.
But, since the parents, on whom this care is primarily incumbent, may be
snatched away by death before they have completed their duty, the law has therefore provided a fourth relation ; 4. '!'hat of g1eardian and ward, which is a kind
of artificial parentage, in order to supply the deficiency, whenever it happens,
of the natural. Of all these relations m their order.
*In discussing the relation of master and servant, I shall, first, con- [ • 423 ]
sider the several sorts of servants, and how this relation is created and
destroyed; secondly, the effect of this relation with regard to the parties themselves; and lastly, its effect with regard to other persons.
I. As to the several sorts of servants: I have fonnerly observed (a) that pure
and proper slavery does not, nay cannot, subsist in England: such I mean, whereby an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life and
fortune of the slave. And indeed it is repugnant to reason, and the princi(a) Stat. 31 Geo. II, c. JO.

(a) Pa. 1117.

(14) See statutes 28 and 29 Vic. c. 73. The power to make uuncupative wills in the United
States has been the subject of statutory regulation in the several states. Soldiel'li and sailors are
allowed to make them, under restrictions imposed to guard against fraud, one of the chief of which
respects tho amount of property which may be thus disposed of.

269

Original from

Dig ize b

NEWYORK PUBLIC LIBRARY

423 OF MASTER AND SERVANT. [Book I.

pies of natural law, that such a state should subsist anywhere. (1) The three

origins of the right of slavery, assigned by Justinian, (b) are all of them built

upon false foundations, (c) As, first, slavery is held to arise " jure gentium,"

from a state of captivity in war; whence slaves are called mancipia, quasi manu

capti. The conqueror, say the civilians, had a right to the life of his captive;

and, having spared that, has a right to deal with him as he pleases. But it is an

untrue position, when taken generally, that by the law of nature, or nations, a

man may kill his enemy: he has only a right to kill him, in particular cases; in

cases of absolute necessity, for self-defence; and it is plain this absolute neces-

sity did not subsist, since the victor did not actually kill him, but made him

prisoner. War is itself justifiable only on principles of self-preservation; and

therefore it gives no other right over prisoners but merely to disable them from

doing harm to us, by confining their persons: much less can it give a right to

kill, torture, abuse, plunder, or even to enslave, an enemy, when the war is over.

Since therefore the right of making slaves by captivity depends on a supposed.

right of slaughter, that foundation failing, the consequence drawn from it must

fail likewise. But, secondly, it is said that slavery may begin " jure rivili;",

when one man sells himself to another. This, if only meant of contracts to

F *4241 serve or work f°r another, is very *just: but when applied to strict slavery

"- J in the sense of the laws of old Rome or modern Barbary, is also impos-

sible. Every sale implies a price, a quid pro quo, an equivalent given to the seller

in lieu of what he transfers to the buyer: but what equivalent can be given for

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

life, and liberty, both of which, in absolute slavery, are held to be in the master's

disposal ? His property also, the very price he seems to receive, devolves ipso

facto to his master, the instant he becomes his slave. In this case therefore the

buyer gives nothing, and the sellers receives nothing: of what validity then can

a sale be, which destroys the very principles upon which all sales are founded ?

Lastly, we are told, that besides these two ways by which slaves "fiunt," or are

acquired, they may also be hereditary: " servi nascuntur;" the children of

acquired slaves are jure natures, by a negative kind of birthright, slaves also.

But this, being built on the two former nghts must fall together with them. If

(l>) Sarvi nut fun', mil ruacuntunjtuntjure gentium, out jure fh-ili; natcuntw ex a nf.il tin nostril, Iiut. 1,3,1.

fcJMontcsq. Sp. L. xv. 2.

(1) This view of the learned commentator has finally become accepted in the laws of England

and America. Slavery was entirely abolished throughout the British colonial possessions by an

act of parliament which took effect on the first day of August, 1834.

When the constitution of the United States was adopted, slavery was tolerated by the local

law almost everwhere. In Massachusetts, however, it had been abolished by the" state con-

stitution, and in the Northwest Territory, now comprising the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,

Michigan and "Wisconsin, it was abolished by the congressional ordinance of 1787 for the

government of that territory. Still, although the feeling against the institution of slavery

found strong expression in some of the northern states where the number of slaves was few,

the southern states supposed themselves strongly interested in maintaining it, and it became

necessary to so frame the constitution as to leave this, like the rest of the domestic relations,

to the regulation of the local law. The foreign slave trade, however, in the division of powers

between the states and the nation, as a part of the foreign commerce of the country, would

fall naturally under the control of congress, and one of the compromises of the constitution

intended for the temporary protection of this traffic, was, that the migration or importation

of such persons as any of the states then existing should think proper to admit, should not be

prohibited prior to the year 1808. Const, art. 1, $ 9. This, however, did not prevent congress

making it a penal offence for American citizens to engage in the foreign slave trade, and acts

were passed to that end. In 1807 congress exercised the power permitted by the constitution,

and made the importation of slaves, from and after January 1, 1808, highly penal. 2 Statutes

at Large, 428. In 1820 the slave trade was made piracy. 3 Statutes at Large, 600. Still, with

slavery existing and the domestic slave trade permitted in nearly half the Union, it is not sur-

prising that it was found impossible to secure convictions for the capital offence under this

legislation, and the pecuniary profits were so much out of proportion to the risks, tha the

slave trade continued until the breaking out of the American civil war. At the end of that

war slavery was abolished throughout the United States by the thirteenth constitutional

amendment, and congress was empowered to render the abolition effectual by adopting th«

pecessary legislation to that end. And in the year 1871, Brazil followed this example by adopt-

ing a law for the gradual abolition of slavery.
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neither captivity, nor the sale of one's self, can by the law of nature and reason

reduce the parent to slavery, much less can they reduce the offspring.

Upon these principles the law of England abhors, and will not endure, the

existence of slavery within this nation; so that when an attempt was made to

introduce it, by statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 3, which ordained, that all idle vagabonds

should be made slaves, and fed upon bread and water, or small drink, and refuse

meat; should wear a ring of iron round their necks, arms, or legs; and should

be compelled by beating, chaining, or otherwise, to perform the work assigned

them, were it never so vile; the spirit of the nation could not brook this condi-

tion, even in the most abandoned rogues; and therefore this statute was repealed

in two years afterwards, (d) And now it is laid down, (e) that a slave or negro,

the instant he lands in England, becomes a freeman; that is, the law will pro-

tect him in the enjoyment of his person, and his property. Yet, with regard to any

right which the master may have lawfully acquired to the perpetual service of

John or Thomas, this will remain exactly in the same state as *before; r *^K i

for this is no more than the same state of subjection for life, which *- -"

every apprentice submits to for the space of seven years, or sometimes for a

longer term. (2) Hence, too, it follows, that the infamous and unchristian prac-

tice of withholding baptism from negro servants, lest they should thereby gain

their liberty, is totally without foundation, as well as without excuse. The law

of England acts upon general and extensive principles: it gives liberty, rightly

understood, that is, protection to a Jew, a Turk, or a heathen, as well as to those
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who profess the true religion of Christ; and it will not dissolve a civil obliga-

tion between master and servant, on account of the alteration of faith in either

of the parties: but the slave is entitled to the same protection in England be-

fore, as after, baptism; and, whatever service the heathen negro owed of right to

his Amei ican master, by general not by local law, the same, whatever it be, is

he bound to render when brought to England and made a Christian. (3)

(il) Stat. 3 and 4 Edw. VI, o. 16. (e) Salk. 666.

(2) [The meaning of this sentence is not very intelligible. If a right to perpetual service

neither captivity, nor the sale of one's self, can by the law of nature and reason
reduce the parent to slavery, much less can they reduce the offspring.
Upon these principles the law of England abhors, and will not endure, the
existence of slavery within this nation; so that when an attempt was made to
intro<luce it, by statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 3, which ordained, that all idle vagabonds
should be made slaves, and fed upon bread and water, or small drink, and refuse
meat ; should wear a ring of iron round their necks, arms, or legs ; and should
be compelled by beating, chaining, or otherwise, to perform the work assigned
them, were it never so vile; the spirit of the nation could not brook this con<lition, even in the most abandoned rogues ; and therefore this statute was repealed
in two years afterwards. (d) And now it is laid down, (e) that a slave or negro,
the instant he lands in England, becomes a freeman ; that is, the law will protect him in the enjoyment of his person, and his property. Yet, with regard to any
right which the master may have lawfully acquired to the pe~tual service of
John or Thomas, this will remain exactly in the same state as before ; [ • 425 ]
for this is no more than the same state of subjection for life, which
every apprentice submits to for the space of seven years, or sometimes for a
longer term. (2) Hence, too, it follows, that the infamous and unchristian practice of withholding baptism from negro servants, lest they should thereby gain
their liberty, is totally without foundation, as well as without excuse. The law
of England acts upon general and extensive principles: it gives liberty, rightly
understood, that is, prot~ction to a Jew, a Turk, or a heathen, as well as to those
who profess the true religion of Christ; and it will not dissolve a civil obligation between master and servant, on account of the alteration of faith in either
of the parties: but the slave is entitled to the same protection in England before, as after, baptism ; and, whateYer service the heathen negro owed of right to
his Ame1 ican master, by general not by local law, the same, whatever it be, is
he bound to render when brought to England and made a Christian. (3)

can be acquired lawfully at all, it must be acquired by a contract with one who is free, who

(d) Stat. 3 and' Edw. VI. e. 16.

is sui juris, and competent to contract. Such a hiring may not perhaps be illegal and void.

(el Salt. 666.

If a man can contract to serve for one year, there seems to be no reason to prevent his con-

tracting to serve for one hundred years, if he should so long live : though, in general, the

courts would be inclined to consider it an improvident engagement, and would not be very

strict in enforcing it. But there could be no doubt but such n, contract with a person in a

state of slavery would be absolutely null and void.

It has however been decided, that a contract by a slave with a person to serve him, in con-

sideration of his purchasing his freedom, is binding.]

(3) [We might have been surprised, that the learned commentator should condescend to

treat this ridiculous notion and practice with so much seriousness, if we were not apprised,

that the court of common pleas, so late as the 5 W. and M. held that a man might have a

property in a negro boy, and might bring an action of trover for him, because negroes are

heathens. 1 Ld. Hay. 147. A strange principle to found a right of property upon!

But it was decided in 1772, in the celebrated case of James Sommersett, that a heathen negro,

when brought to England, owes no service to an American or any other master. James

Sommersett had been made a slave in Africa, and was sold there; from thence he was carried

to Virginia, where he was bought, and brought by his master to England; here he rau away

from his master, who seized him and carried him on board a ship, where he was confined, in

order to be sent to Jamaica to be sold as a slave. While he was thus confined, Lord Mans-

field granted a habeas corpus, ordering the captain of the ship to bring up the body of James

Sommersett, with the cause of his detainer. The above-mentioned circumstances being stated

upon the return to the writ, after much learned discussion in the court of king's bench,

the court were unanimously of opinion, that the return was insufficient, and that Sommersett

ought to be discharged. See Mr. Hargrave's learned argument for the negro in 11 St. Tr. 340;

and the case reported in Lofft's Reports, 1.]

Upon the subject of slavery in general, the reader is referred to the elaborate treatise on the

Law of Freedom and Bondage, by John Codman Hurd.

Since these commentaries were written, the civilized nations of Europe and America have

made great exertions to put an end wholly to the exportation of slaves from Africa. The

municipal laws of these nations now very generally make the traffic piracy, and there are

treaties between them which are not only to the same effect, but they contain mutual stipu-

(2) [The meaning of this sentence is not very intelligible. If a right to perpetual service
can be acquired lawfully at all, it mui!t be acquired by a contract with one who is free, who
is sui juris, and competent to contract. Such a hiring may not perhaps be illegal and void.
If a man can contra.ct to serve for one year, there seems to be no reMon to prevent his controotiug to serve for one hundred years, if he should so long live : though, in general, the
courtl! would be inclined to consider it oo improvident engagement, and would not be very
strict in enforcing it. But there could be no doubt but such a contract with a person in a
state of slavery would be abl!olutely null and void.
It has however been decided, that a contract by a slave with a person to serve him, in contrlderation of his purcha.~ing his freedom, is bindiug.1
(3) [We might have been surprised, that the fearned commentator should condescend to
treat thiR ridiculous notion and practice with so much seriousness, if we were not apprised,
that the court of common plellll, so late as the 5 W. and M. held that a man might have a
property in a negro boy, and might bring an action of trover for him, beca11se negroes are
heathens. 1 Ld. Ray. 147. A strange principle to found a right of property upon!
But it was decided in 1772, in the celebrated case of James Sommeraett, that a heathen negro,
when brought to England, owes no service to an American or any other master. James
Sommersett had been made a slave in Africa, and was Hold there ; from thence he was carried
to Virginia, where he was bought, and brought by his master to England ; here he mu away
from his master, who seized him and carried him on board a ship, where he was confined, in
order to be l!ent to Je.mllica to be sold 8S a slave. While he was thus confined, Lord Mansfield granted a habeas corpus, ordering the captain of the shi.p tv bring up the body of James
Bo111111el'llett, with the cause of his detainer. The above-mentioned circumstanceR being stated
upon the return to the writ, after much learned discussion in the court of king's bench,
the court were unanimously of opinion, that the return was insufficient, and that Sommersett
ought to be discharged. See Mr. Hargrave'11 learned argum1mt for the negro in 11 St. Tr. :340;
and the case reported in Lofft's Reports, l.]
Upon the subject of slavery in general, the reader is referred to the elaborate treatise on the
Law of Freedom and Bondage, by John Codman Hurd.
Since these commentaries were written, the civilized nations of Europe and .America have
made great exertions to put an end wholly to the exportation of sla'l"os from Africa. The
municipal laws of these nations now very generally make the traffic piracy, anll there are
treatio.<i between them which are not only to the same effect, but they contain mutual stipulations designed to establish an efficient police on the .African shores, with a view to detect
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1. The first sort of servants, therefore, acknowledged by the laws of England,

are menial servants; so called from being infra mania, or domestics. The

contract between them and their masters arises upon the hiring. If the hiring

be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a

hiring for a year; (/) upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall

serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the

respective seasons, as well when there is work to be done, as when there ia

not: (g) (4) but the contract may be made for any larger or smaller term. (5)

All single men between twelve years old and sixty, and married ones undei

thirty years of age, and all single women between twelve and forty, not having

any visible livelihood, are compellable by two justices to go out to service in

(/) Co. Litt 43. (g) F. N. B. 168.

1. The first sort of eerva.nts, therefore, acknowledged by the laws of England,
are menial servants; so called from being intra mamia, or domestics. The
contract between them and their masters arises upon the hiring. If the hiring
be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a
hiring for a year ; (/) upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shalJ
serve, and the master maint.ain him, throughout all the revolutions of the
respective seasons, as well when there is work to be done, as when there is
not:(g) (4) hut the contract may be made for any larger or smaller term.(5)
All smgle men between twelve years old and sixty, and married ones unde1
thirty years of age, and all single women between twelve and forty, not having
any visible livelihood, are compellable by two justices to go out to sernce in

and punish any attempted violations of the penal laws on the subject. Their operations also

<.fl Co. Litt. a

extend into the interior of Africa, and seek through fear or interest to induce the native

(g) F. N. B. UIS.

chieftains to abandon the trade in men, and the wars which are necessary to supply that trade.

A very great advance has been made in that direction within a few years, and since the entire

abolition of slavery in the United States, the slave trade has not only become less profitable,

but it has also become exceedingly difficult to evade the vigilant watch which is iept upon

the movements of suspected persons. Indeed, the traffic in slaves between Africa and

America may be said to be substantially at an end, and the influences now at work promise

very speedily to put an end altogether to the relation of slavery in all states professing the

Christian religion.
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(4) The distinction stated in the text between menial and other servants it is believed is not

recognized in the common law of America, and there is no general presumption that a hiring

with no particular time mentioned is a hiring for a year. Indeed in England the presumption

is not one of law, but of fact: Baxter /•. Nurse, 6 M. and G. 941; and it is therefore subject

to be overcome by any thing in the terms of the contract indicating a different intent in the

parties. See Bayloy «. Rimmell, 1 M. and W. 506; Rex ». Christ Parish, 3 B. and C. 459. It

does not apply to governesses : Todd ». Kerrich, 8 Exch. 151; nor to laborers in husbandry.

See Nicoll v. Greaves, 17 C. B. N. S. 27. Nor does the English rule prevail here that such

a servant discharged without cause is entitled to a month's notice or wages. Where the

hiring is for a definite period, and the servant is discharged without cause before that period

has expired, he is entitled, according to the weight of American authority, to wages for the

whole period, provided he holds himself ready to perform the stipulated services if called

111 H >n ; and the converse is equally true, that he forfeits all compensation under the contract

if he abandons the service before the time is completed. Reab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337 :

Marsh v. Rulesson, 1 Wend. 514; Costigan v. Mohawk and H. E. R. Co., 2 Denio, 609; Davis

v. Maxwell, 12 Met. 266; Eldridge «. Kowe, 2 Gilm. 91; Cox v. Adams, 1 N. and McC. 234 :

Sherman v. Champlain Trans. Co., 31 Vt. 162; Miller v. Goddard, 34 Me. 102; Coo v. Smith. 1

Ind. 267 ; Hawkins r. Gilbert, 19 Ala. 54 ; Swanzey v. Moore, 22 111. 63 ; Rice r. Dwight

Manuf. Co., 2 Cush. 60. A disposition has however been manifested of late to allow a party

who has performed valuable services on an entire contract, of which the other party has

received the benefit, to recover the value of such services, not exceeding the contract rate,

deducting therefrom any damages which the other party has suffered from a breach of the

contract. Britton e. Turner, 6 N. H. 481; Allen v. McEibben, 5 Mich. 449. And the courts

which hold to the necessity of an entire performance before there can be any recovery,

txcept from this principle the case of infants, who are allowed to recover the value of their

services upon a quantum meruit: Judkins <'. Walker, 17 Me. 38; Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332;

Medbnry v. Watrous, 7 Hill, 110 ; Thomas v. Dike, 11 Vt. 273 ; though some of the cases

treat the contract as binding to the extent of holding the infant accountable for the failure in

complete performance. Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332; Judkins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38; Contra,

Whitmarsh *. Hall, 3 Denio, 375.

(5) So also either party may by the contract reserve the right to terminate it at his option;

but if the right reserved is to put an end to it " if dissatisfied," it can only be exercised on

this ground, and not for the purpose of engaging in some other business. Lantry «. Parks, 8

Cow. 63; Monell t>. Burns, 4 Denio, 121.

What is reasonable cause for terminating an entire contract, must always depend upon the

particular circumstances of each case. Rough words from the master are not: Marsh r.

Rulesson, 1 Wend. 514; but abusive language from the servant has been held to be. Byrd r.

Boyd, 4 McCord, 246. So any conduct affecting injuriously the employer's business. Lacy v.

Osbaldiston, 8 C. and P. 80; Karneyji. Holmes, 6 La. An. 373. Or, it would seem, any crim-

inal offense. Libhort v. Wood, 1 W. and S. 265. Or any willful disobedience of a lawful

order by the master. Spain v. Arnott, 2 Stark. 256 ; Amor v. Fearon, 9 A. and E. 548. And in

and punish any attemJ>ted violations of the penal laws on the subject. Their operations aLw
extend into the intenor of .Africa, and seek through fear or interest to induce the native
chiefl:.ains to abandon the trade in men, and the wars which are necessary to supply that trade .
.A very gn>at advance has been made in that direction within a few years, and 81Dce the entire
abolitton of slavery in the United States, the slave trade hae not only become Iese profitable,
but it hae also become exceedingly difficult to evade the vigilant watch which is ieJ.lt upon
the movements of su11pected persons. Indeed, the traffic in slaves between Africa and
America may be said to b!l l!!Ubstantially &t an end, and the infiuences now at work promi8Q
very SJ>eedily to put an end altogether to the relation of slavery in all stateB profe&Dllg the
Christian religion.
( 4) The distinction stated in the text between menial and other servants it is believed is not
recognized in the common law of America, and there is no general presumption that a hiring
with no particular time mentioned ie a hiring for a year. Indeed in En~Jand the presumption
is not one of law, but of fact: Baxter v. Nurse, 6 Y. and G. 941; and 1t is therefore subject
to he overcome by any thing in the terms of the contract indicating a different intent in the
parties. See Bayley v. Riuimell, 1 Y. and W. 506; Rex v. Christ Parish, 3 B. and C. 459. It
does not apply to go>ernesses : Todd v. Kerrich, 8 Exch. 151 ; nor to laborers in husbandry.
See Nicoll v. Greaves, 17 C. B. N. S. Zl. Nor does the En~lish rule prevail here that such
a servant discharged without cause is entitled to a months notice or wages. Where the
airing is for a definite period, and the servant is discharged without caul!e before that period
has expired, he is entitled, accordin~ to the weight of American authority, to wages for the
whole period, provided he holds himself ready to perform the stipulated servic011 if called
upon; and the conveI'lle is equally true, that he forfeits all compensation under the contra.c~
if he abandons the service before th~ time is completed. Reab v. Moor, 1~ Johns. 337.;
Marsh t•. RuleRson, 1 Wend. 514; Costi~ v. Mohawk and H. R. R. C<>., 2 Demo, 609; Dan:<
v. Maxwell, 12 Met. 286; Eldridge "· Rowe, 2 Gihn. 91 ; Cox v. Adams, 1 N. and McC. 284 ;
Sherman v. Champlain Trans. Co., 31 Vt. 16'.l; Miller "· Goddard, !W Me. 10'2; Coe v. Smith, 1
Ind. 1!67; Hawkins i · . Gillwrt, 19 Ala. M; Swamey ti. Moore, 22 Ill. 63; Rice r. Dwight
llanut: Co., 2 Cush. 60. A dit.<position has however been manifested of late to allow a party
who has performed valuable services on an entire contract., of which the other party ha..
received the benefit. to recover the value of such services, not exceeding the contract rate,
deducting therefrom any damages which the other party hae suffered from a breach of the
contract. Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481; Allen v. McK.ibben, 5 Mich. 449. And the courts
which hold to the neceAAity of an entire performance before there can be any recovery,
except from this principle the C8ll6 of infants, who are allowed to recover the value of their
11ervices upon a quantu1n meruit: Judkins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38; Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 33:l;
lledbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill, 110; Thomas v. Dike, 11 Vt. 273; though some of the c&lles
treat the contract at1 binding to the extent of holding the infant accountable for the failllfe in
complete performance. Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332; Judkins ti. Walker, 17 Me. 38; Contra,
Whitm8.l'llh t•. Hall, 3 Denio, 375.
(5) So also either party may by the contract reserve the right to terminate it at his option;
but if the right reserved ie to put an end to it "if dissatisfied,'' it can only be exerch1ed un
this ground, and not for the purpose of enitaging in some other business. Lantry ti. Parks, i:l
Cow. 63; Monell t'. BurnH, 4 Denio, 121.
What is reasonable ca.use for terminating an entire contract, must always depend upon thcs
particular circum"tances of each case. Rough words from the maeter are not : Marsh t'.
RuleSBun, 1 Wend. 514 ; but abusive language from the servant has been held to be. Byrd r.
Boyd, 4 McC<>rd, 246. So any conduct 8.ffecting injuriously the employer's business. Lacy ti.
Osbaldiston, 8 C. and P. 80; Karney t•. Holmes, 6 La. An. 373. Or, it would seem, any rriminal offen~. LilJhart ''· Wood, 1 W. o.nd S. ~. Or any willful disobedience of a lawful
order IJy the wa.~ter. Spain "· Arnott, 2 Stark. 256 ; Amor v. Fearon, 9 A. and E. 548. .And in
one very hard ell.He it was held that a female servant's absentin~ herself for the night agRirut
the command of the master, in order to visit a sick mother, justified her discharge. Turner r.
M.a;;on, 14 M. aml W. 112.
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husbandry or certain specific trades, for the promotion of honest industry, (6)

and no master can put away his servant, or servant leave his master, after being

so retained, either before or at the end of his term, without a quarter's warning;

unless upon ""reasonable cause, to be allowed by a justice of the peace,(/t) r # .^g i

but they may part by consent, or make a special bargain. ' '

2. Another species of servants are called apprentices, (from apprendre, to

learn,) and are usually bound for a term of years, by deed indented or indentures,

to serve their masters, and be maintained and instructed by them. This is

usually done to persons of trade, in order to learn their art and mystery; and

sometimes very large sums are given with them, as a premium for such their

instruction: but it may be done to husbandmen, nay, to gentlemen, and others.

And (t) children of poor persons may be apprenticed out by the overseers, with

consent of two justices, till twenty-one years of age, to such persons as are

thought fitting; who are also compellable to take them; and it is held that

gentlemen of fortune, and clergymen, are equally liable with others to such

compulsion; (k) for which purposes our statutes have made the indentures

obligatory, even though such parish-apprentice be a minor. (I) Apprentices to

trades may be discharged on reasonable cause, either at the request of themselves

or masters, at the quarter-sessions, or by one justice, with appeal to the ses-

sions, (m) who may, by the equity of the statute, if they think it reasonable,

direct restitution of a ratable share of the money given with the apprentice: (n\

and parish-apprentices may be discharged in the same manner, by two justices, (o)
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But if an apprentice, with whom less than ten pounds hath been given, runs

away from his master, he is compellable to serve out his time of absence, or

make satisfaction for the same, at any time within seven years after the expira-

tion of his original contract, (p) (7)

(hi Slat, 6 Ellz. 0. 4.

(i) Stat. 6 Eliz. c. 4. 43 Eliz. <-.. 2. Uac. I.C.25. 7 Jao. I, c. S. 8 and !> W. andM. c.SO. 2 and 3 Ann. c. 6.

4 Ann. 0. 19. 17 Geo. II, c. 5. 18 Geo. Ill, o. 47.

Apprentices enter into the enactments of numerous other statutes. The 32, c. 57; 53, c. 55; 42. cc. 46 and

73; 51. c. 80; M, re. 96 and 107; 56, c. 139; all G. Ill; ami 1 and 2, c. 42; and 4, c. 31; statutes of hU present

miyesty's reign. These, together with the cases, are amply abridged in Chetwynde's Burn's Justice.

(k) Salk. 57, 491. (1) Strtt. 5 Eliz. c. 4, 43 Eliz. o. 5. Cro. Cur. 179. (m) Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4.

(n) Salk. 67. (a) Stat. 20 Geo. II. c. 19. (p) Stat. 6 Geo. Ill, c. S6.

(6) The English law on this subject is now much changed. In the United States persons can-

not be compelled to go oat to service unless they become a public charge, nor is jurisdiction con-

ferred upon justices to terminate the relation of master and servant.

(7) In the states of the American TJnion, apprenticeship is the subject of statutory regulation,

and pains have been taken to make it accomplish its proper purpose in fitting the minor for

some steady and suitable employment for life. Besides instruction in business, some oppor-

tunity to attend school is generally prescribed, and suitable clothing at the expiration ot the

period of service. The children of poor persons are not liable to be bound out to service,

unless they have actually become a public charge; but if they have, the officers having charge

of the support of the poor are permitted to bind them out under proper regulations. No per-

son, however, is compellable to receive them as apprentices. In other cases minors are bound

to service by consent of parents or guardians, and by an instrument in writing, which ought

to specify some profession or trade which the minor is to be taught. It has been held, how-

ever, that such specification was not necessary, though in the absence of anv such ruling ws

should have supposed the opposite doctrine the correct one. See Bowes v. Tibbets, 7 Greenl.

457; Fowler e. Hollenbeck, 9 Barb. 309; People v. Pillow, 1 Sand. S. C. 672. The master

covenants with the apprentice to supply him with necessaries, and he must furnish him with

proper medicine and attendance during sickness. Regina v. Smith, 8 C. and P. 153. The

legal relation between the parties is one resting upon personal trust and confidence, and the

master cannot assign his interest in the articles to any third person without the consent of

the minor and his proper guardian: Nickerson «. Howard, 19 Johns. 113; Tucker v. Magee,

18 Ala. 99; Haley c, Taylor, 3 Dana, 2*2; neither can he employ the apprentice in menial

services not connected with the business he was to be taught: Commonwealth v. Hemperly,

12 Penn. St. 129; nor employ him in a business altogether different. Randall c. Rotch, 12

Pick. 108.

The parties to articles of apprenticeship are the minor on the one part and the master on

the other; the father or other guardian signifying his assent thereto. The father, as such,

has no power to bind his son an apprentice without his consent, and it is believed that the,

signing of the articles by the latter would not be sufficient unless by then- terms he was a,

party to the deed, Matter of McDowle, 8 Johns. 328; Harney v. Owen, 4 Blackf. 33?; String-

tield v. Heiskell, 2 Yerg. 546; Pierce v. Massenburgh, 4 Leigh, 493; Harper v. Qilbert, 5 Cash,
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3. A third species of servants are labourers, who are only hired by the day or

r $407 -I the week, and do not live infra mania, as *part of the family; concern-

' J J ing whom the statutes before cited (q) have made many very good

regulations: 1. Directing that all persons who have no visible effects maybe

compelled to work. 2. Defining how long they must continue at work in sum-

mer and in winter. 3. Punishing such as leave or desert their work. 4. Empower-

ing the justices at sessions, or the sheriff of the county, to settle their wages;

and, 5. Inflicting penalties on such as either give, or exact, more wages than are

so settled. (8)

4. There is yet a fourth species of servants, if they may be so called, being^

rather in a superior, a ministerial, capacity; such as stewards, factors, and

bailiffs: whom, however, the law considers as servants pro tempo-re, with regard

to such of their acts as affect their master's or employer's property. Which leads

me to consider,—

II. The manner in which this relation of service affects either the master or ser-

vant. And, first, by hiring and service for a year, or apprenticeship under inden-

tures, a person gains a settlement in that parish wherein he last served forty days.(r)

In the next place persons serving seven years as apprentices to any trade, have

ah exclusive right to exercise that trade in any part of England. (*•) This law,

with regard to the exclusive part of it, has by turns been looked upon as a hard

law, or as a beneficial one, according to the prevailing humour of the times:

which has occasioned a great variety of resolutions in the courts of law concern-
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ing it; and attempts have been frequently made for its repeal, though hitherto

without success. (9) At common law every man might use what trade he

pleased; but this statute restrains that liberty to such as have served as appren-

tices : the adversaries to which provision say, that all restrictions, which tend to

introduce monopolies, are pernicious to trade: the advocates for it allege, that

unskilfulness in trade is equally detrimental to the public as monopolies. This

F *4281 reason indeed only extends to such trades, *in the exercise whereof skill

1 58J is required. But another of their arguments goes much further; viz.:

that apprenticeships are useful to the commonwealth, by employing of youth,

and learning them to be early industrious; (10) but that no one would be induced

to undergo a seven years' servitude, if others, though equally skilful, were allowed

the same advantages without having undergone the same discipline: and in this

there seems to be much reason. However, the resolutions of the courts have in

general rather confined than extended the restriction. No trades are held to be

within the statute but such as were in being at the making of it: (t) for trading

in a country village, apprenticeships are not requisite: (u) and following the

trade seven years without any effectual prosecution, either as a master or a ser-

vant, is sufficient without an actual apprenticeship, (to)

(?) Stat. 6 Eliz. c. 4. 6 Geo. Ill, c. 26. (r) See page 364. (•) Stat. 5 Eliz. e. 4, f 21.

(() Lord Rnym. 514. (u) 1 Ventr. 61. 1 Keb. S83.

(to) l.uiril. Kli.Mii. 1179. Wallen qui tarn v. Holton. Tr. S3 Geo. II, (by all the judges.)

417. But in some of the states it is probable that the terms of the statutes are such as to change

this rule.

Of course an apprentice is not necessarily compensated for his services exclusively in the instruc-

3. A third species of servants a.re labourers, who are only hired by the day or
[ • 427 ] the week, and do not live hlira mamia, as *part of the family; concerning whom the statutes before cited (q) have ma<le many very good
regulations: 1. Directing that all persons who have no Yisible effects may be
compelled to work. 2. Defining how long they must continue at work in summer and in winter. 3. Punishing such as leave or desert their work. 4. Empowering the justices at sessions, or the sheriff of the county, to settle their wages;
and, 5. Inflicting penalties on such as either give, or exact, more wages than are
so settled. (8)
4. There is yet a fourth species of servants, if they may be so called, beinu
rather in a superior, a ministerial, capacity; such as stewardH, factors, and
bailiffs: whom, however, the law considers as servants pro tempore, with regard
to such of their acts as affect their master's or employer's property. Which leads
me to consider,II. The manner in which this relation of service affects either the master or servant. And, first~ by hiring and service for a year, or apprenticeship under indentures, a person gains a settlement in that parish wherein he last served forty days.( r)
In the next place persons serving seven years as apprentices to any trade, have
ah exclusive right to exercise that trade many part of England. (s) This law,
with regard to the exclusive part of it, has by turns been looked npon as a hard
law, or as a beneficial one, according to the prevailing humour of the times:
which has occasioned a great variety of resolutions in the courts of law concerning it; and attempts have been frequently made for its repeal, though hitherto
without success. (9) At common law every man might use what trade he
pleased; but this statute restrains that liberty to such as have served as apprentices: the adversaries to which provision say, that all restrictions, which tend to
introduce monopolies, are permcious to trade: the advocates for it allege, that
unskilfulness in trade is equally detrimental to the public as monopolies. This
[ • 428 ] reason indeed only extends to such trades, *in the exercise whereof skill
is required. But another of their arguments goes much further; viz.:
that apprenticeships are useful to the commonwealth, by emploJing of youth.
and learning them to be early industrious; (10) but that no one would be induced
to undergo a seven years' servitude, if others, though equally skilful, were allowed
the same advant.ages without having undergone the same discipline: and in this
there seems to be much reason. However, the resolutions of the courts have in
general rather confined than extended the restriction. No trades are held to 1x>
within the statute but such as were in being at the making of it: (t) for trading
in a country village, apprenticeships are not requisite: (u) and following tho
trade seven years without any effectual prosecution, either as a master or a servant, is sufficient without an ~tual apprenticeship. (w)
(q) Stat. 6 Eliz. c. '· 8 Geo. IH, c. 26.
(r) See pr.go SM.
(1) Stat. 6 Elle. c . '• I 31.
(IJ J,ord Rnvm.111'.
(u) 1 Ventr. 61. 2 H:eb. 083.
(to) LoJd. Haym. 11711. Wallen qui lam v. Holton. Tr. 8S Geo. II. (by all the judges.)

tion he receives, and the statutes of some of the states require a small money payment to be made

to him when the articles expire.

In Knglaud at the present time only children whose parents are unable to maintain them can

be apprenticed without their own consent, and by statutes 7 and 8 Vic. o. 101, no one can be com-

pelled against his will to take an apprentice.

(8) Provisions like these are not to be mot with in the United States, except, perhaps, in some

of the states where slavery has but recently been abolished. There are statutes, however, for the

Eunishuient, as vagrants, of persons having no visible means of support, and in some of the states

ouses of correction where they can be compelled to labor are provided.

(!)) The repeal was affected by statute 54 Geo. Ill, c. 96, and exclusive rights of trading in

boroughs were also abolished by statutes 5 and 6 Wm. IV, c. 76.

In the United States no such exclusive rights have ever existed.

(10) [Lord Coke says this statute was not enacted only that workmen should be skilful, but

also that youth should not be nourished in idleness, bat brought up and educated in Jawfal

sciences and trades. 11 Co. 54]

417. But in some of the states it is probable the.t the terms of the stat11tes aro s11ch as to change
thii; rule.
Of court\e an apprentice i8 not necessarily compensated for bis services exclusively in the instruction he receives, and the statutes of some of the 1:1tates require 11o sme.11 money payment to be ml!ode
to him when the articles expire.
In F:nglaud 11ot the present time only children whose pa.rents a.re unable to maintain them can
be apprenticed without their own consent, and by statutes 7 and 8 Vic. c. 101, no one can be compelled a.gain~t his will to ta.kc an apprentice.
(8) Provisiont1 like these a.re not to be mot with in the United States, except, perhaps, in some
of the stateB where slavery has but recently been abolit:ihed. There a.re statutes, however, for the
punishment, as vagre.nts, of persons having no visible means of snpP?rt, and in some of the states
hou.ies of cormction where they can be compelled to labor are provided.
(9) The repeal was affected by statute 54 Geo. III, c. 96, and exclusive right.& of trading in
boroughs were a.l,;o abolished by statutes 5 and 6 Wm. IV, c. 76.
In the United States no such exclusive rights have ever existed.
(10) [Lord Coke .iays this statute was not enacted only that workmen Bhould be skilful, but
also that youth should not be nourished iIJ. jdleness, but brought UJ.> and adµ~ ~ J,awful
sciences and trades. 11 Co~ 54]
~H
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A master may by law correct his apprentice for negligence or other misbe-

haviour, so it be done with moderation: (a-) though, if the master or master's

wife beats any other servant of full age, it is good cause of departure, (y) (11)

But if any servant, workman, or labourer, assault his master or dame, he shall

suffer one year's imprisonment, and other open corporal punishment, not extend-

ing to life or limb, (z) (12)

By service all servants and labourers, except apprentices, become entitled to

wages: according to their agreement, if menial servants; or according to the

appointment of the sheriff or sessions, if labourers or servants in husbandry;

for the statutes for regulation of wages extend to such servants only; (a) it being

impossible for any magistrate to be a judge of the employment of menial ser-

vants, or of course to assess their wages. (13)

III. Let us, lastly, see how strangers may be affected by this relation of master

and servant: or how a master may *behave towards others on behalf of r *A%a i

his servant: and what a servant may do on behalf of his master. ' " '

And, first, the master may maintain, that is, abet and assist his servant in

any action at law against a stranger: whereas, in general, it is an offence against

public justice to encourage suits and animosities by helping to bear the expense

of them, and is called in law maintenance, (b) A master also may bring an

action against any man for beating or maiming his servant; but in such case

he must assign, as a special reason for so doing, his own damage by the loss of

his service, and this loss must be proved upon the trial, (c) A master likewise
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may justify an assault in defence of his servant, and a servant in defence of his

master: (d) the master, because he has an interest in his servant, not to be

deprived of his service; the servant, because it is part of his duty, for which he

receives his wages, to stand by and defend his master, (e) Also if any person do

hire or retain my servant, being in my service, for which the servant departeth

from me and goeth to serve the other, I may have an action for damages against

both the new master and the servant, or either of them: but if the new master

did not know that he is my servant, no action lies; unless he afterwards refuse

to restore him upon information and demand. (f) (14) The reason and founda-

(x) 1 Hawk. P. C. 130. Lamb. Elren. 127. Cro. Car. 179. 2 Show. 289.

fyj V. N. B. 108. Bro. Abr. t. Labourers, 81. Trespats, 349 fz) Stat. 8 Ellz. o. 4.

(a) 2 Jones, 47. (b) 2 Roll. Abr. 115. (c) 9 Rep. 113. (d) 1 Roll. Abr. 840.

('.) In like manner, by the laws of King Alfred, c. 38, a servant was allowed to fight for his master, a

parent for hie child, and a husband or father for the chastity of his wife or daughter.

(f) F. N. B. 167, 108.

(11) In the United States provisions are made by statute for some supervision by the parent,

guardian, or the proper officer, of the treatment of the apprentice by the master, and a sum-

A master may by law correct his apprentice for negligence or other misbehaviour, so it be done with moderation: (x) though, if the master or master's
wife beats any other servant of full age, it is good cause of departure. (y) (11)
But if any servant, workman, or labourer, assault his master or du.me, he shall
suffer one year's imprisonment, and other open corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb. (z) (12)
By service all servants and labourers, excellt apprentices, become entitled to
wages: according to their agreement, if memal servants ; or according to the
appointment of the sheriff or sessions, if labourers or servants in husbandry;
for the statutes for regulation of wages extend to such servants only; (a) it being
impossible for any magistrate to be a judge of the employment of menial servants, or of course to assess their wages. (13)
III. Let us, lastly, see how stranfiers may be affected by this relation of master
nnd servant: or how a master may behave towards others on behalf of [ • 429 ]
his servant: and what a servant may do on behalf of his master.
And, first, the master may maintain, that is, abet and assist his servant in
any action at law against a stranger: whereas, in general, it is an offence against
public justice to encourage suits and animosities by helping to bear the expense
of them, and is called in law maintenance. (b) A master also may bring an
action against any man for beating or maiming his servant; but in such CW>e
he must assign, as a special reason for so doing, his own damage by the loss of
his service, and this loss must be proved upon th~ trial. (c) A mast~r likewise
may justify an assault in defence of his serv&nt, and a servant in defence of his
master: (d) the master, because he has an interest in his servant, not to be
deprived of his service; the servant, because it is part of his duty, for which he
receives his wages, to stand by and defend his master. (e) Also if any person do
hire or retain my servant, being in· rn)" service, for which the servant departeth
from me and goeth to serve the other, I may have an action for damages against
both the new master and the servant, or either of them: but if the new master
did not know that he is mv servant, no action lies; unless he afterwards refuse
to restore him upon information and demand. ( () (14) The reason and founda(z) 1 Hawk. P. C. ISO. Lamb. Elren. 127. Cro. Car. 179. 2 Show. 21!9.
frJ 1''. N. B. 16'1. Bro . .dbr. i. Labourer11. lll. Trupf!llB, 8'9
(z) Stat. Ii Eliz. o. '·
47.
(b) 2 Roll. Abr. 115.
(cJ II Rep. US.
(dJ 2 lion. Abr. MS.
(e) In like manner, by the laws or King Alfred, c. sg, a eer\'ant w11s allowed to fight for his master, a
po.rent ror hie child, and a husbaod or Cather for tbe chastity or hl.8 wife or daughter.
(/) F. N. B. 167, 168.
(a) 2 Jones,

mary hearing of complaints of ill treatment is sometimes provided for, with power in the court

to discharge the apprentice from the articles if the circumstances appear to render it proper.

(12) This statute is since repealed.

(13) [The statutes authorizing the interference of the magistrate in such matters, are repealed

by statute 53 Geo. Ill, c. 40. The amount of wages to menial servants must depend on the

contract between them and the master.

A servant cannot maintain an action against his master for not giving him a character. 3 Esp.

201. If the master gives a character which is false and slanderous, the servant might sue the

master for it; but a master who honestly and fairly gives the real and true character of a servant

to one who asks his character, under pretence of hiring him, is not liable to an action for so doing:

Bull. N. P. 8; IT. R. 110; bnt if done maliciously, and with an intent to injure a servant, it is

otherwise. 3 B. and P. 587. The law will in general presume that a servant has, in the ordinary

course of his business, performed his duty, and therefore, a servant in the habit of daily or weekly

accounting for money received fbr his master, will be presumed to have paid over money received.

3 Campb. 10; 1 Stark. 136.]

(14) So if one debauch the female servant of another, the master shall have an action

against him for the consequent loss of services. In these cases, however, although there must

be a right to service on the part of the master, and some evidence from which damage by loss

thereof may be inferred, the jury are not limited in their verdict by the damages proved,

but may give what are called exemplary damages to compensate for the anxiety, shame

and sense of disgrace consequent upon the seduction. A father or any one standing in loco

parentis is regarded as master of the daughter for the purpose of maintaining this action; but

the daughter at the time must actually reside with him, or if not, he must have a right to

recall her to his home at any time, and to control her services. See Clajk t). Fitch, 2 Wend.
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(11) In the United States provif!ione are made by statute for some supervision by the parent,
guardian, or tho proper officer, of tho treatment of the apprentice by tho master, and a sum·
mary hearing of complaints of ill treatment is sometimes provided for, with power in the court
to dischar~e the apprentice from the article~ if the circumstances appear to render it proper.
(12) Thie statute is since repealed.
·
(13) [The statutell authorizmg the interference of the magistrate in such matters, are repealed
by statute 53 Geo. III, c. 40. Tho amount of wages to menial servants must depend on tho
contract between them and the ma.<1ter.
A servant cannot maintain an action agaim1t his mMter for not giving him a character. 3 Esp.
201. If the master gives a character which is false and slanderous, the servant might sue the
master for it; but a ma..~ter who honestly and fairly gives the real and tnrn character of a servant
to one who asks his character, under pretence of hiring him, is not liable to an action for so doing:
Bull. N. P. 8; 1 T. R. 110; but if done maliciously, and with an intent to injure a servant, it is
otherwise. 3 B. and P. 587. The law will in general presume that 11 servant has, in the ordinary
oourse of his bueineBB, performed his duty, and therefore., a l'Orvant in the habit of daily or weekly
accounting for money received tbr his master, will be presumed to have paid over money received.
3 Campb. 10; 1 Stark. 136.]
(14) So if one debauch tb,e female servant of another, the master shall have an action
again11t him for the consequent loss of services. In theil6 ca.~es, however, although there must
be a right to service on the part of the master, and some evidence from which damage by loss
thereof may be inferred, the jury are not limited in their verdict by the dam~os proved,
but may give what are called exemplary damages to compensate for the an:uety, shame
and sen.~e of dis~ consequent upon the seduction. A father or any one standing in looo
parentis is regarcted SR maater of the daughter for the purpo!IO of maintaining this action; but
the daughter at the time must actually reside with him, or if not, he must have a right to
recall her to hie home at any time, and to control her services. SO(! Cl¥,k ii.. ~tc~, 2 Wend~
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MASTER AND SERVANT.

tion upon which all this doctrine is built, seem to be the property that every

man has in the service of his domestics; acquired by the contract of hiring, and

purchased by giving them wages. (15)

As for those things which a servant may do on behalf of his master, they seem

all to proceed upon this principle, that the master is answerable for the act of

his servant, if done by his command, either expressly given, or implied: nam

r *. OQ -i qui facit per alium, facit per se. (g) Therefore, if the *servant commit

' J a trespass by the command or encouragement of his master, the master

shall be guilty of it: though the servant is not thereby excused, for he is only

to obey his master in matters that are hpnest and lawful. If an innkeeper's

servants rob his guests, the master is bound to restitution : (K) for as there is a

confidence reposed in him, that he will take care to provide honest servants, his

negligence is a kind of implied consent to the robbery; nam, qui non prohibet,

cum prohibere possit, jubet. (16) So likewise if the drawer at a tavern sells a

(a) 4 lust. 109. (hi Noy's Max. c. 43.

459; Bartley v. Richtmeyer, 4 X. T. 43; Dain». "Wyckoff, 7 NT. T. 191; id. 18 N. T. 45;

tion upon which all this doctrine is built, seem to be the property that every
man has in the service of his domestics; acquired by the contract of hiring, and
purchased by giving them wages. (15)
As for those things which a servant may do on behalf of his master, they seem
all to proceed upon this principle, that the master is answerable for the act of
his servant, if done by his command, either expressly given, or implied: nam
[ • 430 ] quifacit per alium,facit per se. (g) Therefore, if the *servant commit
·
a trespass by the command or encouragement of his master, the master
shall be guilty of it: though the servant is not thereby excused, for he is only
to obey his master in matters that are h~nest and lawful. If an innkeeper's
servants rob his guests, the master is bound to restitution: (h) for as there is a
confidence reposed in him, that he will take care to provide honest servants, his
negligence is a kind of implied consent to the robbery; nam, qui non prohi'.bet,
cum prohibere possit, jubet. (16) So likewise if the drawer at a tavern sells a

Mulvehallii. Milward, 11 N. T. 343; Knight v. "Wilcox, 14 N. T. 414. Distinguished jurists

(g)

'Ina. 109.

(16) Noy's .Max. o. '3.

have frequently deplored the necessity of proving a loss of service where the parent brings

suit for the seduction of the daughter, and in some of the states statutes have been passed

making it unnecessary, and authorizing a recovery in the name of some near relative for the

benefit of the daughter herself.

(15) [If an apprentice earn any thing, the master is entitled to it. 1 Sulk. 68; 6 Mod. 69;
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Co. Litt. 117, a. n. And see Cro. Elia. 638, 661, 746. And an owner of a ship is entitled to all

the earnings of his captain, however irregularly obtained. 3 Campb. 43. And see 1 Stra. 595.

8. C.; 2 Stra. 944.

So an action on the case may be maintained against a person who continues to employ the

master's servant after notice, though the defendanttdid not procure the servant to leave his

master, or know when he employed him that he was the servant of another. 6 T. R. 221; 5

East, 39, n. A master may bring an action on the case for enticing away his servant or

apprentice, knowing him to be such; 6 Mod. 182 ; Peake, C. N. P. 55; Peake Law Evid. 334;

Bac. Ab. tit. Master and Servant, 0. 3; Bla. Rep. 142; Cowp. 54; and the defendant cannot

avail himself of any objection to the indenture of apprenticeship or contract of hiring. 2 H.

Bla. 511; 7 T. R. 310; 1 Anst. 256. But no action can be maintained for harboring an apprentice

as such, if the master to whom he was bound was then not a housekeeper, and of the age <>t"

twenty-four years. 4 Taunt. 876. And a master cannot maintain an action for seducing his

servant after the servant has paid him the penalty stipulated by his articles for leaving aim.

3 Burr. 1345; 1 Bla. Rep. 387. The master niav, in these cases, waive his action for the ton.

and sue in assumpsit for the work and labor done by his apprentice or servant, against the person

who tortiously employed him. 1 Taunt. 112 ; 3 M. and S. 191, 8. P.

If an injury be committed to goods in the possession of a mere servant, yet if the master have

the right of immediate possession he may sue. 2 Saund. 47; 7 T. R. 12.

In general a mere servant with whom a contract is made on the behalf of another, cannot

support an action thereon. 2 M. and S. 485, 490; 3 B. and P. 147; 1 H. Bla. 84; Owen, 52;

2 Xew Rep. 411, &.-} 2 Taunt. 374; 3 B. and A. 47; 5 Moore, 270. But when a servant has any

beneficial interest in the performance of the contract for commission, Ac., as in the case of a

factor, auctioneer, <fcc.: 1 T. R. 112; 1 M. and S. 147; 1 H. Bla. 81; 7 Taunt. 237; 2 Marsh.

497; S. C. 6 Taunt. 65; 4 id. 189; or where the contract is in terms made with him: 3 Camp.

320, he may sustain an action in his own name, in each of which cases however the master might

sue: 1 H. Bla. 81: 7 T. R. 359; unless where there is an express contract under seal with the

servant to pay him, when he alone can sue. 1 M. and S, 575,

In general a mere servant, having only the custody of goods, and not responsible over, can

not sue for an injury thereto: Owen, 52; 2 Saund. 47, a, b, c, d; but if the servant have a special

property in the goods, as a factor, carrier, <fec., for commission, he may. 2 Saund. 47, b. c. d.:

2 Tin. Ab. 49; 1 Ves. Sen. 359: 1 B. and A. 59.

(16) [It has been long established law, that the innkeeper is bound to restitution if the

guest is robbed in his house by any person whatever; unless it should appear that he was

robbed by his own servant, or by a companion whom he brought with him. 8 Co. 33. And

where an innkeeper had refused to take charge of goods because his house was full; yet he

was held liable for the loss, the owner having stopped aa & guest, and the goods being'stolen

during his stay. 5 T. R. 273. But the innkeeper may be discharged of this general liability

by the guest taking upon himself the care of nis goods, or, having aoticed circumstances or

suspicion, neglects to exercise ordinary care in securing his property. 4 M. and S. 306; Holt,

C. N. P. 209; 1 Bar. and A. 59.]

See McKee v. Owen, 15 Mich. 115, for a discussion as to whether the proprietors of steam-

boats, who furnish their guest with state rooms and accommodations, similar to those provided by

innkeepers, are not to be neld subject to the same legal liabilities,
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459; Bartley t1. Richtmeyer, 4 N. Y. 43; Dain t1. Wyckoff, 7 N. Y. 191; id. 18 N. Y. 45;
llulvehall 11. Milward, 11 N. Y. 343; Knight v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 414. Dii>tinguished jurist.s
ha.ve frequently deJ>lored the necessity of/roving a. loss of service where tho pa.rent brinpi
suit for ibe seduction of the daui;tbter, an in some of the states statutes have been pa.._~
making it unneces~ary, and authorizing a recovery in the name of some near relative for the
benefit of the daughter herself.
(15) [If an apprentice earn any thing, the master is entitled to it. 1 Salk. 68; 6 Mod. 69:
Co. Litt. 117, a.. n. And see Cro. Eli.I. 638i 661, 746. .And an owner of a ship is entitled to all
the earnings of his captain, however irregu arly obtained. 3 Ca.mpb. 43. And see 1 Stra. 595,
8. C. ; 2 Stra. 944.
So an action on the case may be maintained against a person who continues to employ the
ma.ster's servant aft.er notice, though the defendant.did not procure the servant to lea\"e his
ma.ster, or know when he llmployed him that he was the servant of another. 6 T. R. 221 ; 5
East, 39, n. .A master may bring an action on the case for enticing away hill servant or
apprentice, knowing him to be such; 6 Mod. 182; Peake, C. N. P. 55; Peake Law Evid. 3:W;
Bae. .Ab. tit. Ye.ster and Servant, 0. 3; Bia. Rep. 142; Cowp. 54; and the defendant cannot
avail himself of any objection to the indenture of apprenticeship or oontract of hiring. ~ H.
Bla. 511 ; 7 T. R. :no; 1 Anst. 256. But no action ca.u be maintained for harboring an appreutieu
88 such, if the mBBter to whom he wa.tt bound was then not a housekeeper, and of the a~re of
twenty-four years. 4 Taunt. 876. And a mo.ster cannot maintain an act.ion for seducin" hi...;
servant aft.er the servant has paid him the penalty stipulated by his articles for lea\;ng him.
3 Burr. 1345; 1 Bla. Rep. 387. Tho master mav, in these CB.lie~, waive his action for the tort.
and sue in Msumpsit for the work and labor done by his apprentice or servant, against the person
who tortiously employed him. 1 Taunt. 112; 3 !ii. aud S. 191, S. P.
If an injury be committed to goods in the poRsession of a. mere serrant, yet if the master ha\"e
the right of immediate possession he may sue. 2 Saund. 47; 7 T. R. 12.
In general a. mere servant with whom a contract is made on the behalf of another. . CIUlllot
support an nction thereon. 2 M. and S. 485, 490; 3 B. and P. 147; 1 H. Bla. 84; Owen, ~;
2 New ReJ,>. 411, a.. i 2 Taunt. 374; 3 B. and .A. 47; 5 Moore, 270. But when a servant has any
beneficial mterest m the perfonnance of the contract for commission, &-0., as in the ease of a
factor, auctioneer, &c. : 1 T. R. 112; 1 !ii. and S. 147; 1 H. Illa. 81 ; 7 Taunt. 237; 2 llarsb.
4!)7; S. C. 6 '£aunt. 65; 4 id. 189; or where the contract is in terms made with him: 3 Camp.
3-20, be may sustain a.n action in his own name, in each of which cases however the master might
sue : 1 H. Bla. 81 : 7 T. R. 359; unless where there is an expreBB contract under seal with the
servant to pay him, when he alone can sue. 1 !ii. and S. 575,
In general a mere servant, having only the custody of goods, and not responsible over, can ·
not sue for a.n injury thereto: Owen, 52; 2 Saund. 47, a; b, c, d; but if the servant have a special
property in the goods, as a factor, carrier, &c., for commission, he may. 2 Sannd. 4.7, b. c. d.:
2 Vin . .Ab. 49; 1 Ves. Sen. 359 i. ! B. and A. 59.
(16) [It has been long estabJ.i.sned lavr, that the innkeeper is bound to restitution if the
guest is robbed in his house by any person whatever; :wileBB it should appear that he was
robbed by his own servant, or by a companion whom he brought with him. 8 Co. 33. .And
where an innkeeper bad refused to take charge of goods because his house was full ; yet he
being stolen
was held liable for tlie 1088, the owner having stopped as & guest, im,d the
during his stay. 5 T. R. 273. But the innkeeper may be discharged of this ~oral liabilitv
by tho guest taking upon himself the care of his goods, or, having u.oticed Cll'Cumstances ol
sul.lpicion. neglect.! t-0 e1:ercise ordinary care in securing his property. • ll. and S. 306; Hol~
C. N. P. 209; 1 Bar. and .A. 59.]
See McKee 11. Owen, 15 llich. 115, for a discuBSion as to whether the proprietors of ilteam·
boats, who furnish tlieir guest with sta.te rooms and accommodatio~ ~uµw. w tbose provided by
innkeepel'!l, are not to be held subject to the same legal liabilities,
~7f!
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man bad wine, whereby his health is injured, he may bring an action against

the master: (t) for although the master did not expressly order the servant, to

sell it to that person in particular, yet his permitting him to draw and sell it at

all is impliedly a general command. (17)

In the same manner, whatever a servant is permitted to do in the usual course

of his business, is equivalent to a general command. If I pay money to a

banker's servant, the banker is answerable for it: if I pay it to a clergyman's or

a physician's servant, whose usual business it is not to receive money for his

master, and he embezzles it, I must pay it over again. If a steward lets a lease

of a farm, without the owner's knowledge, the owner must stand to the bargain;

for this is the steward's business. A wife, a friend, a relation, that use to trans-

act business for a man, are quoad hoc his servants; and the principal must

answer for their conduct: for the law implies, that they act under a general

command; and without such a doctrine as this no mutual intercourse between

man and man could subsist with any tolerable convenience. If I usually deal

with a tradesman by myself, or constantly pay him ready money, I am not

answerable for what my servant takes up upon trust; for here is no implied order

to the tradesman to trust my servant; but if I usually send him upon trust, or

sometimes on trust and sometimes with ready money, I am answerable for all

he takes up; for the tradesman cannot possibly distinguish when he comes by

my order, and when upon his own authority, (k) (18)

(i) 1 Roll. Abr. 95. (k) Dr. and Stnd d. t, c. 42. Noy's Max. c. 44.
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(17) [Where it is the master's duty to see that the servant acts correctly, the master may be

even criminally responsible for the servant's conduct; as where a baker's servant introduced

noxious ingredients into bread. 3 M. and 8. Ill; 1 Ld. Raym. 264; 4 Campb. 12. So also [at

common law] an indictment for libel contained in an article in a newspaper will lie against a per-

son interested in the profits, without showing that he authorized the insertion of the libefous

article. 1 M. and M. 437; 4 Tyr. 677. Nevertheless, the general rule is that the master is not

criminally liable for the criminal acts of his servant. 8 Rep. 59; 2 Str. 886.]

(18) [It is a general rule of law, that all contracts made by a servant within the scope of his

authority, either express or implied, bind the master; and this liability of the master is not

founded on the ground of the master being paterfamilias, but merely in respect of the authority

delegated to the servant. See 3 Wils. 341; 2 Bla. Rep. 845; 3 Esp. Rep. 235.

Much difficulty is experienced in practice in the application of this rule, on tiie question as

to what amounts to a servant's acting within the authority delegated to him. The main

point to be attended to in the decision of this, is to consider whether the servant was acting

under a special or a general authority. A special agent or servant is one who is authorized to

act for his master only in some particular instance; his power is limited and circumscribed.

A general servant or agent is one who is expressly or impliedly authorized by his master to

transact all his business, either universally or in a particular department or course of business.

A master is not liable for any acts of a special agent or servant unconnected with the object

of the employment, but he is liable for all the acts of a general agent or servant within the

scope of his employment, and this even thongh the master may have expressly forbidden the

particular act lor which he is sought to be rendered liable. Thus, if a master engage a ser-

vant to take care of goods, and the servant sell them, the selling of the goods being totally uncon-

nected with the object for which the servant had them, the sale would not bind the master. So

where the chaise of the master had been broken by the negligence of his servant, and the servant

desired the coachmaker, who had never been employed by the master to repair it, it was held

that the master was not liable for such repairs. 4 Esp. 174. So when the master is in the habit

of paying ready money for articles furnished in certain quantities to his family, if the tradesman

delivers other goods of the same sort to the servant upon credit, without informing the master of

it, and the latter goods do not come to the master's use, he is not liable. 3 Esp. 214 ; 1 Show.

95; Peakc N. P. C. 47 ; 5 Esp. 76. But, on the other hand, if a servant is employed to sell a

horse, and he sells it with a warranty, the master would be liable for a breach of the warranty,

because the act of warranty was connected with the act of sale, and within the scope of the ser-

vant's authority, even though he had received express directions not to make the warrantv. See

3 T. R. 757; 5 Esp. 75; 1 Camp. 258; 3 Esp. 65; 3 B. and C. 38; 4 D. and R. 648; S". C., 15

East, 38. If a servant usually buys for bis master on credit, and the servant buys some things

without the master's order, the master will be liable; for the tradesman cannot possibly distinguish

when the servant comes bv order for him or not. Stra. 506; 3 Esp. N. P. Rep. 85, 114; 1 id.

350 ; 4 id. 174; Peake, C. N. P. 47.

In general, if a party acting in the capacity of a servant or agent, discloses that circum-

stance, or it be known to the person with whom he contracted, such servant or agent is not

liable for a breach of the contract: 12 Ves. 352; 15 East, 62, 66; Palev Priiic. and Agent,

246; even for a deceitful warranty: 3 P. Wins. 278 j if he had authority from his principal to

S87?
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1 servnnt> lastly> by his negligence does any damage to a stranger,

•" the master shall answer for his neglect: if a smith's servant laim-s a

horse while he is shoeing him, an action lies against the master, and not against

the servant. But in these cases the damage must be done while he is actually

make the contract. 3 P. "Wins. 279. And gee 1 Chit, on Pleading, 4th ed. 24. But if a ser-

vant or agent covenant under seal, or otherwise engage for the act of another, though he

describe himself in tho deed as contracting for, and on the behalf of, such other person : 5

East, 148, or he contract as if he were principal. Stra. 995 ; 1 B. and P. 368; 3 B. and A. 47 ;

'2 J). and K. 307; IB. and C. 160, S. C.; 1 Gow. 117; 1 Stark. 14: 2 East, 142; he is per-

sonally liable, and may be sued, unless in the case of a servant contracting on behalf of gov-

ernment : 1 T. R. 172, 674; 1 East, 135, 582: so if a servant does not pursue the principal's

authority so as to discharge the principal, he will be personally liable : 1 Eg. Ab. 308 ; 3 T. R.

361; or where he acts under an authority which he knows the master cannot give: Cowp.

565, 6; so where a servant has been authorized by his master to do an act for a third party,

and he is put in possession of every thing that will enable him to complete it, and he neglects

BO to do, he will be personally liable to the third person; as if a servant receives money from

his master to pay A, and expressly or impliedly engages to pay him, the latter may sue him

on his neglect to pay it, for the servant is considered to hold it on the party's account. 14

East, 590;' 2 RoL Rep. 441; 1 B. and A. 36; 1 J. B. Moore, 74 ; 3 Price, 58; 16 Tesey, 443; 5

Esp. 247; 4 Taunt. 24; 1 Stark. 123, 143, 150, 372; 1 H. Bla. 218. But if the third party by

his conduct shows he does not consider the servant as holding the money on his account, the

agent will be discharged on properly appropriating the money to other purposes before he is
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called upon again by the third party to pay it over. Holt. N. P. 372. There is a material

distinction between an action against a servant for the recovery of damages for the non-per-

formance of the contract, and an action to recover back a specific sum of money received by

him; for when a contract has been rescinded, or a person has received money as servant of

another who had no right thereto, and has not paid it over, an action may be sustained

against the servant to recover the money; and the mere passing of such money in account

with his master, or making a rest without any new credit given to him, fresh bills accepted, or

further sums advanced to the master in consequence of it, is not equivalent to the payment of

the money to the principal: 3 M. and S. 344; Cowper, 565; Stra. 480; but in general, if the

money be paid over before notice to retain it, the servant is not liable: Cowp. 565; Bur.

1986; Ld. Kaym. 1210; 4 T. R. 553; Stra. 480; Bui. N. P. 133; 10 Mod. 23; 2 Esp. Rep. 507;

5 J. B. Moore, 105; 8 Taunt. 737; unless his receipt of the money was obviously illegal, or

his authority wholly void: 1 Camp. 396, 564; 3 Esp. Rep. 153; 1 Stra. 480; Cowp. 69; 1

Taunt. 359; where persons received money for the express purpose of taking up a bill of

exchange two days after it became due, and npon tendenng it to the holders and demanding

the bill, find that they have sent it back protested for non-acceptance to the persons who

endorsed it to them, it was held that such persons, having received fresh orders not to pay the

bill, were not liable to an action by the holders for money had and received, when npon the

bill's being procured and tendered to them, they refused to pay the money. 1 J. B. Moore,

74, and 14 East, 582, 590. A person who as a banker receives money from A to be paid to B,

and to other different persons, cannot in general be sued by B for his share: 1 Marsh. Rep.

132; and an action does not lie against a mere collector, trustee or receiver, for the purpose of

trying a right in the principal, even though he has not paid over the money. 4 Burr. 1985;

Paley, 261, and cases there cited; 1 Selw. N. P. 3d ed. 78; 1 Cainp. 396; 1 Marsh. 132; Holt

C. N. P. 641. An auctioneer and stakeholder, who are considered as trustees for both parties,

are bound to retain the money till one of them be clearly entitled to receive it, and if he

nnduly pay it over to either party not entitled to it, he will be liable to repay the deposit or

stake. 5 Burr. 2639. But in a late case it has been held, that while the stake remains in the

hands of the stakeholder, either party may recover back from him his share of the deposit 7

Price, 54.

Servants of government are not in general personally liable, and an officer appointed by gov-

ernment, avowedly treating as an agent for the public, is not liable to be sued upon any contract

made by him in that capacity, whether under seal or by parol, unless he make an absolute and

unqualified undertaking to be personally responsible : 1 T. Rep. 172, 674; 1 East, 135; 3 B. and

A. 47 ; 2 J. B. Moore, 627 ; and if the public money actually passes through his hands or that of

his agent, for the purpose, or with the intent, that it should be applied to the fulfilment of his

fiduciary undertakings, he is not personally liable. 3 B. and B. 275; 3 Meriv. 758; 1 East, 135,

583. The bank of England are tho servants of the public, and liable as a private servant for any

breach of duty. 1 K. and M. 52; 2 Binghain, 393.

In some cases where there is no responsible or apparent principal to resort to, the agent

will be liable; as where the commissioners of a navigation act entered into an agreement with

the engineer they were held linble : Pal. 251; 1 Bro. Ch. Rep. 101; Hard. 205; and commis-

sioners of highways are personally liable for work thereon, though the surveyor is not: 1 Bla.

Rep. 670 ; Amb. 770 ; and in some cases the agent alone can be sued, as where a seller choose3

to give a distinct credit to a person known to him to be acting as agent for another: 15 East, <U ;

and a sub-agent cannot sue the principal with whom he had no privitv. 6 Taunt. 147 ; 1 Marsh.

r>uo.]
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employed iu the muster's service; otherwise the servant shall answer for his

own misbehaviour. Upon this principle, by the common law, (/) if a servant

kept his master's fire negligently, so that his neighbour's house was burned

down thereby, an action lay against the master; because this negligence hap-

pened in his service; otherwise, if the servant, going along the street with a

torch, by negligence sets fire to a house; for there he is not in his masters

immediate service; and must himself answer the damage personally. But now

the common law is, in the former case, altered by statute 6 Ann. c. 3, which

ordains that no action shall be maintained against any, in whose house or

chamber any fire shall accidentally begin ; for their own loss is sufficient pun-

ishment for their own or their servant's carelessness. (19) But if such fire hap-

pens through negligence of any servant, whose loss is commonly very little,

such servant shall forfeit 100Z., to be distributed among the sufferers ; and, in

default of payment shall be committed to some workhouse, and there kept to

hard labour for eighteen months, (m) A master is, lastly, chargeable, if any

of his family layeth or casteth any thing out of his house into the street or com-

mon highway, to the damage of any individual, or the common nuisance of his

majesty^ liege people: («) for the master hath the superintendence and charge

of all his household. And this also agrees with the civil law; (o) which holds

that the pater familias, in this and similar cases, "' ob alterius culpam tenetur,

sive servi, sive liberi." (20)

(I) Noy's Max. c. 44.
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i iu) Upon a similar principle, by the law of the twelve tables at Rome, a person by whose negligence any

flre began, was bound to pay double to the sufferers; or, if he was not able to pay, was to suffer a corporal

punishment.

(a) Noy's Max. c. 44. (o) Ff. 9, 8,1. Itut. 4, 5, 1.

(19) The substance of the statute of Anne will be found re-enacted in some of the American

states. See Taylor, Land, and Ten. $ 196. In the others it is perhaps to be regarded as having

been adopted as a part of the American common law. The absence of precedents for the recovery

of damages in such cases, when the oases themselves occur so frequently, is strong evidence of

the opinion of the legal profession to this effect, and perhaps the legislation making railroad com-

panies liable for injuries caused by fire communicated by their engines has some bearing in the

same direction. Lansing c. Stone, 37 Barb. 15, is a decision directly to the point that these stat-

utes constitute a part of the American common law.

(20) [A master is liable to be sued for the injuries occasioned by the neglect or unskilfulnesa

of his servant while in the course of his employment, thongh the act was obviously tortious

and against the master's consent; as for fraud, deceit, or any other wrongful act. 1 Salk. 289;

Cro. Jac. 473: 1 Stra. 653; Roll. Ab. 95, 1, 15; 1 East, 106; 2 H. Bla. 44§; 3 Wils. 313; 2 Bla.

Rep. 845. A master is liable for the servant's negligent driving of a carriage or navigating a

ship: 1 Bast, 105; or for a libel inserted in a newspaper of which the defendant was a proprietor.

1 B. and P. 409.

In some cases where it is the duty of the master to see that the servant acts correctly, he may

be liable criminally for what the servant has done ; as where a baker's servant introduced noxious

materials in his bread. 3 M. and S. 11; 1 Ld. Raym. 264; 4 Camp. 18.

A servant cannot in general be sued by a third person for any neglect or npnfeasance which

he is guilty of, when it is committed on behalf of, and under the express or implied authority

of, his master; thus if a coachman lose a parcel, his master is liable and not himself. 12

Mod. 488; Say, 41; Roll. Ab. 94, pi. 5; Cowp. 403; 6 Moore, 47. So a servant is not liable for

deceit in the sole of goods, or for a false warranty. Com. Dig. Action BUT case for deceit, B;

3 P. W. 379; Boll. Ab. 95. But he is liable for all tortious acts and wilful trespasses, whether

done by the authority of the master or not. 12 Mod. 448; 1 Wils. 328; Say. 41; 2 Mod. 242;

6 id. 212; 6 East, 540; 4 M. and S. 259; 5 Burr. 2687; 6 T. R. 300; 3 WUs. 146. And in

every case where a master has not power to do a thing, whoever does it by his command is a

trespasser: Roll. Ab. 90; and this though the servant acted in total ignorance of his master's

right. 12 Mod. 448, and supra; 2 Roll. Ab. 431. And an action may in some cases be

supported against a servant for a misfeasance or malfeasance; thus if a bailiff voluntarily

Buffer a prisoner to escape, he would be liable* 12 Mod. 488 ; 1 id 209; 1 Salk. 18 ; 1 Lord Ray.

665.

It is a general rule that no action is sustainable against an intermediate agent for damage

occasioned by the negligence of a sub-agent, unless such intermediate agent personally interfered

and caused the injury. 6 T. R. 411; 1 B. and P. 405, 411; Cowp. 406; 2 B. uiul P. 438; 6

Moore, 47; 2 P. and R. 33.]

The maxim miifacit per alium faeit per se has general application to the relation of master

and servant, wherever the masters assent to the act done or undertaking entered into by the

servant on his behalf can bo implied, either from his instructions or from the general scope
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F *432 1 *^e ma^ °^8erve' thkt m a^ the cases here put, the master may be

1 " -I frequently a loser by the trust reposed in his servant, but never can be

a gainer ; he may frequently be answerable for his servant's misbehaviour, but

never can shelter himself from punishment by laying the blame on his agent.

The reason of this is still uniform and the same ; that the wrong done by the

servant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the master himself; and it is a

standing maxim, that no man shall be allowed to make any advantage of his

own wrong.

CHAPTER XV.

OF HUSBAND AND WIFE.

THE second private relation of persons is that of marriage, which includes the

reciprocal rights and duties of husband and wife; or, as most of our elder law

books call them, of baron and/erne. In the consideration of which I shall in the

first place inquire, how marriages may be contracted or made; shall next point

out the manner in which they may be dissolved; and shall, lastly, take a view

of the legal effects and consequence of marriage.

of his employment. Upon this see Broom's Maxims, 4th ed. 668, and also the works on Agency

and Contracts.

Where a wrongful act is done by a servant by the express direction of the master, or in his

master's presence so that his assent is presumed, or as the natural or probable result of orders

given by the master, or in the exercis_e of a discretion which the master has given, and an injury

results to a third person, the master is responsible therefor to the same extent as if he had him-
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self done the act in person. McLaughlin v. Pryor, 4 M. and G. 48; Gregory c. Piper, 9 B. and C.

591; Green v. Omnibus Co., 7 C. B. 290; Lee v. McKay, 3 Ired. 29; Harlow v. Humiston, 6 Cow.

189; Meyer v. Second Av. R. R. Co., 8 Bosw. 305; Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen, 420; Evansville,

Ac., R. R. Co. «. Baum, 26 Ind. 70; Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen, 49.

And where the servant in the course of his employment so negligently conducts him&elf, or

with such want of skill or prudence manages the business, as to cause loss or damage to third

persons, the master may be held responsible therefore. Bush v. Steinman, !• B. and P. 404 ;

Tarrant v. Webb, 18 C. B. 797; Freer t>. Cameron, 4 Rich. 228; Perry c. Marsh, 25 Ala. 659;

Chicago, <tc., R. R. Co. ». Harney, 28 Ind. 28; Douglass v. Stephens, 18 Mo. 362; Seymour c.

Greenwood, 7 H. and N. 355; McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Allen, 290.

The mere fact, however, that one is servant of another, does not make the other liable for the

negligent or wrongful conduct of the servant, unless he was at the time engaged in the master's

business or executing his expressed or implied commands. Lyons ». Martin, 8 A. and E. 512;

Mitchell v. Crassweller, 13 C. B. 237. And where a servant, even though at the time employed

in the master's service, steps aside from his duty to commit a trespass or other wrong to another,

the servant alone is responsible for such wrongful conduct McManns v. Crickett, 1 East 106;

Lyons v. Martin, 8 A. and E. 512; Croft ». Alison, 4 B. and Aid. 590; Tanderbilt ». Richmond

Turnpike Co., 2 N. Y. 479; Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. and S. 103; Church v. Mansfield, 20

Conn. 284; Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 347; Hibbard v. N. Y. and Erie R. R. Co., 15 N. Y.

455; Yates v. Squires, 19 Iowa, 26; Cox i>. Keahey, 36 Ala. 340.

The rule that the master shall respond for the negligent acts of his servants, is one for the pro-

tection of third persons only ; and a servant who is injured by the want of care of fellow servants

in doing or omitting to do their portion of the common work, cannot recover compensation from

the master therefor. Farwell «. Boston and Worcester R. R. Co. 4 Met. 49; Hayes c. Western

R. H. Corp. 3 Cush. 270; Beaulieu v. Portland Co., 48 Me. 294; Warner v. Erie R. R. Co., 39 N.

Y. 470; Caldwell r. Brown, 53 Penn. St. 457; Moselcy v. Chamberlain, 18 Wis. 700: O'Connell

v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. 20 Md. 212; Harrison r. Central R. R. Co., 31 N. J. 293; Searle

v. Lindsay, 11 C. B. N. S. 429; Caldwell c. Brown, 53 Penn. St. 453. Unless, indeed, the servant

causing the injury was an incompetent or otherwise improper person to be employed in such busi-

ue^is, and the master was himself guilty of negligence in employing him. Wiggett v. Fox, 36 Eng.

L and Eq. 486; Tarrant v. Webb, 18 C. B. 797; Wright«. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 562;

Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Leahev, 10 Mich. 193; Thayer ». St Louis &c., R. R. Co.,22 Ind.

M; Stewart r. Harvard College, 12 Allen. 58; Stone v. Western Trans. Co., 38 N. Y.240; McMahon

i'. Oavidson, 12 Minn. 357. Some disposition has also been manifested to hold the master liable to a

servant who is injured by the negligence of another servant, where the duties of the latter, in con-

nection with which the injury happened, were not common nor in the same department with

those of the injured servant,"and where the negligence of the injured servant did not contrib-
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I. Our law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract. (1)

The holiness of the matrimonial state is left entirely to the ecclesiastical law,

the temporal courts not having jurisdiction to consider unlawful marriage as a

sin, but merely as a civil inconvenience. The punishment therefore, or annul-

ling, of incestuous or other unscriptural marriages, is the province of the spiritual

courts ; which act pro salute animce. (a) And, taking it in this civil light, the

law treats it as it does all other contracts : allowing it to be good and valid in

. 121.

nte to the injury. Gillenwater v. Madison and Ind. R. R. Co., 5 Ind. 349; Fitzpatrick v. TS. A.

and Salem R. R. Co., 7 Ind. 436: see Chamberlain ». M. and M. R. R. Co., 11 Wis. 238; Cooper*.

,\1 idlins. 30 (too. 146. Also to hold him responsible where the servant injured was subordinate

to and under the control and direction of the servant whose negligence caused the injury. C. C.

aud C. R. R. Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio, N. S. 201. But see Gilshannon v. Stony Brook K. Corp., 10

Cnah. 228; Sherman v. Rochester, Ac., R. R. Co.. 17 N. T., 153; "Wright v. N. T. Centra]

R. R. Co., 25 N. T. 562; Carle t>. Canal and R. R. Co., 23 Me. 269; Ryan v. Cumberland Yal-

ley R. R. Co., 23 Penn. St. 384; Ohio, Ac., R. R. Co. v. Hammersley, 28 Ind. 371; Morgan v.

Yalei of Neath R. Co., Law R., 1 Q. B. 149. And even where the master is himself guilty of

negligence, in employing improper servants or in other matters which increase the risk to tho

servaut, if the latter is aware of all tho facts and continues in the service notwithstanding, he

will be held to have taken upon himself the risk and cannot look to the master for indemnity.

M. R. and L. E. R. R. Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio, N. S. 564 ; Ind. and Gin. R. R. Co. ». Love, 10 Ind.

556; Hayden v. Srnithville Manuf. Co., 29 Conn. 558; Skipp v. E. Counties R. Co., 9 Exch.
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223. DaVis ». Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co., 20 Mich. 105.

The master is not excused, in the case of a negligent injury to a third person, by the fact that,

at the time of the injury, the servant though employed in the master's service, was exceeding

bis instructions, or acting in disregard thereof, and that the injury occurred in consequence of

the failure to observe them. Luttrell v. Hazen, 3 Sneed, 20; Powell v. Deveney, 3 Cush. 304 ;

Southwick v. Estes, 7 Cush. 385; May v. Bliss, 22 Vt. 477; Weed v. Panama R. R., 17 N. T.

362; Philadelphia, Ac., R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 488.

One important exception to the maxim respondeat superior is whore the employee, whose

negligent conduct has caused the injury, was at the time engaged in an independent employ

ment, and not under the immediate control, direction or supervision of the employer; as in the

case of a licensed drayman, employed to draw merchandize and deliver at the store of his

employer; De Forests). "Wright, 2 Mich. 368; and see Milligan v. "Wedge, 12 A. and E. 737;

Cnthbertson v. Parsons, 10 C. B. 304; McGatrick v. "Wason, 4 Ohio, N. S. 566.

The immediate employer of the agent or servant through whose negligence an injury occurs

is the person responsible for the negligence of such ageut or servant. To him the principle

respmtdeat superior applies. There cannot generally be two superiors severally responsible

in snob case: Blake v. Ferris, 5 N" T. 48; Blackwell v. Wiswall, 24 Barb. 355; Clark v.

Frv, 8 Ohio, N. S. 358; Barry u. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121; Rapsonr. Cubitt, 9 M. and W. 710;

Milliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray, 349; therefore where a job is done under a contract, and the

contractor emplovs the workman whose negligence causes the injury, the contractor is the per-

son responsible for such negligence. See the cases collected in City of Detroit ». Corey, 9

Mich. 165. See also Clark's Adm. v. Hannibal. Ac., R. R. Co., 36 Mo. 202; Donaldson ». Missis-

sippi, Ac., R. R. Co., 18 Iowa, 280.

If, however, the injury necessarily results from the ordinarv mode of doing the work con-

tracted for, the employer as well as tho contractor may be held responsible therefor. Chicago

r. Robbins. 2 Black. 418.

Where the master is liable for the torts of his servants, the servant is also, as a general thing,

liable himself, except where the tort springs from a breach of the master's contract.

It has been mentioned above that the master is liable to the servant for any injury traceable

to the master's own negligence in employing incompetent persons, but his responsibility is not

limited to cases of that description. The" legal implication from the contract of employment is,

that the employer will adopt suitable instruments and means with which to carry on his busi-v

ness. These he can provide and maintain by the use of suitable care and oversight; and if he ^

fails to do so, he is guilty of a breach of duty under his contract, for the consequence of which *

he ought injustice and sound reason to be held responsible. Per Bigelow, Ch. J. Snow v.

Housatonic R. R. Co., 8 Allen, 441. And see Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray, 274; Seaver v. Boston

and Maine R. R. Co., 14 Gray, 466; Keegau v. Western R. R. 8 N. T. 175; Conolly v. Poillon,

41 Barb. 366. And it seems that if a servant hire himself out to perform certain duties, and is

forced by another servant of the same master to perform other and more dangerous service, and

an injury results in consequence of negligence of co-servants in such other employment, he may

have an action against the master for the injury. Chicago, Ac., R. R. Co. v. Harney, 28 Ind.

23. See also Ind. and Gin. R. R. Co. v. Love, 10 Ind. 556.

(1) [Therefore an action i-* sustainable for a breach of promise to marry, where the contract

was mutual; 1 Roll. Ab. 22, 1. 5; 1 Sid. 180; 1 Lev. 147; Carth. 467; Freem. 95; and

though one of the parties be an infant, yet the contract will be binding on the other. 2 Stra.
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all cases, where the parties at the time of making it were, in the first place, will-

ing to contract; secondly, able to contract; and, lastly, actually did contract, in

the proper forms and solemnities required by law.

1 *4.-U 1 *First they must be willing to contract, " Consensus, non concubitus,

• "' J facit nuptias," is the maxim of the civil law in this case: (b) and it is

adopted by the common lawyers, (c) who indeed have borrowed, especially in

ancient times, almost all their notions of legitimacy of marriage from the canon

and civil laws. (2)

Secondly, they must be able to contract. In general, all persons are able to

contract themselves in marriage, unless they labour under some particular disa-

bilities and incapacities. What those are it will be here our business to inquire.

Now these disabilities are of two sorts; first, such as are canonical, and there-

fore sufficient by the ecclesiastical laws to avoid the marriage in the spiritual

court; but these in our law only make the marriage voidable, and not ipso facto

void, until sentence of nullity be obtained. Of this nature arc precontract;

(bj ff. SO, 17, 30. (c) Co. Litt. 33.

937. The action is sustainable by a man against a woman: Carth. 467 ; 1 Salk. 24; 5 Mod.

511; but an executor cannot sue or be sued. 2 M. and S. 408.

A promise to marry is not within the statute of frauds, and need not be in writing: 1 Stra.

34 ; 1 Lord Ray. 316 ; Bui. N. P. 280; nor when in writing need it be stamped. 2 Stark. 351.

If the intended husband or wife turns out on inquiry to be of bad character, it is a sufficient

defence for rescinding the engagement; but a mere suspicion of snch a fact is not. Holt. C. X.
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P. 151; 4 Bsp. Rep. 256.

No bill in equity, or other proceeding, is sustainable to compel the specific performance of a

promise to marry; and the 4 Geo. IT, c. 76, s. 27, enacts, that marriage shall not be compelled

in any ecclesiastical court, in performance of any contract; consequently, the only legal remedy

is au action at law to recover damages for the breach of contract.

It may be as well hero to observe, that our law favors and encourages lawful marriages,

and every contract in restraint of marriage is illegal, as being against the sound policy of the

law.

Henco a wager that the plaintiff would not marry within six years was holden to be void.

10 East, 22. For although the restraint was partial, yet the immediate tendaucy of such con-

tract, as far as it went, was to discourage marriage, and no circumstances appeared to show that

the restraint in the particular instance was prudent and proper; and see further, 4 Burr. 2225 •

2 \Tern. 102, 215; 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 248; 1 Atk. 287; 2 Atk. 538, 540; 10 Tes. 429; 1 P. Wins.

181; 3M and S. 463.

On the other hand, contracts in procuration of marriage are void, at least in eqnity: 1 Ch.

Rep. 47; 3 Ch. Rep. 18; 3 Lev, 411; 2 Chan. Ca. 176; 1 Tern. 412; 1 Tes. 503; 3 Atk. 566;

Show. P. C. 76; 4 Bro. P. 0. 144, 8vo. ed.; Co. Litt. 206, b; Forrest Rep. 142; and semble it

would be so at law; 2 Wils. 347; 1 Salk. 156, ace. Hob. 10, cont. Persons conspiring to pro-

cure the marriage of a ward in chancery by undue means, are liable not only to be committed,

but to be indicted for a conspiracy. 3 Tes. and B. 173.]

That contracts in restraint of marriage are void, see in addition to the cases above cited,

Hartley v. Ricw, 10 East, 22; Sterling v. Sinnickson, 2 South. 756. Conditions subsequent in

dueds, which are iu general restraint of marriage, are also void, though reasonable conditions,

the purpose of which is only to throw around the relation proper restraints and protections,

are permissible; the court placing upon them a construction most favorable to the person

restrained. Daley v. Desbpuverie, 2 Atk. 261. Conditions that one shall not marry without

consent of parent or guardian, or not to a person or persons named, or not until reaching a speci-

fied age, if reasonable, or not to a native of a particular country: Perriu v. Lypn, 9 East, 170;

or that a widow shall not marry again: Lloyd v. Lloyd, 16 Jur. 231; are conditions which have

been sustained, though in the case of personal property, a condition in restraint of the marriage

of a widow will be looked upon as imposed in terrorcm only, and as void unless there be a

limitation over in case of a breach. See 1 Jarm. on "Wills, 710, and notes; Willard's Eq. 215;

1 Greenleafs Cruise. 483, 484; Parsons «. Winslow, 6 Mass. 109.

(2) Marriage is sometimes spoken of as a contract, made in due form of law, by which a

man and a woman reciprocally engage to live with each other during their joint lives, and to

discharge towards each other the duties imposed by law on the relation of husband and wilo.

Uouv. Law Die. " Marriage; " and see Clayton c. Wardell, 4 X. Y. 230. In a legal sense,

however, marriage is not a contract, but is a domestic relation resulting from contract* Ditsou

c. Ditsou, 4 R. I. 101; Diokspn v. Dickson, 1 Terg. 112; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 183;

Noel r. Ewing, 9 Ind. 49; it is " the union of one man and one woman so long as they shall

both live, to the exclusion of all others, by an obligation which during that time, the parties

cannot, of their own volition and act, dissolve, but which can be dissolved only by authority

of the state. Nothing short of this is a marriage." Perkins, J., in Roche v. Washington,

19 Ind. 57.
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consanguinity, or relation by blood; and affinity, or relation by marriage; and

some particular corporal infirmities. And these canonical disabilities are either

grounded upon the express words of the divine law or are consequences plainly

deducible from thence : it therefore being sinful in the persons who labour under

them, to attempt to contract matrimony together, they are properly the object

of the ecclesiastical magistrate's coercion; in order to separate the offenders,

and inflict penance for the offence, pro salute animarum. But such marriages

not being void ab initio, but voidable only by sentence of separation, they are

esteemed valid to all civil purposes, unless such separation is actually made dur-

ing the life of the parties. (3) For, after the death of either of them, the courts

of common law will not suffer the spiritual courts to declare such marriages to

have been void; because such declaration cannot now tend to the reformation

of the parties, (d) And therefore when a man had married his first wife's sister,

and after her death the bishop's court was *proceeding to annul the p *„*1

marriage and bastardize the issue, the court of king's bench granted a •- ' '

prohibition quoad hoc ; but permitted them to proceed to punish the husband for

incest, (e) These canonical disabilities being entirely the province of the eccle-

siastical courts, our books are perfectly silent concerning them. But there are

a few statutes which serve as directories to those courts, of which it will be proper

to take notice. By statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 38, it is declared, that all persons

may lawfully marry, but such as are prohibited by God's law; (4) and that all

marriages contracted by lawful persons in the face of the church, and consum-
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mated with bodily knowledge, and fruit of children, shall be indissoluble. And,

because in the times of popery, a great variety of degrees of kindred were made

impediments to marriage, which impediments might however be bought off for

money, it is declared, by the same statute, that nothing, God's law except, shall

impeach any marriage, but within the Levitical degrees; (5) the farthest of

which is that between uncle and niece. (/) By the same statute all impediments

arising from precontracts to other persons were abolished and declared of none

effect, unless they had been consummated with bodily knowledge: in which case

the canon law holds such contract to be a marriage de facto. But this branch

of the statute was repealed by statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 23. How far the act

of 26 Geo. II, c. 33, (6) which prohibits all suits in ecclesiastical courts to compel

(d) Co. l.Hl. 33. (e) Salk. 548. (/) Glib. Bep. 158.

(3) [Elliot v. Gurr, 2 Phil. Ecc. C. 16. And the wife is entitled to dower. 1 Moore, 225,

consanguinity, or relation by blood ; and affinity, or relation by marriage ; unJ
some particular corporal infirmities. And these canonical disabilities are either
grounded upon the express words of the divine law or are consequences plainly
deducible from thence: it therefore being sinful in the persons who labour under
them, to attempt to contract matrimony together, they are properly the object
of the ecclesiastical magistrate's coercion ; in order to separate the offenders,
and inflict penance for the offence, pro salute animarum. But such marriages
not being void ab hiilio, but voidable only by sentence of separation, they are
esteemed valid to all civil purposes, unless such separation is actually made during the life of the v.arties. (3) For, after the death of either of them, the courts
of common law will not suffer the spiritual courts to declare such marriages to .
have been void ; because such declaration cannot now tend to the reformation
of the parties. (d) And therefore when a man had married his first wife's sister,
and after her death the bishop's court was *proceeding to annul the [* 435 ]
marri~e and bastardize the issue, the court of king's bench granted a.
prohibition quoad hoc; but permitted them to proceed to punish the husband for
incest. (e) 'l'hese canonical disabilities being entirely the province of the ecclesia.sticai courts, our books are perfectly silent concerning them. But there are
a few statutes which serve as directoiies t-0 those courts, of which it will be proper
to take notice. By statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 38, it is declared, that all persons
may lawfully marry, but such as are prohibited by God's law; (4) and that all
marriages contracted by lawful persons in the face of the church, and consummated with bodily knowledge, and fruit of children, shall .be indissoluble. And,
because in the times of popery, a great variety of degrees of kindred were made
impediments to marriage, which impediments might however be bought off for
money, it is declared, by the same statute, that nothing, God's law except, shall
impeach any marriage, but within the Levitical degrees; (5) the farthest of
which is that between uncle and niece.(/) By the same statute all impediments
arising from precontracts to other persons were abolished and declared of none
effect, unless they had been consummated with bodily knowledge: in which case
the canon law holds such contract to be a marriage de facto. But this branch
of the statute was repealed by statute 2 and 3 Et.lw. VI, c. 23. How far the act
of 26 Geo. II, c. 33, (6) which prohibits all suits in ecclesiastical courts to compel

228; Noy. 29 ; Cro. Car. 352 ; 1 Roper, 332, 333.]

(d) Co. Litt. 33.

Marriage within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity was made absolutely

(ll)

Salk. IWS.

(/) Gilb. Bep.

1~.

void by stat. 5 and 6 William IT, c. 54.

(4) [This act does not specify what these prohibitions are, but by the 2T> Hen. VIII, c. 22, s.

3, these prohibitory degrees are stated, and it is enacted, " that no subjects of this realm, or in

any of his majesty's dominions, shall marry within the following degrees, and the children

of such unlawful marriages are illegitimate, viz. : a man may not marry his mother or step-

mother, his sister, his son's or daughter's daughter, his father's daughter by his step-mother,

his aunt, his uncle's wife, his son's wife, his brothers wife, his wife's daughter, his wife's son's

daughter, his wife's daughter's daughter, his wife's sister;" and by s. 14, this provision shall

be interpreted of such marriages where marriages were solemnized, and carnal knowledge

had ; and see the 28 Hen. VIII, c. 7.]

(5) [See table of Levitical degrees, Burn Ecc. L. tit. Marriage, I. The same degrees by

affinity are prohibited. Affinity always arises by the marriage of one of the parties so

related; as a husband is related by affinity to all consanguinei of his wife; and vice versa,

the wife to the husband's con-sanguinei: for the husband and wife being considered one flesh,

those who are related to the one by blood, are related to the other by affinity. Gibs. Cod. 412.

Therefore a man after his wife's death cannot marry her sister, aunt, or niece, or daughter, by

a former husband. 2 Phil. Ecc. C. 359. So a woman cannot marry her nephew by affinity,

such as her former husband's sister's son. 2 Phil. Ecc. C. 18. So a niece of a wife cannot

after her death marry the hnsband. Nov. Rep. 29. But the consanguinei of the husband are

not at all related to the consangui>iei of the wife. Hence two brothers may marry two sis-

ters, or father and son a mother and daughter; or if a brother and sister marry two persons

not related, and the brother and sister die, and the widow and widower may intermarry ; for

though a man is related to his wife's brother by affinity, he is not so to his wife's brother's

wife, whom, if circumstances would admit, it would not be unlawful for him to marry.]

(6) [The statute is repealed by subsequent acts.]
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(3) [Elliot v. Gurr, 2 Phil. Ecc. C. 16. And the wife iR entitled to dower.

228; Noy. 29; Cro. Car. 352; 1 Roper, 332, 333. ]

1 Moore, 225,

Marriage within the prohibited degrees of collfl8ngninity or affinity was made absolutely
\'oid by stat. G and 6 William IV, c. 54.
( 4) [This act does not specify what these prohibitions a.re, but by the 2r. Hen. VIII, c. 22, s.
3, these prohibitory degrees a.re tltated, and it is enacted, " that no subjects of this realm, or in
any of his majesty'R dominion~, Rhall marry within the following dl."grees, and the children
of !!UCh unlawful marriages a.re illegitimato, viz. : a man may not marry his mother or stepmother, his sister, his llOD'il or daughter's daughter, his father's daughter by hi:1 MteP,-motherJ
hiil aunt, his uncle's wife, his son's wife, hi11 brother's wife, hi,; wife's daughter, hit1 wife's son's
dau~hter, his wife'R daughter'!! daughter, hiR wife's sister;" and by s. 14, t.hi~ provision Bhall
be mtcrpreted of .1mch marriageK where marriages were solemnized, and carnal knowledge
had ; 1Jnd see the 28 Hen. VIII, c. 7.]
(5) [See table of Levitice.l degreel!, Burn Ecc. L. tit. Marriage, I. The same degrees by
affinity are prohibited. Affinity always arises by the marriage of one of the parties HO
related ; BK a husband i11 related by affinity to all consangui1wt of his wife ; and t•ioo versa,
the wife to the husband's consanguinei : for tho husband and wife bcin11: conffidered one flesh,
thoRe who are related to the one by blood, are related to the other by affinity. Gibs. Cod. 412.
Therefore a man aft.er his wife's death cannot marry her 11i;iter, aunt, or niece, or daughter, by
a former husband. 2 Phil. Ecc. C. 359. So a. woman cannot marry her nephew by affinity,
such as her former husband's Kister'K son. 2 Phil. Ecc. C. 18. So a niec.e of a wife cannot
nllcr her death marry the husband. Noy. Rep. 29. But the oonsangtlinet of the husband a.re
not at all related to the con.sangui1U!i of the wife. Hence two brothel'll may marry two sistcn1, ur father and eon a mother and daughter; or if a brother and sister marry two persons
not related, and the brother and sister die, and the widow and widower may inturmarry ; for
though a man is related to his wife's brother by affinity, he iii not so to hill wife':i brother's
wifP, whom, if circumstances would admit, it wonld not be unlawful for him to marry.]
(6) ['fhc statute i11 repealed by subsequent acts.]
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a marriage, in consequence of any contract, may collaterally extend to revive

this clause of Henry VIII's statute, and abolish the impediment of precontract,

I leave to be considered by the canonists. (7)

The other sort of disabilities are those which are created, or at least enforced,

by the municipal laws. And though some of them may be grounded on natural

law, yet they are regarded by the laws of the land, not so much in the light of

any moral offence, as on account of the civil inconveniences they draw after them.

These civil disabilities make the contract void ab initio, and not merely voidable;

F *4361 no*' ^a* *ney Dissolve a contract already formed, but they render the

' J parties incapable of forming any contract at all: they do not put asunder

those who are joined together, but they previously hinder the junction. And,

if any persons under these legal incapacities come together, it is a meretricious,

and not a matrimonial union. (8)

1. The first of these legal disabilities is a prior marriage, or having another

husband or wife living; in which case, besides the penalties consequent upon it

as a felony, the second marriage is to all intents and purposes void: (g) polygamy

being condemned both by the law of the New Testament, and the policy of all

prudent states, especially in these northern climates. And Justinian, even in

the climate of modern Turkey, is express, (h) that " duas uxores eodem tempore

habere non licet." (9)

2. The next legal disability is want of age. This is sufficient to avoid all

other contracts, on account of the imbecility of judgment in the parties con-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

tracting ; a fortiori therefore it ought to avoid this, the most important contract

of any. Therefore if a boy under fourteen, or a girl under twelve years of age,

marries, this marriage is only inchoate and imperfect; and, when either of them

comes to the age of consent aforesaid, they may disagree and declare the marriage

void, without any divorce or sentence in the spiritual court. This is founded

on the civil law. (i) But the canon law pays a greater regard to the constitution,

than the age, of the parties; (j) for if they are habiles ad matrimonium, it is a

good marriage, whatever their age may be. And in our law it is so far a mar-

riage, that, if at the age of consent they agree to continue together, they need

not be married again. (*) If the husband be of years of discretion, and the wife

under twelve, when she comes to years of discretion he may disagree as well as

she may: for in contracts the obligation must be mutual; both must be bound,

or neither: (10) and so it is, vice versa, when the wife is of years of discretion,

and the husband under. (I)

' (g) Bro. Mr. tit. Bastardy, pi. 8. (A) Inst. 1, 10, 6. m Lam. CoiutU. 109. •

(j) Decretal. I. 4, tit. 8, qu. 3. (i) Co. Lit*. 78. (I) IMd.

(7) [A contract per verba de praosentt tempore used to be considered in the ecclesiastical courts

ipmim matrimonium, and if either party had afterwards married, this, as a second marriage,

a marriage, in consequence of any contract, may collaterally extend to revive
this clause of Henry VIII's statute, and abolish the impediment of precontract,
I leave to be considered bv the canonists. (7)
The other sort of disab1Iities are those which are created, or at least enforced,
by the municipal laws. And though some of them may be grounded on natural
law, yet they are regarded by the laws of the land, not so much in the light of
any moral offence, as on account of the civil inconveniences they draw after them.
These ciYil disabilities make the contract void ab int'tio, and not merely voidable;
[ • 436 ] not that they *dissolve a contract already formed, but they render the
parties incapable of forming any contract at all: they do not put asunder
those who are joined together, but they previously hinder the junction. And,
if any persons under these legal incapacities come together, it is a meretricious,
and not a matrimonial union. (8)
1. The first of these legal disabilities is a prior marriage, or having another
husband or wife living; in which case, besides the penalties consequent upon it
as .a felony, the second marriage is to all infonts and purposes void: ( g) polygamy
bemg condemned both by the law of the New Testament, and the policy of all
prudent states, especially in these northern climates. And Justinian, even in
the climate of modern 'furkey, is express, (k) that" dtta8 uxores eodem tempore
ltahere non licet." (!l)
2. The next legal disability is want of age. This is sufficient to a.void all
other contracts, on account of the imbecility of judgment in the parties contracting; a fortfori therefore it ought to avoid this, the most important contract
of any. Therefore if a boy under fourteen, or a girl under twelve years of age,
marries, this marriage is only inchoate and imperfect; and, when either of them
comes to the age of consent aforesaid, they may disagree and declare the marriage
void, without any divorce or sentence in the spiritual court. 'fhis is founded
on the civil law. (i) But the canon law pays a greater regard to the constitution,
than the age, of the parties; (j) for if they are halJiles ad matrimonium, it is a.
good marriage, whatever their age may be. And in our law it is so far a marriage, that, if at the age of consent they agree to continue to$ether, they need
not be married again. (k) If the husband be of years of discret10n, and the wife
under twelve, when she comes to years of discretion he may disagree as well as
she may: for in contracts the obligation must be mutual; both must be bound,
or neither: (10) and so it is, vice versa, when the wife is of years of discretion,
and the husband under. (l)
(g) Bro. Abr. tU. Bcutal"d11, pl. 8.
(j) D~. l. '· tU. 2, qu. a.

(Ta) Jut. 1, 10, 6.
(kl Co. Litt. 79.

liJ UoJI. ComtU. 100.
(l) Ibid.

would have been annulled in the spiritual courts, and the first contract enforced. See an

instance of it, 4 Co. 29.]

(8) And in such a case the parties may treat the marriage as absolutely void, and are at lib-

erty to contract lawful matrimony without first obtaining decree of nullity. But in cases

where the invalidity depends upon questions of fact, it is manifestly the dictate of proper

prudence that a suit for decree of nullity should be instituted in the proper court.

(9) The statute 9 Geo. IV, o. 31, the provisions of which have very generally been adopted

in the American states, exempts from the criminal provisions for the punishment of poly-

gamy the case of a party whose husband or wife shall nave been absent from such person for

the space of seven years then last past, and shall not have been known to such person to be

living within that time; but the second marriage under such circumstances is nevertheless

void, and either party may withdraw from it on discovering the error under which it was

agreed to. Kenley »• Kenley, 2 Yeates, 207 ; Williamson «. Parisien, 1 Johns. Ch. 389; Heffner

t1. Heffner, 23 Penn. St. 104. But it seems that by statute in some states the second marriage

is made voidable only. See Valleau v. Vallean, 6 Paige, 207; White v. Lowe, 1 Redf. Sur.

B. 378.

(10) If parties who are of the proper age of consent agree to marry each other, and one of

thorn is under the age of twenty-one years, and the other has reached that age, the latter is

bound by the contract, and liable to respond in damages for a breach thereof, while the former

may repudiate it with impunity. Hunt ». Peake, 5 Cow. 475; Willard v. Stone, 7 Cow. 22.

The common law rule that cither party to a marriage, while one is under the age of consent
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(7) [A contra.ct per 11erba de F.mBenti tempore used to be considered in the ecclesiastical courts
ipsum matrimo11ium, and if mther partr, had afterwards married, this, as a second marriage,
would have been annulled in the spintual courts, e.nd the first contract enforced. See an
in11tl\nce of it, 4 Co. 29.]
(8) And in such a case the yarties may treat the marriage as absolutely void, and are at liberty to contract lawful matrimony without first obtainin~ decree of nullity. But in cll888
where the invalidity depends upon questions of foot, it is manifestly the dictate of proper
prudence that a snit for decree of nullity should be instituted in the proper court.
(9) The 1<tatute 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, the provisions of which have very generally been adopt.ed
in the American stateR, exempts from the criminu.l provisions for the punb1hment of poly~amy the case of a party whose husband or wife shall have been absent from such pel'llOn for
the space of seven years then la.st past, and shall not have been known to such person t~1 be
living within that time ; but the second marriage under such circumstances is nevertheless
void, and either party mav withdraw from it on discovering the error under which it wo.s
agreed to. Kenley t•. Kenley, 2 Yeate1<, 207; Williamf!On t'. Parisien, 1 Johns. Ch. 389; Heffner
''- Heffner, 2:3 Penn. St. 104. Ilut it seems that by statute in some states the second marriage
i~ me.de voidable only. See Valleau v. Valleau, 6 Paige, 207; White tt. Lowe, 1 Redf. Sur.
R. 378.
(10) If parties who are of the proper a.ge of consent agree to marry each other, and one of
th<1m is under the age of twenty-one ye!ll'l!, and the other has reached that age, the latter is
bound by the contract, and liable to respond in damages for a breach thereof, whlle the former
may repudiate it with impunity. Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cow. 475; Wille.rd v. St.one, 7 Cow. :.?2.
The common law rule that either party t<> a marriage, while one is under the age of consent
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*3. Another incapacity arises from want of consent of parents or r $40™ -i

guardians. By the common law, if the parties themselves were of the *- -I

age of consent, there wanted no other concurrence to make the marriage valid:

and this was agreeable to the canon law. But, by several statutes, (m) penalties

of 1001. are laid on every clergyman who marries a couple either without publi-

cation of banns, which may give notice to parents or guardians, or without a

license, to obtain which the consent of parents or guardians must be sworn to.

And by the statute 4 and 5 Ph. and M. c. 8, whosoever marries any woman child

under the age of sixteen years, without consent of parents or guardians, shall be

subject to fine, or five years' imprisonment: and her estate during the husband's

life shall go to and be enjoyed by the next heir. The civil law indeed required

the consent of the parents or tutor at all ages, unless the children were emanci-

pated, or out of the parents' power: («) and if such consent from the father was

wanting, the marriage was null, and the children illegitimate (o) but the con-

sent of the mother or guardians, if unreasonably withheld, might be redressed

and supplied by the judge, or the president of the province: (p) and if the father

was non compos, a similar remedy was given. (y) These provisions are adopted

and imitated by the French and Hollanders, with this difference: that in France

the sons cannot marry without consent of parents till thirty years of age, nor

the daughters till twenty-five; (r) (11J and m Holland, the sons are at their own

disposal at twenty-five, and the daughters at twenty. (*) Thus hath stood, and

thus at present stands, the law in other neighbouring countries. And it has
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lately been thought proper to introduce somewhat of the same policy into our

laws, by statute 26 Geo. II, c. 33, whereby it is enacted, that all marriages cele-

brated by license (for banns suppose notice) where either of the parties is under

twenty-one, (not being *a widow or widower, who are supposed eman- •- *JQQ -i

cipated,) without the consent of the father, or, if he be not living, of the •- J

mother or guardians, shall be absolutely void. (12) A like provision is made as

in the civil law, where the mother or guardian is non compos, beyond sea, or

unreasonably froward, to dispense with such consent at the discretion of the

lord chancellor: but no provision is made, in case the father should labour

under any mental or other incapacity. (13) Much may be, and much has been,

said both for and against this innovation upon our ancient laws and constitution.

On the one hand, it prevents the clandestine marriages of minors, which are

often a terrible inconvenience to those private families wherein they happen.

On the other hand, restraints upon marnages, especially among the lower class,

are evidently detrimental to the public by hindering the increase of the people;

and to religion and morality, by encouraging licentiousness and debauchery

among the single of both sexes; and thereby destroying one end of society and

government, which is concubitu prphibibere vago. And of this last inconven-

ience the Roman laws were so sensible, that at the same time that they forbade

marriage without the consent of parents or guardians, they were less rigorous

upon that very account with regard to other restraints: for, if a parent did not

(m) 6 and 7 Will, in, c 8. 7 ami 8 W. in, o. 85. 10 Ann. o. 19. fn) ff. S3, 2. 2, and 18.

(o) ff. 1, 5,11. (p) Cod. 5, 4, 1, and 20. (q) Intt 1,10, 1.

(r) Domat of Dowries. < 1. Monteaq. Sp. L. 83, 7. (t) rinni'tx in Intt. 1. 1, t. 10.

may repudiate it: Reeve. Dom. Eel. 200; was held, in People ». Slack, 15 Mich. 199, to be

changed by statute in Michigan, so that the party competent to consent is bound by tho

*3. Another incapacity arises from want of consent of parents or
guardians. By the common law, if the parties themselves were of the [ *437 ]
age of consent, there wanted no other concurrence to make the marriage valid:
and this was agreeable to the canon law. But, by several statutes, (m) penalties
of lOOl. are laid on every clergyman who marries a couple either without publication of banns, which may give notice to parents or guardians, or without a
license, to obtain which the consent of parents or guardians must be sworn to.
And by the statut~ 4 and 5 Ph. and M. c. 8, whosoeYer marries any woman child
under the age of sixteen years, without consent of parents or guardians, shall be
subject to fine, or five years' imprisonment: and her estate durin~ the husband's
life shall go to and be enjoyed by the next heir. The civil law rndeed required
the consent of the parents or tutor at all ages, unless the children were emancipated, or out of the parents' power: (n) and if such consent from the father was
wanting, the marriage was null, and the children illegitimate (o) but the consent of the mother or guardians, if unreasonably withheld, might oo redressed
and supplied by the judge, or the president of the province: (p) and if the father
was non compos, a similar remedy was given. (<J) These provisions are adopted
and imitated by the French and Hollanders, with this difference: that in France
the sons cannot marry without consent of yarents till thirty years of age, nor
the daughters till twenty-five; (r) (11) and m Holland, the sons are at their own
disposal at twenty-five, and the daughters at twenty. (s) Thus hath stood, and
thus at present stands, the law in other neighbouring countries. And it has
lately been thought proper to introduce somewhat of the same policy into our
laws, by statute 26 Geo. II, c. 33, whereby it is enacted, that all mama~es celebrated by license (for banns suppose notice) where either of the parties is under
twenty-one, (not being *a widow or widower, who are supposed eman- [ • 438 ]
cipated,) without the consent of the father, or, if he be not living, of the
mother or guardians, shall be absolutely void. (12) A like provision is made as
in the civil law, where the mother or guardian is non compos, beyond sea, or
unreasonably froward, to dispense with such consent at the discretion of the
lord chancellor: but no provision is made, in case the father should labour
u~der any mental or ?ther i!1~pacity.. (13) Much may oo, and much h~ b~n,
said both for and a15a.mst this mnovat10n upon our ancient laws and constitut10n.
On the one hand, it prevents the clandestine marria~es of minors, which are
often a terrible inconvenience to those private families wherein they happen.
On the other hand, restraints upon marnages, especially among the lower class,
are evidently detrimental to the public by hindermg the increase of the people;
and to religion and morality, by encouraging licentiousness and debauchery
among the single of both sexes; and thereby destroying one end of society and
S'overnment, which is concubitu proliilJibere vago. And of this last inconvenience the Roman laws were so sensible, that at the same time that they forbade
marriage without the consent of parents or guardians, they were less rigorous
upon that very account with regard to other restraints: for, if a parent did not
(mJ 6 and 7 Will. ill, c . 6. 7 ands W. m 1 c. 85. 10 Ann. c. i9.
(••) Ff. 23, 2. 9, and 18.
(o) Ff. I, 6, 11.
(p) Cod. 6, "· 1, ana 20.
(q) Inat . 1, 10, 1.
(r) Domat. or Dowries. t ~. lllontesq. Sp. L. 23, 7.
(I) Pinniu.t in In1t. l. 1, t. io.

marriage.

(11) [This is now altered to 25 in sons and 21 in daughters, and the consent of the father suffices.

After those ages the parties may marry after three respectful, but ineffectual, endeavors to obtain

consent of parents. Code Civil, Livre 1, Title 5. ]

(12) But now by several statutes, the last of which is 19 and 20 Vic. c. 119, 8. 17, the mar-

riage of a minor, if actually solemnized without consent, is nevertheless valid. But in such

case the court of chancery may deprive the offending party of any pecuniary benefit from the

marriage. Statute 4 Geo. IV, c. 76, s. 23; 6 and 7 Wm. IV, c. 85, s. 43. In case consent is

unreasonably refused, an appeal may be had to the court of chancery. See Kxparte I. C., 3 Myl,

& Cr. 471.

(13) A provision for this will be found in the later statutes.
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provide a husband for his daughter, by the time she arrived at the age of twenty-

five, and she afterwards made a slip m her conduct, he was not allowed to dis-

inherit her upon that account; " quia non sua culpa, sed parentum, id com-

misisse cognoscitur." (t) (14)

4. A fourth incapacity is want of reason; without a competent share of which,

as no other, so neither can the matrimonial contract, be valid. (M) It was for-

ftj Nov. US, «11. (u) 1 Roll. Abr. 357.

(14) [The statute 6 and 7 Wm. IV, c. 65 (explained by 1 Tic. c. 22, and 3 and 4 Vic. c. 72), was

passed for the relief of those who scrupled at joining in the services of the established church,

and wag the result of a long and arduous struggle carried on for many years in and out of

parliament. It provides for places of religious worship, other than the churches and chapels

of the establishment, being registered for the solemnization of marriages therein; and it also

enables persons, who wish to do so, to enter into this contract without any religious ceremony-

whatever. It is therefore no longer essential to the validity of a marriage, either that it

should be solemnised in a parish church or public chapel, or be performed by a person in

holy orders; but whether celebrated in facie ecelesiai, or (under the provisions of the above

mentioned statute) in a place of religious worship, or in the presence merely of the superintendent

registrar of births, deaths and marriages, the officer before whom civil marriages may be performed,

the contract must be preceded and accompanied by certain circumstances ot publicity, or entered

into in virtue of a license obtainable only on proof by affidavit that there is no legal impediment to

the marriage.]

On the question whether the marriage relation has been duly formed, it becomes important
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to distinguish between the actual relation of marriage, and ituisi- facts and circumstances

which may tend to prove a marriage, and from which a court or jury might be justified in

inferring its existence. A marriage is one thing; the proof of a marriage is another. Letters

f. Cady, 10 Cal. 53:!. Mere cohabitation, after the manner of husband and wife, can never con-

stitute marriage: Undo v. Belisario, 1 Hagg. Cons. 216; Goldbeck v. Goldbeck, 3 Green. X. J.,

42; but nevertheless such cohabitation is a circumstance which, taken in connection with the

public recognition of each other as sustaining this relation, or with general reputation of marriage,

may fully warrant the inference that a lawful marriage has been formed. Indeed such cohabita-

tion aud reputation, supported as they would be by the presumption of legal conduct rather than

the reverse, must generally bo sufficient evidence of a marriage where civil rights only are in-

volved, and it is only where one of the parties is charged with a criminal disregard of the obliga-

tions which marriage imposes, and where jthe presumption arising from cohabitation and reputa-

tion would be met by a counter presumption of innocence, that the law would demand more

direct evidence. Fleming t>. Fleming, 4 Biug. 266 ; Starr v. Peek, 1 Hill, 270; Stater. Winkley, 14

N. H. 480; Arthur ». Broadnax, 3 Ala. 557; Hantz v. Sealey, 6 Binn. 405; tforthfield v. Vers-

hire,33 Vt. 110; Harman v. Harman, 16 111. 85; Henderson v. Cargill, 31 Miss. 367; Holmes p.

Holmes, 6 La. 463; Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Penn. St. 132. Thus, in prosecutions for bigamy

and criminal conversation an actual marriage must bo proved. Birt r. Barlow, 1 Doug. 17l";

Taylor ». Shemwell, 4 B. Monr. 575; People v. Humphrey, 7 Johns. 314 ; Clayton v. Wardell, 4

N. Y. 230. And so where a defendant is prosecuted criminally for sexual commerce, the unlaw-

fulness of which depends upon a prior marriage. State v. "Wedgwood, 8 Greenl. 75; Common-

wealth v. Horcross, 9 Mass. 492; State «. Roswell, 6 Conn. 446. And even where civil rights only

are involved, if there be proof of one marriage in due form, it would seem that this is not rebut-

ted by proof of former cohabitation and reputed marriage of one of the parties with another per-

son. Clayton v. Wardell, 4 N. T. 230; Houpt v. Honpt, 5 Ohio, 539.

In the cases where a marriage may legitimately be inferred from cohabitation and the con-

current circumstances, it is competent to rebut the presumption by any evidence which proves

that in fact there was no mamage. Philbrick v. Spangler, 15 La. An."46; Matter of Taylor, 9

Paige, 611. Nevertheless, if a party has allowed a woman to be held out to the world as his wife,

he may be precluded, on the principle of estoppel, from disproving the marriage as against parties

who, trusting to its existence, had supplied the woman with those articles, for herself or her

family, which a trader is usually justified in treating a married woman as the agent of her hus-

band to purchase.

When the statute law of the state does not expressly make some formal ceremony, or the pres-

ence of a magistrate, priest or minister of religion necessary, the common law, it is believed, will

permit parties who are legally competent, to consent to intermarry, by any form of consent they

may see fit to adopt, and without any formal ceremony whatever. Hicks ». Cochran, 4 Edw. Ch.

107"; Fenton r. Reed, 4 Johns. 52; Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige, 574; Donnellyr.Donnelly, 8 B. Monr.

113; Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Binn. 405; Newbury B. Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151; Londonderry v. Chester,

2 N. H. 208; Dumaresly v. Fishly, 3 A. K. Marsh. 368; Bashaw v. State, 1 Terg. 177; Carmi-

phael v. State, 12 Ohio, N. S. 553; Cheseldine v. Brewer, 1 H. and Me H. 152; State v. Murphy.

6 Ala. 765; Commonwealth ». Stump. 53 Penn. St. 132. Such is very clearly the weight of

authority, though some doubt was east upon this point by the two cases of Regina v. Millis, 10

Cl. and Fin 534, and Jewell's Lessee v. Jewell, 1 How. 219; in each of which the court was

equally divided. Sec also Beamish v. Beamish. 9 H. L. Gas. 274.
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merely adjudged, that the issue of an idiot was legitimate, and consequently that

his marriage was valid. A strange determination! since consent is absolutely

requisite to matrimony, and neither idiots nor lunatics are capable of consent-

ing to any thing. And therefore the civil law judged much more sensibly when

it made snch deprivations of reason a previous impediment; *though r *jqn -i

not a cause of divorce, if they happened after marriage, (v) And mod- "- '"' '

era resolutions have adhered to the reason of the civil law, by determining (w)

that the marriage of a lunatic, not being in a lucid interval, was absolutely

void. But as it might be difficult to prove the exact state of the party's mind

at the actual celebration of the nuptials, upon this account, concurring with

some private family (a;) reasons, the statute 15 Geo. II, c. 30, has provided that

the marriage of lunatics and persons under phrenzies, if found lunatics under

a commission, or committed to the care of trustees by any act of parliament,

before they are declared of sound mind by the lord chancellor or the majority

of such trustees, shall be totally void. (15)

(v) Ff. 23, tit. 1,1. 8, and tit. 2,1.16. (w) Morrison's case, Coram Delegat. (x) See private acts, 2S Geo.n, c. 6-

(15) The parties must each have a consenting mind, and be able to understand the relation

they are about to form. True v. Banney, 21 N. H. 53. That defect of understanding which

would preclude the forming of any other valid contract, would preclude also a marriage con-

tract. Turner r. Meyers, 1 Hagg. Cons. R. 416; Browning v. Roane, 2 Phil. 70. If the inca-

pacity be such that the party is incapable of understanding the nature of the contract itself,

and incapable from mental imbecility of taking care of his or her own person or property, he
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or she is obviously incapable of disposing of person and property by the marriage contract.

Per Sir John Nichol in Browning v. Reane, 2 Phil. 70. A marriage with an idiot or an insane

person is therefore void. True v. Ranney, 21 N. H. 52; Parker v. Parker, 2 Lee, 382. So is a

marriage with a lunatic, unless when contracted during a lucid interval. Rawdon t>. Rawdon,

28 Ala. 565; Cole v. Cole, 5 Sneed, 57. So is one with a person stupvfied from intoxication so

as to be incapable of understanding the nature of the transaction at tin-, time. Clement v.

Mattison, 3 Rich. 93.

And not only must there be a consenting mind, that is to say, a capacity to consent, but the

parties must have actually consented. Tney must not only have agreed to marry, but they

must have intended completely to form the relation, and in some manner have expressed that

consent. The performance of a marriage ceremony is evidence of consent, but it is not con-

clusive, and it may still be shown that they went through the form as a mere jest, or to evidence

the sincerity of their design to form the relation at some future time, or that they intended it for

some private purpose of their own, and did not contemplate marriage in fact. Dalrymple v.

Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Cons. R. 54; Clark «. Field, 13 Tt. 460.

A consent obtained by fraud is no consent, and may be repudiated, notwithstanding a cer-

emony of marriage may have been gone through with. But what is or is not such fraud as

should avoid a marriage is a question usually BO complicated by the particular circumstances

of the case under consideration, that it does not become necessary to lay down a rule by which

cases not thus complicated caii be tested. If, for instance, a female heiress, of immature and

feeble mind, should fall a prey to a needy adventurer, who, by artifice and false representa-

tions, should entice her from the protection of parents or guardian, and by importunities wring

a reluctant consent to an unsuitable marriage, it will at once be perceived that there are

circumstances attending the cose which may properly distinguish it from one where a man, in

the full possession of a mature mind, has surrendered himself with blind credulity to the

fascinations of an artful woman, and has entered into relations of matrimony with her, without

making those inquiries concerning her character, habits or circumstances which prudence would

have suggested, but which ho has been content to dispense with. "Weakness of intellect in the party

claiming to be defrauded is an important element in these cases, as would also be the improper

u>..- of the influence derived from a confidential relation, like that of guardian and ward. Ports-

month r. Portsmouth, 1 Hagg. 355; Harford v. Morris, 2 Hagg. Cons. R. 423.

Speaking generally upon this subject, it will be safe to say, that deception by one of the

parties in respect to his or her character, temper, reputation, standing in society, bodily con-

dition or fortune, while it might justify the other in repudiating an executory contract to

marry, would not be sufficient ground for avoiding a marriage. The law presumes that every

person employs due caution in a matter in which his happiness for life is so materially

involved, and from regard to the highest interests of society, it refuses to enter upon any

inquiry whether such caution has been employed or not, but makes the presumption conclu-

sive. Wakefield v. Mackay, 1 Phile. 134; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen, 607. And this is

so even as to the important matter of the woman's previous character for chastity. ReynoldK

r. Reynolds, 3 Allen, 307 ; Scroggins v. Scroggins, 3 Dev. 535 ; Leavitt e. Leavitt, 13 Mich. 452;

Baker e. Baker, 13 Cal. 87. If, however, the woman was not only previously unchaste, but is

actually at the time of the marriage pregnant by another man than the husband, and the hus-

band is ignorant of that fact, and believed her to be chaste, he is entitled to haye the marriage
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Lastly, the parties must not only be willing and able to contract, but actually

must contract themselves in due form of law, to make it a good civil mar-

riage .(16) Any contract made,^?er verba de presenti, or in words of the present

tense, and in case of cohabitation per verba defuturo also, between persons able

to contract, was before the late act deemed a valid marriage to many purposes;

and the parties might be compelled in the spiritual courts to celebrate it in

facie ecclesice. But these verbal contracts are now of no force, to compel a

'future marriage, (y) Neither is any marriage at present valid, that is not cele-

brated in some parish church or public chapel, unless by dispensation from the

archbishop of Canterbury. It must also be preceded by publication of banns,

or by license from the spiritual judge. Many other formalities are likewise pre-

scribed by the act; the neglect of which, though penal, does not invalidate the

marriage. It is held to be also essential to a marriage, that it be performed by

a person in orders; (z) though the intervention of a priest to solemnize this

contract is merely juris positivi, and not juris naturalis aut divini: it being

said that Pope Innocent the Third was the first who ordained the celebration

F *440 1 °^ marr'aoe 'n the church; (a) before *which it was totally a civil con-

L •" tract And, in the times of the grand rebellion, all marriages were per-

formed by the justices of the peace; and these marriages were declared valid,

without any fresh solemnization, by statute 12 Car. II, c. 33. But, as the law

now stands, we may upon the whole collect, that no marriage by the temporal

law is ipso facto void, that is celebrated by a person in orders,—in a parish
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church or public chapel, or elsewhere, by special dispensation,—in pursuance

of banns or a license,—between single persons,—consenting,—of sound mind,—

and of the age of twenty-one years;—or of the age of fourteen in males and

twelves in females, with consent of parents or guardians, or without it, in case

of widowhood. And no marriage is voidable by the ecclesiastical law, after the

death of either of the parties; nor during their lives, unless for the canonical

impediments of precontract, if that indeed still exists; of consanguinity ; and

of affinity, or corporal imbecility, subsisting previous to their marriage. (17)

II. I am next to consider the manner in which marriages may be dissolved;

and this is either by death, or divorce. (18) There are two kinds of divorce, the

(y) Stat. 86 Geo. H, c. S3. (x) Balk. 119. (a) Moor. 170.

declared null for the fraud. Scott r. Shnfeldt, 5 Paige, 43; Guiiford ». Oxford, 9 Conn. 321:

Lastly, the parties must not only be willing and able to contract, but actually
must contract themselves in due form of law, to make it a good civil marriage.( 16) Any contract made, per verba de presenti, or in words of the present
tense, and in case of cohabitation per verba de futuro also, betwoon persons able
to contract, was before the late act deemed a valid marriage to many purposes;
and the parties might be compelled in the spiritual courts to celebrate it in
Jacie ecclesim. But these nrbal contracts are now of no force, to compel a
future marriage. (y) Neither is any marriage at present Yu.lid, that is not celebrated in some parish church or public chapel, unless by dispensation from the
archbishop of Canterbury. It must also be preceded by publication of banns,
or by license from the spiritual judge. Many other formalities are likewise prescribed by the act; the neglect of which, though :penal, does not invalidate the
marriage. It is held to be also essential to a marnage, that it be performed by
a person in orders; (z) though the intervention of a priest to solemnize this
contract is merely juris positivi, and not juris naturalis aut divini: it being
said that Pope Innocent the Third was the first who ordained the celebration
[ • 440 ] of marriage in the church; (a) before •which it was totally a civil contract. And, in the times of the grand rebellion, all marriages were performed by the justices of the peace ; and these marriages were declared valid,
without any fresh solemnization, by statute 12 Car. II, c. 33. But, as the law
now stands, we may upon the whole collect, that no marriage by the temporal
law is ipso facto void, that is celebrated by a ~rson in orders,-in a parish
church or public chapel, or elsewhere, by special dispensation,-in pursuance
of banns or a license, -between single persons,--consenting,-of sound mind,and of the age of twenty-one years ;-or of the age of fourteen in males and
twelves in females, with consent of pa.rents or guardians, or without it, in case
of widowhood. And no marriage is voidable b,y the ecclesiastical law, aft.er the
death of either of the parties; nor during their lives, unless for the canonical
impediments of precoutract, if that indeed still exists; of consanguinity; and
of affinity, or corporal imbecility, subsisting previous to their marriage. (17)
II. I am next to consider the manner in which marriages may be dissolved;
and this is cit.her by death, or divorce. (18) There are two kinds of divorce, the

Morris v. Morris, Wright, 630; Baker v Baker, 13 Cal. 87; Reynolds t>. Reynolds, 3 Allen, 309.

(I/) Stat. 26

Deception in respect to identity of person, by means of which one is induced to enter into

Geo. Il, c. 811.

(Z) S&llr:. 119.

(a)

Moor.170.

marriage with one person, supposing it to be another, is unquestionably such legal fraud as

will avoid the marriage, for in this case the element of consent is entirely wanting, and con-

sequently no valid contract has been effected.

The fraud in any case, to be available as a ground for annulling a marriage, must be a

fraud upon one of the parties thereto, and such party must complain. A marriage fraudu-

lent as to third persons—for example, creditors—cannot be set aside on that ground. McKiiiney

«. Clarke, 2 Swan, 321.

So a marriage may be declared void if contracted in consequence of the use of force, men-

ace or duress. Shelford on Mar. and Div. 213. And see Harford v. Morris, 2 Hagg. Cons. K.

423. But where the only duress consists in legal proceedings, not resorted to maliciously and

by abuse of legal process, and the defendant enters into a marriage to avoid imprisonment,

and because of being unable to procure bail, the marriage will nevertheless be valid. Jackson

v. Winne, 7 \Vend. 47. And see Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige, 43.

(16) As to the consequences of a failure to observe the formalities required by the marriage

act, see the statutes 4 Goo. IV, c. 76; 6 and 7 Wm. IV", c. 85 ; 19 and 20 Vic. c. 119.

(17) [The marriage act extends only to marriages in England. Marriages on elopements to

Scotland seem to be valid. Bui. N. P. 113; 1 Ves. and B. 112, 114; 2 Haggard, 54; 1 Roper,

334. Marriages of British subjects in foreign countries are valid if made according to the laws

of those countries. 10 East, 282; 2 Marsh. 243; 1 Dowl. and R. Rep. 38. So a marriage in

Ireland, performed by a clergyman of the church of England, in a private house, was held valid,

although no evidence was given that any license had been granted to the parties. Smith v. Max-

well, Ryan and M. Rep. 80.]

The general rule is, that a marriage, valid by the law of the state whore it is entered into, is

valid everywhere, unless incestuous or bigamous.

(18) [The jurisdiction in the United States over the contract of marriage is almost entirely

statutory. It has besn held, however, that the court of chancery, in rirtae of its inherent
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declared null for the fraud. Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige, 43; Guilford ti. Oxford, 9 Conn. 321 ;
Morris v. Morris, Wright, 6.10; Baker v Baker, 13 Ca.I. f5'I; Reynolds r. Reynolds, 3 Allen, 309.
Deception in re~pect to identity of .Person, by means of which one i.'! induced to enter into
marriage with one person, ~opposing it to be a.nother, is unquestionably such legal fraud as
will avoid the mamage, for in this C&ile the element of consent is entirely wanting, and con·
sequently no valid contract has been effected.
.
The fraud in any case, to be available as a ground for annulling & marriage, must be a
fraud upon one of the parties thereto, and such party must complain. .A. marriage fraudulent as to third persons-for example, creditors-cannot be set &Bide on that ground. llcKi.u.Dey
"· Clarke, 2 Swan, 321.
So a marriage may be declared void if contract:ed in consequence of the use of force, menace or duress. Shelford on Mar. and Div. 213. And see Halford v. Morris, 2 Hagg. C<>ns. R.
423. But where the only duress con!<iRts in legal proceedings, not resorted to maliciously and
by abuse of legal process, and the defendant ente~ into a marriage to avoid imprisonment,
and because of being unable to procure bail, the marriage will nevertbelees be valid. Jackson
v. Winne, 7 Wend. 47. And see Scott ti. Shufeld~, 5 Paige, 43.
(16) As t-0 the con:<equence~ of a. failure to observe the formalities required by the marriage
net, see the statutes 4 Geo. IV, c. 76; 6 tlnd 7 Wm. IV, c. 8.5 ; 19 and 20 Vic. c. 119.
(17) [The marriage act extendi! only to marriages in England. Marriages on elopements to
Scotland seem to be valid. Bui. N. P. 113; 1 Ves. and B. 112, 114; 2 Haggard, 54; 1 Roper,
334. Marriages of Briti~h 11ubjects in foreign countrie8 a.re valid if made according to the laWll
of those countries. 10 EMt, 282; 2 ¥a.1'1'h. 243 ; 1 Dowl. and R. Rep. 38. So a marriage in
Ireland, pert'ormed by a clergyman of the ehurch of England, in a private house, was held valid,
although no erldence wa>1 ginm that any license had been granted to the parties. Smith 11. llaxwell, Ryan and M. Rep. 80.]
The general rule is, that a marriage, valid by the law of the state where it is ent.ered into, is
valid everywhere, unless ince:ituous or bigamous.
(18) [The jurisdiction in the Unit:ed Stat:e11 over the contract of marriage is almost entirely
statutory. It h8i b~n held, however, that the court of chancery, in Tirtue of its inherent

288

b

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

Chap. 15.]

OF HUSBAND AND

Chap. 15.] OF HUSBAND AND WIPE. 440

WIFE~

440

one total, the other partial; the one a vinculo matritnonii, the other merely

a mensa et thoro. The total divorce, a vinculo matrimonii, must be for some

of the canonical causes of impediment before mentioned, and those, existing

before the marriage, as is always the case in consanguinity; not supervenient,

or arising afterwards, as may be the case in affinity or corporal imbecility. (19)

For in cases of total divorce, the marriage is declared null, as having been abso-

lutely unlawful ab initio: and the parties are therefore separated pro salute

animarum: for which reason, as was before observed, no divorce can be obtained,

but during the life of the parties. The issue of such marriage as is thus entirely

dissolved, are bastards, (c) (20)

Divorce a mensa et thoro is when the marriage is just and lawful ab initio, and

therefore the law is tender of dissolving *it; but, for some supervenient r *,, -. -i

cause, it becomes improper or impossible for the parties to live together: "• ' '

as in the case of intolerable ill temper, or adultery, in either of the parties. For

the canon law, which the common law follows in this case, deems so highly and

•with such mysterious reverence of the nuptial tie, that it will not allow it to be

unloosed for any cause whatsoever, that arises after the union is made. (21) And

(o) Co. Lilt. 235.

one total, the other partial ; the one a vinculo matrimonii, the other merely
a mensa et thoro. The total divorce, a vinculo matrim.onii, must be for some
of the canonieal causes of impediment before mentioned, and those, existing
before the marriage, as is always the case in consanguinity; not supervenient,
or arising afterwards, as may be the case in affinity or corporal imbecility. (19)
For in cases of total divorce, the marriage is declared null, as having been absolutely unlawful ab initio: and the parties are therefore separated pro salute
anim,arum.: for which reason, as was before observed, no divorce can be obtained,
but during the life of the parties. The issue of such marriage as is thus entirely
dissolved, a.re bastards. (c) (20)
Divorce a mensa et thoro is when the marriage is just and lawful ab initio, and
therefore the law is tender of dissolving *it; but, for 80me supervenient [ *«l ]
cause, it becomes improper or impossible for the parties to live together:
as in the case of intolerable ill temper, or adultery, in either of the parties. For
the canon law, which the common law follows in this case, deems so highly and
with such mysterious reverence of the nuptial tie, that it will not allow it to be
unloosed for any cause whatsoever, that arises after the union is made. (21) And

equity powers, has jurisdiction to declare marriages null on the ground of fraud, mistake or

(a) Co. Llit. 286.

defect of mental capacity. See Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343; Burtis v. Burtis,

Hopk. 557; Perry v. Perry, 2 Paige, 501; Clark f. Field, 13 Vt. 460; Ferris e. Ferris, 8 Conn.

166.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

(19) [The impotency of the husband at the time of the marriage to consummate it, and still

continuing, is ground for annulling it, though the husband was ignorant of his constitutional

defects. 2 Phil. EC. C. 10. Corporal imbecility may arise after the marriage, which will not

then vacate the marriage, because there was no fraud in the original contract; and one of the

ends of marriage, viz.: the legitimate procreation of children, may have been answered; but no

kindred by affinity can happen subsequently to the marriage ; for as affinity always depends

upon the "previous marriage of one of the parties so related, if a husband and wife are not so

related at the time of the marriage, they can never become BO afterwards.]

The causes for which a total divorce is allowed in the United States are prescribed by statute,

and differ in the different states. The consequences mentioned in the text only follow in those

cases in which the marriage was void ab initio; in other cases the marriage is regarded as bind-

ing upon the parties up to the time of the decree, and as put an end to, lor all purposes, at that

time. The distinction is between a decree of nullity, which declares a marriage to have been

void froin the beginning, and a decree of divorce, which dissolves a marriage once valid for the

misconduct of one of the parties. The English law has been recently changed so as to permit

divorces for causes arising after marriage, and a court is created with jurisdiction over the sub-

ject. The husband may nave a divorce from the bonds of matrimony for the adultery of the

wife, and the wife for incestuous adultery, bigamy, rape or unnatural crime by the husband, or

for adultery coupled with two years' desertion. And either party may have a judicial separation

from the other for adultery, cruelty, or desertion without cause for two years or upwards. See

statute 20 and 21 Vic. c. 85.

(20) [In these divorces the wife, it is said, shall receive all again that she brought with her;

because the nullity of the marriage arises through some impediment; and the goods of the

•wife were given for her advancement in marriage, which now ceaseth; but this is where the

goods are not spent; and if the husband give them away during the coverture without any

collusion, it shall bind her: if she knows her goods are unspent, she may bring an action of

detinue for them ; but, as to money, <fec., which cannot be known, she must sue in the spiritual

court. Dyer, 62.

This divorce enables the parties to marry again, and to do all other acts as if they had never

been married.]

(21) [But the husband and wife may live separate by agreement between themselves and a

trustee; and such agreement is valid and binding, and may be sued upon, if it be not pros-

pective in its nature as for a future separation, to be adopted at the sole pleasure of the wife,

the parties being, at the time of making the agreement, living together in a state of amity. See

Jee v. Thurlow, 2 Bar. and C. 547; 4 Dowl. and R. 11; 2 East, 283; 6 id. 244; 7 Price, 577; 11

Tes. 529.

If, after this agreement to live separate, they appear to have cohabited, equity will aousider

the agreement as waived, by such subsequent cohabitation. 1 Dowes' Rep. 235; Moore, 874;

2 Peere "W, 82; 1 Fonbl. 106, and notes; 2 Cox Rep. 100: Bunb. 187; 11 Yes. 526, o37. Or if

the agreement being in consequence of the wife's elopement, the husband offer to take her again.

equity powers, has jurisdiction to declare maniag:es null on the ground of fraud, mistake or
defect of mental capacity. See Wightman 11. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343; Burtis v. Burtis,
Bopk. 557; Perry v. Perry, 2 Paige, 501; Clark v. Field, 13 Vt. 460; Fenis ti. Ferris, 8 Conn.
166.
(19) [The impotency of the husband at tho time of the marriage to consummate it, and still
continuing, is ~ound for annulling it, though the hui:>be.nd was ignorant of his constitutional
defecu. 2 Phil. Ee. C. 10. Corporal imbecility may arise after the marriage, which will not
then vacate the marriage, becau11c there was no fraud in the original contract ; and one of the
ends of marriage, viz. : the legitimate procreation of children, may have been answered ; but no
kindred by affinity can happen subsequently to the marria~e ; for as affinity always depends
upon the previous marriage of one of the parties so related, 1f a hu~band and wife are not so
related at the time of the marriage, they can never become so afterwards.]
The causes for which a total divorce is allowed in the United Statoti are prescribed by statute,
and differ in the different states. The consequences mentioned in the text only follow in those
cases in which the marriage wa.~ void ab initio; in other cases tho marrio.~e is regarded as binding upon the parties up to the time of the decree, and as put o.n end to, for all purposes, at that
time. The distinction is between a decree of nullity, which declare11 a marriage to have been
void from the beginning, and a decree of divorce, which di:lSolves a marriage once valid for the
misconduct of one of the parties. The English luw has been recently changed so as to permit
divorces for causes ariRing after marriage, and a court is created with jurisdiction over tho 1mbject. The husband may nave a divorce from the bonds of matrimony for the adultery of the
wife, and the wife for inceRtuous adultery, bigamy, rape or unnatural crime bv the husband, or
for adultery coupled with two years' desertion. And either party may have a Judicial separation
from the other for adultery, cruelty, or det.<ertion without cause for two years or upwards. Sec
statute 20 and 21 Vic. c. 85.
(20) [In these divorces the wife, it is said, shall receive all again that sho brought with her;
because the nullity of the marriage arises through some impediment; and the goods of the
wife were given for her advancement in marriage, which now ceaseth; but this is where the
goods are not 11pent; and if the husband give them away during the eoverture without any
collusion, it !'he.II bind her: if she knows her goods are unspent, she may bring an action of
detinue for them; but, as to money, &c., which cannot be known, she must sue in the spiritual
conrt. Dyer, 62.
This divorce enablee the parties to marry again, and to do all other oots as if they had ne\"cr
been married. l
(21) [Dnt tlie husband and wife may live separate by agreement between themselves and a
trustee; and such agreement is valid aud binding. and may be sued upon, if it be not prospective in its nature 8.ll for a future separation, to be adopted at the sole pleasure of the wife,
the parties being, at the time of making the afn'eemeut, living together ~ a state of ~mity. See
Jee ti. Thurlow, 2 Bar, and C. 547; 4 Dow!. and R. 11; 2 East, 283; 6 id. 244; 7 Pnce, 577; 11
Vea. 529.
If, after this agreement to live separate, they appear to have cohabited, equity will 110nsider
the agreement as waived, by such subsequent cohabitation. 1 Dowes' Rep. 235; Moore, 874;
2 Peere W, 82; 1Fonbl.106, and notes; 2 Cox Rep. 100: Dunb. 187; 11 Ves. 526, o37. Or if
the agreement being In consequence of the wife's elopement, the husband offer to take her again.
1Vern,52,
But at law, the wife being guilty of adultery is no bar to a claim made by her trustee under a
separation deed, for arrears of annuity, there being no clause $at the deed should be void on that
account. 2 :Sar. and Cres. 547; 4 D. and R. 11, S. C.]
VoL. I.-37
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1 Vern, 52,

But at law, the wife being guilty of adultery is no bar to a claim made by her trustee under a

separation deed, for arrears of annuity, there being no clause Unit the deed should be void on that

account, 2 Bar. and Ores. 547; 4 D. and R. 11, 8. C.]
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this is said to be built on the divine revealed law; though that expressly assigns

incontinence as a cause, and indeed the only cause, why a man may put away

his wife and marry another, (d) The civil law, which is partly of pagan origi-

nal, allows many causes of absolute divorce; and some of them pretty severe

ones: as. if a wife goes to the theater or the public games, without the knowl-

edge and consent of the husband ; (e) but among them adultery is the principal,

and with reason named the first. (/") But with us in England adultery is only

a cause of separation from bed and board: ( a) for which the best reason that

can be given, is, that if divorces were allowed to depend upon a matter within

the power of either of the parties, they would probably be extremely frequent;

as was the case when divorces were allowed for canonical disabilities, on the

mere confession of the parties, (h) which is now prohibited by the canons, (i) (22)

However, divorces a vinculo matrimonii, for adultery, have of late years been

frequently granted by act of parliament. (23)

In case of divorce a mensa et thoro, the law allows alimony to the wife, which

is that allowance which is made to a woman for her support out of the husband's

estate: being settled at the discretion of the ecclesiastical judge, on considera-

tion of all the circumstances of the case. This is sometimes called her estovers,

for which, if he refuses payment, there is, besides the ordinary process of excom-

munication, a writ at common law de estoveriis habendis, in order to recover

F *442 1 ^ (-7°) ^ '8 genera^y proportioned to the rank and quality of *the par-

' J ties. But in case of elopement, and living with an adulterer, the law
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allows her no alimony, (k)

III. Having thus shewn how marriages maybe made or dissolved, I come now,

lastly, to speak of the legal consequences of such making, or dissolution.

By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in Taw: (I) that is, the very

being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at

least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose

wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore called in

our law-french a feme-covert, fcemina viro co-operta ; is said to be covert-baron,

or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and

her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle,

of an union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights,

duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage. I speak

not at present of the rights of property, but of such as are merely personal.

For this reason, a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into cove-

nant with her: (m) for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence;

and to covenant with her would be only to covenant with himself: (24) and

(d) Matt. xlx. 9. (e) Nov. 117. (/) Cod. 5, 17, 8. (g) Moor, 888. (A) 2 Hod. $14.

it) Can. 1603, o. 105. I ii 1 Lev. 6. (ti Cowel, tit. Alimony. (I) Co. 1 ,Ut. 118. (m) Co. l-itt 12.

(22) Confessions alone ought seldom, if ever, to be sufficient proof of gnilt on which to found a

this is said to be built on the divine revealed law; though that expressly llSsigns
incontinence as a cause, and indeed the only cause, why n man may put away
his wife and marry another. (d) The civil law, which is partly of pagan original, allows many causes of absolute divorce; and some of them pretty 8<.'vere
ones: as, if a wifo goe:i to the theater or the public games, without the knowledge and consent of the husband; (e) but among them adultery is the principal,
and with reason named the first.(/) But with us in England adultery is only
a cause of separation from bed and board: ( .</) for which the best reason that
can be given, is. that if divorces were allowed to depend upon a matter within
the power of either of the parties. they would probably be extremely frequent;
as was the case when divorces were allowed for canonical disabilities, on the
mere confession of the parties, (h) which is now prohibited by the canons. (i) (22)
However, divorces a vinculo matrimonii, for adultery, ham of late years been
frequently granted by act of parliament. (23)
fn case of divorce a mensa et thoro, the law allows alimony to the wife, which
is that allowance which is made to a woman for her support out of the husband's
estate: being settled at the discretion of the ecclesiastical judge, on consideration of all the circumstances of the case. This is sometimes called her e~toiiers,
for which, if he refuses payment, there is, besides the ordinary process of excommunication, a writ n.t common law de esto-veri1'.s habendis, in order to recover
[ • 442 ] it. (j) It is generally proportioned to the rank and quality of *the parties. But in case of elopement, and living with an adulterer, the law
allows her no alimony. (k)
III. Having thus shewn how marriages may be made or dissolved, I come now,
lastly, to s~k of the legal consequences of such making, or dissolution.
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: (l) that is, the verv
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose
wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore called in
our law-french a ferne-covert, /a11nina viro co-operta; is said to be covert-baron,
or under the protection and mfluence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and
her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principl~,
of an union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights,
duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage. I speak
not at present of the rights of property, but of such as a.re merely persmuil.
For this reason, a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into covenant with her: (m) for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence;
and to coTenant. with her would be only to covenant with himself: (24) and

at

decree of divorce, because of the very great danger of collusion. They are receivable, however,

in support of other evidence, and their weight will depend very much upon the conclu&iveness

(d) Matt. xix. 9.
(e) Not1. 117.
''I Can. llKIS, o. 106.
!ti 1 Lev. 6.

(f) Cod. 6, 17, 8.
(g) Moor, 888.
(1') Z Mod.1114,.
(k) Cowel, tit. Alimony.
(l) Co. Litt. 119.
(111) Co. Litt.

l~.

of thu surrounding circumstances in disproving their having been made for the purposes of a

divorce. Adultery is now cause for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, not only in all the states of

the American Union, but in England also.

(23) The legislatures of the American states have claimed and exercised the right to grant

divorces, and it has generally been conceded that they possessed full authority to do so. Some

courts, however, have denied their right, on the ground that the power was in its nature

judicial, not legislative, and consequently was not conferred in a grant of legislative power.

Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 445; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Ponder c. Graham, 4 Flor. 23;

State ». Fry, 4 Mo. 120; Bryson v. Campbell, 12 id. 498; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 id. 590. And in

most of the states now, the legislature is prohibited, by express constitutional provision, to grant

divorces.

As to what will give the courts of a state jurisdiction to grant divorces, see Story Con. L,

$ 230, a; Bish. Mar. and Div. $ 727 et seq.; Ibid. 4th ed. vol. 2, j 155 et seq.; Cooley Const.

Liin. 400-102.

(24) [The husband and wife being one person in law, the former cannot, after marriage, by

any conveyance at common law, give an estate to t ho wife, Co. Litt. 112, a. 187, b. Nor the

290

(22) Confessions alone ought seldom, if ever, to be sufficient proof of guilt on which to found a
de<>ree of divorce, because of the very ~eat danger of collusion. They are receivable, however,
in ~upport of other ovidonce, and their weight will depend very much upon the conclu.Uveness
of the surrounding circurnstan<>eR in di1<proving their having been made for the purpoRes of a
dirnrce. .Adultery is now cam1e for a divorce a vincuw matrimonii, not only in all the states of
tho American Union, but in England also.
(23) The legislatures of the .American states have claimed and exercised the right to grant
divorees, and it bas generally been conceded that they possessed full authority to do so. Some
courts, however, have denied their right, on the ground that the power was in its nature
judicial, not legislative, and eon1mquently was not eonfemld in a grant of legislative power,
Bingham "· Miller, 17 Ohio, 445; Cfark "· Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Ponder 17. Graham, 4 Flor. 23;
St.a.tu ''- Fry, 4 Mo. 120; Bryson 17. Campbell, 12 id. 491:!; Bryson t'. Bry110n, 17 id. 590. And in
mo11t of the states now, tho legislature is prohibited, by express constitutional provision, to grant
divorces.
As to what will give the courts of a state jurisdiction to grant divorces, see Story Con. L,
~ 2:JO, a; Ili8h. Mar. and Div. ~ 7Z1 et seq. ; Ibid. 4th ed. vol. 2, ~ 156 et seq. ; Cooley Coruit.
L~m.

400-40'2.

(24) [The husband and wife being one person in law, the former cannot, after marriage, by
11ny conveyance at common law, give _an estate tA> $e wi.fe, Co. Litt. 112, a, 187, b. Nor the
~!)0
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therefore it is also generally true, that all compacts made between husband and

wife, when single, are voided by the intermarriage. («) (25) A woman indeed

may be attorney for her husband; (o) for that implies no separation from,

but is rather a representation of, her lord. And a husband may also be-

queath any thing to his wife by will; for that cannot take effect till the

coverture is determined by his death, (p) (26) The husband is bound to pro-

vide his wife with necessaries by law, as much as himself; and, if she contracts

(n) Cro. Car. 681. (o) V. S. B. 27. (p) Co. Lltt. 114.

therefore it is also generally true, that all compacts made between husband and
wife, when single, are voided by the intermarriage. (n) (25) A woman indeed
may be attorney for her husband; (o) for that implies no separation from,
but is rather a representation of, her lord. And a husband mav also bequeath any thing to his wife by will; for that cannot take effect till the
coverture is determined by his death. (p) (26) 'fhe husband is bound to provide his wife with necessaries by law, as much as himself; and, if she contra.eta

wife to the husband. Go. Litt. 187, b. But the husband may grant to the wife, by the interven-

(n) Cro.

tion oi trustees: Co. Litt. 30; and he may surrender a copyhold to her use. A husband cannot

Car. 11111.

(o) F. N. B. 'n.

(p)

Co. Litt. 112.

covenant or contract with his wife : Co. Litt. 112, a; though he may render his contract binding,

if entered into with trustees; for unless by particular custom, as the custom of York, a feme

covert is incapable of taking any thing by the gift of her husband: Co. Litt. 3; except by will.

Lit. s. 168; 2 Tern. 385; 3 Atk. 72; Fonbl. Eg. vol. 1, 103.

But in equity, gifts between husband and wife are supported: 1 Atk. 270; 2 Ves. 666; 1 Fonb.

on Eq. 103; 3 P. wins. 334; unless in fraud of creditors, <fcc., or where the gift is of the whole of

the husband's estate. 3 Atk. 72; 2 Ves. 498.

But though in equity the wife may take a separate estate from her husband in respect of a gift,

and even have a decree against her husband in respect of such estate: 1 Atk. 278; or avail her-

self of a charge for payment of his debts : Prec. Ch. 26; yet, if she do not demand the produce

during his life, and he maintains her, an account of such separate estate shall not be earned back

beyond the vear. 2 P. "Wms. 82, 341; 3 id. 355; 2 Ves. 7, 190, 716 ; 16 id. 126; 11 id. 225; 1
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Fonbl. on Eq. 104; 1 Atk. 269; 1 Eq. Ca, Ab. 140, pi. 7.

By 17 Hen. Till, the husband may make an estate to his wife; as if he make a feoffment

to the use of his wife for life, hi tail or in fee, the estate will be executed by the 27 Hen. VIII,

and the wife will be seized. Co. Litt. 112. a. So if the husband covenant to stand seized to

the use of his wife. Id. a, b. And this where by custom he might devise at common law.

Lit. s. 168. So where the husband or wife act en anter droit, the one may make an estate to the

other; as if the wife has an authority by will to sell, she may sell to her husband. Co Litt.

112, a.]

The statutes of some of the American states have changed this rule of the common law. by

conferring upon married women the power to make contracts in respect to their individual

property, and to buy and sell and receive conveyances and transfers in the same manner and

with the like effect as if unmarried. See Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91. Independent of

these statutes, contracts between husband and wife are enforced in equity where they are juat

and equitable, clear and distinct in terms, and appear to have been entered into with full

knowledge and free will on the part of the wife. "West ti. Howard, 20 Conn. 581 ; Livingston

v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. 537 ; Shepard r. Shepard, 7 id. 57 ; Garlick v. Strong, 3 Paige, 440;

Neitncewicz v. Gahn, 3 Paige, 614; Imlay v. Huntmjjtou, 20 Conn. 146. And the wife

may make gifts to her husband, which will be sustained if satisfactorily established. Imlay ».

Huntington, 20 Conn. 146 ; Pcnniman v. Perce, 9 Mich. 509. Agreements for separation

between husband and wife are not favored in the law, and if they contemplate future separa-

tion, and are designed to bring it about, they are absolutely void. Carson v. Murray, 3 Paige,

483. But where the parties actually separate, and, by agreement at the time or afterwards,

provision is made for disposing of property, and settling the respective rights of the parties

thereto, and the agreement seems not unreasonable in view of their circumstances and of an

actual separation, equity will enforce the stipulations in respect to property, and generally

give effect to those regarding the control of the persons of children. And although it has

been supposed that trustees were necessary to the validity of such agreements: Story Eq.

Juris. J 1428; the better opinion appears to be otherwise. Reeve's Dom. Eel. 91 and

note.

(25) [At law, if a man make a bond or contract to a woman before marriage, and they after-

wards intermarry, the bond or contract is discharged. Cro. Car. 551; 1 Lord Ray. 515.

So if two men make a bond or contract to a woman, or e contra, and one of them marries with

her, the bond, <to,, is discharged Cro. Car. 551.

Though not if it be intended for the advantage of the wife during the coverture, as that she

shall have such rents, &c., at her disposal. Ca. Ch. 21, 117.

But a covenant or contract by a man with a woman is not destroyed by their marriage

where the act to be performed is future, to be done after the marriage is determined, as to

leave his wife so much after his death. Cro. Car. 376; Salk. 326; 5 T. Rep. 381. If a wife

charge her estate with payment of her husband's debts, or apply her separate estate to such

purpose, and it does not appear to have been intended by her as gift to her husband, equity

wife to the husband. Co. Litt. 187, b. But the husband may grant to the wife, by the intervention ot trustees : Co. Litt. 30; and he may surrender a copybold to her use. A husband cannot
covenant or contract with his wife : Co. Litt. 112, a; though he may render his contra.ct binding,
if entered into with tru11tees ; for unless by particular custom, RS the custom of York, a fame
c<?vert is incapable of taldng any thing by the gift of her husband : Co. Litt. :3 ; except by will.
Lit. s. 168; 2 Vern. 385; 3 Atk. 72; Fonbl. E9. vol, 1, 103.
But in equitv, gifts between hut1band and wife are supported : 1 Atk. 270; 2 Ves. 666 ; 1 Fonb.
on Eq. 103; 3 'P:'Wms. 334; unle~s in fraud of creditol'l!, &c., or where the gift is of the whole of
the busba.nd's e11tate. 3 Atk. 72; 2 Ves. 498.
But though in equity the wife may take a separate estate from her husband in respect of a ltift,
and even have a decree against her huRband in respect of such estate: 1 .Atk. 278; or avail herself of a charge for payment of bis debts: Pree. Ch. 26; yet. if she do not demand the J>roduec
during bis life, and he maintains her, an account of such separate estate shall not be earned back
beyond the year. 2 P. Wm~. 82, 341; 3 id. 355; 2 Ves. 7, 190, 716; 16 id. 126; 11 id. 225; 1
Fonbl. on Eq. 104 ; 1 Atk. 269; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 140, pl. 7.
By 17 Hen. VIII, the husband may make an estate to his wife ; 88 if he make a feoffment
to the use of hlii wife for lifo, iu tail or in fee, the estate will be executed by the 27 Hon. VIII,
and tho wife will be seized. Co. Litt. 112. a. So if tho husband covenant to stand seized to
the use of bis wife. Id. a, b. .And thiA where by custom he might devise at common Jaw.
Lit. s. 168. So where tho husband or wife act en auter droit, the one may make an estate to the
other ; 88 if the wife has au authority by will to sell, she may sell to her husband. Co Litt.
112, a.]
The statutes of some of the .American states have changed this rule of the common law, by
couferring upon married women the power to mo.kc contract.8 in reRpect to their individual
property, and to buy and sell and receive conveyances and transfers in the same manner and
with the like effect 88 if unmtmied. See Burdeno "· Amperse, 14 Mich. 91. Independent of
these statutes, contracts between hu11hand and wife are enforcud in equity where they are just
aud equitable, clear and dit1tinct in terms, and appear to have been entered into with full
kllowledge and free will on the part of the wife. West v. Howard, 20 Conn. 581; Livingston
ti. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. 537; Shepard t'. Shepard, 7 id. 57; Garlick v. Strong, 3 Paige, 440;
Neimcewicz v. Gahn, 3 Paige, 614; Imlay v. Huntin~tou, 20 Conn. 146. And the wifo
may make gifts to her husband, which will be sustained 1f 8Uti~f~torily established. Imlny v.
Huntington, 20 Conn. 146 ; Penniman ti. Perce, 9 Mich. 509. Agrer,ments for separation
between husband and wife are not favored in the Jaw, and if they contemplate future separation, and are designed to bring it about, they are ab:iolutcly void. CIU'llon "· Murray, 3 Paige,
483. But where the parties actually separate, and, by agreement at the time or afterwards,
provision is made for diRposing of property, and Rettlin~ the respective rights of the parties
thereto, and the agreement seems not UDreasonable in view of their circum11tances and of an
actual separation, equity will enforce the stipulations in respect to property, and generally
give effect to those regarding the control of the persons of children. And although it hu
been supposed that trustees were necessary to tlie validity of such agreements: Story Eq.
Juris. ~ 1428; the better opinion appears to be otherwise.
Ree\·e's Dom. Rel. 91 and
note.
(25) [.At law, if a man make a bond or contract to a woman before marriage, and they afterwards intermarry, the bond or contra.ct is discharged. Cro. Car. 551; 1 Lord Ray. 516.
So if two men make a bond or contract to a woman, ore contra, and one of them ma.rr:es with
her, the bond, &c., is discharged Cro. Car. 551.
·
Though not if it be intended for the advantage of the v,;fe during the coverturo, as that she
Bhall have such rents, &c., at her disposal. Ca. Ch. 21, 117.
But a covenant or contract b,;y a man with a woman is not destroyed by their marriage
where the act to be performed 18 future, to be done after the marriage iR determined, 88 to
leave his wife so much after his death. Cro. Car. 376; Salk. 326; 5 T. Rep. 381. If a wife
charge her estate with payment of her husband's debts, or apply her separate estate to such
purpose, and it does not appear to have been int.ended by her 88 gift, to her husband, equity
Will decree the husband's assets to be applied in exoneration of her estate, or in repayment
of the money advanced. 2 Vern. 347, 689; 1 P. Wms. 264; 2 Atk. 384; 1 Fonbl. on Eq, HI'..!,
103.)
. causa mortlB
. by a husband to b'is w1ie
·~ may """'
_, __ be good, as 1"t.18 m
. the nat ure
(26) [ A dQ~tio
ofa legacy. l P. Wms. 441.)

will decree the husband's assets to be applied in exoneration of her estate, or in repayment

of the money advanced. 2 Vern. 347, 689; 1 P. "Wms. 264; 2 Atk. 384; 1 Fonbl. on Eq. 102,

103.]

(26) [A donatio causa mortis by a husband to his wife may also be good, as it is in the nature

of a legacy. 1 P, Wms. 441.]
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debts for them, he is obliged to pay them ; (q) but for anything besides neces-

saries he is not chargeable, (r) (27) Also if a wife elopes, and lives with another

(9) sulk 118. (r) 1 Sid. 130.

de~ts for .them, he is obliged to pa.y the11! ; (q). but for anything besides necessanes he rs not chargeable. (r) (27) Also if a wife elopes, and lives with another

(27) [Every agreement of any nature entered into by a married woman, without the express

( q)

or implied consent of her husband, is absolutely void. I Sid. 120; 1 Lev. 4; 1 Mod. 128, S.

Salk. 118.

{r)

1 Sid. 120.

C.; 2 Atk. 453; 2 Wils. 3; 8 T. R. 545; 2 B. and P. 105 ; Palm. 312; 1 Taunt. 217. Except

indeed in the instance of the queen consort: Co. Litt. 133, a: or of a deed enrolled or cove-

nant on the warranty of a fine, or on a covenant running with the land of the wife, demised

by her during coverture : 2 Saund. 180, n. 9; and contracts binding her by special custom:

Hob. 225; 34 and 35 Hen. Till, c. 88; and this rule prevails so strongly that a feme may

avail herself of her coverture to defeat a contract, though she have been guilty of fraud: 4

Camp. 26; nor can a married woman even state an account of a debt contracted before mar-

riage. 2 Esp. 716; 1 Taunt. 212. If the wife sell, or dispose of the money or goods of the

husband without his assent, the sale is void, and the husband may have trover for the goods;

and if she lose money at cards, the husband may bring an action for the money. Com. Dig.

Bar. and F. As a consequence of the same doctrine, a married woman cannot in general bo

made a bankrupt. 1 Mont, on B. L. 4. In equity, the same rule as to the husband s liabilitv

for the wife's contract applies: Prec. Ch. 255 : 2 Vem. 118; Sel. Ca. Ch. 19; 3 Mod. 186; and a

court of equity cannot make the husband liable in respect of the fortune he may have had with,

his wife for her debts contracted before marriage. 1 P. Wms. 461; 3 id. 410; Forrester. 173,

but see 2 Freem. 231. Though indeed if he take out administration to her he will be liable to the

extent of what he receives as her assets. Forrester, 172; and see post as to enforcing in equity
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the wife's contract.

But notwithstanding the wife is thus in general incapable of making a valid contract, so

as to bind her husband, vet in some cases he will be rendered liable when his assent to her

contract can be presumed, or was expressly given. Thus, during cohabitation the law will,

from that circumstance, presume the assent of the husband to all contracts made by the wife

for necessaries, which are suitable to the husband's degree and estate, and the misconduct,

short of the adultery of the wife, will not destroy this presumption. 2 Lord Rayrn. 1006 ; 1

Balk. 118. And this liability for necessaries is not confined to cases where they are supplied

to, or for the use of, the lawful wife of the party to be charged. A man cohabiting with a

woman, and allowing her to assume his name, and appearing to the world as his wife, and in

that character to contract debts for necessaries, will be liable, thongh indeed the tradesman

knew the circumstances: 2 EBP 637; 1 Camp. 215; and though the man be married to

another woman: 1 id. 245, 249; but this rule onlv holds during cohabitation. 4 id. 215.

U'lu'ii a man marries a widow, and receives her children into his family, although he wa.-<

not bound by the act of marriage to maintain the children; 4 T. R. 118; 4 East. 76 ; yet, having

treated them as part of his family, he is liable for contracts made by the wife in his absence for

the education of the children. 3 Esp. Rep. 1. If the husband be an infant, yet he is liable for

necessaries furnished to his wife and children, then- interests being considered*^ as identified with

his own. 1 Stra. 168; Bui. N. P. 155. This legal presumption of assent may in particular ca.*es

be rebutted; as for instance, in an action brought for the price of dresses supplied for the wife

by her order, evidence may be given that she was not in want of articles of this Kind, or that the

husband had given notice to the tradesman not to trust her upon credit. 2 Lord Ray. 1006; 1

Salk. 118; 3 B. and C. 631.

And where a husband makes an allowance to the wife for the supply of herself and family- with

necessaries during his temporary absence, and a tradesman with notice of this supplies her with

goods, the husband is not liable. 4 B. and A. 252. Money lent to a married woman cannot be

recovered against the husband. 1 Salk. 387 ; 1 P. "Wins. 482 ; Preo. Ch. 502. Even though the

money be laid out in the purchase of necessaries; though indeed in a court of equity the lender

would, in such case, be entitled to stand in the place of the tradesman by whom the goods were

supplied. Id. Where a married woman buys materials for clothing, and pawns them before

they are made up, the husband is not liable, for they never came to his use, though it would be

otherwise if the clothes were mode up and used by the wife, although they may be afterwards

pawned by her. 1 Salk. 118; Com. Dig. B. and F. Where a party contracts solely with, and

gives credit to, the wife, he cannot sue the husband, though for necessaries; and t!ii.~. although

the wife lives with him, and he sees her in possession of some of the goods, unless indeed tie

husband by any act show that he considered himself the debtor. 5 Taunt. 356; 1 Carr. Rep. 16;

3 Camp. 22; 4 id. 70; 2 Stra. 706 ; 4 B. and A, 255.

Where the husband and wife are separated and live apart from each other, still the husband

will be liable upon a contract for necessaries made with her where his assent can be implied.

Thus, where the husband deserts his wife, or turns her away without any reasonable ground,

or refuses to admit her into his house, or compels her by ill usage, indecency of demeanor, or

severity, to leave him, in all these cases he gives tin- wife a general credit, and is liable to be

sued for necessaries furnished her. 1 Esp. 441; Lord Raym. 444; 4 Esp, 42; 3 id. 251,252; 2 Stra.

1214; 3 Taunt. 421; 2 Stark. 87. And this although he has given a general notice to all per-

sons, or even a particular one to the indiviiln.il supplying Tier with necessarieSg not to give

credit to her. 4 Esp. 42; 1 Selw. If. P. 5th ed, 275. And a husband who, without cause,

turns away his wife, is liable for costs she incurs in articles of tt)e peace against him. 3 Camp.

(27) [Every agrel.'ment of any nature entered into by a married woman, without the e:xpl'08d
or implied eonsent (Ir. her husband, i11 absolutely void. 1 Sid. 120; 1 Lev. 4; 1 Kod. 128, S.
9·; 2 A;tk. 45:!; 2 Wils. 3; 8 T. R. 545; 2 B. and ~· 105; Palm. 312; 1 Taunt. 217. Except
mdeed m the mstance of the queen conl!ort: Co. Litt. 133, a: or of a deed enrolled or covenant on the warranty of a fine, or on a cov1.mllllt running with the land of the wife, demised
by her during coverture : 2 Saund. 180, n. 9; and contracts binding her by special cu>1t<im :
Ho~. 225; 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 88; and this rule prevails Ro strongly that a feme may
avail hert\elf of her covertnre to defeat a contract, though she have been guilty of fraud : 4
Camp. 26 ; nor can a married woman even 11tate an account of a debt contracted before marriage. 2 Esp. 716 ; 1 Taunt. 212. If the wife i;ell, or di~pose of the money or goods of tho
husband without his assent, the sale is void, and the hu11band may ha\"e trover for the good~;
and if she lOHe money at cards, the husband may bring an action for the money. Com. Dig.
Bar. and F. .As a consequence of the same doctrine, a married woman cannot in ~encral he
made a bankrupt. 1 Mont. on B. L. 4. In equity, the so.me rule as to the husbands liabilitv
for the wife's contract applies: Pree. Ch. 255 · 2 Vern. 118; Sel. Ca. Ch. 19; 3 Mod. 186; and
court of equity cannot make the husband liable in respect of the fortune he may ha\"e htld with
his wife for her debts contracted before marriage. 1 P . WIDtl. 461; 3 id. 410; Forre:.1ter, 173,
but see 2 Freem. 231. Though indeed if he take out administration to her he will he liable to the
extent of what he receivoe as her q,ssets. Forrester, 172; and see post &tl to enforcing in equit\•
the wife's contract.
•
But notwithstanding the wife is thus in general incapable of making a valid contract, ><o
as to bind her husband, vet in some ell.Bee he will be rendered liable when hie assent to her
contract oan be presumed, or was expressly given. Thus, during cohabitati<m the law will,
from that circumstance, pr6tlume the 888ent of the hu;iband to &l oontra.cts made by the wife
for MC688ariea, which are snit.able to the husband's degree and estate, and the mi11Conduct,
short of the adulter,y of the wife, will not de:1troy this presumption. 2 Lord Raym. 1006 ; 1
Salk. 118. .And thu1 liability for necellS&ries is not confined to cases where they a.re sup{llied
to, or for the nee of, the lawful wife of the party to be charged. .A man cohabiting with a
woman, and allowing her to ll..'!l>Ume his name, and appearing to the world &tl hi~ wife, &nd in
that charact~r to contract debts for necessaries, will be liable, though indeed the tradc.iman
knew the ciroum11tances : 2 Esp. 637 ; 4 Camp. 215 ; and though the man be married tA1
another woman: 1 id_ 245, 249; but this rule onlv holds durin~ cohabitation. 4 id. 215.
When a man marries a widow, and receives her children into his family, although he wn.~
not bound by the act of marriage to maintain the children; 4 T. R. 118; 4 East. 76 ; yet, hadng
treated them as part of his family, he is liable for contractK made by the wife in his ab~eucc for
the education of the children. 3 E~p. Rep. 1. If the husband he an infant,,et ho is liable for
necessaries furnished to hi11 wife and children, their interests being considere 118 identified 'ldth
hiM own. 1Stra.168; Bui. N. P. 155. This legal presumption of assent may in psrtrnular c&.~
be rebutted; Rll for instance, in an action brought for the price of d.re&;e~ Hupphed for the wife
by her order. evidence may be given that she W118 not in want of articles of this kind, or that the
husband had given notice to the tradesman not to trust her upon credit. 2 Lord Ray. 1006; l
Salk. 118; 3 .H. and C. 631.
.And where a husband makes an allowance to the wife fur the suppl1 of herself and family with
necessaries during his temporary absence, and a tradesman with notice of this 11Upplies her with
goods, the hu11band ii.' not liable. 4 B. and .A. 252. Yoney lent to a married woman cannot he
recovered against the husband. 1 Salk. 387; 1 P. Wms. 482; Pree. Ch. 502. Even though the
money be laid out in the purcha.;ie of nooessaries ; thou!Jh indeed in a court of eqnity the lender
woulcl, in 1mch case, be entitled to stand in the place ot the tradesman by whom the goods were
1mppliecl. Id. Where a married woman buy11 materials for clothing, and pawns them before
they are made up! the husband is not liable, for they never came to his use, though it would be
otherwise if the c othe~ were made up and used by the wife, $!though they may be at\erwa.i-dtt
pawned by her. 1 Salk. 118; Com. Dig. B. o.nd F . Where a party contracts solely with, and
gives cmdit to, the wife, he cannot sne t.he husband, though for necessariesj and this1 although
the wife lives with him, and he sees her in possession of some of the g00<1s, unless mdeed the
husband by any act show that he CQnsidered himself the debtor. 5 Taunt. 356; 1 Carr. Rep. 16;
3 Camp. 22 ; 4 id. iO ; 2 Stra. 706 ; 4 B. and A. 255.
Where the hll8band and wife are separat8d and live apart frQm each other, still the husband
will be liable upon a contract for necessaries made with her where his assent can be implied.
Thus, where the husband deserts his wife, or turns her away without any reasonable ground,
or refui;eH to admit her into his house, or compels her by ill usage, indecency of demeanor, or
severity, to leave him, in all these Cl\868 he gives the Wife a generlll credit, and is liable to be
sued for necessaries furnished her. 1 Esp. 441 i wrd :R4ym. 444; 4 Esp, 4~; 3 id. 251, 252; 2 Stra.
1214 ; 3 Taunt. 421 ; 2 Stark. ~. .Ana this aithough he has given 11> general notice to all per!!OM, or e\"en a particular one to the individual snpplying her with ·nece8tl&ries1 not to gi"re
credit to her. 4 EsJ.>. 42; 1 Selw. N. P. 5th ed. 275. .And a hQ.Bband who, without cat1t1e,
turns away his wife, is Ii.a ble for costs she incurs
e.rticlea of tlJ.e J.>6406 ~Qin.st him. 3 Camp.
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man, the husband is *not chargeable even for necessaries; (s) at least r „,. q -•

if the person who furnishes them is sufficiently apprised of her elope- L ' -'

(•) SITU. 647.

326. But the husband would not be liable at law for money lent to his wife, though laid out in

the purchase of necessaries; but he would be liable in equity. 1 Salk. 387; 1 P. "Wms. 482;

Prec. Ch. 502. And a person paying the debts of a wife, contracted while so separated, cannot

sue the husband at law. 1 H. Bla. 92. Though when a husband goes abroad and leaves his wife,

who dies in his absence, and the wife's father pays the expenses of her funeral in a manner suit-

able to the husband's rank and fortune, the amount may be recovered back from the husband,

though expended without his knowledge or consent. 1 H. Bla. 92.

This liability for necessaries does not arise where the wife voluntarily leaves her husband with-

out his consent, and where he gave her no sufficient cause for her leaving, provided the tradesman

has notice of her husband's dissent to her absence. 2 Stra. 1214, in notes; 2 Lord Raym. 1006;

1 Sid. 109; 1 Lev. 4; 2 Stark. 87; Stra. 875. So where the wife has a separate maintenance

from the husband suitable to the husband's station, and is actually paid, and the tradesman has

uotice of this, or the means of knowing it by its being notorious in the neighborhood, the hus-

band will not be liable even for necessaries furnished to her. 4 Camp. 70; 4 B. and A. 254 ; 2

Hew Rep. 144; 8 Taunt. 343; 3 Esp. 250; Sftlk. 116; Lord Ray. 444; 2 Stark. 88. But a pro-

mise by the husband to pay the amount of a debt contracted by the wife, though she was allowed

a separate maintenance, and this was known, is binding. 2 Stark. 177.

Where the wife has been guilty of the crime of adultery, either during cohabitation with

her husband, or in a state of separation from him, her claims for maintenance and protection
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are forfeited by her misconduct. Stra. 875; 6 T. R. 603; 1 Selw. N. P. 5th ed. 272. And

where the wife eloped with an adulterer, it was held that the husband should not be charged

for necessaries, although the tradesman who supplied them had no notice of the criminality.

Stra. 647, 706. But in these cases, the husband should take due measures to prevent the wife

faining credit in his name; and where the wife, having committed adultery, was left by the

usband in his house with two children, bearing his name, but without making any provision

for her in consequence of the separation, it was held, that, although she continued in a state

of adultery, the husband was liable for necessaries furnished to her, on the ground that it did

not appear that the tradesman knew the facts of the case. 1 Bos. and P. 226; 6 T. R. 603.

And if, after the wife's criminality, the husband again receives her into his house, his liability

for necessaries revives; and if he afterwards expel her from his house he will be liable,

although due caution bo given not to trust her. 11 Yes. 536; 4 Esp. 41, 42; 1 Salk. 10; G

Mod. 172.

Although the wife's capacity to contract is put an end to by the marriage, and her nrop-

erty falls in general under the disposal of her husband, yet it frequently happens that; either

by a settlement made with trustees, with the consent of the husband before marriage, or

where they separate, and a separate maintenance is allowed, or from some other source, the

•wife is entitled to separate property, over which, in a court of equity, the husband has no

control. Her having such separate property does not indeed remove "her incapacity to con-

tract, but she has a power of charging or disposing of it, subject of course to the conditions

and limitation? with which the property was clothed on her becoming entitled; and it has

been decided in the court of chancery, that a general personal engagement of the wife, as for

instance, a bond given by a feme covert as surety: 15 Ves. 596; or a bond given, or promis-

sory note given as a security for money borrowed b"y her: 17 Tes. 365; 2 P. Wins. 144; or given

jointly with the husband as a security for his debt: 1 Bro. Ch. c- 16; 9 Tes. 188, 486: 2 Ves.

Jun. 138; 2 P. Wms. 144; 2 Atk. 68; 11 Tes. 202; 1 Tes. and Beames, 121-123; although the

instrument is void as a contract both in law and equity, and although it contains no reference

to her separate estate, will be regarded as evidence of an intention on her part to charge her

own separate property, and will accordingly operate as a lien upon it, in respect of which she

is liable to be proceeded against in that court; where her discretion is freely exercised, the

contract will be obligatory. 16 Tesey, Jnn. 116; 3 Mad. 387; and see 3 Chitty's Com. Law

39, 40. And it may be taken as a general rule, that when it appears, or can be inferred, that

the wife intends to charge her separate maintenance with a debt incurred for necessaries, the

creditor is entitled to receive his debt on't of the fund provided for her separate maintenance;

3 Mad. 387; and as we have before seen, although at law a wife cannot borrow money to lay

out in necessaries, but at the peril of th« lender, who must lay it out for her; Salk. 387; yet in

equity it is sufficient to charge the husband, if the money be actually applied to the purpose for

wnicn it was borrowed, though the lender neglect to see to the application. 1 P. Wms. 483;

Prec. Ch. 502.

After a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, the parties are competent to contract, and may marry

again the same as if they had never been married. Com. Dig. B. and F. c. 1, and c. 7; Moore,

666; 1 Salk. 115, 116; Cro. Eliz. 908; 3 Mod. 71; Cro. Car. 463; 1 Gow, 10, ante 440, n. 37.

A wife may acquire a separate character, and contract accordingly, by the civil death of her

husband by exile: 2 H. 4, 7, a; 1 H. 4. 1, a; and formerly by profession and abjuration of

the realm. 1 Inst. 138, a 130, a. Thus, if the hnsband be transported or banished for life, the

wife may contract as a feme sole. Co. Lilt. 133, a; 2 B. and P. 231, n. a; 3 Camp. 125. And

though the hnsband be transported for a time only, yet it should neein that during the limited
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• ment. (t) (28) If the wife be indebted before marriage, the husband is bound a.~r
wards to pay; for he has adopted hera.nd her circumstances together. (u) (29.) If
the wife be mjured in her person or her property, she can bring no a.ct10n for redress without her husband's concurrence, and in his name, as well asher own: (v)

merit, (t) (28) If the wife be indebted before marriage, the husband is bound after-

wards to pay; for he has adopted her and her circumstances together, (u) (29.) If

the wife be injured in her person or her property, she can bring no action for re-

dress without her husband's concurrence, and in his name, as well as her own: (v)

ft} 1 Lev. 5. fu) a Mod. 1, 6. fvj Salk. 119. 1 Roll. Abr. 847.

(I) 1Lev.6.

period, the effect of his absence is the same to the wife as if it had been perpetual. 2 Bla.

(U)

8 Mod. 1, 6.

(fl)

Salle. 119. 1 Roll Abr. 847.

itep. 1197; 1 T. R. 7; 2 B. and P. 231; Co. Litt. 133, a. n. 3; 1 B. and P. 358; and see 4 Bap.

•-'7. 'Where the husband is an alien who has deserted this kingdom, leaving his wife to act

period, the effect of h1! absence is the same to the wife as if it had boon perpetual. 2 Bl&.
Rep. 1197; 1 T. R. 7; 2 B. and P. !al; Co. Litt. 133, a. n. 3; 1 B. and P. 358; and see 4 Esp.
'.t7. Where the husband is an alien who has deserted this kingdom, lea~ his wife t.o act
here as a feme sole, the wi(o may be charged as a feme sole after such d680rtion : 2 Esp. RetJ.
&54, 587; 1 B. and P. 3.57; ~ id. 226; 1 N. R. 80; 11 East, 301; so where the husband l8
au alien, and has never been in this country. 3 Camp. 123. Indeed it has boon considered
that the preceding doctrine is confined to the case where the husband has never been in this
country. Id. ibid. Sed qumre. .At all events it is confined to oases only where the h118band
was an alien: 11 Ea.-1t, 301; 1 N. R. 80; and where the husband resided in the West Indies,
and allowed hill wife a weekly sum for her subsistence, it was held that she could not contract
as a feme sole. 3 E11p. 18; 1 N. R. 80; 5 T. R. 679, 68'l. And where an Englishman employed
in the 11ervice of the British go\'ern'Ilent residing in a foreign country, and having lands there,
upan the cesimtion of hill employment in con11equence of war between the two countrie!', eent
h1s wife aud family to this country, but continued to reside abroad himself, it was held the wife
could not contract os a fcme sole. 2 B. and P. 2'26.
By the cu11tom of London, where a feme covert of a husband useth l\DY craft in such city on
her sole account, whereof the hu11band meddleth nothing, such a woman shall be charged as a
feme sole, concerning e¥ery thing which toucheth the craft; and if the husband and wife be
impleaded in such cwie, the wife Hhe.11 plead ll.'! a feme t10le, and if she be condemned, she shall
be committed to priwn till she hath made satit!faction, and the husband and his goods shall not
in such case be charged or impeached. See 3 Burr. 1776; Cro. Car. 67; 10 Hod.~; 2 B. and P.
93, 101; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 3i.)
(28) Hr. JU1Jtice Coleridge ssy:1: "I do not imagine that the liability of the husband t.o discharge the contract'! of his wife depends upon the principle of a union of person, but on that of
authority and a&;ent, expreSHed or implied. This principle borne ill mind is a clew to almost all
the decisions; thu:1, first, during cohabiW.tion, it may be presumed that the husband authorues
his wife to contract for all necessaries suitllblo to his degree; and no misconduct of hers during
cohabitation, not even adultery, which he must therefore be suppased to be igno~t of or to
have forgiven, can have auy tendency to destroy that presumption of authority. But if that
presumption be removed, either by the unreasonable expensiveness of the goods furnished, or by
direct warning, the liability falls to the ground. Secondly, cohabitation may cease; either by
consent, the fa.ult of the husband or of the wife; in the first case if there be an agreement for a
separate o.l.lowance to the wife, and that allowance be paid, it operates as notice that she i8 to be
dealt with on her own credit, and that the husband is discharged ; if there bo no allowance
agreed upon or none paid, then it must be presumed that she has still his authority to contract
for her necei!88l"ies, and he remains liable. In the second case, in which it is im11robable that an1
allowance should be made, the husband is said to send his wife into the world with general credit
for her reasonable expenses. This is upon the general principle that no one shall avail himself
of his own wrong; by the common law the husband is bound to maintain his wife, and when he
turus her from his house he does not thereby discharge himself of that liability, which still
remaining, is a ground for presuming an authority from him to her to contract for reMOnable
necessaries. Against this presumption no general notice not to deal with her shall be allowed
to prevail; but where there is an express notice to any particular individual, that person ca.nnot
sue upon contracts afterwards entered into with her. In the last case there is no ground for the
presumption of authority; the law does not oblige the husband to maintain an adulteress who
has eloped from him, and '\\"hose situation has thus become public; and therefore it will not be
inferred that he has given het authority to bind him by contracts, and there will be no nec.essitv
for notice to rebut an inference which dOO!I not arise. Sec the cases collected and arranged, ·1
Selw. N. P. 275, ~-"
The husband is under obligation to support his wife only at hie own home ; and it is only
where h1! conduct i8 such as to justifS her in leaving him, and he makes no suitable provision
fur her, that he can be held in the law to send her forth with authority to contract for necesearies on his credit. Rumney ti. Keyes, 7 N. H. 571 ; ~-\llen ti. A.ldrioh, 9 Fost. 63; Shaw"· Thompson, 16 Pick. 198; Clement v. Hatti;ion, 3 Rich. 93 ; Brown ti. Mudgett, 40 Vt. 68 i .Monroe County
v. Budlong, 51 Barb. 493. The husband whose wife lives aJ>art from him with ni~ MSent, is liable for her BUJ>port. Carley v. Green, 12 Allen, 104. And m such CO.'>llS it seems that the credi~
11~e carries With her is a general credit, and caun<!t bo restricted by notice
the hus'!>and to particular ~rson.s not to trust her. Bolton t•. Prentice, 2 Strange, 1214; Harns "· .Moms, 4 Esp..u.
(29) LBut though the hu8band ha" had a great fortune with his wife, if she dies before him,
be ts not liable to pay her debt8 contracted before inarriage, either at law or in equity, nnle.-is
there be some part of her p<~r;;oual property which ho did not reduce into his posses..-ion
before her death, which he mn~t afterwards r1~co\"et as her adminiRtmtor; and to the e:tteut
of the value of that property, he will be liahle to pay his wife's debts, <lum sol.a, which
remained undi:;chargcd cluri11g the cov(•rturc. 1 P. Wm:<. 46S; 3 id. 409; ReJI. T. Tlllb. l7a.]

here as a feme sole, the wife may be charged as a feme sole after such desertion : 2 Esp. Rep.

554, 587; IB. and P. 357; 2 id. 226; 1 N. R. 80; 11 East, 301; so where the husband is

an alien, and has never been in this country. 3 Camp. 123. Indeed it has been considered

that the preceding doctrine is confined to the case where the husband has never been in this

country. Id. ibid. Sed queere. At all events it is confined to cases only where the husband

was an alien: 11 East, 301; 1 If. R. 80; and where the husband resided in the "West Indies,

and allowed his wife a weekly sum for her subsistence, it was held that she could not contract

as a feme sole. 3 Esp. 18; 1 IT. R. 80; 5 T. R. 679, 682. And where an Englishman employed

in the service of the British government residing in a foreign country, and having lands there,

upon the cessation of his employment in consequence of war between the two countries, sent

his wife and family to this country, but continued to reside abroad himself, it was held the wife

could not contract as a feme sole. 2 B. and P. 226.

By the custom of London, where a feme covert of a husband useth any craft in such city on

her sole account, whereof the husband meddleth nothing, such a woman shall be charged as a
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feme sole, concerning every thing which toucheth the craft; and if the husband and wife be

impleaded in such case, the wife shall plead as a feme sole, and if she be condemned, she shall

be committed to prison till she hath made satisfaction, and the husband and his goods shall not

in such case be charged or impeached. See 3 Burr. 1776; Cro. Car. 67; 10 Mod. 6; 2 B. and P.

93, 101; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 37.]

(28) Mr. Justice Coleridge says: " I do not imagine that the liability of the husband to dis-

charge the contracts of his wife depends upon the principle of a union of person, but on that of

authority and assent, expressed or implied. This principle borne in mind is a clew to almost all

the decisions, thus, first, during cohabitation, it may be presumed that the husband authorizes

his wife to contract for all necessaries suitable to his degree; and no misconduct of hers during

cohabitation, not even adultery, which he must therefore be supposed to be ignorant of or to

have forgiven, can have any tendency to destroy that presumption of authority. But if that

presumption be removed, either by the unreasonable eipensiveness of the goods furnished, or by

direct warning, the liability falls to the ground. Secondly, cohabitation may cease; either by

consent, the fault of the husband or of the wife; in the first case if there be an agreement for a

separate allowance to the wife, and that allowance be paid, it operates as notice that she is to be

dealt with on her own credit, and that the husband is discharged; if there bo no allowance

agreed upon or none paid, then it must be presumed that she has still his authority to contract

for her necessaries, and ho remains liable. In the second case, in which it is improbable that any

allowance should be made, the husband is said to send his wife into the world with general credit

for her reasonable expenses. This is upon the general principle that no one shall avail himself

of his own wrong; by the common law the husband is bound to maintain his wife, and when he

turns her from his house he does not thereby discharge himself of that liability, which still

remaining, is a ground for presurning an authority from him to her to contract for reasonable

necessaries. Against this presumption no general notice not to deal with her shall be allowed

to prevail; but where there is an express notice to any particular individual, that person cannot

sue upon contracts afterwards entered into with her. In the last case there is no ground for the

Eresumption of authority; the law does not oblige the husband to maintain an adulteress who

as eloped from him, and whose situation has thus become public; and therefore it will not be

inferred_ that he has given her authority to bind him by contracts, and there will be no necessity

for notice to rebut an inference which does not arise. See the cases collected and arranged, 1

Selw. X. P. 275, 284."

The husband is under obligation to support his wife only at his own home; and it is only

hr

where his conduct is such as to justify her in leaving him, and he makes no suitable provision

for her, that he can be held in the law to send her forth with authority to contract for necessa-

ries on his credit. Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N, H. 571; Allen ». Aldrich, 9 Post 63; Shaw ». Thomp-

she carries with her is a general credit, and cannot be restricted by notice by the husband to par-

ticular persons not to trust her. Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Strange, 1214; Earns ». Morris, 4 Esp. 41.

(29) LBut though the husband has had a great fortune with his wife, if she dies before him,

ho is not liable to pay her debts contracted before marriage, cither at law or in equity, unless

there be some part of her personal property Which ho did not reduce into his possestnim

before her death, which he must afterwardK recover as her administrator; and to toe e\teut

of the value of that property, ho will be liable to pay his wife's debts, clunt sola, which

remained undischarged during the coverture. 1 P. Wins. 463; 3 id. 409; Rep. T. Talb. 173.]
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neither can she be sued without making the husband a defendant, (w) There is

indeed one case where the wife shall sue and be sued as a feme sole, viz: where the

husband has abjured the realm, or is banished, (a;) for then he is dead in law ;

and, the husband being thus disabled to sue for or defend the wife, it would be

most unreasonable if she had no remedy, or could make no defense at all. (30)

In criminal prosecutions, it is true, the wife may be indicted and punished sep-

arately ; (a) for the union is only a civil union. (31) But in trials of any sort

they are not allowed to be evidence for, or against, each other: (b) partly because

it is impossible their testimony should be indifferent, but principally because of

the union of person ; and therefore, if they were admitted to be witnesses for

each other, they would contradict one maxim of law, " nemo in propria causa

testis esse debet;" and if against each other, they would contradict another

maxim, "nemo tenetur seipsum accitsare." (32) But, where the offence is

directlv against the person of the wife, this rule has been usually dispensed

with; (c) and, therefore, by statute 3 Hen. VII,vC. 2, in case a woman be forcibly

taken away, and married, she may be a witness against such her husband, in

order to convict him of felony. For in this case she can with no propriety be

reckoned his wife; because a main ingredient, her consent, was wanting to the

contract: and also there is another maxim of law, that no man shall take ad-

vantage of his own wrong; which the *ravisher here would do, if, by •- <.... -i

forcibly marrying a woman, he could prevent her from being a witness, L -*

•who is perhaps the only witness to that very fact. (33)

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

(w) Bro. Abr. Error, 173. 1 Leon. 312. 1 Sid. 120. This was also the practice in the courts of Athens.

Tot. Antiq. b. 1, c. 21.

(x) Co. 1 .ill. 133. (a) 1 Hawk. P. C. B. (») 2 Hawk. P, C. 431.

(c) State Trials, vol. 1. Lord Audley'a case. Stra. 633.

(30) Mr. Chitty in his treatise on Pleadings has given very fully the rules of the common law

neither can Hhe be sued without making the husband a defendant. (w) There is
indeed one case where the wife shall sue and be sued as a feme sole, viz : where the
husband has abjured the realm, or is banished, (x) for then he is de.ad in law;
and, the husband being thus disabled to sue for or defend the wife, it would be
most unreasonable if she had no remedy, or could make no defense at all. (30)
In criminal prosecutions, it is true, the wife may be indicted and punished separately; (a) for the union is only a civil union. (31) But in trials of any sort
they are not allowed to be evidence for, or against, each other: (b) partly because
it is impossible their testimony should be indifferent, but principally because of
the union of person ; and therefore, if they were admitted to be witnesses for
each other, they would contradict one maxim of law, "nemo in pro;ria cau8a
testi& esse debet;" and if against ea.ch other, they would contradict another
maxim, "ne-mo tenetur seipsum acmesare." (32) But, where the offence is
directly against the person of the wife, this rule has been usually dispensed
with; (c} and, therefore, by statute 3 Hen. VII,,c. 2, in case a woman be forcibly
taken away, and married, she may be a witness against such her husband, in
order to convict him of felony. For in this case she can with no propriety be
reckoned his wife; because a main ingredient, her consent, was wanting to the
contract: and also there is another maxim of law, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong; which the *ravisher here would do, if, by [ *4« ]
forcibly marrying a woman, he could prevent her from being a witness,
who is perhaps the only witness to that very fa.ct. (33)
(w) Bro. Abr. Error, 173. 1 Leon. 812. 1Sid. 120. This was a1Jlo t.he pracdoe int.he courts of Athens.
Pot. Antiq. b. 1, c. 21.
(Z) co. Litt. 183.
(a) I Hawk. P. c. s.
(bl 2 Hawk. p, c. '31.
(CJ State Trials, vol. 1. Lord Audley's case. Stra. 688.

regarding the manner in which actions are to be brought by and against husband and wife. In

some of the United States those rules have been changed by statute so far as to permit a married

•woman to bring suits in her own name alone in respect to her individual property, and also to

protect for the benefit of the family, where the husband refuses or neglects to do so, that portion

of his property which is exempt from levy and sale on execution, or from being mortgaged or sold

by him without her consent.

(31) The criminal responsibility of the wife is considered in Book 4, p. 28.

(32) [The statute 16 and 17 Tic. enacts that husbands and wives shall be competent and com-

pellable to give evidence on behalf of either party; but neither can be compelled to disclose any

communication during marriage, and neither is a competent witness in a criminal proceeding, or

in any proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery. ]

The common law on this subject is changed by statute in some of the United States, and hus-

bands and wives are made competent witnesses for and against each other, but in some only by

consent. In the absence of statutory provisions the husband or wife is not permitted, even after

the termination of the marriage by divorce, to testify against the other concerning matters occur-

ring while it existed. State v. Jolly, 3 Dev. and Bat. 110; Merriam «. Hartford, <tc., R. R. Co.,

20 Conn. 354; Cook ». Grange, 18 Ohio, 526; Barnes t>. Camack, 1 Barb. 392. Nor after the

death of the husband may the wife testify to confidential communications which he had made to

her. Pike ». Hayes. 14 N. H. 19; EdgeU v. Bennett, 7 Vt. 534.

(33) [The best reason for not allowing a husband or wife to be witnesses against each other is,

that if a wife were a witness for her husband she would be under a strong temptation to commit

perjury, and if against her husband it would be contrary to the policy of marriage, and might

create much domestic dissension and unhappiness ; so vice versa of the husband. Bui. N". P. 286;

4 T. R. 679; 2 T. R. 263. The husband and wife cannot be witnesses for each other, and on a

prosecution against several for a conspiracy, the evidence of the wife of one of the defendants is

inadmissible: 2 Stra. 1094; 5 Esp. Rep. 107 ; and it is the same in an action for assault, where

the cases of the co-defendants cannot be separated. Stra. 1095.

They cannot be witnesses against each other, therefore the husband cannot be a witness against

the wife nor the wife against the husband, to prove the first marriage on an indictment for a

second marriage. 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 46, s. 68; Sir T. Raym. 1; 4 St. Tr. 754; and see Co. Litt.

6, b.; 2 T. R. 263; 2 Lord Ray. 752; but in such case the second wife or husband may be a

witness, the second marriage being void. Bnl. N. P. 287; 1 Hal. P. C. 693. So in a civil action,

a first wife was refused to be admitted to prove her marriage. 2 Lord Ray. 752. In an action

brought by a woman as a feme sole, the plaintiff's husband cannot be called to prove the mar-

riage. 2 T. R. 265, 269; Brownl. 47.

(30) Mr. Chitty in his treatise on Pleadings has given very fully the rules of the common law
regarding the manner in which actions are to be brought by and against husband and wife. In
some of the United States those rules have been changed by statute so fe.r as to permit a. married
woman to bring 1mits in her own name a.lone in respect to her individual property, and also to
protect for the benefit of the family, where the husband refuses or neglects to do so, that portion
of hii! pro~rty which i~ exempt from levy and sale on execution, or from being mortgaged or sold
by him without her conRent.
(31) The criminal responsibility of the wife is considered in Book 4, p. 28.
(32) [The ste.tule 16 and 17 Vic. enacts that husbands and wives shall be competent and compellable to give cvidenc-e on behalf of either party ; but neither can be comJ!elled to disclose any
communication dnriug marriage, and neither is a competent witness in a cnmina.l proceeding, or
in any proceedings instituted in consequence of adnltery.]
The common law on this subject is changed by st.atute in some of the United States, and husbands and wive!! arc ma.de competent witnesses for and age.inst each other, but in some only by
con1'1ent. In the absence of statutory provisions the husband or wife is not permitted, even after
the termination of the marriage by divorce, to testify a.gain.st the other conoerning matter11 occurring while it exi11t-011. State v. Jolly, 3 Dev. and Bat. 110; Merriam ti. Hartford, &c., R. R. Co.,
20 Conn. 354; Cook ti. Grange, 18 Ohio, 526; Bo.mes "· Camack, 1 Barb. 39'2. Nor after the
death o~ the husband may the m:e testify to confidential oommunications which he had made to
her. Pike ti. Hayes. 14 N. H. 19, Edgefi ti. Bennett, 7 Vt. 534.
(33) [The best rea.5on for not allowing a husband or wife to be wituesses against each other i!1,
that if a wife were a witnei1s for her husband she wonld be under a Rtrong temptation to commit
perjury, and if age.inst her hu;iband it would be contrary to the policy of marriage, and might
create much domestic dissension and unhappiness; 80 vice versa. of the husband. Bui. N. P. 286;
4 T. R. 679; 2 T. R. 263. The husband and wife cannot be witnesses for each other, and on a
prosecution against 11everal for a. conspiracy, the evidence of the wife of one of the defendants is
inadmi:isible : :l Stra. 1094; 5 Esp. Rep. 107; and it is the same in an action for a.ssanlt, where
the ea..;;es of the co-defendant.'! cannot be sepamtecl. Stra.. 1095.
They cannot be witne~sos agai11,st each other, therefore the husband cannot be a witnes.~ a.gainst
the wife nor. the wife against the husband, to prove the first marriage on an indictment fo.r a
second mamage. 2 Ha.wk. P. C. c. 46, s. 68; Sir T. Raym. 1 ; 4 St. Tr. 754; and see Co. Litt.
6, b.; 2 T. R. :l63; 2 Lord Ray. 752; but in such rase the l!econd wife or husband may be a
witness, the second marriage bein~ void. Bul. N. P. 287; 1 Ha.I. P. C. 693. So in a civil action,
s first wife was refused to be adnutted to prove her marriage. 2 Lord Ray. 752. In an action
brought by I\ woman I\.'! a femo sole, the plaintiff's husband cannot be called t-0 prove the marriage. 2 T. R. 265, 26"9; Brownl. 47.
Although the hnl!band and wife be not a party to the suit, yet if either be interested in the
result of the i,uit, the other cannot be a witness f<tr the one 80 intere13ted. Lord Ray. 744;
2lJ5

Although the husband and wife be not a party to the suit, yet if either be interested in the

result of the Knit, the other cannot be a witness for the one so interested. Lord Ray. 744;
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In the civil law the husband and the wife are considered as two distinct per-

sons, and may have separate estates, contracts, debts and injuries; (d) and there-

fore in our ecclesiastical courts, a woman may sue and be sued without her

husband, (e) (34)

(d) Cod. 4, 12, 1. (e) 2 Boll. Abr. 298.

Stra. 1095; 2 Stark, on Evid. 708. But the interest to disqualify the party must be certain and

vested. Leach, 133. The wife of a bankrupt cannot be examined as to her husband's bank-

ruptcy. 1 P. "Wins. 610, 611; 12 Tin. Ab. pi. 28; 1 Brownl. 47. The husband is an incompe-

tent witness for the wife where her separate estate is concerned. 1 Burr. 424; 4 T. R. 678; 2 S".

K. 331; 2 Stark, on Evid. 708; Lord Ray. 344. On the other hand, where tie interest of the

husband consisting in a civil liability would not have protected him from examination, it seems

that the wife must also answer, although the effect may be to subject the husband to an action,

for where the husband might be examined, so may the wife. See 2 Stark, on Evid. 709. And

in an action between other parties, the wife may be called to prove that credit was given to her

husband. Bull. N. P. 287 ; 1 Stra. 504.

Upon the same principle that the husband and wife cannot be witnesses for or against each

other, so in general are their declarations or admissions inadmissible in evidence. 6 T. R.

680; Willes, 577; 3 Ves. and B. 165; Bull. Jf. P. 28; Hutt. 16; 1 T. R. 69; 1 Burr. 635;

Brownl. 47. The declarations of the wife are not evidence for the husband: 4 Gamp. 70;

and in an action for criminal conversation the wife's confessions are not evidence for the

husband: Bull. N. P. 28; "Willes Rep. 577; but in snch action the conduct of the husband

and wife, and their letters passing between them, are admissible to show the terms of affec-
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tion on which they were living, but the letter sought to be strictly proved. 4 Esp. Rep. 39;

2 Stark. 191; 1 B. and A. 90, S. C. In such action also the letters of the wife to the defend-

ant are not evidence against the husband, though indeed conversations between her and the

defendant are. Bull. N. P. 28; Willes, 577. An admission by the wife, even of a trespass

committed by her, is not evidence to affect the husband. 7 T. R. 112. So a declaration by

the wife in an action against the hnsband, that the husband absented his house for fear of

creditors, is inadmissible in evidence. 3 Moore, 23; and see 1 P. "Wins. 610, 611; 12 Tin. Ab.

SI. 28; 1 Brownl. 47. So the answer of the wife in equity cannot be read against the hnsband.

P. Wms. 238; Salk. 350; Tern. 60, 109, 110. But letters written by the husband to the wife

may be read as evidence against him; and so a discourse between the husband and wife in

the presence of a third person may be given in evidence against the hnsband, like anv

other conversation in which he may have been concerned. Bull. If. P. 28; 1 Phil, on Evid. 6th

ed. 76.

In high treason a wife may he admitted as a witness against her husband, because the tie of

allegiance ought to be more obligatory than any other. Lord Raym. 1; Bull. K. P. 286; 1

Brownl. 47. See also 2 Keb. 403 ; 1 H. P. C. 301.

So in the case of an indictment for forcible abduction and marriage, the woman is a competent

witness for the crown. Supra; Gilb. Ev. 254; Cro. Car. 482,488,489; 1 Hale, 301; 1 Vent.

243; 3 Keb. 193; 3 Stark, on Evid. 711. So in snch case, it is said, she is a competent witness

for the prisoner. 2 Hawk. o. 46, s. 79. But if the marriage be ratified by voluntary cohabitation,

she is incompetent. Hale, 301; 1 Vent. 243; 3 Keb. 193; Cro. Car. 488; Vent. 243; 4 Mod. 3 ;

Stra. 633. Upon an indictment for marrying a second wife, the first being alive, though the first

cannot be a witness, yet the second may, the second marriage being void. 1 Hale, P. 0. 693; 2

Hawk. P. C. c. 46, s. 68; Sir T. Raym. 1.

In cases of evident necessity, where the fact is presumed to be particularly within the wife's

knowledge, there is an exception to the general rule. Thus, a wife may be a witness on the

prosecution of her husband for an offence committed against her person. Stra. 633,1202;

Bull. N. P. 287, S. C.; 1 East, P. C. 454; 13 East, 171; 1 T. R. 698. On the trial of a man for

the murder of his wife, her dying declarations are admissible. 2 Loach, C. L. 563; 1 East, P. C.

357.

The rule does not extend to declarations of the parties, which are in the nature of facts,

for in such cases the presumptions which are made are not founded on the credit of the party,

but of the fact. Thus the declaration of the wife at the time of effecting a policy on her

life of the bad state of her health, is evidence against her husband. 6 East, 188; 2 Stark, on

Evid. 712, 713.

Where the husband has allowed the wife to act as his agent in the management of his

affairs, or any particular business, the representations and admissions of the wife, made within

the general scope of her authority as such agent, are admissible in evidence against the

husband. See 1 Esp 142; 2 Stark. 204; Str. 527; 6 T. R. 176; 4 Camp. 92; 2 Esp. 211; 5 Esp.

145.]

As to the competency of one of the parties to be a witness against the other in a case where

the validity of the marriage is in dispute: see Dixon v. People, 18 Mich. 84.

(34) In respect to that property which, by marriage articles or otherwise, is settled upon a

niarricd woman for the support of herself and her children, to the exclusion of marital rights

in the husband, and which is technically called her separate estate, the wife is to be treated as

a feme sole, aud her contracts are valid without in any wav binding the husband or his prop-
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But though pur law in general considers man and wife as one person, yet

there are some instances in which she is separately considered; as inferior to

him, and acting by his compulsion. And therefore all deeds executed, and acts

done, by her, during her coverture, are void; except it be a fine, or the like

matter of record, in which case she must be solely and secretly examined, to

learn if her act be voluntary. (/) She cannot by will devise lands to her hus-

band, unless under special circumstances; for at the time of making it she is

eupposed to be under his coercion. (</) And in some felonies, and other inferior

crimes, committed by her, through constraint of her husband, the law excuses

her: (h) but this extends not to treason or murder.

The husband also, by the old law, might give his wife moderate correction, (i)

For, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to

intrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the

same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children;

for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer. But this

power of correction was confined within reasonable bounds, (/) and the husband

•was prohibited from using any violence to his wife, aliter quam ad virum, ex

causa regiminis et castigationis uxoris sues, licite et rationabiliter pertinet.

The civil law gave the husband the *same, or a larger, authority over his r *AAK -i

wife: allowing him, for some misdemeanors, flagdlis etfustibus (writer I '

verberare uxorum; for others, only modicum castigationem adhibere. (k) But

with us, in the politer reign of Charles the Second, this power of correction
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began to be doubted; (I) and a wife may now have security of the peace against

her husband ;(»*) or, in return, a husband against his wife. (») Yet the lower rank

of people, who were always fond of the old common law, still claim and exert

their ancient privilege: and the courts of law will still permit a husband to

restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross misbehaviour, (o)

These are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon which

we may observe, that even the disabilities which the wife lies under are for the

most part intended for her protection and benefit: so great a favourite is the

female sex of the laws of England. (35)

(f) Litt. ^ 6C8, 670. (g) Co. Litt. 112. fh) 1 Hawk, P. C. 8. (i) IWd. 180.

(i) Moor. 874. (k) Nov. 117, c. 14, and Vim Leeuwen in loe. (1) 1 Sid. 113. 3 Keb. 133.

(m) 2 Lev. 128. (n) Stra. 1207. (o) Stra. 478, 875.

erty. They are not, however, binding upon her personally, but are enforced in equity against the

But though our law in general considers man and wife as one person, yet
there are some instances in which she is separately considered; as inferior to
him, and acting by his compulsion. And therefore all deeds executed, and acts
done, by her, during her coverture, are void; except it be a fine, or the like
matter of record, in which case she must be solely and secretly examined, to
learn if her act be voluntary. (f) She cannot by will devise lands to her husband, unless under special circumstances; for at the time of making it she is
supposed to be under his coercion. (g) And in some felonies~ and other inferior
cnmes, committed by her, through constraint of her husband, the law excuses
her: (h) but this extends not to treason or murder.
The husband also, by the old law, might give his wife moderate correction. (i)
For, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to
intrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the
same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children;
for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer. But this
power of correction was confined within reasonable bounds, (j) and the husband
was prohibited from using any violence to his wife, aliter quam ad virum, ex
causa regiminis et castigationis uxoris sutB, licite et rationabiUter pertinet.
The civil law gave the husband the *same, or a larger, authority over his [ • 445 ]
wife: allowing him, for some misdemeanors, flag ellis et j ustibus acn:ter
verberare uxor1tm; for others, only rnodicam castigatwnem adliibere. (k) But
with us, in the politer reign of Charles the Second, this power of correction
began to be doubted; (l) and a wife may now have security of the peace against
her husband ;(rn) or, in return, a husband against his wife. (n) Yet the lower rank
of people, who were always fond of the old common law, still claim and exert
their ancient privilege: and the courts of law will still ~rmit a husband to
restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross misbehaviour. (o)
'rhese are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon which
we may observe, that even the disabilities which the wife lies under are for the
most part intended for her protection and benefit: so great a favourite is the
female sex of the laws of England. (35)
(f) LIU. f 600, fflO.
(j) Moor. 1'74.

(•) 2 Lev. 128.

(g) Co. Litt. 112.
(A) 1 Hawk, P. C. 2.
(k) Noo. 117, c. 14, and Van Leeuwen In loc.
(n) Stra. 1207.
(o) Stra. ~78, 876.

(iJ Ibid. 180.
{I) l Sid. 113. 8 Keb.

'33.

property, which she either charges expressly or is presumed to intend to charge when making

them. Story Eq. Juris. $ 1400; Vanderheyden v. Mallory, 1 N. T. 452; Gardner o. Gardner, 7

Paige, 112. Her contracts for the sale of such separate estate are also enforceable against her

in equity, but cannot be sued upon at law, except in states where the statute has made her liable

to such actions.

(35) [Nothing, I apprehend, would more conciliate the good will of the student in favor of the

laws of England, than the persuasion that they had shown a partiality to the female sex. But I

am not so much in love with my subject as to' be inclined to leave it in possession of a glory

•which it may not justly deserve. In addition to what has been observed m this chapter, by the

learned commentator, I shall here state some of the principal differences in the English law,

respecting the two sexes; and I shall leave it to the reader to determine on which side is the

balance, and how far this compliment is supported by truth.

Husband and wife, in the language of the law, are styled baron and/erne: the word baron,

or lord, attributes to the husband not a very courteous superiority. But we might be inclined

to think this merely an unmeaning technical phrase, if we did not recollect, that if the baron

kills his feme, it is the same as if ne had killed a stranger, or any other person; but if the

feme kills her baron, it is regarded by the laws as a much more atrocious crime; as she not

only breaks through the restraints of humanity and conjugal affection, but throws off all sub-

jection to the authority of her husband. And therefore the law denominates her crime a species

of treason, and condemns her to the same punishment as if she had killed the king. And for

every species of treason, (though in petit treason the punishment of men was only to be drawn

and hanged,) till the 30 Geo. Ill, c. 48, the sentence of women was to be drawn and burnt alive.

Book 4, 204.

By the common law all women were denied the benefit of clergy; and till the 3 and 4

W. and M. c. 9, they received sentence of death, and might have been executed for the first

offense in simple larcency, bigamy, manslaughter, <fcc., Tiowever learned they were, merely

erty. They are not, however, binding upon her personally, but are enforced in equity againllt the
property, which she either charges exprer1sly or is pre1m1J1ed to intend to charge when making
them. Story Eq. Juris. § 1400; Va.nderheyden 11. Mallory, 1 N. Y. 452; Gardner ti. Gardner, 7
Paige, 112. Her contracta for the sale of such separate estate are also enforceable against her
in equity, but cannot be sued upon at law, except in states where the statute has made her liable
to such actions.
(35) [Nothing, I apprehend, would more coMili&te the good will of the student in favor of the
laws of England, than the persuasion that they hlMl shown a pl\rtiality to the female sex. But I
am not so much in love with my subjeet as to be inclined to leave it in ;posses..'lion of a glory
which it may not justly deserve. In addition to what has been observed m thi;i chapter, by the
learned commentator, I shall here state some of the principal differences in the Eneli11b law,
respecting the two sens; and I shall leave it to the reader to determine on which side is the
balance, and how far this compliment is supported by truth.
Husband and wife, in the language of the la.w, are styled ba.ron andfeme: the word baron,
or lord, attributes to the husband not a very courteous superiority. But we might be inclined
to t.hink this merely an unmeaning technical phrat!e, if we did not recollect, that if the baron
kills his feme, it is the same as if lie bad killed o. stranger, or any other person; but if the
feme kills her baron, it is regarded by the laws aa a much more atrocious crime ; o.i; she not
only breakR through the reRtniints of humanity and conjugal affection, but throws off all subjection to the authority of her husband. .And therefore the law denominate~ her crime a species
of treo.i;on, and condemns her to the same punishment as if she had killed the king. And for
every species of treason, (though in petit treason the punishment of men 1\-as only to be drawn
and hanged,) till the 30 Geo. III, c. 48, the 110ntence of women W&K to be drawn and burnt alive.
Book4, ~.
By the common law all women were denied the benefit of clergy; and till the 3 and 4
W. and M. c. 9, they received sentence of death, and might have been executed for the first
offense in simple larcency, biga.my, manslaughter, &c., however lea.med they were, merely
becaut10 their sex precluded the possibility of their taking holy orderti; though a man, who
2~n
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because their sex precluded the possibility of their taking holy orders; though a man, who
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CHAPTER XVI.

THE next, and the most universal relation in nature, is immediately derived

from the preceding, being that between parent and child.

OF PARENT AND CHILD.

Children are of two sorts; legitimate, and spurious or bastards, each of which

we shall consider in their order; and, first, of legitimate children.

I. A legitimate child is he that is born in lawful wedlock, (1) or within a com-

petent time afterwards. " Pater est quern nuptice demonstrant," is the rule of

the civil law; (a) and this holds with the civilians, whether the nuptials happen

(a) ff. 2, 4, 5.

could read, was fur the same crime subject only to burning in the hand and a few months impris-

onment. Book 4, 369.

These are the principal distinctions in criminal matters; now let us see how the account stands

THE next, and the most universl\] relation in nature, is immediately derived
from the preceding, being that between parent and child.
Children are of two sorts; legitimate, and spurious or bastards, each of which
we shall consider in their order; and, first, of legitimate children.
I. A legitimate child is he that is born in lawful wedlock, (1) or within a c-0mpetent time afterwards. "Pater est quem. nu_J!ti<B demonstrant," is the rule of
.the civil law; (a) and this holds with the civilians, whether the nuptials happen

with regard to civil rights.

(a)

Intestate personal property is equally divided between males and females; but a son, though

F/. i, '• II.

younger than all his sisters, is heir to the whole of real property.

A woman's personal property, by marriage, becomes absolutely her husband's, which at his

death he may leave entirely awav from her; but if he dies without will, she is entitled to one-

third of his personal property, if he has children; if not, to one-half. In the province of Tork, to

four-ninths or three-fourths,

By the marriage, the husband is absolutely master of the profits of the wife's lands during the

coverture ; and if he has had a living child, and survives the wife, ho retains the whole of those
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lands, if they are estates of inheritance, during his life ; but the wife is entitled only to dower, or

one-third, if she survives, out of the husband's estates of inheritance ; but this she has, whether

she has had a child or not.

But a husband can be tenant by the curtesy of the trust estates of the wife, though the wife

cannot be endowed of the trust estates of the husband. 3 P. Wms. 229.

"With regard to the property of women, there is taxation without representation; for they pay

taxes without having the liberty of voting for representatives; and indeed there seems at present

no substantial reason why single women should be denied this privilege. Though the chastity of

women is protected from violence, yet a parent can have no reparation, by our law, from" the

seducer of his daughter's virtue, but by stating that she is his servant, and that by the consequences

of the seduction he is deprived of the'bencflt of her labor; or where the seducer, at the same time,

is a trespasser upon the close or premises of the parent. But when by such forced circumstances the

law can take cognizance of the offense, juries disregard the pretended injury, and give damages

commensurate to the wounded feelings of a parent.

Female virtue, by the temporal law, is perfectly exposed to the slanders of malignity and

falsehood; for any "one ni;iy proclaim in conversation, that the purest maid, or the chastest

matron, is the most meretricious and incontinent of women, with impunity, or free ftpm the

animadversions of the temporal courts. Thus female honor, which is dearer to the sex

than their lives, is left by the common law to be the sport of an abandoned calumniator. Book

3, 125.

From this impartial statement of the account, I fear there is little reason to pay a compliment

to our laws for then: respect and favor to the female sex.

As to the interest which the husband has in the chatties real and choses in action of his wife, if

he survive her, and what interest his representatives have if she survive him, I should recommend

to the student's perusal Mr. Butler's note of Co. Litt. 351, a. n. 1. CHSISTIAN.]

The statute law of the several states of the American union has very much changed for

the better the common law rules which Prof. Christian here arraigns with so much justice.

Some of these changes we have already alluded to. The general purpose is to protect the

married woman in the emjoyment and power to dispose of all the property, real or personal,

which she may have at the time of the marriage, or acquire afterwards; to preclude the hus-

band from disposing of the property, exempt from execution, without her consent, and to give

to her a larger share of his estate than she had at the common law in the event of her sur-

viving him. The diversity in these statutes is very great, and in some states they give the

wife more complete power to dispose of her estate independently than the husband is allowed to

possess.

(1) [In the great case of the Antenatns : Doe t>. Tardill, 5 B. and C. 43; 6 Bing. If. C. 385;

6 Bligh. N. S. 479; 2 Cl. and Fin. 582; Moylan's report of the case; it was decided that even

where a bastard, by the subsequent marriage of his parents, becomes legitimate according to the

laws of the country in which he was born, he is nevertheless still a bastard, so far as regards the

inheritance of lands in England. See, however, Story's Conflict of Laws, p. 117-143, aud 7

could read, waa for the Mme crime subject only to burning in the band and a few months impriaonment. Book 4, :l69.
These are the .Principal distinctions in criminal matters ; now let ns see how the account at&nda
with regard to crril rights.
Intm;tate per80nal propert,Y is equally divided between males and females; bnt a son, though
younger than all his 111stel'!1, 1e heir to the whole of real property.
A woman's penonal property, by marriage, becomes ab,;oluwly her husband's, which at his
death he may leave entirely awav from her ; but if he dieR without will, ilhe is entitled to onethird of hi8 perHOnal property, if he has children; if not, to one-half. In the provinoe of York, to
fonr-ninthll or three-fourths,
By the marri~e, the husband is absolutely master of the profits of the wife's lands durinp; the
coverture ; and 1f he ha.~ had a li'ring child, and survive11 the wife, he retains the whole of those
land~. if they are estates of inheritance, during hie life ; but the wife is entitled only to dower, or
one-third, if Rhe Rurvives, out of the husband's estates of inheritance; but this she has, whether
she ha..~ had a child or not.
But a hnRhand can be tenant by tho curtesy or the trnHt estates of the wife, though the wife
Cll.llnot be endowed of the tm~t e:;tates of the husband. 3 P. Wms. 229.
With regard to the property of women, there i::i taxation without representation ; for they pay
taxes without having the liberty of votinll for representatives; and indeed there 11eem11 at pre.ient
no substantial rellBOn why t<ingle women should be denied thia privilege. Though the chlk!tity of
women is protected from violence, yet a parent c.an have no reparation, by our law, from the
seducer of hi~daughter'R virtue, hut by stating that she is his servant, and that by the consequences
of the !\eduction he i~ deprived of the benefit of her labor; or where the seducer, at the same time,
is a tre11p811!ler upon the close. or premises of the parent. But when by such forced circum.stanct>.s the
law can take cugnill&nce of the o~ense, juries disregard the pretended injury, and gh-e damages
commensurate to the wounded fcelmgs of a parent.
Female virtue, by tho temporal law, is perfectly exposed to the slanders of malignity a.nd
falsehood; for any one may proclaim in conversation, that the purest maid, or the chastest
matron, is the most meretriciou11 and incontinent of women, with impunity, or free fwm the
animadvenrlonR of the temporal courtd. Thus female honor, which is dearer to £he i!llX
than their lives, is left by the common law to be the sport of a.n abandoned calumniator. Book
3, 1211.
From this impartial statement of the account, I fear there is little re880n to pay a compliment
to our laws for their re~ct and favor to the female eex.
Ari to the interest which the husband has in the chattles real and choses in action of his wife, if
he survive her, and what interest his repreRentativeR have if she survive him, I Rhould recommend
to the Htudent's pem11nl .Mr. Butler's note of Co. Litt. 351, a. n. 1. Cua18TIAN.]
The statute law of the several states of the American union has very much ch~ for
the better the common law rules which Prof. Christian here arraigns with so much JUstict>.
Some of these changett we have already alluded to. The general purpose is to protect the
married woman in the emjo:yment and power to dispose of all the property, real or penional,
which she may have at tho time of the marriage, or acquire afterwards ; to preclude the bu,...
band from diepoidnit of the property, exempt from execution, without her consent, and to gfre
to her n larger share of his estate than !!he had at the common law in the event of her :;ur·
viving him. The ditersity in these !!t&tutes iR very great, and in some states they give the
wife more complete power to dispose of her estate independently than the husband is allowed t.o
p0$r'e8!1.
{l) [In the great c&11e of the .A.ntenatus : Doe ti. Vardill, 5 B. ar.d C. 43; 6 Bing. N. C. 385;
6 Bligh. N. S. 479; 2 Cl. and Fin. 582; M:oylan's report of the case; it wae decided that. even
where a bastard, by the subsequent marriage of his parents, becomes legitimate aocording to the
law11 of the country in which he was born, he is nevertheless still a bastard, so far as regards the
inheritance of lands In England. See, however, Story's Conflict of Lawe, p. 117-143, and 7
Cl. and Fin. 817, 84:.!. ]
:lU8

Cl. and Fin. 817, 842.]
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before or after the birth of the child. With us in England the rule is narrowed,

for the nuptials must be precedent to the birth; of which more will be said

when we come to consider the case of bastardy. At present, let us inquire into,

1. The legal duties of parents to their legitimate children. 2. Their power

over them. 3. The duties of such children to their parents,

1. And, first, the duties of parents to legitimate children: which principally con-

sist in three particulars; their maintenance, their protection, and their education.

*The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their chil- r *., r -i

dren, is a principle of natural law; an obligation, says Puffendorf, (b) >• J

laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bring-

ing them into the world: for they would be in the highest manner injurious to

their issue, if they only gave their children life that they might afterwards see

them perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary

obligation to endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have be-

stowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have the

perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents. And the president

Montesqueiu j[c) has a very just observation upon this head: that the establish-

ment of marriage in all civilized states is built on this natural obligation of

the father to provide for his children ; for that ascertains and makes known the

person who is bound to fulfil this obligation : whereas, in promiscuous and illicit

conjunctions, the father is unknown; and the mother finds a thousand obstacles

in her way, shame, remorse, the constraint of her sex, and the rigour of laws,

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

that stifle her inclinations to perform this duty; and, besides, she generally

wants ability.

The municipal laws of all well-regulated states have taken care to enforce

this duty: though Providence has done it more effectually than any laws, by

implanting in the breast of every parent that natural ropy*/, or insuperable degree

of affection, which not even the deformity of person or mind, not even the wick-

edness, ingratitude, and rebellion of children, can totally suppress or extinguish.

The civil law (d) obliges the parent to provide maintenance for his child;

and, if he refuses, "fudez de ea re cognoscet" Nay, it carries this matter so far,

that it will not suffer a parent at his death totally to disinherit his child with-

out expressly giving *his reason for so doing; and there are fourteen r „ ,^g -•

such reasons reckoned up, (e) which may justify such disinberison. If «• J

the parent alleged no reason, or a bad, or a false one, the child might set the

•will aside, tanquam testamentwm inofficiosum, a testament contrary to the nat-

ural duty of the parent. And it is remarkable under what colour the children

•were to move for relief in such a case: by suggesting that the parent had lost

the use of his reason when he made the inofficious testament. And this, as

Puffendorf observes, (/) was not to bring into dispute the testator's power of

disinheriting his own offspring, but to examine the motives upon which he did

it; and if they were found defective in reason, then to set them aside. But

perhaps this is" going rather too far: every man has, or ought to have, by the

laws of society, a power over his own property; and, as Grotius very well dis-

tinguishes, (g) natural right obliges to give a necessary maintenance to children;

but what is more than that they have no other right to, than as it is given them by

the favour of their parents, or the positive constitutions of the municipal law

Let us next see what provision our own laws have made for this natural duty.

It is a principle of law, (h) that there is an obligation on every man to provide

for those descended from his loins; and the manner in which this obligation shall

be performed is thus pointed out. (i) (2) The father and mother, grandfather

(b) L. of X. 1. 4, c. 11. (c) Sp. L. b. 23, e. 2. (d) Pf. 25, 3. 6. (e) Nov. IIS.

(/) L. 4, o. 11, J 7. (g)De J. B. <f P. I. 2, c. 7, n. 3. (») Rayrn. 500. (») Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2.

(2) The obligation of the father to support his children is not dependent upon the children

having no estate of their own. Dupont e. Johnson, 1 Bailey Ch. 274; Matter of Burku, 4 Sandf.

Ch. 617 ; Hillsborough ». Deering, I N. H. 86. Thompkins v. Thompkins' Executors, 3 Green, N.

J. 303; but the courts of equity may make provision for applying such estate to their support.

Ibid.
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and grandmother, of poor, impotent persons, shall maintain them at their own

charges, if of sufficient ability, according as the quarter session shall direct:

and (k) if a parent runs away, and leaves his children, the churchwardens and

overseers of the parish shall seize his rents, goods, and chattels, and dispose

of them toward their relief. By the interpretations which the courts of law

have made upon these statutes, if a mother or grandmother marries again, and

was before such second marriage of sufficient ability to keep the child, the

r *.<MQ -i husband shall be charged *to maintain it: (I) for, this being a debt of

' -I hers when single, shall like others extend to charge the husband. (3)

But at her death, the relation being dissolved, the husband is under no farther

obligation.

No person is bound to provide a maintenance for his issue, unless where the

children are impotent and unable to work, either through infancy, disease, or

accident, and then is only obliged to find them with necessaries, the penalty on

refusal being no more than 20s. a month. (4) For the policy of our laws,

which are ever watchful to promote industry, did not mean to compel a father

to maintain his idle and lazy children in ease and indolence: but thought it unjust

to oblige the parent against his will, to provide them with superfluities, and

other indulgences of fortune; imagining they might trust to the impulse of

nature, if the children were deserving of such favours. Yet, as nothing is so

apt to stifle the calls of nature as religious bigotry, it is enacted, (m) that if

any popish parent shall refuse to allow his protestant child a fitting mainte-
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nance, with a view to compel him to change his religion, the lord chancellor shall

by order of court constrain him to do what is just and reasonable. But this

did not extend to persons of another religion, of no less bitterness and bigotry

than the popish: and therefore in the very next year we find an instance of a

Jew of immense riches, whose only daughter, having embraced Christianity,

he turned her out of doors; and, on her application for relief, it was held she

was entitled to none, (n) (5) But this gave occasion (o) to another statute, (p)

which ordains, that if Jewish parents refuse to allow their protestant children

a fitting maintenance suitable to the fortune of the parent, the lord chancellor

on complaint may make such order therein as he shall see proper. (6)

(£) Stat. fl Geo. I. c. 8. (I) Styles, 233. 2 Bulstr. 346. fmj Stat. 11 and 18 W.Ill, c. 4.

(n) Lord Kay m. 899. (o) Com. Journ. 18 Feb. 12 Mar. 1701. (pj 1 Ann, at 1. c. 30.

of Ryder, 11 Paige, 185. But in the absence of the parent's authority for the' supply

of such necessaries, either express or implied, it is believed no action can be maintained

therefor. See Varney v. Young, 11 Vt. 258; Gordon v. Potter, 17 id. 348; Hunt r. Thomp-

son, 3 Scam. 179; Raymond v. Loyl, 10 Barb. 483, where the cases are fully collected;

Mortimoro v. Wright, 6 M. and W. 482 ; Shelton v. Springett, 11 C. B. 452. The course in case

of neglect is to pursue such remedy as the statute gives.

(3) By the common law a man is not obliged to maintain the children of his wife bv a

former marriage. Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 K. Y. 312: Worcester v. Merchant, 14 Pick.

510. But if he receives them into his home, he is considered as adopting them as his children,

and the law will not imply a promise on his part to pay them for services performed for him, nor

on theirs to compensate him in money for necessaries supplied. Williams c. Hutehinsou 3

N. Y. 312; Swartz v. Hazlett, 8 Cal. 118; Sharp «. Cropsey, 11 Barb. 224; Brush t>. Blanehard,

18 111. 46; Resor v. Johnson, 1 Ind. 100; Oxford v. McFarland, 3 id. 156. Luney ». Vantine, 40

Vt. 501.

The statute 4 and 5 Wm. IT, c. 76, § 57, makes the husband liable to maintain the children

of his wife bora before his marriage with her, whether the children be legitimate or illegitimate,

until they attain the age of sixteen years, or until the death of the mother.

(4) The amount of the provision to be made for them is fixed by the justices.

By statute 31 and 32 Vic. c. 122, the parent who wilfully neglects to provide adequate

necessaries for his child, being in his custody and under the age of 14 years, is punishable criminally.

(5) [It was not held that she was entitled to none because she was the daughter of a Jew, but

because the order did not state that she was poor, or likely to become chargeable to the parish.]

(6) These statutes are now repealed. Statute 9 and 10 Vic. c, 59.
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Our law has made no provision to prevent the disinheriting of children hy

will: leaving every man's property in his *own disposal, upon a prin- r +AKQ -\

ciple of liberty in this as well as every other action ; though perhaps it •• -1

had not been amiss if the parent had been bound to leave them at least a neces-

sary subsistence. Indeed, among persons of any rank or fortune, a competence

is generally provided for younger children, and the bulk of the estate settled

upon the eldest, by the marriage articles. Heirs also, and children, are favourites

of our courts of justice, and cannot be disinherited by any dubious or ambiguous

words; there being required the utmost certainty of the testator's intentions to

take away the right of an heir, (q) (7)

From the duty of maintenance we may easily pass to that of protection,

which is also a natural duty, but rather permitted than enjoyed by any munici-

pal laws; natural in this respect, working so strongly as to need rather a check

than a spur. A parent may by our laws maintain and uphold his children

in their lawsuits, without being guilty of the legal crime of maintaining quar-

rels, (r) A parent may also justify an assault and battery in defense of the per-

sons of his children: (s) nay, where a man's son was beaten by another boy, and

the father went near a mile to find him, and there revenged his son's quarrel

by beating the other boy, of which beating he afterwards unfortunately died, it

was not held to be murder, but manslaughter merely, (t) Such indulgence does

the law shew to the frailty of human nature, and the workings of parental

affection. (8)
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The last duty of parents to their children is that of giving them an education

suitable to their station in life; a duty pointed out by reason, and of far the

greatest importance of any. For, as Punendorf very well observes, (it) it is not

*easy to imagine or allow, that a parent has conferred any considerable r *AK-\ n

benefit upon his child by bringing him into the world; if he afterwards L J

entirely neglects his culture and education, and suffers him to grow up like a

mere beast, to lead a life useless to others, and shameful to himself. Yet the

municipal laws of most countries seem to be defective in this point, by not con-

straining the parent to bestow a proper education upon his children. Perhaps

they thought it punishment enough to leave the parent, who neglects the

instruction of his family, to labour under those griefs and inconveniences which

his family, so uninstructed, will be sure to bring upon him. Our laws, though

their defects in this particular cannot be denied, have in one instance made a

wise provision for breeding up the rising generation: since the poor and

laborious part of the community, when past the age of nurture, are taken out of

the hands of their parents, by the statutes for apprenticing poor children; (w)

and are placed out by the public in such a manner, as may render their abilities,

in their several stations, of the greatest advantage to the commonwealth. The

rich, indeed, are left at their own option, whether they will breed up their chil-

dren to be ornaments or disgraces to their family.(9) Yet in one case, that of

(q) 1 Lav. 130. (r) 2 Inst. 5W. (•) 1 Hawk. P. 0. 131. (t) Cro. Jac. 296. 1 Hawk. P. C. 88.

(it) L. of N. b. 6, c. 2, } 12. ftcj See page 428.

(7) See Fitch t>. "Weber, 6 Hare, 145; Maugham v. Mason, 1 T. and B. 410.

(8) [This case should not be read without the comment of Mr. Justice Foster on it; he says

the case as reported by Lord Coke always appeared to him very extraordinary. The two

Our law has made no pro-vision to prevent the disinheriting of children by
will : leaving every man!s pro}1erty in his *own disposal, upon a prin- [ • 450 ]

ciple of liberty in this as well as every other action ; though perhaps it
had not been amiss if the parent had been bound to leave them at least a necessary subsistence. Indeed, among peri!ons of any rank or fortune, a competence
is generally provided for younger children, and the bulk of the estate settled
upon the eldest, by the marriage articles. Heirs also, and children, are favourites
of our courts of justice, and cannot be disinherited by any dubious or ambiguous
words; there berng required the utmost certainty of the testator's intentions to
take away the right of an heir. (q) (7)
.
From the duty of maintenance we may eruiily pass to that of protection,
which is also a natural duty, but rather permitted than enjoyed by any municipal laws; natural in this respect, working so strongly as to need rather a check
than a spur. A parent ma:y by our laws maintain and uphold his children
in their lawsuits, without bemg guilty of the legal crime of maintaining quarrels. (r) A parent may also justify an assault and battery in defense of the persons of his children: (s) nay, where a man's son was beaten by another boy, and
the father went near a mile to find him, and there revenged his son's quarrel
by beating the other boy, of which beating he afterwards unfortunately died, it
was not held to be murder, but manslaughter merely. (t) Such indulgence does
the law shew to the frailty of human nature, and the workings of parental
affection. (8)
The last duty of parents to their children is that of giving them an educati01'
suitable to their station in life; a duty pointed out by reason, and of far the
Etest importance of any. For, as Puffendorf very well observes, (1t) it is not
easy to imagine or allow, that a parent has conferred any considerable [ • 451 ]
benefit upon his child by bringing him into the world; if he afterwards
entirely neglects his culture and education, and suffers him to grow up like a
mere beast, to lead a life useless to others, and shameful to himself. Yet the
municipal laws of most countries seem to be defective in this point, by not constraining the parent to bestow a proper education upon his children. Perhaps
they thought it punishment enough to leave the parent, who neglects the
instruction of his family, to labour under those griefs and inconveniences which
his family, so uninstructed, will be sure to bring upon him. Our laws, though
their defects in this particular cannot be denied, have in one instance made a
wise provision for breeding up the rising generation : since the poor and
laborious part of the community, when past the age of nurture, are taken out of
the hands of their parents, by the statutes for apprenticing poor children ; ( w)
and are placed out by the public in such a manner, as may render their abilities,
in their several stations, of the greatest advantage to the commonwealth. The
rich, indeed, are left at their own option, whether they will breed up their children to be ornaments or disgraces to their family.(9) Yet in one case, that of
(q) 1 Lev. l~.
(rJ 2 Inst. :WU.
(s) 1 Hawk. P. C. 131.
(uJ L. ofN. b. 6, c. 2, f 12.
(w) See page -126.

(t)

Cro. Jae. 296.

1 Hawk. P. C. 8.'l.

children had been fighting, the prisoner's son is worsted, and returns home bloody; tho

father takes a staff, runs three-quarters of a mile and beats the other boy, who dies of tho

beating. If, says he, upon provocation such as this, the father after running three-quarters

of a mile had dispatched the child with an hedge stake, or any other deadly weapon, or by

repeated blows with his cudgel, it must in my opinion have been murder, since any of these

circumstances would have been a plain indication of malice. He then adverts to Coke's

report of the case, and to the remarks made on it by Lord Eaymond in R. v. Oneby, 2 Lord

Bavm. 1498, from which he infers that the accident happened by a single stroke with a tmuM

cudgel not likely to destroy, and that death did not immediately ensue. So that the ground

of the decision was the absence of any fact showing malice, rather than indulgence shown to

parental passion. Foster, 294. ]

<9) If the child has a property independent of the father, and the father fails to provide

suitable maintenance and education, the court of chancery may interfere and cause them to be
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(7) See Fitch n. Weber, 6 Ile.re, 145; Mangham v. Mason, 1 V. and B. 410.
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father takes a staff, runs three-quarters of a mile and bee.ts the other boy, who dies of tho
beating. If, says be, upon provocation such e.R this, the father after running three-qna.rtcrs
of s mile had di~patched the child with e.n hedge ste.ke, or any other deadly weapon, or by
repeated blows with his cudgel, it must in my opinion be.ve been murder, since e.ny of these
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religion, they are under peculiar restrictions; for (x) it is provided, that if any

person sends any child under his government beyond the seas, either to prevent

its good education in England, or in order to enter into or reside in any popish

college, or to be instructed, persuaded, or strengthened in the popish religion;

in such case, besides the disabilities incurred by the child so sent, the parent or

person sending, shall forfeit 100Z., which (y) shall go to the sole use and benefit

of him that shall discover the offence. And (z) if any parent, or other, shall

send or convey any person beyond sea, to enter into, or be resident in, or

trained up in, any priory, abbey, nunnery, popish university, college, or school,

or house of Jesuits, or priests, or in any private popish family, in order to be

F *452 1 instructe(i» persuaded, or confirmed in the *popish religion, or shall con-

' J tribute any thing towards their maintenance when abroad by any pretext

whatever, the person both sending and sent shall be disabled to sue in law or

equity, or to be executor or administrator to any person, or to enjoy any legacy

or deed of gift, or to bear any office in the realm, and shall forfeit all his goods

and chattels and likewise all'liis real estate for life. (10)

2. The power of parents over their children is derived from the former consid-

eration, their duty: this authority being given them, partly to enable the parent

more effectually to perform his duty, and partly as a recompense for his care

and trouble in the faithful discharge of it. And upon this score the municipal

laws of some nations have given a much larger authority to the parents than

others. The ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and death over
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his children; upon this principle, that he who gave had also the power of taking

away.(a) But the rigour of these laws was softened by subsequent constitu-

tions ; so that (b) we find a father banished by the Emperor Hadrian for killing

his son, though he had committed a very heinous crime, upon this maxim, that

''patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate, consistere." But still they

maintained to the last a very large and absolute authority; for a son could

not acquire any property of his own during the life of his father; but all his

acquisitions belonged to the father, or at least the profits of them, for his life.(«)

The power of a parent by our English laws is much more moderate; but still

sufficient to keep the child in order and obedience.(ll) He may lawfully correct

his child, being under age, in a reasonable manner ;(d) for this is for the benefit

of his education.(12) The consent or concurrence of the parent to the marriage

of his child under age, was also directed by our ancient law to be obtained: but

now it is absolutely necessary, for without it the contract is void.(e) And

this also, is another means, which the law has put into the parent's hands, in

F *453 1 *or^er ^ne oe^ter to discharge his duty; first, of protecting his children

' ' -I from the snares of artful and designing persons; and, next, of settling

them properly in life, by preventing the ill consequences of too early and pre-

cipitate marriages. A father has no other power over his son's estate thau as

his trustee or guardian; for though he may receive the profits during the child's

fxj Stat. 1 Ja. I, c. I. and 3 Ja. I, o. 5. (y) suit. 11 and 12 \f. ill, <•. 4.

(zj Stat. 3 Car. I. c. 4. fa) Ff. 28, 2. 11. Cod. 8, 47. 10. (b) Ff. 48, 9, S.

(c) Iiut. 2, 9, 1. (d) 1 Hawk. P. C. 130. (t) Stat. 26 Geo. II, c. 83.

provided at the expense of the child's estate, through the intervention of a guardian. See Clark

v. Clark, S Paige. 153; Thompkins v. Thompkins' Ex'r, 3 Green, N. J. 303; Story Eq. Juris.

$$ 1341, 1353 to 1357.

(10) Since the statutes 10 Geo. IT, c. 7, and 2 and 3 "Will. IV, o, 115, these restrictions no

longer exist.

(11) [At law the father has against third persons the right to the custody and possession of his

infant son, and the court of king's bench cannot directly control it, 5 East, 221; 10 Vos. J. 58,

59. And, at common law, it was an offence to take 4 child from his father's possession. Andrews,

312. And child-stealing is au offence now punishable by statute. A court of equity controls

this power of the parent when he conducts himself improperly, as being in constant habits of

drunkenness or blasphemy, or attempting to mislead him in matters of religion, or to take him

improperly out of the kingdom ; and tho father mav be compelled to give security in these cases.

10 Ves. J. 58, 61.]

(12) The parent may bo said to exercise a judicial authority in determining what punishment is

proper for his child, but he is liable criminally in a clear case of excess. Johnson c. State, 2

Jfijmph. 283,
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minority, yet he must account for them when he comes of age. He may indeed

have the benefit of his children's labour while they live with him, and are main-

tained by him ; but this is no more than he is entitled to from his apprentices

or servants. (13) The legal power of a father, for a mother, as such, is entitled

to no power, but only to reverence and respect; (14) the power of a father, I say,

over the persons of his children ceases at the age of twenty-one: for they are

then enfranchised by arriving at years of discretion, or that point which the

law has established, as some must necessarily be established, when the empire

of the father, or other guardian, gives place to the empire of reason. Yet, till

that age arrives, this empire of the father continues even after his death; for

he may by his will appoint a guardian to his children. He may also delegate

part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his

child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the

parent committed to his charge, viz.: that of restraint and correction, as may be

necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed. (15.)

3. The duties of children to their parents arise from a principle of natural

justice and retribution. For to those who gave us existence we naturally owe

subjection and obedience during our minority, and honour and reverence ever

after: they who protected the weakness of our infancy are entitled to our pro-

tection in the infirmity of their age; they who by sustenance and education

have enabled their offspring to prosper, ought in return to be supported by that

offspring, in case they stand in need of assistance. Upon this principle proceed
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all the duties of children to their parents which are enjoined by positive laws.

And the Athenian laws (/) carried *this principle into practice with a •- *AKA i

scrupulous kind of nicety: obliging all children to provide for their father *• J

when fallen into poverty; with an exception to spurious children, to those whose

chastity had been prostituted by consent of the father, and to those whom he

had not put in any way of gaining a livelihood. The legislature, says Baron

Montesquieu, (a) considered, that in the first case the father, being uncertain,

had rendered the natural obligation precarious; that in the second case he had

sullied the life he had given, and done his children the greatest of injuries, in

depriving them of their reputation; and that in the third case, he had rendered

their life so far as in him lay, an insupportable burthen, by furnishing them

with no means of subsistence.

Our laws agree with those of Athens with regard to the first only of these

particulars, the case of spurious issue. In the other cases the law does not hold

the tie of nature to be dissolved by any misbehaviour of the parent; and there-

fore a child is equally justifiable in defending the person or maintaining the

cause or suit, of a bad parent, as a good one; and is equally compellable, (n) if

of sufficient ability, to maintain and provide for a wicked and unnatural pro-

(f) Potter's Antlq. b. 4. c. 15. (g) Sp. L. b. 26, c. 5. fkj Stat. 43, EUz. o. 2.

(13) But if the parent emancipate his child before the age of majority, either by express words,

or by turning him away from his home, or any equivalent conduct, the child may hire himself out,

minority, yet he must account for them when he comes of age. He may indeed
have the benefit of his chi1dren's labour while they live with him, and are maintained by him; but this is no more than he is entitled to from his apprentices
or servants. (13) 'fhe legal power of a father, for a mother, as such, is entitled
to no power, but only to reverence and respect; (14) the power of a father, I say,
over the persons of his children cea~es at the age of twenty-one: for they are
then enfranchised by arriving at years of discretion, or that point which the
law has established, as some must necessarily be established, when the empire
of the father, or other guardian, gives place to the empire of reason. Yet, till
that age arrives, this empire of the father continues even after his death; for
he may by his will appoint a guardian to his children. He may also delegate
part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his
child ; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the
parent committed to his charge, viz.: that of restraint and correction, as may be
necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed. (15.)
3. The d1tties of children to their parents arise from a principle of natural
justice and retribution. For to those who gave us existence we naturally owe
subjection and obedience during our minority, and honour and reverence ever
after: they who protected the weakness of our infancy are entitled to our protection in the infirmity of their age; they who by sustenance and education
have enabled their offspring to prosper, ought in return to be supported by that
offspring, in case they stand in need of assistance. Upon this principle proceed
all the duties of children to their parents which are enjoined by positive laws.
And the Ath.enian l~ws (/) c~r~ied *this. principle int? practice. with a [ • 454 J
scrupulous kmd of mcety : obhgmg all children to provide for their father
·
when fallen into poverty; with an exception to spurious children, to those whose
chastity had been prostituted by consent of the father, and to those whom he
had not put in any way of gainin~ a livelihood. The legislature, says Baron
Montesquieu, (g) considered, that m the first case the father, being uncertain,
had rendered the natural obligation precarious; that in the second case he had
sullied the life he had given, and done his children the greatest of injuries, in
depriving them of their reputation ; and that in the third case, he had rendered
their life so far as in him lay, an insupportable burthen, by furnishing them
with no means of subsistence.
Our laws agree with those of Athens with regard to the first only of these
particulars, the case of spurious issue. In the other cases the law does not hold
the tie of nature to be dissolved by any misbehaviour of the parent; and therefore a child is equally justifiable in defending the person or maintaining the
cause or snit, of a bad parent, as a good one; and is equally compellable, (h) if
of sufficient ability, to maintain and provide for a wicked and unnatural pro-

and recover for his own use a compensation for his services. See Stiles v. Granville, 6 Gush. 458;

(f)

Potter's Antiq. b. 4. c. 16.

( g) Sp.

L. b. 26, c. 6.

(la) Stat. '3, EUz. o. 9.

McCoy v. Hnffman, 8 Cow. 84; Burlingamo v. Burlingame, 7 id. 92; Conover ». Cooper, 3 Barb.

115; Armstrong v. McDonald, 10 id. 300; Huntoon v. Hazleton, 20 ST. H. 388. Bush t>. Tonght,

55 Penn. St. 457.

(14) That IB, during the life of the father; for after his death, the parental power of control

passes to her. Bex v. Greenliill, 4 A, and E. 624. And where the father and mother are living

apart from each other, the proper court having authority in the premises may adjudge the

custody of the children to either of them, in view of what appears most for the interest of

the children themselves. On this subject; see Barry's Case, 8 Paige, 47; 25 Wend. 64; 3 Hill,

399.

(15) In deciding upon the proper punishment of a scholar the teacher acts judicially, and

is not to be made bable, either civilly or criminally, unless he has acted with express malice,

or been guilty of such excess in punishment that malice must be implied. State v. Pender-

prass, 2 Dev. and Bat. 365; Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind, 290; Commonwealth v. Kandall, 4

Gray, 38. It may be proper to observe, however, that public sentiment does not now tolerate

guch corporal punishment of pupils in schools as was formerly thought permissible and eyen

necessary.
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(13) But ifthe parent emancipate his child before the age of majority, either by expreBB wordR,
or by turning him away from his home, or any equivalent conduct, the child may hire himself out,
and recover for his own use a compensation for his services. See Stiles ti, Granville, 6 Cush. 458;
McCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cow. 84; Burlingame v. Burlingame, 7 id. 92; Conover v. Cooper, 3 Barb.
115; Armstrong ti. McDonald, 10 id. 300; Huntoon ti. Hazleton, 20 N. H. 388. Rush v. Vought,
55 Penn. St. 457.
(14) That is, during the life of the father; for after his death, the parental power of control
pBBsea to her. Rex 1•. Greenhill, 4 .A., and E. 624. And where the father and mother are liviuir
apart from each .other, the .proper court h!l'vin~ authority in the premises may ~udge the
custody of the chJ!dren to either of them, m view of whe.t appears most for the mterei!t of
the children themseh'es. On thiil subject, see Barry's Case, 8 Paige, 47; 25 Wend. 64; 3 Hill,

399.

(15) In deciding u~n the proper J!Unishment of a scholar the teacher acts judicially, and
ie not to lie made liable, either civilly or crimin~y, unless he has acted with express malice,
or been guilty of such excess in punishment that me.lice must be implied. State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. and Bat. 365; Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind, 290; Commonwealth ti. Randall, 4
Gray, 38. It may be proper to observe, however, that public sentiment does not now tolerate
such corporal punishment of pupils in 8(.)bools 8il WQll formerly thought 11ennissible and even
necmisary.
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genitor as for one who has shewn the greatest tenderness and parental

piety. (16)

II. We are next to consider the case of illegitimate children, or bastards: with

regard to whom let us inquire, 1. Who are bastards. 2. The legal duties of the

parents towards a bastard child. 3. The rights and incapacities attending such

bastard children.

1. Who are bastards. A bastard, by our English laws, is one that is not only

begotten, but born, out of lawful matrimony. The civil and canon laws do not

allow a child to remain a bastard, if the parents afterwards intermarry: (i) and.

herein they differ most materially from our law; which, though not so strict

r *,„ i as to require that the child shall be begotten, *yet makes it an indis-

^ ' -I pensable condition to make it legitimate, that it shall be born, after lawful

wedlock. (17) And the reason of our English law is surely much superior to

that of the Roman, if we consider the principal end and design of establishing

the contract of marriage, taken in a civil light, abstractedly from any religious

view, which has nothing to do with the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the chil-

dren. The main end and design of marriage, therefore, being to ascertain and

fix upon some certain person, to whom the care, the protection, the maintenance,

and the education of the children should belong: this end is, undoubtedly, bet-

ter answered by legitimating all issue born after wedlock, than by legitimating

all issue of the same parties, even born before wedlock, so as wedlock afterwards

ensues: 1. Because of the very great uncertainty there will generally be, in the
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proof that the issue was really begotten by the same man ; whereas, by confin-

ing the proof to the birth, and not to the begetting, our law has rendered it

perfectly certain what child is legitimate, and who is to take care of the child.

2. Because by the Roman law a child may be continued a bastard, or made

legitimate, at the option of the father and mother, by a marriage ex post facto;

thereby opening a door to many frauds and partialities, which by our law are

prevented. 3. Because by those laws a man may remain a bastard till forty

years of age, and then become legitimate, by the subsequent marriage of his

parents ; whereby the main end of marriage, the protection of infants, is totally

frustrated. 4. Because this rule of the Roman law admits of no limitations as

to the time or number of bastards so to be legitimated; but a dozen of them

may twenty years after their birth, by the subsequent marriage of their parents,

be admitted to all the privileges of legitimate children. This is plainly a great

discouragement to the matrimonial state; to which one main inducement is

usually not only the desire of having children, but also the desire of procreating

lawful heirs. Whereas our constitutions guard against this indecency, and at

the same time give sufficient allowance to the frailties of human nature. For,

if a child be begotten while the parents are single, and they will endeavour to

P „,,56 T make an early reparation for the offence, by ""marrying within a few

I ' J months after, our law is so indulgent as not to bastardize the child, if it

be born, though not begotten in lawful wedlock; for this is an incident that

can happen but once, since all future children will be begotten, as well as born,

within the rules of honour and civil society. Upon reasons like these we may

suppose the peers to have acted at the pa.liament of Merton, when they refused

to enact that children born before marriage should be esteemed legitimate, (k) (18)

(i) Intt. 1. 10, 13. Dtcret. 1. 4, «. IT, c. 1.

(k) Rogaverunt omnet rpiscopi magnata, ut rmuenttrtnt quod natt mite mtitrimonium Client Ifgiiimi. next

illi f/ui witi siint pout iiuitrimonium. quia. eccleaift tales habetpro kgitimia. Et omnee c&mites ct baroue* una

twi' rapotulerunt. quod nolunt reges Anglia mutare. qua hucutyue vtUatas tunt ft approbates. Stat. 20 Ben.

II f, "'. 9. See the iiurcxiiiction to the great charter, edit, Oxon. 1759, tub anno lira.

(16) The liability of a child to support a parent is purely statutory, and can only be enforced

In tho mode the statute has provided. Edwards v, Davis, 16 Johns. 281. See also Raymond

genitor as for one who has shewn the greatest tenderness and parent.al
piet{. (16)
I . We are next to consider the case of illegitimate children, or bastards: with
regard to whom let us inquire, 1. Who are bastards. 2. The legal duties of the
parents towards a bastard child. 3. The rights and incapacities attending such
bastard children.
1. Who are bastards. A bastard, by our English laws, is one that is not only
begotten, but born, out of lawful matrimony. The civil and canon laws do not
allow a child to remain a bastard, if the parents afterwards intermarry: (i) and
herein they differ most materially from our law ; which, though not so strict
[ * 45 ~] as to re.quire that the child shall be begotten, *yet ma.lies it an indisa pensable condition to make it legitimate, that it shall be born, after lawful
wedlock. (17) And the reason of our English law is surely much superior to
that of the Roman, if we consider the principal end and design of establishing
the contract of marriage, taken in a civil light, abstractedly from any religious
view, which has nothing to do with the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the children. The main end and design of marriage, therefore, being to ascertain and
fix upon some certain person, to whom the care, the protection, the maintenance,
and the education of the children should belong: this end is, undoubtedly, better answered by legitimating all issue born after wedlock, than by legitimating
all issue of the same parties, even born before wedlock, so as wedlock afterwards
ensues: 1. Be~use of the very great uncertainty there will generally be, in the
proof that the issue was re.ally begotten by the same man; whereas, by confining the proof to the birth, and not to the begetting, our law has rendered it
perfectly certain what child is legitimate, and who is to take care of the child.
2. Because hy the Roman law a child may be continued a bastard, or made
legitimate, at the option of the father aud mother, by a maniage ex post facto;
thereby opening a. door to many frauds and partialities, which by our law are
prevented. 3. Because by those laws a man may remain a. bastard till fortv
years of age, an<l. then become legitimate, by the subsequent marriage of hfs
parents; wbereby the main end of marriage, the protection of infants, is totally
frustrated. 4. Because this rule of the Roman law admits of no limitations as
to the time or number of bastards so to be legitimated; but a dozen of them
may twenty years after their birth, by the subsequent marriage of their parents,
be admitted to all the privileges of legitimate children. This is plainly a great
disconmgement to tht> matrimonial state; to which one main inducement is
usually not only the desire of having cltildren, but also the desire of procreating
lawfnl lteir.<;. Whereas our constitutions guard against this indecency, and at
the same time give sutlicicmt allowance to the frailties of human nature. For,
if a child be begotten while the parents are single, and they will endeavour to
,.. 456 ] make &n early reparation for the offence, by *marrying within a few
[
months afh:r, our law is so indulgent as not to bastardize the child, if it
be born, though not begotten in lawful wedlock; for this is an incident that
can happen but once, since all future children will be begotten, as well as born,
within the rules of honour and civil society. Upon rea.."lons like these we mav
suppose the peers to have acted at the p~liq.ment of Merton, when they refused
to enact that ehildren born before maPriaga should be estoemed legitimate. (k) (18)
{i) !nit. I. 10, J:l, lJer1·eJ. l. 4, t. Ii. c. 1.
(/.:) Rogareru11t nmne• r11fsoopi magnatu, tie co1uientlrtmt qvod naff ant.I matrlmonium euenl ~."-I
illi rµd 11uti JNtnt pnat 11u1trl1111.mium. quia eccle.aiti talu habet pro kgUimu. El omAU oomiles cl liaroaei • roce rupondwu1at. quod 1UJ/unt regex Anglim mutare. qua hucusque untatre mnt et ap~. SIA&.. :ilO Ilea.
Ill, $ 9. See the intrO<tucLion to the great ch1Lrter, edtl, Ozon. 1769, l1W anno 126.1.

V. Loyl, 10 Barb 483.

(17) The rule of the civil law on this subject has been adopted by statute in some of the

United States: the child being legitimated for all purposes by tho marriage of the parents and

the recognition of the child by the father as his own.

(1H) If the husband and wife are separated by a decree of a competent court, a child begotten

during that period is presumed illegitimate, and the husband is uot allowed by his own evi-
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(16) The liuhilitr of ll child to ;;upport a parent is purely Rtatutory, au<l can only be en(oroed

t.t,e mo<le th<> :itatute hn.~ provided. Edwards v, Do.vis, 16 Johns. ~l. See also Raymond
Lori, 10 Bnrh 4t<3.
(17) The rnl<> of the civil law on this subject hBll been adopt.ed by statuto iu some of the
United State8; the child being legitimated for all purposes by the marriage of the parents and
tpe recognition of the child by the father as his own.
( 11') If the h1111band and wife are soparated by a decree of a competent oourt1 a child begotten
during that period i11 presumed illegitimate, and the husband is not &l.lowea by his OW'll evi!l0-1
{n
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From what has been said, it appears, that all children born before matrimony

are bastards by our law: and so it is of all children born so lone after the death

of the husband, that, by the usual course of gestation, they could not be begot-

ten by him. But, this being a matter of some uncertainty, the law is not exact

as to a few days. (I) And this gives occasion to a proceeding at common

law, where a widow is suspected to feign herself with child, in order to produce

a supposititious heir to the estate; an attempt which the rigour of the Gothic

constitutions esteemed equivalent to the most atrocious theft, and therefore

punished with death. (m) In this case, with us, the heir presumptive may have

a writ de ventre inspiciundo to examine whether she be with child, or not; (n) (19)

and, if she be, to keep her under proper restraint till delivered; which is entirely

conformable to the practice of the civil law: (o) but, if the widow be, upon due

examination, found not pregnant, the presumptive heir shall be admitted to the

inheritance, though liable to lose it again, on the birth of a child within forty

weeks from the death of a husband. (p) But, if a man dies, and his widow soon

after marries again, and a child is born within such a time, as that by the course

of nature it might have been the child of either *husband; in this case r +,*„ -i

he is said to be more than ordinarily legitimate; for he may, when he L ' "' '

arrives to years of discretion, choose which of the fathers he pleases.^) To

prevent this, among other inconveniences, the civil law ordained that no widow

should marry infra annum luctus, (r) a rule which obtained so early as the

reign of Augustus, (s) if not of Romulus: and the same constitution was prob-
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ably handed down to our early ancestors from the Eomans, during their stay

in this island; for we find it established under the Saxon and Danish govern-

ments, (t)

As bastards may be born before the coverture or marriage state is begun, or

after it is determined, so also children born during wedlock may in some circum-

stances be bastards. As if the husband be out of the kingdom of England, or

as the law somewhat loosely phrases it, extra quatuor maria, for above nine

months, so that no access to his wife can be presumed, her issue during that

period shall be bastards, (v) But, generally, during the coverture, access of the

husband shall be presumed, unless the contrary can be shewn; (w) which is such

a negative as can only be proved by shewing him to be elsewhere: for the gen-

eral rule is, prasumitur pro legitimatione. (x) (20) In a divorce, a mensa et

thoro, if the wife breeds children, they are bastards; for the law will pre-

sume the husband and wife conformable to the sentence of separation, unless

(I) Cro. Jao. Ml. (m) Stiernhook de Jure Ootlior. 1. 3, c. 5. (n) Co. Litt. 8. Bract. J.2. c. 82.

(o) ff. 25, ttt. 4, per tot. (p) Brltton, c. 66, pag. 166. (q) Co. Litt. 8.

From what has been said, it appears, that all children born before matrimony
are bastards by our law: and so it is of all children born so long after the death
of the husband, that, by the usnal course of gestation, they could not be begotten bv him. But, this being a matter of some uncertainty, the law is not exu.ct
as tO a few days. (l) And this gives occasion to a r.roceeding at common
law, where a widow is suspected to feign herself with child, in order to produce
1.1. supposititious heir to the estate; an attempt which the rigour of the Gothic
constitutions esteemed equirnlcnt to the most atrocious theft, and therefore
punished with death. (m) In this case, with us, the heir presumptive may have
a writ d8 ventre inspicicndo to examine whether she be with child, or not; (n) (19)
and, if she be, to keep her under proper restraint till delivered; which is entirely
conformable to the practice of the civil law: (o) but, if the widow be, upon due
examination, found not pregnant, the presumptive heir shall be admitted to the
inheritance, though liable to lose it again, on the birth of a child within forty
weeks from the death ofa husband. (p) But, if a man dies, and his widow soon
after marries again, and a child is born within such a time, as that by the course
of nature it might have been the child of either *husband; in this case [ • 457 ]
he is said to be more than ordinarily legitimate; for he may, when he
arrives to yea.rs of discretion, choose which of the fathers he pleases.(q) To
prevent this, among other inconveniences, the civil law ordained that no widow
should marry infra annum luctus, (1·) a rule which obtained so early as the
reign of Augustus, (s) if not of Romulus: and the same constitution was probably handed down to our early ancestors from the Romans, durin~ their stay
in this island; for we find it established under the Saxon and Damsh governments. (t)
As bastards may be born before the coverture or marriage state is begun, or
after it is determined, so also children born during wedlock may in some circumstances be bastards. As if the husband be out of the kingdom of England, or
as the law somewhat loosely phrases it, extra quatuor maria, for above nine
months, so that no o.cceSB to his wife can be presumed, her issue during that
period shall be bastards. (v) But, generally, during the coverture, access of the
husband shall be presumed, unless the contrary can be shewn; (w) which is such
a negative as can only be proved by shewing him to be elsewhere: for the general rule is, prwsumitur pro legitirnatione. (z) (20) In a divorce, a msnsa et
tlioro, if the wife breeds children, they are bastards ; for the law will presume the husband and wife conformable to the sentence of separation, unless

(r) Cod. 5, 9, 2. (I) Bat the y«>ir was then only ten months. Uvid, Feat. I. ¥1.

(t) Sit omnii vidua tnne marUo duododm menses. LL. Ethelr. A. D. 1008. LL. Canut. c. 71.

(v) i;.i. Lltt. 2U. (v) Salt 188, 8 P. W. srii. Stra. 1)25. (x) 6 Rep. 98.

dence to establish the fact of access. Patchett v. Holgate, 15 Jnr. 308. Neither on the other

hand, is the wife to be allowed to testify to non-access, and thus bastardize the issue when

(l) Cro. Ja.c. Ml.
(m) Stlcmhook d4 Jure Gotlwr. l. 3, c. Ii.
(n) Co. Lilt. 8. Bract. Z.2, c. 82.
(o) Jl'f. 211, tU. 4, per tol.
(p) Britton, c. 66, pag. 166.
(q) Co. Litt. 8.
(r) <fod. Ii. 9, 2.
(•)But the yel\r was then only len montha. Uvid, Jlad. I. ~.
OJ SU omnw vidva rine marlto dvodoclm menau. LL. Blhelr. A. D. lOOtl. LL. Can"'. c. 71.
(") Uo. LIU. Ui.
(111) Salk. lJll, 8 P. W. U6. SA'a. 921i.
(:z:) Ii Rep. 96.

they are not thus separated. Parker ». Way, l.VN. 11. 45; Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn.

288; People t>. Ontario, 15 Barb. 286.

(19) [The writ is granted not only to an heir at law, but to a devisee for life, or in tail, or in

fee; and whether IiU interest is immediate or contingent. See 4 Bro. 90. For the proceed-

ings under this writ, see 2 P. Wms. 591. And in Moseley's Report of Aiscough's case, the

same in 2 P. Wins. 591, a case of personal estate i* cited. The writs direct, that, in the

presence of the knights and women, the female tractari per urberem et ventrem; the pre-

sumed necessity of the case dispensing at once with common decency and with respectful defer-

ence to sex. ]

(80) [It used to be held that when the husband was living within the kingdom, access was

presumed, unless strict proof was adduced that the husband and wife were all the time living

at a distance from each other; but now, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child of a married

woman, living in a notorious state of adultery, under all the circumstances is a question for a

jury to determine. 4 T. R. 356, and 251.]

See also what is said by Lord EUenborongh in 8 East, 193; Heard v. Heard, 1 Sim. and Stu.

150; Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige, 139; Commonwealth v. Shepherd, li Binn. 280; Bury v. Philpot.

2 M. and K. 349.
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dence t.o establish the fact of acoetlf!. Patchett v. Holgate, 15 Jnr. 308. Neither on the other
hand, ill the wifo to be allowed to tesW:v to non-acceilS, and thus bastardise the issue when
they a.re not thuR sep!lfattld. Pe.rker v. Way, 15 N. H. 45; Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn.
288; People ti. Ontario, 15 Bl\fb. 286.
(19) [The writ is ~ted not only to an heir at law, but t.o a devisee for life, or in tail, or iu
fee; and whether his interest i11 immediate or contingent. See 4 Bro. 90. Jt'or the proceedings under this writ, 1100 2 P. Wms. 591. And in Moseley's Report of .A.iscough's case, the
same in 2 P. Wms. 591, a case of pel'l!Onal estate i11 cited. The writs direct, that, in the
preeeuce of the knights and women, the female tractari ptJT urberem et ventrem; the presumed necessity of tlie case dispensing at once with common decency and with respectful deference to eex.]
(20) [It used to be held that when the buRband w&R living within the kingdom, access was
presumed, unless strict proof was adduced that the husband and wife were all the time living
at a di11tance from each other; but now, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child of a married
woman, living iu a not.orious state of adultery. under all the oircum11taDces is a question for a
jwy to determine. 4 T. R. 356, and 251.]
•
See also what is said by Lord Ellenborongh in 8 East, 193; Heard ti. Heard, 1 Sim. and S~u.
150 ; CrOSll ti, Oroes, 3 Paige, 139; Commonwealth ti. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 200; Bury v. Philpot,
2 .M. and K. 349.

Vo1;. I.-39
D

301i

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

467 OF PARENT AND CHILD. [Book I.

457

OF

p ARENT

AND CHILD.

[Book I.

access be proved; but in a voluntary separation by agreement, the law will sup-

pose access, unless the negative be shewn, (a) So also, if there is an apparent

impossibility of procreation on the part of the husband, as if he be onlv eight

years old, or the like, there the issue of the wife shall be bastards, (b) Likewise,

in case of divorce in the spiritual court, a vinculo matrimonii, all the issue

born during the coverture are bastards; (c) because such divorce is always upon

f *4581 *8ome cause> that rendered the marriage unlawful and null from the

L •' J beginning.

2. Let us next see the duty of parents to their bastard children, by our law;

which is principally that of maintenance. For, though bastards are not looked

upon as children to any civil purposes, yet the ties of nature, of which mainte-

nance is one, are not so easily dissolved: and they hold indeed as to many other

intentions; as, particularly, that a man shall not many his bastard sister or

daughter, (d) The civil law, therefore, when it denied maintenance to bastards

begotten under certain atrocious circumstances, (e) was neither consonant to

nature nor reason, however profligate and wicked the parents might justly be

esteemed.

The method in which the English law provides maintenance for them is as

follows. (/) (21) When a women is delivered, or declares herself with child, of a

bastard, and will by oath before a justice of peace charge any person as having

got her with child, the justice shall cause such person to be apprehended, and

commit him till he gives security, either to maintain the child, or appear at the
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next quarter sessions to dispute and try the fact But if the woman dies, or is

married before delivery, or miscarries, or proves not to have been with child,

the person shall be discharged; otherwise the sessions, or two justices out of

sessions, upon original application to them, may take order for the keeping of

the bastard, by charging the mother or the reputed father with the payment

of money or other sustentation for that purpose. And if such putative father,

or lewd mother, run away from the parish, the overseers, by direction of two

justices, may seize their rents, goods and chattels, in order to bring up the said

bastard child. Yet such is the humanity of our laws, that no woman can be

compulsively questioned concerning the father of her child till one month after

her delivery; which indulgence is, however, very frequently a hardship npon

parishes, by giving the parents opportunity to escape. (22)

T *4591 •*• Proceed next to the rights and incapacities which appertain to a

L J bastard. The rights are very few, being only such as he can acquire ; for

he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody; and sometimes

called films nullius, sometimes^Kws populi. (a) (23) Yet he may gain a surname

by reputation, (A) though he has none by inheritance. (24) All other children

have their primary settlement in their father's parish; but a bastard in the

(a) Snlk. 123. (ft) Co. LIU. '.Ml. (c) Ibid. 235.

'i'i Lord Rttym. 63. Comb. 396. Id Nov. 89, c. 15.

(/) Stat. 18 Kliz. o. 3. 7 Jac. I, c. 4. 3 Car. I, c. 4. 13 and 14 Car. EC, c. 12. 7 Geo. H, o. SI.

access be proved; but in a voluntary separation by agreement, the law will su11pose access, unless the negative be shewn. (a) 80 also, if there is an apparent
impossibility of' procreation on the part of the husband, as if he be onlv eight
years old, or the like, there the issue of the wife shall be bastards. (b) Likewi:;e.,
m case of divorce in the spiritual court, a vinculo matrimonii, all the issue
born during the coverture are bastards: (c) because such divorce is always upon
[ • 458 ] *so~e .cause, that rendered the marriage unlawful and null from the
begmmng.
2. Let us next see the duty of parents to their bastard children, bv our law;
which is principally that of maintenance. For, though bastards are" not looked
upon as children to any civil purposes, yet the ties of nature, of which maint€nance is one, are not so easily dissolved: and they hold indeed as to many other
intentions; as, particularly, that a man shall not marry his bastard sister or
daughter. (d) The civil law, therefore, when it denied maintenance to bastards
begotten under certain atrocious circumstances, (e) was neither consonant to
nature nor reason, however profligate and wicked the parents might justly be
esteemed.
The method in which the English law provides maintenance for them is as
follows.(/) (21) When a women is delivered, or declares herself with child, of a
bastard, and will by oath before a justice of peace charge any person as ha Ying
got her with child, the justice shall cause such person to be apprehended, and
commit him till he gives security, either to maintain the child, or appear at the
next quarter sessions to dispute and try the fact. But if the woman die.s, or is
married before delivery, or miscarries, or pro,•es not to have been with child,
the person shall be discharged; otherwise the sessions, or two justices out of
sessions, upon original application to them, may take order for the keeping of
the bastard, by charging the mother or the reputed father with the payment
of money or other sustentation for that purpose. And if such putative father,
or lewd mother, run away from the parish, the overseers, by direction of two
justices, may seize their rents, goods and chattels, in order to bring up the said
bastard child. Yet such is the humanity of our laws, that no woman can ht'
compulsively questioned concerning the father of her child till one month after
her delivery; which indulgence. is, however, very frequently a hardship npon
parishes, by giving the parents opportunity to escape. (22)
*3. I proceed next to the rights and incapacities which appertain to a
[ • 459 ]
bastard. The rights are very few, being only such as he can acquire; for
he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody; and sometimes
called fiUus nullius, sometimesfilius populi. (g) (23) Yet he may gain a surname
by reputation, {It) though he has none by inheritance. (24) All other children
have their primary settlement in their father's parish; but a bastard in the

(g) Fort, de L. L. c. 40. (ft) Co. LIU. 3.

(21) The law upon this subject was very materially altered by the 4 and 5 Win. IV, o. 76,

but the principle that the parents shall support a bastard child, and imdemnify the parish against

such support, is the foundation of the new statute as it was of the former ones. The statutes

(a) Salk. 123.
(bl Co. Litt. 2«.
(c) Ibid. 2311.
111) Lonl Raym. 6i!.
Comb. 356.
(e) NOfJ. 89, c. Iii.
(fl Stat 18 IWz. c. 3. 7 Jae. IJ c. 4. 3 Car. I, c. 4. 18and1' Car. II, c . 12. 7 Geo. II, c. 31.
lg) Forl. de L. L. c. 40.
(A) Co. Litt. 3.

now regulating this subject are 7 and 8 Tic. o. 101, and 8 and 9 Vic. c. 10.

(22) [In the technical treatises on the poor laws will be found the cases occurring as to the

right of custody, whether it be in the father or in the mother of the bastard. And the right of

the mother to such custody seems recognized and established. 5 East, 221; see also 1 B. and

P. N. R. 148; 7 East, 579.]

(23) In some of the United States it is provided by statute that a bastard child shall inherit

from the mother, and the mother from him.

The crime of incest does not at common law depend upon the legitimacy of the parties to the

sexual intercourse, or of either of them. People t>. Jenness, 5 Midi. 305.

(24) [A bastard having gotten a name by reputation, may purchase by his reputed or known

name to him and his heirs: Go. Litt. 3 b; but this can only be to the heirs of his own body.

A conveyance to a man who is a bastard, and his heirs, though his estate is in its descent

confined to the issue of his body, yet gives him a fee simple, and confers an unlimited power
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(21) The law upon this subject was ;ery materially altered by the 4 and 5 Wm. IV, c. 76.
but the principle that the pa.rent:1 shall support a bastard child, and imdemnify the parish against
such support, is the foundation of the new statute as it WM of the former ones. The statutes
now regulating this subject are 7 and 8 Vic. c. 101, and 8 and 9 Vic. c. 10.
(22) [In the technical treatises on the poor laws will l>e found the cases occurring as to the
right of custody, whether it l>e in the father or in the mother of the bastard. .And the right o(
the mother to such custody seems recogniled and established. 5 East, 221; see also 1 B. and
P. N. R. 148; 7 East, 579.]
(23) In some of the United States it is provided by statute that a bastard child shall inherii
from the mother, and the mother from him.
The crime of incest does not at common law depend upon the legitimacy of the parties to the
sexual intercoun;e, or of either of them. People v~ Jenness, 5 Mich. 305.
(24) LA bastard having gotten a name by reputation, may purchase by his re_puted or known
name to him and his heirs: Oo. Litt. 3 b; but this can only be to the heirs ot his own body.
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parish where born, for he hath no father, (i) However, in case of fraud, as if a

woman be sent either by order of justices, or comes to beg as a vagrant, to a

parish where she does not belong, and drops her bastard there, the bastard

shall, in the first case, be settled in the parish from whence she was illegally

removed; (/) or, in the latter case, in the mother's own parish, if the mother be

apprehended for her vagrancy. (&) Bastards also born in any licensed hospital

for pregnant women, are settled in the parishes to which the mothers belong. (I)

The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he cannot be heir

to any one, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body; for being nullius

flius, he is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any

inheritable blood can be derived. A bastard was also, in strictness, incapable

of holy orders; and, though that were dispensed with, yet he was utterly dis-

qualified from holding any dignity in the church: (m) but this doctrine seems

now obsolete; and, in all other respects, there is no distinction between a bastard

and another man. And really any other distinction, but that of not inheriting,

which civil policy renders necessary, would with regard to the innocent offspring

of his parents' crimes, be odious, unjust, and cruel to the last degree: and yet

the civil law, so boasted of for its equitable decisions, made bastards, in some

cases, incapable even of a gift from their parents, (n) A bastard may, lastly, be

made legitimate, and capable of inheriting, by the transcendent power of an act

of parliament, and not otherwise: (o) as was done in the case of John of Gant's

bastard children, by a statute of Richard the Second. (25)
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CHAPTER XVII.

OF GUARDIAN AND WARD.

parish where born, for he hath no father. (i) However, in case of fraud, as if a
woman be sent either by order of justices. or comes to beg as a va~rant, to a
parish where she does not belons-, and drops her bastard there, the bastard
shall, in the first case, be settled m the parish from whence she was illegally
removed ; {j) or, in the latter case, in the mother's own parish, if the mother be
apprehended for her vagrancy. (k) Bastards also born in any licensed hospital
for pregnant women, are settled in the parishes to which the mothers belong. (l)
The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he cannot be heir
to any one, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body; for being nullius
f!1ius, he is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any
mheritable blood can be derived. A bastard was also, in strictness, incapable
of holy orders; and, though that were dispensed with, yet he was utterly disqualified from holding any dignity in the church: (m) but this doctrine seems
now obsolete; and, in all other respects, there is no distinction between a bastard
and another man. And really any other distinction, but that of not inheriting,
which civil policy renders necessary, would with regard to the innocent offspring
of his parents' cnmes, be odious, unjust, and cruel to the last degree: and yet
the civil law, so boasted of for its equitable decisions, made bastards, in some
cases, incapable even of a gift from their parents. (n) A bastard may, lastly, be
ma.de legitimate, and capable of inheriting, by the transcendent power of an act
of parliament, and not otherwise: (o) as was done in the case of John of Gant's
bastard children, by a statute of Richard the Second. (25)

THE only general private relation, now remaining to be discussed, is that of

guardian and ward: (1) which bears a very near resemblance to the last, and is

plainly derived out of it; the guardian being only a temporary parent, that is,

for so long time as the ward is an infant, or under age. In examining this

CHAPTER XVII.

species of relationship, I shall first consider the different kinds of guardians,

ii> Salic. 427. (j) Ibid. 121. (k) SKI! . 17 Geo. II, c. 5. (1) star. 13 Geo. ill, c. 82.

OF GUARDIAN AND WARD.

(n) Fortesc. c, 40. 6 Rep. 58. (n) Cod. 6, ST. 5. (o) 4 Insl. 36.

of alienation; and any person deriving title from him or his heirs, may transmit the estate in

perpetual succession.

'Hie role as to a bastard's taking by his name of reputation, must be understood as giving a

capacity to take by that name merely as a description, not as a child by a claim of kindred;

therefore a bastard cannot claim a share under a devise to children generally, though the will

was strong in big favor by implication. 5 Yes. 530, and see 1 Yes. and B. 434, 469; 6 Yes. 43;

1 Kaddox, 430.

A limitation cannot be to a bastard en ventre sa mere, for bastards cannot take till they gain a

name by reputation. 1 Inst. 3 b; 6 Co. 68; 1 P. Wins. 529; 17 Yes. 528; 1 Mer. 151; 18 Yes.

THE only general private relation, now remaining to be discussed, is that of
guardian and ward: (1) which bears a verr near resemblance to the last, and is
plainly derived out of it; the guardian bemg only a temporary parent, that is,
for so long time as the ward is an infant, or under age. In examining this
species of relationship, I shall first consider the different kinds of guardians,
(i) Salk. 4/¥1.
(j) Ibid. 121.
(k) St;at. 17 Geo. n. c. 5.
(I) Stat. 13 Geo. m, c. 82.
(m) J!'orteec. c, 40. Ii Rep. 58.

(n) Cocl. 6, l)l. 5.

(o) 'Inst. 36.

288: H. Cutty's Law of Descents, 29, 30.

If a bastard' die seized of a real estate of inheritence, without having devised it, and with-

out issue, the estate will escheat to the king, or other immediate lord of the fee. 3 Bulstr. 195;

1 Ld. Eaym. 1152; 1 Prest. Bst. 468, 469; post, .book 2, 249; 2 Cruise's Dig. 374. But, as

there might in many cases be much apparent hardship in the strict enforcement of this branch

of the royal prerogative, it is usual in such cases to transfer the power of exercising it to

some one of the family, reserving to the crown a small proportion, as a tenth of the value of

both the real and the personal estate. 1 "Wood. 397, 308. And so likewise in the case of per-

sonal estate, where a bastard dies intestate and without issue, the king is entitled and the

ordinary of course grants administration to the patentee or grantee of the crown. Salk. 37; 3

P. Wms 33.

(25) [The father of an infant, legitimate child is entitled to the custody of it; but the mother

of an illegitimate child in preference to the putative father. 5 East, 221; 1 Bos. and P. N. R.

148; 7 East, 579.]

(1) For the details of the law on this subject, see the several works on equity jurisdiction

and practice, and particularly Reeve on the Domestic Relations, and Shouler on the same subject,
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cape.city to ta.ke by that name merely as a description, not as a child by a claim of kindred{·
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name by re{>uta.tion. 1 Illl!t. 3 b; 6 Co. 68; 1 P. Wms. 529; 17 Ves. 528; 1 Mer. 151; 18 Ves.
288 · H. Chitty's Law of Descents, 29, 30.
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P. Wms. 33.
(25) [The father of an infant legitimate child is entitled to the custody of it; but the mother
of a.n illegitimate ohild in preference to the putative father. 5 East, 221; 1 Bos. and P. N. R.
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(1) For the details of tile law on this subject, see the several works on equity jurisdiction
and practice, and parti.oul~ly Reeve on the Domestic Relations, and Shouler on the same subject,
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how they are appointed, and their power and duty: next, the different ages of

prsons, as defined by the law; and lastly, the privileges and disabilities of an

infant, or one under age and subject to guardianship,

1. The guardian with us performs the office both of the tutor and curator of

the Roman laws; the former of which had the charge of the maintenance and

education of the minor, the latter the care of his fortune; or, according to the

language of the court of chancery, the tutor was the committee of the person,

the curator the committee of the estate. But this office was frequently united

in the civil law; (a) as it is always in our law with regard to minors, though as

to lunatics and idiots it is commonly kept distinct.

r *4fil 1 *^ *ne severftl species of guardians, the first are guardians bynature;

-• viz.: the father, and, in some cases, the mother of the child. For if an

estate be left to an infant, the father is by common law the guardian, and must

account to his child for the profits, (b) (2) And, with regard to daughters, it

seems by construction of the statute 4 and 5 Ph. and Mar. c. 8, that the father

might by deed or will assign a guardian to any woman-child under the age of

sixteen; and if none be so assigned, the mother shall in this case be

guardian, (c) (3) There are also guardians for nurture; (d) which are of coarse,

the father or mother, till the infant attains the age fourteen years: («) and in

default of father or mother, the ordinary usually assigns some discreet peison to

take care of the infant's personal estate, and to provide for his maintenance and

education, (f) (4) Next are guardians in socage, (5) (anappellation which will
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be fully explained in the second book of these Commentaries,) who are also

called guardians by the common law. These take place only when the minor is

entitled to some estate in lands, and then by the common law the guardianship

devolves upon his next of kin to whom the inheritance cannot possibly descend ;

as, where the estate descended from his father, in this case nis uncle by the

mother's side cannot possibly inherit this estate and therefore shall be the

guardian. (</) For the law judges it improper to trust the person of an infant in

his hands, who may by possibility become heir to him; that there may be no

temptation, nor even suspicion of temptation, for him to abuse his trust. (h) The

(b) Co. Lilt. 88. fe) 3 Rep. 39. (d) Co. Lttt. 88.

(a) FY. 2«, 4, 1. (b) Co. Lilt. 88. (f) 3 Rep. 39. (d) Co. Lit

(e) Irfoor. 7S8. 3 Rep. 38. (/)2 Jones, 90. i Lev. 183. fa) Lltt. J 123.

how they are appointed, and thcirjower and duty: next, the different a,,<Fes of
persons, as defined by the law; an lastly, the privileges and disabilities of an
mfant, or one under age and subject to guardianship,
1. 'l'he guardiim with us performs the office both of the tutor and cttrafor of
the Roman laws; the former of which had the charge of the maintenance a.nd
education of the minor, the latter the care ot' his fortune; or, according to the
language of the court of chancery, the tut()r WM the committee of the person,
the curator the committee of the estate. But this office was frequently united
in the civil law; ((t) as it is always in our law with regard to minors, though a.a
to luootics and idiots it is commonly kept distinct.
•Of the several species of guardians, the first are guardians by nature;
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viz.: the father, and, in some cases, the mother of the child. ~or if an
estate be left to an infant, the father is by common law the guardian, and must
account to his child for the profits. (h) (2) And, with regard to daughters. it
seems by construction of the statute 4 and 5 Ph. and Mar. c. 8, that the father
might by deed or will assign a guardian to any woman-child under the we of
sixteen; and if none be so assigned, the mother shall in this case be
guardian. (c) (3) 'fhere are also guardians/or nurl'ur~; (d) which are of course,
the father or mother, till the infant attains the age fourteen years: (e) and in
default of father.or mother, the ordinary usually a.s~gns so~e dis?reet person t-0
take care of the mfant's personal estate, and to provide for his mamtenanoe and
education.{/) (4) Next are guardians in socage, (5) (anappellation which will
be fully explained in the second book of these Commentaries,) who are also
called guardians by the common law. These take place only when the minor is
entitled to some estate in lands, a.ncl then by the common law the guardianship
devolves upon his next of kin to whom the mheritance cannot possibly descend;
as, where the estate descended from his father, in this case his uncle by the
mother's side cannot possibly inherit this estate and therefore shall be the
guardian. (g) For the law jnd~es it improper to trust the person of au infant in
his hands, who may by possibility become heir to him; that there may be no
temptation, nor even suspicion of temptation, for him to abuse his trust. (h) The
(a) Jl'f. 2'1, 4, l.
(b) Co. Lil.i. 88.
(c) 3 Rep. 39.
(e) M'.oor. 738. S Re[l. 38.
(fl 2 Jones, 90. ~Lev. IB.1.
(It) Nvnquarn CtUk>dia allcujru tk jure alkul remand. de

(h) \itii'/ii'im autodia aKcujiu tie jure aiieul remanet, de quo nabeatur nut

(h) \iiii'in,an custorlia alifujiu de jure alicui remanet, de quo nabeatur nupieio, quod pottit rrf edit

aliqiwdjuf in ipia hareditate Clamare. Glanv. 2. 7, c. 11.

aliquotl jua in ip1a 11.mretlitate Clamare. Glanv. l. 7, c. 11.

(tl) Co. Litt. 88.
(g) Litt. f 123.
quo hakatur mapiclo, q1'0tl pouit t'd ttUt

(2) Bnt a guardian by nature cannot lease the lands of the ward. May ". Calder, 2 Mass.

65: Combs ». Jackson, 2 "Wend. 153; Kendall v. Miller, 9 Cal. 592. Nor can an executor

discharge himself by making payment to such guardian. Genet». Tallmadge, 1 Johns. Ch, 3;

Miles r. Boyden, 3 Pick. 213; Williams v. Storrs, 6 Johns. Ch. 353. The mother becomes

guardian by nature on the death of the father. Freto v. Brown, 4 Mass. 675.

(3) [An appointment of a testamentary guardian byamofAer is absolutely void. Vaaghan,

180; 3 Atk. 519. A father's appointment by deed of a guardian may be revoked by will.

Finch, 323; 1 Vern. 442. Any form of words indicative of the intent suffices. Swimb. p. 3,

c. 12; 2 Fonbl. on Eq.5th ed. 246, 247. A guardian appointed by the father cannot delegate or

continua the authority to another. Vaughan, 179; 2 Atk. 15.]

The grandfather has no power to appoint a testamentary guardian, lloyt. v. Hilton, 2 Edw.

Ch. 202; Fullertonti. Jackson, 5 Johns. Ch. 278.

(4) [It might be questionable whether the ordinary would be permitted to interfere farther than

to appoint ad litem. 3 Atkins. 631; Burr. 1436. For, where a legitimate child, even at the

breast, is withheld from the custody of the father, habeas corpus may be brought. The King r.

Do Manneville, 5 East, 221. See, also, 1 Bl. It. 386: and 4 J. B. Moore, 366,

But, of an illegitimate child, the mother appears to be the natural guardian. 4 Taunt 498,

ex parte Knee, 1 N. R. 148. And habeas corpus lies at her instance. See The King t>. Hopkins,

7 East, 579 ; 5 id. 224, n; also 5 T. R. 278.]

See to the same point, Somerset v. Dighton, 12 Mass. 383. Guardians for nurture were for

those children who were not heirs; and as all legitimate children are heirs equally in America,

this species of guardianship is here obsolete. 2 Kent, 221.

(5) [A widow is guardian in socage to her daughters until they are fourteen years old. as

well of freehold as of copyhold. 10 East, 491: 2 M. and S. 504. She has a right as snch to

elect whether she will let the estate, or occupy it for their benefit. Such a guardian hag not

a mere office or authority, but an interest in the ward's estate; she may maintain trespass

and ejectment; avow damage feasant, make admittance to copyhold, and lease in ii> r own

name. Ibid]
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(2) But a guardian by nature cannot 111a.'!6 the lands of the ward. May v. Calder, 2 MB.'!..<(.
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Roman laws proceed on a quite contrary principle, committing the care of the

minor to him who is the next to succeed to the inheritance, presuming that the

next heir would take the best care of an estate, to which he has a prospect of

succeeding: and this they boast to be " summa providentia." (i) But in the

mean time they seem to have forgotten, how much it is the *guardian's r * j go i

interest to remove the incumbrance of his pupil's life from that estate •- '' '" '

for which he is supposed to have so great a regard, (k) And this affords For-

tescue, (I) and Sir Edward Coke, (m) an ample opportunity for triumph; they

affirming, that to commit the custody of an infant to him that is next in suc-

cession is " quasi agnum committere lupo, ad devorandum." (ti) These guardians

in socage, like those for nurture, continue only till the minor is fourteen years

of age; for then, in both cases, he is presumed to have discretion, so far as to

choose his own guardian. This he may do, unless one be appointed by the

father, by virtue of the statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, which, considering the imbe-

cility of judgment in children of the age of fourteen, and the abolition of

guardianship in chivalry (which lasted till the age of twenty-one, and of which

we shall speak hereafter), enacts that any father, under age or of full age, may

by deed or will dispose of the custody of his child, either born or unborn, to any

person, except a popish recusant, either in possession or reversion, till such child

attains the age of one and twenty years. (6) These are called guardians by

statute, or testamentary guardians. There are also special guardians by custom

of London, and other places; (o) hut they are particular exceptions, and do not
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fall under the general law. (7)

(»i Ff. 28, «, 1.

(1) The Roman sntyrlst was fully aware of this danger, when he puts this private prayer into the mouth

of a selfish guardian:

jmpiUuni o vthwm, quern proximut hirrte

Impello. expungam. l*ers. 1,12.

(2) C. 11. (m) 1 lust. 88.

(n) See stat. Bibem. 14 Hen. HI. This policy of our English law is warranted by the wise institutions of

Solon, who provided that no one should be another's guardian, who was to enjoy the estate alter his death.

(!•< >tU'i-v Antiq. b. 1, c. 26.) And Charondas, another of the Grecian legislators, directed that the inheri-

tance should go to the father's relations, but the education of the child to the mother's; that the guardian-

ship and right of succession might always be kept distinct. (Petit. /.«</. All. I. 6, t. 7.)

(o) Co. Lltt. 88.

(6) [By this statute the father may dispose of the guardianship of any child unmarried under

the age of twenty-one, by deed or will, executed in the presence of two or more witnesses, till

such child attains the age of twenty-one, or for any less time. And the guardian so appointed

has the tuition of the ward, and the management of his estate and property.

No material form of words is necessary to create the appointment. Swinb. p. 3, o. 12; see 2

Fonbl. on Eq. 5th ed. 246, 247, notes. But the power of the guardian exists only during the time

for which he is expressly appointed. Vaugh. 184.

Though under this act a testamentary guardian has the custody of the infant's real estate, a

lease granted by him of such real estate is absolutely void. 2 "Wils. 129, 135.

The marriage of the infant before he becomes twenty-one years of age does not determine the

guardianship. 3 Atk. 625.]

Since the statute 31 Geo. Ill, o. 32, a Roman Catholic priest is not precluded from being a tes-

tamentary guardian.

(7) [The King is also an universal guardian of infants, who delegates it to the lord chancellor.

See 2 Fonbl. on Eq. 5th ed. 225.

By virtue of this power the chancellor may appoint guardians to such infants as are with-

out them. Bac. Ab. Guardians, c.; 2 Fonbl. 5th ed. 225. And in a case where the infant, of

the age of seventeen had appointed » guardian by deed, it wds decided that the chancellor

had still a power to appoint a guardian: 4 Mad. 462; and guardians at common law may be

removed or compelled to give security, if there appear any danger of their abusing the per-

son or .estate of the ward: 3 Cha. Ca, 237; Style, 456; Hard, 96: 1 Sid. 424; 3 Salk. 177;

but it has been considered that a statute guardian cannot be wholly removed. 3 Salk. 178; 1

P. "W. 698; 2 id. 112; 2 Fonbl. 232. And guardians are appointed by him where such appoint-

ment is necessary to protect the infant's general interest, or to sustain a suit, or to consent to the

jpfant's marriage: 1 Mad. 213; bnt he never appoints a guardian to a woman after marriage.

1 Ves. 157.

The infant himself may also appoint a guardian, and this right arises only when from a

defect in the law (or rather in the execution of it), the infant finds himself wholly unprovided

with a guardian. This may happen either before fourteen, when the infant has no such prop-

erty as attracts a guardianship by tenure, and the father is dead without having executed his

power of appointment, and there is no mother; or after fourteen, when the custody of the

guardian in soeago terminates, and there is no appointment by the lather under the 12 Car. II.
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The power and reciprocal duty of a guardian and ward are the same, pro tern-

pore, as that of a father and child ; and therefore I shall not repeat them, (8) but

shall only add, that the guardian, when the ward comes of age, is bound to give

* *him an account of all that he has transacted on his behalf, and must

F *463 1 n a e a ransace on is ea, an mus

1 J answer for all losses by his wilful default or negligence. (9) In order

Lord Coke only takes notice of such election where the infant ia under fourteen; and as to

this, omits to state how or before whom it should be made. See 1 Inst. 87, b. Nor does this

defect seem supplied by any prior or contemporary writer. As to a guardian under fourteen,

it appears from the ending of guardianship in socage at Unit age, as if the common law

deemed a guardian afterwards unnecessary. However, since the 12 Car. II, c. 24, it has been

usual, in defect of an appointment under the statute, to allow the infant to elect one for himself;

and this practice appears to have prevailed even in some degree before the restoration; such

election is said to be frequently made before a judge on the circuit: 1 Yes. 375; bat this form

does not seem essential.

The late Lord Baltimore, when he was turned of eighteen, having no testamentary guardian,

and being under the necessity of having one for special purposes, relative to his proprietary

government of Maryland, named a guardian by deed, a mode adopted by the advice of counsel.

It seems, in fact, as if there was no prescribed form of an infant's electing a guardian after

fourteen, any more than there is before; and therefore election by parpl, though unsolemn, might

be legally sufficient. The deficiency in precedents on this occasion is easily accounted for, this

kind of guardianship being of very late origin, unnoticed as it seems by any writer before Coke,
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except Swinbum. Testam. edit. 1590, 97, b. And there being yet no cases in print to explain

the powers incident to it, or whether the infant may change a guardian so constituted by him-

self, Coke, though professing to enumerate the different sorts of guardianship, omits this in one

case, whence perhaps it may be conjectured, that in his time it was in strictness scarcely recog-

nized as legal. 1 Inst. 88, b, in notes. For these observations, see Toml. Law Diet. tit. Guardian.

Though an infant thus appoint a guardian, yet it does not preclude the court of chancery from

appointing another. 4 Mud. 462.

Guardians are also appointed ad litem. All courts of justice have a power to assign a guardian

to an infant to sue or defend actions, if the infant comes into court and desires it; or a judge at

his chambers, at the desire of the infant, may assign a person named by him to be his guardian.

F. N. B. 27; 1 Inst. 88, b. n. 16, 135, b. 1.]

(8) But the legal position of a guardian differs essentially from that of a father, in the con-

trol which the former has over the ward's property. The real estate he has power to lea-w

during the minority of the ward: Field v. Scneifielin, 7 Johns. Ch. 154; and the personal

estate he may sell and convert into money to invest for the benefit of the ward. Ellis c. Essex

Bridge, 2 Pick. 243; Koeve Dom. Rel. 469. But he cannot turn real estate into personal, or

personal into real, without the authority of the court of chancery or other court having jurisdic-

tion in respect to this relation. Merchant v. Sunderlin, 3 Ircd. 501; Stall's lessee v. Mkcalestor,

9 Ohio, 19; Westbrook ». Comstock, "Wai. Ch. 314; Sherry v. Lansberry, 3 Ind. 320; Hassanl r.

Rowe, 11 Barb. 25.

(9) [Under the general protection afforded to infants by the court of chancery, an infant may

in that court, by his prochein amy, call his guardian to account, even during his minority.

2 Vem. 342; 2 P. Wms. 119; 1 Ves. 91.

Guardians in socage are by the common law accountable to the infant, either when he comes

to the age of fourteen, or at any time after, as he thinks fit. Co. Litt. 87.

The guardian in his account shall have allowance of all reasonable expenses: if he is robbed of

the rents and profits of the land without his default or negligence, he shall be discharged there-

of in his account; for he is in the nature of a bailiff or servant to the infant, and undertakes no

otherwise than for his diligence and fidelity. Co. Litt. 89, a 123.

If a man intrudes upon an infant, he shall receive the profits but as guardian, and the

infant may have an account against him as guardian, or the infant may treat him as a dis-

seisor; and if a person, during a person's infancy, receives the profits of an infant's estate,

and continues to do so for several years after the infant comes of age before any entry is made

on him, yet he shall account for the profits throughout, and not during the infancy only; and

so it seems at law he should be charged in an action of account, as tutor alienus; 1 Vent

295; 1 Atk. 489; 2 Fonbl. 5th ed. 235, 236; and where a guardian, after his ward attains full

age, continues to manage the property at the request of the ward, and before the accounts of

his receipts and payments during the minority are settled, it is in effect a continuance of the

guardianship as to the property, and he must account on the same principle as if they were

transactions during the minority. And under these circumstances an injunction was granted

on terms to restrain the guardian from proceeding in an action to recover the balance claimed

by him on account of the transactions after his ward came of ago. 1 Simons and Stn. Reti.

138.

A receiver to the guardian of an infant, whose account has been allowed by the guardian, shall

not be obliged to account over again to the infant when he comes of age. Prec. Ch. 535.]

The guardian is not permitted to make a profit out of the estate of his ward, and if he

fails to invest money received for him, he shall be charged interest upon it, and may even lie
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therefore to prevent disagreeable contests with young gentlemen, it has become

a practice for many guardians, of large estates especially, to indemnify them-

selves by applying to the court of chancery, acting under its direction, and

accounting annually before the officers of that court. For the lord chancellor

is, by right derived from the crown, the general and supreme guardian of all

infants, as well as idiots and lunatics; that is, of all such persons as have not

discretion enough to manage their own concerns. (10) In case therefore any

guardian abuses his trust, the court will check and punish him; nay sometimes

will proceed to the removal of him, and appoint another in his stead, (p) (11)

(p) 1 Sid. 424. 1 P. Wens. 703.

therefore to prevent disagreeable contests with young gentlemen, it has become
a practice for many guardians, of large estates especially, to indemnif1 themselves by applying to the court of chancery, acting under its direction, and
accounting annually before the officers of that court. For the lord chancellor
is, by right derived from the crown, the general and supreme guardian of all
infants, as well as idiots and lunatics; that is, of all such persons as have not
discretion enough to manage their own concerns. (10) In case therefore any
guardian abuses his trust, the court will check and punish him; nay sometimes
will proceed to the removal of him, and appoint another in his stead. (p) (11)

charged compound interest in a proper case: Fay «. Howe. 1 Pick. 528; Clarkson v. De Pey-

(p) l Sid. 42'.

ster, Hopk. Ch. 424. If he become purchaser on sales of the ward's property made by him,

l P. Wms. 703.

the sales are voidable by the ward. Cmte v. Barren, 2 Mich. 192 j Beanbien v. Ponpard, Har.

Ch. 206; Bostwick ». Atkins. 3 N. T. 53. Eberts v. Eberts, 55 Penn. St. 110.

The court will not generally settle the guardian's accounts until some time after the ward

comes of age, that the ward may have opportunity to investigate them. Matter of Van Home,

7 Paige, 46. And if the guardian settles with the ward at once, the accounts may be opened

afterwards, even though no fraud be charged. Fish v. Miller, 1 Hoffi Ch. 267; "Wade v. Loodell,

4 Gush. 510. And contracts not for the ward's interest, and which it is presumable the guardian

mnst have obtained from him in consequence of the influence which he still possessed because

of the relation, will be voidable. See Gale v. Wells, 12 Barb. 92.

(10) In many of the states of the United States, courts, variously designated probate courts,
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orphans' courts, surrogate courts, <fcc., have been vested with jurisdiction to appoint guardians,

and to exercise a control over them similar to that exercised by the court of chancery in

England: and sometimes the jurisdiction has been conferred in terms which would exclude

anv chancery jurisdiction. But where the terms are not thus exclusive, the court of chancery

still retains its general supervision. Matter of Andrews, 1 Johns* Ch. 99; Westbrook v. Corn-

stock, Wai. Ch. 314.

(11) [Testamentary guardians are within the preventive and controlling jurisdiction of this

court; and if there be reason to apprehend that such a guardian meditates an injury to his ward,

it will interfere, and prevent it. 1 P. "Wins. 704, 705; 2 FonbL 5th ed. 249; 3 Bro. P. C. 341;

1 Sid. 424.

If a person appointed guardian under statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, dies, or refuses the office, the

chancellor may appoint one: 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 260, pi. 2; 1 P. Wins. 703; and if he become a

lunatic, he may be removed. Ex parte Brydes, H. T. 1791. So if he become a bankrupt.

But, generally speaking, a guardian appointed by statute cannot be removed by this court:

2 Cha. Ca. 227; 1 Tes. 158; 1 Tern. 442; unless the infant be a ward of the court. 2 P.

"Wms. 561.

The court of chancery will in some cases on petition make an order of maintenance of the

infant: 3 Bro. C. C. 88; 12 Ves. 492; but, in general, payments to the infant during his minority

are discountenanced. 4 Ves. 369.

In a case where a father left a legacy payable to a child at a future day, though he was

silent respecting the interest, the court allowed maintenance: 11 Ves. 1; and so in a case

where the interest was directed to accumulate. Dick. 310 ; 1 Mad. 253. But an order of main-

tenance was refused, though so directed, the father being living, and of sufficient ability to

maintain the infant. 1 Bro. C. C. 387.

In allowing maintenance, the court will attend to the circumstances and state of the family.

2 P. Wms. 21; 1 Ves. 160.

In some cases it will allow the principal to be broken in upon for the maintenance of the

infant. 1 Vern. 255; 2 P Wins. 22.

The court may interpose even against that authority and discretion which the father has

in general in the education and management of the child: 1 P. Wms. 702; 2 id. 177; and cases

citied in 2 Fonbl. 5th ed. 232 ; but quaere if such child must not be a ward of the court. 4 Bro.

C. C. 101, 102.

The court will permit a stranger to come In, and complain of the guardian's abuse of tho

infant's estate. 2 Ves. 484.

The court will not suffer an infant to be prejudiced by the laches of his trustee or guardian.

2 Vern. 368; Free. Ch. 151.

Marrying a ward of the court of chancery without the consent of the court, is a contempt for

which the party may be committed, or indicted, though he was ignorant of the wardship. 3 P.

Wms. 116; 5 Ves. 15. But to render third persons so liable, it should appear that they were

charged compound interest in a proper case: Fay v. Howe. 1 Pick. 528; Clarkson v. De Peyster, Hopk. Ch. 424. If he become purchaser on sales of the ward's property made by him,
the sal.es are voi~able by t_he ward. Clute v. Barron, 2 Mich. 192; Beaubien "· Poupard, Har.
Ch. 206; Bostwick v. Atkins. 3 N. Y. 53. Eberts"· Eberts, 55 Peun. St. 110.
The court will not generally settle the guardiwi's accottnts until some time after the ward
comet! of age, that the ward may have opportunity to investigate them. Matter of Van Horne,
7 Paige, 46. And if the guardian settles with the ward at once, the accounts may be opened
afterwards, even though no fraud be charged. Fish v. lffiler, 1 Hoff. Ch. 267; Wade"· Lobdell,
4 Cush. 510. .And contracts not for the ward's interest, wid which it is presumable the guardiwi
must have obtained from him in consequence of the influence whioh he still possessed because
of the relation, will be voidable. See Gale ti. Wells, 12 Barb. 9'2.
(10) In many of the 11tates of the United States, ooum, variously designated probate courts,
orphans' courts, surrogate courts, &.o., have been vested with jurisdiction to appoint guardians,
wid to exerch1e s control over them similar t.o that exercised by the court of chancery in
England : and sometimes the jurisdiction has been conferred in terms which would exclude
anv chance~· jurisdiction. But where the terms are not thus exclusive, the oourt of chancery
still retains its goneral supervision. Matter of Andrews, 1 Johns, Ch. 99; Westbrook ti. Comstock, Wal. Ch. 314.
(11) [Testamentary guardians are within the preventive and controlling jurisdiction of this
court; and if there be reaaon to apprehend that such a guardian meditates an injury to his ward,
it will interfere, and prevent it. 1 P. Wms. 704, 705; 2 Fonbl, 5th ed. 249; 3 Bro. P. C. 341 ;
1 Sid. 424.
If a person appointed guardian under statute 12 Car. II, o, 24, dies, or refuses the office, the
chancellor may appoint one: 1 Eq. Ca. .Ab, 260, pl. 2; 1 P. Wms. 703; and if he become a
lunatic, he may be removed. Ex parte Brydes, H. T. 1791. So if he become a bankrupt.
But, generally speaking, a guardiwi appointed by statute cannot be removed by this court:
2 Cha. Ca. 227 ; 1 Ves. 158 ; 1 Vern. 442 ; unless the infant be a ward of the court. 2 P.
Wms. 561.
The court of chancery will in some oases on petition make an order of maintenwice of the
infant: 3 Bro. C. C. 88; 12 Ves. 492 ; but, in general, payments to the infant during his minority
are diRCountenanced. 4 Ves. 369.
Ins case where a father left a legacy payable to a ohild at a future day, though he was
silent respecting the interest, the court allowed maintenwice : 11 V es. 1 ; wid so in a case
where the interest was directed to accumulate. Dick. 310 ; 1 Mad. 253. But an order of maintenance was refuRed, though so direotedi the father being living, and of sufficient ability to
maintain the infant. 1 Bro. C. C. 387.
In allowing maintenance, the court will attend to the circumstances and state of the family.
2 P. Wms. 21; 1 Ves. 160.
In 11ome cases it will allow the principal to be broken in upon for the maintenance of the
infant. 1 Vern. 25.'l; 2 P Wms. 22.
The court may inte11?ose even against that authority and discretion which the father has
in ~neral in the education and management of the child: 1 P. Wms. 702; 2 id. 177; and cases
citied in 2 Fonbl. 5th ed. 23'.l ; but qumre if snob child must not be a ward of the court. 4 Bro.
c. c. 101, 111'.l.
.
The court will permit a stranger to come in, llnd complain of the guardian's abuse of tho
infant's estate. 2 Ves. .is.4.
The court will not Bllffer wi infant to be prejttdioed by the laohes of his trustee or guardian.
2 Vern. 368; Pree. Ch. 151.
Marrying a ward of the court of ohance11' without the consent of the court, is a contempt for
which the party may be committed, or indicted, though he was ignorwit of the wardship. 3 P.
Wm~. 116 ; 5 Ves. 15. But to render third persons so liable, it should appear that they were
apprised of the party's being a ward, 2 .Atk. 157; 16 Ves. 259.
A marriage in fact is sufficient to ground the contempt, though the validity of the marriage be
questionable. 6 Ves. 572.
.
To clear lluch n contempt a proper settlement must be made on the ward. 1 Vas. Jwi. 154.
But the making such K<Jttlement does not necessarily cure the contempt. 8 Ves. 74. It is not
cleared by the ward'" attaining the age of twenty-one. 3 Ves. 89; 4 id. 386.]

apprised of the party's being a ward, 2 Atk. 157 ; 16 Ves. 259.
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A marriage in fact is sufficient to ground the contempt, though the validity of the marriage be

questionable. 6 Ves. 572.

To clear such a contempt a proper settlement must be made on the ward. 1 Ves. Jun. 154.

But the making such settlement does not necessarily cure the contempt. 8 Ves. 74. It is not

cleared by the ward's attaining the age of twenty-one. 3 Ves. 89; 4 id. 386.")
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2. Let us next consider the ward or person within age, for whose assistance

and support these guardians are constituted by law; or who it is, that is said to

he within age. The ages of male and female are different for different purposes.

A male at twelve years old may take the oath of allegiance; at fourteen is at

years of discretion, and therefore may consent or disagree to marriage, may

choose his guardian, and, if his discretion be actually proved, may make nis tes-

tament of his personal estate; at seventeen may be an executor; and at twenty-

one is at his own disposal, and may alien his lands, goods, and chattels. A

female also at seven years of age may be betrothed or given in marriage; at nine

is entitled to dower; at twelve is at years of maturity, and therefore may con-

sent or disagree to marriage, and, if proved to nave sufficient discretion,

may bequeath her personal estate; (12) at fourteen is at years of legal discretion,

and may choose a guardian; at seventeen may be executrix; and at twenty-one

may dispose of herself and her lands. So that full age in male or female is

twenty-one years, which age is completed on the day preceding the anniversary

of a person's birth, (q) who till that time is an infant, and so styled in law.

F *4641 Among tne ancient Greeks and Romans women were never *of age, but

•- •" subject to perpetual guardianship, (r) unless when married, " msi con-

venissent in manum viri:" and when that perpetual tutelage wore away in

process of time, we find that, in females as well as males, full age was not till

twenty-five years. (») Thus by the constitution of different kingdoms, this

period, which is merelv arbitrary, and juris positivi, is fixed at different times.
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Scotland agrees with England in this point; both probably copying from the old

Saxon constitutions on the continent, which extended the age of minority " ad

annum vigesimum primum, et eo usque juvenes sub tutelam reponunt;" (t) but in

Naples they are of full age at eighteen ; m France, with regard to marriage, not till

thirty ; and in Holland at twenty-five.

3. Infants have various privileges, and various disabilities: but their very dis-

abilities are privileges; in order to secure them from hurting themselves by

their own improvident acts. An infant cannot be sued but under the protec-

tion, and joining the name, of his guardian; for he is to defend him against all

attacks as well by law as otherwise: (u) (13) but he may sue either by ms guar-

dian, or prochein amy, his next friend who is not his guardian. (14) This

prochein amy may be any person who will undertake the infant's cause; and it

frequently happens, that an infant, by his prochein amy, institutes a suit in equity

against a fraudulent guardian. In criminal cases, an infant of the age of

fourteen years may be capitally punished for any capital offence: (w) but under

the age of seven he cannot. The period between seven and fourteen is subject

to much uncertainty: for the infant shall, generally speaking, be judged prima

(q) Salk. 14, 82B. Lord Raym. 480, 1096. Toder w. Sansam, Dam. Proc. 27 Feb. 1775.

(T) Pott. Antiq. b. 4, c. 11. Cic.pro Muren. 12. (•) Irut. 1, 23, 1.

(<) Stlernbook dejvre Sueonum, I. 2, c. 2. This in also the period when the king, as well as the subject,

arrives at full acre in modern Sweden. Mod. Un. Hist, xxxili, 220.

(u) Co. Uti. m (v) 1 Hal. P. C. 25.

(12) The power to bequeath personalty is taken from infants by statute 7 Wm. IT, and 1

Vic. c. 26, B. 7.

2. Let us next consider the ward or person within age, for whose assistance
and support these guardians are constituted by law; or who it is, that is said to
be within age. The ages of male and female a.re different for different purposes.
A male at twelve years old may take the oath of alle~a.nce; at fourteen is a.t
years of discretion, and therefore may consent or disagree to marriage, may
choose his guardian, and, if his discretion be actually proved, may make bis testament of hi::i persona.I estate; at seventeen may be an executor; and at twentyone is at his own disposal, and may alien his lands, goods, and chattels. A
female also at seven years of age may be betrothed or given in marriage; at nine
is entitled to dower; at tioelve is at years of maturity, and therefore may consent or disagree to marriage, and, if proved to have sufficient discretion,
may bequeath her personal estate; (12) at fourteen is at years of legal discretion,
and may choose a guardian ; at seventeen may be executrix ; and at t·wenty-<rne
may dispose of herself and her lands. So that full age in male or female is
twenty-one years, which age is completed on the day precedin&' the anniversary
of a person's birth, (q) who till that time is an infant, and so styled in law.
* 4 ] Among the ancient Greeks and Romans women were never *of ~e, but
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subject to perpetual guardianship, (r) unless when married, "nisi convenissent in manum. viri :" and when that perpetual tutelage wore away in
process of time, we find that, in females as well as males, full age was not till
twenty-five years. (s) Thus by the constitution of different kingdoms, this
~eriod, which is merely arbitrary, and juris positivi, is fixed at different times.
:Scotland agrees with England in this point; both probably copying from the old
Saxon constitutions on the continent, which extended the age of minority "ad
annum vi_qes1'.mum primum, et eo w1que juvenes s1tb tutelam reponunt ;" (t) but in
N aple8 they are of full age at eigMeen ; m France, with regard to marriage, not till
thirty ; and in Holland at twenty-five.
3. Infants have various privileges, and various disabilities: but their very disabilities are privileges; in order to secure them from hurting themselves by
their own improvident acts. An infant cannot be sued but under the .Prot.ection, and joining the name, of his guardian. ; for he is to defend him a.gamst all
attacks as well b_y law as otherwise: (1t) (13) but he may sue either by his guardian, or prochein amy, his next fnend who is not his guardian. (14) This
prochein amy may be any person who will undertake the infant's cause; and it
frequently happens, that a.n infant, by his prochei.n amy, institutes a snit inequity
agamst a fraudulent guardian. In criminal cases, an infant of the age of
fourteen years may be capitally punished for any capital offence: (w) but under
the age of seven he cannot. 'l,he period between seven and fourteen is subject
to much uncertainty: for the infant shall, generally speaking, be judged prima
(q) Salk. «, 6211. Lord Raym. 481, 1096. Toder "· Sanaam, Dotll. Proc. ~ Feb. 17711.
Pott. Antiq. b. '· e. ll. Cle. pro Muren. 12.
(I) Imt. l~ 28 1 l.
\tl Stlernbook ~jure Sueonum~ l. 2, c. 2. This la also the perioo wnen the king, as well as the subject,
arrives at fnll age In modern Sweaen. Mod. Un. Htat. :n:xlll, 290.
(U) Co. Litt. IM
(tO) 1 Hal. P. C. 21!.
(r)

(13) [This is incorrectly expressed. 1st. The infant is sued in his own name alone as any

other person, bnt he appears to defend his cause by guardian, being supposed without discretion

to appoint au attorney for that purpose. 2d. He does not necessarily appear by his guardian as

the text implies, but by any person whom the court shall appoint guardian ad titem to defend

that particular suit. It is within the province of every court to appoint a guardian ad litem,

where a party in a suit is an infant. See vol. Ill, p. 23, 24.]

(14) [An infant executor may sue by attorney. 2 Stra. 783; 2 Sunnd. 212.

And where a plaintiff, an infant, appears by attorney, it is cured after verdict for him by the

21 Jac. I, c. 13, s. 2, or by 4 Ann. c. 16, s. 2, after judgment by confession, nil dicit, nonsum

informatus, in any court of record, or after writ of inquiry executed.

If an infant sue by guardian, or prochem amy, he cannot afterwards remove his guardian, or

disavow the action of his prochein amy: F. N*< B. 63, K. 7th ed.; but he may either have a

writ out of chancery to remove him, or, which is tbe Osnal course, may apply to the court, who

may remove him at their discretion. Id.; Cro. Car. 261.]
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(12) The power to bequeath personalty is taken from infants by statute 7 Wm. IV, and l
Vic. c. 26, s. 7.
(13) [This is incorrectly expressed. 1st. The infant is sued in hie own name alone as &nv
other person, but he appears to defend his cause by guardian, being supposed without di..'!Creti.on
to appoint an attorney for that pnrpoRe. 2d. He Cioes not necessarily appear by his gua.nli&n 8il
the text implies, but by a.ny person whom the court shall appoint guardian ad utem to defend
that particular 1mit. It is within the province of every court to appoint a guardian ad Ute.
where a partv in a suit i11 an infant. See vol. III, p. 23, ~4.]
'
(14) [An fufant executor may sue by attorney. 2 Stra. 78.'l; 2 Sa.und. 212.
.And where a plaintiff, an infant, appears b.f attorney, it is cured aft.er verdict for him bv the
21 J all. I, c. 13, s. 2, or by 4 .Ann. c. 16, s. 2, after judgment by confession, nil dicit, non sum
informa.tus, in any court of record, or aft.er writ of inquiry executed.
If an infant :me by guardian, or prochein amy, he cannot nfterwardH remol'e his ~anlian, or
cli~o.vow the action of his prochein amy: F. N". B. 63, K. 7th ed.; but he may either h&Tc a
writ out of chancery to remove him, or, which i~ the 11sn11l con~e, may apJ7ly to the court. who
may remove him at their discretion. Id.; Cro. Car. 261.]
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facie innocent; yet if he was doli capax, and could discern between good and

evil at the time of the oifence committed, he may be convicted and undergo

judgment and execution of death, though he hath not attained to years of

puberty or discretion, (x) And Sir Mathew Hale gives us two instances, r% ^ i

one of a girl of thirteen, who was burned for killing her mistress ; an- L '

other of a boy still younger, that had killed his companion, and hid himself,

who was hanged; for it appeared by his hiding that he knew he had done wrong,

and could discern between good and evil: and in such cases the maxim of law

is, that malitia supplet cstatem. So also, in much more modem times, a boy of

ten years old, who was guilty of a heinous murder, was held a proper subject for

capital punishment, by the opinion of all the judges, (y)

With regard to estates and civil property, an infant hath many privileges

which will be better understood when we come to treat more particularly of

those matters: but this may be said in general, that an infant shall lose nothing

by non-claim, or neglect of demanding his right; nor shall any other lavfies or

negligence be imputed to an infant, except in some very particular cases.

It is generally true, that an infant can neither alien his lands, nor do any

legal act, nor make a deed, nor indeed any manner of contract, that will bind

him. But still to all these rules there are some exceptions: part of which were

just now mentioned in reckoning up the different capacities which they assume

at different ages: and there are others, a few of which it may not be improper

to recite, as a general specimen of the whole. And, first, it is true, that infants
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cannot alien their estates: but infant trustees, or mortgagees, are enabled to

convey, under the direction of the court of chancery or exchequer, or other

courts of equity, the estates they hold in trust or mortgage, to such person as

the court shall appoint, (z) Also it is generally true, that an infant can do no

legal act: yet an infant, who has had an advowson, may present to the benefice

when it becomes void, (a) For the law in this case dispenses with one rule, in

order to maintain others of far *greater consequence: it permits an in- r * ,gg -,

fant to present a clerk, who, if unfit, may be rejected by the bishop, >- '' '

rather than either suffer the church to be unserved till he comes of age, or per-

mit the infant to be debarred of his right by lapse to the bishop. An infant

may also purchase lands, but his purchase is incomplete: for, when he comes to

age, he may either agree or disagree to it, as he thinks prudent or proper, with-

out alleging any reason; and so may his heirs after him, if he dies without having

completed his agreement, (b) It is, farther, generally true, that an infant, under

twenty-one, can make no deed but what is afterwards voidable: yet in some

cases (c) he may bind himself apprentice by deed indented or indentures, for

seven years; and (d) he may by deed or will appoint a guardian to his children,

if he has any. Lastly, it is generally true, that an infant can make no other

contract that will bind him: (15) yet he may bind himself to pay for his neces-

sary meat, drink, apparel, physic, and such other necessaries; (16) and likewise

(x) JMd. 26. (y) Fouler, 72. (z) Stat. 7 Ann. c. 19. 4 Geo. m, c. 16. (a) Co. Litt. 172. •

(bj lbid.i. (c) Stat. 6 Ellz. c. 4. 43 EUz. c. 2. Cro. Car. 17». (d) Stat. 12 Car. H, c. 24.

(15) [It has been considered, that a bill of exchange, or negotiable security, given by an infant

during his minority, is in no case binding on him, though given for necessaries: 2 Camp. 562.

563; Holt, C. N. P. 78; 1 T. R. 40; 4 Price, 300; Chit, on Bills, 5th ed. 22; and most clearly

fad6 innocent ; yet if he was doli capax, and could discern between good and
evil at the time of the offence committed, he may be convicted and undergo
judgment and execution of death, though he hath not attained to years of
puberty or *discretion. (x) And Sir Mathew Hale gives us two instances, [* 465 ]
one of a girl of thirteen, who was burned for killing her mistress; another of a boy still younger, that had killed his companion, and hid himself,
who was hanged; for it appeared by his hiding that he knew he had done wrong,
and could discern between good and evil: and in such cases the maxim of law
is, that malitia suppl.et mtate-m. So also, in much more modern times, a boy of
ten years old, who was guilty of a heinous murder, was held a proper subject for
capital punishment, by the opinion of all the judges. (y)
With regard to estates and civil property, an infant hath many priYileges
which will be better understood when we come to treat more particularly of
those matters: but this may be said in general, that an infant shall lose nothing
by non-claim, or neglect of demanding his right; nor shall any other laches or
negli~ence be imputed to an infant, except in some very particular cases.
It is generally true, that an infant can neither alien his lands, nor do any
legal act, nor make a deed, nor indeed any manner of contract, that will bind
him. But still to all these rules there are some exceptions: part of which were
just now mentioned in reckoning up the different capacities which they assume
at different ages: and there are others, a few of which it may not be improper
to recite, as a general specimen of the whole. And, first, it is true, that infants
cannot alien their estates: but infant trustees, or mortgagees, are enabled to
convey, under the direction of the court of chancery or exchequer, or other
courts of equity, the estates they hold in trust or mortgage, to such person as
the court shall appoint. (z) Also it is generally true, that an infant can do no
legal act: yet an infant, who has he.d an e.dvowson, may present to the benefice
when it become.; void. (a) For the law in this case dispenses with one rule, in
order to maintain others of far *greater consequence: it permits an in- [ • 466 ]
fant to present a clerk, who, if unfit, may be rejected by the bishop,
rather than either suffer the church to be unserved till he comes of age, or permit the infant to be debarred of his right by lapse to the bishop. An infant
may also purchase lands, but his purchase is incomplete: for, when he comes to
age, he may either agree or disagree to it, as he thinks r.rudent or proper, without alleging any reason; and so may his heirs after him, if he dies without having
completed his agreement. (b) It is, farther, generally true, that an infant, under
twenty-one, can make no deed but what is afterwards voidable: yet in some
cases (c) he may bind himself apprentice by deed indented or indentures, for
seven years; and (d) he may by deed or will appoint a guardian to his children,
if he has any. Lastly, it is generally true, that an infant can make no other
contrnct that will bind him: (15) yet he may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, physic, and such other necessaries; (16) and likewise
(z) Ibid. 96.
(b) Ibid. 2.

(11) FosterJ. 72.

(c) Stat. II E1lz.

(zJ Stai. 7 Ann. c. 19. 'Geo. ill, c. 16.
(a) Co. Litt. 172.
(d) Stat.12 Car. II, c. 24.

c. '· '3 Eliz. c. 2. Cro. Car. 1711.

·

so, if not given for necessaries. Carth. 160. But infancy being a personal privilege, the infant

only can take advantage of this. 4 Esp. 187.

An infant is not liable on an account stated, even though the particulars of the account

were for necessaries. 1 T. R. 40; See 2 Stark. 36: otherwise in equity; 1 Eq. C. Abr.

286.]

(16) [The term necessaries is a relative one; and the quest ion, as to what are necessaries, must

be determined by the age, fortune, condition, and rank in life of the infant. See 8 T. R. 578; 1

Eep. Rep. 212; Carter, 315; which must be real and not apparent. Peake, 229; Esp. Rep. 211.

The question, as to what are necessaries, is for a jury. 1 M. and S. 738.

An infant is liable for necessaries furnished to his wife and family, but not for articles furnished

in order for the marriage. 1 Stra. 168. He is liable for so much goods supplied to him to trade

with, as were consumed as necessaries in his own family, 1 Car. R«p. 94.")
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(15) Lit has been considered, that a bill of exchange, or ne~otiable eecurity, given by an infant
during his minority, is in no cSRe bindin~ on him, th~mgh giyen for necesi>ari'es: 2 Camp. 562,
563; Holt, C. N. P. 78; 1 T. R. 40; 4 Price, 300; (,'hit. on Bills, 5th ed. 2'l; and moi;t clearly
so, if not given for neceRsari.es. Carth. 160. But infancy being a personal privilege, the infant
only can take adv&n~e of this. 4 Esp. 187.
.An infant iR not li1\ble on an account 11te.ted, even though the particulars of the account
were for necessaries. 1 T. R. 40; See 2 Stark. 36: otherwise in equity ; 1 Eq. C. .A.br.
286.]
(16) [The term necessaries is a relative one; and the question, as to what are necessaries, muAt
be <let.ermined by the age, fortune, condition, and rank in life of the infant. See 8 T. R. 578; 1
F.t:p. Rep. 212; Carter, 315; which mnst be real and not apparent. Peake, 229; Esp. Rop. 211.
The question, a.« to what are necessaries, is for a jury. 1 M. and S. 738.
An infant is liable for necessarieR furnished to hi11 wife and family, but not for articleR furnished
in order for the marriage. 1 Stra. 168. He is liable for so much goodi! suppliud to him to trade
with, as were commmed a.s necessaries in his own fu.mily, 1 Car. Rep. 94. l
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for his good teaching and instruction whereby he may profit himself after-

wards, (e) And thus much at present, for the privileges and disabilities of

infants. (17)

for his good teaching and instruction whereby he may profit himself afterwards. (e) And thus much at present, for the privileges and disabilities of
infants. (17)

CHAPTEE XVIII.

OF CORPORATIONS.

WE have hitherto considered persons in their natural capacities, and hare

treated of their rights and duties. But, as all personal rights die with the per-

CHAPTER XVIII.

son ; and, as the necessary forms of investing a series of individuals, one after

another, with the same identical rights, would be very inconvenient, if not im-

OF CORPORATIONS.

practicable ; it has been found necessary, when it is for the advantage of the

public to have any particular rights kept on foot and continued, to constitute

(«) Co. I.ltt. 172.

(17) There are a number of cases in which it has been held that certain contracts made by

infants were absolutely void, and courts have attempted to distinguish between such cases and

those in which the inmnt's contracts are only voidable at his option. If the case is such that

the contract cannot be for the infant's benefit, it is said it is absolutely void; while if it may or

may not be for his benefit, according to the circumstances, it is only voidable. "Whitney r.

Dutch, 14 Mass. 457. Contracts of suretyship have been held void on this distinction. Wheaton

WE have hitherto considered persons in their natural capacities, and have
treated of their rights and duties. But, as all personal rights die with the person; and, as the necessary forms of inYesting a series of individuals, one after
another, with the same identical rights, would be very inconvenient, if not impracticable; it has been found necessary, when it is for the advantage of the
public to have any particular rights kept on foot and continued, to constitute

r. East, 5 Yerg, 41; Allen v. Minor, 2 Call, 70; Maples v. Wightman, 4 Conn. 376; Chandler v.

(e)

Co. J.ltt. 172.

McKinney, 6 Mich. 217. The inclination of the courts, however, has of late been towards hold-

ing all contracts of infants, which are not binding upon them, to be voidable only, leaving the
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infant to ratify or disaffirm them at his option at the proper time. Tucker v. Moreland. 10"Pet.

69; Kline v. Beebo, 6 Conn. 494; Cole v. Pennoyor, 14 111. 158; Drake's Lessee r. Ramsey, 5

Ohio, 252. The proper time to avoid a conveyance of real estate is when the grantor comes of

nge : Zouch v. Parsons, Burr. 1794 ; but a sale of personal property may be disaffirmed at anv

time : Stafford v. Roof, 9 Cow. 626; Carr r. Clongh, 6 Fost. 280; Shipman r. Hortoa, 17 Conn.

481; and the plea of infancy can be interposed to any other contract at any time when it is

attempted to be enforced. If. however, an infant disaffirms a purchase of property made by him,

lie must return the property if still in his possession: Deason v. Bovd, 1 Dana. 45; Cheshire r.

Barrett, 4 McCord, 241; Badger ». Phinney, 15 Mass. 359; Lynde v. Budd. 2 Paige, 191; Bailey

p. Barnberger, 11 B. Monr. 113: Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige, 107.

The ratification of a voidable contract by an infant may either be by a promise in affirm-

ance ; Ford v. Phillips, 1 Pick. 203; in which case it seems to be necessary that it be made to

the party entitled to the benefit; Goodsell ». Myers, 3 Wend. 479; Hoit ». Underbill, 9 N. H.

439; Smith v. E alley, 13 Mete. 310; Wilcox v. Roath, 12 Conn. 550; or, in the absence of such

promise, the party after coming of age must do some other act, either unequivocally indicat-

ing an intent to affirm the contract, or that would render it unjust for him to disaffirm, and

therefore estop him from doing so. See Delano v. Blake, 11 Wend. 85; Boyden v. Boyden, 9

Mete. 520.

The fact that an infant represents himself to be of age, and procures a contract on that repre-

sentation, will not make the contract binding upon him. Burley ». Russell, 10 N". H. 184. But

an infant is liable generally for his torts, and he may therefore be made to respond for the frnud

in such a case : Wallace v. Mores, 5 Hill, 391; Fitts P. Hall, 9 N. H.' 441; or for any other tort,

notwithstanding a contract may have afforded the occasion for it. Campbell v. Stakes, 2 Wend.

137 ; Cary r. Hotailing, 1 Hill, 311; Homer v. Thwing, 3 Pick. 492.

In respect to an infant's contract for necessaries, it is to be observed that it is binding upon

him only when he has no parent or guardian to supply them, or when that duty is neglected

by the person upon whom it devolves. The mere fact, therefore, that an article is proper and

suitable to he supplied to an infant for his own personal use, in view of his age and station in

Iii'r. does not alone render him liable on his contract to make payment, for if there be a parent

or guardian who undertakes in good faith to supply his wants, neither the infant nor any third

person is at liberty to substitute his judgment as to what is needful for that of the proper guard-

ian. Ford v. Fothergill, 1 Peakc, N. P. 230; Kline v. L'Amoureux, 2 Paige, 419; Perrin p. Wil-

son, 10 Mo. 451. Goods to be employed in trade are not necessaries for an infant; Whittmgham

v. Hill, Cro. Jac. 494; Whywall r. Champion, 2 Strange, 1083; neither are repairs upon his build-

ings : Tupper r. Caldwell, 12 Mete. 559; nor insurance; Mut. Fire Ins. Co. p. Noyes, 37 N. H.

345. If he be a father, necessaries for his children are necessaries for him: Beeler r. Young. 1

Bibb. 520; and he is liable for the antenuptial debts of his wife. Butler p. Brack, 7 Mete. 164 ;

Roach r. Quiet, 9 Wend. 238.
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(17) There &re a number of cases in which it hll.ll been held that cert.a.in contractd made h'f'
infants were absolutely void, and courts have attempted to di11tinguish between such c.&Jcs iwd
those in which the infa.nt'e contractl! are only voidable at hie option. If t.he caee is such that
the contract cannot be for the infant's benefit, it is Kaid it is absolutely void; while if it may or
may not be for his benefit, according to the circumstance!!, it is only voidable. Whitnev r.
Dutch, 14 Me.es. 457. Contracts of suretyNhip have been held void on this distinction. Wheaton
t'. East, 5 Yerg, 41; Allen v. Minor, 2 Call, 70; Maple8 v. Wightma.n, 4 Conn. 376; Chandler v.
McKinney, 6 Mich. 217. The inclination of the courts, however, he..s of lnte been towards holding all contracts of infa.nts, which are not binding upon them, to be voidable only, leaving the
infant to ratify or dillBffirm them at his option at the proper time. Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pct.
69 ; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494 ; Cole v. Pcnnoyer, 14 Ill. 158 ; Drake's LeAAee r. Ramt'ey, 5
Ohio, 252. The proper time to avoid a conveyance of real estate is when the ~ntor comes of
nge: Zouch v. Pe.rsons, Burr. 1794; but a AAle of personal property may be disaffirmed at any
time: Stafford v. Roof, 9 Cow. 626; Vnrr "· Olongh, 6 Fost. 280; Shipman v. Horton, 17 Gunn.
~1; and the plea of infancy can be interpo;ied to any other contract ut any time when it is
attempted to be enforced. lf, how1•\·er, an mfant diMffimin a purchaim of property made bv him,
ho mullt return the property if still in hi:i po%e~~ion: Deason v. Bovd, 1 Dana, 45; Cheshire r.
Barrett, 4 McConl, 241; BMlger v. Phinney, 15 M8811. 3f.>9; Lynde v. Budcl, 2 Paige, 191; Bailey
v. Raruberger, 11 B. Monr. 113: Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige, 107.
The ratification of a voidable contract by au infant may either be by a promil'e in aftirmance; Ford v. Philli11~. 1 Pick. 203; in which case it seemll to be necessary that it be made t-0
the party entitled to the benefit; Good8ell v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479; Hoit v. Underhill, 9 N. H.
439; Smith v. Kelley, 13 Mete. 310; Wilcox v. Roe.th, 12 Conn. 55(); or, in the absence of such
promise, the party after coming of age must do l!Ome other act, either unequivocally indicatmg a.n intent to affirm the contract, or that would render it nnjullt for him to diR&ffinn, and
therefore ei<top him from doing so. See Dela.no v. Blake, 11 Wend. 85; Boyden v. Boyden, 9
Mete. 520.
The fact that a.n infa.nt represents himself to be of age, and procures e. contrsct on that representation, will not make the contract binding upon him. Burley v. Russell, 10 N. H. 184. But
an infant is liable generally for his torts, and he may therefore be made to respond for the fmud
in sm·h a ca:~e: Wallace v. MorsR, 5 Hill, 391; Fitts"· He.11, 9 N. H. · 441; or for e.ny other tort.
11otwitht1tanding a contract may have afforded the occasion for it. Ce.mpbell "·Stakes, 2 Wend.
i:u; Carv t'. Hotailing, 1 Hill, 311; Homer v. Thwing, 3 Pick. 492.
In rcRpeet to an infant's contract for necessaries, it is to be observed that it is binding upon
him only when he has no J?&l'ent or guardian to supply them, or when that duty is neglected
by the person upon whom 1t devolves. The mere fact, therefore, that an article is /roper e.nd
suitable to he supplied to an infant for his own personal use, in view of his age an 1.1tation in
life, doetl not alone render him liable on his contract to make payment, for if there be a pBrent
or guardian who undertakes in good faith to supply his wants, neither the infant nor any third
person is at libert:v to 11ub11titute his judgment as to what is needful for that of the proper gu.anl11\n. Ford v. Fothergill, 1 Peake, N. P. 230; Kline fl. L'.Amoureux, 2 Pe.ige, 419; Perrin t'. Wilson, 10 Mo. 451. Good11 to be employed in trade are not necessaries for an infant; Whittin,rham
v. Hill, Cro. Jae. 494; Whywe.ll t'. Champion, 2 Strange, 1083; neither are repairs upon his buildin~: Tupper"· Caldwell, 12 Mete. 559; nor insure.nee; Mut. Fire Ins. Co. "· Noyes, 37 N. H.
34<>. If he be a father, necesR&ries for his children are necessarie11 for him : Beeler v. Younf?. 1
Bibb. 520 ; and he i11 liable for the a.ntenuptial debts of his wife. Butler tt. Breck, 7 llete. 164 ;
Roach v. Quiclr, 9 Wend. ~JS.
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artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of

legal immortality.

These artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate, (corpora

corporate,) or corporations: of which there is a great variety subsisting for the

advancement of religion, of learning, and of commerce; in order to preserve

entire and forever those rights and immunities, which, if they were granted

only to those individuals of which the body corporate is composed, would upon

their death be utterly lost and extinct To shew the advantages of these incor-

porations, let us consider the case of a college in either of our universities,

founded ad studendum et orandum, for the encouragement and support of relig-

ion and learning. If this were a mere voluntary assembly, the individuals

which compose it might indeed read, pray, study, and perform scholastic exer-

cises together, so long as they could agree to do so; but they *could r „,, „„ -,

neither frame, nor receive any laws or rules of their conduct; none, at "- J

least, which would have any binding force, for want of a coercive power to create

a sufficient obligation. Neither could they be capable of retaining any privi-

leges or immunities; for, if such privileges be attacked, which of all this

unconnected assembly has the right, or ability, to defend them ? And, when

they are dispersed by death or otherwise, how shall they transfer these advan-

tages to another set of students, equally unconnected as themselves ? So also,

with regard to holding estates or other property, if land be granted for the pur-

poses of religion or learning to twenty individuals not incorporated, there is no
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legal way of continuing the property to any other persons for the same purposes,

but by endless conveyances from one to the other, as often as the hands are

changed. But when they are consolidated and united into a corporation, they

and their successors are then considered as one person in law: as one person,

they have one will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the in-

dividuals: this one will may establish rules and orders for the regulation of the

whole, which are a sort of municipal law of this little republic; or rules and

statutes may be prescribed to at at its creation, which are then in the place of

natural laws: the privileges and immunities, the estates and possession, of the

corporation, when once vested in them, will be forever vested, without any new

conveyance to new successions; for all the individual members that have existed

from the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are

but one person in law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the river

Thames is still the same river, though the parts which compose it are changing

every instant.

The honor of originally inventing these political constitutions entirely belongs

to the Eomans. They were introduced, as Plutarch says, by Numa; who find-

ing, upon his accession, the city torn to pieces by the two rival factions of

Sabines and Komans, thought it a prudent and politic measure to subdivide

these two into many smaller ones, by ^instituting separate societies of r *^RQ 1

every manual trade and profession. They were afterwards much con- L -I

sidered by the civil law, (a) in which they were called universitates as forming

one whole out of many individuals; or collegia, from being gathered together:

they were adopted also by the canon law, for the maintenance of ecclesiastical

discipline; and from them our spiritual corporations are derived. But our

laws have considerably refined and improved upon the invention, according to

the usual genius of the English nation: particularly with regard to sole corpora-

tions, consisting of one person only, of Which the Roman lawyers had no notion;

their maxim being that " tres faciunt collegium." (b) Though they held, that if

a corporation, originally consisting of three persons, be reduced to one, " si uni-

versitas ad unum redit," it may still subsist as a corporation, " et stet nomen

universitatis." (c)

Before we proceed to treat of the several incidents of corporations, as regarded

by the laws of England, let us first take a view of the several sorts of them ;

and then we shall be better enabled to apprehend their respective qualities.

fa) fy. I. S, t. 4, per tot. (b) Ff. 50, 16, 8. Cc) Ff. 8, 4, 7.
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artificial persons, who may maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of
le~pil immortality.
l'hese artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate, (corpora
corpomta,) or corporations: of which there is a great variety subsisting for the
advancement of religiort, of learning, and of commerce; in order to preserve
entire and forever those rights and immunities, which, if they were granted
only to those individuals of which the body corporate is composed, would upon
their death be utterly lost and extinct. To shew the advantages of these incorporations, let us consider the case of a college in either of our universities,
founded ad studendum et orandum, for the encouragement and support of religion and learning. If this were a mere voluntary 11.Ssembly, the individuals
which compose it might indeed read, pray, study, and perform scholastic exercises together, so long as they could agree to do so; but they *could [ • 468
neither frame, nor receive any laws or rules of their conduct; none, at
]
least, which would have any binding force, for want of a coercive power to create
a sufficient obligation. Neither could they be capable of retaining any privileges or immunities; for, if such privileges be attacked, which of all this
unconnected assembly has the right, or ability, to defend them? And, when
they are dispersed by death or otherwise, how shall they transfer these advantages to another set of students, equally unconnected as themselves? So also,
with regard to holding estates or other property, if land be granted for the purposes of religion or learning to twenty indiYiduals not incorporated, there is no
legal way of continuing the property to any other persons for the same purposes,
but by endless conveyances from one to the other, as often as the hands are
changed. But when they are consolidated and united into a corporation, they
and their successors are then considered as one person in law: as one person,
they have one will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the individuals: this one will may establish rules and orders for the regulation of. the
whole, which are a sort of municipal law of this little republic; or rules and
st.atutes may be prescribed to .it at its creation, which are then in the place of
natural laws: the privileges and immunities, the estates and possession, of the
corporation, when once vested in them, will be foreYer vested, without any new
conveyance to new successions; for all the individual members that have existed
from the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are
but one person in law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the river
Thames is still the same river, though the .Parts which compose it are changing
every instant.
'.rhe honor of originally inventing these political constitutions entirely belongs
to the Romans. They were introduced, as Plutarch says, by Numa; who finding, upon his accession, the city torn to pieces by the two rival fadions of
8a.bines and Romans, thought it a prudent and politic measure to subdivide
these two into many smaller ones, by *instituting separate societies of [ • 469 ]
every manual trade and profession. They were afterwards much considered by the civil law, (a) in which they were called wniversitates as forming
one whole out of many individuals; or collegia, from being gathered to~ether:
they were adopted also by the canon law, for the maintenance of ecclesiastical
discipline; and from them our spiritual corporations are deriYed. But our
laws have considerably refined and improved upon the invention, according to
the usual genius of the English nation: particularly with regard to sole corporations, consistin~ of one person only, of which the Roman lawyers had no notion;
their maxim bcmg that " tre.~ f aci?tnt collegium." (h) Though they held, that if
a corporation, originally consisting of three persons, be redt1ced to one, "si universitas ad unum redit," it may still subsist as a corporation, "et stet nomen
ttniversitatis." ( c)
Before we proceed to treat of the several incidents of corporations, as regarded
by the laws of England, let us first take a view of the several sorts of them;
and then we shall be better enabled to apprehend their respective qualities.
(a)

D

Ff. l. 3, t. 4', per

ti e b

t-Ol.

(b) Ff. 50, 16, 8.

(<'-)

Ff. 3, 4, 7.
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The first division of corporations is into aggregate and sole. (1) Corporations

aggregate consist of many persons united together into one society, and are kept

up by a perpetual succession of members, so as to continue forever: of which

kind are the mayor and commonalty of a city, the head and fellows of a college,

the dean and chapter of a cathedral church. Corporations sole consist of one

person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are incorporated

by law, in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly

that of perpetuity which in their natural persons they could not have had. In

this sense the king is a sole corporation; (d) so is a bishop; so are some

deans, and prebendaries, distinct from their several chapters; and so is every

parson and vicar. And the necessity, or at least use, of this institution will be

f *470 1 very. aPParent> if we consider the case of *a parson of a church. At the

original endowment of parish churches, the freehold of the church,

the churchyard, the parsonage house, the glebe, and the tithes of the parish,

were vested in the then parson by the bounty of the donor, as a temporal recom-

pense to him for his spiritual care of the inhabitants, and with intent that

the same emoluments should ever afterwards continue as a recompense for the

same care. But how was this to be effected ? The freehold was vested in the

parson; and, if we suppose it vested in his natural capacity, on his death it might

descend to his heir, and would be liable to his debts and incumbrances: or, at

best, the heir might be compellable, at some trouble and expense, to convey

these rights to the succeeding incumbent. The law therefore has wisely or-
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dained, that the parson, quatenus parson, shall never die, any more than the

king ;^ by making him and his successors a corporation. By which means all

the original rights of the parsonage are preserved entire to the successor; for

the present incumbent, and his predecessor who lived seven centuries ago, are in

law one and the same person; and what was given to the one was given to the

other also.

Another division of incorporations, either sole or aggregate, is into ecclesiastical

and lay. (2) Ecclesiastical corporations are where the members that compose it

are entirely spiritual persons: such as, bishops; certain deans, and prebendaries;

all archdeacons, parsons, and vicars; which are sole corporations; deans and

chapters at present, and formerly prior and convent, abbot and monks, and the

like, bodies aggregate. These are erected for the furtherance of religion, and

perpetuating the rights of the church. Lay corporations are of two sorts, civil and

eleemosynary. The civil are such as are erected for a variety of temporal pur-

poses. The king, for instance, is made a corporation to prevent in general the

possibility of an interregnum or vacancy of the throne, and to preserve the

possessions of the crown entire; for immediately upon the demise of one king,

his successor is, as we have formerly seen, in full possession of the regal rights

and dignity. Other lay corporations are erected for the good government of

r *^ijn -i *a town or particular district, as a mayor and commonalty, bailiff and

* J burgesses, or the like: some for the advancement and regulation of

manufactures and commerce; as the trading companies of London, and other

towns: and some for the better carrying on of divers special purposes; as

churchwardens, for conservation of the goods of the parish; the college of

physicians and company of surgeons in London, for the improvement of the

medical science; the royal society for the advancement of natural knowledge;

«t) Co. I.itt. 43.

(1) The number of corporations sole in the United States must be very few indeed. It is

possible that the statutes of some states vesting the property of the Roman Catholic church

The first division of corporations is into aggregate and so'le. (1) Corporations
aggregate consist of many persons united together into one society, and are kept
up by a perpetual succession of members, so as to continue forever: of which
kind are the mayor and commonalty of a city, the head and fellows of a college,
the dean and chaph:Jr of a cathedral church. Corporations sole consist of one
person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are incorporated
hy law, in order to give them some legal capacities and a<lYantages, particularly
that of perpetuity which in their natural persons they could not have had. In
this sense the king is a sole corporation; (d) so is a bishop; so are some
deans, and prebendaries, distinct from their several chapters ; and so is every
parson and vicar. And the necessitv, or at least use, of this institution will be
[ • 470 ] very apparent, if we consider the case of *a parson of a church. At the
original endowment of parish churches, the freehold of the church,
the churchyard, the parsonage house, the glebe, and the tithes of the parish,
were vested in the then parson by the bounty of the donor, as a temporal recompense to him for his spiritual care of the inhabitants, and with intent tha.t
the same emoluments should ever afterwards continue as a recompense for the
same care. But how was this to be effected? The freehold was ve.sted in the
parson; and, if we suppose it vested in his natural capacity, on his death it might
descend to his heir, and would be liable to his debts and incumbrances: or, at
best, the heir might be compellable, at some trouble and expense, to convey
these rights to the succeeding incumbent. The law therefore has wisely ordained, that the parson, quatenus parson, shall never die, any more than the
king; by making him and his successors a corporation. By which means all
the origmal rights of the parsonage are preserved entire to the successor; for
the present incumbent, and his predecessor who lived seven centuries ago, are in
law one and the same person; and what was given to the one was given to the
other also.
Another division of incorporations, either sole or aggregate, is into eccleB'iastical
and la;I/· (2) Ecclesiastical corporations are where the members that compose it
are entirely spiritual persons: such as, bishops; certain deans, and prebenclarie.s;
all archdeacons, parsons, and vicars; which are sole corporations; de.ans and
chapters at present, and formerly prior and convent, abbot and monks, and the
like, bodies aggre~ate. These are erected for the furtherance of religion, and
perpetuating the nghts of the church. Lay corporations are of two sorts, civil and
eleemosynary. The civil are such as are erected for a variety of temporal purposes. The king, for inst.ance, is made a corporation to prevent in general the
possibi~ity of an interregnu!ft or vacancy . of the throne, and !-<> preserve .the
possessions of the crown entire; for immediately upon the demise of one kmg,
his successor is, as we have formerly seen, in full possession of the regal righu;
and dignity. Other lay corporations are erected for the good government of
[ • 471 ] *a town or particular district, as a mayor and commonalty, bailiff and
burgesses, or the like: some for the advancement and regulation of
manufactures and commerce; as the trading companies of London, and other
towns: and some for the better carrying on of divers special purposes ; as
churchwardens, for conservation of the goods of the parish; the college of
physicians and company of surgeons in London, for the improvement of the
medical science; the royal society for the advancement of natural knowledge;

in the bishop and his successors may have the effect to make him a corporation sole; and

Id) Co. Litt. 43.

some public officers have corporate powers for the purpose of holding property, and of going and

being sued.

(2) Ecclesiastical corporations, in the proper meaning of that term, do not exist in the

United States. The religious societies which are incorporated under the state laws are mere pri-

vate civil corporations, subject to the like visitation and control with the corporations for secular

purposes. See note, ante, p. 376.
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and the society of antiquaries for promoting the study of antiquities. And

among these I "am inclined to think the general corporate bodies of the univer-

sities of Oxford and Cambridge .must be ranked: for it is clear they are not

spiritual or ecclesiastical corporations, being composed of more laymen than

clergy: neither are they eleemosynary foundations, though stipends are annexed

to particular magistrates and professors, any more than other corporations

where the acting officers have standing salaries; for these are rewards pro opera

et labore, not charitable donations only, since every stipend is preceded by service

and duty: they seem therefore to be merely civil corporations. The eleemosy-

nary sort are such as are constituted for the p< ^tnal distribution of the free

alms, or bounty, of the founder of them to such persons as he has directed. Of

this kind are all hospitals for the maintenance of the poor, sick, and impotent:

and all colleges both in our universities and out (e) of them; which colleges are

founded for two purposes; 1. For the promotion of piety and learning by proper

regulations and ordinances. 2. For imparting assistance to the members of those

bodies, in order to enable them to prosecute their devotion and studies with

greater ease and assiduity. And all these eleemosynary corporations are, strictly

speaking, lay and not ecclesiastical, even though composed of ecclesiastical per-

sons, (f) and although they in some things partake of the nature, privileges, and

restrictions of ecclesiastical bodies. (3)

*Having thus marshalled the several species of corporations, let us r *4wg ~|

next proceed to consider, 1. How corporations in general may be created. L ''"" '
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2. What are their powers, capacities, and incapacities. 3. How corporations are

visited. And 4. How they may be dissolved.

I. Corporations, by the civil law, seem to have been created by the mere act,

and voluntary association of their members: provided such convention was not

contrary to law, for then it was Ulicitum collegium,. (g) It does not appear that

the prince's consent was necessary to be actually given to the foundation of them;

but merely that the original founders of these voluntary and friendly societies,

for they were little more than such, shonld not establish any meetings in oppo-

sition to the laws of the state.

But, with us in England, the king's consent is absolutely necessary to the

erection of any corporation, either impliedly or expressly given, (h) (4) The kings'

(e) Such as Manchester, Kton, Winchester. &c. (/) 1 Lord Baym. 6.

(jr) I'Y 47, 22, 1. Neque societal, neoiie collegium, neque nujttsmodi corpus passim omnibus habere concedi-

tur; Ham et leffibus, et senatus consuttis, etprincipalibus constitutionibus ea res coercetur. Ff.:(, 4, 1,

(A) Cities ana towns where first erected into corporate communities on the continent, ana endowed with

many valuable privileges, about the eleventh century: 1 Rob. Ch. V. 30; to which the consent of the feudal

sovereign was absolutely necessary, as many of his prerogatives and revenues were thereby considerably

diminished.

(3) [They arc lay corporations because they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the eccle-

siastical courts, or to the visitations of the ordinary or diocesan in their spiritual characters.]

(4) Corporations in the United States are the creatures of the legislative authority. Each

corporation is either created by a special act of the legislature, which defines its objects and

specifies its powers, and is called a charter, or it is formed by the voluntary association of its

members under some general law of the state, which permits them to become a corporation

on subscribing the proper agreement, and observing such other forms as may be prescribed.

Corporations are either public or private. The first are for the most part created for the pur-

poses of municipal government, in which case the corporators have no choice but to accept

the charter, and to exercise the corporate powers under it. Charters of private incorpora-

tion, on the other hand, the corporators are not oompellable to accept, but if they do so, the

charter becomes a contract hetween them and the state, and the state cannot repeal or modify

it without then: assent, unless the right to do so was reserved when it was granted. Bart-

mouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. In several of the states, corporations for other

than municipal purposes are forbidden to be created except for a limited period, and with full

power to repeal and amend; and in some, also, they can only be formed under general laws.

The rights and privileges claimed under charters of incorporation are to be strictly construed

as against the corporators. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Charles River Bridge v.

"Warren Bridge, 11 id. 544; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Canal Commissioners, 21 Penn. St. 22;

Bradley v. N. Y. and N". H. R. R. Co., 21 Conn. 306; Reed v. Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161; Dunham «.

Rochester, 5 Cow. 465; Mining Co. v. Baker, 3 Nov. 386.

When no charter can be proved, the exercise of corporate rights, for a period whereof the

memory of man runneth not to the contrary, is sufficient evidence that such rights were origi-

nally granted by the proper authority. The King v. Mayor, <fcc., of Stratford upou Avon, 14
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implied consent is to be found in corporations which exist by force of the common

law, to which our former kings are supposed to have given their concurrence;

common law being nothing else but custom, arising from the universal agree-

ment of the whole community. Of this sort are the king himself, all bishops,

parsons, vicars, churchwardens, and some others; who by common law have

ever been held, as far as our books can shew us, to have been corporations,

virtute offidi: and this incorporation is so inseparably annexed to their offices,

that we cannot frame a complete legal idea of any of these persons, but we must

F *4731 a^8° nave an ^ea °f a corporation, capable to transmit *his rights to his

' J successors at the same time. Another method of implication, whereby

the king's consent is presumed, is as to all corporations by prescription, such as

the city of London, and many others, (t) which have existed as corporations,

time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary; and therefore

are looked upon in law to be well created. For though the members thereof

can shew no legal charter of incorporation, yet in cases of such high antiquity

the law presumes there once was one; and that by the variety of accidents which

a length of time may produce, the charter is lost or destroyed. The methods by

which the king's consent is expressly given are either by act of parliament or

charter. By act of parliament, of which the royal assent is a necessary ingre-

dient, corporations may undoubtedly be created: (_;') but it is observable, that,

till of late years, most of these statutes which are usually cited as having created,

corporations do either confirm such as have been before created by the king, as
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in the case of the College of Physicians, erected by charter 10 Hen. VIII, (k)

which charter was afterwards confirmed in parliament; (I) or they permit the

king to erect a corporation infuturo with such and such powers, as is the case

of the Bank of England, (m) and the society of the British Fishery, (re) So that

the immediate creative act was usually performed by the king alone, in virtue of

his royal prerogative, (o)

All the other methods, therefore, whereby corporations exist, by common law,

by prescription, and by act of parliament, are for the most part reducible to this

of the king's letters patent, or charter of incorporation. The king's creation

may be performed by the words " creamus, erigimus, fundamus, incorporamus,"

or the like. Nay, it is held, that if the king grants to a set of men to have

lority,

perform this, or any other act whatsoever: and actually did perform it to a

great extent, by statute 39 Eliz. c. 5, which incorporated all hospitals and houses

of correction founded by charitable persons, without farther trouble: and the

(fl 2 Inst. 330. (j\ 10 Rep. 29. 1 Roll. Abr. 512. (t) 8 Rep. 114.

(I) 14 and 15 Hen. VIII, c 5. (TO) Stat. 6 and 6 W. and M. c. 20.

(n) Stat. 23 Geo. 11. c. 4. (o) See page 272. ml V

(p) GiW signified among the Saxons a fraternity, derived from the verb fillO. on, to pay. because every

man paid hi * share towards the expenses or toe community. And hence their place or meeting is fre-

quently called the Guild, or Guild-hall.

(g) 10 Rep. 30. 1 Roll. Abr. 613.

East, 360; Robic i: Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 326. So a corporation may al?o be established upon

presumptive evidence that a charter has been granted within the time of memory. Such evi-

dence is addressed to a jury, and though not conclusive upon them, if it reasonably satisfies their

minds, it will justify them in a verdict finding the corporate existence. Miww of Hull e. Horner,

Cowp. 108; Dillingham p. Snow, 5 Mass. 552; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351; Stockbridge v.

"West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400; Trott v. Warren, 2 Fairf. 227; Kew Boston v. Dnnbarton, 12

N. H. 409 ; and 15 id. 201.

So corporations may exist by implication. If there be granted by the state to individuals

such property, rights or franchises, or imposed upon them such burdens, as can only be prop-

erly held, enjoyed, continued or borne, according to the terms of the grant, by a corporate

entity, the intention to create such corporate entity is to be presumed, and corporate capacity

is held to ba conferred, BO far as is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the grant or burden.

Dyer, 400; Consorvators of River Tone v. Ash, 10 B. and C. 349; per Kent, Chancellor, in Den-

ton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 325 ; Colbnm ». Ellenwood, 4 If. H. 101; Atkinson v. Bemig, 11 IT.

H. 46; North Hempstcad v, gempstead, 2 Wend. 109; Thomas v, Dakin, 22 id. 9; Stebbins v.

Jennings, 10 Pick. 188.
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same lias been done in other cases of charitable foundations. But otherwise it

has not formerly been usual thus to intrench upon the prerogative of the crown,

and the king may prevent it when he pleases. And, in the particular instance

before mentioned, it was done, as Sir Edward Coke observes, (r) to avoid the

charges of incorporation and licenses of mortmain in small benefactions; which

in his days were grown so great, that they discouraged many men from under-

taking these pious and charitable works.

The king, it is said, may grant to a subject the power of erecting corpora-

tions, (s) though the contrary was formerly held: (t) that is, he may permit the

subject to name the persons and powers of the corporation at his pleasure; but

it is really the king that erects, and the subject is but the instrument: for

though none but the king can make a corporation, yet quifacit per alium,facit

per se. (u) In this manner the chancellor of the University of Oxford has

power by charter to erect corporations; and has actually often exerted it, in the

erection of several matriculated companies, now subsisting, of tradesmen sub-

servient to the students.

When a corporation is erected, a name must be given to it; and by that name

alone it must sue and be sued, and do all *legal acts; though a very •- *. ~- -i

minute variation therein is not material, (v) Such name is the very L -1

being of its constitution; and, though it is the will of the king that erects the

corporation, yet the name is the knot of its combination, without which it

could not perform its corporate functions, (w) The name of incorporation, says
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Sir Edward Coke, is as a proper name, or name of baptism; and therefore when

a private founder gives his college or hospital a name, he does it only as a god-

father, and by that same name the king baptizes the incorporation .(x) (5)

II. After a corporation is so formed and named, it acquires many powers,

rights, capacities, and incapacities, which we are next to consider. Some of

these are necessarily and inseparably incident to every corporation; which inci-

dents, as soon as a corporation is duly erected, are tacitly annexed, of course. (y)

As, 1. To have perpetual succession. (6) This is the very end of its incorporation:

for there cannot be a succession forever without an incorporation; (z) and there-

fore all aggregate corporations have a power necessarily implied of electing mem-

bers in the room of such as go off. (a) 2. To sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded,

grant or receive, by its corporate name, and do all other acts as natural persons

may. 3. To purchase lands, and hold them, for the benefi t of themselves and their

successors; which two are consequential to the former. 4. To have a common

seal. For a corporation, being an invisible body, cannot manifest its intentions

by any personal act or oral discourse: it therefore acts and speaks only by its

(r) 2 lost. 723. (») Bro. Abr. ta. Prerog. S3. Viner. Prerog. 88, pL 16. (t) Yearbook, 2 Hen. VH, 13.

(HI 10 Rep. 33. (r) 10 Rep. 122. (w) Glib. Hist. (.:. P. 182. (r) 10 Rep. 28.

same has been <lone in other cases of charitable foundations. But otherwise it
has not formerly been usual thus to in trench upon the prerogative of the crown,
an<l the king may prevent it when he pleases. And, in the particular instance
before mentioned, it was done, as 8ir Edward Coke observes, (r) to avoid the
charges of incorporation and licenses of mortmain in small benefactions; which
in his days were grown so great, that they discouraged many men from undertaking these pious and charitable works.
'rhc king, it is said, may grant to a subject the power of erecting corporations, (.'I) though the contrary was formerly held: (t) that is, he may permit the
subject to name the persons and powers of the corporation at his pleasure; but
it is really the king that erects, and the subject is but the instrument: for
though none but the king can make a corporation, yet qui fadt per aliurn, fac-it
per se. (u) In this manner the chancellor of the University of Oxford has
power by charter to erect corporations; and has actually often exerted it, in the
erection of several matriculated companies, now subsisting, of tradesmen subservient to the students.
When a corporation is erected, a name must be given to it; and by that name
alone it must sue and be sued, and do all *legal acts; though a very • 4 5 ]
minute variation therein is not material. (v) Such name is the very [ 7
being of its constitution; and, though it is the will of the king that erects the
corporation, yet the name is the knot of its combination, without which it
could not perform its corporate functions. (w) The name of incorporation, says
Sir Edward Coke, is as a proper name, or name of baptism; and therefore when
a. private founder gives his college or hospital a name, he does it only as a godfather, and by that same name the king baptizes the incorporation .(x) (5)
II. After a corporation is so formed and named, it acquires many powers,
rights, capacities, and incapacities, which we are next to consider. Some of
these are necessarily and inseparably incident to every corporation; which incidents, as soon as a corporation is duly erected, are tacitly annexed, of course. ( y)
As, I. To have perpetual succession. (6) This is the very end of its incorporation:
for there cannot be a succession forever without an incorporation; (z) and therefore all aggregate corporations have a power necessarily implied of electing members in the room of such as go off. (a) 2. To sue or be sued, impleador be impleaded,
grant or receive, by its corporate name, and do all other acts as natural persons
may. 3. To purchase lands, and hold them, for the benefit of themselves and their
successors; which two are consequential to the former. 4. To have a.common
seal. For a corporation, being an invisible body, cannot manifest its intentions
by any personal act or oral discourse: it therefore acts and speaks only by its

(y) 10 Rep. 80. Hob. 211. (.-;) 10 Rep. 26. (a) 1 Roll. Abr. 514.

(5) [By prescription a corporation may have several different names. Hard. 504; Lut 1498;

3 Salk. 102, pi. 2. So by charter a corporation may be incorporated by one name and afterwards

(r) \l Inst. 72'2.
(1) Bro. A.br. tU. Prm-og. 63. Viner. Prerog. 88, pl 16.
JO Rep. 33.
(ti) 10 Rep. 122.
(ID) Glib. Hist. C. P. 182.
10 Rep. SO. Hob. llll.
(~) 10 Rep. 26.
(a) 1 Roll. AIJr. 1114.

(11)
(If)

(t)

(:c)

Yearbook, \l Hen. VU, lS.
10 Rep. 28.

by another, and after the change of the name the last ought to be used. 1 Rol. 572,1. 55. So

a change of name or new charter does not merge the ancient privileges. 4 Co. 87, b. Ray. 439.

And it retains the privileges and possessions it had before. 1 Rol. 513,1. 2; 1 Saund. 339. A

misnomer of the corporation name in a grant under the corporate seal is immaterial. 2 Mareh.

174; 6 Taunt. 467, S. C. And where in ejectment the demise was laid to be by the mayor, <fec.,

of the borough town of M., and on the trial it turned out, from the charter, that the name of the

corporation was "the mayor," <tc., omitting " of the borough town" of M., it was held that this

was no variance, it appearing from the charter that M. was a borough town: 1 B. and A. 699;

and in general, a variance of this nature in pleading must be taken advantage of by plea in

abatement. 1 B. and P. 30; 3 Campb. 29; 1 Sound. 340, a.

A corporation may be constituted of persons natural or political. 10 Co. 29, b. It may be

composed out of another corporation: 1 Rol. 512; if the other be a corporation by prescrip-

tion. 1 Sid. 291.

So a corporation aggregate may be without a head. Bro. Corp. 43; 10 Co. 30, b.]

(6) That is to say, for the term prescribed in the charter for the corporate existence, which may

or may not be unlimited.
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(5) [By prescription a corporation may ha.ve severe.I different names. Ha.rd. 504; Lnt. 1498;
3 Salk. lW, pl. 2. So by charter a corporation may be incorporated by one name and afterwards
by another, and after the change of the name the last ought to be used. 1 Roi. 572, I. 55. So
a change of name or new charter doeil not merge the ancient privileges. 4 Co. f5'/, b. Ray. 439.
And it retains the privileges and possessions it had before. 1 Roi. 513, l. 2; 1 Saund. 339. A
misnomer of the corporation name in a grant under the coryorate seal is immaterial. 2 Marsh.
174; 6 Taunt. 407, S. C. And where in ejectment the demise was laid to be by the mayor, &c.,
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and in general, a vanance of this nature m pleading must be taken advantage of by plea m
abatement. 1 B. and P. 30; 3 Campb. 29; 1 So.und. 340, a.
.A. corporation may be constituted of persons natural or political. 10 Co. 29, b. It may ho
composed out of another corporation: 1 Roi. 512; if the other be a corporation by pref:lcrip·
tion. 1 Sid. 291.
So a corporation ag~egate may be wi~hou~ a head. Bro. Corp. 43; 10 Co. ~O, b.]
.
( 6) That is t-0 My, tor the term prescnbed m the charter for the corporate existence, which may
01 may not be unlimited.
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common seal. (7) For, though the particular members may express their pri

vate consents to any acts, by words, or signing their names, yet this does not

bind the corporation: it is the fixing of the seal, and that only, which unites

the several assents of the individuals who compose the community, and makes

one joint assent of the whole, (b) 5. To make by-laws or private statutes for the

F *47f 1 b^ter *government of the corporation ; which are binding upon them-

"- -I selves, unless contrary to the laws of the land, and then they are

void. (8) This is also included by law in the very act of incorporation: (c) for

as natural reason is given to the natural body for the governing it, so by-lawe or

statutes are a sort of political reason to govern the body politic. And this

(b) Dav. «, 48. (e) Hob. 211.

(7) The old doctrine that corporations act and speak only by their common seal, to which

there were always some exceptions based upon a supposed necessity, has become almost

entirely obsolete. Mr. Parsons in his work on Contracts, vol. 1, 139, 5th ed., has collected

cases showing how generally the courts have recognized the power of corporations to bind

themselves in the same way that natural persons and voluntary associations of individuals

may, throngh the agency of officers and other persona. See also Grant on Corporations, 62. It

is not even necessary, nor is it usual, that the appointment of agents be under seal, and the

corporation may be held liable in assumpsit on implied contracts. Beverley v. Lincoln Gas Co., 6

A. and E. 829 ; Seagravese. Alton, 13 111. 366; N. C. Railway v. Bastian, 15 Md. 494. And this,

notwithstanding the charter points out a different mode for contracting. Bnlkley ». Derby

Fishing Co., 2 Conn. 252. Board of Education ». Greenebauin, 39 111. 609. And it may be held
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liable also on the contract of an unauthorized person, where a ratification by the corporators can

be implied from their acts. Hayward v. Pilgrim Society, 21 Pick. 270. A contract not within

the appropriate business of the charter is of course void, whether made with due formalities or

not: Hood t>. N. Y. and N. H. E. E. Co. 22 Conn. 502; and it would seem that hi such a case,

no acts of confirmation could make the contract binding. It has been held, however, on the

ground of making a corporation responsible for its wrongs, that, where a contract is made ultra

vires, and the shareholders have acquiesced in the abuse, the corporation will not be allowed to

repudiate it where to do so would work a greater wrong to innocent third parties than the affirm-

ance of the contract would to the shareholders. Bissell v. M. S. and N. I. H. E. Co., 22 X. Y.

258. As against the state, however, a corporation could acquire no rights by usurpation.

Corporations have no general authority to give promissory notes or accept bills of exchange,

unless the nature of the business in which they are engaged is such as to raise a necessary

implication of the existence of the authority. Broughton «. Manchester Waterworks Co., 3

B. and A. 1; Bateman v. Mid. Wales E. R. Co. Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 620; Chambers «. Manches-

ter, <tc., Railway Co., 10 Jur. N. S. 700; Grant on Corporations, 276; A. and A. on Corp. $J

236, 257, 267. Any contract, as, for instance, a conveyance of lands, which, if executed by an

individual, would require to be under seal, must of course be under seal when made by a

corporation. Koehler v. Iron Co., 2 Black, 715.

Corporations are liable generally for the wrongful acts and neglects of their officers and agents,

where they were directly authorized, or were done or occur, iu the regular course of their emplo v-

ment. Chestnut v. Butter, 4 S. and B. 16; Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 7 Wend.

31; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 516. And this though the act of such officer or agent way have

been in disregard of or contrary to instructions. Weed v. Panama E. B. Co., 17 N. X". 362;

Southwick D. Estes, 7 Cush. 385; Bailroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468. It was formerly supposed

that trespass would not lie against a corporation; but the contrary is now settled. Maund v.

Canal Co., 4 M. and G. 452; Edwards v. Union Bank, 1 Fla. 136; Barnard ». Stevens, 2 Aik.

429; Humes v. Knoxville, 1 Humph. 403; Chicago, Ac., E. R. Co. v. Fell, 22 111. 333; The

President, .fee., v. Wright, 5 Ind. 252. Goffc. Great Nor. R. Co., 3 El. and El. 672: Harlem v.

Ernrnert, 41 111. 319. And this, it seems, to recover damages for assault and battery. Eastern

Counties R. Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314; Chilton ». London, <fec., E. Co., 16 M. and W. 212;

Green v. London G. 0. Co, 7 C. B. N. S. 290; Moore v. Fitchburg E. B. Co., 4 Gray. 465;

Maund v. Canal Co., 4 M. and G. 452; but see Orr v. Bank of U. S., 1 Ohio, 36; Childs v. 'Bank

of Missouri, 17 Mo. 213. They are not liable where the trespass was wilful, and not within the

scope of the servant's authority. Vanderbilt c. Turnpike Co., 2 N. Y. 479; Fox v. Northern

Liberties, 3 W. and S. 103.

Corporations are also liable for the frauds of their agents when committed in the course of

their employment, or where the corporations reap the benefit of them; and for libels by theii

agents which they authorize. Philadelphia, <fcc., E. R. Co. v Quigley, 21 How. 202; Aldrich t>.

Press Printing Co., 9 Minn. 133.

(8) Corporations have a general power to make by-laws to further the purposes of their

incorporation, but they must be in harmony with tha general laws of the state, and reasonable in

their provisions, or they will be void in law. See Davies v, Morgan, 1 Cromp. and J. 587;

Chamberlain of London v. Compton, 7 D. and R. 597; Clark z>, Le Gran, 9 B. and C. 52; Gosling

v. Vnley, 12 Q. B. 347; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Austin r. Murray, 16 Pick. 121;

Galliitm v. Bradford, 1 Bibb, 209 ; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala, 461. The power to make by-laws

may be delegated to a select body qf the corporators. Eex, v, Spencer, Burr. 1837.
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right of making by-laws for their own government, not contrary to the law of

the land, was allowed by the law of the twelve tables of Rome, (d) But no

trading company is with us allowed to make by-laws which may affect the

king's prerogative, or the common profit of the people, under penalty of 40Z.,

unless they be approved by the chancellor, treasurer, and chief justices, or the

judges of assize in their circuits; and, even though they be so approved, still, if

contrary to law, they are void, (e) These five powers are inseparably incident to

every corporation, at least to every corporation aggregate; for two of them,

though they may be practised, yet are very unnecessary to a corporation sole,

viz.: to have a corporate seal to testify his sole assent, and to make statutes for

the regulation of his own conduct.

There are also certain privileges and disabilities that attend an aggregate cor-

poration, and are not applicable to such as are sole; the reason of them ceasing,

and of course the law. It must always appear by attorney, for it cannot appear

in person, being, as Sir Edward Coke says, (/) invisible and existing only in

intendment and consideration of law. It can neither maintain, or be made

defendant to, an action of battery or such like personal injuries; for a corpora-

tion can neither beat nor be beaten, in its body politic, (g) A corporation cannot

commit treason, or felony, or other crime in its corporate capacity: (h) though

its members may, in their distinct individual capacities, (i) Neither is it capable

of suffering a ""traitor's or felon's punishment, for it is not liable to cor- r,,. ~~ -i

poral penalties, nor to attainder, forfeiture, or corruption of blood. It *- '
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cannot be executor or administrator, or perform any personal duties; for it

cannot take an oath for the due execution of the office. It cannot be seised of

lands to the use of another; (;') for such kind of confidence is foreign to the end

of its institution. (9) Neither can it be committed to prison; (k) for, its

existence being ideal, no man can apprehend or arrest it. And therefore, also,

it cannot be outlawed; for outlawry always supposes a precedent right of arrest-

ing_, which has been defeated by the parties absconding, and that also a corpo-

ration cannot do: for which reasons the proceedings to compel a corporation to

appear to any suit by attorney are always by distress on their lands and goods. (I)

Neither can a corporation be excommunicated: for it has no soul, as is gravely

observed by Sir Edward Coke; (m) and therefore also it is not liable to be sum-

moned into the ecclesiastical courts upon any account; for those courts act only

pro salute animcs, and their sentences can only be enforced by spiritual censures:

a consideration which, carried to its full extent, would alone demonstrate the

impropriety of these courts interfering in any temporal rights whatsoever.

There are also other incidents and powers which belong to some sort of cor-

porations, and not to others. An aggregate corporation may take goods and

chattels for the benefit of themselves and their successors, but a sole corporation

cannot: (») for such movable property is liable to be lost or embezzled, and would

raise a multitude of disputes between the successor and executor, which the law

is careful to avoid. (10) In ecclesiastical and eleemosynary foundations, the

king or the founder may give them rules, laws, statutes, and ordinances, which

they are bound to observe: but corporations merely *lay, constituted for r ** 70 -i

civil purposes, are subject to no particular statutes; (11) but to the com- • !• '

f'l) Sodalei legem qtuan volent. tfum ne quid ex rntblica leye comtmpant, sibifmtnto.

fej Stat. 19 Hen. Vn, c. 7. 11 Rep. 54. (/) 10 Rep. 82. (g) Bro. Abr. tit. Corporation, 63. (*) 10 Hep. 32.

(<) The civil law also ordains that, for the misbehaviour of a body corporate, the directors only shall be

answerable in their personal capacities. /•/. 4. 3, 15.

H) Bro. Abr. tit. feoffm. al. vies. 40. Bacon, of Uses, 347. (k) Plowd. S38

) Bro. Abr. tit. Corporation, 11. Outlawry, 71. (m) 10 Rep. 32. (nj Co. Litt. 46.

(9) A corporation cannot be compelled to execute a trust which is foreign to the ends of its

institution, but the trust does not therefore fail, for equity may appoint a trustee to execute it.

Yidal v. Philadelphia, 2 How. 127. So if a corporation which is seized of lands in trust is dissolved,

equity will protect the trust by appointing a trustee. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704.

(10) [Mr. Hargrove considers the jewels of the crown rather as heir-looms than an instance

of chattels passing in succession in a sole corporation. Co. Litt. 9, n. 1.]

(11) [Their charters or immemorial usages, which are equivalent to the express provisions of a

charter, are, in fact, their statutes. ]
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mon law, and to their own by-laws, not contrary to the laws of the realm, (o)

Aggregate corporations, also, that have by their constitutions a head, as a dean,

warden, master, or the like, cannot do any acts during the vacancy of the head-

ship, except only appointing another: neither are they then capable of receiving

a grant: for such corporation is incomplete without a head, (p) But there may

be a corporation aggregate, constituted without a head: (q) as the collegiate

church of Southwell, in Nottinghamshire, which consists only of prebendaries;

and the governors of the Charterhouse, London, who have no president or

superior but are all of equal authority. In aggregate corporations, also, the act

of the major part is esteemed the act of the whole, (r) By the civil law this

major part must have consisted of two-thirds of the whole, else no act could be

performed: (s) which perhaps may be one reason why they required three at

least to make a corporation. But with us any majority is sufficient to determine

the act of the whole body. And whereas, notwithstanding the law stood thus,

some founders of corporations had made statutes in derogation of the common

law, making very frequently the unanimous assent of the society to be necessary

to any corporate act, which King^ Henry VIII found to be a great obstruction

to his projected scheme of obtaining a surrender of the lands of ecclesiastical

corporations, it was therefore enacted by statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 27, that all

private statutes shall be utterly void, whereby any grant or election, made by

the head, with the concurrence of the major part of the body, is liable to tie
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obstructed by any one or more being the minority: but this statute extends not

to any negative or necessary voice, given by the founder to the head of any such.

society. (12)

We before observed, that it was incident to every corporation to have a capa-

r *47Q 1 c'ty *° Purc^ase laQds for themselves and *successors: and this is regn-

L J larly true at the common law. (t) But they are excepted put of the

statute of wills: (u) so that no devise of lands to a corporation by will is good,

except for charitable uses, by statute 43 Eliz. c. 4; (w) which exception is again

greatly narrowed by the statute 9 Geo. II, c. 36. And also, by a great variety

of statutes, (x) their privilege even of purchasing from any living grantor is

much abridged: so that now a corporation, either ecclesiastical or lay, must

have a license from the king to purchase, (y) before they can exert that capacity

which is vested in them by the common law: nor is even this in all cases

(o) Lord Bsym. a. (p) Co. Utt. S68, 264. (q) 10 Rep. 30.

(r) Bro. Abr. tit. Corporation, 31, 34. (») FT. 3, 4,3. (t) 10 Rep. 30. («) 34 Hen. VHI, c. 5.

mon law, and to their own by-laws, not contrary to the laws of the realm. (o)
Aggregate corporations, also, that have by their constitutions a head, as a dean,
warden, master, or the like, cannot do an;r acts during the vacancy of the headship, except only appointing another: neither are they then capable of rec~iving
a grant: for such corporation is incomplete without a head. (p) But there may
be a corporation aggregate, constituted without a head: (q) as the collegiate
church of Southwell, in Nottinghamshire, which consists only of prebendaries;
and the governors of the Charterhouse, London, who have no president or
superior but are all of equal authority. In aggregate corporations, also, the act
of the major part is esteemed the act of the whole. (r) By the civil law this
major part must have consisted of two-thirds of the whole, else no act could be
performed: (s) which perhaps may be one reHson why they required thre.e at
least to make a corporation. But with us any majority is sufficient to determine
the act of the whole body. And whereas, notwithstanding the law stood thus,
some founders of corporations had made statutes in derogation of the common
law, making very frequently the unanimous assent of the society to be necessary
to any corporate act, which King Henry VIII found to be a gre.at obstruction
to his projected scheme of obtaming a surrender of the lands of ecclesiastica.l
corporations, it was therefore enactea by statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 27, that all
private statutes shall be utterly void, whereby any grant or election, ma.de by
the head, with the concurrence of the major part of the body, is liable to be
obstructed by any one or more bein~ the mmority: but this statute extends not
to any negative or necessary voice, given by the founder to the head of any such
society. (12)
We before observed, that it was incident to every corporation to have a ca.pa,..
[ 479 ] city to purchase lands for themselves and "'successors: and this is regularly true at the common law. (t) But they are excepted out of the
statute of wills: ( u) so that no devise of lands to a corporation by will is good,
except for charitable uses, by stHtute 43 Eliz. c. 4; (w) which exception is again
greatly narrowed by the statute 9 Geo. II, c. 36. And also, by a great •ariety
of statutes, (x) their privilege even of purchasing from any living grantor is
much abridged: so that now a corporation, either ecclesiastical or lay, must
have a license from the king to purchase, (y) before they can exert that capacitv
which is vested in them by the common 1aw: nor is even this in all cases

fir) Hob. 136. (.r) From magna carta, 9 Hen. III. c. 86, to 9 Geo. II, c. 36.

(V) By H>e civil law, a corporalton was Incapable of taking lands unless by special privilege from tbe

emperor. Collegium ri nvtto epeciali priviiegto iubnixum sit, htereditatem capere nan posse, dootumnoit e*t.

Cod. 6,24, 8.

(12) Corporations act by majorities in legal meetings. St. Mary's Church, 7 S. and R. 517 ;

(o) Lord Raym. il.

(f') Co. Litt. 268, 2M.
(q) 10 Rep. 80.
(r) Bro. Abr. tit. Corporotwn, 31, 34.
(1) 1'/. 3, ~l 3.
{t) 10 Rep. 30.
(u) M Hen. VIIT, c. 3.
(w) Hoh. 136.
(:r:) From magna earta, 9 lfen. lit, c. 86,
9 Geo. II, c. :16.
(y) By the civil law, a corporalton was incapable of taking lands unless by special privilege Crom tbe

w

e!11peror . Collegium n nullo apeciali prfoiugio rubnil:um Bit, IKM'edUatem capere non JJ06•e, dublua
(.od. 6, u, 8.

flOR

nt.

Hortoii v. Bapt^t Church, 34 Tt. 316. What is a legal meeting may depend upon the charter,

and upon the nature of the act to be done. 'Where a corporate act is to DO done by a definite

number of persons, the majority of the number is necessary to constitute a quorum, without

which no act can be done: Ex parto Willcocks, 7 Cow. 402; but, where the number is indefinite,

it seems that a majority of those who actually meet may bind all. See A. and A. on Corp.

$ 501. And even where the number is definite, the charter may make less than a majority a

quorum for the transaction of business. Rex ». Hovte, 6 T. R. 430.

A legal meeting being convened, the acts of a majority of those present will bind all, unless

a different rule is prescribed by the charter. Cotton e. Davies, Str. 53; Rex ». Wyndham,

Cowp. 377; Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 543. And if any abstain from voting, even thongh

they be a majority of the meeting, they are supposed to acquiesce in the action of the majority

who do vote. Oldknow ». Wainwright, Burr, 1017; Rex v. Foxcroft, id. 1021; Gosling c.

Veley, 7 Q. B. 439; Booker c. Young, 12 Gratt. 303 ; State v. Lehre, 7 Rich. 234. But the rule

that the majority may bind all only extends to strictly corporate acts; to the carrying on of

the business, and not to the dissolution of the corporation and distribution among members.

North Am. M. Co.i\ Clarke, 40 Penn. St. 43-2; State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 51. It has been held

that at common law, though in public corporations votes could not be given by proxy, yet pri-

vate money corporations might establish by-laws authorizing voting by that mode, btate v. Tuoor.

5 Day, 329. This doctrine is denied, however, in cases which hold that there must be legislative

authority to authorize voting by proxy. Philips e. "Wiekham, 1 Paige, 590; Taylor c. Griswold,

2 Green, N. J. 223.

(12) Corporations act by majorities in legal meetings. St. Mary's Church, 7 S. and R. 517;
IIortUll t•. Bapti~t Church, 34 Vt. 316. What is a legal meeting may depend upon the charter
and upvn the nature of the act to be done. Where a corporate act is to be done by a defini~

number of persons, the majority of the number is necessary to con11titute a quorum, without
which no set can be done: Ex parte Willcocks, 7 Cow. 40'2; but, where tho number is indefinite,
it 8eems that a majority of those who actually meet may bind all. See A. and .A. on Corp.
~ 501. And even whore the number is definite, the charter may make leRS than a majorit,; a
quorum for the transaction of business. Rex"· Ho~, 6 T. R. 430.
•
A legal meetin~ being convened, the acts of a m~ority of those present will bind all, unless
a different rule 1s prescribed by the charter. Cotton v. Davies, Str. 53; Rex v. Wyndham.
Cowp. 'J77 ; ~e:ir v. Theodoric~, 8 East, 543. And if any ~bstai?1 from V?ting, even t~ongti
they be a m8Jontv of the meeting, they are sttpposed to acqwe!lee m the act10n of the m&Joritv
who do vote. Oldkuow "· Wainwright, Burr, 1017; Re:s: v. Foxcroft, id. 11>'21; Gosling f..
Veley, 7 Q. B. 439; Booker"· Young, 12 Gratt. 303; State''· Lohre, 7 Rich. 234. But the ml~
that the majority may bind all only e:s:tendt! to strictly corporate acts; to the carrying on of
the business, and not to the diiisolution of the corporation and distribution among memben<.
North Am. M. Co. t•. Clarke, 40Penn. St. 43'2; State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 61. It has been held
that at common law, thou~h in public corporations votes could not be given by ~roxy, yet private money corporations m1~ht establish by-lawi; authorizin~ voting by that mode. 8tate v. Tudor.
5 Day, 3'.l9. This doctrine 1s denied, however, in cases which hold that there must be legislative
authority to authorize voting by proxy. Philips "· Wickham, 1 Paige, 590 ; Taylor 11. Griswold,
2 Green, N. J. 223.
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sufficient These statutes are generally called the statutes of mortmain; nil

purchases made by corporate bodies being said to be purchases in mortmain, in

mortua manu: for the reason of which appellation Sir Edward Coke («) offers

many conjectures; but there is one which seems more probable than any that

he has given us ; viz.: that these purchases being usually made by ecclesiastical

bodies, the members of which (being professed) were reckoned dead persons in

law, land therefore holden by them might with great propriety be said to be

held in mortua manu.

I shall defer the more particular exposition of these statutes of mortmain till

the next book of these Commentaries, when we shall consider the nature and

tenures of estates; and also the exposition of those disabling statutes of Queen

Elizabeth, which restrain spiritual and eleemosynary corporations from aliening

such lands as they are at present in legal possession of: only mentioning them

in this place for the sake of regularity, as statutable incapacities incident and

relative to corporations.

The general duties of all bodies politic, considered in their corporate capacity,

may, like those of natural persons, be *reduced to this single one, that r *

of acting up to the end or design, whatever it be, for which they were *-

created by their founder. (13)

III. I proceed therefore next to inquire, how these corporations may be

visited. For corporations being composed of individuals, subject to human

Irailties, are liable, as well as private persons, to deviate from the end of their
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institution. And for that reason the law has provided proper persons to visit,

inquire into, and correct all irregularities that arise in such corporations, either

sole or aggregate, and whether ecclesiastical, civil, or eleemosynary. With re-

gard to all ecclesiastical corporations, the ordinary is their visitor, so constituted

by the canon law, and from thence derived to us. The pope formerly, and now

the king, as supreme ordinary, is the visitor of the archbishop or metropolitan;

the metropolitan has the charge and coercion of all his suffragan bishops; and

the bishops in their several dioceses are in ecclesiastical matters the visitors of all

deans and chapters, of all parsons and vicars, and of all other spiritual corpora-

tions. With respect to all lay corporations, the founder, his heirs, or assigns,

are the visitors, whether the foundation be civil or eleemosynary; for in a lay

incorporation the ordinary neither can nor ought to visit, (a)

I know it is generally said, that civil corporations are suoject to no visitation,

but merely to the common law of the land; and this shall be presently explained.

But first, as I have laid it down as a rule that the founder, his heirs, or assigns,

are the visitors of all lay corporations, let us inquire what is meant by the

founder. The founder of all corporations, in the strictest and original sense, is

the king alone, for he only can incorporate a society; and in civil incorpora-

tions such as mayor or commonalty, &c., where there are no possessions or

endowments given to the body, there is no other founder but the king: but in

eleemosynary foundations, such as colleges and hospitals, where there is an en-

dowment of lands, the law distinguishes, and makes two species of *foun- ,- ^. QI -,

dation; the one fundatio incipiens, or the incorporation, in which L J

sense the king is the geneneral founder of all colleges, and hospitals; the other

fundatio perficiens, or the dotation of it, in which sense the first gift of the reve-

ls) 1 I lift. 1. (H) 10 Rep. 31. i

(13) [It may be hero incidentally mentioned that in the administration of property left upon

trust for charitable purposes, whether to a corporation or to trustees, the rule, that the donor's

sufficient. These statutes are winera.lly called the statutes of mot·tmain; ull
purchases made by corporate bodies being said to be purchases in mortmain, in
mortua manu: for the reason of which appellation Sir Edward Coke (z) offers
many conjectures; but there is one which ~me more probable than any th1~t
he has given us ; viz.: that these purchases being usually made by ecclesiastical
bodies, the members of which {being professed) were reckoned dead persons in
law, land therefore holden by them might with great propriety be said to be
.
held -in morfaa manu.
I shall defer the more particular exposition of these statutes of mortmain till
the next book of these Commentaries, when we shall consider the nature an<l
fa~nures of estates; and also the exposition of those disabling statutes of Queen
Elizabeth, which restrain spiritual and eleemosynary corporations from aliening
such lands as they are at present in legal possession of: only mentioning them
in this place for the sake of regularity, as statutable incapacities incident and
relative to corporations.
The general duties of all bodies politic, considered in their corporate ca.pa.city,
may, like those of natural persons, be •reduced to this single one, that [ • 480 ]
of acting up to the end or design, whatever it be, for which they were
creat.ed by their founder. {13)
Ill I proceed therefore next to inquire, how these corporations may be
visited. For corporations being composed of individuals, subject to human
frailties, are liable, as well as private persons, to deviat.e from the end of their
institution. And for that reason the law has provided proper persons to visit,
inquire into, and correct all irregularities that arise in such corporations, either
sole or aggregate, and whether ecclesiastical, civil, or eleemosynary. With regard to all ecclesiastical corporations, the ordinary is their visitor, so constituted
by the canon law, and from thence derived to us. The pope formerly, and now
the king, as supreme ordinary, is the visitor of the archbishop or metropolitan ;
the metropolitan has the charge and coercion of all his suffragan bishops ; and
the bishops in their several dioceses a.re in ecclesiastical matwrs the visitors of all
deans and chapters, of all parsons and vicars, and of all other spiritual corporations. With respect to all lay corporations, the founder, his heirs, or assigns,
are the visitors, whether the foundation be civil or eleemos;rnary; for in a lay
incorporation the ordinary neither can nor ought to visit. (a)
I know it is generally said, that civil corporations are subJect to no visitation,
but merely to the common law of the land; and this shall be presently explained.
But first, as I have laid it down as a rule that the founder, his heirs, or assigns,
are the visitors of all lay corporations, let us inquire what is meant by the
founder. The founder of all corporations, in the strictest and ori~nal sense, is
the king alone, for he only can incorporate a society; and in civil incorporations such as mayor or commonalty, &c., where there are no possessions or
endowments given to the body, there is no other founder but the king: but in
eleemosynary foundations, such as colleges and hospitals, where there is an endowment oflands, the Jaw distinguishes, and makes two species of•foun- [ • 481 ]
dation ; th~ o~e .fundatio incip1:ens, or the incorporation, in which
sense the kmg is the geneneral founder of' all colleges, and hospitals ; the other
fundaNo perjtcien.<t, or the dotation of it, in which sense the first gift of the reve-

intention shall guide the trustees in their administration of the trust minis, becomes mnch

l•l 1 Inst. ll.

modified by the cy pres doctrine, which by a long series of decisions has now become fully

(a) 10

Rep. SI.

established in courts of equity. Under this doctrine the court of chancery will, on failure

of the express object of the donor's charitable intentions, direct a reference to inquire what

objects are (cy pres) nearest to such express objects, and will direct the application of the

tnist funds to such objects. As to the principles which govern the courts in the application

of this doctrine, see Cherry v. Mott, 1 My. and Cr. 213; Att'y-Gen'l v. Ironmongers' Co., 2

Beav. 313; Cr. and Ph. 208 ] See Story's Eq. Juris. }J 1169-1176, and cases cited.

(13) [It may be hero inci<lentally mentioned that in the admiillltmtion of propertv left upon
trust for charitable purposes, whether to a corporation or to trustees, the mle, that ihe donor's
int.ention shall guide the trustees in their admini.stration of the trust funds, becomes mnch
modified by the cg pres doctrine, which by a. long series of decisions ha.s now become fully
establ.il!hcd in conrts of eqnity. Under this doctrine the court of rhancery will, on failure
of the expre..'\8 object of the donor's charitable int.entions, direct & refereuce to inquire what
objects are (cy pres) nearest to such express objects, and will direct tho application of the
trust fnndR to such objects. .A.s to the principles which goTern the courts in the application
of this doctrine, see Cherry "· Mott, 1 My. and Cr. 213l.. Att'y·Gen'l v. Ironmongeni' Co., 2
Boo>. 313; Cr. and Ph. 008 ] See Story's Eq. Juris. §§ llw-1176, and cBRC11 cited.
'
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nues is the foundation, and he who gives them is in law the founder: and it is in

this last sense that we generally call a man the founder of a college or hospi-

tal, (b) But here the ting has his prerogative: for, if the king and a private

man join in endowing an eleemosynary foundation, the king alone shall be the

founder of it And, in general, the king being the sole founder of all civil cor-

porations, and the endower the perficient founder of all eleemosynary ones, the

right of visitation of the former results, according to the rule laid down, to the

king; and of the latter to the patron or endower.

The king being thus constituted by law visitor of all civil corporations, the

law has also appointed the place wherein he shall exercise this jurisdiction:

which is the court of king's bench; where, and where only, all misbehaviours

of this kind of corporations are inquired into and redressed, and all their con-

troversies decided. And this is what I understand to be the meaning of our

lawyers when they say that these civil corporations are liable to no visitation;

that is, that the law having by immemorial usage appointed them to be visited

and inspected by the king, their founder, in his majesty's court of king's bench,

according to the rules of the common law, they ought not to be visited else-

where, or by any other authority, (c) And this is so strictly true, that though

the king by his letters patent had subjected the college of physicians to the

visitation of four very respectable persons, the lord chancellor, the two chief

justices, and the chief baron ; though the college had accepted this charter with

all possible marks of acquiescence, and had acted under it for near a century;
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yet in 1753, the authority of this provision coming in dispute, on an appeal pre-

r i,,go -• ferred to these supposed "visitors, they directed the legality of their own

*• •* appointment to be argued; and as this college was merely a civil and

not an eleemosynary foundation, they at length determined, upon several days'

solemn debate, that they had no jurisdiction as visitors; and remitted the

appellant, if aggrieved, to his regular remedy in his majesty's court of king's

bench. (14)

As to eleemosynary corporations, by the dotation the founder and his heirs

are of common right the legal visitors, to see that such property is rightly em-

ployed, as might otherwise have descended to the visitor himself: but, if the

founder has appointed and assigned any other person to be visitor, then his as-

signee so appointed is invested with all the founder's power, in exclusion of his

heir. Eleemosynary corporations are chieflv hospitals, or colleges in the univer-

sities. These were all of them considered, by the popish clergy, as of mere

ecclesiastical jurisdiction: however, the law of the land judged otherwise; aud

with regard to hospitals, it has long been held, (d) that if the hospital be spirit-

ual, the bishop shall visit; but if lay, the patron. This right of lay patrons

was indeed abridged by statute 2 Hen. V, c. 1, which ordained, that the ordinary

should visit all hospitals founded by subjects; though the king's right was re-

served to visit by his commissioners such as were of royal foundation- But the

subject's right was in part restored by statute 14 Eliz. c. 5, which directs the

bishop to visit such hospitals only where no visitor is appointed by the found-

ers thereof: and all the hospitals founded by virtue of the statute 39 Eliz. c, 5,

are to be visited by such persons as shall be nominated by the respective'founders.

But still, if the founder appoints nobody, the bishop of the diocese must visit, (e)

Colleges in the universities (whatever the common law may now, or might

formerly, judge) were certainly considered by the popish clergy, under whose

(ft) 10 Rep. S3.

(a) This notion is perhaps too reflned. Tlu> court of king's bench (it may lit; saiil), from its general super-

intendent authority, where other Jurisdictions are deficient, has power to regulate alt corporations where

no special visitor 19 appointed. But not in the light of visitor ; for as its judgments are liable to be re-

versed by writs of error, it may bo thought to want one of the essential marks of visitatorial power.

(d) Yearbook, 8 Edw. m, 2». 8 Ass. 29. (e) 1 Inst. 725.

(It) In the United States the legislature is the visitor of all corporations created by it, where

there is no individual founder or donor, and may direct judicial proceedings against such corpora-

nues is the foundation, and he who gives them is iu law the founder: and it is in
this last sense that we generally call a man the founder of a college or hos1>it.al. (b) But here the king has his prerogative: for, if the king and a private
man join i~ endowin~ an eleemosynm'.Y fou~cLi.tion, the king alone shal~ ~ the
founder of it. And, m general, the king bemg the sole founder of all c1nl corporations, and the endower the perficient founder of all eleemos,rnary ones, the
right of visitation of the former results, according to the rule hud down, to the
king; and of the latter to the patron or endower.
The king being thus constituted by law ruitor of all civil corporations, the
law ha.a also appointed the place wherein he shall exercise this jurisdiction:
which is the court of king's bench; where, and where only, all misbehaviours
of this kind of corporations are inquired into and redressed, and all their controversies decided. And this is what I understand to be the meaning of our
lawyers when they say that these civil corrorntions are liable to no nsita.tion ;
that is, that the law having by immemoria usage appointed them to be visited
and inspected by the king, their founder, in his majesty's court of king's bench,
according to the rules of the common law, they ought not to be visited elsewhere, or by any other authority. (c) And this is so strictly true, that though
the king by his letters patent had subjected the college of physicians to the
visitation of four very respectable persons, the lord chancellor, the two chief
justices, and the chief baron; though the college had accepted this charter with
all possible marks of acquiescence, and had acted under it for near a c.entury ;
yet in 1753, the authority of this provision coming in dispute, on an appeal pre[ • 482 ] ferred to these supposed *visitors, they directed the legality of their own
appointment to be argued; and as this college was merely a civil and
not an eleemosynary foundation, they at length determined, upon several days'
solemn debate, that they had no Jurisdiction as visitors; and remitted the
appellant, if aggrieved, to his regular remedy in his majesty's court of king's
bench. (14)
As to eleemosynary corporations, by the dotation the founder and his heirs
are of common right the legal visitors, to see that such property is rightly employed, as might otherwise have descended to the visitor himself: but, if the
founder has appointed and assigned any other person to be visitor, then his assignee so appointed is invested with all the founder's power, in exclusion of his
heir. Eleemosynary corporations are chieflv hospitals, or colk•ges in the universities. These were all of them considerecl, by the popish clergy, as of mere
ecclesiastical jurisdiction : however, the law of the land juilged otherwise; and
with regard to hospitals, it has long been held, (d) that if the hospital be spiritual, the bishop shall visit; but if lay, the patron. This right of lay patrons
was indeed abridged by statute 2 lien. V, c. 1, which ordained, that the ordinary
should visit all hosvitals founded by subjects; though the king's right was r~
served to visit by his commissioners such as were of royal foundation. But the
subject's right was in part restored by statute 14 Eliz. c. 5, which directs the
bishop to visit such hospitals only where no visitor is appointed by the founders thereof: and all the nospitals founded by virtue of the statute 39 Eliz. c. 5,
are to be visited by such persons as shall be nominated by the respective'fonnde1"8.
But still, if the founder a:ppoints nobody, the bishop of the diocese must >isi t. {e)
Colleges in the universities (whatever the common law may now, or might
formerly, judge) were certainly considered by the popish clergy, under whose
(bl 10 Rep. 33.
(a) This notion ls perhap11 &oo reftned. The court of king's bench (It may be .111\idJ, from 1te genen'1 anpt'l'·
lntendenl authorit:i-, where other Jurisdictions are <teftcient, has power to regitlate all corporatlon11 wb..,re
no special visitor 1s appointott nut not In tho light or visitor; for as Its jndKtnenta are liable to be re-rereed by writs of error, It may be thought to want one ot the essential marks or vill&atorlal pow.r.
(d) Yearbook, 8 Edw. Ill, 28.

8 Ass. ill.

(6) 2 Inst. 7ll5.

tions for such abuses or neglects as would at common law cause a forfeiture of their charters.

Amherst Academy o. Cowls, 6 Pick. 433.

324

(14) In the United States the legi!llature is the visit.or of aJ.J. corporations created by it, where
there ia no individual founder or donor, and may direct judicial proceedings against such oorporatioll.8 for Btlch abuses or neglects as would at common law cause a forfeiture of their charters.
Amherst Academy 11. Cowls, 6 Pick. 433.
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direction they were, as ecclesiastical, or at least as clerical, corporations: and

therefore the right of visitation was claimed by the ordinary of the *dio- r „,„„ -•

cese. This is evident, hecause in many of our most ancient colleges, "- ^

where the founder had a mind to subject them to a visitor of his own nomina-

tion, he obtained for that purpose a papal bull to exempt them from the

jurisdiction of the ordinary; several of which are still preserved in the archives

of the respective societies. And in some of our colleges, where no special vis-

itor is appointed, the bishop of that diocese, in which Oxford was formerly

comprised, has immemorially exercised visitorial authority; which can be

ascribed to nothing else but his supposed title as ordinary to visit this, among

other ecclesiastical foundations. And it is not impossible that the number of

colleges in Cambridge, which are visited by the bishop of Ely, may in part be

derived from the same original.

But whatever might be formerly the opinion of the clergy, it is now held as

established common law, that colleges are lay corporations, though sometimes

totally composed of ecclesiastical persons; and that the right of visitation does

not arise from any principles of the canon law, but of necessity was created by

the common law. (/) And yet the power and jurisdiction of visitors in cof-

leges was left so much in the dark at common law, that the whole doctrine was

very unsettled till the famous case of Philips and Bury, (g) In this the main

question was, whether the sentence of the bishop of Exeter, who, as visitor, had

deprived Doctor Bury, the rector of Exeter College, could be examined and re-
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dressed by the court of king's bench. And the three puisne judges were of

opinion that it might be reviewed, for that the visitor's jurisdiction could not

exclude the common law; and accordingly judgment was given in that court

But the Lord Chief Justice Holt was of a contrary opinion; and held, that by

the common law the office of visitor is to judge according to the statutes of the

college, and to expel and deprive upon just occasions, and to hear all appeals of

course: and that from him, and him only, the party grieved ought to nave re-

dress; the founder having reposed in him so entire a confidence, that he

*will administer justice impartially, that his determinations are final, r *AOJ -i

and examinable in no other court whatsoever. And upon this, a writ of L -I

error being brought into the house of lords, they concurred in Sir John Holt's

opinion, and reversed the judgment of the court of king's bench. To which

leading case all subsequent determinations have been conformable. (15) But,

where the visitor is under a temporary disability, there the court of king's bench

•will interpose to prevent a defect of justice. (A) Also it is said, {£) that if a founder

of an eleemosynary foundation appoints a visitor, and limits his jurisdiction

by rules and statutes, if the visitor in his sentence exceeds those rules, an action

lies against him; but it is otherwise where he mistakes in a thing within his

power.

IV. We come now, in the last place, to consider how corporations may be

dissolved. Any particular member may be disfranchised, or lose his place i»the

corporation, by acting^ contrary to the laws of the society, or the laws of the

land; or he may resign it by his own voluntary act. (k) (16) But the body

i/l Lord IJaym. 8. (</) Lord Hiiym. 5. 4 Mod. 106. Show. 85. Skiuu. 407. Sulk. 403. Carthew. 180.

(A) Strn. 787. (<) 4 Lntw. 1S66. (*) 11 Rep. 98.

(15) See King v. Master, <fcc., of St. Katharine's Hall, 4 T. R. 233; also cases cited in re Down-

ing College, 2 My. and Cr. 642.

(16) [Every member or officer of a corporation may resign his place or office, and a corpora-

tion has power to take such resignation. 1 Sid. 14. A resignation by parol, if entered and

accepted, is sufficient. 2 Salk. 433. Accepting another office incompatible with the other

implies a resignation. 3 Burr. 1615. If a resignation be once accepted, the party cannot after-

wards claim to be restored. 1 Sid. 14 ; 2 Salk. 433.

A corporation may for good cause remove an officer from his office; 2 Stra. 819; Sir T. Ray.

439; and this is incident to a corporation without charter or prescription: 1 Burr. 517: sed. vid.

11 Co. 99, a; Style, 477, 480: 1 Lord Ray. 392; 2 Kyd, 50, <tc., a mandamus lies to com-

pel a removal. 4 Mod. 233. If the member do any thing contrary to the duty of his place or

oath he is removable. 11 Co. 99, a. If an alderman be a common drunkard he is remov-
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politic may also itself be dissolved in several ways, which dissolution is the

civil death of the corporation; and in this case their lands and tenements shall

revert to the person, or his heirs, who granted them to the corporation: for the

law doth annex a condition to every such grant, that, if the corporation be dis-

solved, the grantor shall have the lands again, because the cause of the grant

faileth. (I) The grant is, indeed, only during the life of the corporation; which

may endure forever: but when that life is determined by the dissolution of the

body politic, the grantor takes it back by reversion, as in the case of every other

grant for life. (17) The debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally

extinguished by its dissolution; so that the members thereof cannot recover, or

be charged with them, in their natural capacities; (m) (18) agreeable to that

maxim of the civil law," si quid universitati debetur, singulis non debetur j nee,

quod debet universitas, singuli debent." (n)

(0 Co. l.iil. 13. (M) 1 Lev. 237. (n) Ff. 3, 4, 7.

politic may also itself be dissolved in several wa:rs, which dissolution is the
civil death of the corporation; and in this case their lands and t.enements shall
revert to the person, or his heirs, who granted them to the corporation: for the
law doth annex a. condition to every such grant, that, if the corporation be dissolved, the ~rantor shall have the lands a.gain, because the cause of the grant
faileth. (l) The grant is, indeed, only during the life of the corporation; which
may endure forever: but when that life is determined by the dissolution of the
body politic, the grantor takes it back by reversion, as in the case of every other
grant for life. (17) The debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally
extinguished by its di1:1solution; so that the members thereof cannot recover, or
be charged with them, in their natural capacities; (m) (18) agreeable to that
maxim of the civil law," si quid universitati debetur, singuli& mm debetur; nu,
quod debet universitas, singuli debent." (n)

able for it 2 Rol. 455,1. 20; Dub. 1 Rol. 409; BO if he removes from the borough and refuges

(l) Co. Litt. 13.

attendance without lawful excuse. 4 Mod. 36; Semb. Show. 259; 4 Burr. '2037; and nee

(M)

l Lev.

~7.

(n)

Ff.

S, '· 7.

further 9 Co. 99; Sir T. Raym. 438; Sty. 479. From the decisions on this subject, it appears

that mere non-residence, without any particular inconvenience arising to the corporation from

it, and where the charter does not require it, is no cause for removal. See cartes collected in 3

B. and C. 152. And a corporate office does not become ipso facto vacant by the non-residence

of the corporator ; a sentence must be nagged. 2 T. R. 772. Where a charter doeg not require

the members of a corporation to be resident, the court will not jrrant a mandamus command-
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ing the corporation to meet and consider of the propriety of removing from their offices non-resi

dent corporators, miles* their absence has been productive of gome serious inconvenience. 3 B.

and C. 152. As to what is a cause for removal, 2 Kyd. 62, 94. •

A ministerial officer chosen durante bene placito may be removed ad libitum, as a town

clerk: 1 Vent. 77, 82; Ray. 188; 1 Lev. 291; a recorder, 1 Vent. 242; 2 Jones, 52. And a cus-

tom to remove an officer ud libitum is good: Dy. 332, b.; Cro. J. 540; 2 Salk. 430; but gener-

ally an officer cannot be removed without good cause, though the charter says generally he may

be removed: Dy. 332, b.; or though it says he may be chosen for life *» viderint expedire. 1

Lev. 148. If, however, a charter, by express words, empower either the corporation at large

or a select body to remove an officer at pleasure, or empower them to choose him during pleasure,

they may in either case remove him without cause. Sir T. Jones, 52; 3 Keb. 667; Sir T. Ravin.

188. Though the election be general, if it be not under the common seal, the officers thereby

elected may be removed ad libitum. 2 Jones, 52; 1 Vent. 355. A common freeman cannot in

any case be deprived of his freedom ad libitum of the corporation at large, or of any select body.

Cro. J. 540; Sir T. Raym. 188; 1 Lord Ray. 391.

A removal must in general be by the act of the whole body. If a special power to remove

be delegated to part of the body it must be shown. Cowp. 502, 503, 504; Dougl. 149. T»

this power of amotion the power of holding a corporate meeting for that purpo.se is neces

sarily incident. Dougl. 153, 155. A party cannot be removed but by the corporate act under

geal. 5 Mod. 259. There must be a summons for the mayor, <tc., expressly to meet for th<

purpose of deciding as to the removal: 1 Stra. 385 ; and every member of the assembly must

be summoned where a summons is necessary. 2 Stra. 1051. A corporation cannot in general

remove a member without summoning the party to answer for himself and hearing him, for

he may have a good excuse. 11 Co. 99, a.; 1 Sid. 14. In some cases this may be dispensed

with, and whure non-residence is a good cause of amotion, it is unnecessary, before proceeding

to amove the party, to summon him to come and reside. Dougl. 149. But if he oe remov

able for non-attendance at the corporate assemblies, he must nave had personal -notice to

attend, and that his presence wag necessary; the usual notice of the intended meeting will not

be sufficient, unless that usual notice be personal. 1 Burr. 517, 527, 540. Where an officer is

removable ad libitum, he may be removed without summons or hearing of him, &c. 1 Sid.

15; 1 Lev. 291. In general the summons should show the particular charge alleged against

the party to be removed: 11 Co. 99, a.; 4 Mod. 33, 37; but sometimes this is unnecessary, 1

Lord Raym. 225, 2d ed. 1240; especially where the party by his act dispenses with it. 2 Burr.

723; 1 Kyd. 439,447.

If a member be improperly amoved a mandamus lies. Where it is confessed that a man has

been rightly removed from an office, the court will not grant a mandamus for a restoration,

though he had no notice to appear and defend himself. Cowp. 523; 2 T. It. 177. An

order of restoration of a corporator illegally disfranchised relates to the original right Gown. 503.

able for it. 2 Roi. 455, I. 20 ; Dub. 1 Roi. 409; BO if he removes from the borough and refuae>J
attendance without lawful excutie. 4 Mod. 36; Semb. Show. 2f:>9; 4 Burr. 2087; and I.lee
t'Urther 9 Co. 99; Sir T. Raym. 4:!8; Sty. 479. From the decisions on this subject, it appeara
that mere non-residence, without any particular inconvenience wi11ing to the corporation from
it, and where the charter does not reqmre it., is no cause for removal. See C8'!08 collected in 3
B. and (). 152. And a corporate office does not become ipso facto vacant by the non-residen(<e
of the corporator; a sentenc~ mu1:1t be J.>IW!ed. 2 T. R. 772. Where a charter does not require
the membel'l'I of a cnrpomtion to be re1ndent, the court will not ipimt a mandamus command·
ing the corporation to meet and r.ouHidcr of the propriety of remo\'lng from their offices non-r&li
dent corporatol"ll, unlefll'I their a!Jsence has been productive of some ,;erious inconvenience. 3 B.
and C. 152. .A.t1 to what is a cause for removal, 2 Kyd. 62, 94.
·
A mini11terial officer choi>en durante bene placit.o may be removed ad libitu.m, 88 a t.o\T"Il
clerk: 1 Vent. 77, l'!:l; Hay. 188; 1 Lev. 291; a recorder, 1 Vent. 242; 2 Jones, 52. And a cudtom to remove an officer au li!Jitum is good: Dy. 33"2. b.; Cro. J . 540; 2 Salk. 430; but generally an officer cannot !Je removed without good cause, though the charter eay11 generally he may
be removed: Dy. 33'2, b. ; or though it sayt1 he may be chosen for life 8i l'fderint expcdire. 1
Lev. 14". If, however, a charter, by express word11, empower either the corporatiou at large
or a select body to remove an otti<'er at plca.~ure, or empower them to choose him during pleasure,
they may in either ca.~e remove him without cause. Sir T. Jone11, 52; 3 Keh. 667; Sir T. Hann.
188. Though the election be {lEmeral, if it be not under the common seal, the officerR tbeie!Jv
elected may be removed ad Ii bitum. 2 J one1:1, 52; 1 Vent. 355. .A. common freeman cannot iii
any c88e be d':prived of hi11 freedom ad libitum of the corporation at large, or of any t10lect body.
(,'ro. J. MO; 8ir T. Raym. 188; 1 Lord Ray. 391.
.
A removal must in general be by the act of the whole body. If a special power to remov"
be delegated to part of the body it must be shown. Cowp. 50'2, 500, 504; Dougl. 149. To
this power of &motion the power of holding a corporate meeting for that purpo~e is nooed
sw.ily incident. Dou~I. 153, 15f>. A party cannot be removed !Jut by the corporate act under
11eal. 5 Mod. 259. rhere must be a summons for the mayor, .tc., expressly to meet for th1
purpose of deciding 11.8 to the removal: 1 Stra. 385 ; and every member of the MSCmbly mudt
be summoned where a summons is necessary. 2 Stre.. 1061. A corporation cannot in ~eneral
remove a member without summoning the party to alll!wer for him8elf and hewing him, for
he may have a good excuae. 11 Co. 99, a. ; 1 Sid. 14. In some ca.~eR thiR may be dispensed
wit!i.. and whore non-residence is a ~ood cause of amotion, it is unnecessary, !Jefore procet'diug
to aTnove the party, to summon him to come and reside. Dougl. 149. But if he be remov·
able for non-attendance at the corporate assemblies, he must have had pel'!lOnal .not.ice to
attend, and that his prm1~nce was neceRllarJ ; the usual notice of the intended meeting l'l"ill not
be 1mfficient, unless that uRual notice be lJersonal. 1 Burr. 517, 527, MO. Where an officer is
removable ad libitum, he may be removed without summons or hearing of him &c. 1 Sid.
lf:>; 1 Lev. 291. In general tho summons should show the particular charge ~eged again~t
the party to be removed: 11 Co. 99, a.; 4 Mod. 33, 37; but sometimes this is unnecessary, 1
Loni Raym. 2'i5, :l<l ed. 1240 ; especially where the party by his act dit1pellll08 with it. 2 Burr.
723; 1 Kyd. 439, 447.
If a member be improperly amoved a mandamus lies. Where it is e-0nf68JJ6tl that a man hAs
been rightly removed from an office, the court will not grant a mandamus for a restoration,
though he had no notice to appear and defend himself. Cowp. 523; 2 T. R. 177. .All
order of restoration of a col"_l?orator illegally disfranchised relates to the original right. Co~. sro.
(17) [But if the corporatmn have granted over their po88essions t.o another before thell' dissolution, they do not return to the donor: 1 Roi. 816, l. 10, 20, and vide the cases collected in
Bae. Ab. C<Jrp. J. ; if lands are given to a corporate body ud it is dissolved, they will revert
to the donor anll not ei!Cheat. 9 .Mod. 2'26.]
(18) See note ~l, p. 485.

(17) [But if the corporation have granted over their possessions to another before their dis-
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solution, they do not return to the donor : 1 Rol. 816, 1. 10, 20, and vide the cases collected in

Bac. Ab. Corp. J.; if laiidg are given to a corporate body amd it is dissolved, they will revert

to the donor and not escheat. 9 Mod. 226.]

(16) See note 21, p. 485.
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*A corporation may be dissolved, 1. By act of parliament, which is r */„- -•

boundless in its operations. (19) 2. By the natural death of all its mem- L •' •'I

bers, in case of an aggregate corporation. (20) 3. By surrender of its franchises

into the hands of the king, which is a kind of suicide. 4. By forfeiture of its

charter, through negligence or abuse of its franchises; in which case the law

judges that the body politic has broken the condition upon which it was incor-

porated, and thereupon the incorporation is void. And the regular course is to

bring an information in nature of a writ of quo warranto, to inquire by what

warrant the members now exercise their corporate power, having forfeited it by

such and such proceedings. The exertion of this act of law, for the purposes

of the state, in the reigns of King Charles and King James the Second, particu-

larly by seizing the charter of the city of London, gave great and just offence;

though perhaps, in strictness of law, the proceedings in most of them were

sufficiently regular: but the judgment against that of London was reversed by

act of parliament (o) after the revolution; and by the same statute it is enacted,

that the franchises of the city of London shall never more be forfeited for any

cause whatsoever. And because, by the common law, corporations were dissolved,

in case the mayor or head officer was not duly elected on the day appointed in

the charter, or established by prescription, it is now provided, (p) that for the

future no corporation shall be dissolved upon that account; and ample direc-

tions are given for appointing a new officer, in case there be no election, or a

void one, made upon the prescriptive or charter day. (21)
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(<>) Slat, 9 W. and M. o. 8. (p) Stat. 11 Geo. r, <:. 4.

(19) [The king cannot by his prerogative destroy a corporation. Rex e. Amley, 2 Term E.

532.]

(20) [But, if the king makes a corporation consisting of twelve men to continue always in

succession, and when any of them die the others may choose another in his pjace, it may be so

continued. Roll. 524; Bac. Ab. tit. Corp. G. But, where a corporation consists of several dis-

tinct integral parts, if one of these parts become extinct, whether by the death of the persons

of whom it is composed, or by any other means, the whole corporation is dissolved. 3 Burr.

1866. When an integral part of a corporation is gone, and the corporation has no power to restore

it, or to do any corporate act, the corporation is so far dissolved that the crown may grant a new

charter. 3 T. R. 199. And when the major part of an integral part of a corporation whose

attendance is required at the election of officers, being gone, it operates as a dissolution of the

whole corporation, which has thereby lost the power of noldmg corporate assemblies for the pur-

pose of filling up vacancies and continuing itself. 3 East, 213. And where the election of mayor

was to be made by the majority of an assembly composed of several integral definite parts of a

corporation and other burgesses and inhabitants for the time being, it was held that one of such

definite integral parts, being reduced below its majority of a proper number, could no longer be

represented in such corporate assembly, and the whole corporation was thereby dissolved, being

no longer capable of continuing itself. 4 East, 17.]

(21) It is a tacit condition of a grant of incorporation that the corporators shall act up to

the end or design for which they were incorporated; and hence, through neglect or abuse of

its franchises, a corporation may forfeit its charter as for condition broken, or for a breach of

1 rust. A. and A. on Corp. « 774, and cases cited. It is said, however, that the mere omission

by a corporation to exercise its powers does not, of itself, disconnected with any other acts, work

a forfeiture of the charter: Sandford Ch.. Attorney-General v. Bank of Niagara, 1 Hopk. 361;

but this can hardly be universally true, and in several cases the chartered privileges of banks, it

hat< been held, may be forfeited by suspension of specie payments. State v. Commercial Bank,

10 Ohio, 535; People v. Bank of Pontiac, 12 Mich. 527; see State v. Bank of South Carolina, 1

Speers, 441; Attorney-General v. Bank of Michigan, Har. Ch. 315. So a usurpation of other

franchises than those conferred by the charter may be cause of forfeiture. People v. Utica Ins.

Co., 15 Johns. 358; People v. Oakland County Bank, 1 Doug. Mich. 282; People v. River Raisin

and Lake Erie R. R. Co., 12 Mich. 389. But in any case the neglect or abuse must be wilful;

not merely the result of accident or mistake. State v. Royalton Turnpike Co., 11 Vt. 431;

People r. Hillsdale Turnpike Co., 23 Wend. 254. .

The forfeiture of chartered privileges mnst be declared in a direct proceeding taken on behalf

of the state for that purpose, and cannot be taken advantage of by a private individual in any col-

lateral suit or proceeding. Dyer v. Walker, 40 Penn. St. 157; Vermont and Canada R. R. Co. v.

Vermont Central R. R. Co., 34 Vt. 57; Heard v. Talbot, 7 Gray, 120 ; Cahill v. Kalamazoo Ins. Co.

2 Doug. Mich. 124; Young v. Harrison, 6 Ga. 130; Roudell v. Fay, 32 Cal. 354; Wood v. Coosa,

A r., R. R. Co., 32 Ga. 273. And the state may waive the forfeiture, and will be held to do so by
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any distinct legislative act inconsistent with an intent to enforce it. See Lumpkin r. Jones, 1

Kelly, 30; Commercial Bank v. State, G Smedes and M. 622: People v. Kingston Turnpike Co.,

23 Wend. 193.

The modes in which a private corporation in the United States may be dissolved have been said

to be three: 1. By the death of its members. 2. Surrender of its franchises. 3. A judgment

of forfeiture for iion-usur or abuse. Trustees of Mclntire Poor School v. Zanesville C. and M. Co.,

9 Ohio, 289. Where, however, the corporate powers are vested in shareholders whose shares are

Eroperty, and pass to personal representatives on the death of the owner, it is difficult to perceive

ow a corporation can cease to exist in the first mode mentioned. To these should be added the

determination of corporate powers by the expiration of the period for which they were originally

granted, and the repeal of the charter by the legislature where the right to repeal was reserved in

granting it, or is given by the constitution of the state under which the charter was obtained.

The right to the personal property of a corporation upon its dissolution, which, in England,

is in the king, in the United States, is in the people. It is customary, however, either by gen-

eral or special laws, to make provision for applying the property of corporations, both real and

personal, at the time of their dissolution, to the satisfaction of their debts, and for a distribution

any disti:act legllladt"e act ineoblli8tent with an intent to enforoe it. See Lumpkin "· Jones, 1
Kelly, 30; CQmmeroial Bank ti. State, 6 Smedea and M. 002: People "· Kingston Turnpike Co.•
23 Wend. 1513.

The modes in which a private corporation in the United States may be di880lved have been said
to be three : 1. By the death of it.a memben. 2. Surrender of it.s franchitJell. 3. A jucbtmen~
of forfeiture for non-u881' or abuee. Tru8tees of Kclntire Poor School "· Zanesville C. and .Sl. Co.,
9 Ohio, 289. Where, however; the oorporate powers are vested in shareholdel"il whose aha.res are
property, and pMs to personal representatives on the death of the owner, it is difficult to perceil"e
how a corporation can ce&lle to exist in the first mode mentioned. To these ehould be added the
determination of corporate powers by the expiration of the period for which the~ were originally
granted, and the repeal of the charter by the legislature where the right to repeal was reserved in
grau~ it, or ia given by tho coll.Btitut.ion of tlie state under which the charter was obtained.
The nght to the personal property of a corporation upon it.a diMolntion, which, in Bngiand,
is in the king. in the United Statee, is in the people. U is cuatomary, however, either by general or special lawa, to make provision for applyin~ the ,Property of oorpor&ttona, bot.b real awl
pereonal, at the time of their diaaolution, to the aat.iai6ction of their debt.a, and for a distribution
of the illrplua &mODg the corporators ; and by that means the hardships attending a dislolution
at the commou law are averted.

of the surplus among the corporators; and by that means the hardships attending a dissolution

THE BllD O'P TBB' Piii.ST BOOK.

at the common law are averted.

THE EHD OF THE FIRST BOOK.
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OF THE RIGHTS OF THINGS.

CHAPTER I.

OF PROPERTY, IN GENERAL.

THE former book of these Commentaries having treated at large of the jura

COMMENTARIES

personarum, or such rights and duties as are annexed to the persons of men,

the objects of our inquiry in this second book will be the jura rerum, or those

01'

rights which a man may acquire in and to such external things as are uncon-

nected with his person. These are what the writers on natural law style the

rights of dominion, or property, concerning the nature and original of which I

shall first premise a few observations, before I proceed to distribute and consider

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

its several objects.

*There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and r *o -i

engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that *• -"

sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the exter-

BOOK THE SECOND.......--

nal things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual

in the universe. And yet there are very few that will give themselves the trouble

OF THE RIGHTS OF THINGS.

to consider the original and foundation of this right Pleased as we are with

the possession, we seem afraid to look back to the means by which it was

acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title; or at best we rest satisfied

with the decision of the laws in our favour, without examining the reason or
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authority upon which those laws have been built We think it enough that our

title is derived by the grant of the former proprietor, by descent from our

CHAPTER I.

ancestors, or by the last will and testament of the dying owner; not caring to

reflect that (accurately and strictly speaking) there is no foundation in nature

OF PROPERTY, IN GENERAL.

or in natural law, why a set of words upon parchment should convey the

dominion of land; why the son should have a right to exclude his fellow creat-

ures from a determinate spot of ground, because his father had done so before

him: or why the occupier of a particular field or of a jewel, when lying on his

death-bed, and no longer able to maintain possession, should be entitled to tell

the rest of the world which of them should enjoy it after him. These inquiries,

it must be owned, would be useless and even troublesome in common life. It is

well if the mass of mankind will obey the laws when made, without scrutinizing

too nicely into the reasons of making them. But, when law is to be considered

not only as a matter of practice, but also as a rational science, it cannot be
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THE former book of these Commentaries having treated at large of the jura
per8onarum, or such rights and duties as are annexed to the persons of men,
the objects of our inquiry in this second book will be the jitra rerum, or those.
rights which a man may acquire in and to such external things as are unconnect.ed with his person. These are what the writers on natural law style the
rights of dominion, or property, concerning the nature and original of which I
shall first premise a few observations, before I proceed to distribute and consider
its several objects.
*There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and [ • 2 ]
engages the affections of mankind, as the ri~ht of property; or that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual
in the universe. And yet there are very few that will give themselves the trouble
to consider the original and foundation of this right. Pleased as we are with
the :possession, we seem afraid to look back to the means by which it was
acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title; or at best we rest satisfied
with the decision of the la.we in our favour, without examining the reason or
authority upon which those laws have been built. We think it enough that our
title is denved by the grant of the former propriet.or, by descent from our
ancestors, or by the last will and testament of the dying owner; not caring to
reflect that (accurately and strictly speaking) there is no foundation in nature
or in natural law, why a set of words upon parchment should convey the
dominion of land; why the son should have & right to exclude his fellow creatures from a detennina.te spot of ground, because his father had done so before
him: or why the occupier of a particular field or of a jewel, when lying on his
death-bed, and no longer a.ble to maintain possession, should be entitled t.o tell
the rest of the world which of them should enjoy it after him. These inquiries,
it must be owned, would be useless and even troublesome in common life. It is
well if the mass of man.kind will obey the laws when made, without scrutinizing
too nicely into the reasons of making them. But, when law is to be considered
not only as a matt.er of practice, but also as a rational science, it cannot be
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improper or useless to examine more deeply the rudiments and grounds of these

positive constitutions of society.

In the beginning of the world, we are informed by holy writ, the all-bountiful

Creator gave to man " dominion over all the earth; and over the fish of the sea,

r fg -I and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth *upon

L J the earth, (a) This is the only true and solid foundation of man's do-

minion over external things, whatever airy metaphysical notions may have been

started by fanciful writers upon this subject The earth, therefore, and all things

therein, are the general property of all mankind, exclusive of other beings, from

the immediate gift of the Creator. And, while the earth continued bare of

inhabitants, it is reasonable to suppose that all was in common among them, and

that every one took from the public stock to his own use such things as his

immediate necessities required.

These general notions of property were then sufficient to answer all the pur-

poses of human life; and might perhaps still have answered them had it been

possible for mankind to have remained in a state of primeval simplicity: as

may be collected from the manners of many American nations when first dis-

covered by the Europeans; and from the ancient method of living among the

first Europeans themselves, if we may credit either the memorials of them pre-

served in the golden age of the poets, or the uniform accounts given by histori-

ans of those times, wherein " erani omnia communia et indivisa omnibus, velutl
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unum cunctus patrimonium esset." (b) Not that this communion of goods seems

ever to have been applicable, even in the earliest ages, to aught but the substance

of the thing; nor could it be extended to the use of it. For, by the law of

nature and reason, he, who first began to use it, acquired therein a kind of tran-

sient property, that lasted so long as he was using it, and no longer: (c) or, to

speak with greater precision, the right of possession continued for the same time

only that the act of possession lasted. Thus the ground was in common, and

no part of it was the permanent property of any man in particular ; yet who-

ever was in the occupation of any determined spot of it, for rest, for shade, or

the like, acquired for the time a sort of ownership, from which it would have

been unjust, and contrary to the law of nature, to have driven him by force:

r t^ -i but the instant that he *quitted the use or occupation of it, another

L J might seize it, without injustice. Thus also a vine or other tree might )>e

said to be in common, as all men were equally entitled to its produce; and yet

any private individual might gain the sole property of the fruit, which he b"ad

gathered for his own repast. A doctrine well illustrated by Cicero, who com-

pares the world to a great theatre, which is common to the public, and yet the

place which any man has taken is for the time his own. (d)

But when mankind increased in number, craft, and ambition, it became

necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion; and to appro-

priate to individuals not the immediate use only, but the very substance of the

thing to be used. Otherwise innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the

good order of the world been continually broken and disturbed, while a variety

of persons were striving who should get the first occupation of the same thing,

or disputing which of them had actually gained it. As human life also grew

more and more refined, abundance of conveniences were devised to render it more

easy, commodious, and agreeable; as, habitations for shelter and safety, and

raiment for warmth and decency. But no man would be at the trouble to pro-

vide either, so long as he had only an usufructuary property in them, which was

to cease the instant that he quitted possession; if, as soon as he walked out of

his tent, or pulled off his garment, the next stranger who came by would have

a right to inhabit the one, and to wear the other. In the case of habitations in

particular, it was natural to observe, that even the brute creation, to whom

every thing else was in common, maintained a kind of permanent property in

their dwellings, especially for the protection of their young; that the birds of

(a) Gen. 1, 28. (61 Justin. 1.43, c. 1. (c) Barbeyr. Puff. 1. 4. c. 4.

(dl Qttenuuimodum theatrum, cum commune *H, rate tamtn did potett, ejus ate earn locum </u«fi i/Mby*<

occnparit De Fin. 1. 3, c. 20.
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the air had nests, and the beasts of the field had caverns, the invasion of which

they esteemed a very flagrant injustice, and would sacrifice their lives to pre-

serve them. Hence a property was soon established in every man's house and

home-stall; which seem to have been originally mere *temporary huts or r *K -i

movable cabins, suited to the design of Providence for more speedily L '

peopling the earth, and suited to the wandering life of their owners, before any

extensive property in the soil or ground was established. And there can be no

doubt, but that movables of every kind became sooner appropriated than the

permanent substantial soil: partly because they were more susceptible of a long

occupancy, which might be continued for months together without any sensible

interruption, and at length by usage ripen into an established right; but prin-

cipally because few of them could be fit for use, till improved and meliorated by

the bodily labour of the occupant, which bodily labour, bestowed upon any

subject which before lay in common to all men, is universally allowed to give

the fairest and most reasonable title to an exclusive property therein.

The article of food was a more immediate call, and therefore a more early

consideration. Such as were not contented with the spontaneous product of

the earth, sought for a more solid refreshment in the flesh of beasts, which they

obtained by nuntinjj. But the frequent disappointments incident to that

method of provision, induced them to gather together such animals as were of

a more tame and sequacious nature; and to establish a permanent property in

their flocks and herds in order to sustain themselves in a less precarious manner,
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partly by the milk of the dams, and partly by the flesh of the young. The sup-

port of these their cattle made the article of water also a very important point.

And therefore the book of Genesis (the most venerable monument of antiquity,

considered merely with a view to history) will furnish us with frequent instances

of violent contentions concerning wells; the exclusive property of which appears

to have been established in the first digger or occupant, even in such places

where the ground and herbage remained yet in common. Thus we find Abra-

ham, who was but a sojourner, asserting his right to a well in the country of

Abimelech, and exacting an oath for his security, " because he had digged that

well." (e) And Isaac, *about ninety years afterwards, reclaimed this his

father's property; and after much contention with the Philistines, was

suffered to enjoy it in peace. (/)

All this while the soil and pasture of the earth remained still in common as

before, and open to every occupant: except perhaps in the neighborhood of

towns, where the necessity of a sole and exclusive property in lands (for the

sake of agriculture) was earlier felt, and therefore more readily complied with.

Otherwise, when the multitude of men and cattle had consumed every conven-

ience on one spot of ground, it was deemed a natural right to seize upon and

occupy such other lands as would more easily supply their necessities. This

practice is still retained among the wild and uncultivated nations that have

never been formed into civil states, like the Tartars and others in the east;

•where the climate itself, and the boundless extent of their territory, conspire to

retain them still in the same savage state of vagrant liberty, which was universal

in the earliest ages; and which, Tacitus informs us, continued among the

Germans till the decline of the Roman empire, (g) We have also a striking

example of the same kind in the history of Abraham and his nephew Lot. (A)

When their joint substance became so great, that pasture and other conveniences

grew scarce, the natural consequence was, that a strife arose between their

servants; so that it was no longer practicable to dwell together. This conten-

tion Abraham thus endeavoured to compose: " Let there be no strife I pray thee

between thee and me. Is not the whole land before thee ? Separate thyself, I

pray thee, from me. If thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right;

or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left. This plainly

implies an acknowledged right, in either, to occupy whatever ground he pleased,

(e) Gen. xxl, 30. t/i Gen. xxvi, 15,13, Ac.

(a) Colunt discretietdiverti; utfont, ut camput, itt nemna plocuit. De mor. Otr. 16.

On Uen, c. xiil.
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the air had nests, and the beasts of the field had caverns, the invasion of which
they esteemed a very flagrant injustice, and would sacrifice their lives to preserve them. Hence a property was soon established in every man's house and
home-stall; which seem to have been originally mere *temporary huts or [ ,..5 ]
movable cabins, suited to the design of Providence for more sp<:edily
peopling the earth, and suited to the wandering life of their owners, be~ore any
extensive property in the soil or ground was established. And there can be no
doubt, but that movables of every kind became sooner appropriated than the
permanent substantial soil: partly because they were more susceptible of a long
occupancy, which might be continued for months together without any sensible
intermpt10n, and at length by usage ripen into an established right; hut principally because few of them could be fit for use, till improved and meliorated by
the bodily labour of the occupant, which bodily labour, bestowed upon any
subject which before lay in common to all men, is universally allowed to give
the fairest and most reasonable title to an excTusive property therein.
The article of food was a more immediate call, and therefore a more early
consideration. Such as were not contented with the spontaneous product of
the earth, sou~ht for a more solid refreshment in the flesh of beasts, which they
obtained by nuntin~. But the frequent disappointments incident to that
method of provision, mduced them to gather together such animals as were of
a more tame and sequacious nature; and to establish a permanent property in
their flocks and herds in order to sustain themselves in a less precarious manner,
partly by the milk of the dams, and partly by the flesh of the young. The sup·
port of these their cattle made the article of water also a very important point.
And therefore the book of Genesis (the most venerable monument of antiquity,
considered merely with a view to history) will furnish ue with frequent instances
of violent contentions concerning wells; the exclusive property of which appears
to have been established in the first digger or occupant, even in such places
where the ground and herbage remained yet in common. Thus we find Abraham, who was but a sojourner, asserting his right to a well in the country of
Abimelech, and exacting an oath for his security, "becaftse he had digg-ed that
well." (e) And Isaac, *about ninety years afterwards, reclaimed this his [ • 6 J
father's property; and after much contention with the Philistines, was
suffered to enjoy it in peace.(/)
All this while the soil and pasture of the earth remained still in common as
before, and open to every occupant: except perhaps in the neighborhood of
towns, where the necessity of a sole and exclusiYe property in lands (for the
sake of agriculture) was earlier felt, and therefore more readily complied with.
Otherwise, when the multitude of men and cattle had consumed every convenience on one spot of ground, it was deemed a natural right to seize upon and
occupy such other lands as would more easily supply their necesaities. This
practice is still retained among the wild and uncultivated nations that have
never been formed into civil states, like the Tartars and others in the east;
where the climate itself, and the boundless extent of their territory, cons:pire to
ret.ain them still in the same savage state of vagrant liberty, which was umversal
in the earliest ages; and which, Tacitus informs us, continued amon~ the
Germans till the decline of the Roman empire. (g) We have also a striking
example of the same kind in the history of Abraham and his nephew Lot. (h)
When their joint substance became so great, that pasture and other conveniences
grew scarce, the natural consequence was, that a strife arose between their
servants; so that it was no longer practicable to dwell together. 'rhis contention Abraham thus endeavoured to compose: "Let there be no strife I pray thee
between thee and me. Is not the whole land before thee? Separate thyself, I
pray thee, from me. If thou wilt take the left hand, then I will ~o to the right;
or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left.' This plamly
implies an o.cknowledged right, in either, to occupy whatever ground he pleased,
<el Gen. xxl.1 80. . .
(fl Gen. xxvl, Iii, is, &c.
(g) Colum ducrm ddioern ; ul /Ontl,

(11) Ueo. c. xiii.

ut oampm, 'fl neinw placuU.

De 1110r. <J«o, 16.
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that was not pre-occupied by other tribes. " And Lot lifted up his eyes, and

beheld all the plain of Jordan, that it was well watered everywhere, even a» the

garden of the Lord. Then Lot chose him all the plain of Jordan, and journeyed

east; and Abraham dwelt in the land of Canaan.

r *7 i * Upon the same principle was founded the right of migration, or sending

•- J colonies to find out new habitations, when the mother country was over-

charged with inhabitants; which was practised as well by the Phoenicians and

Greeks, as the Germans, Scythians, and other northern people. And, so lone

as it was confined to the stocking and cultivation of desert, uninhabited

countries, it kept strictly within the limits of the law of nature. But how far

the seizing on countries already peopled, and driving out or massacring the

innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders

in language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far such

a conduct was consonant to nature, to reason, or to Christianity, deserved well

to be considered by those, who have rendered their names immortal by thus

civilizing mankind.

As the world by degrees grew more populous, it daily became more difficult

to find out new spots to inhabit, without encroaching upon former occupants;

and, by constantly occupying the same individual spot, the fruits of the earth

were consumed, and its spontaneous produce destroyed, without any provision

for future supply or succession. It therefore became necessary to pursue some
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regular method of providing a constant subsistence; and this necessity produced,

or at least promoted and encouraged, the art of agriculture. And the art of

agriculture, by a regular connexion and consequence, introduced and established

the idea of a more permanent property in the soil than had hitherto been received

and adopted. It was clear that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient

quantities, without the assistance of tillage: but who would be at the pains of

tilling it, if another might watch an opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the

product of his industry, art, and labour ? Had not therefore a separate property

in lands, as well as movables, been vested in some individuals, the world must

have continued a forest, and men have been mere animals of prey; which, accord-

ing n ing to some philosophers, is the genuine state of nature. *Whereas now (so

"- -1 graciously has Providence interwoven our duty and our happiness together)

the result of this very necessity has been the ennobling of the human species, by

giving it opportunities of improving its rational faculties, as well as of exerting its

natural. Necessity begat property: and in order to insure that property, recourse

was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of inseparable

concomitants: states, government, laws, punishments, ana the public exercise

of religious duties. Thus connected together, it was found that a part only of

society was sufficient to provide, by their manual labour, for the necessary sub-

sistence of all; and leisure was given to others to cultivate the human mind, to

invent useful arts, and to lay the foundations of science.

The only question remaining is, how this property became actually rested: or

what it is that gave a man an exclusive right to retain in a permanent manner

that specific land, which before belonged generally to every body, but particu-

larly to nobody. And, as we before observed that occupancy gave the right to

the temporary use of the soil, so it is agreed upon all hands, that occupancy

gave also the original right to the permanent property in the substance of the

earth itself: which excludes every one else but the owner from the use of it

There is indeed some difference among the writers on natural law, concerning

the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this

absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy

is found on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind, that the first occupant

should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titius, Mr. Locke, and others, hold-

ing, that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there

should be; for that the very act of occupancy, alone, being a degree of bodily

labour, is from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact,

sufficient of itself to gam a title. A dispute that savours top much of nice and
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that W88 not pre-occupied by other tribes. "And Lot lifted up his eyes, and
beheld all the plain of Jordan, that it was well watered everywhere, even as the
garden of the Lord. Then Lot chose him all the plain of Jordan, and journC1'ed
east; and Abraham dwelt in the land of' Canaan."
•
*Upon the same principle was founded the right of migration, or sending
[ •7]
colonies to find out new habitations, when the mother countrv was onrcharged with inhabitants; which was practised as well by the Phcexiicians and
Greeks, as the Germans, Scythians, and other northern people. And, so long
as it was confined to the stocking and cultivation of desert., uninhabitro
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to be considered bl, those, who have rendered their names immortal by thue
civilizing mankind. '
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to find out new spots to inhabit, without encroaching upon former occupants;
and, by constantly occupying the same individual spot, the fruits of the earth
were consumed, and its spontaneous produce destroyed, without any prm-ision
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regular method of providing a constant subsistence; and this necessity produced,
or at least promoted and encouraged, the art of agriculture. And the art of
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nat1tral. Necessity begat property: and in order to insure that property, recour~
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concomitants: states, government, laws, punishments, and the public exercise
of religious duties. Thus connected together, it was found that a part only of
society was sufficient to provide, by their manual labour, for the necessary su~
sistence of all ; and leisure was given to others t.o cultivi.te the human mind, to
invent useful arts, and to lay the foundations of science.
The only question remaining is, how this property became actually vested: or
what it is that gave a man an exclusive right to retain in a permanent manner
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gave also the original right t.o the permanent property in the S"Ubstan~ of the
earth itself: which excludes every one else but the owner from the UBe of it
There is indeed some difference among the writers on natural law, concerning
the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and. invest one with this
absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy
is found on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind, that the first occupant
should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titine, Mr. Lock~ and othilrs, holding, that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there
should be ; for that the very act of occupancy, alone, being a degree of bodily
labour, is from a princi]?le of natural jUBtice, without any consent or compact,
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scholastic refinement. (1) However, both sides agree in this, that occupancy is

the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing to

his own continued *use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable r *q -i

to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any *• •>

one else.

Property, both in lands and movables, being thus originally acquired by the

first taker, which taking amounts to a declaration that ne intends to appropri-

ate the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by the principles of universal

law, till such time as he does some other act which shews an intention to

abandon it; for then it becomes, naturally speaking, publici juris once more,

and is liable to be again appropriated by the next occupant. So, if one is pos-

sessed of a jewel, and casts it into the sea or a public highway, this is such an

express dereliction, that a property will be vested in the first fortunate finder

that will seize it to his own use. But if he hides it privately in the earth or

other secret place, and it is discovered, the finder acquires no property therein;

for the owner hath not by this act declared any intention to abandon it, but

rather the contrary: and if he loses or drops it by accident, it cannot be collected

from thence, that he designed to quit the possession; and therefore in such a

case the property still remains in the loser, who may claim it again of the finder.

And this, we may remember, is the doctrine of the law of England, with relation

to treasure trove, (i)

But this method of one man's abandoning his property, and another seizing
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the vacant possession, however well founded in theory, could not long subsist in

fact. It was calculated merely for the rudiments of civil society, and necessa-

rily ceased among the complicated interests and artificial refinements of polite

(i) See book I, page 295.

IT) [Hut it is of frrrnt importance that moral obligations and the rudiments of laws should be

scholastic refinement. (I) However, both sides agree in this, that occupancv is
the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained ; every ma.n seizing to
his own continued •use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable [ •g]
to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any
one else.
Property, both in lands and movables, being thus originally aequired by the
first taker, which taking amounts to a declaration that he intends to appropriate the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by the principles of universal
law, till such time as he does some other act which shews an intention to
abandon it; for then it becomes, naturally speaking, pubUci juri.'I once more,
and is liable to be again appropriated by the next occupant. So, if one is possessed of a jewel, and casts it into the sea or a public highway, this is such an
express dereliction, that a property will be vested in the first fortunate finder
that will seize it to his own use. But if he hides it privatelv in the earth or
other secret place, and it is discovered, the finder acquires no property therein;
for the owner hath not by this act declared any intention to abandon it, but
rather the contrary: and if he loses or drops it by aceident, it cannot be collected
from thence, that he designed to quit the possession; and therefore in such a
case the property still remains in the loser, who may claim it a.gain of the finder.
And this, we may remember, is the doctrine of the law of England, with relation
to treasure trove. (i)
But this method of one man's abandoning his property, and another seizing
the vacant possession, however well founded in theory, could not long subsist in
fact. It was calculated merely for the rudiments of civil society, and necessarily ceased among the complicated interests and artificial refinements of polite

referred to true and intelligible principles, snch as the minds of serious and well-disposed men can

f'J See book I, page 2116.

rely upon with confidence and satisfaction.

Mr. Locke soys, " that the labor of a man's body, and the work of his hands, we may say are

properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it

in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes

it his property." On Gov. c. 5.

But tliis argument seems to be n /H-H/ia /irhtci/iii: for mixing labor with a thing can signify

only to make an alteration in its shape or form; and if I had a right to the substance, before any

labor was bestowed upon it, that right still adheres to all that remains of the substance, whatever

changes it may have undergone. If I had no right before, it is clear that I have none after; and

we have not advanced a single step by this demonstration.

The account of Grotins and Puffendorf, who maintain that the origin and inviolability of pro-

perty are founded upon a tacit promise or compact, and therefore we cannot invade another's

Sroperty without a violation of a promise or a breach of good faith, seems equally, or more, super-

nous and incouclusive.

There appears to bo just the game necessity to call in the aid of a promise to account for, or

enforce, every other moral obligation, and to say that men are bound not to beat or murder each

other, because they have promised not to do so. Men are bound to fulfil their contracts and

engagements, because society could not otherwise exist; men are bound to refrain from another's

property, because, likewise, society could not otherwise exist. Nothing therefore is gained by

resolving one obligation into the other.

But how, or when, then, does property commence f I conceive no better answer can bo

given, than by occupancy, or when any thing is separated for private use from the common

stores of nature. This is agreeable to the reason and sentiments of mankind, prior to all civil

establishment*. "When an untutored Indian has set before him the fruit which he has plucked

from the tree that protects him from the heat of the sun, and the shell of water raised from

tie fountain that springs at his feet; if he is driven by any daring intruder from this repast,

so easy to bo replaced, he instantly feels and resents the violation of that law of property,

which nature herself has written upon the hearts of all mankind. This universal principle

we find well described in the laws of Menu, son of Brama: " Sages, who know former times,

pronounce cultivated land to be the property of him who cut away the wood, or who cleared and

tilled it; and the antelope, of the first hunter who mortally wounded it." 3 Sir Wm. Jones, 341.

CHRISTIAN.

For interesting discussions on these questions, the reader is referred to Hume's Philosophical

(1) [But it is of great importance that moral obligationH and the rudimenl.8 of laws should be
referred to t.ro.e and int~lligible principles, snob as the minds of l!eriow and well-disposed men can
rely upon with confidence and satisfaction.
.Mr. Locke says, "that the labor of a man's body, and the work of his hands, we may say are
properly bh;. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state thnt nnture hath provided and left it
In, he hath mixed hiR labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes
it his property.'' On Gov. c. 5.
But thl8 argument toooms to be a petiti-0 principii; for mixing labor with a thing can signify
only to make an alteration in its shape or fonn; and if I had a right to the substance, before any
laoor was be$towcd upon it, that right still e.dheres t-0 all that remains of the substance, whatever
change11 it mny have undergone. If I had no right before, it is clear that I have none after; and
we have not advanced & single step by thill demonstration.
The account of Grotius and Puffendorf, who maintain that the origin and inviolability of property are founded upon a tacit promise or compact, and therefore we cannot invade another's
property without a violation of a promise or a breach of good faith, seems equally, or more, superBuonR and incouclui1ive.
There sppeani to be ju!lt the same necessity to call in the aid of s promise to account for, or
enforce, every other moral obligation, and to say that men are bound not to beat or murder each
other, becauRe they bnve promii!cd not to do so. Men are bound to fulfil their contracts and
engagementil, because Rociety could not otherwise exist; men are bound to refrain from another's
property, beooul'e, likewise, tl()(•iety could not otherwise exist. Nothing therefore is gained by
reMlving one obligation into the other.
But how, or when, then, does property commence f I conceive no better answer can be
given, than by occupru:icv, or when any thing is separated for private use from the common
stores of nature. 'fhis 'ls agreeable to the reason and sentiments of mankind, prior to all civil
establishment... When an untutored Indian has set before him the fruit which he h11.11 plucked
from the tree that protect.'! him from the heat of the sun, and the shell of water raised from
the fountain that springs at hit1 foet; if' he i:; driven by any daring intruder froru thit1 repa:;t,
so ea.~y to be replo.ccd, he irn1tantly feels and resents the violation of that law of property,
which nature hanielf has written upon the hearts of all mankind. This universal principle
we tind well dca;cribed in the law11 of .Menu, son of Brame.: "Sages. who know fonncr times,
pronounce cultivated land to be the property of him who cut away the wood, or who clea.rod and
tilled it ; and the antelope, of the fin;t hllnter who mortally wounded it/' 3 Sir Wm. Jones, 341.
CBBlllTIA.N.

1''or intere8ting discusRion~ on these questions, the reader i::1 referred to Hume's Philosophical
works, vol. 2; Benthum, Fragment of Government, Ed. 1776, p. 179, n; .Austin, Province of
JuriHprudence.]
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and established governments. In these it was found, that what became incon-

venient or useless to one man, was highly convenient and useful to another;

who was ready to give in exchange for it some equivalent, that was equally

desirable to the former proprietor. Thus mutual convenience introduced com-

mercial traffic, and the reciprocal transfer of property by sale, grant, or convey-

r*iAi ance: which *may be considered either as a continuance of the original

<- J possession which the first occupant had; or as an abandoning of the thing

by the present owner, and an immediate successive occupancy of the same by

the new proprietor. The voluntary dereliction of the owner, and delivering the

possession to another individual, amount to a transfer of the propertv: the pro-

prietor declaring his intention no longer to occupy the thing himself, but that

his own right of occupancy shall be vested in the new acquirer. Or, taken in

the other light, if I agree to part with an acre of my land to Titius, the deed of

conveyance is an evidence of my intending to abandon the property: and Titius,

being the only or first man acquainted with such my intention, immediately

steps in and seizes the vacant possession: thus the consent expressed by the

conveyance gives Titius a good right against me; and possession, or occupancy,

confirms that right against all the world besides.

The most universal and effectual way of abandoning property, is by the death

of the occupant: when, both the actual possession and intention of keeping

possession ceasing, the property which is founded upon such possession and

intention ought also to cease of course. For, naturally speaking, the instant a
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man ceases to be, he ceases to have any dominion: else if he had a right to dis-

pose of his acquisitions one moment beyond his life, he would also have a right

to direct their disposal for a million of ages after him: which would be highly

absurd and inconvenient. All property mUjst therefore cease upon death, con-

sidering men as absolute individuals, and'unconnected with civil society: for,

then, by the principles before established, the next immediate occupant would

acquire a right in all that the deceased possessed. But as, under civilized gov-

ernments which are calculated for the peace of mankind, such a constitution

would be productive of endless disturbances, the universal law of almost every

nation (which is a kind of secondary law of nature) has either given the dying

person a power of continuing his property, by disposing of his possessions by

will; or, in case he neglects to dispose of it, or is not permitted to make any

F*ll 1 Disposition *at all, the municipal law of the country then steps in, and

L -1 declares who shall be the successor, representative, or neir of the deceased;

that is, who alone shall have a right to enter upon this vacant possession, hi

order to avoid that confusion which its becoming again common would occa-

sion, (k) And farther, in case no testament be permitted by the law, or none be

made, and no heir can be found so qualified as the law requires, still, to prevent

the robust title of occupancy from again taking place, the doctrine of escheats is

adopted in almost every country; whereby the sovereign of the state, and those

who claim under his authority, are the ultimate heirs, and succeed to those

inheritances to which no other title can be formed.

The right of inheritance, or descent to the children and relations of the

deceased, seems to have been allowed much earlier than the right of devising

by testament. We are apt to conceive at first view that it has nature on its aide;

yet we often mistake for nature what we find established by long and inveterate

custom. It is certainly a wise and effectual, but clearly a political, establish-

ment ; since the permanent right of property, vested in the ancestor himself,

was no natural, but merely a civil right. (2) It is true, that the transmission

(k) It is principally to prevent any vacancy of possession, that the civil law considers father and eon u

one person: go that upon the ilenth or either, the inheritance does not so properly descend, as continue

in the hands of the survivor. i'f. 28, 2.11.

and established governments. In these it was found, that what became inconvenient or useless to one man, was highly convenient u.nd useful to another;
who was ready t-0 give in exchange for it some equivalent, t.hat was equally
desirable to the former proprietor. Thus mutual convenience introduced commercial traffic, and the reciprocal transfer of property by sale, grant, or conYey[ *lO] ance: which *may be considered either as a continuance of the original
possession which the first occupant had; or as an abandoning of the thing
by the present owner, and an immediate successive occupancy of the same by
the new proprietor. The voluntary dereliction of the owner, and delivering the
possession to another individual, amount to a transfer of the propertv: the proprietor declaring his intention no longer to occupy the thin~ himself, but that
bis own right of occupancy shall be vested in the new acqmrer. Or, taken in
the other light, if I agree to part with an acre of my land to Titius, the deed of
conveyance 1s an evidence of my intending to abandon the property: and Ti ti us,
being the only or first man acquainted with such my intention, immediately
steps in and seizes the vacant eossession: thus the consent expressed by the
conveyance gives Titins a good nght against me; and possession, or occupancy,
confirms thu.t right against all the world besides.
The most uniYersal and effectual way of abandoning pro~rty, is by the death
of the occupant : when, both the actual possession and intention of keeping
rossession ceasing, the property which is founded upon such possession and
mtention ought also to cease of course. For, naturally speaking, the instant a
man ceases to be, he ceases to have any dominion: else if he had a right to dispose of his acquisitions one moment beyond his life, he would also have a right
to direct their disposal for a million of ages after him: which would be highly
absurd and inconvenient. All property m~t therefore cease upon death, considering men as absolute individuals, and,unconnected with civil society: for,
then, by the principles before established, the next immediate occupant would
acquire a right in all that the deceased possessed. But as, under civilized governments which are calculated for the peace of mankind, such a constitution
would be producth·e of endless disturbances, the universal law of almost every
nation (which is a kind of secondary law of nature) has either given the dying
person a power of continuing his property, by disposing of his possessions bv
will; or, in case he neglects to dispose of it, or is not permitted to make any
[*ll ] disposition *at all, the municipal law of the country then steps in, and
declares who shall be the successor, representative, or heir of the deceased;
that is, who alone shall have a ri~ht to enter upon this vacant possession, in
order to avoid that confusion which its becoming again common would occasion. (k) And farther, in case no testament be permitted by the law, or none be
made, and no heir can be found so qualified as the law requires, still, to prevent
the robust title of occupancy from a.gain taking place, the doctrine of escheata is
adopted in almost every country; whereby the sovereign of the state, and those
who claim under his authority, are the ultimate heirs, and succeed to those
inheritances to which no other title can be formed.
The right of inheritance, or descent to the children and relations of the
deceased, seems to have been allowed much earlier than the right of devising
by testament. We are apt to conceive at first view that it has nature on its aide;
yet we often mistake for nature what we find established by Ion~ and inveterate
custom. It is certainly a wise and effectual, but clearly a political, est.ablishment; since the permanent right of property, vested in the ancestor himself,
was no nalu.rrtl, but merely a civil right. (2) It is true, that the transmission

(2) [I cannot agree with the learned commentator, that the permanent right of property vested

in the ancestor himself (that is, for his life), is not a natural, but merely a civil, right.

I have endeavored to show (Note 1) that the notion of property is universal, and is sug-

(k) It le prlnc1pally to pre,·en~ any vacancy of possession, that the civil law considers 111.ther and son u
one person; so that upon the •tenth or either, the Inheritance doea not ao properly deacend, u coattaae
In the bands ortbe survivor. Ff. 28, 2 11.

gested to the mind of man by reason and nature, prior to all positive institutions and oivu-
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of one's possessions to posterity has an evident tendency to make a man a good

citizen and a useful member of society : it sets the passions on the side of duty,

and prompts a man to deserve well of the public, when he is sure that the

reward of his services will not die with himself, but be transmitted to those

with whom he is connected by the dearest and most tender affections. Yet,

reasonable as this foundation of the right of inheritance may seem, it is prob-

able that its immediate original arose not from speculations altogether so deli-

cate and refined, and, if not from fortuitous circumstances, at least from a

plainer and more simple principle. A man's children or nearest relations are

usually about him on his *death-bed, and are the earliest witnesses of his r „, ^ -i

decease. They become therefore generally the next immediate occupants, *- -"

till at length in process of time this frequent usage ripened into general law.

And therefore also in the earliest ages, on failure of children, a man's servants

born under his roof were allowed to be his heirs; being immediately on the

spot when he died. For, we find the old patriarch Abraham expressly declaring,

that " since God had given him no seed, his steward Eliezer, one born in his

house, was his heir." (I)

While property continued only for life, testaments were useless and unknown:

and, when it became inheritable, the inheritance was long indefeasible, and the

children or heirs at law were incapable of exclusion by will. Till at length it

was found, that so strict a rule of inheritance made heirs disobedient and head-

strong, defrauded creditors of their just debts, and prevented many provident
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fathers from dividing or charging their estates as the exigence of their families

required. This introduced pretty generally the right of disposing of one's

property, or a part of it, by testament; that is, by written or oral instructions

properly witnessed and authenticated, according to the pleasure of the deceased,

which we therefore emphatically style his witt. This was established in some

countries much later than in others. With us in England, till modern times, a

man could only dispose of one-third of his movables from his wife and chil-

dren ; and, in general, no will was permitted of lands till the reign of Henry

the Eighth; and then only of a certain portion'. for it was not till after the

restoration that the power of devising real property became so universal as at

present.

Wills, therefore, and testaments, rights of inheritance and successions, are all

of them creatures of the civil or municipal laws, and accordingly are in all

respects regulated by them; every distinct country having different ceremonies

and requisites to make a testament completely valid; neither does any thing

vary more than the right of inheritance under different *national estab- r *jo -i

lishments. In England, particularly, this diversity is carried to such a I- J

(I) Gen. XT, 3.

ized refinements. If the laws of the land were suspended, we should be nnder the same moral

and natural obligation to refrain from invading each other's property as from attacking and

of one's possessions to posterity has a.n evident tendency to make a man a good
citizen and a useful member of society: it sets the passions on the side of duty,
and prompts a man to deserve well of the public, when he is sure that the
reward of his services will not die with himself, but be transmitted to those
with whom he is connected by the dearest and most tender affections. Yet,
reasonable as this fonndtLtiou of the right of inheritance may seem, it is probable that its immediate original arose not from speculations altogether so delicate and refined, and, if not from fortuitous ci1·cumstances, at least from a
plainer and more simple principle. A man's children or nearest relations are
usually about him on his *death-bed, and are the earliest witnesses of his [ • 12 ]
decease. They become therefore generally the next immediate occupants,
till at length m process of time this frequent usage ri~ned into general law.
And therefore also in the earliest ages, on failure of children, a man's servants
born under his roof were allowed to be bis heirs; being immediately on the
spot wh_en he died. Fo~, we fi~d the old pati:iarch Abrfl.hai;n expressly decl~ring,
that "smce God had given him no seed, hts steward Ehezer, one born m his
house, was his heir." (l)
While property continued only for life, testaments were useless and unknown:
and, when it became inheritable, the inheritance was long indefeasible, ancl the
children or heirs at law were incapable of exclusion by will. Till at length it
was found, that so strict a rule of inheritance made heirs disobedient and headstrong, defrauded creditors of their just debts, and prevented many provident
fathers from dividing or charging their estates as the exigence of their families
required. This introduced pretty generally the right of disposing of one's
property, or a part of it, by testament; that is, by written or oral instructions
pro~rly witnessed and authenticated, according to the pleasure of the deceased,
which we therefore emphatically style his will. This was established in some
countries much later than in others. With ns· in England, till modern times, a
man could only dispose of one-third of his movables from his wife and children ; and, in general, no will was permitted of lands till the reign of Henry
the Eighth; and then only of a certain portion~ for it was not till after the
restoration that the power of deTising real property became so universal as at
present.
Wills, therefore, and testaments; rights of inheritance and successions, are all
of them creatures of the civil or municipal laws, and accordingly are in all
respects re1p1lated by them; every distinct country having different ceremonies
and requisites to make a testament completely valid; neither does any thing
v_ary more than the right of ~nheritance. un~er ~ffe!ent •~ational est.ab- [ *l3]
hshments. In Engl11.nd, particularly, this diversity is earned to such a
(I) Gen. xv, S.

assaulting each other's persons. I am obliged also to differ from the learned judge, and all

writers upon general law, who maintain that children have no better claim by nature to succeed

to the property of their deceased parents than strangers; and that the preference given to them

originates solely in political establishments. I know no other criterion by which we can deter-

mine any rule or obligation to be founded in nature, than its universality; and by inquiring

whether it is not, and has not been, in all countries and ages, agreeable to the feelings, affections,

and reason of mankind. The affection of parents towards their children is the most powerful and

universal principle which nature has planted iu the human breast; and it cannot be conceived,

even in the most savage state, that any one is so destitute of that affection and of reason, who

would not revolt at the position, that a stranger has as good a right as his children to the property

of a deceased parent.

Hatredes guecessoresque sui cuique liberi, seems not to have been confined to the woods of Ger-

many, but to be one of the first laws in the code of nature; though positive institutions may

have thought it prudent to leave the parent the full disposition of his property after his death,

or to regulate the shares of the children, when the parent's will is unknown.

In the earliest history of mankind we have express authority that this is agreeable to the will

of God himself; and behold the word of the Lord came unto Abraham, saying, this shall not be thine

heir; but he that shall come out of thine own towels shall be thine heir. Gen. c. 15. CHRISTIAN.
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length, as if it had been meant to point out the power of the laws in regulating

the succession to property, and how futile every claim must be, that has not its

foundation in the positive rules of the state. In personal estates the father may

succeed to his children; in landed property he never can be their immediate

heir, by any the remotest possibility: (3) in general only the eldest son, in some

places only the youngest, m others all the sons together, have a right to succeed

to the inheritance: in real estates males are preferred to females, and the eldest

male will usually exclude the rest; in the division of personal estates, the

females of equal degree are admitted together with the males, and no right of

primogeniture is allowed.

This one consideration may help to remove the scruples of many well-meaning

persons, who set up a mistaken conscience in opposition to the rules of law. If

a man disinherits his son, by a will duly executed, and leaves his estate to a

stranger, there are many who consider this proceeding as contrary to natural

justice; while others so scrupulously adhere to the supposed intention of the

dead, that, if a will of lands be attested by only two witnesses, instead of three,

which the law requires, they are apt to imagine that the heir is bound in con-

science to relinquish his title to the devisee. But both of them certainly pro-

ceed upon very erroneous principles, as if, on the one hand, the son haa by

nature a right to succeed to his father's lands: or, as if, on the other hand, the

owner was by nature entitled to direct the succession of his property after his

own decease. Whereas, the law of nature suggests, that, on the death of the
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possessor, the estate should again become common, and be open to the next

occupant, unless otherwise ordered for the sake of civil peace by the positive law

of society. The positive law of society, which is with us the municipal law of

England, directs it to vest in such person as the last proprietor shall, by will,

attended with certain requisites, appoint; and, in defect of such appointment, to

T *141 ^° *° 8ome Particular person, who, from the result *of certain local consti-

"- •" tutions, appears to be the heir at law. Hence it follows, that, where the

appointment is regularly made, there cannot be a shadow of right in any one

but the person appointed; and, where the necessary requisites are omitted, the

right of the heir is equally strong, and built upon as solid a foundation, as the

right of the devisee would have been, supposing such requisites were observed.

But, after all, there are some few things, which, notwithstanding the general

introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoidably remain in

common; being such wherein nothing but an usufructuary property is capable

of being had; and, therefore, they still belong to the first occupant, during the

time he holds possession of them, and no longer. Such (among others) are the

elements of light, air and water; which a man may occupy by means of nis win-

dows, his gardens, his mills, and other conveniences: such, also, are the gener-

ality of those animals which are said to \Kferce natures, or of a wild and untame-

able disposition; which any man may seize upon and keep for his own use or

pleasure. All these things, so long as they remain in possession, every man has

a right to enjoy without disturbance; but, if once they escape from his custody,

or he voluntarily abandons the use of them, they return to the common stock,

and any man else has an equal right to seize and enjoy them afterwards.

Again; there are other things in which a permanent property may subsist,

not only as to the temporary use, but also the solid substance; and which yet

would be frequently found without a proprietor, had not the wisdom of the law

provided a remedy to obviate this inconvenience. Such are forests and other

waste grounds, which were omitted to be appropriated in the general distribu-

tion of lands; such, also, are wrecks, estrays, and that species of wild animals

which the arbitrary constitutions of positive law have distinguished from the

(3) That is, as father he could not be such heir; but he might nevertheless sustain such rela-

tion in the child in a collateral way as to entitle him to the inheritance.

And since the statute 3 and 4 William IV, c. 106, the lineal ancestor may be heir to his tespe

in preference to collaterals, where there is a failure of lineal descendants. Similar statutes exist

in the United States.
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introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoidably remain in
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not only as t-0 the temporary use, but also the solid substance; and which yet
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rest by the well-known appellation of game. With regard to these and some

others, as disturbances and quarrels *would frequently arise among indi- p... -i

viduals, contending about the acquisition of this species of property by "- J

first occupancy, the law has therefore wisely cut up the root of dissention by

vesting the things themselves in the sovereign of the state; or else in his repre-

sentatives appointed and authorized by him, being usually the lords of manors.

And thus the legislature of England has universally promoted the grand ends

of civil society, the peace and security of individuals, by steadily pursuing that

wise and orderly maxim of assigning to every thing capable of ownership a legal

and determinate owner. (4)

CHAPTER IJ.

OF REAL PROPERTY ; AND, FIRST, OF CORPOREAL HERED-

ITAMENTS.

THE objects of dominion or property are things, as contradistinguished from

persons: and things are, by the law of England, distributed into two kinds;

things real and things personal. Things real are such as are permanent, fixed

and immovable, which cannot be carried out of their place; as lands and tene-

ments: things personal are goods, money, and all other movables; .which may

attend the owner's person wherever he thinks proper to go. (1)

In treating of things real, let us consider, first, their several sorts or kinds;

secondly, the tenures oy which they may be holdeu; thirdly, the estates which

may be had in diem; and fourthly, the title to them, and the manner of acquir-
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ing and losing it.

First, with regard to their several sorts or kinds, things real are usually said

to consist in lands, tenements or hereditaments. Land comprehends all things

(4) [It is not very easy, as the author seems to be aware, for the minds of renders who have

been born and bred np in all the habits and with the feelings of civil society, to admit the trntk

of this reasoning on the acquisition and transmission of property. The subject is too wide a one

to be discussed in a note; but two observations may be made as important in forming a sound

opinion on the whole matter. First, we should have a clear notion what is meant by natural

rights, or rights founded in the laws of nature, as far as regards this subject. "When we say

that a right to devise property of our own acquisition, or to inherit that left undisposed of by our

fathers, is a right founded on the law of nature, we commonly mean, a right founded on those

conclusions of natural reason and justice which men in all civil societies have, as it were, by

general consent, recognized and established. But it is obvious that the law of nature, thus

understood, presupposes the formation, nay, even in some measure, the maturity of civil society,

and of course along with it the existence of the right of property. Whereas, strictly considered,

the law of nature relates to a time anterior to this, and provides for a state of things independent

of civil compact. In this point of view it seems correct to say that inheritance and devise are

not founded on the law of nature.

But secondly, in the former sense it may be equally true, that the industrious acquirer of prop-

erty has a natural right to transmit it to whomsoever he pleases, and that the child has a natural

right to inherit what hte ancestor shall not have transmitted specially to any other person; that

is to say, the wisest persons in all societies have agreed that, by the establishment of these two

rights, certain great purposes of civil union are best answered.]

(1) The reader will be careful to note here that toe learned commentator is speaking of

thitigs real, and not of the estate or interest which one may have in those things. "We shall

see hereafter that an estate in the most permanent species of property may be of such character

and duration, that the law does not regard it as real property, out classifies it for most purposes,

as re&pects its control, assignment, and transmission on the death of the owner, with things

personal. .Nevertheless, when such estates exist, there'is always a higher estate in the same

things real, vested in some other person, and which is designated as real estate. The nature

of the thing itself, therefore, does not determine the character of any particular estate that may

exist in it, whether real or.perspnal^'butjthe.extent and 'duration of the estate, as wiH be hereaf?

I er explained.
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of a permanent substantial nature; being a word of a very extensive significa-

tion, as will presently appear more at large. Tenement is a word of still greater

F*17 1 ex*'ent' an(^ though, in its vulgar *acceptation, it is only applied to houses

•- J and other buildings, yet, in its original, proper and legal sense, it signi-

fies every thing that may be holden, provided it be of a permanent nature;

whether it be of a substantial and sensible, or of an unsubstantial, ideal kind. (2)

Thus, liberum tenementum, frank tenement, or freehold, is applicable not only

to lands and other solid objects, but also to offices, rents, commons, and the

like: (a) and, as lands and houses are tenements, so is an advowson a tenement;

and a franchise, an office, a right of common, a peerage, or other property of the

like unsubstantial kind, are all of them, legally speaking, tenements, (b) ~ But an

hereditament, says Sir Edward Coke, (c) is by much the largest and most com-

prehensive expression; for it includes not only lands and tenements, but what-

soever may be inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal or mixed.

Thus, an heir-loom, or implement of furniture which, by custom, descends to

the heir, together with a house, is neither land nor tenement, but a mere mov-

able ; yet being inheritable, is comprised under the general word hereditament:

and so a condition, the benefit of which may descend to a man from his ances-

tor, is also an hereditament, (d) (3)

Hereditaments, then, to use the largest expression, are of two kinds, corporeal

and incorporeal. Corporeal consist of such as affect the senses; such as may be

seen and handled by the body: incorporeal are not the object of sensation, can
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neither be seen nor handled, are creatures of the mind, and exist only in con-

templation.

Corporeal hereditaments consist wholly of substantial and permanent objects;

all which may be comprehended under the general denomination of land only.

For land, says Sir Edward Coke, (e) comprehendeth, in its legal signification, any

ground, soil or earth whatsoever; as arable, meadows, pastures, woods, moors,

waters, marshes, furzes and heath. *It legally includeth, also, all castles, ,-„, g -,

houses and other buildings: for they consist, saith he, of two things; L J

land, which is the foundation, and structure thereupon; so that, if I convey the

land or ground, the structure or building passeth therewith. It is observable

that water is here mentioned as a species of land, which may seem a kind of

(a) Co. l,itt. 6. (6) n,i,l. 19, 20. (e) 1 lust. 6. (d} 3 Hep. ». (<) 1 Inst. 4.

(2) [Therefore, in an action of ejectment, which, with the exception of tithe and common

appurtenant, is only sustainable for a corporeal hereditament, it is improper to describe the

property sought to be recovered ax a tenement, unless with reference to a previous more cer-

of a permanent substantial nature; being a word of a wry extensive signification, as will presently appear more at larfe. Tenement is a word of still greater
(*l 7] extent, and though, in its vulgar accettation, it is only applied to houses
and other buildings, yet, in its origina '[roper and legal sense, it signifies every thing that may be holden, provide it be of a permanent nature;
whether it be of a substantial and sensible, or of an unsubstuntial, ideal kind (2)
Thus, liberum tenementum, frank tenement, or freehold, is applicable not only
to lands and other solid objects, but also to offices, rents_. commons, and the
like: (a) and, as lands and houses arc tenements, so is an advowson a tenement;
and a. franchise, an office, a right of common, a peera~e, or other property of the
like unsubstantial kind, are all of them, legally speakmg, tenements. (h) But an
hereditament, says Sir Edward Coke, (c) is bl much the largest and most comprehensive expression; for it includes not on y lands and tenements, but whatsoever may be inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal or mixed.
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Hereditaments, then, to use the largest expression, are of two kinds, corporeal
and incorporeal. Corporeal consist of such as affect the senses; such as may be
seen and handled by the body: incorporeal are not the object of sensation, can
neither be seen nor handled, are creatures of the mind, and exist only in contemplation.
Corporeal hereditaments consist wholly of substantial and permanent objecta;
all which may be comprehended under the general denomination of land only.
For land, says Sir Edward Coke, (e) comprehendeth, in its legal signification, any
ground, soil or earth whatsoever; as arable, meadows, pastures, woods, moors,
waters, marshes, furzes and heath. "'It legally includeth, also, a.II cast.Jes, (*lS]
houses and other buildings: for they consist, saith he, of two things;
land, which is the foundation, ant! structiere thereupon; so that, if I convey the
land or ground, the structure or building passeth therewith. It is obserrnble
that water is here mentioned as a species of land, which may se.em a kind of
(al Co. Litt. 6.

(bJ Ibid. l!l, 20.

(CJ 1 Inst. 6.

(d) 8Rep. 9.

(e) l

In8t. -l.

tain description. 1 East, 441; 8 id. 357. By the general description of a messuage, a church

may be recovered. 1 Salk. 256. The term close without stating a name or number of acres,

in a sufficient description in ejectment. 11 Coke, 55. In common acceptation it means an

enclosed field, but in law it rather signifies the separate interest of the party in a particular

spot of laud, whether enclosed or not. 7 East, 207; Doct. and Stud. 30. If a man make a

feoffmeut of a house " with the appurtenances," nothing passes by the words with the appur-

tenances, but the garden, curtilage, and close adjoining to the house, and on which the house

is built, and no other land, although usually occupied with the house; but by a devise of a

messuage, without the words " with the appurtenances," the garden and curtilage will pass, and

where the intent is apparent, even other adjacent property. See eases, 2 Saund. 401, not* i

1 Bar. and Ores. 350; see further as to the effect of the word " appurtenant," 15 East, 109; 3

Taunt. 24, 147; 1 B. and P. 53, 55; 2 T. R. 498, 502; 3 M. and S. 171. The term farm, though

in common acceptation it imports a tract of land with a house, out-buildings, and cultivated

land, yet in law, and especially in the description in an action of ejectment, it signifies the

leasehold interest in the premises, and does not mean a farm in its common acceptation. See

post, 318.]

(3) [By a condition is here meant a qualification or restriction annexed to a conveyance of

land, whereby it is provided that in case a particular event does or does not happen, or a par-

ticular act is done or omitted to be done, an estate shall commence, he enlarged or defeated. As

an instance of the condition here intended, suppose A to have enfeoffed B of an acre of ground

upon condition, that if his heir should pay the feoffor 20«. he and his heir should re-enter; this

condition would be an hereditament descending on A's heir after A's death, and if such heir

after A's death should pay the 20». he would be entitled to re-enter, and would hold the land us

if it had descended to him. Co. Litt. 211, 214 b.]
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(2) [Therefore, in an action of ejectment, which, with the exception of tithe and common
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ill lmilt, and no other land, although usually occupied with the house; but by a devitie of a
messuage, without the words "with the apJ!!l"tenance.s," the garden and curtilage will pa..«S, and
where the intent i11 apparent, even other adjacent property. Soe ca..qes, 2 Saund. 401, not~ 2.
1 Bar. and Gres. 350; tiee further as to the effect of the word "appurteuant," 15 East, 109; 3
Taunt. 24, 147; 1 B. and P. 53, 55; 2 T. R. 498, 502; 3 Y. and S. 171. The term farm, though
in common acceptation it imports a tract of land with a houBe, out-buildings, and cultivated
land, yet in law, and especially in the description in an action of ejectment, it signi1ies the
leasehold interest in the premises, and doetJ not mean a farm in it.a common acceptation. See
post, 318.]
(3) [By a condition is here meant a qualification or restriotion annexed to a conveyance of
land, whereby it is provided that in ca..'16 a particular event does or does not happen, or a particular a.ct ill done or omitted to be done, an estate shall commence, be enlarged or defeated. As
e.n instance of the condition here intended, suppose A. to have enfeoffed B of an acre of ttronnd
upon condition, that if his heir shonld pay the feoft'or 20s. he and his heir shonld re-enter; t~
condition would be an hereditament descending on A's heir after A's death: and if such bell'
after A's dee.th should pay the 20s. he wonld be entitJed to re-enter, and wonla hold the land l\S
if it had descended to him. Co. Litt. 211, 214 b.]
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solecism ; but such is the language of the law: and therefore I cannot bring an

action to recover possession of a pool or other piece of water by the name of

water only; either by calculating its capacity, as, for so many cubical yards;

or, by superficial measure, for twenty acres of water; or by general description,

as for a pond, a watercourse, or a rivulet; but I must bring my action for the

land that lies at the bottom, and must call it twenty acres of land covered with

water. (/) (4) For water is a movable, wandering thing, and must of neces-

sity continue common by the law of nature; so that I can only have a tempo-

rary, transient, usufructuary property therein ; wherefore, if a body of water runs

out of my pond into another man'8,1 have no right to reclaim it. But the land

which that water covers is permanent, fixed and immovable; and therefore, in

this, I may have a certain substantial property; of which the law will take

notice, and not of the other.

Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as

well as downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad cesium, is the maxim of

the law; upwards, therefore no man may erect any building, or the like to over-

hang another's land: and downwards, whatever is in a direct line, between the

surface of any land and the centre of the earth, belongs to the owner of the sur-

face ; as is every day's experience in the mining countries. So that the word

'• land" includes not only the face of the earth, but every thine under it, or

over it. And therefore, if a man grants all his lands, he grants thereby all his

mines of metal and other fossils, his woods, his waters, and his houses, as well
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as his fields and meadows. Not but the particular names of the things are

*equally sufficient to pass them, except in the instance of water; by a r^ ^ -,

grant of which, nothing passes but a right of fishing: (g) (5) but the >- -1

capital distinction is this, that by the name of a castle, messuage, toft, croft, (6)

(/) Brownl. 143. (g) Co. Litt. 4.

(4) The grant of a stream of water eo nomine, will not pass the land over which the water

runs ; Jackson v. Halstead, 5 Cow. 216; Egremont t>. Williams, 11 A. and E. (N. S.) 701; the

grant of a parcel of land, on the other hand, passes the property in a stream of water which runs

over it, as mnch as it does the property hi the stones upon the surface. Buckingham t>. Smith,

10 Ohio, 288; Brown ». Kennedy, 5 H. and J. 195; Canal Commissioners v. People, 5 Wend. 423;

Elliot v. Fitchbnrg R. R. Co., 10 Cash. 193. One who owns land on both sides of a stream owns

the whole bed. If he in bounded upon it, he owns to the thread of the stream. Hatch r. Dwight,

17 Mass. 289; Mead v. Haynes, 3 Rand. 33; Morrison « Keen, 3 Greenl. 474; Middleton p.

Pritchard, 3 Seam. 510; Jones v. Soulard, 24 How. 41; Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vt. 257; Stolp

v. Hoyt, 44 111. 219 ; Berry r. Snyder, 3 Bush. 266. Prima facie, every proprietor on each bank

of a nver is entitled to the land covered with water to the middle thread of the stream, or, as is

commonly expressed, usque adfilum aqua:. In virtue of this ownership he has a right to the use

of the water flowing over it, in its natural current, without diminution or obstruction. But strictly

speaking he has no property in the water itself, but a simple use of it while it passes along. The

consequence of this principle is, that no proprietor has a right to use the stream to the prejudice

of another. This is a necessary result of the perfect equality of right among all the proprietors of

that which is common to all. Story, J. in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 400; Beissell ». Sholl,

4 Ball. 211; Ingraham v. Hntchinson, 2 Conn. 584; Hendricks v. Johnson, 6 Port. 472; Omclvany

v. Jaggera, 2 Hul (S. C.), 634 ; Elliott v. Fitchbnrg R. R. Co., 10 Gush. 193 ; Tillotson v. Smith,

32 N. H. 94.

Where parties are owners of adjoining premises bounded upon a river, and the division line

between them does not strike the river at right angles, it is extended to the centre thread of the

stream, not in the same direction, but in a line at right angles to the general direction of the

river at that point. See Wouson v. Wonson, 14 Allen, 71; Clark v. Campau, 19 Mich, and cases

cited.

(5) [Or the right to use the water as in the case of rivers and mill streams.]

(6) [By the name of a castle, one or more manors maybe conveyed, and ceonve>-so, by the

name of manor a castle may pass. I Inst. 5; 2 id. 31. "When land is built upon it is a mes-

suage, and if the building afterwards fall to decay, yet it shall not have the name of land,

although there be nothing in substance left but the land, but it shall be called a toft, which is

a name superior to land and inferior to messuage; and this name it shall have in respect of

the dignity which it once bore." Plowd. 170. A croft is an enclosed piece of land near to a

messuage.

By a grant of a house or messuage a garden and curtilage will pass (Co. Litt, 56): and seo

Partridge r. Strange, Plowd. 85, 86, where it is said that eleven acres might pass by the grant

of a messuage, as being parcel of it: Nicholas r. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac, 121; Hill». Grange,

Plowd. 170: but the land must consist only of the close on which the house is built: wsi
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or the like, nothing else will pass, except what falls with the utmost propriety

under the term made use of; but by the name of land, which is nomen generatr

issimum, every thing terrestrial will pass, (h) (7)

CHAPTER III.

OF INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS.

AN incorporeal hereditament is a right issuing out of a thing corporate

(whether real or personal) or concerning, or annexed to, or exercisable within,

the same, (a) (1) It is not the thing corporate itself, which may consist in lauds,

houses, jewels, or the like; but something collateral thereto, as a rent issuing

out of those lands or houses, or an office relating to those jewels. In short, as

the logicians speak, corporeal hereditaments are the substance, which may be

always seen, always handled: incorporeal hereditaments are but a sort of acci-

dents, which inhere in and are supported by that substance; and may belong, or

not belong to it, without any visible alteration therein. Their existence is

merely in idea and abstracted contemplation; though their effects and profits

may be frequently objects of our bodily senses. And indeed, if we would fix a

clear notion of an incorporeal hereditament, we must be careful not to confound

together the profits produced, and the thing, or hereditament, which produces

them. An annuity, for instance, is an incorporeal hereditament; for though the

money, which is the fruit or product of this annuity, is doubtless of a corporeal

nature, yet the annuity itself, which produces that money, is a thing invisible,

has only a mental existence, and cannot be delivered over from hand to hand.
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F*211 tithes, if we consider the *produce of them, as the tenth sheaf or tenth

L -I lamb, seem to be completely corporeal; yet they are indeed incorporeal

hereditaments; for they being merely a contingent springing right, collateral to

or issuing out of lands, can never be the object of sense; that casual share of

the annual increase is not, till severed, capable of being shewn to the eye, nor of

being delivered into bodily possession. _ JM ty^t.

Incorporeal hereditaments are principally of ten sorts; dcTvowsons, tithes^

commons, ways, offices, dignities, franchises, corodies or pensions, annuities and

rents.

(*) Co. Litt. 4, 5, 8. (a) INd. 19, 20.

Blackbone «. Edgley, 1 P. "Wms. 600; Bodenham v. Pritchard, 1 B. and Or. 350; Smith r.

Martin, 2. Saund. 401, see n. 2; Doe d. Norton v. Webster, 12 A. and E. 442. In Doe r.

Collins, 2 T. R. 498, a coal pen on the side of a pnblic road opposite to that ol a house, was

held to pass as part of the house. See also as to what are or are not appurtenances, London

v. Coll. St. Mary, Hob. 303; Hijfham v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 15 ; Shep. Touch. 89, 94, Preet.

ed.; Cowlam ». Slack, 15 East, 109; Morris v. Edgington, 3 Taunt. 24; Buck d. Wballey f.

Clark, 1 B. and P. 53, 55; Barlow v. Rhodes, 1 Cr. and M. 439; James B. Plant, 6 Jfev. and

M. 282. Much discussion has recently taken place upon the meaning of the word "house "in

cases arising under sec. 92 of the lands clauses consolidation Act, 1845. See 1 J. and H. 400:

28Beav. 104; 27 id. 242; 30 id. 556; 2 J. and H.248; 11 TV. K. 1088; 33 Beav. 644; 12 W. R.

969; 1 Hew K. 517 ; Law R. 1 Ch. 275.]

(7) [See judgment in Hill ». Grange, Plowd. 170; Den d, Bnlkley v. Velford, 8 D. and Ry.

549: R. v. Great Northern R. Co., 14 Q. B. 25, where a ferry passed under a conveyance of land

" with all profits and commodities belonging to the same."]

(1) [Not necessarily, as in the case of an annuity granted by one person to another and his

heirs, and not charged on any property. Co. Litt. 20, 144, b; 2 Ves. Sr. 179. It is trae that

where the annuity was not granted by the crown or other corporation: 2 Ves. Sr. 170; after

the death of the grantor the annuity would cease, so far as he left no property or assrts for the

payment of it; and so indirectly it would be charged on property. Offices and dignities are also

examples of incorporeal hereditaments which do not issue out of any thing corporate; bnt

though so called, they seem scarcely to partake of the nature of property. See 1 J. B. Moore.

• 1. »•'". J
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J. Advowson is the right of presentation to a church, or ecclesiastical benefice,

Advowson, advocatio, signifies in clientelam recipere, the taking into protection;

and therefore is synonymous with patronage, patronatus: ana he who has the

right of advowson is called the patron of the church. For, when lords of

manors first built churches on their own demesnes, and appointed the tithes of

those manors to be paid to the officiating ministers, which before were given to

the clergy in common (from whence, as was formerly mentioned, (b) arose the

division of parishes), the lord who thus built a church, and endowed it with

glebe or land, had of common right a power annexed of nominating such min-

ister as he pleased (provided he were canonically qualified) to officiate in that

church, of which he was the founder, endower, maintainer, or, in one word, the

patron, (c)

This instance of an advowson will completely illustrate the nature of an

incorporeal hereditament. It is not itself the bodily possession of the church

and its appendages; but it is a right to give some other man a title to such

bodily possession. The advowson is the object of neither the sight, nor the

touch ; and yet it perpetually exists in the mind's eye, and in contemplation of

law. It cannot be delivered from man to man by any visible bodily transfer,

nor can corporeal possession be *had of it. If the patron takes cor- r^o i

poreal possession of the church, the church-yard, the glebe, or the like, L ^

he intrudes on another man's property; for to these the parson has an exclusive

right. The patronage can therefore be only conveyed by operation of law, by
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verbal grant, (2) either oral or written, which is a kind or invisible mental trans-

fer : and being so vested it lies dormant and unnoticed, till occasion calls it

forth : when it produces a visible corporeal fruit, by entitling some clerk, whom

the patron shall please to nominate, to enter, and receive bodily possession of

the lands and tenements of the church.

Advowsons are either advowsons appendant, or advowsons in gross. Lords of

manors being originally the only founders, and of course the only patrons, of

churches, (</)the right of patronage or presentation, so long as it continues

annexed to the possession of the manor, as some have done from the foundation

of the church to this day, is called an advowson appendant: (e) and it will

pass, or be conveyed, together with the manor, as incident and appendant

thereto, by a grant of the manor only, without adding any other words. (f)

But where the property of the advowson has been once separated from the

property of the manor by legal conveyance, it is called an advowson in gross, or

at large, and never can be appendant any more; but it is for the future annexed

to the person of its owner, and not to his manor or lands, (ff)

Advowsons are also eitherpresentative, collatim, or donative: (A) an advowson

presentative is where the patron hath a right of presentation to the bishop or

ordinary, and moreover to demand of him to institute his clerk, if he finds him

canonically qualified; and this is the most usual advowson. An advowson

collative is where the bishop and patron are one and the same person: in which

case the bishop cannot present to himself; but he does, by the one act of colla-

tion, or *conferring the benefice, the whole that is done in common r**v -i

cases, by both presentation and institution. An advowson donative is "- ^

fl>> Book I, page 112.

(cj This original of the just patronatut, by building and endowing the church, appears also to have been

J. Advowson is the right of presentation to a church, or ecclesiastical benefice,
Advowson, advocatio, signifies in clientelani recipere, the taking into protection;
and therefore is synonymous with patronage, patronat·us: and he who has the
right of advowson is called the patron of the church. For, when lords of
manors first built churches on their own demesnes, and appointed the tithes of
those manors to be paid to the officiating ministers, which before were given to
the clergy in common (from whence, as was formerly mentioned, (b) arose the
diYision of parishes), the lord who thus built a church, and endowed it with
s-Iebe or land, had of common right a power annexed of nominating such minister s.s he pleased (provided he were canonically qualified) to officiate in that
church, of which he was the founder, endower, maintainer, or, in one word, the
patron. (c)
This instance of im advowson will completely illustrate the nature of an
incorporeal hereditament. It is not itself the bodily possession of the church
and its appendages; but it is a right to give some other man a title to such
bodily possession. The advowson is the object of neither the sight, nor the
touch ; ·and yet it perpetually exists in the mmd's eye, and in contemplation of
law. It cannot be delivered from man to man by any visible bodily transfer,
nor can corporeal possession be *had of it. If the patron takes cor- •· . J
poreal possession of the church, the church-yard, the glebe, or the like, [ 22
he intrudes on another man's property; for to these the parson has an exclusive
right. The patronage can therefore be only conveyed by operation of law, by
verbal grant, (2) either oral or written, which isa kmd of invisible mental transfer: and being so vested it lies dormant and unnoticed, till occasion calls it
forth : when it roduces a visible corporeal fruit, by entitling some clerk, whom
the patron shal please to nominate, to enter, and receive bodily possession of
the lands and tenements of the church.
Advowsons are either advowsons appendan:t,or a.dvowsons in gross. Lordsof
manors being originally the only founders, and of' course the only patrons, of
churches, (d) the right of patronage or presentation, so long as it continues
annexed to the possession of the manor, as some have done from the foundation
of the church to this day, is called an advowson appendant: (e) and it will
pass, or be conveyed, together with the manor, as incident and appendant
thereto, by a grant of the ma.nor only, without adding any other words. ( f)
But where the property of the advowson has been once separated from the
property of the manor by legal conveyance, it is called an advowson in gross, or
at large, and never can be appendant any more; but it is for the future annexed
to the person of its owner, and not to his manor or lands. (g)
.A.dvowsons are aleo either presentat£ve, collative, or donative: (h) an advowson
pr~fJntative is where the patron hath a right of presentation to the bishop or
ordinary, and moreover to demand of him to institute his clerk, if he finds him
canonically qualified; and this is the most usual advowson. An advowson
collative is where the bishop and patron are one and the same person: in which
case the bishop can not present to himself; but he docs, by the one act of collation, or *conferring the benefice, the whole that is done in common [*23 ]
cases, by both presentation and institution. An advowson donative is

f

allowed in the Roman empire. Nov. 26, t. 12, e. 2. Nvtt118, tf. 83.

fd} Co. Litt. 119. (e)IMd. 121. (SJIbid.WI. (g) Ibid. 120. (h) Ibid.

(2), [Mr. Wooddeson has taken notice of this inaccuracy, and has observed that " advow-

ns merely as such [i. e. in gross] conld never, in any age of the English law, pass by oral

(b) Book I, Jl88'8 l12.
(. c) This original or the~ patronatua, by building antf endo.w lng the church, appears also to have been
al owed In the Roman empire. NOfJ. 26, t. 12, c. 2. NO'b• 118, c. !IS.
(d) Co. J.ltt. 119.
(e) llM. 12L
(f) Ibid. ao'7. .
(g) Ibid. UIO.
(A) lbitl.

jrrant with'ont deed." 2 Woodd. 64. Lord Coke says expressly that •' grant is properly of

things incorporeal, which cannot pass without deed." 1 lust. 9. But before the Statute of

Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, any freehold interest in incorporeal hereditaments might have passed

by a verbal feoffment accompanied with livery of seisin. Litt. $ 59. And by such a verbal

grant of a manor, Mr. TVooddeson justly observes, before the statute, an advowson append-

ant to it might have been conveyed. But he who has an advowson or a right of patronage in

fee may by deed transfer every species of interest out of it, viz.: in fee, in tan, for life, for years,

or may grant ouu or wore presentations.]

(2). [Yr. W ooddeson he.s taken notice of thiR inaccuracy, and has obserred that "ad>owsons merelv a8 such [i. e. in grossl could never, in any age of the English law, pass by oral
grant without deed." 2 Woodd. &t. Lord Coke says expressly that·' grant is properly of
things incorporeal, which cannot pe..~s without deed." 1 Inst. 9. But before the Statute of
!''rands, 29 Car. II, c. 3, any freehold intere8t in incorporeal hereditamentR might have passed
by a rnrbal feoffrnent accompanied with livery of seisin. Litt. § 59. And by 1mch a verbal
grant of a manor, Mr. Woocldeson jn8tly observes, before the statute, o.n a<lrow8on appendant to it might hru·e heen conveyed. But he who has an advowson or a right of P,atronagc in
fee nmy hy dcc1l t.rmtsfer every spe~ieil of interest out of it, viz. : in fee, in tail, for life, for yea.rs,
ur muy grant mm ur more pre<'entations.]
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when the kin;;, or any subject by His license, doth found a church or chapel, and

ordains that it shall be merely in the gift or disposal of the patron ; subject to

his visitation only, and not to that of the ordinary; and vested absolutely in

the clerk by the patron's deed of donation, without presentation, institution, or

induction, (i) This is said to have been anciently the only way of conferring

ecclesiastical benefices in England; the method of institution by the bishop not

being established more early than the time of Archbishop Becket in the reign

of Henry II. (k) And therefore though Pope Alexander III, (I) in a letter to

Becket, severely inveighs against &prava consuetudo as he calls it, of investiture

conferred by the patron only, this however shows what was then the common

usage. Others contend that the claim of the bishops to institution is as old as

the first planting of Christianity in this Island; and in proof of it they allege a

letter from the English nobility to the pope in the reign of Henry the Third,

recorded by Matthew Paris, (m) which speaks of presentation to the bishop as a

thing immemorial. The truth seems to be, that, where the benefice was to be

conferred on a mere layman, he was first presented to the bishop in order to

receive ordination, who was at liberty to examine and refuse him: bnt where

the clerk was already in orders, the living was usually vested in him by the sole

donation of the patron; till about the middle of the twelfth century, when the

pope and his bishops endeavoured to introduce a kind of feudal dominion over

ecclesiastical benefices, and in consequence of that, began to claim and exercise

the right of institution universally as a species of spiritual investiture.
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However this may be, if, as the law now stands, the true patron once waives

this privilege of donation, and presents to the bishop, and his clerk is admitted

T*241 an<^ instituted, the *advowson is now become forever presentative, and

L J shall never be donative any more, (n) For these exceptions to general

rules, and common right, are ever looked upon by the law in an unfavorable

view, and construed as strictly as possible. If therefore the patron, in whom

such peculiar right resides, does once give up that right, the law, which loves

uniformity, will interpret it to be done with an intention of giving it up for-

ever ; and will therefore reduce it to the standard of other ecclesiastical

livings. (3)

II. A second species of incorporeal hereditaments is that of tithes; (4) which

are defined to be the tenth part of the increase, yearly arising and renewing

from the profits of lands, the stock upon lands, and the personal industry of the

inhabitants: (5) the first species being usually called predial, as of corn,

fi) Co. Litt. 344. ftj Seld. lilh. <-.. 12, i J. fij Decretal. I. 8. (. 7, c. S.

(m) A. D. 1289. („} Co. Lilt. 34i. Cm. Jac. 68.

when the king, or any subject by is license, doth found a church or chapel, and
ordains that it shall be merely i the gift or disposal of the patron ; subject to
his visitation only, and not to thati of the ordinary; and vested absolutely in
the clerk by the patron's deed of donation, without presentation, institution, or
induction.(?'.) This is said to haYe been anciently the only way of conferring
ecclesiastical benefices in England; the method of rnstitution by the bishop not
being established more earlv .than the time of Archbishop Becket in the reign
of Henry II. (k) And therefore though Pope Alexander III, (l) in a letter to
Becket, severely inveighs against a prava consuetudo as he calls it, of investiture
conferred by the patron only, this howeYer shows what was then the common
usage. Others contend that the claim of the bishops to institution is as old as
the first planting of Christianity in this Island; and in proof of it they allege a
letter from the English nobility to the pope in the reign of Henry the Third,
recorded by Matthew Paris, (m) which speaks of presentation to the bishop a.s a
thing immemorial. The truth seems to be, that, where the benefice was to be
conferred on a mere layman, he was first presented to the bishop in order to
receive ordination, who was at liberty to examine and refuse him: but where
the clerk was already in orders, the Ii ving was usually vested in him by the sole
donation of the patron; till about the middle of the twelfth century, when the
pope and his bishops endeavoured to introduce a kind of feudal dominion over
ecclesiastical benefices, and in consequence of that, began to claim and exercise
the right of institution universally e.s a species of spiritual investiture.
However this may be, if, as the law now stands, the true patron once waives
this privilege of donation, and presents to the bishop, and his clerk is admitted
[ • 24 ] and instituted, the *advowson is now become forever presentative, and
shall never be donative any more. (n) For these exceptions to general
rules, and common right, are ever looked upon by the law in an unfavorable
view, and construed as strictly as possible. If therefore the patron, in whom
such peculiar right resides, does once give up that right, the law, which loYes
uniformity, will interpret it to be done with an intention of giYing it up forever; and will therefore reduce it to the standard of other ecclesiastical
livings. (3)
II. A second species of incorporeal hereditaments is that of tithes; (4) which
are defined to be the tenth pa.rt of the incre.ase, yearly a.rising and renewing
from the profits of lands, the stock upon lands, and the personal industry of the
inhabitants: (5) the first species being usually called predial, as of corn,

(3) [The contrary is held by a later authority than the authorities referred to by the learned

judge; in which it was declared, that although a presentation may destroy an impropriation,

f'J Co. Litt. 3".
(m) A. D. 1239.

0:) Seid. titb, Ch 111, f

(fl) Co. Litt. 8".

t.

cro. Jae. 68.

{l) lJ«retal, l.

81 I. 7, C. 8.

yet it cannot destroy a donative, because the creation thereof is by letters patent. 2 Silk.

541; 3 id. 140; Mirehouse, 26. It may be here observed, that when an incumbent is made s

bishop, the right of presentation in that case is in the king, and is called a prerogative presenta-

tion ; the law concerning which was doubted in Car. Il'g time, but in the fame of King William

it was fin ally determined in favor of the crown. 2Bla. R. 770.]

The whole subject of advowsons is foreign to the American law. Congress is forbidden by

the first amendment to the constitution of the United States to make any law respecting an

establishment of religion, and the people of the states have been careful, by their state con-

stitutions to prohibit any such establishment under state laws. Religions societies are volun-

tary organizations in America, and their pastors or teachers are chosen by the members, or in

such other mode as the articles of association shall prescribe.

(4) Tithes no longer exist as a distinct species of incorporeal hereditaments; they have become

members of the family of rents.

(5) [The definition proposed in the text is not strictly accurate. The faulty part of the

definition seems to be the supposition that tithe consists, in all canes, of the tenth part of the

increase yearly arising and renewing. This is not correct, even as to predial tithes, univer-

sally ; and to mixed and personal tithes it does not at all apply.

Wood is one of the instances to show that predial tithe may be payable in respect of an

article of which the renewal is not annual. Suva coediM is titheable when it is felled; and

between the falls several years commonly Cand a great many years not unfrequently,) inter-

vene. Page?. Wilson, 2 Jac. and Walk. 523; Walton v. Tryon, 1 Dick. 245; Chichesterr. Shel-

(3) [The contrary is held by a later authorit,}' than the authorities referred to by the learned
in which it was declared, that although a presentation may destroy a.n impropriation,
yet 1t cannot destroy a donative, because the creation thereof is by letters patent. 2 Salk.
541 ; 3 id. 140; }firehouse, 26. It may be here observed, that when an incumbent is made a
bishop, the right of presentation in that case is in the king, and is called a {'rerogative present&tion; the law concerning which wa.s doubted in C&r. Il'I! time, but in the time of King William
it was finally determined in favor of the crown. 2 Illa.. R. 770.]
The whole RUbject of advow8ons is foreign to the American law. Congress is forbidden by
the first amendment to the constitution of the United States to make any law respecting an
establishment. of religion, and the people of the states have been careful, by their state con·
stitntions to prohibit any such establishment under state laws. Religious societie11 are volun·
tary organizations in America., and their pastors or teachers a.re chosen by the members, or in
Kuch other mode II..'! the articles of association shall prescribe.
( 4) Tithes no lon~er ex:i~t as a distinct species of mcorporeal hereditaments; they have become
members of the fauuly of rents.
(5) [The definition proposed in the text i11 not strictly accurate. The faultv part of the
definition seem11 to be the ~uppo:>ition that tithe consists, in all cMeti, of the tenth part of the
increase yearly arising and renewing. Thiti is uoL comet, e\'en II..'! to prodial tithes, unive.rsallv; and to mixed and personal titheii it does not at all apply.
Wood i3 one of the in:<tance~ to show that predi&l tithe may be payable in respect of an
article of which the renewal is not annual. Silva cavlua is titheable when it is felled; and
between the falls ..evera.l yeani commonly ( o.ud o. great many ye&nl not unfreqnently) int.ernme. Paget'. Wilt1tm, 2 J ac. and WtLlk. 52:l; Wal ton v. Tryon, 1 Dick. 245; Chichester f'. Sbt>l·
1lon, l Tum. and Rusi;. 249.]
jud~e;
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grass, hops, and wood : (o) the second mixed, as of wool, milk, pigs. &c., ( p) con-

sisting of natural products, but nutured and preserved in part oy the care of

man ; and of these the tenth must be paid in gross ; the third personal, as of man-

ual occupations, trades, fisheries, and the like ; and of these only the tenth part

of the clear gains and profits is due. (g) (6)

It is not to be expected from the nature of these general commentaries, that I

should particularly specify what things are titheable, and what not ; the time

•when, or the manner and proportion in which, tithes are usually due. For this

I must refer to such authors as have treated the matter in detail : and shall

only observe, that, in general, tithes are to be paid for every thing that yields an

annual increase, as corn, hay, fruit, cattle, poultry, and the like ; but not for any

thing that is of the substance of the earth, or is not of annual increase, as stone,

lime, chalk, and the like ; nor for creatures that are of a wild nature, or ferte

natures, as deer, hawks, &c., whose increase, so as to profit the owner, is not

annual, but casual, (r) It will rather be our business to consider, 1 The original

of the right *of tithes. 2. In whom that right at present subsists, r^g i

3. Who may be discharged, either totally or in part, from paying them. L -"

1. As to their original, I will not put the title of the clergy to tithes upon

any divine right ; though such a right certainly commenced, and I believe as

certainly ceased, with the Jewish theocracy. Yet an honourable and competent

maintenance for the ministers of the gospel is, undoubtedly, jure divino ; what-

ever the particular mode of that maintenance may be. For, besides the positive
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precepts of the New Testament, natural reason will tell us, that an order of men,

who are separated from the world, and excluded from other lucrative professions,

for the sake of the rest of mankind, have a right to be furnished with the nec-

essaries, conveniences, and moderate enjoyments of life, at their expense, for

whose benefit they forego the usual means of providing them. Accordingly all

municipal laws have provided a liberal and decerit maintenance for their national

priests or clergy : ours in particular have established this of tithes, probably in

imitation of the Jewish law ; and perhaps, considering the degenerate state of

the world in general, it may be more beneficial to the English clergy to found

their title on the law of the land, than upon any divine right whatsoever, unac-

knowledged and unsupported by temporal sanctions.

We cannot precisely ascertain the time when tithes were first introduced into

this country. Possibly they were contemporary with the planting of Christian-

ity among the Saxons, by Augustin the monk, about the end of the sixth century.

But the first mention of them, which I have met with in any written English.

law, is in a constitutional decree, made in a synod held A. D. 786, (s) wherein

the payment of tithes in general is strongly enjoined. This canon, or decree,

whicn at first bound not the laity, was effectually confirmed by two kingdoms

if the heptarchy, in their parliamentary conventions of estates, respectively

onsisting of the kings of Mercia *and Northumberland, the bishops, dukes, pqg -i

J

nators, and people ; which was a very few years later than the time

tat Charlemagne established the payment of them in France, (t) and made

Ut famous division of them, into four parts; one to maintain the edifice

o*;he church, the second to support the poor, the third the bishop, and the

foth the parochial clergy, (u)

'•ie next authentic mention of them is in the fcedus Edwardi et Guthruni ;

or ie laws agreed upon between King Guthrun the Dane, and Alfred and his

son 'd ward the Elder, success! ves kings of England, about the year 900. This

kind of treaty between those monarchs, which may be found at large in

Chilli. Abr. 633. 2Inst,649. (p}lMd. (a) 1 Roll. Abr. 656. fr)t Inat 681.

(•-> Sl. c. 8, } 2. (t)A.D.WS. I'M; Book 1, Oh. 11. Sold. c. 6, 57 Sp. of Laws, b. 81, c. 12.

(6) [ addition to this" triple distinction, all tithes have been otherwise divided into two

classes, »<jt Or small ; the former/ in general, comprehending the tithes of corn, peas, and beans,

hay iMUvood ; the latter, all other predial, together with all personal and mixed, tithes.

Tithes uirreat Or small, according to the nature of the things which yield the tithe without

reference thc quantity.]
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the Anglo-Saxon laws: (w) wherein it was necessary, as Guthrun was a pagan,

to provide for the subsistence of the Christian clergy under his dominion; and,

accordingly, we find {x) the payment of tithes not only enjoined, but a penalty

added upon non-observance: which law is seconded by the laws of Athelstan, {y)

about the year 930. And this is as much as can certainly be traced out, with

regard to their legal original. .

2. We are next to consider the persons to whom they are due. And npon

their first introductions^ hath formerly been observed,) (z) though every man

was obliged to pay tithes in general, yet he might give them to what priest he

pleased; (a) which were called arbitrary consecrations of tithes: or he might

pay them into the hands of the bishop, who distributed among his diocesan

clergy the revenues of the church, which were then in common. (J) But, when

dioceses were divided into parishes, the tithes of each parish were allotted to its

own particular minister; first by common consent, or the appointment of lords

of manors, and afterwards by the written law of the land, (e)

[-1,27 -i *However, arbitrary consecrations of tithes took place again affcer-

I- J wards, and became in general use till the time of King John. (3) Which

was probably owing to the intrigues of the regular clergy, or monks of the Ben-

edictine and other rules, under Archbishop Dunstan, and his successors: who

endeavoured to wean the people from paying their dues to the secular or paro-

chial clergy {a much more valuable set of men than themselves,) and were then

in hopes to have drawn, by sanctimonious pretences to extraordinary purity of
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life, all ecclesiastical profits to the coffers of their own societies. And this will

natnrallv enough account for the number and riches of the monasteries and re-

ligious houses, which were founded in those days, and which were frequently

endowed with tithes. For a layman, who was obliged to pay his tithes somewhere,

might think it good policy to erect an abbey, and there pay them to his own

monks; or grant them to some abbey already erected: since, for this dotation,

which really cost the patron little or nothing, he might, according to the super-

stition of the times, have masses forever sung for his soul. But, in process of

years, the income of the poor laborious parish priests being scandalously reduced

by these arbitrary consecrations of tithes, it was remedied by Pope Innocent

the Third (e) about the year 1200, in a decretal epistle, sent to the archbishop

of Canterbury, and dated from the palace of Lateran: which has occasioned Sir

Henry Hobart and others to mistake it for a decree of the council of Lateran,

held A. D. 1179, which only prohibited what was called the infeodation of tithes,

or their being granted to mere layman, (/) whereas this letter of Pope Innocent

to the archbishop enjoined the payment of tithes to the parsons of the respect-

ive parishes where every man inhabited, agreeable to what was afterwardf

directed by the:same pope in other countries, (g) This epistle, says Sir Edwar*

Coke, "" "

L J it was allowed of, and so became lex terra. This put

all the arbitrary consecrations of tithes: except some footsteps which still

tinue in those portions of tithes, which the parson of one parish hath, thofh

rarely, a right to claim in another: for it is now universally held,(i) that t*es

are due of common right, to the parson of the parish, unless there be a sv^al

exemption. This parson of the parish, we have formerly seen, (k) may be »her

the actual incumbent, or else the appropriator of the benefice: appropriations^ig

a method of endowing monasteries, which seems to have been devised by t'reg-

ular clergy, by way of substitution to arbitrary consecrations of tithes) (?)

(to) Wllkins, page 61. (x) Cap. 6. (y) Cap. 1. (z) Book I, Inlrod. « 4.

(a) S Inst. (M6. Hob. 296. (6) Scl5. c. 9, S 4. (c) T.L. tidgar, c. 1 $ 9. Canui. c. 11. (d) ?• °- u-

ie) Opera Innocent. JJJ, torn. 2, page452. (/) .Decretal. (. 3, t. 30, c. 19. (a) Ibid. <r-

(ft) 2 last Ml. (<) RegUt. 46. Hob. 296. (*) Book I, p. 8S5.

(I) In extraparochl.il places the king, by bis royal prerogative, has a right to all the tithes. Sr°°* '• !'•

113. 284.

(7) [A parsonage is appropriate when it belongs to a spiritual corporation orpjn: inap-

propriate when it is in lay hands. Ante) book 1, p. 385; Plowd, 493.]
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3. We observed that tithes are due to the parson of common right, unless by

special exemption ; let us therefore see, thirdly, who may be exempted from the

payment of tithes, and how lands, and their occupiers, may be exempted or dis-

charged from the payment of tithes, either in part or totally; first, by a real com-

position ; or, secondly, by custom or prescription.

First, a real composition is when an agreement is made between the owijer of

the lands, and the parson or vicar, with the consent of the ordinary and the

patron, that such lands shall for the future be discharged from payment of

tithes, by reason of some laud or other real recompense given to the parson, in

lieu and satisfaction thereof, (m) This was permitted by law, because it was

supposed that the clergy would be no losers by such composition; since the

consent of the ordinary, whose duty it is to take care of the church in general;

and of the patron, whose interest it is to protect that particular church, were

both made necessary to render the composition effectual: and hence have arisen

all sudh compositions as exist at this day by force of the common law. But

experience shewing that even this caution was ineffectual, and *the pos- pqq i

sessions of the church being, by this and other means, every day dimin- *- *

ished, the disabling statute 13 Eliz. c. 10, was made: which prevents, among

other spiritual persons, all parsons and vicars from making any conveyances

of the estates of their churches, other than for three lives, or twenty-one years.

So that now, by virtue of this statute, no real composition made smoe the 13

Eliz. is good for any longer term than three lives, or twenty-one years, though
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made' by consent of the patron and ordinary: which has indeed effectuafly

demolished this kind of traffic: such compositions being now rarely heard of,

unless by authority of parliament.

Secondly, a discharge by custom or prescription, is where, time out of mind,

such persons or such lands have been either partially or totally, discharged from

the payment of tithes. And this immemorial usage is binding upon all parties;

as it is in its nature an evidence of universal consent and acquiescence, and with

reason supposes a real composition to have been formerly made. This custom

or prescription is either de modo decimandi, or de non decimando.

A modus decimandi, commonly called by the simple name of a modus only, is

where there is by custom a particular manner of tithing allowed, different from

the general law of taking tithes in kind, which are the actual tenth part of the

annual increase. This is sometimes a pecuniary compensation, as two-pence

an acre for the tithe of land: sometimes it is a compensation in work and labour,

as that the parson shall have only the twelfth cock of hay, and not the tenth, in

consideration of the owher's making it for him: sometimes, in lieu of a large

quantity of crude or imperfect tithe, the'parson shall have a less quantity, when

arrived to greater maturity, as a couple of fowls in lieu of tithe eggs; and the

like. Any'meangj in short, whereby the general law of tithing is altered, and a

new method of taking them is introduced, is called a modus decimandi, or special

manner of tithing.

*To make a good and sufficient modns, the following rules must be r*oQ-i

observed. 1. It must be certain and invariable, (n) for payment of differ- <- '

ent sums will prove it to be no modus, that is, no original real composition;

because that must have been one and the same,'from its first original to the

present time. 2. The thing given, in lieu of tithes, must be beneficial to the

parson, and not for the emolument of third persons only; (p) thus a modus, to

repair the church in lieu of tithes, is not good, because that is an advantage to

the parish only; but to repair the chancel is a good modus, for that is an advan-

tage to the parson. 3. It must be something different from the thing com-

pounded for; (p) one load of hay, in lieu of all tithe hay, is no good modus; for

no parson'would bonafide make a composition to receive less than his due in the

same species of tithe; and therefore the law will not suppose it possible for such

composition to have existed. 4. One cannot be discharged from payment of one

(m) 2 hist, 490. Regist. 88 13 Rep. 40. !») 1 Kpb. 60-2.

(o) 1 Ko11.'A»r.'**0. (p) 1 Lev. 179.
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species of tithe, by paying a modus for another, (q) Thus a modus of \d.

for every milch cow will discharge the tithe of milch kine, but not of barren

cattle : for tithe is, of common right, due for both; and therefore a modus for

one shall never be a discharge for the other. 5. The recompense must be in its

nature as durable as the tithes discharged by it; that is, an inheritance cer-

tain : (r) and therefore a modus that every inhabitant of a house shall pay 4d, a

year, in lieu of the owner's tithes, is no good modus; for possibly the house

may not be. inhabited, and then the recompense will be lost. 6. The modu*

must not be too large, which is called a rank modus: as if the real value of the

tithes be 601. per annum, and a modus is suggested of 401., this modus will not

be established; though one of 40«. might have been valid. (s) Indeed, properly

speaking, the doctrine of rankness in a modus is a mere rule of evidence, drawn

from the improbability of the fact, and not a rule of law. (t) For, in these

cases of prescriptive of customary moduses, it is supposed that an original real

composition was anciently made; which being lost by length of time, the im-

memorial usage is admitted as evidence to shew that it once did exist, and that

F*311 fr°m tnence *such usage was derived. Now time of memory hath been

"• J long ago ascertained by the law to commence from the beginning of the

reign of Richard the First; («) and any custom may be destroyed by evidence

of non-existence in any part of the long period from that time to the present; (8)

wherefore, as this real composition is supposed to have been an equitable contract,

or the full value of the tithes, at the time of making it, if the modus set up is so
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rank and large, as that it beyond dispute exceeds the value of the tithes in the

time of Richard the First, this modus is (in point of evidence) felo de se, and

destroys itself. For, as it would be destroyed by any direct evidence to prove its

non-existence at any time since that era, so also it is destroyed by carrying in

itself this internal evidence of a much later original.

A prescription de non dedmando is a claim to be entirely discharged of tithes,

and to pay no compensation in lieu of them. Thus the king by his prerogative

is discharged from all tithes, (v) So a vicar shall pay no tithes to the rector, iior

the rector to the vicar, for ecchsia decimas non solvit ecclesice. (w) But these

personal privileges (not arising from or being annexed to the land) are personally

confined to both the king and the clergy; for their tenant or lessee shall pay

tithes, though in their own occupation their lands are not generally titheable. (r)

And, generally speaking, it is an established rule, that, in lay hands, modus de

non dedmando non valet. (9) But spiritual persons or corporations, as monas-

teries, abbots, bishops, and the like, were always oapfthle of having their lands

totally discharged of tithes by various ways; (2) as, 1. By real composition: '2.

By the pope's bull of exemption: 3. By unity of possession; as when the

rectory of a parish, and lands in the same parish, both belonged to a religious

F*321 *h°U8e> those lands were discharged of tithes by this unity of possession:

*• J 4. By prescription; having never been liable to tithes, by being alwavs

in spiritual hands: 5. By virtue of their order: as the knight-templars, Cister-

cians, and others, whose lands were privileged by the pope with a discharge of

tithes.(«) Though upon the dissolution of abbeys by Henry VIII, most of those

(?) Cro. 'Eliz. 486. Salk. 857. (r) S P. Wms. 462. («) 11 Mod. M.

(t) I'yke v. Dowling, HU. 19 Geo. EH, C. B.

(«) 2 InsL 238, 239. This rule was adopted, when by the statute of Wcstm. I (3 Edw. I. c. 89). the rcigna

[Book II.

species of tithe, by pa~ng a modus for another. (q) Thus a nwclus of Id.
for every milch cow will discharge the tithe of milch kine, but not of barreii
cattle: for tithe is, of common 1;ght, due for both; and therefore a modus for
one shall never be a discharge for the other. 5. The recompense must be in its
nature as durable as the tithes discharged by it; that is, an inheritance ~r
tain: (r) and therefore a modus that every i'.nhabitant of a house shall pay 4d. a
year, in lieu of the owner's tithe.s. is no good modus; for possiblX the houSE>
may not be. inhabited, and then the recompense will be lost. 6. The modu~
must not he too large, which is called a rank modus: as if the real value of the
tithes be 60l.,er annum, and a modus is suggested of 40l., this modus ·will not
be establishe ; though one of 40s. might have been valid. (s) Indeed, properly
speaking, the doctrine of ran1cneJJs in a modus is a mere rule of e.,;dence, drawn
from the improbability of the fact, and not n. rule of law. (t) For, in the.st>
cases of prescriptive or customary moduse.'f, it is supposed that an original real
composition was anciently made ; which being lost by length of time, the immemorial usage is admitted as evidence to shew that it once did exist, and that
[ • 31 ] from thence •such usage was derived. Now time of memory hath been
long ago ascertained by the law to commence from the beginning of tbt'
reign of Richard the First; (tt) and any custom may be destroyed by e\·idence
of non-existence in any part of the long period from that time to the preiient; (8)
wherefore, as this real composition is supposed to have been an equitable contract,
or the full value of the tithes, at the time of making it, if the modus set up is so
rank and large, as that it beyond dispute exceeds the value of the tithe.a in the
time of Richard the First, this modus is (in point of eyidence) few de se, and
destroys itself. For, as it would be destroyed by any direct evidenoe to prove its
non-existence at any time since that era, so also it is destroyed by carrying in
itself this internal evidence of a much later original.
A prescription de non decimando is a claim to be entirely discharged of tithes,
and to pay no compensation in lieu of them. Thus the kmg by his prerogative
is discharged from all tithes. (v) So a vicar shall pay no tithes to the rector, nor
the rector to the vicar, for ecclesia decirnas non solvit ecclesics. (w) But these
personal privileges (not arising from or being annexed to the land) are personally
confined to both the king and the clergy ; for their tenant or lessee shall pav
tithes, though in their own occupation their lands are not generally titheable. (.i)
And, generally speaking, it is an established rule, that, in /,ay hands, modus de
non decimando non. valet. (9) But spiritual persons or corporations, as monasteries, abbots, bishops, and. the like, were always oapa.ble of baYing their lands
totally discharged of tithes by various ways; (z) as, 1. By real composition: 2.
By the pope's bull of exemption: 3. By unity of possession; as when the
reotory of a parish, and lands in the same parish, both belonged to a religious
[ • 32 ] •house, those lands were discharged of tithes by this unity of passession:
'
4. By prescription; having never been liable to tithes, by bemg alwiAYS
in spiritual hands: 5. By virtue of their order; as the knight-templars, cistircians, and others, whose lands were privileged by the pope with a discharge of
tithes.(a) Though upon the dissolution of abbeys by Henry VIII, most of tho~

of Itlchard I \\n- made the time of limitation in a writ of right. But, since liy the Mtatute 32 Hen. Mil, c. i,

this period (in a writ of right) bath been very rationally reduced to 60 years, it seems unaccountable, that

the date of lejfal prescription or memory should still continue to be reckoned from an era so verv »nli

qitated. See Litt. »170. 34 Hen. VI, 37. « Roll. Abr. 468, pi. 16.

(ti) Cro. Elii. 511. (10) Cro. Eliz. 479, 511. Sav. 3. TMoor. 010. (x) Cro. Eliz. 479.

(V) Ibid. 511. (x) Hob. 309. Cro. Jac. 308. (a) 2 Rep. 44. Seld. tlth. c. IS, »2.

(8) The time of prescription was shortened by Lord Tentorden's Act, 2 and 3 Wm. IV, f

(ql Cro. Eliz. 486. Salk. M'T.
(r) II P. Wme. 48!.
(•) 11 Mod. 80.
v. Dotoling, Hll. Ill Geo. m, c. B.
(u) 21nst.. 231l, 239. This nlle wae adopted. when by the statute or Westm. I (3 E1lw. I c . 89). the rci~
or lUchnrd I WM made the time of llmltlltlon In a writ of right. But, since hy the Kt&tute ii Hen. \111, c. 2.
this period (In a writ of right) bath been very rationally redu<".etl to 60 years, It seems unaooount4ble, thac
the clntc orJeiial prescription or memory should stlll continue to be reckoned from an l'TIL llO "~· anti
qnated. Sec Litt. f liO. 34 Hen. VI. 37. II RoU. Abr. 2611, pl. 18.
(t1l (;ro. Eliz. lill.
(ID) (;ro. Eliz. 479, 511. Sav. 3. "'Moor. 910.
(z) CT.o . Eliz. 479.
(If) Ibid. 611.
(z) Hob. 309. (;ro. Jae. 308.
(a) 9 Rep. '4. Seid. &hb. c. IS, •\I.
(t) Pr/~

10, to twenty, thirty, forty and sixty years for different classes of cases. For cases under thii

act see Parker t. Mitchell, 11 A. and E. 788; Wright». Williams, 1 M. and "W. 77; Welcou*

v. Upton, 6 id. 536; England v. Wall, 10 id. 699; Richards ». Pry, 3 Nev. and P. 67; Wa*d r.

Eobins, 15 M. and W. 237; Bright e. Walker, 1 Cr. M. and B. 211; Eaton e. Swansea Wbtet Co.,

17 Q. B. 267.

(9) Prescript™ is the proper word here, instead of morftw. See 4 Tonng and C. 285.
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(il) The time of prescription was shorten~ by Lord Tentcnlcn's Act, 2 and 3 Wm. I,, e
10, to twent:r, thirty, forty and l!ixty years for different cla.osllS of c.aees. For ca.lei! under th.i~
a.ct see Parker t;. Mitchell, 11 A. and E. 788 ; Wright ti. Williams, 1 Y. and W. 77; Weloo!.U
t1. Upton, 6 id. !">36; England ~· Wall, 10 id. 699; Richard~ ti. ~· 3 Nev. and P . 67; Wa.td, c.
Rohmt<, 15 M:. and W. 237; Bnght 11. Walker, 1 Cr. M:. and R. 211, Eaton 11. Sw8ll.8e& Wa.ter l'-0.,
17 Q. B. 267.
(9) Prescriptw is the proper word here, instead ofmod"s. See 4 Young and C. 285.
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exemptions from tithes would have fallen with them, and the lands become

titheable again: had they not been supported and upheld by the statute 31

Hen. VIII, c. 13, which enacts, that all persons who should come to the posses-

sion of the lands of any abbey then dissolved, should hold them free and

discharged of tithes, in as large and ample a manner as the abbeys themselves

formerly held them. And from this original have sprung all the lands, which,

being in lay hands, do at present claim to be tithe-free: for, if a man can shew

his lands to have been such abbey-lands, and also immemorially discharged of

tithes by any of the means before mentioned, this is now a good prescription,

de non decimando. But he must shew both these requisites; for abbey-lauds,

without a special ground of discharge, are not discharged of course; neither

will any prescription de non decimando avail in total discharge of tithes, unless

it relates to such abbey-lands. (10)

III. Common, or right of common, appears from its very definition to be an

incorporeal hereditament: being a profit which a man hath in the land of

another; as to feed his beasts, to cabch fish, to dig turf, to cut wood, or the

like.(V) And hence common is chiefly of four sorts; common of pasture, of

piscary, of turbary, and of estovers. (11)

1. Common of pasture is a right of feeding one's beasts on another's land:

for in those waste grounds, which are usually called commons, the property of

the soil is generally in the lord of the manor; as in common fields it is in the

particular tenants. This kind of common is either appendaut, appurtenant,
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because of vicinage, or in gross, (c)

*0ommon appendant is a right belonging to the owners or occupiers •-„„„ -•

of arable land, to put commonable beasts upon the lord's waste, and upon I J

the lands of other persons, within the same manor. Commonable beasts are

either beasts of the plough, or such as manure the ground. This is a matter of

most universal right; and it was originally permitted,(d) not only for the

encouragement of agriculture, but for the necessity of the thing. For, when

lords of manors granted out parcels of land to tenants, for services either done

or to be done, these tenants could not plough or manure the land without

beasts; these beasts could not be sustained without pasture; and pasture could

not be had but in the lord's wastes, and on the uninclosed fallow grounds of

themselves and the other tenants. The law therefore annexed this right of com-

mon, as inseparably incident to the grant of the lands; and this was the original

of common appendant; which obtains in Sweden, and the other northern king-

doms, much in the same manner as in England, (e) (12) Common appurtenant,

(6) Finch, Law, 157. (c) Co. Lilt. 122. (d) 2 lust. 86. (e) Stiernh. (Injure Sueonum, I. 2, c. 6.

(10) The whole subject of tithes, like that of advowsons, is foreign to American law.

Under the English statutes of 6 and 7 \Vrn. IT, c. 71; 7 id. and 1 Tic. c. 69; 1 and 2

exemptions from tithes would have fallen with them, and the lands become
tithea.ble again : had they not been supported and upheld by the statute 31
• Hen. VIII, c. 13, which enacts, that all persons who should come to the possession of the lands of any abbey then dissolved, should hold them free and
discharged of tithes, in as large and ample a manner as the abbeys themselves
formerly held them. And from this original have sprnng all the lands, which,
being in lay hands, do at present claim to be tithe-free: for, if a man can shew
hie lands to have been such abbey-lands, and also immemorially dischar~ed of
tithes by any of the means before mentioned, this is now a good prescription,
de non decim.ando. But he must shew both these requisites; for abbey-lands,
without a special ground of discharge, are not discharged of course; neither
will any prescription de non decim.ando avail in total discharge of tithes, unless
it relates to such abbey-lands. (10)
III. Common, or right of common, appears from its very definition to be an
incorporeal hereditament: being a profit which a man hath in the land of
another ; as to feed his beasts, to catch fish, to dig turf, to cut wood, or the
like. (h) And hence common is chiefly of four sorts; common of pasture, of
lliscary, of turbary, and of estovers. (11)
1. Common of pasture is a right of feeding one's beasts on another's land:
for in those waste grounds, which are usually called commons, the property of
the soil is generally in the lord of the manor; as in common fields it is in the
particular tenants. This kind of common is either appendant, appurtenant,
because of vicinage, or in gross. (c)
•common appendant is a right belonging to the owners or occupiers [•33 ]
of arable land~ to put commona.ble beasts upon the lord's waste, and upon
the lands of other persons, within the same ma.nor. Commonable beasts are
either beasts of the plough, or such as manure the ground. This is a matter of
most universal right; a.nd it wa.s originally permitted, (d) not only for the
encouragement of agriculture, but for the necessity of the thing. For, when
lords of manors granted out pa.reels of land to tenants, for services either done
or to be done, these tenants could not plough or manure the land without
beasts; these beasts could not be sustained without pasture; and pasture could
not be had but in the lord's wastes, and on the uninclosed fallow grounds of
themselves a.nd the other tenants. 'rhe law therefore annexed this right of common, as inseparably incident to the grant of the lands; and this was the original
of common appendant; which obtains in Sweden, and the other northern kingdoms, much in the same manner as in England. (e) (12) Common appurtenant,
(b) Finch, Law, 167.

(c)

Co. Litt. 122.

(d)

2 Inst. 86.

(e) Stiernh. Mjvre

s - , l. 2, o. 6.

Vic. c. 64; 2 and 3 Tic. c. 62, and 5 and 6 Tic. c. 54, tithes in England have now been converted

into a rent-charge, payable in money, but in amount varying according to the average price

of corn for the seven preceding years. A voluntary agreement between the owners of the

land and of the tithes was first promoted, and in case of no such agreement, a compulsory

commutation was effected by commissioners. If the rent-charge falls in arrear, it may be

distrained for, and if forty days in arrear, possession of the land may be taken and held until

arrears and costs are satisfied.

(11) [The proper description of a common is, that it is a profit a prendre, a right to take or

sever something valuable from the land of another; and this distinguishes it from mere ease-

ments, which are rights merely to use or interfere with the enjoyment of another's property.

Thus, a right of way, a right to free air, light, <fcc., is an easement. A right to wash and

water cattle at a pond, and to take from thence water for domestic purposes, has been held to

be a mere casement. 5 Ad. and El. 758; 1 Nev. and P. 172. See 3 Ad. and El. 554; 3 Nov.

and P. 257; 7 Mees. and W. 63. The distinction has been rendered important by the statute of

prescriptions, 2 and 3 Win. IT, c. 71. Another peculiarity of a right of common is, that

it impbes no duty on the part of the owner of the soil, beyond the negative duty of permis-

sion : it lies, in the old phrase, not in render, like a rent, but merely in prendre.']

(12) [Common appendant belongs only to arable land, and cannot be claimed for more

cattle than are necessary to plough or manure the tenant's arable laud. Levancy and con-

chancy are incident to common appendant as well as appurtenant. Willes, 227, 231; 1 B. and

Ad. 710; 5 T. R. 46; 2 Mood, and K. 205. But, where a farm contains pasture, it may be pre-
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(10) The whole subject of tithes, like that of oovowsons, is foreign to American law.
Under the English statutes of 6 and 7 Wm. IV, c. 71; 7 id: and 1 Vic. c. 69; 1 a.nd 2

Vic. c. 64 ; 2 and 3 Vic. c. 62, and 5 and 6 Vir. c. 54, tithe~ in England have now been oonverted
int.o a rent-charge, payable in money, but in amount varying o.ccording to the average frice
of corn fhr the seven preceding years. A volwitary agreement between the owners o the
land and of the tithes was first promotetl, and in case of no such agreement, a compulsory
commutation WM effected by commissioners. If the rent-charge falls in arrear, it may be
distrained for, &nd if forty days in arrear, poi;;session of the land may be ta.ken and held until
arrears and costs are satisfied.
(11) [The l'roper description of a common id, that it is a yrofit a prcndrc, a right tu take or .
sever something valuable from the land of another; and this cfa1tinguishes it from mere eat1e- .
ments, which are right.I merely to u11e or interfere with the enjoyment of another's property.
Thus, o. right of way, a right to free air, light, &c., is an easement. A right to wa.~h and
water cattle at a pond, and to take from thence water for domestic purposes, ha.~ been held t.o
lie a mere easement. 5 Ad. and El. 758 ; 1 Nev. and P. 172. See 3 Ad. aucl El. 554; 3 Nev.
and P. 257; 7 Mees. and W. 63. The distinction hall been rendered important by the ~tatute of
prescription!!, ~ and 3 Wm. IV, c. 71. Another peculiarity of a right of common is, that
1t implie:1 no duty on the part of the owner of the soil, beyond the negative duty of pennisIlion: it lies, in the old phrMe, not in render, like a rent, but merely in prcndre.]
(12) [Common appendant belongs only to arable land, and cannot be clnimccl for more
cattle th1m are nece!18&I'Y t.o plough or manure the tenant's arable land. Lernncy and couehancy are incident t.o common appenda.nt as well 88 appurtenant. Willes, 2'%/, t:n ; 1 B. and
Ad. 710; 5 T. R. 46; 2 Mood. and R. 205. But, where a farm contains pa.4urc. it may be pre-
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ariseth from no connexion of tenure, nor from any absolute necessity: but may

be annexed to lands in other lordships, (/) or extend to other beasts, besides each

as are generally commonable; as hogs, goats, or the like, which neither plough

nor manure the ground. This not arising from any natural propriety or neces-

sity, like common appendant, is therefore not of general right; but can only be

claimed by immemorial nsage and prescription, (g) which the law esteems suf-

ficient proof of a special grant or agreement for this purpose. Common because

of vicinage, or neighbourhood, ie where the inhabitants of two townships, which

lie contiguous to each other, have nsually intercommoned with one another;

the beasts of the one straying mutually into the other's fields, without any

molestation from either. This is indeed only a permissive right, intended to

excuse what in strictness is a trespass in both, and to prevent a multiplicity of

suits: and therefore either township may enclose and bar out the other, though

they have intercommoned time out of mind. Neither hath any person of one

f*341 *own a right to put his beasts originally *into the other's common: but

•- J if they escape, and stray thither of themselves, the law winks at the

trespass. (A) Common in gross, or at large, is such as is neither appendant nor

appurtenant to land, but is annexed to a man's person; being granted to him

and his heirs by deed; or it may be claimed by prescriptive right, as by a parson

of a church, or the like corporation sole. This is a separate inheritance, entirely

distinct from any landed property, and may be vested in one who has not a foot

of ground in the manor.
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All these species of pasturable common may be and usually are limited as to

•number and time; but there are also commons without stint, and which last

all the year. (13) By the statute of Morton, however, and other subsequent

statutes, (i) the lord of a manor may enclose so much of the waste as he pleases

for tillage or woodground, provided he leaves common sufficient for such as are

entitled thereto. This enclosure, when justifiable, is called in law "approving"

an ancient expression signifying the same as " improving." (k) (14) The lord

hath the sole interest in the soil; but the interest of the lord and commoner, in

the common, are looked nppn in law as mutual. They may both bring actions

for damage done, either against strangers, or each other; the lord for the public

injury, and each commoner for his private damage. (I)

2, 3. Common of piseary is a liberty of fishing in another man's water; (15)

(/) Cro. Car. 482. 1 Jon. 397. (g) Co. Litt. Ill, 122. (ft) Ibid. 122.

(?) 20 Hen. m, c. 4. 29 Geo. H, c. 86. and 31 G«o. II, c. 41. (*> Sinai. 474. (J) 8 Hep. 113.

arieeth from no connexion of tenure, nor from IW.lJ absolute necessity: but may
be annexed to lands in other lerdships, (/) or extend to ether beasts, besi~ such
as are generally commonable; as hogs, .goats, or the like, which neither plough •
110r manure the ground. This not a.ri~mg from any natural propriety or nee~
sity, Jike common ap~nda.nt, is therefore not of general right; but can only be
claimed by immemonal usage and prescription, ( g) which the law esteem8 8Ufficient proof of a special grant or agreement for this purpose. Common heca.UM
of vicinage, or neighbourhood, is where the inhabitants of two townships, which
he contiguous to each other, ·have nsua.Uy intercommoned witJi one another;
the beasts of the one straying mutually into the other's fields, without any
molestation from either. This is indeed only a permissive right, intended to
exC'llse what in strictness is a trespass in both, and to prevent a multiplio.i.ty of
suit.a: and therefore either township may enclose and bar out t.he other, though
they have intercommoned time out of mind. Neither hath any person of one
[*34 ] to,vn a right to put bis beaf!t.s originally *into the other's common: but
if they escape, and stray thither of themselves, the law winks at the
trespass. (k) Common in pross, or at large, is such as is neither appendant nor
appurtenant to land, but 1s annexed to a man's person; being granted to him
·and his heirs by deed; or it may be claimed by ~rescriptive right, as by a parson
of a church, or the like corporation sole. This 1s a sepa:rate inheritance, entirehdistinct from any landed property, and may be veated in one who has not a foot
·of ground in the manor.
All these species of pasturable common may be and usually are limited as t.o
.number and time; but there a.re also commons without stint, and. which la.st
all the year. (13) By the statute of Merton, however, and other subeequent
statutes, ('i) the lord of a manor may enclose so much of the waste as he pfe.a.aes
for tillage or woodground, provided he leaves common sufficient for such a.s are
entitled thereto. rrhis enclosure, when justifiable, is called in law "approving/'
an ancient expression signifying the same as" improving-" (k) (14) The lord
hath the sole mterest in the soil; but the interest of the lord and commoner, in
the common, are looked npon in law as mutual. They may both bring actions
for damage done, either against stran~ers, or each other; the ford for the public
injury, and each commoner t'or his private damage. (l)
2, 3. Common of p1:~eary is a liberty of fishing in another man's water; (15)

•umed, if there is evidence of usage, Uiat it was all originally arable. Bac. Ab. Common. A.

1; 4 Rep. 37; see 5 Taunt. 244.]

(fl ·Cro. C&r. 482. 1 Jon. au7.
(g) Co. Litt. JU, 122.
(l) 20 Ben. ID, c. 4. !II Geo. II, c. 86. and 31 Geo. Il, c. 41.

Ihld. 12!.
(kl I Inat. •7.4.

(la)

(l) i

Bep. 113.

(13) [The notion of this species of common is exploded: a right of common -without stint

cannot exist in law. Bennet v. Reeve, "Willes, 232; 8 T. R. 396.]

(14) The inclosure of commons is now regulated by statute 41 Geo. Ill, c. 109, and various

acts amendatory thereof. Inclosure commissioners are appointed, before whom proposals for

inclosures are laid, and the details are arranged and sanctioned by them, aud allotments nude

to the lords and commoners in lieu of their respective interests.

(15) In tide waters the right of taking fish is common to all citiaens: Parker v. Cutler Mill

Dam Co., 7 Shep. 353; Coofidge v. Williams, 4 Mass. 140; Burnham r. Webster, 5 id. 866:

but the town within whose bounds the waters are may have an exclusive right by grant from

the state. Coolidge v. "Williams, 4 Mass. 140. And it seems that a right to a several fishery

in an arm ot the sea may be acquired by prescription, though uninterrupted exercise and use

alone would not establish it, however long continued, since the person so using it only exer-

cises a right which, prima fade, he possesses in common with all others. It most further

appear that all others have been excluded. Chalker «. Dickinson, 1 Conn. 382. And every

presumption will be against the right. Gould v. James, 6 Cow. 369; and see Collins v. Ben-

bury, 5 Ired. IIS; Cobb v. Davenport^ 3 Vroom. 369.

In rivers where the title docs not ebb and flow, the proprietor of the bank has an exclusive right

of fishery to tie thread of the stream : People r. Platt, 17 Johns. 209; "Waters v. lalley, 4 Pick.

145; Adams v, Pease, 2 Conn. 481; Beckman v. Kreamer, 43 111. 447; but the stole may regulate

its existence with a view to the protection of the rights of all others having a like right. Com-

monwealth v. CUapin, 5 Pick. 199; Ingram v. Threadgill, 3 Dev. 69; Vintont'. "Welsh, 9 Pick. CT.

It has been held that in those large rivers, like the Susquehanna, which are navigable by

sea-going vessels, there is no exclusive right of fishery in the adjoining owners, but the right

is in the public at large. Shrunk «. Schuylfall Nav. Co., 14 S. and E. 71.
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wmed, if there liJ evidence of usage, that it was all originally amble. B$C. Ab. ContMOA, A.
1; 4 Rep. 37; see 5 Taunt. 244.J
·
(13) (The notion of thiti species of common is exploded: a right of common without stint
cannot exist in law. Bennet ti. Reeve, Willes, 2:J2; 8 T. H.. 396.]
(14) The inclot'lure of commonri is now regnlated by statute 41 Geo. III, c. 109, and various
acts amendatory thereof. lnclosure commi!lsionen1 are &llpoinied, before whom proposals 10r
inclosure~ are laid, and the details are arranged and sanctioned by them, and allotments IDlde
to the IorclH and commonert1 in lieu of their respective intereRts.
. (15)
t_!de waters the right of taki~g. fish is common to all citiaens: Parker "· Cuf:ler llill
I>am Co., , Shep. 353; Coolidge ti. Williams, 4 M:88S. 140; Burnham tl. Webster, 5 id. 200:
but the town within whose bounds the waters are may have &n exclUAive right by grant from
the state. Coolidge ti. Williams, 4 Y888. 140. And it 1.1eems that a right to a several ~
in an a.rm ot the sea may be scquired by prescription, though uninterrupted exercise and u~
alone would not establish it, however long continued, since the person so using it only exercises a right which, prim.a facie, he possesses in common with all others. It must fnrtbt•r
appear that all others have been excluded. Chalker "· Dfokinson, 1 Conn. 382. And every
presumption will he against the right. lffiuld "· Je.mes, 6 Cow. 369; and see Collins "· Boo.bury, 5 Ired. Ill:!; Cobb t•. Davenport, 3 Vroom. 369.
In riven! where the tide docs not ebb and flow, the proprietor of the bank has an exclusive right
of fishery to the thread of the i;tre11m: People t•. Platt, 17 Johns. 209; Watel'I! "·Lilley, -4 Pick.
145; Adams i•, Pease, 2 C<mn. 481; Backman t'. Kreamer, 43 Ill. 447; but the state may regulate
itR existence with a view to the protection of the rights of all others having a like ri~ht. Commonwealth ti. Chapin, 5 Pick. 199; ingram v. Threadgill, 3 Dev. 59; Vinton ti. Welsh, 9 Pick. 87.
It has been held that in those large rivers, like the Susquehimna1 which are oaviJl;able by
sea-going vessels, there is no exelusite right of fi11hery in the adjoimng owners, but the ~h~
LI in the public at large. Shrunk t•. Schuylkill Nav. Co., 14 S. and R. n.
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as common of turbary is a liberty of digging turf upon another's ground.(m) (16)

There Is also a common of digging for coals, minerals, stones and the

like. All these bear a resemblance to common of pasture in many respects:

though in one point they go much further; common of pasture being only a

right of feeding on th« herbage and vesture of the soil, which renews annually;

but common of turbary, and those aforementioned, are a right of carrying away

the very goil itself.

*4. Common of estovers or esfoumers, (17) that is, necessaries (from r*Q--i

estoffer, to furnish,) is a liberty of taking necessary wood, for the use or •• •>

furniture of a house or farm, from off another's estate. The Saxon wood, dote, is

used by us as synonymous to the French estovers: and therefore house bote is a

sufficient allowance of wood, to repair, or to burn in the house: which latter is

sometimes called fire-bote: plough-bote and cart-bote are wood to be employed in

making and repairing all instruments of husbandry; and hay-bote, or hedge-

bote, is wc-od for repairing of hay, hedges or fences. These botes or estovers

must be reasonable ones; and such any tenant or lessee may take off the land

let or demised to him, without waiting for any leave, assignment, or appoint-

ment of the lessor, unless he be restrained by special covenant to the eontrary.(»)

These several species of commons do all originally result from the same

necessity as common of pasture; yiz.: for the maintenance and carrying on of

husbandry; common of piscary being given for the sustenance of tne tenant's

family; common of turbary and fire-bote for his fuel; and house-bote, plough-
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bote, cart-bote, and hedge-bote, for repairing his house, his instruments of

tillage, and the necessary fences of his grounds. (18)

IV. A fourth species of incorporeal Hereditaments is that of ways; or the

right of going over another man's ground. I speak not here of the king's high-

(/»> Co. Lltt. 123. (7i) Co. Lilt. 41.

For the taking of fish where the public have the right, no penon can lawfully go upon the

as common of turbm·y is a liberty of digging turf upon another'sground.(m) (16)
There is also a common of digging for coals, minerals, stones and the
like. All these bear a resemblance to common of pasture in many respects:
though in one point they go much further; common of pasture being only a
right of feeding on thti herbage and vesture of the soil, which renews annually;
but common of turbary, ~nd those aforementioned, are a right of carrying away
the very soil itselt:
*4. Common of estovers or estoiwiers, (17) that is, necessaries (from [*a~ ]
0
es!offer, to furnish,) is a liberty of taking necessary wood, for the use or
furniture of a house or farm, from off another's estate. The Saxon wood, bote, is
used by us as synonymous 1io the French estovers: and therefore house bote is a
sufficient allowance of wood, to repair, or to burn in the house: which latter is
sometimes called fire-bote: plough-bote and cart-bote are wood to be employed in
making and repairing all instruments of husbandry; and hay-bote, or hedgebote, is wood for repairing of hay, hedges or fences. These botes or estovers
must be reasonable ones; and such any tenant or lessee may take off the land
let or demised to him, without waiting for any leave, assignment, or appointment of the lessor, unless he be restrained by special covenant to the eontra.ry.( ti)
These several species of commons do all originally result from the same
necessity as common of pasture; :viz.: for the maintenance and caITJing on of
husbandry; common of piscary being given for the sustenance of the tenant's
family ; common of turbary and fire-bote for his fuel; and house-bote, ploughbote, cart-bote, and hedge-bote, for repairing his house, his instruments of
tillage, and the necessary fences of his grounds. (18)
IV. A fourth species of incorporeal bereditaments is that of wa'!!s; or the
right of going over another man's ground. I speak not here of the king's hight•l Co. Litt. 12i.

land of another without license. Coolidge v. Williams, 4 Mass. 140.

(n) Co. Litt. il.

(16) [Common of turbary can only be appendant, or appurtenant, to a house, not to lands:

Tyringham's Case, 4 Rep. 37; and the turf cut for fuel must be burned in the commoner's

house : Dean and Chapter of Ely v. Warren, 3 Atk. 189; not sold. Valentine v. Penny, Hoy,

145. See 2 T. R. 391; 6 id. 748, as to right to dig sand or gravel for repairs; a species of com-

mon of estovers.]

(17) [The liberty which every tenant for life, or years, has, of common right, to take necessary

estovers in the lands which he holds for such estate, seema to be confounded, in most of tho text-

books, with right of common of estovers. Yet they appear to bis essentially different. The

privilege of tho tenant for life or years is an exclusive privilege, not a commonable right. Right

of common of estovers seems properly to mean, a right appendant or appurtenant to a messuage

or tenement, to be exercised in lands not occupied by the holder of the tenement. Such a right

may either be prescriptive, or it may arise from modern grant. Countess of Arnndel «. Steere,

Cro. Jac. 25. And though the grant be made to an individual, for the repairs of his house,

the right is not a persoual one, but appurtenant to the house. Dean and Chapter of Windsor's

Case, 5 Rep. 25: Sir Henry Nevill's Case, Plowd. 381. Such a grant is not destroyed by any

alteration of the house to which the estovers are appurtenant, but it may be restricted within the

limits originally intended, if the altered state of the premises would create a consumption of

estovers greater than that contemplated when the grant was made. Lnttrel's Case, 4 Rep. 87.]

(18) Rights of common are very rare in the United States, and the cases which have considered

them are few. See Livingston v. Ten Broeck, 16 Johns. 14; Leyman v. Abeel, id. 30; Van Rens-

selaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 639; Trustees, <fec., u. Robinson, 12 8. and R. 29; Worcester v. Green,

2 Pick. 429; Smith v. Floyd, 18 Barb. 522; Livingston v. Ketcham, 1 id. 592; Hall v. Lawrence,

2 R. I. 218; Bell v. Ohio and Penn. R. R. Co., 25 Penn. St. 161.

A custom that all the inhabitants of a particular town, for the time being, have ft right to depas-

ture the unenclosed woodlands of individual proprietors within the town, is not a mere easement,

but a right to take profit; and for such right, the commoner must prescribe in respect to some

estate and not in respect to mere inhabitancy. The custom is therefore void. Smith e. Floyd,

18 Barb. 522. The feet that cattle are suffered, without objection, to run at large over the unen-

closed woodlands of a new country affords no ground from which to imply a grant Id. Com-

mon of estovers cannot be apportioned. If partition of the premises to which the right is appur-

tenant is made without reserving the right of common to one alone, it extinguishes the right.

Livingston «. Ketcham, 1 Barb. 592; and see Leyman c. Abeel, 16 Johns. 30; Van Rensselnor

For the t.aking of fish whero the public have the right, no pel'l!On can lawfully go upon the
land of another without licenl'le. Coolidge " · Williams, 4 Mass. 140.
(i6) [Common of turbary can only be appendant, or appurtenant, to a house, not to lands:
Tyringham's Case, 4 Rep. 37 ; and the tnrf cut for fuel must be burned in the commoner's
house: Dean &nd Chapter of Ely t•. Warren, 3 .A.tk. 189; not sold. Valentine "· Pennyz Noy,
145. See 2 T. R. 391; 6 id. 748, 88 to right to dig 11and or gravel for repairs; a species 01 common of estovers.]
(17) [The liberty which every tenant for life, or ye81'8, hM, of common right, to take nece1!88.1'1
estovers in the lands which he holds for such est.ate, seems to be confounded, in most of the textbooks, with right of common of ef'.ltovel'll. Yet thoy appear to b" essentially different. The
privilege of the tenant for life or years is an exclusive privilege, not a oommonable right. Right
of common of estoYer~ seems properly to mean, a right appendant or appurtenant to a messuage
or tenement, to be exercised in lands not ocoupied by the holder of the tenement. Such a right
may either be prescriptive, or it may arise fmm modem grant. Countess of .A.mndel "· S~re,
Cro. J RC. 25. And though the grant be made to an individual, for the repairs of his housa,
the right is not a p~rnonal one, b_ut appurtenant to the house. Dean ~d Cliapter of Windsor's
Ca.'le, 5 Rep. 25: Sir Henry Nenll's Vlllle, Plowd. :vn. Such a ~t u1 not deatroyed b,r any
a.Iteration of the house to which the estovers are appurtenant, but 1t may be restrict.ed withm the
limits ori~olly intended, if the altered state of the premises would create a consumption of
estovers ~ater than that contemplated when the grant Wl\ll made. Luttrel's Case, 4 Rep. 87.]
(18) R1~hts of common a.re very rare in the United States, and the cases which have considered
them are tew. See Livingston v. Ten Broeck, 16 Johns. 14; Layman v. Abeel, id. 30; Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 639; TrusteeR, &c., "· Robiu~on, 12 S. and R. 29; Worcest.er v. Green,
2 Pick. 429; Smith"· Floyd, 18 Barb. 52'.l; Livingston "· Ket.cham, 1 id. 59'.l; Hall "· Lawrence,
2 R. I. 218 ; Bell "· Ohio and Penn. R. R. Co., 25 Penn. St. 161.
A oust.om that all the inhabitants of a particular town, for the time bein~, have o. right to depa.~
ture the unenclo11ed woodlands of individual proprietors within the town, 111 not a mere ea.'iement,
but a right to take profit; and for such right, the commoner must prescribe in respoot to some
estate and not in re11pect to mere inhabitaney. The custom is therefore void. Smith v. FJoyd,
18 Barb. 522. The fact that cattle are suffered, without objection, to rnn at lnrge over the unenclm1ed woodlandt1 of a new country affords no ground from which to imply a grant.. Id. Common of etitovers cannot be apportioned. If partition of the premises to which the riF:ht is appurtenant is made without re~erving the right of common to one alone, it extinguishes the right.
Livingston 11. Ketcham, 1 Barb. 592; and see Leyman v. .A.beet, 16 Johrul. 30; Vnn Re~or
v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 6:~. The taking of l!eS. weed from the beach may be a commons.hie right.
KnowleK ''· Nichols, 2 Curt. C. C. 571.
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v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 639. The taking of sea weed from the beach may be a commonable right

Knowles v. Nichols, 2 Curt. C. 0. 571.

349

D

ti e b

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

...

35 INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. [Book n.

waya, which lead from town to town; nor yet of common ways, leading from a

Tillage into the fields; (19) but of private ways, in which a particular man may

(19) Ways are either public or private. A public way is established either by the dedication

of the owner of the land, or by an appropriation of the land for the purpose, by the sovereign

authority, under what is called the right of eminent domain. "When this right is exercised, it

mnst be in pursuance of some express legislative authority which prescribes the formalities,

and compensation must be made to the owner. The constitutions of the United States and of

tin? several states contain declarations that private property shall not be taken tor public use

without compensation made therefor, but these are oifly declaratory of the pre-existing principle.

Dedication ot a way is an appropriation of land to that use by the owner thereof, and requires

for its perfection an acceptance by the public. The dedication can only be made by the owner

of the Tee : Wood v. Teal, 5 B. and Aid. 454; and therefore where land is under lease, the fact

that the public are permitted to make use of a way across it will not be evidence of a dedication,

nnless there be circumstances from which the knowledge and concurrence of the owner of the

reversion can be implied. Rex v. Barr, 4 Camp. 16; Daviest). Stephens, 7 C. and P. 570. Xo

writing is required to establish a dedication, and no particular formality. The mere throwing

open the land to the use of the public for a way constitutes ipso facto and instantaneously a

dedication, if the public accept it. Hunter t'. Trustees of Sandy Hill, 6 Hill, 407. The intent to

dedicate, hoWcver, mnst be unequivocal; it will not be implied from any acts of an ambiguous

character. The fact that the owner acquiesced in the use and enjoyment of the way by the pub-

lic for twenty years would be sufficient evidence of such intent in any case: Smith v. State, 3

/..iii. 130; State r. Marble, 4 Ired. 318 ; but it might also be inferred from an uninterrupted use
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for a much less time. The question is one of fact, to be passed upon by jury. See Angel]

and Durfee on Highways, c. 3; Hobbs «. Lowell, 19 Pick. 405; Pritohard «. Atkinson, 4 N. H.

1; Stacy v. Miller, 4 Mo. 478; Morrison V. Marquardt, 24 Iowa, 35 ; Nbyes v. "Ward, 19 Conn.

250. A common mode, by which a party who temporarily allows the public to pass over his laud

negatives an intent to dedicate, is by fencing up the passage one day in the year, or doing some

other unequivocal act in assertion of his paramount right. Cook ». Hillsdale, 7 Mich. 115.

Acceptance by the public may either be by some formal resolution or other action by the proper

authorities, or it may be inferred from circumstances. The mere fact that any number of indi-

viduals DOSS through a passage left open to them does not constitute an acceptance, but if the

proper highway authorities treat it as a public way, either by expending public moneys upon it,

or by setting it off into some road district for supervision and repair, they thereby accept it. See

Kelly's Case, 8 Grat. 632 ; Hobbs v. Lowell, 19 Pick. 405; "Wright v. Tukey, 3 Gush. 2<K); People

r. Jone.--, 6 Mich. 176. And long continued user by the public is important evidence bearing on

the question of dedication, and may in some cases be sufficient to warrant its being found. S««

Augell and Durfee on highways, $ 161, and cases cited. A dedication may be of a part of a road

only, as well as of the whole of it. Valentine v. Boston, 22 Pick. 75.

"Ways are also often dedicated by laying out plats upon which streets and roads are marked,

and selling lots in reference thereto. There are statutes in the several states which prescribe the

effect of such plats, when duly acknowledged and recorded. If, however, the plat is not so exe-

cuted as to comply with the statute, it will still be regarded, when acted upon, as an offer to the

public of the streets marked upon it, and the}' become public ways when accepted as hi other

cases. And if there be no act of acceptance on the part of the public, there is nevertheless a

right in those who have bought lots upon the plat with reference thereto to have all the ways

laid down thereon kept open for their use with reference to the enjoyment of their purchases.

Matter of Lewis street, 2 Wend. 472; Smyles v. Hastings, 22 N. Y. 217; Smith c. Lock, 16 Mich.

56; see O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 292.

Prescription which presupposes a grant is not properly applicable to highways.

Highways are for the use of all the public, though the mode of use may be restricted, as to

foot passengers, <fcc. Restricted highways, however, are very rare. Turnpikes and other roads,

which are constructed and controlled by corporations created for the purpose, are nevertheless

public highways; the whole public having an equal right to use them on complying with the pre-

scribed terms. Railroads are sometimes called public highways, though persons can pass along

them only in the vehicles which the proprietors provide.

As a general rule the owner of land bounded on a highway owns to the center, subject to

the public easement, and he may make any use thereof not inconsistent with the public occu-

pancy, and maintain ejectment against any one who makes a permanent appropriation of any

portion to the exclusion of himself and the public. Goodtitle «. Alker, Burr. 133; Gardiner r.

Tisdale, 2 Wis. 153.

A private way is either a right iu gross, which is purely a personal right and cannot be

assigned, or it is appurtenant or annexed to an estate and passes with a conveyance of the

estate. It may exist of necessity or by grant. A way ot necessity exists where land is

granted which is either wholly surrounded by land of the grantor, or partially by

such laud, and elsewhere by land of strangers. In such a case if there be no other

way to the land, the law presumes that it was the intention of the parties that the

grantee should have access to it over the land of the grantor, and he has a way across such

last mentioned land in order to make his grant available. Washbnrn on Easements, eh. 2,
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have an interest and a right, though another be owner of the soil. This may be

grounded on a special permission; as when the owner of the land grants to

another a liberty of passing over his grounds, to go to church, to market, or

the like: in which case the gift or grant is particular, and confined to the

jrantee alone: it dies with the person ; and, if the grantee leaves the country,

. hamlet, or all the owners and occupiers

such a farm, have immemorially used to cross such a ground for such a particu-

lar purpose: for this immemorial usage supposes an original grant, whereby

a right of way thus appurtenant to land or houses may clearly DC created. A

right of way may also arise by act and operation of law; for, if a man grants mo

(O) Finch, Law, 31.

$ 2; Lawton v. Kivere, 2 McCord, 445; Wissler v. Hershey, 23 Penn. St. 333; Nichols v. Luce,

24 Pick. 102; Phoysey v. Vicary, 16 M. and W. 484 ; Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush. 285; Thomas

have an interest and a right, though another be owner of the soil. This may be
grounded on a special permission; as when the owner of the land grants to
another a liberty of passing over his grounds, to go to church, to market, or
the like: in which case the gift or grant is particular, and confined to the
grantee alone: it dies with tht> person ; and, if the grantee le.aves the country,
he cannot assign over his right to any other; nor can he justify taking another
*per.son i~ his company. (o) A way may be also by prescription; as if all [*36 ]
the mhab1tunts of such a hamlet, or all the owners and occupiers of
such a farm, have immemorially used to cross such a ground for such a particular purpose: for this immemorial usage supposes an original grant, whereby
a right of way thus appurtenant to land or houses may clearly be created. A
right of way may also arise by act and operation of law; for, if a man grants mo

tf. Bertram, 4 Bush. 317. If, however, the grantee has a way of access to the land granted, but

(o)

not so convenient as the one over the grantor's land, a way of necessity will not exist over the

Finch, Law, 81.

latter, for mere convenience is not sufficient to raise the implication of an intent to give it Turn-

bull c. Rivers, 3 McCord, 131; Screyen v. Gregorie, 8 Rich. 158; McDonald ». Lindall, 3 Rawle.

492. If a grantor conveys land entirely surrounding a parcel which he retains, he has a way of

necessity over the land conveyed, which likewise rests upon the supposed intention of the par-

ties. Brigham v. Smith, 4 Gray, 297; Pinnington «. Galland, 20 E. L. and Bq. 561: Id. 22 Law

3. Eep. (N. S.) Exch. 348.

If, however, in any case a way of necessity would be inconsistent with a grant, it cannot
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exist, because the intent to create it cannot be implied. As, where land is conveyed for a

specific purpose, and a way across it would defeat that purpose. Seeloy v. Bishop, 19

Conn. 134.

Wherever a right of way of necessity exists, the owner of the estate over which it is to pass

has the right to locate it, but if he shall tail to do so within a reasonable time after request, the

person entitled to it may select a suitable route therefor, having reasonable regard to the interest

and convenience of the owner of the estate. When once selected by the party entitled to do so,

it is fixed, and cannot afterwards be changed except by consent. Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend.

507; Nichols t>. Luce, 24 Pick. 102, A right of way of necessity is limited to the necessity, and

ceases whenever the owner thereof, by purchase or otherwise, acquires a way of access over his

own land to the land in respect to which it existed. Pierce v. Selleck, 18 Conn. 321; Viall v.

Carpenter, 14 Gray, 126; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. 507 ; Abbott». Stewartstown, 47 N. H. 228.

Ways by grant are either granted separately, or as appendant or appurtenant to an estate which

is conveyed. Their location is either defined by the grant, or it becomes fixed by the use of one

party and the acquiescence of the other, or, in the case of ways appurtenant to an estate granted,

it has been denned by previous use. A right of way may also be created by the grantor reserv-

ing it in the grant which he makes of the land.

I n the case of a private way, the land owner has a general right to make use of the land in

any manner he may please, not interfering with the easement. Atkins v. Bordman, 2 Met. 457.

He is under no obligation to keep the way in repair unless he has bound himself to do so, nor is

he obliged to suffer the party entitled to the easement to pass over the land elsewhere, if the way

has become impassable. Miller c. Bristol, 12 Pick. 550; see also, Capers v. McKee, 1 Strobh.

164. The rule is different in the case of public ways, for if a highway be out of repair and

impassable, the traveller may go upon the adjoining premises, doing no unnecessary damage. Wil-

liams v. Safford, 7 Barb. 309; Campbell ». Race, 7 Cush. 408; Holmes ». Seely, 19 Wend. 507.

And in the case of a private way, if the owner of the estate obstructs it, the person entitled to

the easement inav pass around the obstruction upon other lands of the owner, without rendering

himself liable, Farnum v. Platt, 8 Pick. 339.

Ways may also exist by custom; as that every inhabitant of a borough shall have a right of

way over a parcel of land to mill or to market; but these are not frequent in America. When

they exist they must rest on a user of at least twenty years.

The doctrine of dedication has no application to private ways. A private way may, however,

be established by prescription. If a person has used a way over the land of another for twenty

years, it will be presnmad that the use had its origin in a grant, provided the following things

concur: 1. The use must have been definite, both as to manner and as to locality. 2. It must

have continued for the whole period without interruption. 3. It must have been accompanied

bv a claim of right adverse to the owner of the land, and not have been under leave and license

of the owner; for if the claim has been in subordination to the right of the owner, a grant could

not be presumed, since that would be inconsistent with the claim. The law of prescription is

~ 2; Lawton "' Rivers, 2 McCord, 445; Will81er ti. Hershey, 23 Penn. St. 333; Nichols v. Luce,
24 Pick. 10'2; Phoysey v. Vicary, 16 M. and W. 484 ; Underwood v. Carney, 1 CUllh. 285; Thomas
11. Bertram, 4 Bullh. 317. If, however, the grantee has a way of acce~s to the land ~anted, but
not so convenient as the one over the grantor's land, a way of necei;Rity will not enst over the
latter, for mere convenience is not Hufficient t.o raii!e the implication of an intent to give it. Turnbull ti. Riveni, 3 McCord, 131 ; Screven ti. Gregoria, 8 Rich. 1&8; McDonald v. Lindall, 3 Rawle1
49'.l. If a grnntor conveys land entirely surrounding a parcel which he retains, he has a way ot
n:ecessity. over the hm~ com·eycd'. which_ lik.ewise rests upon the supposed intention of the parties. Bngham v. Smith, 4 Gray, 'm; Pinnington ti. Gall8.lld, 20 E. L. l\Ild Eq. 561 ; Id. 2'i Law
J. Rep. (N. S.) Exch. 348.
If, however, in any C&'!e a way of neoeSllity would be inconsistent with a grant, it cannot
exist, becanRe tho intent to create it cannot be implied. .As, where land is conveyed for a
specific purpose, and a way acrol!ll it would defeat that purpose. Seeley v. Bishop, 19

Conti. 134.

Wherever a right of way of necessity e:xists, the owner of the estate over which it is to pass
has the right to locatu it, but if he Khali fail to do t!O within a reasonable time after request, tho
person entitled to it may gelect a suitable route therefor, having reasonable regard to tho interest
and convenience of the owner of the elltate. When once 1!6lecte1l by the party entitled to do Ro,
it is fixed, and cannot aftl'rwaril~ be changed except by comient. Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend.
507; Nichols''· Luce, 24 Pick. 102, A right of way of neceAAity is limited to the necessity, and
ceases whenever the owner thereof, by purcha.>e or otherwi~e, acquire8 a way of acoet1s over hie
own land to the land in respect to which it existed. Pierce ti. Selleck, 18 Conn. 321 ; Viall v.
Carpenter, 14 Gray, 126; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. 507; Abbottv. Stewartstown, 47 N. H. 228.
Ways by grant are either granted separately, or ai; appendant or appurtenant to an estate which
is conveyed. Their location is either defined IJy the grant, or it bocomei1 fixed by the use of one
party and tho acquiescence of the other, or, in the case of ways appurtenant to an o.-tate granted,
1t has been de.fined by previou11 u~e. A right of way may also be created by the gmntor reserving it in the grant which he makes of the land.
In the Cl\lle-of a private way, the land owner has a general right to make use of the land in
any manner he mar pl688e, not interforiug with the ell.'!ement. Atkins v. Bordman, 2 Met. 457.
He is under no obligation to keep the way in repair unlo:ll! he ha.~ bound hiiru1elf to do so, nor il'I
he obliged to llUffer the partr. entitled to the easement to pass over the land elsewhere, if th11 way
has become impSSl!able. Miller ti. Bristol, 12 Pick. 550; see also, Cape~ v. McKee 1 Strobh.
164. The rule i11 different in the C'lkle of public ways, for if a highway be out of repair and
impasi;able, the traveller may go upon the adjoiningpremi~el!, doing no unnece&<ary damage. Willianu1 v. Saffonl, 7 Barb. 309; CamP,bell v. Race, 7 Cush. 408; Holme8 v. Seely, 19 Wend. rm .
.And in the case of a. private wav, 1f the owner of the estate oblltructll it, the person entitled u1
the easement mav pass arowid the obstruction upon other lands of the owner, without rendering
himself liable. Farnum v. Platt, 8 Pick. 339.
Ways may also exist by custom; as that every inhabitant of a borongh sho.11 havo a right of
way over a parcel of land to mill or to market; hut these are not frequent in America. When
they exist they must rest on a user of at least twenty yearR.
The doctrine of dedication has ·no application to private ways. A private way may, however,
be establitJhed by
If a penion h&ll used a way over thtJ land of another for twenty
years, it will be presu
that the use had its origin in a grant, provided the following thing:;
concur: 1. 'rhe use must have been definite, both as to manner and as to locality. 2. It mu~t
have oontinned for the whole period without interruption. 3. It must have been accompanied
bv a claim of right advel'!le to the owner of the land, and not have been under leave WJd license
of the owner; tur if the claim bas been in subordination to the right of the owner, a grant could
not be presumed, since that would be inconsi8tent with the claim. The law of pre~cription is
:>ne of quiet, and is based upon the presumption that a long-continued use of land adverlle to the
interest of the owner would not have been acquiesced in, Unless it had itll origin in right. See
Wa.llace v. 1''letcher, 10 Fost. 434.

pres:Jewn.
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•me of quiet, and is based upon the presumption that a long-continued use of laud adverse to the

interest of the owner would not have been acquiesced in, unless it had its origin in right. See

"Wallace v. Fletcher, 10 Fost. 434.
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a piece of ground in the middle of his field, he at the same time tacitly and

impliedly gives me a way to come at it; and I may cross his laud for that par-

pose without trespass, (p) For when the law doth give any thing to one, it

giveth impliedly whatsoever is necessary for enjoying the same, (q) By the law

of the twelve tables at Rome, where a man had the right of way over another's

land, and the road was out of repair, he who had the right of way might go over

any part of the land he pleased: which was the established rule in public as well

as private ways. And the law of England, in both cases, seems to correspond

with the Roman, (r) (20)

(p) Ibid. <',». (q) Co. /.ill. 68. (r) Lord Kayin. 725. 1 Brownl. 212. 2 Show. 28. 1 Jon. 197.

(20) This statement is erroneous. He would only have that right where the owner of the

land was bound by grant or prescription to repair the way. See Taylor v. Whitehead, Doug. 746.

See also the preceding note.

It will be observed that the subject of easements receives very little attention from our author,

and indeed the subject then was of very little consequence as compared with ite importance at

the present time. For a full discussion the reader is referred to the special treatises, and espe-

cially that by Mr. TVashbum, as the latest and most eomplete.

An easement exists when the owner of one tenement, called the dominant tenement, hag a

right to compel the owner of another, called the servient tenement, to permit something to be

done, or to refrain from doing something, which, as owner of his tenement, he would otherwise

have been entitled to restrain or to do. An easement must be limited in extent, And must be

in some way for the benefit of the dominant tenement, and not for some general benefit of its
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owner. Clayton v. Corby, 5 Q. B. 415; Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 C. B. 164; Bailey v. Stephens, 12

C. B. N. S. 94.

Among the principal easements, besides the right of way already mentioned, are the right

to water, the right to light and air, the right to the natural support of the land, the right to

the support of buildings by adjacent land or adjacent buildings, the right to have party walls

and fences kept in repair, and the right to carry drains and gutters across adjoining land. A

deed is necessary to create an easement by grant or reservation; and, where one is thus cre-

ated, the grant gives to the owner of the dominant tenement the right to go upon the servient

tenement, and do thereon whatever may be necessary to enable him to enjoy the easement.

An easement may also exist by prescription, where the enjoyment has been for such a period of

time that the law will presume a grant. And, upon this point, reference is again made to the

preceding note.

The right to the flow of water in its natural course we have considered elsewhere, and need

not do further here than to refer to the excellent treatise on water-courses by Mr. Angell.

This right, however, is to be distinguished broadly from that to receive or to cany off water

through an artificial channel, for it is inseparably annexed to the soil, and passes with it, not

as an easement, nor as an appurtenance, Tint as a parcel. Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Mete. 839.

The other right referred to is strictly an easement, and may be created in the same manner as

a private way, and is governed by substantially the same rules. One who has a tight to

receive water for the use of any species of manufacture may do whatever is nacessary for ite

enjoyment, but he has no right to foul the water by turning the refuse of the manufactory into

it. Howell i'. McCoy, 3 Kawle, 356. And an easement to drain water through the lam! of

another for one purpose cannot be changed and enlarged by putting it to use for another purpose.

Carter v. Page, 8 Ired. 190. Upon this subject, in general, see Pyer e. Carter, 1 H. and N. W3;

White v. Leeson, 5 id. 53; Pheysey v. Ticary, 16 M. and W. 484; Alston «. Grant, 3 El. and BL

128; Ferguson ». Witsell, 5 Rich. 280.

,. The right to enjoy, in favor of one tenement, the right to light and air which ntiturally

reaches it in coining laterally from and across the land of an adjacent proprietor, is an important

right in the civil law, and in the law of England, but is relatively of little consequence in Amer-

ica, where the English doctrine, that a prescriptive right to light and air may be gained by mere

length of enjoyment, has generally been discarded. See Washb. on Easements, 49d et seq.,

where the cases are collected.

Every man has a right to the natural support of his land by the adjacent laud of another,

so that, if the owner of the latter shall make excavations within his own boundaries, into which

the laud of the first shall fall, an action will lie for the injury. Harris «. Ryding, 5M, and

W. 60; Bibby ». Carter. 4 H. & N. 153; Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass.226; LasaUc. Holbrook,

4 Paige, 169; Foley v. Wycth, 2 Allen, 131; Richardson v. Vt. Cen. R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 465. But

it seems that this nght is limited to injuries caused to the land itself, and does not afford relief

for damages by the same means to artificial structures. Foley v. Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131; Charles-

B. Rankin, 22 Mo. 571. If, however, an injury is caused to a building by a negligent excavation

on adjacent land, an action will lie for the injury. Farrand v. Marshall, 19 Barb. 380. And

the unqualified right to lateral support for buildings may be acquired in the same way aa any

other easement.

Easements may be lost by ceasing to enjoy the right for such time and under snch circnm

stances as to indicate an intention to abandon the same. Lul trel's Case, 4 Rep. 86; Hale r.
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V. Offices, which are a right to exercise a public or private employment, and

to take the fees and emoluments thereunto belonging, are also incorporeal

hereditaments; whether public, as those of magistrates; or private, as of bailiffs,

receivers, and the like. For a man may have an estate in them, either to him and

his heirs, or for life, or for a term of years, or during pleasure only; save only

that offices of public trust cannot be granted for a term of years, especially if

they concern the administration of justice, for then they might perhaps vest in

executors or administrators, (s) (21) Neither can any judicial office be granted

in reversion : because though the grantee may be able to perform it at the time of

the grant, yet before the office falls he may become unable and insufficient: but

ministerial offices may be so granted; (t) for those may be executed by dep-

uty. (22) Also, by statute 5 and 6 Edw_. VI, c. 16, no public office (a few only

excepted) shall be sold, under pain of disability to dispose of or hold it. For the

law presumes that *he who buys an office will, by bribery, extortion, or

other unlawful means, make his purchase good, to the manifest detriment

of the public. (23)

VI. Dignities bear a near relation to offices. Of the nature of these we treated

at large in a former book; (w) it will therefore be here sufficient to mention them

as a species of incorporeal hereditaments, wherein a man may have a property or

estate.

VII. Franchises are a seventh species. Franchise and liberty are used as

synonymous terms; and their definition is (v) a royal privilege, or branch of the
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king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject Being therefore derived

from the crown, they must arise from the king's grant; or in some cases may be

held by prescription, which, as has been frequently said, presupposes a grant. (24)

The kinds of them are various, and almost infinite: I will here briefly touch,

upon some of the principal; premising only, that they may be vested in either

natural persons or bodies politic; in one man or in many; out the same identi-

cal franchise, that has before been granted to one, cannot be bestowed on another,

for that would prejudice the former grant, (w)

To be a county palatine is a franchise, vested in a number of persons. It is

likewise a franchise, for a number of persons to be incorporated, and subsist as a

body politic; with a power to maintain perpetual succession, and do other corpo-

rate acts: and each individual member of such corporation is also said to have a

franchise or freedom. Other franchises are to hold a court leet: to have a

manor or lordship; or, at least, to have a lordship paramount; to have waifs,

wrecks, estrays, treasure-trove, royal fish, forfeitures, and deodands: to have a

court of one's own, or liberty of holding pleas, and trying causes; to have the

(») 9 Rep. 97. (t) 11 Rep. I. (u) See book 1, ch, 12. (v) Finch, L, 16*.

(V) J Boll. Abr. 191. Keilw. 196.

Oldroyd, 14 M. and W. 789; Ward ». Ward, 7 Exch. 838; Carr v. Foster, 3 Q. B. 581. And,

where the same party becomes owner of both the dominant and servient tenement, the easement

is extinguished. Washb. on Easements, 517-622. And an easement may be discharged by

V. Offices, which are a right to exercise a public or private employment, and
to take the fees and emoluments thereunto belonging, are also mcorporeal
hereditaments; whether public, as those of magistrates; or private, as of bailiffs,
receivers, and the like. For a man may have an estate in them, either to him and
his heirs, or for life, or for a term of years, or during pleasure only; save only
that offices of public trust cannot be granted for a term of years, especially if
they concern the administration of justice, for then they might perhaps vest in
executors or administrators. (s) (21) Neither can any fttd-ic-ial office be granted
in reversion : because though the grantee may be able to perform it at the time of
the ~rant, yet before the office falls he may become unable and insufficient: but
ministerial offices may be so granted; (t) for those may be executed by deputy. (22) Also~ by statute 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 16, no public office (a few only
excepted) shall be sold, under pain of disability to dispose of or hold it. For the
law presumes that *he who buys an office will, by bribery, extortion, or [* ]
other unlawful means, make his purchase good, to the manifest detriment 37
of the public. (23)
VI. Dignities bear a near relation to offices. Of the nature of these we treated
at large in a former book; (u) it will therefore be here sufficient to mention them
as a species of incorporeal hereditaments, wherein a man may have a property or
estate.
VII. Franchises are a seventh species. Franchise and liberty are used aa
synonymous terms; and their definition is (v) a royal privilege, or branch of the
king's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject. Being therefore <lerived
from the crown, they must arise from the king's grant; or in some cases may be
held by prescription, which, as ha.s been frequently said, presupposes a grant. (24)
The kinds of them a.re various, and almost infinite: I will here brietly touch
upon some of the principal ; premising only, that they may be vested in either
natural persons or bodies politic; in one man or in many ; but the same identical franchise, that has before been gra.nted to one, cannot be bestowed on another,
for that would prejudice the former grant. (w)
To be a county palatine is a franchise, vested in a number of persons. It is
likewise a franchise, for a number of persons to be incorporated, and subsist as a
body politic; with a power to maintain perpetual succession, and do other corpo·
rate acts: and each individual member of such corporation is also said to have a
franchise or freedom. Other franchises are to hold a court leet : to have a
manor or lordship; or, at least, to have a lordship para.mount; to hiwe waifs,
wrecks, estrays, treasure-trove, royal fish, forfeitures, and deodands: to have a
court of one's own, or liberty of holding pleas, and trying causes; to have the
(•) 9 Rep. 97.
(t) 11 Rep. '·
(fD) j Roll. Abr. 191. KeUw. Ille.

(u)

See book 1, ob. 12.

(fl) Finch, L, 16'.

release to the owner of the servient tenement; but the release must be by deed. Dyer v. San-

ford, 9 Met. 395.

(21) The term of office in the United States is never longer than during good behavior,

and even then, unless the term is fixed by the constitution, it is subject to change by law, and

limy be shortened or abolished at the will of the legislature. By choosing a person to an

office, the term of which is prescribed by law, the state does not contract with him that he

may enjoy it during the term, or preclude itself from repealing or amending the law under which

the office exists. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Conner v. New York, 2 Sandf. 355, and

6 K. T. 285.

Offices in private corporations and companies are employments of a private character, in the

nature of agencies only.

(22) [See R. v. Parrand, 3 B. and A. 260; R. v. Sravesend, 2 B. and 0. 602; R. v. Roberts, 3

A. and E. 771. If two offices are incompatible, by the acceptance of the latter, the first is relin-

quished and vacant, even if it should be a superior office. 2 T. R. 81.]

(23) [See statute 6 Geo. IV, cc. 82, 83; 11 id. c. 20. $ 47; 2 B. and Or. 674; 4 Tes. 815; 3,

Yon. and J. 136; 3 T. R. 681; 6 J. B. Moore, 28; 8 Cl. and Fin. 295.]

(24) [See Trotter «. Harris, 3 T. and J. 885; E. v. Marsden, 3 Burr. 1812.]
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Oldroyd, 14 M. and W. 789; Ward v. Ward, 7 Exch. 838; Carr "· Foster, 3 Q. B. 581. And,
where the Rame party become~ owner of both the dominant and i;ervient tenement, the easement
is extinguished. Washb. on Easement!!, 517-522. And an easement may be disoharged by
releMe to the owner of the servient tenement ; but the release must be by deed. Dyer ti. Sanford, 9 Met. 395.
(21) Tho term of office in the United States i8 never longer than during good behavior,
and e\"en then, unless the term is fixed by the constitution, it is subject to change by law, and
m&y be shortened or abolished a.t the will of the legislature. By choosing a pel'llOn to an
office, the term of which is pre11cribed by law, the state does IUJt oontract with him that he
may enjoy it during the term, or preclmlc it.~elf from repealing or amending the law under which
the office exists. :Sutler"· Pennsylvania, 1() How. 402; Conner ti. New York, 2 Sandf. 355, and
C>N. Y. 285.
Offices in private corporations and companies a.re employments of a private cha.meter, in the
nature of agencies only.
(22) [See R. v. Farrand, 3 B. and A. 260; R. v. 6rave1100.d, 2 B. and C. 602; R. ti. Roberts, 3
.A. and E. 771. If two offices are incompatible, by the accept.a.nee of the latter, the first is relinquished and vacsnt, even if it should be a superior offiee. 2 T. R. 81.]
(23) [See statute 6 Geo. IV, c.c. 82, 8.1; 11 id. c. 20, ~ 47; 2 B. and Cr. 674; 4 Vee. 815; ~
You. and J. 136; 3 T. R. 681; 6 J. B. Moore, 28; 8 Cl. and Fin. 295.)
(24) [Soo Trotterv. Harrie, I Y. and J. 286; R. ti. M8l'llden, 3 Burr. 1812.]
VOL.
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cognizance of pleas; which is a still greater liberty, being an exclusive right, so

that no other court shall try causes arising within that jurisdiction: to have

f*381 a Bailiwick, or liberty exempt from the sheriff of the county; *wherein

J the grantee only, and his officers, are to execute all process; to have a

fair or market: with the right of taking toll, either there or at any other public

places, as at bridges, wharfs, or the like; which tolls must have a reasonable

cause of commencement (as in consideration of repairs, or the like), else the

franchise is illegal and void: (x) or, lastly, to have a forest, chase, park, warren,

or fishery, endowed with privileges of royalty; which species of franchise may

require a more minute discussion.

As to a forest; this, in the hands of a subject, is properly the same thing

with a chase; being subject to the common law, and not to the forest laws, (y)

But a chase differs from a park, in that it is not enclosed, and also in that a man

may have a chase in another man's ground as well as in his own, being indeed the

liberty of keeping beasts of chase or royal game therein, protected even from the

owner of the land, with a power of hunting them thereon. A park is an enclosed

chase, extending only over a man's own grounds. The word park indeed properly

signifies an enclosure; but yet it is not every field or common, which a gentleman

pleases to surround with a wall or paling, and to stock with a herd of deer, that

is thereby constituted a legal park: for the king's grant, or at least immemorial

prescription, is necessary to make it so. (z) Though now the difference be-

tween a real park, and such enclosed grounds, is in many respects not very
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material: only that it is unlawful at common law for any person to kill any beasts

of park or chase, (a) except such as possess these franchises of forest, chase or

park. Free-warren is a similar franchise, erected for preservation or custody

(which the word signifies) of beasts and fowls of warren; (b) which, being/era

r*3°/1 na^ur(B> every one had a natural right to kill as he could; but upon *the

"- -I introduction of the forest laws, at the Norman conquest, as will be shewn

hereafter, these animals being looked upon as royal game and the sole property

of our savage monarchs, this franchise of free-warren was invented to protect

them; by giving the grantee a sole and exclusive power of killing such game so

far as his warren extended, on condition of his preventing other persons. A man

therefore, that has the franchise of warren, is in reality no more than a royal

gamekeeper; but no man, not even a lord of a manor, could by common law

justify sporting on another's soil, or even on his own, unless he had the liberty of

free-warren, (c) (25) This franchise is almost fallen into disregard, since the new

statutes for preserving the game ; the name being now chiefly preserved in

grounds that are set apart for breeding hares and rabbits. There are many

instances of keen sportsmen in ancient times who have sold their estates, and

reserved the free-warren, or right of killing game, to themselves; by which means

it comes to pass that a man and his heirs have sometimes free-warren over another's

ground, (d) A. free fishery, or exclusive right of fishing in a public river, is also a

royal franchise; and is considered as such in all countries where the feudal polity

has prevailed; (e) though the making such grants, and by that means appropriat-

ing what seems to be unnatural to restrain, the use of running water, was pro-

hibited for the future by King John's great charter; and the rivers that were

fenced in his time were directed to be laid open, as well as the forests to be

disafforested. (/) This opening was extended by the second (a) and third (A)

charters of Henry III, to those also that were fenced under Richard I; so that

(x) 2 Inst. 220. (y) 4 Inst. 814. . (x) Co. Lltt. 833. S Inst. 199. 11 Rep. 86.

(a) These are properly buck, doe, fox, martin, and roe ; bat in a common and legal sense extend like-

wise to all the beasts of the forest; which besides the other, are reckoned to be hart, hind, hare, boar, and

wolf, and in a word, all wild beasts of venary or hunting. (Co. Lilt. 233.)

('a) The buasts are hares, conies, and roes; the fowls are either camptstrtt, as partridges, rails, and

quails; or sylvestres, as woodcocks and nheasnnte ; or ni/iialUes, as mallards and herons. (Co. Litt 233.)

(c) Salk. ftr?. (d) Bro. Abr. tit. Warren, 3.

(e) Sold. Afar. Clma. I. 24. Dnfresne, V, SOT. Crag, de Jur. feod. II, 8, 15. (/) Cap. 47, edit. Oxon.

(g) Cop. 20. (h) 3 Hen. m, o. 16.

(25) [A free warren may be granted at this day, though such a grant is not usual. Cruise Dij,

tit, 34, J 4-1
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a franchise of free fishery ought now to be at least as old as the reign of Henry

II. This differs from a several fishery; because he that has a several fishery

must also be (or at least derive his right from) the owner of the soil, (i) which in

a free fishery is not requisite. It difiers also from a common of piscary before

mentioned, in that the free fishery is an *exclusive right, the common of r+ -Q -•

piscary is not so: and therefore, in a free fishery a man has a property in >• J

the fish before they are caught, in a common of piscary not till afterwards, (k) (26)

Some indeed have considered a, free fishery not as a royal franchise, but merely as

a private grant of a liberty to fish in the several fishery of the grantor. (/) But to

consider such right as originally a flower of the prerogative, till restrained by

tnagna charta, and derived by royal grant (previous to the reign of Richard I) to

such as now claim it by prescription, and to distinguish it (as we have done) from

a several and a common of fishery, may remove some difficulties in respect to

this matter, with which our books are embarrassed. For it must be acknowledged,

that the rights and distinctions of the three species of fishery are very much

confounded in our law-books; and that there are not wanting respectable au-

thorities (m) which maintain that a several fishery may exist distinct from the

property of the soil, and that a free fishery implies no exclusive right, but is

synonymous with common of piscary. (27)

Vin. Corodies are a right of sustenance, or to receive certain allotments of

victual and provision for one's maintenance. (•») In lieu of which (especially

when due from ecclesiastical persons) a pension or sum of money is sometimes
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substituted, (o) And these may be 'reckoned another species of incorporeal

hereditments; though not chargeable on, or issuing from, any corporeal inher-

itance, but only charged on the person of the owner in respect of such his inher-

itance. To these may be added,

IX. Annuities, which are much of the same nature; only that these arise

from temporal, as the former from spiritual persons. An annuity is a thing

very distinct from a rent-charge, with which it is frequently confounded: a

rent-charge being a burthen imposed upon and issuing out of lands, whereas an

annuity is a yearly sum chargeable only upon the person of the grantor. (p)

Therefore, if a man by deed grant to another the sum of 201. per annum, without

expressing out of what lands it shall issue, no land at all shall be charged with

it; but it is a mere personal annuity; which is of so little account in the law,

that if granted to an eleemosynary corporation, it is not within the statutes of

mortmain; (q) and yet a man may have a real estate in it, though his security

is merely personal. (28)

(fl M. 17 Edw. IV, 6 P. KEcho.ir.4T. 10 Hm. VII, 24, 28. SaOc. 637. (t) F. N. B. 88. Salt 637.

>:/i 2 Sid. 8. (m) See them well digested in Hargrove's notes on Co. Lilt. 122. '») Finch, L. 1«2.

(o) See book 1, ch. 8. (p) Co. Lltt. 144. (q) Ibid. 2.

(26) [A subject may have, by prescription, a several fishery in an arm of the sea. Per Ld.

Kenyon, 4 T. K. 439; 1 Camp. 312. A grant of " a several fishery," without more, does not pass

the soil. 5 B. and Cr. 881.] A public river is a public highway, and this is its distinguishing

characteristic; and all rights of fishery in it must lie subservient to the right of passage, and

must be so exercised a» not to prejudice such right when it is used in reasonable manner. Mayor

of Colchester *. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 339; Young r. llichens, 6 Q. B. 609.

(27) In the United States, franchises are derived from legislative grant, or claimed by pre-

scription, which presupposes such grant. And, in England, at the present time, they are all

more or less taken under legislative direction and control.

(28) [This appears to require some explanation. If an annuity (not charged on lauds) be

granted to a man and his heirs, it is a fee simple personal, Co. Litt. 2, a And Mr. Hargrave,

in his note upon the passage just cited, says, though an annuity of inheritance is held to be

forfeitable for treason, as an hereditament: 7 Kep. 34 b; yet, being only personal, it is not an

hereditament within the statute of mortmain, 7 Edw. I, st. 2; nor is it entailable within the

statute de donis. Lord Coke again says, Co. Litt. 20 a. " if I, by my deed, for me find my

heirs, grant an annuity to a man, and the heirs of bis body, this concerneth no land, nor

gavoreth of the realty." And see Earl of Stafford ». Buckley, 2 Tes. Sen. 177; Holdemesse

». Carmarthen, 1 Br. 382; Aubin v. Daly, 4 Barn, and Aid. 59. Some of the diversities between

a rent and an annuity are thus laid down, in the 30th chapter of the Doctor and Student, Dia-

logue 1: " Every rent, be it rent-service, rent-charge, or rent-seek, is going out of land. Also

of an annuity there lieth no action, but only a writ of annuity; but, of a rent, the same action

may lie aa doth of land. Also, an annuity is never taken for assets, because it is no freehold
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f*411 ' ens are tne I*8* 8P?°ie8 of incorporeal hereditaments. The

*• J word rent or render, reditus, signifies a compensation or return, it being

in the nature of an acknowledgment given for the possession of some corpo-

real inheritance, (r) It is defined to be a certain profit issuing yearly out of

lands and tenements corporeal. It must be a profit ; yet there is no occasion

for it to be, as it usually is, a sum of money ; for spurs, capons, horses, corn.

and other matters may be rendered, and frequently are rendered, by way of

rent (s) It may also consist iu services or manual operations ; as, to plough so

many acres of ground, to attend the king or the lord to the wars, and the like ;

which services in the eye of the law are profits. This profit must also be certain ;

or that which may be reduced to a certainty by either party. It must also issue

yearly ; though there is no occasion for it to issue every successive vear; but it

may be reserved every second, third, or fourth year; (t) yet, as it is to be pro-

duced out of the profits of lands and tenements, as a recompense for being per-

mitted to hold or enjoy them, it ought to be reserved yearly, because those

profits do annually arise and are annually renewed. It must issue out of the

thing granted, and not be part of the land or thing itself; wherein it differs from

an exception in the grant, which is always of part of the thing granted. («) (29)

It must, lastly, issue out of lands and tenements corporeal ; that is, from some

inheritance whereunto the owner or grantee of the rent may have recourse to

dist rein. Therefore a rent cannot be reserved out of an advowson, a common,

an office, a franchise, or the like, (w) But a grant of such annuity or sum mav
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operate as a personal contract, and oblige the grantor to pay the money reserved,

or subject him to an action of debt : (x) though it doth not affect the inheritance,

and is no legal rent in contemplation of law. (30)

There are at common law (v) three manner of rents, rent-service, rent-

F*42l c^arSe> an(* rent-seek. Kent-service is so called "because it hath some

L J corporal service incident to it, as at the least fealty or the feudal oath of

fidelity, (z) For, if a tenant holds his land by fealty, and ten shillings rent ; or

by the service of ploughing the lord's land, and five shilling rent ; these pecu-

niary rents, being connected with personal services, are therefore called rent-

service. And for these, in case they be behind, or arrere, at the day appoint*?*!.

the lord may distrein of common nght, without reserving any special power of

distress; provided he hath in himsel? the reversion, or future estate of the lauds

and tenements, after the lease or particular estate of the lessee or grantee is

expired, (a) A rent-charge is where the owner of the rent hath no futnre inter-

est, or reversion expectant in the laud : as where a man by deed maketh over to

(T) Ibid. 144. (ij Ibid. 142. (t) Ibid. 47. (u) Plowd. 13. 8 Hop. 71. (v) Co. Utt. 144.

(x) Ibid. 47. (y) Litt. I 213. (*) Co. Litt. 142. (a) Litt. » 215.

in the law, nor shall it be put in execution upon a statute merchant, statute staple, or elcgit. as

a rent may." No doubt, when an annuity is granted, so as to bind both the person and real estate

of the grantor, the grantee hath his election, either to bring a writ of annuity, treating his

demand as a personal one only, or to distrain upon the land, as for a real interest. Co. Litt.

144 b. The definition which Fitzherbert, N. B. p. 152, gives of an annuity is, that it either

proceeds from the lands or the coffers of another. Where it is charged upon land, it may be

real or personal, at the election of the holder. If it is out of the coffers, it is personal only as

to the remedy; but the property itself is real as to its descent to the heir. And this seems to be

the only sense in which an annuity, for which the security is merely personal, can be called real

estate. Turner v. Turner, Ambl. 782.]

(29) [Co. Litt. 142; see alao 'Wickham ». Hawker, 7 M. and W. 63; Doe d. Douglas r.

Lock, 2 A. and E. 705; Durham and S. K. Co. v. Walker, 2 Q. B. 940; Pannell v. Mill, 3 C. B. 625.

An exception to this exists in the case of mines, quarries, <fcc., where the rent or royalty consist?

commonly of a fixed proportion of the ore raised or stone gotten, which, it is to be observed, is a

part of the land itself; Campbell v. Leach, Ambl. 740; Buckley v. Kenyon, 10 East, 139; K. p.

Earl of Pomfret, 5 M. and S. 139; B. v. Inhabitants of St. Anstell, 5 B. and Aid. 693; R. i>.

Westbrook, 10 Q. B. 178.]

(30) [A rent may however be granted or reserved out of tithes, with all the incidents of a

rent, except from the necessity of the case, that of distress. 3 Wils. 25; 2 Saund. 303; slai-

ute 5 Goo. Ill, c. 17. But a rent cannot be reserved out of chattels personal, and if such

chattels are demised with land at an entire rent, the rent issues out of the land only. 5 Rep. 17 b .

2 N. K. 224-1
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others his whole estate in fee-simple, with a certain rent payable thereout, and

adds to the deed a covenant or clause of distress, that if the rent be arrere, or

behind, it shall be lawful to distrein for the same. In this case the land is liable

to the distress, not of common right, but by virtue of the clause in the

deed; and therefore it is called a rent-charge, because in this manner the land is

charged with a distress for the payment of it. (b) Rent-seek, reditus siccus, or

barren rent, is in effect nothing more than a rent reserved by deed, but without

any clause of distress.

There are also other species of rents, which are reducible to these three.

Rents of assize are the certain established rents of the freeholders and ancient

copyholders of a manor, (c) which cannot be departed from or varied. Those of

the freeholders are frequently called chief-rents, reditus capitales: and both

sorts are indifferently denominated quit-rents, guieti reditus: because thereby

the tenant goes quit and free of all other services. When these payments were

reserved in silver or white money, they were anciently called white-rents, or blanch-

farms, reditus albi; (d) in contradistinction to rents reserved in work, grain, or

baser money, which were called *reditus nigri, or black-mail, (e) Rack- r*jo-i

rent is only a rent of the full value of the tenement, or near it. A fee- >- •"

farm rent is a rent-charge issuing out of an estate in fee; of at least one-fourth

of the value of the lands, at the time of its reservation: (/) for a grant of

lands, reserving so considerable a rent, is indeed only letting lands to farm in

fee-simple instead of the usual methods for life or years. (31)
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These are the general divisions of rent; but the difference between them (in

respect to the remedy for recovering them) is now totally abolished; and all

persons may have the like remedy by distress for rents-seek, rents of assize, and

chief-rents, as in case of rents reserved upon lease, (g)

Rent is regularly due and payable upon the land from whence it issues, if no

particular place is mentioned in the reservation: (h) but in case of the king, the

payment must be either to his officers at the exchequer, or to his receiver in the

country, (t) And strictly the rent is demandable and payable before the time

of sunset of the day whereon it is reserved; (k) though perhaps not absolutely

due till midnight. (I)

With regard to the original of rents, something will be said in the next

chapter; and, as to distresses and other remedies for their recovery, the doctrine

relating thereto, and the several proceedings thereon, these belong properly to

the third part of our Commentaries, which will treat of civil injuries, and the

means whereby they are redressed.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.

IT is impossible to. understand, with any degree of accuracy, either the civil

constitution of this kingdom, (1) or the laws which regulate its landed property,

fb) Co. I.ilt. 143 (e) 2 Iiut. 19.

(d) In Scotland this kind of small payment is called Manch-holding.or redituit alba frmte.

(e) 4 Inst. 19. (f. Co Lift 143. (g) Stilt* 4 Geo. II, c. 28, (hi Co. Litt. Ml.

(XMltep. 73 (kj Co. IJtl. 302. 1 Anders. 253. (1) 1 Saund. 887. Free. Cbanc. S9S. Salk. B78.

(31) [A fee-farm rent is not necessarily a rent-charge; Mr. Hargrare indeed thought it could

only be a rent service, and that the quantum of the rent was immaterial. Co. Litt. 143, n. 235.

But in the case of Bradbury v. "Wright, Douglas Bep. 4th ed., are notes by the reporter him-

self, and the late learned editor, which explain the mistake both of Blaekstone and Hargrave,

and show, I think, satisfactorily, that the former is correct in his account of the rent, except in

calling it a rent-charge, which it may but need not necessarily be.]

(1) [An intimate acquaintance with the feudal system is absolutely necessary to the attain-

ment of a comprehensive knowledge of the first principles and progress of our constitution.
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without some general acquaintance with the nature and doctrine of feuds, or the

feudal law: a system so universally received throughout Europe upwards of

twelve centuries ago, that Sir Henry Spelman (a) does not scruple to call it the

law of nations in our western world. This chapter will be therefore dedicated

to this inquiry. And though, in the course of our observations in this and

many other parts of the present book, we may have occasion to search pretty

highly into the antiquities of our English jurisprudence, yet surely no industri-

ous student will imagine his time misemployed, when he is led to consider that

the obsolete doctrines of our laws are frequently the foundation upon which

what remains is erected; and that it is impracticable to comprehend many rules

of the modern law, in a scholar-like, scientifical manner, without having recourse

to the ancient. Nor will these researches be altogether void of rational enter-

tainment as well as use: as in viewing the majestic ruins of Rome or Athens,

of Balbec or Palmyra, it administers, both pleasure and instruction to compare

them with the draughts of the same edifices, in their pristine proportion and

splendour.

F*45 1 *The constitution of feuds (b) had its original from the military policy

L J of the northern or Celtic nations, the Goths, the Huns, the Franks, the

Vandals, and the Lombards, who all, migrating from the same officina gentium,

as Crag very justly entitles it, (c) poured themselves in vast quantities into all

the regions of Europe, at the declension of the Roman empire. It was brought

by them from their own countries, and continued in their respective colonies aa
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the most likely means to secure their new acquisitions: and to that end, large

districts or parcels of land were allotted by the conquering general to the supe-

rior officers of the army, and by them dealt out again in smaller parcels or

allotments to the inferior officers and most deserving soldiers, (d) These allot-

ments were called feoda, feuds, fiefs or fees: which last appellation in the

northern language (e) signifies a conditional stipend or reward. (/) Rewards or

stipends they evidently were ; and the condition annexed to them was, that the

possessor should do service faithfully, both at home and in the wars, to him by

whom they were given : for which purpose he took the juramentum fidelitaiiis,

or oath of fealty: (g) (2) and in case of the breach of this condition and oath,

(a) Of parliaments. 67 (b) See Spelman, of feuds, and Wright of tenures, per tot.

fcj Dejure/eod. 19, 20. (d) Wright, 7. (e) Spelm. Gl. 218.

(f) Pontoppidan. in his history of Norway, (page 290) observes that in the northern languages odh signifir

propriftiu. and all tot urn. Hence he derives the odhal right in those countries ; anil thence too perhaps, u

derived the udal right in Finland, Ac. (See Mac Doaal Inst. part2.J Now the transposition of these northern

syllables, attodh, will give us the true etymology of the allodium, or absolute property of the feudlgte : as by

a similar combination of the latter svllabte with the word/w, (which signifies, we have Been a conditional

reward or stipend) ffeodh or fenrium will denote stipendiary property.

(a) See this oath explained at large in Fetid. 1. 2, t. 7.

without some general acquaintance with the nature and doctrine of feuds, or the
foudal law : a system so universally received throughout Europe upwards of
twelve centuries ago, that Sir Henry Spelman (a) does not scruple to call it the
law of nations in our western world. This chapter will be therefore dedicated
to this inquiry. And though, in the course of our obse~vations in this and
many other parts of the present book, we may have occasion to search pretty
highly into the antiquities of our English jurisprudence, ,ret surely no industnons student will im14gine his time misemployed, when he is led to consider that
the obsolete doctrines of our laws are frequently the foundation upon which
what remains is erected; and that it is impracticable to comprehend many rnles
of the modern law, in a scholar-like, scientifical manner, without having recourse
to the ancient. Nor will these researches be alto~cther void of rational entertainment as well as use: as in viewing the majestic ruins of Rome or Athens,
of Balbec or Palmyra, it administers, both plea.sure and instruction to compare
them with the draughts of the same edifices, in their pristine proportion and
splendour.
[ • 45 ] •The constitution of feuds (b) had its original from the military policy
of the northern or Celtic nations, the Goths, the Huns, the }'ranks, the
Vandals, and the Lombards, who all, migrating from the same officina gentium,
as Crag very just1J entitles it, (c) poured themselves in vast quantities into all
the regions of Europe, at the declension of the Roman empire. It 11·wi brought
by them from their own countries, and continued in their respective colonies sa
the most likelv means t-0 secure their new acquisitions: and to that end, large
districts or pa.reels of land were allotted by the conquering general to the superior officers of the army, and by them dealt out again in smaller parcels or
allotments to the inferior officers and most deservin~ soldiers. (d) These allotments were called feoda, feuds, fiefs or fees: which last ap~llation in the
northern language (e) signifies a conditional stipend or reward.(/) Rewards or
stipends they e¥idently were; 1md the condition annexed to them was, that the
possessor should do service faithfully, both at home and in the wars, to him by
whom they were given: for which purpose he took the /urarnentum jidelita.ti.~,
or oath of fealty: (g) (2) and in case of the breach of this condition and oath,
(a) Oft1arllameut11, 67
(c) De}Uref-1.. HI, m.

(bJ See Spelman, ot 1'!uds, and Wright of ienorea, per lol.
(ilJ Wrl.ght, 7.
(e) Spelm. Gl. 216.

(f) Pontoppi<\an, In his history ot N<>rway, (page 2001 obeerves that In the northern langnagee otA ~lftes
~· and all t-Olsm. Henot1 be derives the odAal rlgh' In those eouuti1es; and thenoe Coo perbapa, ia

derived the udal right In Finland, .te. (See Mac Dool\! Inst. part2.J N<>w the transposition of these northern
syllabics, allodh, wlll give ns the true etymoloio· or the all.odium., or absolute property of the 1'eu1ll8'8 i aa by
a similar combination of the latter syllahle with the wordfee, \which algnl1le1, we have~ a cooditiooAJ.
reward or stlpenil)f~ or feodum will denote stipendiary propeny.
(g) See thls oath explained at large In Feud. i. 2, I. 7.

'Hie authority of Lord Coke, upon constitutional questions, is greatly diminished by his neg-

lect of tbe study of the feudal law; which Sir Henry Spelman who well knew its value and

importance, feelingly laments: •• I do marvel, many times, that my Lord Coke, adorning oar

law with so many flowers of antiquity and foreign learning, hath not tnmed into this field,

from whence so many roots of our law have, of old, been taken and transplanted." Spelm. Grig.

of Terms, c. viii.]

Upon the subject of the feudal system see, in addition to the authorities cited by Blackatone,

Robertson's History of Charles V; Hallam'g Middle Ages, c. 2, part 2; Guizot's History of

Civilization in France, and Bell's Historical Studies of Feudalism. See also 1 Washb. on Real

Prop. c. 2.

(2) [Fealty, the essential feudal bond, is so necessary to the very notion of a fend, that it is

a downright contradiction to suppose the most improper feud to subsist without it; but the

other properties or obligations of an original feud may be qualified or varied by the tenor or

express terms of the feudal donation. Wright L. of Ten. 35. Fealty and homage are some-

times confounded; but they do not necessarily imply the same thing. Fealty was a solemn

oath, made by the vassal, of fidelity aiid attachment to his lord. Homage was merely an

acknowledgement of tenure, unless it was performed as homaffium Ugeum; that indeed did.

in strictness include allegiance as a subject, and could not be renounced; but homagium MOM

l/in inn contained a saving or exception of faith due to other lords, and the homager might at

any time free himself from feudal dependence by renouncing the land with which he had

b«en invested. Du Fresno Gloss, voc. llominium* Legiiie, ct Fidelitaf. Mr. Hargrove, in note

'nle authority of Lord Coke, upon constitutional questions, ie greatly diminiRhed by his neglect of the study of the feudal law; which Sir Henry Spelman who well knew its value a.nd
importance, feelingly lament.ii : '· I do marvel, many times, that my Lord Coke, adorning our
lo.w with BO many flowers of antiquity and foreign learning, hath not turned into this field,
from whence so many root!! of our law have, of old, been ta.ken and transplanted." Spelm. Orig~
of Tenne, c. viii.]
Upon the mbject of the feudal system see, in addition to the authorities cited by Blackstone,
Robertllon's History of Charles V; Halla.m's Middle .A.gos, c. 2, part 2; Guizot's Hitltory of
Civilization in France, and Bell'!! Hi11torical Studies of Feudalism. See also 1 Washb. on Real
Prop. c.2.
(~) [l<'ealty, the ei!i!ential feudal bond, is so necessary to the very notion of a fend, that it ia
a downright contradiction to suppose the most improper feud to subsist without it; but the
other pn1pertiei; or obligations of o.n original feud may be qualified or Yaried by the tenor or
express t.enns of the foudal donation. Wright L. of Ten. 35. Fealty and homage are 80metimet1 confounded; but they do not necessarily imply the same thing. Fealty was a 80lemn
oath, made by the vassal, of fidelity and attachment to hi11 lord. Homage was merely an
acknowledgement of tenure, unleil>I it was performed as honiagtum. Ugeu111; that indeed did.
In strictness include allegiance as a subject, and could not be renounced; but 11om.agium wo11
ligeum oonta.inod a savin!l or exception of faith due to other lords, and the homager might ~t
ai1y time free himself from feudal dependence by renounciug t.he land with which he had
I.wen invested. Du F'resne Glos8. voe. Hrm1i11iv:m, LegittB, ct Pidelitas. M:r. Hargrave, in note
1 liO Co. Litt. 68 a, says, th some countrie"' on the continent of Europl', homage and fealty are \
blended to11:ether, BO e.s to fonn one engagement; and therefore foreign jurist.II frequently con-
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blended together, so as to form one engagement; and therefore foreign jurists frequently" con-

358

D ti

e b

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

Chap. 4.]

45

THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.

Chap. 4.] THE FEUDAL SYSTEM. 45

by not performing the stipulated service, or by deserting the lord in battle, the

lands were again to revert to him who granted them. (A)

Allotments, thus acquired, naturally engaged such as accepted them to defend

them: and, as they all sprang from *the same right of conquest, no part •-*,,, -•

could subsist independent of the whole; wherefore all givers as well as "- •"

receivers were mutually bound to defend each other's possessions. But, as that

could not effectually be done in a tumultuous irregular way, government, and,

to that purpose, subordination, was necessary. Every receiver of lands, or feuda-

tory, was therefore bound, when called upon by his benefactor, or immediate

lord of his feud or fee, to do all in hjs power to defend him. Such benefactor

or lord was likewise subordinate to, and under the command of, his immediate

benefactor or superior; and so upwards to the prince or general himself: and

the several lords were also reciprocally bound, in their respective gradations, to

protect the possessions they had given. Thus the feudal connection was estab-

lished, a proper military subjection was naturally introduced, and an army of

feudatories was always ready inlisted, and mutually prepared to muster, not only

in defence of each man's own several property, but also in defence of the whole,

and of every part of this their newly-acquired country; (t) the prudence of which

constitution was soon sufficiently visible in the strength and spirit with which

they maintained their conquests. (3)

The universality and early use of this feudal plan, among all those nations,

which in complaisance to the Romans we still call barbarous, may appear from
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what is recorded (k) of the Cimbri and Teutones, nations of the same northern

(k) Fetid. I. 2, *. 24. fij Wright, 8. ft} L. Fiona, I. 3, c. 3.

by not performing the stipulated service, or by deserting the lorn in battle, the
lands were a.gain to revert to him who granted them. (It)
Allotments, thus acquired, naturally engaged snch as accepted them to defend
them: and, as they all sprang from *the same right of conquest, no part [*4:6 ]
could subsist independent of the whole; wherefore all givers as well as
receivers were mutually bound to defend each other's possessions. But, as that
could not effectually be done in a tumultuous irregular way, government, and,
to that purpose, subordination, was necessary. Every receiver of lands, or feudatory, was therefore bound, when called upon by his benefactor, or immediate
lord of his feud or fee, to do all in }\is power to defend him. Such benefactor
or lord was likewise subordinate to, and under the command of, his immediate
benefactor or superior; and so upwards to the prince or general himself: and
the several lords were also reciprocally bound, in their respective gradations, to
protect the possessions they had given. Thus the feudal connection was established, a proper military subjection was naturally introduced, and an army of
feudatories was always ready inlisted, and mutually prepared to muster, not only
in defence of each man's own several property, but also in defence of the whole,
and of every part of this their newly-acqmred country; (i) the prudence of which
constitution was soon sufficient!~ visible in the strength and spirit with which
they maintained their conquests. (3)
The universality and early use of this feudal plan, among all those nations,
which in complaisance to the Romans we still call barbarous, may appear from
what is recorded (k) of the Cimbri and Teutones, nations of the same northern

rider them as synonymous. But, in our law, whilst both continued, they were in some respects

(1') Feud. l. ~ '· H.

distinct; fealty was sometimes done where homage was not due. And Lord Coke himself

f'J Wright, 8.

(k) L. Flonu, l. S,

o. 8.

tells us, 1 Inst. 151 a, fealty may remain where homage is eztineL So Wright, L. of Ten. 55,

in note, informs us, that it appears not only from the concurrent testimony of all our most

authentic ancient historians (whom he cites), but likewise from Britton, Bracton, the Mirror,

and Fleta, that homage and fealty were really with us distinct, though (generally) concomitant,

engagements; and that homage (he of conrse means liomaffium non ligeum) was merely a

declaration of the homager's consent to become the military tenant of certain of the lord's lands

or tenements.

The short result appears to be, that, whilst the tie of homage subsisted, fealty, though

acknowledged by a distinct oath, was consequential thereto; but that the converse did not hold,

as fealty might be due where homage was not.]

(3) [Mr. Hallam gives an account of the origin of the feudal system rather different from

that in the text. He says that, when the Germanic tribes poured down upon the empire, the

conquerors made partition of the lands between themselves and the original possessors, some

tribes taking a large, some a less, portion to1 themselves. The estates of the conquerors were

termed allodial, subject to no burden bat that of public defence, and inheritable. Besides

these lands, others also were reserved out of the share of the conquered for the crown, partly

to maintain its dignity, partly to supply its munificence. These were the fiscal lands, and for the

greater part were gradually granted out un'der the name of benefices; and if the donation was

not accompanied by any express reservation of military service, yet the beneficiary was undoubt-

edly more closely connected wfth the crown, and bound to more constant service than the allo-

dial proprietor.

Mr. Hallam thinks there is no satisfactory proof that these benefices Were ever redeemable at

pleasure, but that from the beginning they were ordinarily granted for the life of the grantee,

v ery early they became hereditary, and, as soon as they did so, they led to the practice bf subin-

fendation, which he deems the true commencement of feudal tenures.

Still, at this point the far larger part of the lands remained allodial, and the extension of

the i'eudal system is to be attributed, in his oninion, to the forlorn and unprotected state in

which the allodial proprietor found himself during the period of anarchy and private warfare

which followed soon after the death of Charlemagne. In those times the connection between

the beneficiary and the vassal was a protection to both; the former abstained from acts of

violence against the latter, and both together protected each other against the attacks of

others; while the isolated allodialist, to whom the crown in its weakness could afford no

snccor, was left a common prey for all. This led to a voluntary subjection of themselves to feu-

dal lords, upon feudal conditions, and to the gradual diminution, though not extinction, of allo-

sider them as ;iynonymous. But, in our law, whilst both continued, they were in some respects
distinct; foo.lty was sometimes done where homage was not due. .And Lord Coke himself
tells UR, 1 Inst. 151 a, fealty may remain where homage is extinot.. So Wright, L. of Ten. 5.'l,
in note, informs us, that it appears not only from the concurrent testimony of all our most
authentic ancient historians (whom he cites), but likewise from Britton, Bracton, the Mirror,
and Fleta, that homage and fealty were really wiUi us distinct, though (generally) conc-0mitant,
engagements; and that homage (he of course means lwmagium non ligcum) w811 merely a
declaration of the homager's consent to become the military tenant of certain of the lord'~ land~
or tenements.
The short re8lllt ap\>ears to be, that, whilst the tie of homage subsisted, fealty, though
acknowled15ed by o. distmct oath, W81l consequenti11l thereto ; but that the converse did not hold,
as fealty might be due where homage was not.]
(3) [Mr. Hallam gives an account of the origin of the feudal system rather different from
that in the text. He says that, when the '1ermanic tribes poured down upon the empire, the
conquerors made partition of the lands between themselves and the original posaessors, some
tribes taking a large, some a less, portion tO' themselves. The estates of the conquerors were
termed allodial, subject to no burden but that of public defence, and inheritable. Beside11
these lands, others also were reserved 011.t of the share of the conquered for the crown, partly
to maintain its dignity, partly to supply its munificence. These were the fiscal landR, and for the
greawr part were gradu8.lly grantea out under the name of benefices ; and if the donation was
not accompanied by any express reservation of military service, yet the beneficiary wo.i; undoubtedly more closely connected wfth the crown, and bound to more constant service than the allodial proprietor.
Mr. Hallam thinks there is no satisfactory proof that these benefices were e\•er redeemable at
plea..'IUJ'e, but that from tho be~nning they were ordinaril,r granted for the life of the grantee.
Ver:v early they became hereditary, and, Bil soon as they did so, they Jed to the practice of subinfeudation, which he deems the trlie commencement of feudal tenures.
Still. at this point the far larger part of the lands remained al!odial, and the extension of
the feudal system is to be attributed, in his o\>inion, to thti forlorn aml unprotected state in
w~ch the allodial proprietor found himself dunng the period of ~narchy and pri".ate warfare
which followed soon aft.er the death of Charlemagne. In those times the con11ect10n between
the beneficiary and the va.~sal was a protection to both ; the former abstained from acts of
violence against the latter, and both together protected eoch other agaim1t the attacks of
others; wliile the itlOlated alloilialh1t1 to whom the crown in its weakness could afford no
succor, was left. a common \>rey for all. This led to a voluntary subjection of thewsel\'es to feudal lords, upon feudal conditions, and to the gradual diminution, though not extinction, of allodial estates.]
Mr. Justice Coleridge gives his 888ent to Mr. Hallam's theory, which he regards as more rellSOD
able and natural than the common theory, that which is stated in the text.

dial estates.]

aou

Mr. Justice Coleridge gives his assent to Mr. Hallam's theory, which he regards as more reason

able and natural than the common theory, that which is stated in the text.
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original as those whom we have been describing, at their first irruption into

Italy about a century before the Christian sara. They demanded of the Romans,

" ut martius populus aliquid s-ibi terra daret, quasi stipendium; cceterum, ul

vellet, manibus atque armis suis uteretur." The sense of which may be thug

rendered; they desired stipendiary lands (that is, feuds) to be allowed them, to

be held by military and other personal services, whenever their lord should call

upon them. This was evidently the same constitution that displayed itself more

fully about seven hundred years afterwards; when the Salii, Burgundians, and

Franks broke in upon Gaul, the Visigoths on "Spain, and the Lombards

upon Italy; and introduced with themselves this northern plan of polity,

serving at once to distribute and to protect the territories they had newly gained.

And from hence, too, it is probable that the Emperor Alexander Severus (7) took

the hint of dividing lands conquered from the enemy among his generals and

victorious soldiery, duly stocked with cattle and bondmen, on condition of receiv-

ing military service from them and their heirs forever.

Scarce had these northern conquerors established themselves in their new

dominions, when the wisdom of tneir constitutions, as well as their personal

valour, alarmed all the princes of Europe, that is, of those countries which

had formerly been Roman provinces, but nad revolted, or were deserted by their

old masters, in the general wreck of the empire. Wherefore most, if not all,

of them thought it necessary to enter into the same or a similar plan of policy.

For whereas, before, the possessions of their subjects were perfectly Modial
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(that is, wholly independent, and held of no superior at all), now they parcelled

out their royal territories, or persuaded their subjects to surrender up and retake

their own landed property, under the like feudal obligations of military fealty, (m)

And thus, in the compass of a very few years, the feudal constitution, or the

doctrine of tenure, extended itself over all the western world. (4) Which altera-

tion of landed property, in so very material a point, necessarily drew after it an

alteration of laws and customs; so that the feudal laws soon drove out the

Roman, which had hitherto universally obtained, but now became for many

centuries lost and forgotten ; and Italy itself (as some of the civilians, with more

spleen than judgment, have expressed it) belluinas, atque ferinas, immanesqut

Longobardorum leges accepit. (n)

T*AQ -I *But this feudal polity, which was thus by degrees established OTCT all

L -I the continent of Europe, seems not to have been received in this part of

our island, at least not universally, and as a part of the national constitution,

till the reign of William the Norman, (o) Not but that it is reasonable to

believe, from abundant traces in our history and laws, that even in the time of

the Saxons, who were a swarm from what Sir William Temple calls the same

northern hive, something similar to this was in use; yet not so extensively, nor

attended with all the rigour that was afterwards imported by the Normans. For

the Saxons were firmly settled in this island, at least as early as the year 600:

(I) " Sola, qws de hoslibu* capta funt timitanels duribus ft militffivs donavit; itn ut forum itn t**fnt, ri

hrrredes iUorummttitarent. nee. unqwm ad privates pertinerent i dicens ettcntius iUos militatttros. Mi etiam

sua i-ur'f dffenderent. Aadviit sane his A animaha et servos, nt posnent colere quod acrfpertnt; ne per

inopuim hominum vet per senectutem detenrentw rum vtcina barbarios, quod turpissimum ille <incft**t.'

(JSl. Lnmprlcl, in vita Alex. Severi.J

(m) Wright, 10. (n) Grarln. Oriy. I. 1, J 138. (n) Spelra. Gloss. 218. Bract. / -'. r 16. i J.

(4) [The feudal constitutions and Usages were first, reduced to writing about tho yew 1150 by

two lawyers of Milan, under the title of consuetudines feudorum, and nave been Hubjoined to

original as those whom we have been describing, at their first irruption into
Italy about a century before the Christian rera. They demanded of the Romans,
"ut martius populus aliquid sihi terrm daret, quasi stipendium; cmterum, ut
vellet, manibus atque armis suis uteretur." The sense of which may be thus
rendered; they desired stipendiary lands (that is, fou<ls) to be allowed them, to
be held by military and other personal services, whenever their lord should call
upon them. This was evidently the same constitution that displayed itself more
fully about seYen hundred yea.rs afterwards; when the Salii, Burgundians, tLDd
[• 47 ] Franks broke in upon Gaul, the Visigoths on *Spain, and the Lorn bards
upon Italy ; and introduced with themselves this northern plan of polity,
serving at once to distribute a.nd to protect the territories they had newly gained.
And from hence, too, it is probable that the Emperor Alexander Severus (l) took
the hint of dividing lands conquered from the enemy among his generals and
victorious soldiery, duly stocked with cattle and bondmen, on condition of receiving military service from them and their heirs forever.
Scarce had these northern conquerors established themselves in their new
dominions, when the wisdom of their constitutions, as well as their pel"80na.l
valour, alarmed all the princes of Europe, that is, of those countries which
had formerly been Roman yrovinoes, but had revolted, or were deserted by their
old masters, in the genera wreck of the empire. 'Wherefore most, if not all,
of them thought it necessary to enter into the same or a similar plan of policy.
For whereas, before, the possessions of their subjects were perfectly al./.Qdial
(that is, wholly independent. and held of no superior at all), now they parcelled
out their royal territories, or persuaded their subjects to surrender up and retake
their own landed property, under the like feudal obligations of military fealty. (m)
And thus, in the compass of a very few years, the feudal constitution, or the
doctrine of tenure, extended itself over all the western world. (4) Which alteration of landed property, in 80 very material a point, necessarily drew after it an
alteration of laws and customs; so that the feudal laws ·soon drove out the
Roman, which had hitherto universally obtained, but now became for many
centuries lost and forgotten; and Italy itself (as some of the civilians, with more
spleen than judgment, have expreaised it) beUuinas, atque ferinas, immanesqu~
Longohardormn leges nccepit. ( n)
[*48 ] *But this feudal polity, which was thus by degrees established over all
the continent of Europe, seems not to have been received in this J>arl of
our island, at least not universally, and as a part of the national constitution,
till the reign of William the Norman. (o) Not but that it is reasonable to
beliern, from abundant traces in our history and laws, that even in the time of
the Saxons, who were a swarm frotn what Sir William Temple calls the same
northern hive, something similar to this was in use; yet not 80 extensively, nor
attended with all the rigour that was afterwards imported by the Normans. For
the Saxons were firmly settled in this island, at least as early as the year 600:
(l) ;, &la. qua d~ lwlti1nu capta ""'' l~fl dtlclbtu ti mlUHbtu ~; U. tit - . . . Ua eaetd, Ii
lltwwa Ulorut11 wlilUarmt. nee unqua• t1fl primto• piirtinerent 1 dlceM ct"5nlitu ill06 .uli$aturo6. n -...
11Ua nira defendertnt. AddldU .,,JU! hu et aninaal1t1 et ~-. td po•~ cokre quod accqennt ; - por
i~m o\otni•m• tlel per 1enectuCeM daererentur nira vicina baf"bariai, qtUKi turpi&nmu• Ille dlU:lll6nt. ·•
r El. L11ml1r!rl, in ~ '41'.z. Seven.)
(rn) Wi- ght, 10.
(n) Gra\'ID. Orig, l, l, t 139.
(o) Spelm. <Jloa. 218. Bract. Z. i, o. 16, ; 7.

Justinian's Novels in nearly all the editions of the body of the Roman law. Though this was the

feudal law of the German empire, other states have modified this law by the spirit of their respec-

tive constitutions.

Allodial lands are commonly opposed to beneficiarvi or feudal, the former being strictly pro-

prietary, while the latter depended upon a superior; In this sense the word is of continual recur-

rence m ancient histories, laws and instrument*. It sometimes, however, bears the sense of

inheritance, and this seems to be its meaning; in the famous 63d chapter of the Salic laws,—De

-Allodis. "Allodium interdum nppointur comparato," says Du Cange, "in fonnulis veteribus."

Hence, in the charters of the eleventh century, hereditary fiefs are frequently termed alodiie.

Hallain Mid. Ages, vol. 1, p. 97.]
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(4) [The feudal conRtitutionR and usageR were fil'l!t reduced t.o writing about the year 1150 by
two lawyers of Milan, under the title of C01'8Uetttditte$ feudorum, and have been t!UbJoined to
Jui;tiniM'~ Nove18 in nearly all the editlonsot the body of the Roman law. Though this wutho
feudal law of the German empire, other stateR ha\te modifiad this law by the spirit of their respective constitutions.
Allotlio.l lo.nd~ are commonly oppo~ed to beneficiarv, or feudal, the former bein1t trtrictly proprietary, while the latter depeudml upon II. superior. ln this sen!Ml the wonl is of continual recur·
ronce m ancient historie11, laws and instruments. It sometimcR. howe¥er bears the 8tlD86 oC
inheritance, and thh1 scemi< to be its meaning in the famom1 6'.ld chapter of the Salic laws,-De
.A 1lodi~. "Allodium interdum appoint Ur eomparat.,," AAYB Du Cange, "in fonnulis veteribu.~"
Hence, in the charter>' of the eleventh century, hereditary fiefs are frequently termed alodUe.
Hallam .Mid . .Ages, vol. 1, p. !17.]
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and it was not till two centuries after, that feuds arrived at their full vigour and

maturity, even on the continent of Europe, (p)

This introduction however of the feudal tenures into England, by King Wil-

liam, does not seem to have been effected immediately after the conquest, nor

by the mere arbitrary will and power of the conqueror; but to have been grad-

ually established by the Norman barons, and others, in such forfeited lands as

they received from the gift of the conqueror, and afterwards universally con-

sented to by the great council of the nation, long after his title was established.

Indeed, from the prodigious slaughter of the English nobility at the battle of

Hastings, and the fruitless insurrections of those who survived, such numerous

forfeitures had accrued, that he was able to reward his Norman followers with

very large and extensive possessions: which gave a handle to the monkish his-

torians, and such as have implicitly followed them, to represent him as having

by right of the sword seized on all the lands of England, and dealt them out

again to his own favourites. A supposition, grounded upon a mistaken sense

of the word conquest; which, in its feudal acceptation, signifies no more than

acquisition ; and this has led many hasty writers into a strange historical mis-

take, and one which, upon the slightest examination, will *be found to r*An -\

be most untrue. However, certain it is, that the Normans now began to "- '

gain very large possessions in England; and their regard for the feudal law

under which they had long lived, together with the king's recommendation of

this policy to the English, as the best way to put themselves on a military foot-
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ing, and thereby to prevent any future attempts from the continent, were proba-

bly the reasons that prevailed to effect its establishment here by law. And,

though the time of this great revolution in our landed property cannot be ascer-

tained with exactness, yet there are some circumstances that may lead us to a

probable conjecture concerning it. For we learn from the Saxon chronicle, (q)

that in the nineteenth year of King William's reign an invasion was appre-

hended from Denmark; and the military constitution of the Saxons being then

laid aside, and no other introduced in its stead, the kingdom was wholly defence-

less ; which occasioned the king to bring over a large army of Normans and

Bretons, who were quartered upon every landholder, and greatly oppressed the

people. This apparent weakness, together with the grievances occasioned by a

foreign force, might co-operate with the king's remonstrances, and the better

incline the nobility to listen to his proposals for putting them in a posture of

defence. For, as soon as the danger was over, the king held a great council to

inquire into the state of the nation; (r) the immediate consequence of which

was the compiling of the great survey called domesday-book, (5) which was

finished in the next year: and in the latter end of that very year the king was

attended by all his nobility at Sarum ; where all the principal landholders sub-

mitted their lands to the yoke of military tenure, became the king's vassals, and

(p) Crag. I. 2. *. 4. (q) A. D. 1085.

fr) Rex trnuit mamum concilium, et grata termones hatniit cum «rf» proceriinu de hoc terra; quo nodo

incoleretur, et a qulmti hominttnts. Chrm. Sax. arid.

(5) The original of Domesday Book is comprised in two volumes, one a large folio, and the

and it was not till two centuries after, that feuds arrived at their full vigour and
maturity, even on the continent of Europe. (p)
This mtroduction however of the feudal tenures into England, by King William, does not seem to have been effected immediately after the conquest, nor
by the mere arbitrary will and power of the conqueror; but to have been gradually established by the Normnn barons, and others, in such forfeited lands as
they received from the gift of the congueror, and afterwards universally consented to by the great council of the nation, long after his title was established.
Indeed, from the prodigious slaught.er of the English nobility at the battle of
Hastings, and the fruitless insurrections of those who survived, such numerous
forfeitures had accrued, that he was able to reward his Norman followers with
very large and extensive possessions: which gave a handle to the monkish historums, and such as have implicitly followed thetn, to represent him as having
by right of the sword seized on all the lands of England, and dealt them out
again to his own favourites. A supposition, grounded upon a mistaken sense
of" the word conquest ; which, in its feudal acceptation, signifies no more than
Q(;quisition; and this has led many hasty writers into a strange historical mistake, and one which, upon the slightest examination, will *be found to [*49 ]
be most untrue. Howeyer, certa.in it is, that the Normans now began to
gain very large possessions in England ; and their re~ard for the feudal law
under which they had long lived, together with the km~s recommendation of
this policy to the English, as the best way to put themsefves on a milita.ry footing, and thereby to prevent any future attempts from the continent, were probably the reasons that prevailed to effect its establishment here by law. And,
though the time of this great revolution in our landed property cannot be ascertained with exactness, yet there are some circumstances that may lead us to a
probable conjecture concerning it. For we learn from the Saxon chronicle, (q)
that in the nineteenth year of King William's reign an invasion was apprehended from Denmark; and the military constitution of the Saxons being then
laid aside, and no other introduced in its stead, the kingdom was wholly defenceless ; which occasioned the king to bring over a larg~ army of Normans and
Bretons, who were quartered upon every landholder, and greatly oppressed the
people. 'l'his apparent weakness, together with the grievances occasioned by a
foreign force, mi~ht co-operate with the king's remonstrances, and the better
incline the nobility to listen to his proposals for putting them in a posture of
defence. For, as soon as the danger was over, the king held a great council to
inquire into the st.ate of the nation; (r) the immediate consequence of which
was the compiling of the great survey called domesday-booK., (5) which was
finished in the next year: and in the latter end of that very year the king was
attended by all his nobility at Sarum ; where all the principal landholders submitted their lands to the yoke of milita.ry tenure, became the king's vassals, and
(p) Crag. l . 2. I.'·
(q) &. D. 1086.
(r J Ru: lmult magnum concilium, d gravu aermoMS l'ltWuU cum auu proceril>ua de hac terra; <JtW tllOdo
'1lcokn!tur, d a quibua lwminU>tu. Ch.rofl. Sa:e. ibid.

other a quarto, and is preserved among the other records of the exchequer in the chapter house

at 'Westminster. In 1783 a fac simile was published by the government, and thus became gene-

rally accessible. In 1816 two volumes supplementary were published, one of which contains a

general introduction with indexes. The other contains four records; three of them, namely, the

Exon Domenday, the Inquisitio Eliensis, and the Liber Winton, contemporary with the survey;

the other, called Boldon Book, is the survey of Durham, made hi 1183 by Bishop Hugh Pndsey.

By Domesday Book the king acquired an exact knowledge of the possessions of the crown,

and it afforded him also tbe names of the landholders, and the means of ascertaining the military

strength of the country. It also pointed out the possibility of increasing the revenue in some

cases. To the people Domesday Book became valuable as a record to which appeal might be

made when titles were disputed.

For furthur information respecting this most important record, see Domesday Book Illustrated.

by Kellam, London, 1788. Mr. Eafiam says: "Ingulfus gives the plain meaning of the word

Domesday, which has been disputed. The book was so called, he says, pro sua genfralitate

itiiuiin terumenta totetut terra mtegre continents; that is, it was ae general and conclusive as

the last judgment will be." Kiddle Ages, ch. 9, pt. 2.

VOL. I.—46 3C1

(5) The original of Domesday Book is comprised in two volumes, one a large folio, and the
other a quarto, and is preRerved among the other records of tho exchequer in the chapter house
st Westminster. In li83 a fac frimile was published by the government, and thuR became ~ene
rally acceH:1ible. 1ll 1816 two volmne!l supplementary were published, one of which contatnR a
general introduction "·ith indexe:1. The other contains four reconls ; three of them, ne.mely, the~
Exon Dome~do.y, the Inquisitio Eliemis, e.nd the Liber Winton, contemporary with the survey ;
the other, caliP..d Boldon Book, is the survey of Durham, made in 11~ by Bishop Hugh Pudsey.
By Domeway Book the king acquired an exact knowledge of the possei!sions of the crown,
e.nd it o.lforded him o.IAo the names or the landholders, e.nd the means of ascertaining the military
strength uf the country. It also pointed out the possibility of incr031!ing the revenue in some
ca.~et!. To the people Domesday Book became valuable as a record to which appeal might be
made when titles were disput.ed.
For furthur information respecting this most important record, see Domesday Book Illustrated,
bv .Kellam, Loudon, 1788. Mr. Hallam says: "Ingulfus givea the plain meaning of the word
riometlday, which has been disputed. Th+' book was so called, he says, pro sua gcnrralitat8
01m1ia tem<rnenta totetua terrm •ntegrc conlinente; that is, it was as general and conclusiTe 8tl
the last judgment will be." Middle AgeB, ch. 9, pt. 2.
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did homage and fealty to his person. («) This may possibly have been the an*

of formally introducing the feudal tenures by law; and perhaps the very lair,

thus made at the council of Sarum, is that which is still extant, (t) *and

couched in these remarkable words: " Statuimus, ut omnes, liberi hom-

ines fadere et sacramento affirment, quod intra et extra universum regnum

Anglice Wilhelmo regi domino suo fideles esse volunt; terras et honores illiuf

omnifidelitate ubique servare cum eo, et contra inimicos et alienigena* deftnd-

ere." The terms of this law (as Sir Martin Wright has observed) (u) are plainly

feudal: for, first, it requires the oath of fealty, which made, in the sense of the

feudists, every man that took it a tenant or vassal: and, secondly, the tenants

obliged themselves to defend their lords' territories and titles against all enemies

foreign and domestic. But what clearly evinces the legal establishment of thia

system, is another law of the same collection, (w) which exacts the performance

of the military feudal services, as ordained by the general council. " Omne*

comites, et barones, et milites, et servientes, et universi liberi homines tolius regni

nostri prcedicti, habeant et teneant se semper bent in armis et in equis, ut decet

et oportet: et sint semper prompti et bene parati, ad servitium suum integrum

nobis explendum et peragendum, cum opusfuerit: secundum quod nobis debeiit

defeodis et tenementis suis de jure facere, et sicut illis statuimus per commune

concilium totius regni nostri pradicti."

This new polity seems therefore not to have been imposed by the conqueror,

but nationally and freely adopted by the general assembly of the whole realm,
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in the same manner as other nations of Europe had before adopted it, upon the

same principle of self-security. And, in particular, they had the recent example

of the French nation before their eyes; which had gradually surrendered up

all its allodial or free lands into the king's hands, who restored them to the

owners as a beneficium or feud, to be held to them and such of their heirs as

they previously nominated to the king; and thus by degrees all the allodial

estates in France were converted into feuds, and the freemen became the vassals

of the crown, (x) The only difference between this change of tenures in France,

r+K-i -i and that in England, was, that the former was effected gradually *by the

*• J consent of private persons; the latter was done at once, all over England,

by the common consent of the nation, (y) (6)

In consequence of this change, it became a fundamental maxim and necessary

principle (though in reality a mere fiction) of onr English tenures, " that the

king is the universal lord and original proprietor of all the lands in his king-

dom : (2) and that no man doth or can possess any part of it, but what has

mediately or immediately been derived as a gift from him, to be held upon feu-

dal services." For this being the real case in pure, original, proper feuds, other

nations who adopted this svstem were obliged to act upon the same supposition,

as a substruction and foundation of their new polity, though the fact was indeed

far otherwise. And indeed, by thus consenting to the introduction of feudal

tenures, our English ancestors probably meant no more than to put the king-

dom in a state of defence by establishing a military system; and to oblige them-

selves (in respect of their lands) to maintain the king's title and territories,

with equal vigour and fealty, as if they had received their lands from his

bounty upon these express conditions, as pure, proper, beneficiary feudatories.

(*.} Omnes prtedia tenentc*. qvotqvot cssent notes melforte per totam Angliam, <;/».••• homines facti sunt. et

ornnw if iili mMiJere, ejunt/ue facti aunt voiolli, oc ei fidclitotis juramenta praatiterunt, tt contra atiot ifuor-

cum/tie ittifldosfuturta. Chron. Sax. A. D. 108B.

ft) Cap. 52. Wilk. 228. (u) Tenures, 66. (v>) Cap. 58. Wllk. 238.

(x) Montasq. Sp. L. b. 31, c 8.

(y) PharoHh thus acquired I he dominion of all the lands in Egypt, and granted them out to the Egyptians,

reserving an annual render of the fifth part of their value. (Gen. c. xlriT)

(•:> Ti.ulfiiil in lnii, et i itnl de Iny at commencement. (If. 24 Kdu>. Ill, 65.)

(6) Justice Coleridge says: " I do hot understand Montesquieu, in the chapter cited, to say

that all the allodial lands in France were surrendered up into the king's hands, and taken again

as fiefs. Down to a late period the presumption of lav in the southern provinces of France as to

land was that it was allodial until the contrary was shown. See llullam's Mid. Ages, c. 2,

part 1."
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But whatever their meaning was, the Norman interpreters, skilled in all the

niceties of the feudal constitutions, and well understanding the import and

extent of the feudal terms, gave a very different construction to this proceed-

ing : and thereupon took a handle to introduce not only the rigorous doctrines

which prevailed in the duchy of Normandy, but also such fruits and dependen-

cies, such hardships and services, as were never known to other nations; (a) as

if the English had, in fact as well as theory, owed every thing they had to the

bounty of their sovereign lord.

Our ancestors, therefore, who were by no means beneficiaries, but had barely

consented to this fiction of tenure from *the crown, as the basis of a mil- r*K<> -i

itary discipline, with reason looked upon these deductions as grevious L -•

impositions, and arbitrary conclusions from principles that, as to them, had no

foundation in truth, (b) However, this king and his son William Kufus kept up

with a high hand all the rigours of the feudal doctrines: but their successor,

Henry I, found it expedient, when he set up his pretensions to the crown, to

promise a restitution of the laws of King Edward the Confessor, or ancient

Saxon system; and accordingly, in the first year of his reign, granted a char-

ter, (c) whereby he gave up the greater grieviances, but still reserved the fiction

of feudal tenure, for the same military purposes which engaged his father to

introduce it But this charter was gradually broken through, and the former

grievances were revived and aggravated; by himself and succeeding princes;

till in the reign of King John they became so intolerable, that they occasioned
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his barons, or principal feudatories, to rise up in arms against him; which at

length produced the famous great charter at Runing-mead, which, with some

alterations, was confirmed by his son Henry III. And, though its immuni-

ties (especially as altered on its last edition by his son) (d) are very greatly short

of those granted by Henry I, it was justly esteemed at the time a vast acquisi-

tion to English liberty. Indeed, by the farther alteration of tenures that has

since happened, many of these immunities may now appear, to a common

observer, of much less consequence than they really were when granted: but

this, properly considered, will shew, not that the acquisitions under John were

small, but that those under Charles were greater. And from hence also arises

another inference; that the liberties of Englishmen are not (as some arbitrary

writers would represent them) mere infringements of the king's prerogative,

extorted from our princes by taking advantage of their weakness; but a restora-

tion of that ancient constitution, of which our ancestors had been defrauded

by the art and finesse of the Norman lawyers, rather than deprived by the force

of the Norman arms.

*Having given this short history of their rise and progress, we will r+K* -i

next consider the nature, doctrine, and principal laws of feuds; wherein *- *

we shall evidently trace the groundwork of many parts of our public polity,

and also the original of such of our own tenures as were either abolished m the

last century, or still remain in force.

The grand and fundamental maxim of all feudal tenure is this: that all lands

were originally granted out by the sovereign, and are therefore holden, either

mediately or immediately, of the crown. The grantor was called the proprie-

tor, or lord: being he who retained the dominion or ultimate property of the

feud or fee; and the grantee, who had only the use and possession, according to;

the terms of the grant, was styled the feudatory, or vassal, which was only

another name for the tenant, or holder of the lands; though, on account of the

prejudices which we have justly conceived against the doctrines that were after-

wards grafted on this system, we now use the word vassal opprobriously, as

synonymous to slave or bondman. (7) The manner of the grant was by words

(a) Spelm. of feuds, o. S8. (b) Wright, 81. (c) LL. Ben. I, e. 1. (d) 9 Ben. III.

(7) [Mr. Christian says: "Nothing. I think, proves more strongly the detestation in which

the people of this country held the feudal oppression, than that the word vassal, which once

signified a, feudal tenant or grantee of load, is now synonymous to slave: and that the word
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But whatever their meaning was, the Norman interpreters, skilled in all th~
niceties of the feudal constitutions, and well understanding the import and
extent of the feudal terms, gave a very different construction to this proceeding: and thereupon took a handle to introduce not only the rigorous doctrines
which prevailed in the duchy of Normandy, but also such fruits and dependencies, such hardships and services, as were never known to other nations; (a) as
if the English had, in fact as well as theory, owed every thing they had to the
bounty of their sovereign lord.
Our ancestors, therefore, who were by no means beneficiaries, but had barely
consented to this fiction of tenure from *the crown, as the basis of a mil- [* 52 ]
itary discipline, with reason looked upon these deductions as grevious
impositions, and arbitrary conclusions from principles that, as to them, had no
foundation in truth. (b) However, this king and his son William Rufus kept up
with a high hand all the rigours of the feudal doctrines: but their successor,
Henr1 I, found it expedient, when he set up his pretensions to the crown, to
promise a restitution of the laws of King Edward the Confessor, or ancient
Saxon system; and accordingly, in the first year of his reign, granted a charter, (c) whereby he gave up the greater grieviances, but still reserved the fiction
of feudal tenure, for the same military purposes which engaged his father to
introduce it. But this charter was gradually broken through, and the former
grievances were revived and a.ggran.ted; by himself and succeeding princes;
till in the reign of King John they became so intolerable, that they occasioned
his barons, or priticipal feudatories, to rise up in arms against him; which at
length produced the famous great chart.er at Runing-mead, which, with some
alterations, was confirmed by his son Henry III. And, though its immunities (especially as altered on its last edition by his son) (d) are very greatly short
of those granted by Henry I, it was justly esteemed at the time a vast acquisition to English liberty. Indeed, by the farther alteration of tenures that has
since happened, many of these immunities may now appear, to a common
observer, of much less consequence than they really were when granted: but
this, properly considered, will shew, not that the acquisitions under John were
small, but that those under Charles were greater. And from hence also arises
another inference; that the liberties of Englishmen a.re not (as some arbitrary
writers would represent them) mere infringements of the king's prerogative,
extorted from our princes by taking advantage of their weakness; but a restoration of that ancient constitution, of which our ancestors had been defrauded
by the art and finesse of the Norman lawyers, rather than deprived by the force
of the Norman arms.
*Havin~ given this short history of their rise and progress, we will [*53 ]
next consider the nature, doctrine, and principal laws of feuds; wherein
we shall evidently trace the groundwork of many parts of our public J?Olity,
and also the original of such of our own tenures as were either abolished m the
last century, or still remain in force.
The grand and fundamental maxim of all feudal tenure is this: that all lands
were originally granted out by the sovereign, and are therefore holden, either
mediately or immediately, of the crown. The ~rantor was called the proprietor, or lord: being he who retained the domimon or ultimate property of the
fend or fee; and the grantee, who had only the use and possession, according to:
the terms of the grant, was styled the feudatory, or vassal, which was only
another name for the tenant, or holder of the lands; though, on account of the
prejudices which we have justly conceived against the doctrines that were afterwards grafted on this system, we now use the word vassal opprobriously, as
synonymous to slave or bondman. (7) The manner of the grant was by words
(a) Spelm. offends, o. ts.

(b) Wright, 81.

(cl LL. Hen. I, c. 1.

(d) II Hen. III.

-- - -·--·- - - - - - - - - - - - - (7) [Mr. Chriirtian say:!: "Nothing I think, proves more strongly the detestation in which
the yeople of this country held the feudal opprei;i!iou, than that the word vassal, which once
sigrnfied a foutll\l tenant or grantee of lMd, ii! now synonymous to slave: and thl\t the word

36:.J

D

ti e b

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

53 THE FEUDAL SYSTEM. [Book IT.

THE

53

FEUDAL SYSTEM.

[Book II.

of gratuitous and pure donation, dedi et concessi; which are still the operative

words in our modern infeudations or deeds of feoflfment. This was perfected

by the ceremony of corporal investiture, or open and notorious delivery of pos-

session in the presence of the other vassals; which perpetuated among them the

asra of the new acquisition, at a time when the art of writing was very little

known; and therefore the evidence of property was reposed in the memory of

the neighborhood; who, in case of a disputed title, were afterwards called upon

to decide the difference not only according to external proofs, adduced by

the parties litigant, but also by the internal testimony of their own private

knowledge.

Besides an oath of fealty, or profession of faith to the lord, which was the

pareut of our oath of allegiance, the vassal or tenant upon investiture did

usually homage to his lord; openly and humbly kneeling, being ungirt, uncov-

I *541 ere(^» *and holding up his hands both together between those of the lord,

' " -" who sate before him ; and there professing, that " he did become his >n-<.-,

from that day forth, of life and limb and earthly honour:" and then he re-

ceived a kiss from his lord, (e) Which ceremony was denominated homagium,

or manhood, by the feudists, from the stated form of words, devenio ve&ter

homo.(f)

When the tenant had thus professed himself to be the man of his superior or

lord, the next consideration was concerning the service, which, as such, he was

bound to render, in recompense for the land that he held. This, in pure, proper,
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and original feuds, was only two-fold; to follow, or do suit to, the lord in his

courts in time of peace; and in his armies or war-like retinue, when necessity

called him to the field. The lord was, in early times, the legislator and judge

over all his feudatories: and therefore the vassals of the inferior lords were

bound by their fealty to attend their domestic courts baron (g) (which were in-

stituted in every manor or barony for doing speedy and effectual justice to ail

the tenants,) in order as well to answer such complaints as might be alleged

against themselves, as to form a jury or homage for the trial of their fellow-

tenants: and upon this account, m all the feudal institutions both here aud on

the continent, they are distinguished, by the appellation of the peers of the

court; pares curtis, or pares curia. In like manner the barous themselves, or

lords of inferior districts, were denominated peers of the king's court, and were

bound to attend him upon summons, to hear causes of greater consequence in

the king's presence, and under the direction of his grand justiciary; till in many

countries the power of that officer was broken and distributed into other courts

of judicature, the peers of the king's court still reserving to themselves (in

p.g -i *almost every feudal government) the right of appeal from those subor-

L J dinate courts in the last resort. The military branch of service consisted

in attending the lord to the wars, if called upon, with such a retinue, and for

such a number of days, as were stipulated at the first donation, in proportion to

the quantity of the land.

At the first introduction of feuds, as they were gratuitous, so also they were

precarious, and held at the will of the lord, (/*) who was then the sole judge

whether his vassals performed his services faithfully. Then they became certain

(e) Litt. » 85.

(/) It was an observation of Dr. Arhulhnot, that tradition was nowhere preserved so pare and, incorrupt

an among children, whose Ramcs and plays are delivered down invariably from one generation to another

of gratuitous a.nd pure donation, dedi et oonC688i; which are still the operati•e
words in our modern infeudations or deeds of feoffment. This was perfected
by the ceremony of corporal investiture, or open and notorious delivery of posaession in the presence of the other vassals; which perpetuated among them the
rera of the new acquisition, at a. time when the art of writing was very lit.tle
known; and therefore the evidence of property W88 reposed in the memory of
the neighborhood; who, in caae of a disputed title, were afterwards ~lled upon
to decide the difference not only according to external proofs, adduced by
the parties litigant, but also by the internal testimony of their own printe
knowledge.
Besides an oath of fealty, or profession of faith to the lord, which was the
parent of our oath of allegiance, the va88al or tenant upon investiture did
usually homage to his lord; openly and humbly kneeling, being ungirt, unco••and holdi~ up his hands both together between those of the lord,
l •·0 4 ] ered,
who sate before him ; and there professing, that " he did become his 1na•,
from that day forth, of life and limb and earthly honour:" and then he received a kiss from his lord. (e) Which ceremony was denominated homagiu~
or manhood, by the feudists, from the stated form of words, dBVenio i1ester
ltomo. (/)

When the tenant had thus professed himself to be the man of his superior or
lord, the next consideration was concerning the service, which, as such, he was
bound to render, in recompense for the land that he held. This, in pure, proper,
and original feuds, was only two.fold; to follow, or do suit to, the lord in his
courts in time of peace; and in his armies or war-like retinue, when nece&iity
called him to the field. The lord was, in early times, the legislator and judge
over all his feudatories: and therefore the vassals of the inferior lords were
bound by their fealty to attend their domestic courts baron (g) (which were instituted in every ma.nor or barony for doing speedy and effectual justice to all
the tenants,) in order as well to answer such complaints as might be alleged
against themselves, as to form a jury or homage for the trial of their fellowtenants: and upon this account, in all the feudal institutions both here and on
the continent, they are distinguished, by the appellation of the peers of thtl
court; pares curtis, or pares curi<B. In like manner the barons themselves, or
lords of inferior districts, were denominated peers of the king's court, and were
bound to attend him upon summons, to hear causes of 6'reater consequence in
the king's presence, and under the direction of his grand JUsticie.ry; till in many
countries the power of that officer was broken and distributed into other court.8
of judicature, the peers of the king's court still reserving to themseh-cii (in
[ • 55 ] *almost every feudal government) the ri~ht of appeal from those subordinate courts in the last resort. The mihtary branch of serv"ice consisted
in attending the lord to the wars, if called upon, with such a retinue, and for
such a number of days, as were stipulated at the first donation, in proportion ro
the quantity of the land.
At the first introduction of fends, as they were gratuitous, so also they were
precarious, and held at the will of the lord, (It) who was then the sole ju~
whether his vassals performed his services faithfully. Then they became certam

(Wai-burton's notes on Pope. vl. 1st, H8.) It will not, I hope, he thought puerile to remark, in ronflnnati-in

of this observation, that in one of our ancient Juvenile pastimes (the King lam or basilinda of Julias Pollux,

Onomattic, 1. 9, c. 7,1 the ceremonies and language of feudal homage are preserved with great exactness

(g) Feud. 1. 2, «. 85. (A) Feud. I. 1, (.1.

villain, whiah once meant only an innocent, inoffensive bondman, has kept its relative dis-

te) Litt. J 811.
(f) It was an observation of Dr. Arbuthnot, that tradition wu no"·here preeerved so pure 11nd incoJTUpi
""among children, whose ,l{&mes and plays are delivered down lnYarlably trom one genention to anotbtt.
(Warhnrton's notes on Pope. 'l"I. 134, 118.) U will not, I hope, be thought puerile to re1n1u1t, in r:onl!nnabon
of this ollser,·aUoo, that in one of our ancient juvenile pastimCB (the Iring I am or btuUinda or JnllW> l'ollu.x.
Qnoma&tic. l. 9, c. 7,l the ceremonies and language of feudal homage are pre&ened with grea& exac&nees.
(g) Feud. l. 2, I. M.
(A) Feud. l. 1, I. l. .

tance, and denotes a person destitute of every moral and honorable principle, and is become

one of the most opprobrious terms in the English language." May it not be assumed that the

system produced a moral debasement equivalent to the political degradation which it

inflicted; and that, although villain originally meant nothing more than bondman or laborer.

it became afterward, as we have seen, expressive of moral turpitude, from the vices which the

system necessarily engendered in its victims.]
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villain, whioh once meant only an innocent, inoffensive bondman, haa kept its relative W.tance, and denoto;i a person clestitutll of every moral and honorable principle, and is become
one of the motit opprobrious tenns in the English language." May it not be &88\lmed that the

eystem produced a moral del>81!ement equi>alent to the political d6l{rlldation which it
inft.ioted; s.nd that, although t'illain originally meant nothing more than &ondms.n or la.borer.
it became aft.erward, as we have 110en, expre:!sive of moral turpitude, from the vices which
system nece881\rily engendered in its victims.]
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for one or more years. Among the ancient Germans they continued only from

year to year; an annual distribution of lands being made by their leaders in their

general councils or assemblies. (i) This was professedly done lest their thoughts

should be diverted from war to agriculture, lest the strong should encroach

upon the possessions of the weak, and lest luxury and avarice should be en-

couraged by the erection of permanent houses, and too curious an attention to

convenience and the elegant superfluities of life. But, when the general migra-

tion was pretty well over, and a peaceable possession of the new-acquired settle-

ments had introduced new customs and manners; when the fertility of the soil

had encouraged the study of husbandry, and an affection for the spots they had

cultivated began naturally to arise in the tillers; a more determined degree of

property was introduced, and feuds began now to be granted for the life of the

feudatory, (k) But still feuds were not yet hereditary ; though frequently granted

by the favour of the lord, to the children of the former possessor; till m pro-

cess of time it became unusual, and was therefore thought hard, to reject the

heir, if he were capable to perform the services: (Z) and therefore infants,

women, and professed monks, who were incapable of 'bearing arms, were r^.„ -,

also incapable of succeeding to a genuine feud. But the heir, when ad- L J

mitted to the feud which his ancestor possessed, used generally to pay a fine or

acknowledgment to the lord, in horses, arms, money, and the like, for such re-

newal of the feud: which was called a relief, because it raised up and re-established

the inheritance, or in the words of the feudal writers, " incertam et caducam
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hereditatem relevabat." This relief was afterwards, when feuds became absolutely

hereditary, continued on the death of the tenant, though the original foundation

of it had ceased.

For in process of time feuds came by degrees to be universally extended be-

yond the life of the first vassal, to his sons, or perhaps to such one of them as

the lord should name; and in this case the form of the donation was strictly

observed ; for if a feud was given to a man and his sons, all his sons succeeded

him in equal portions: and, as they died off, their shares reverted to the lord,

and did not descend to their children, or even to their surviving brothers, as not

being specified in the donation .(m) But when such a feud was given to a man

and his heirs, in general terms, then a more extended rule of succession took

place; and when the feudatory died, his male descendants in infinitum were

admitted to the succession. When any such descendant, who had thus succeeded,

died, his male descendants were also admitted in the first place; and, in defect

of them, such of his male collateral kindred as were of the blood or lineage of

the first feudatory, but no others. For this was an unalterable maxim in feudal

succession, that " none was capable of inheriting a feud, but such as was of the

blood of, that is, lineally descended from, the first feudatory." (n) And the

descent being thus confined to males, originally extended to all the males alike;

all the sons, without any distinction of primogeniture, succeeding to equal por-

tions of the father's feud. But this being found upon many accounts incon-

venient (particularly, by dividing the services, and thereby weakening the

strength of the feudal union), and honorary feuds (or titles of nobility) being

now introduced, which were not of *a divisible nature, but could only be r^-~ -•

inherited by the eldest son; (o) in imitation of these, military feuds (or L J

those we are now describing) began also in most countries to descend, according to

the same rule of primogeniture, to the eldest son, in exclusion of all the rest, (p)

Other qualities of feuds were, that the feudatory could not aliene or dispose

of his feud; neither could he exchange, nor yet mortgage, nor even devise it by

will without the consent of the lord, (q) For the reason of conferring the feud

being the personal abilities of the feudatory to serve in war, it was not fit he

«'' TlniK Tacitus : (dt mor. Germ. o. K.) " agri ab unioertitper vica oceupantur i arvaper anno* mutant."

And Csesar yet more fully : file bell. Gall. 1. 6, <•. tl.J •' Neque quismam agri modum co-turn autflne» pro-

prios tt<il»_f i sed mngistratus ft principee, in annofl rtngulos, gentious et cognationibvs hominum qui «na

coicrunt, (fuantum eu et quo loco vi sum eiit, attribuunt agri. atque anno pott alto trantire cogunt."

(k) Feud. 1. 1. t. 1. (I) Wright, 14. (m)IUd.ll. (n) Ibid. 183. (o) Feud. 1, t. 55.

(p) Wright, 34. (q)Ibid.i$.
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should be at liberty to transfer this gift/either from himself, or from his pos-

terity who were presumed to inherit his valour, to others who might prove less

able. (8) And, as the feudal obligation was looked upon as reciprocal, the

feudatory being entitled to the lord's protection, in return for his own fealty and

service; therefore the lord could no/more transfer his seignory or protection

without consent of his vassal, than the vassal could his feud without consent

of his lord: (r) it being equally unreasonable that the lord should extend his

protection to a person to whom he had exceptions, and that the vassal should owe

subjection to a superior not of his own choosing.

Ihese were the principal, and very simple, qualities of the genuine or original

feuds; which were all of a military nature, and in the hands of military persons,

though the feudatories, being under frequent incapacities of cultivating and

manuring their own lands, soon found it necessary to commit part of them to

inferior tenants: obliging them to such returns in service, corn, cattle, or

money, as might enable the chief feudatories to attend their military duties

without distraction: which returns, or reditua, were the original of rents, and

by these means the feudal polity was greatly extended; these inferior feudatories

(who held what are called in the Scots law " rere-fiefs") being under similar

obligations of fealty, to do suit of court, to answer the stipulated renders or

rent-service, and to promote the welfare of their immediate superiors or lords-(s)

r*r81 *Bnt this at the same time demolished the ancient simplicity of feuds;

*• ° •• and an inroad being once made upon their constitution, it subjected
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them, in a course of time, to great varieties and innovations. Feuds began to

be bought and sold, and deviations were made from the old fundamental rules

of tenure and succession; which were held no longer sacred, when the feuds

themselves no longer continued to be purely military. Hence these tenures

began now to be divided into feodapropria et impropria, proper and improper

feuds; under the former of which divisions were comprehended such, and such

only, of which we have before spoken; and under that of improper or derivative

feuds were comprised all such as do not fall within the other descriptions; such,

for instance, as were originally bartered and sold to the feudatory for a price;

such as were held upon base or less honourable services, or upon a rent, in lieu

of military service; such as were in themselves alienable, without mutual

license; and such as might descend indifferently either to males or females.

But, where a difference was not expressed in the creation, such new created

feuds did in all respects follow the nature of an original, genuine, and proper

feud. (<)

But as soon as the feudal system came to be considered in the light of a civil

establishment, rather than a"s a military plan, the ingenuity of the same ages,

which perplexed all theology with the subtilty of scholastic disquisitions, and

bewildered philosophy in the mazes of metaphysical jargon, began also to exert

its influence on this copious and fruitful subject: in pursuance of which, the

most refined and oppressive consequences were drawn from what originally was

a plan of simplicity and liberty, equally beneficial to both lord and tenant, and

prudently calculated for their mutual protection and defence. From this one

foundation, in different countries of Europe, very different superstructures have

been raised: what effect it has produced on the landed property of England will

appear in the following chapters.

(r) Wright, 30. (•) Ibid. 20. ft) Feud. 2. t. 7.

(8) [When a feud had descended t» any one, the restraint on alienation went a step

farther, and he was not allowed to alien without the consent of the nert collateral heir; for

should be at liberty to transfer this gift either from himself, or from his posterity who were presumed to inherit his alour, to others who might prove less
was looked upon as reciprocal, the
able. (8) And, as the feudal obligati
feudatory being entitled to the lord's pr tection, in return for his own fealty and
service ; therefore the lord could no.- more transfer his seignory or prorection
without consent of his vassal, than the vassal could his feud without consent
of his lord: (r) it being equally unreasonable that the lord should extend his
protection to a. person to whom he had exceptions, and that the vassal should owe
snb~ection to a superior not of his own choosing.
'Ihese were the principal, and vp,ry simple, qualities of the genuine or original
feuds; which were all of a military nature, and in the hands of military persons,
though the feudatories, being under frequent incapacities of cultivating and
manuring their own lands, soon found it necessary to commit part of them to
inferior tenants: obJiging them to such returns in service, corn, cattle, or
money, as might enable the chief feudatories to attend their military dutiea::;
without distraction: which retums, or reditus, were the ori~na.l of rents, a.nd
by these means the feudaljolity was greatly extended ; these mferior feudatoric.-g
(who held what are calle in the Scots law " rere-fiefs") being under similar
obligations of fealty, to do suit of court, to answer the stipulated renders or
rent-service, and to promote the welfare of their immediate superiors or lords..(s)
[*;- 8]
*But this at the same time demolished the ancient simplicity of feuds;
"
and an inroad being once made upon their constitution, it subjectro
them, in a coune of time, to great varieties and innovations. Feuds began to
be bought and sold, and deviations were made from the old fundamental rules
of tenure and succession ; which were held no longer sacred, when the feuds
themselves no longer continued to be purely military. Hence these tenures
began now to be dh·ided into feoda propria et impropria, proper and improper
fends; under the former of which divisions were comprehended such, and such
only, of which we have before spoken ; and under that of improper or derivative
feuds were comprised all such as do not fall within the other descriptions; such,
for instance, as were originally bartered and sold to the feudatory for a price ;
such as were held upon base or less honourable services, or upon a. rent, in lieu
of military service; such as were in themselves alienable, without mutual
license; and such as might descend indifferently either to males or females..
But, where a difference was not expressed in the creation, such new crea.t-l'd
feuds did in all respects follow the nature of an original, genuine, and propt>r
feud. (t)
But as soon as the feudal system came to be considered in the light of a civil
establishment, rather than as a military plan, the ingenuity of the same ages.
which perplexed all theology with the subtilty of scholastic disquisitions, and
bewildered philosoI?hY in the mazes of metaph,Ysical jargon, began also to exert
its influence on this copious and fruitful subJect: in pursuance of which. the
most refined and oppressive consequences were drawn from what originally was
a plan of simplicity and liberty, equally beneficial to both lord and tenant, and
prudently calculated for their mutual protection and defence. From this one
foundation, in different countries of Europe, very different superstructures haYe
been raised: what effect it has produced on the landed property of England "ill
appear in the following chapters.

though the law trusted an ancestor with the interest of his own immediate descendants, yet it

(r')

AVIniIJ not allow him to prejudice the distinct, though remote, interest in the donation which the

Wright, 30.

(1) Ibid. 20.

(I) Feud. 2, t. 1.

next collateral heir had. Wright on Tenures, 167,]

3«6

(8) [When a feud had descended to any one, the restraint on alienation w-ent a l.ltt'p
farther, and he was not allowed to alien without the consent of the next collat.eral heir ; for
though the law trusted an ancestor with the interest of his own immediate descendants, yet it
would not allow him. to prejudice the distinct, though remote, interest in the donation which th.,
1w,xt collawra.l heir had. Wright on Tenµres, 167,]
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CHAPTER V.

OF THE ANCIENT ENGLISH TENUKES.

CHAPTER V.

IN this chapter we shall take a short view of the ancient tenures of our

English estates, or the manner in which lands, tenements, and hereditaments,

OF THE ANCIENT ENGLISH TENURES.

might have been holden, as the same stood in force, till the middle of the last

century. In which we shall easily perceive, that all the particularities, all the

seeming and real hardships, that attended those tenures, were to be accounted

for upon feudal principles and no other; being fruits of, and deduced from, the

feudal policy.

Almost all the real property of this kingdom is, by the policy of our laws,

supposed to be granted oy, dependent upon, and holden of, some superior lord,

by and in consideration of certain services to be rendered to the lord by the

tenant or possessor of this property. The thing holden is therefore styled a

tenement, the possessors thereof, tenants, and the manner of their possession a

tenure. Thus all the land in the kingdom is supposed to be holden, mediately

or immediately, of the king, who is styled the lord paramount, or above all.

Such tenants as held under the king immediately, when they granted out

portions of their lands to inferior persons, became also lords with respect to

those inferior persons, as they were still tenants with respect to the king: (1) and,

thus partaking of a middle nature, were called mesne, or middle, lords. So that if the

king granted a manor to A, and he granted a portion of the land to B, now B

was said to hold *of A, and A of the king; or, in other words, B held r*60 -,
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his lands immediately of A, but mediately of the king. The king there- *• J

fore was styled lord paramount; A was both tenant and lord, or was a mesne

lord: and B was called tenant paravail, or the lowest tenant; being he who

was supposed to make avail, or profit of the land, (a) In this manner are all

the lands of the kingdom holden, which are in the hands of subjects: for,

according to Sir Edward Coke, (b) in the law of England we have not properly

allodium; which, we have seen, (c) is the name by which the feudists abroad dis-

tinguish such estates of the subject, as are not holden of any superior. So that

at the first glance we may observe, that our lands are either plainly feuds, or par-

take very strongly of the feudal nature.

All tenures being thus derived, or supposed to be derived, from the king,

those that held immediately under him, in right of his crown and dignity, were

called his tenants in capite, or in chief; which was the most honourable species

of tenure, but at the same time subjected the tenants to greater and more bur-

thensome services, than inferior tenures did. (d) This distinction ran through

all the different sorts of tenure, of which I now proceed to give an account.

I. There seems to have subsisted among our ancestors four principal species

of lay tenures, to which all others may be reduced: the grand criteria of which

were the natures of the several services or renders, that were due to the lords

from their tenants. The services, in respect of their quality, were either free or

base services; in respect of their quantity and the time of exacting them, were

either certain or uncertain. Free services were such as were not unbecoming

the character of a soldier or a freeman to perform; *as to serve under his r*/.-. -i

lord in the wars, to pay a sum of money, and the like. .Base services were L "J J

fa) 2 Inst, 290. fbj 1 Inst. 1. (c) Page 47.

(a) In the Germanic constitution, the electors, the bishops, the secular princes, the Imperial cities. Ac.,

•which hold directly from the emperor, are called the immediair states of the empire; all other landholders

being denominated mediate ones. Mod, Un. Hist, xliii, 61.

(1) [William the First, and other feudal sovereigns, thongh they made large and numerous

grants of lands, always reserved a rent, or certain annual payments (commonly very trifling),

which were collected by the sheriffs of the counties in which the lands lay, to show that they

still retained the domininm direotum jn themselves. Madox Hist, Ivsdi. c. 10; Craig, de Feud, 1.

1, c. 9.]
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IN this chapter we shall take a short vfow of the ancient tenures of our
English estates, or the manner in which lands, tenements, and hereditaments,
might have been holden, as the same stood in force, till the middle of the last
century. In which we shall easily perceive, that all the particularities, all the
seeming and real hardships, that attended those tenures, were to be accounted
for upon feudal principles and no other; being fruits of, and deduced from, the
feudal policy.
Almost all the real property of this kingdom is, by the policy of our laws,
supposed to be granted by, dependent upon, and holden of, some superior lord,
by and in considern.tion of certain services to be rendered to the lord by the
tenant or possessor of this property. The thing holden is therefore styled a
tenement, the possessors thereof, tenants, and the manner of their possession a
tenure. Thus all the land in the kingdom is supposed to be holden, mediately
or immediately, of the king, who is styled the lord paramount, or above all.
Such tenants as held under the king immediately, when they granted out
portions of their lands to inferior persons, became also lords with respect to
those inferior persons, as they were still tenants with res~ct to the king: (1) and,
th us partaking of a middle nature, were called rnesne, or middle, lords. So that if the
king granted a manor to A, and he grant.ed a portion of the laud to B, now B
was said to hold *of A, and A of the king; or, in other words, B held [*60 ]
his lands immediately of A, but mediately of the king. The king therefore was styled lord paramount; A was both tenant and lord, or was a mesne
lord : and B was called tenant paravail, or the lowest t.enant ; being he who
was supposed to make avail, or profit of the land. (a) In this manner are all
the lands of the kingdom holden, which are in the hands of subjects: for,
according to Sir Edward Coke, {b) in the law of England we have not properly
allodiwn; which, we have seen, (c) is the name by which the feudists abroad distinguish such estates of the subject, a.s are not holden of any superior. So that
at the first glance we may observe, that our lands are either plainly feuds, or partake very strongly of the feudal nature.
All tenures being thus derived, or supposed to be derived, from the king,
those that held immediately nuder him, in right of his crown and dignity, were
called his t.enants in capite, or in chief; which was the most honourable species
of tenure, but at the same time subjected the tenants to greater and more burthensome services, than inferior tenures did. (d) This distinction ran through
all the different sorts of tenure, of which I now proceed to give an account.
I. 'fhere seems to have subsisted among onr ancestors four principal species
of lay tenures, to which all others may be reduced: the grand criteria of which
were the natures of the several services or renders, that were due to the lords
from their tenants. 'fhe services, in respect of their quality, were either free or
base services; in respect of their quantity and the time of exacting them, were
either certain or uncertain. Free services were such as were not unbecoming
the character of a soldier or a. freeman to perform ; *as to serve under his *
lord in the wars, to pay a sum of money, and the like. Base senices were [ 61 ]
2 Inst, 296.
(b) 1 lnst. l.
(c) Page •7.
In the Gennanlo constitution, the electont tile bishops, the secular princes. the Imperial cities. ..tc.,
whlch hohl directly from the emperor, are callca the immblialf states of tile empire; all other laodboldere
being denomlnaLed .-uate ones. Mod, Un. Hist. xliii, 61.
(a)
{ti)

(1) [William the First, and other feudal BO'Vereigns, though they made large and numerous
grants of lands, e.lways reserved a rent, or certain annual pe.ymenUI (commollly very trifling).
which were collected by the sheriffs of the counties in which t.he lands lay, to show that tht~r.
still retained the dominium dirsotum jn themselves. M$dox His~, ~xch. c. 10; Craig. de l'eud, .
1, c. 9.)
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such as were fit only for peasants or persons of a servile rank; as to plough the

lord's land, to make his hedges, to carry out his dung, or other mean employ-

ments. The certain services, whether free or base, were such as were stinted in

quantity, and could not be exceeded on any pretence; as, to pay a stated annual

rent, or to plough such a field for three days. The uncertain depended upon

unknown contingencies; as, to do military service in person, or pay an assess-

ment in lieu of it, when called upon; or to wind a horn whenever the Scots

invaded the realm; which are free services: or to do whatever the lord should

command; which is a base or villein service.

From the various combinations of these services have arisen the four kinds

of lay tenure which subsisted in England till the middle of the last century;

and three of which subsist to this day. Of these Bracton (who wrote under

Henry the Third) seems to give the clearest and most compendious account, of

any author ancient or mouern (e) of which the following is the outline or

abstract. (/) "Tenements are of two kinds, frank-tenement and vittenage.

And, of frank-tenements, some are held freely in consideration of homage and

knight-service; others in free-socage with the service of fealty only." And

again, (g) " of villenages some are pure, and others privileged. He tnat holds

in pure vittenage shall do whatever is commanded him, and always be bound to

an uncertain service. The other kind of villenage is called villein-socage; and

these villein-socmen do villein services, but such as are certain and determined."

Of which the sense seems to be us follows: first, where the service was/ree but

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

uncertain, as military service with homage, that tenure was called the tenure

F*621 '" *chivalry> f61" wrvitium rnilitare, or by knight-service. Secondly,

L J where the service was not only free, but also certain, as by fealty only, by

rent and fealty, &c., that tenure was called liberum socagium, or free socage.

These were the only free holdings or tenements; the others were villenous or

servile, as thirdly, where the service was base in its nature, and uncertain as to

time and quantity, the tenure was purum villenagium, absolute or pure ville-

nage. Lastly, where the service was base in its nature, but reduced to a cer-

tainty, this was still villenage, but distinguished from the other by the name of

privileged villenage, villenagium privilegiatum; or it might still be called socage

(from the certainty of its services), but degraded by their baseness into the infe-

rior title of villanum socagium, villein-socage.

I. The first, most universal, and esteemed the most honourable species of

tenure, was that by knight-service, called in Latin servitium militare; and in

law French, chivalry, or service de chivaler, answering to the fief d'Jiaubert of

the Normans, (h) which name is expressly given it by the Mirrour. (f) This

differed in very few points, as we shall presently see, from a pure and proper

feud, being entirely military, and the general effect of the feudal establishment

in England. To make a tenure by knight-service, a determinate quantity of

land was necessary, which was called a knight's fee,feodum militare; the meas-

ure of which in 3 Edw. I, was estimated at twelve ploughlands, (k) and its value

(though it varied with the times) (I) in the reigns of Edward I and Edward II,

\m) was stated at 201. per annum. (2) And he who held this proportion of land

(e) L. 4, tr. 1, «. 28.

f/J Tenementorum Mud liberum, aliud vtliciuigium. Item, Ubtrorum aliud tenetur Hbere pro hotnayio et

servitio milituH ; aliud in Itbero tocagio cum Jtdelitatf tantum 5 1.

(g) Villenaifiorum uliuri parum, aliud pripiltaiatum. Qui tenet in puro rillenagiofoctet quicquid eiprcecep-

tum i u< :-it, it semper tenebititr ad incerta. Aliud genus villenagii dicitur rillaiutiit socagium; elhujwtmodi

villani socmanni—vittanafaciunt servitia, ted <•> rtn. et determinala. Q 6.

(h) .Spclm. Gloss. 210. (i) C. 2. { 27. (tl Patch. S Edw. I. Co. Lltt. 68. (I) % lust. 590.

(m) Stat. Weatiu. 1, c. 86. Stat. de milit. 1 Edw. II. Co. Lltt. 69.

(2) Mr. Justice Coleridge is of the opinion that the fluctuation in the value of knight's fees

such as were fit only for peasants or persons of a servile rank; as to plough the
lord's land, to make his hedges, to carry out his dung, or other mean employments. The certain services, whether free or base, were such as were stinted in
quantity, and could not be exceeded on any pretence; a.s, to pay a stated annual
rent, or to plough such a field for three days. The uncertain depended upon
unknown contingenciea; as, to do military service in person, or pay an &SBeSS.ment in lieu of it, when called upon; or to wind a horn whenever the Scots
invaded the realm; which are free services: or to do whatever the lord should
comma.nd ; which is a. base or villein service.
From the various combinations of these services have arisen the four kinds
of lay tenure which subsisted. in England till the middle of the la.st century;
and three of which subsist to this day. Of these Bra.cton (who wrote under
Henry the Third) seems to give the clea.reat and most compendious account, of
any author ancient or modern (e) of which the following is the outline or
abstract. (f) "Tenements are of two kinds, frank-tenement and villenage.
And, of frank-tenements, some are held freely in consideration of homage and
knif!ht-service; others in free-socage with the service of fealty only." .And
age.m, (g) "of villena.ges same are pure, a.nd others privileged. He that holds
in pure villenage shall do whatever is commanded him, and always be bound to
an uncertain service. The other kind of villenage is called villein-socage; and
these villein-socmen do villein services, but such as are certain and determined."
Of which the sense aeems to be as follows: first, where the service was/re~ but
uncertain, as military service with homage, that tenure was called the tenure
[*62 ] in *chivalry, J!Br lffJrvitium militare, or by knight-senice. Secondly,
where the service was not only free, but also certain, as by fealty only, by
rent and fealty, &c., that tenure was called li"berum socagium, or free socage.
These were the only free holding-s or tenements; the others were villen.ous or
servile, as thirdly, where the service was base in its nature, and uncertain as to
time and quantity, the tenure was purum villenagium, absolute or pure villenage. Lastly, where the service was base in its nature, but reduced to a certainty,. this was still villenage, but distins-uished from the other by the name of
privileged villenage, 1•illenagfom privilegiatum; or it might still be calle.d socage
(from the certainty of its services), but degraded by their baseness into the inferior title of vfflanum socagium, villein-socage.
I. The first, most universal, and esteemed the most honourable species of
tenure, was that by knight-service, called in Latin sertritium militare; and in
law French, chivalry, or service de chivaler, answering to the fi~f d'ltaubert of
the Normans, (h) which name is expressly given it by the Mirrour. (i) 'l'his
differed in very few points, as we shall presently see, from a. pure and proper
feud, being entirely military, and the general effect of the feudal establishment
in England. To make a. tenure by knight-service, a determinate quantity of
land was necessary, which was called a knight's fee,feodum militare; the measure of w~ich i~ 3 E~w. I, w~ estima~ at tw~lve ploughlands, (k) o.nd its value
(though it varied with the times) (l) m the reigns of Edward I a.nd Edward II,
( m) was stated at 20l. per annum. (2) .And he who held this proportion ofland
(£) L . '· I#'. 1, o. 28.
(f) T~°"'m a1'ud liberu•, aUud t>Uknatrlu1n. I'«n, UZ-0,.Um aliud tendvr Jiben! pro AotRaglo d
urvttlo mUilarl ; aUtul l11 libero
cum ftMrUate lantum . f 1.
( g J V"Ulenagioru• alivd par1flll aliud prltlik!liatum. Qui~ in puro rlllenagio fadt:t qwfo!ltdtl _el~
tum ft~. d 1emper te11ebU"r ;id l11certa. Aliud genta "'1lenauil itkUur oillanu• 1ocagfu1111 et~
aoommani--flillanBfaciunl 1en.Uia, l«l «rla, til dder!Mnala. f II.
(h) 8pclm. Gloa1. 2111.
(l) <.;, 2. t 'rl.
(I:) Pa.ch. S Edw. I. Co. l.Jtt. 811.
{l) i Inst. 590.
(m) Stat. Westm. 1, c . 36. Stat. de mUU. i Edw. 11. Co. Lltt. 09.

"°COJ!lo.

''"'°"'

was so uncertain and extraordinary that it could not be accounted for by any change in the

times. "With regard to the extent, he has no hesitation in assenting to the doctrine that it

varied with the goodness of the land; at the same time the measure might be the same, as

twelve plough lands of rich soil would contain a less space than the ttaine number in a lighter

and less productive soil. There might therefore be always the game number of plough Inn..!-,

though the number of acres might vary; nor is it at all inconsistent with this that there might be

appended to the plough lands wood, meadow and pasture, for the arable land was the

368

(2) Mr. Justice Coleridge is of the opinion that the finctuation in the value of knight's feea1
was w uncertain and extraordinary that it could not be accounted for by any change in the
times. With regard to the extent, he has no hesitation in as11enting t.o the doctrine that it
varied with the goodnes~ of the land; at the 8ame time the measure might he the same, as
twelve plough lands of rich soil would contain a lesil space than the 11ame number in a lighter
and leM l'roductive @oil. There might therefore l>e always the same number of plough land11
though the number of acres might vary ; nor i11 it llt all inconsistent with this that there miirht l>e
11ppenqed to the plough lands wood, meadow and pasture, for the arable land wu the
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(or a whole fee) by knight-service, was bound to attend his lord to the wars for

forty days in every year, if called upon; (n) which attendance was his reditus

or return, his rent or service for the land he claimed to hold. If he held only

half a knight's fee, he was only bound to attend twenty days, and so in propor-

tion, (o) And there is reason to *apprehend that this service was the

whole that our ancestors meant to subject themselves to; the other fruits

and consequences of this tenure being fraudulently superinduced, as the regu-

lar (though unforseen) appendages of the feudal system.

Tnis tenure of knight-service had all the marks of a strict and regular feud;

it was granted by words of pure donation, dedi et concessi; (p) was transferred

by investiture or delivering corporal possession of the land, usually called livery

of seisin; and was perfected by homage and fealty. It also drew after it these

seven fruits and consequences, as inseparably incident to the tenure in chivalry;

viz: aid, relief, primer seisin, wardship, marriage, fines for alienation, and

escheat: all which I shall endeavour to explain, and to show to be of feudal

original. (3)

1. Aids were originally mere benevolences granted by the tenant to his lord,

in times of difficulty and distress; (q) but in process of time they grew to be

considered as a matter of right, and not of discretion. These aids were princi-

pally three; first, to ransom the lord's person, if taken prisoner; a necessary

consequence of the feudal attachment and fidelity: insomuch that the neglect

of doing it, whenever it was in the vassal's power, was by the strict rigour of the
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feudal law an absolute forfeiture of his estate, (r) Secondly, to make the lord's

eldest son a knight; a matter that was formerly attended with great ceremony,

pomp, and expense. This aid could not be demanded till the heir was fifteen

years old, or capable of bearing arms: (*) the intention of it being to breed up

the eldest son and heir apparent of the seignory, to deeds of arms and chivalry,

for the better defence of the nation. Thirdly, to marry the lord's eldest

daughter, by giving her a suitable portion : for daughters' portions were in those

days extremely slender, few lords being able to save much out of "their ,-„„. -,

income for this purpose; nor could they acquire money by other means, L J

being wholly conversant in matters of arms; nor, by the nature of their tenure,

could they charge their lands with this or any other incumbrances. (4) From

bearing their proportion to these aids, no rank or profession was exempted: and

therefore even the monasteries, till the time of their dissolution, contributed to

the knighting of their founder's male heir (of whom their lands were holden),

and the marriage of his female descendants. (/) And one cannot but observe in

this particular the great resemblance which the lord and vassal of the feudal

law bore to the patron and client of the Roman republic; between whom also

there subsisted a mutual fealty, or engagement of defence and protection. For,

with regard to the matter of aids, there were three which were usually raised by

(n) See writs for this purpose in Ifemorand. Seaeeh. 36, prefixed to Maynard's yearbook, Edw. II.

(o) I,ill. (96. (p) Co. LIU. B.

{•/) AuxilM,Jtttnide gratia et turn de jure,—cvm dependeani ex gratiti tenentium, etnon ad voluntfttem domino-

rum. Bracton, 1. 2. tr. 1, c. 16. i S.

(r) Feud. 1. 2, t. 24. (<) 2 In.-,!. 233. «) Phillip's Life of Pole, I, 223.

principal (hint: considered in all ancient agriculture; wood, meadow and pasture were appen-

dages, furnishing the estovers and botes of the tenant of the arable land. Mr. Seldon con-

tends that a knight's fee did not consist of land of a fixed extent or value, but was as much as

the king was pleased to grant upon condition of having the service of one knight. Tit. of Hon.

b. 2, c. 5, SB. 17 and 26.

(3,) [Sir John Dalrymple, in an Easay on Feudal Property, p. 24, says, that "in England,

before the 12 of Car. II, if the king had granted lands without reserving any particular ser-

vices or tenure, the law creating a tenure for him would have made the grantee hold by

knight's service."

Wright also says, that "military tenure was created by pure words of donation." Wright's

Ten. 141.]

(4) [By the statute Vest. 1, c. 36, the aid for the marriage portion of the lord's eldest

daughter could not be demanded till she was seven years of age, and if he died, leaving her

unmarried, she might by the same statute recover the amount so received by him from his

executors.]
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the client; viz.: to marry the patron's daughter; to pay hie debts and to redeem

his person from captivity. («)

But besides these ancient feudal aids, the tyranny of lords by degrees exacted

more and more: as,.aids to pay the lord's debts (probably in imitation of the

Komans), and aids to enable him to pay aids or reliefs to his superior lord; from

which last indeed the king's teiiants in capite were, from the nature of their

tenure, excused, as they held immediately of the king, who had no superior.

To prevent this abuse, King John's magna cJiarta (v) ordained that no aids be

taken by the king without consent of parliament, nor in anywise by inferior

lords, save only the three ancient ones above mentioned. But this provision

was omitted in Henry Ill's charter, and the same oppressions were continued

till the 25 Edward I, when the statute called confirmatio chartarum was

enacted; which in this respect revived King John's charter, by ordaining that

none but the ancient aids should be taken. But though the species of aids was

thus ""restrained, yet the quantity of each aid remained arbitrary and

uncertain. King John's charter indeed ordered, that all aids taken by

inferior lords should be reasonable; (w) and that the aids taken by the king of

his tenants in capite should be settled by parliament.^) But they were never

completely ascertained and adjusted till the statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 3t>,

which fixed the aids of inferior lords at twenty shillings, or the supposed

twentieth part of the annual value of every knight's fee, for making the eldest

son a knight, or marrying the eldest daughter: and the same was done with
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regard to the king's tenants in capite by statute 25 Edw. Ill, c. 11. The other

aid, for ransom of the lord's person, being not in its nature capable of any cer-

tainty, was therefore never ascertained.

2. Kelief, relevium, was before mentioned as incident to every feudal tenure,

by way of fine or composition with the lord for taking up the estate, which was

lapsed or fallen in by the death of the last tenant. But though reliefs had their

original while feuds were only life-estates, yet they continued after feuds became

hereditary; and were therefore looked upon, very justly, as one of the greatest

grievances of tenure: especially when, at the first, they were merely arbitrary

and at the will of the lord; so that, if he pleased to demand an exorbitant relief

it was in effect to disinherit the heir, (y) The English ill brooked this conse-

quence of their new-adopted policy; and therefore William the Conqueror, by

his law, (z) ascertained the relief, by directing (in imitation of the Danish

heriots) that a certain quantity of arms, and habiliments of war, should be paid

by the earls, barons, and vavasours respectively: and if the latter had no arms,

they should pay 100s. William Rufus broke through this composition, and

again demanded arbitrary uncertain reliefs, as due by the feudal laws;

thereby in effect obliging every heir to new-purchase or redeem his land: (a)

but his brother Henry I, by the charter before mentioned, restored his father's

r^g,, -I law; *and ordained, that the relief to be paid should be according to the

L °° J law so established, and not an arbitrary redemption. (V) But afterwards,

when, by an ordinance in 27 Hen. II, called the assize of arms, it was provided

that every man's armour should descend to his heir, for defence of the realm;

and it thereby became impracticable to pay these acknowledgments in arms

according to tie laws of the conqueror, the composition was universally accepted

of 100s. for every knight's fee; as we find it ever after established, (c) But it

must be remembered, that this relief was only then payable, if the heir at the

death of his ancestor had attained his full age of one and twenty years.

3. Primer seisin was a feudal burthen, only incident to the king's tenants in

capite, and not to those who held of inferior or mesne lords. It was a right

which the king had, when any of his tenants in capite died seised of a knight's

f<) '•>"/ mitem lin-i- inter vtrtaant ofciomm victttitudo—ut dienta ad collocanda* smaiommfUtu de mo

conferrent; in ttrii alieni dbtotufionem gratvitam pecuniam erogarmt; et ab koitibns in btllo capto* rtdi-

merent. 1'aul Manutins de senntu Romano, c. 1. (v) Cm. IS, 15,

the client; viz.: to marry the patron's daughter; to pay his debts and to redeem
his person from captivity. (u)
But besides these ancient feudal aids, the tyranny of lords by degrees exacted
more and more: as,.aids to pay the lord's debts <rrobably in imitation of the
Romans), and aids to enable him to pay aids or rehefs to his superior lord; from
which last indeed the king's tenants in capi:te were, from the nature of their
tenure, excused, as they held immediately of the king, who had no superior.
To prevent this abuse, King John's magna cltarta (v) ordained that no aids be
taken by the king without consent of parliament, nor in anywise by inferior
lords, save only the three ancient ones above mentioned. But this provision
was omitted in Henry Ill's charter, and the same oppressions were continued
till the 25 Edward I, when the statute called confirmatio chartarum was
enacted; which in this respect revived King John's charter, by ordaining that
none but the ancient aids should be ta.ken. But though the species of' aids was
[* 65 ] thus •restrained, yet the quantity of each a.id remained arbitrary and
uncertain. King John's charter mdeed ordered, that all aids taken by
inferior lords should be reasonable; (w) and that the aids taken by the king of
his «manta in capite should be settled by parliament. (x) But they were nernr
completely ascertained and adjusted till the statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 36,
which fixed the aids of inferior lords at twenty shillings, or the supposed
twentieth part of the annual value of every knight's fee, fo1· making the eldest
son a knight, or marIJing the eldest daughter: and the same was done with
regard to the kin~s tenants in capite by statute 25 Edw. III, c. 11. The other
aid, for ransom of the lord's person, being not in its nature capable of any certainty, was therefore never ascertained.
~. Relief, relevium, was before mentioned as incident to every feudal tenure,
by way of fine or composition with the lord for taking up the estate, which was
laJ?sed or fallen in by the death of the last tenant. But though reliefs had their
onginal while feuds were only life-estates, yet they continued after feuds became
hereditary; and were therefore looked upon, very justly, as one of the greatest
grievances of tenure: especially when, at the first, they were merely arbitrary
and at the will of the lord; so that, if he pleased to demand an exorbitant relief
it was in effect to disinherit the heir. (y) The English ill brooked this consequence of their new-adopted policy; and therefore William the Conqueror, by
his law, (z) al/certained the relief, by directing (in imitation of the Danish
heriots) that a. certain quantity of arms, and habiliments of war, should be paid
by the earls, barons, and varn.sours respectiYely: and if the latter had no arms,
they should pay lOOs. William Rufus broke through this composition, ant!
again demanded arbitrary uncertain reliefs, as due by the feudal laws;
thereby in effect obliging every heir to new-purchase or redeem his land: (a)
but his brother Henry I, by the charter before mentioned, restored his father's
[ • 66 ] law; *and ordained, that the relief to be paid should be according to the
law so established, and not an arbitrary redemption. (b) But afterwards,
when, by an ordinance in 27 Hen. II, called the assize of arms, it was provided
that every man's armour should descend to his heir, for defence of the realm ;
and it thereby became impracticable to pay these acknowledgments in arms
according to the laws of the conqueror, the composition was universally accepted
of lOOs. for every knight's fee; as we find it ever after established. {c) But it
must be remembered, that this relief was only then payable, if the heir at the
death of his ancestor had attained his full age of one and twent~ years.
3. Primer seisin was a feudal burthen, only incident to the kmg's tenants in
capife, and not to those who held of inferior or mesne lords. It W$8 a right
which the king h!ld, when any of his t~nants in capife died seised of a knight's

(icj Ibid. 15. (x)Ibid.U. (y) Wright. 99. {*) C. 22, 23. 24. fa) 4 Roll. Abr. 814.

(bj ' • ffm-et non redimet terram mam rieut facitbat temporc fratrit mei, ted tegitlma etjtutq rettrationt

rfleetilnt mm." (Text. Hoffeta. Cap. St.)

(c} Glanv. I. 9, c. J. Litt. « 112.
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(u) Erat auU1n ""'" lnur utro1qm o.6f""'"'m vicUAtudo-ut cllmlu a4 coUocandaa ~_,lw de aw<>
CO'llferrent ; in rrria alieni du60lutionem gratuUam pecunla• erogartf&t; d ab ANffbm in bdlo cnptol Nldi·
~ent. Paul ManuU11K rle 1eflalu Romano, c. 1.
(o) Cap. 12. Ill,
(w) Ibitl. 111.
(x) HUI. 14.
(1/) Wright, 99.
(111) C ..21, 11:11. H.
(. a) 2 Roll. Abr.111'.
(b) "H~rt~ non redimd ll't'T<ltn mam ri<:ut /~ l«Apore .ft'al!rll flld, M!tlUpll(frlG djtuttJ r~
relft'Obit eam. '' (Te.rt. Roffnaa. Cap. M.)
·
(r)

manv. l. 9,

c. '·

J.ltt.

~

112.

·
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fee, to receive of the heir (provided he were of full age) one whole year's profits

of the lands, if they were in immediate possession, and half a year's profits, if

the lands were in reversion expectant on an estate for life, (d) This seems to be

little more than an additional relief, but grounded upon this feudal reason;

that by the ancient law of feuds, immediately upon the death of a vassal, the

superior was entitled to enter and take seisin or possession of the land, by way

of protection against intruders, till the heir appeared to claim it, and receive

investiture: during which interval the lord was en titled to take the profits; and,

unless the heir claimed within a year and a day, it was by the strict law a for-

feiture, (e) This practice however seems not to have long obtained in England,

if ever, with regard to tenure under inferior lords; but as to the king's tenures

in capite, the prima seisina was expressly declared, under Henry III and

Edward II, to belong to the king by prerogative, in contradistinction to other

lords. (/) The king was entitled to enter and receive the *whole profits ,-*„- -,

of the land, till livery was sued; which suit being commonly made within a *• -"

year and a day next after the death of the tenant, in, pursuance of the strict feudal

rule, therefore the king used to take as an average the first fruits, that is to say,

one year's profits of the land, (a) And this afterwards gave a handle to the

popes, who claimed to be feudal lords of the church, to claim in like manner

from every clergyman in England, the first year's profits of his benefice, by way

of primitice, or first fruits.

4. These payments were only due if the heir was of full age; but if he was
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under the age of twenty-one, being a male, or fourteen, being a female, (A) the

lord was entitled to the wardship of the heir, and was called the guardian in

chivalry. This wardship consisted in having the custody of the body and lands

of such heir, without any account of the profits, till the age of twenty-one in

males, and sixteen in females. For the law supposed the heir-male unable to

perform knight-service till twenty-one: but as for the female, she was supposed

capable at fourteen to marry, ana then her husband might perform the service.

The lord therefore had no wardship, if at the death of the ancestor the heir-male

was of the full age of twenty-one, or the heir-female of fourteen: yet, if she was

then under fourteen, and the lord once had her in ward, he might keep her so

till sixteen, by virtue of the statute of Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 22, the two addi-

tional years being given by the legislature for no other reason but merely to

benefit the lord, (i) (5)

This wardship, so far as it related to land, though it was not nor could be part

of the law of feuds, so long as they were arbitrary, temporary, or for life only; yet,

when they became hereditary, and did consequently often descend upon infants,

who by reason of their age could neither perform nor stipulate for the services

of the feud, does not seem upon feudal principles to have been unreasonable.

For the wardship of the land, or custody of the feud, was retained by the lord,

(d) Co. Litt. 77. ft} read. 1. 2, t. M, (f) Stat. Marlb. o. 16. 17 Edw. H, o. 8.

(a) Suumdf. Prerog. 12. (li) Utt. i 103. (i) l.itt. 1103.

(5) [According to Lord Coke, 2 Inst. 204, it is not quite correct to say that the lord might

keep her in ward for the two additional years; he had the land by the statute, but the guardian-

ship was at an end. The distinction was not merely a verbal one, for being no longer guardian,

fee, to receive of the heir (provided he were of full age) one whole year's profits
of the lands, if they were in immediate possession, and half a year's profits, if
the lands were in reversion expectant on an estate for life. (d) 'rhis seems to be
little more than an additional relief, but grounded upon this feudal reason;
that by the ancient law of feuds, immediately upon the death of a vassal, the
superior was entitled to enter and take seisin or possession of the land, by way
of protection against intruders, till the heir appeared to claim it, and receive
investiture: durin~ which interval the lord was entitled to take the profits; and,
unless the heir churned within a year and a day, it was by the strict law a forfeiture. (e) This practice however seems not to have long obtained in England,
if ever, with regard to tenure under inferior lords; but as to the king's tenures
in capite, the prima seist'.na was expressly declared, under Henry III and
Edward II, to belong to the king by prerogative, in contradistinction to other
lords. ( f) The king was entitled to enter and receive the *whole profits [*67 ]
of the land, till livery was sued; which suit being commonly made within a
year and a day next after the death of the tenant, in, pursuance of the strict feudal
rule, therefore the king used to take as an average the first fruits, that is to say,
one year's profits of the land. (g) And this afterwards gave a handle to the
popes, who claimed to be feudal lords of the church, to claim in like manner
from every clergyman in England, the first year's profits of his benefice, by way
of primitice, or first fruits.
4. These payments were only due if the heir was of full age; but if he was
under the age of twenty-one, being a male, or fourteen, being a female, (It) the
lord was entitled to the wardship of the heir, and was called the guardian in
chivalry. This wardship consisted in having the custody of the body and lands
of such heir, without any account of the profits, till the age of twenty-one in
ma.lea, and sixteen in females. For the law supposed the heir-ma.le unable to
perform knight-service till twenty-one: but as for the female, she was supposed
capable at fourteen to marry, and then her husband might perform the service.
The lord therefore had no wardship, if at the death of the ancestor the heir-male
was of the full age of twenty-one, or the heir-female of fourteen; yet, if she was
then under fourteen, and the lord once had her in ward, he might keep her so
till sixteen, by virtue of the statute of Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 22, the two additional years being given by the legislature for no other reason but merely to
benefit the lord. (i) (5)
This wardship, so far as it related to land, though it was not nor could be part
of the law of feuds, so long as they were arbitrary, temporary, or for life only; yet,
when they became hereditary, and did consequently often descend upon infants,
who by reason of their u.ge could neither perform nor stipulate for the services
of the feud, does not seem upon feudal principles to have been unreasonable.
For the wardship of the land, or custody of the feud_, was retained by the lord,
(d) Co. Litt. 77.
(e) Feud. l. 2J .t. lli,
(I/) Stanndt. Prerog. 12.
(h) i.iu. i 103.

(f) Stat. Marlb. c. 16. 17 Edw. Il, c. 8.

OJ Litt. t 100.

he was not liable to the actions in respect to the land which as guardian he must have answered;

for example, the widow of the last tenant could not bring her writ of dower against him; on the,

other hand, he had not all the established rights of a guardian against the heir, and therefore, ii"

he tendered her a marriage during the two years, and she contracted a marriage elsewhere, there

lay no forfeiture of the value of the marriage against her.

It is necessary also to make another qualification of the text, for the statute did not apply

if the female was married, though under fourteen, the two years being given to the lord osten-

sibly not so much for his benefit as that during that time he might find his ward a proper

husband; and therefore if he married her within the two years, he immediately lost the land.

2 Inst. 203. On the other hand, the capability of marriage at fourteen, and the performance]

of the service by the husband, were not the sole reasons for limiting her wardship to that age;

because by law she might marry at twelve; and it' she had so done, and her husband were

able to perform the semoe, still flic lord would have th,e wardship °f the land till her age of

fonrteen. Co, Litt. 79.]
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(5) [According to Lord Coke, 2 Inst. 204, it ia not quite correct to say that the lord might
keep her in tcard for the two additional yes.rs ; he had the land by the statute, but the guardianship WW! at an end. The distinction was not me!'flly a verbal one, for being no longer guardian,
he waa not liable to the actious in respect to the land which as guardian he must have answered ;
for example, the widow of the l88t tenant could not bring her writ of dower against him; on tb,e.
other hand, he had not all the established rights of a guardian again8t the heir, and therefore, i,f
he tendered her a marriage during the two year~, and she contracted a marriage elsewhere, there
lay no forfeiture of the value of the marriage e.gainRt her.
It is necessary also to make another qualification of the text, for the lltatute did not apply
if the female was married, though under fourteen, the two year11 heing given to the lord ostensibly not so much for his benefit as that during that time he might find his w1"'d ~ prowr
husband ; and therefore if he married her within the two y~, he ill\lllediately. lost the land.
2 Inst. 203. On the other hand, the ca}lability of marriage at t~en, and the performan<>e:
of the service by the husband, were not the sole l'ell80llll for limiting. her wardship to that age;
because by law she mi~ht marry at twelve; and if she had so done, and her husband were.
able to perform the sernce, still the lord would have tl;\e "'\Vardehip of thQ land till her age of
fourteen. Co. Litt. 79.]
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*68 1 ne mi§h* ou* °f 'he Pr°fits thereof provide a fit person *to supply

" ' -* the infant's services, till he should be of age to perform them himself. (6)

And if we consider the tend in its original import, as a stipend, fee, or reward

for actual service, it could not be thought hard that the lord should withhold

the stipend, so long as the service was suspended. Though undoubtedly to our

English ancestors, where such a stipendiary donation was a mere supposition or

figment, it carried abundance of hardship ; and accordingly it was relieved by the

charter of Henry I, before mentioned, which took this custody from the lord, and

ordained that the custody, both of the land and the children, should belong to the

widow or next of kin. But this noble immunity did not continue many years.

The wardship of the body was a consequence of the wardship of the land ; for

he who enjoyed the infant's estate was the properest. person to educate and

maintain him in his infancy : and also, in a political view, the lord was most

concerned to give his tenant suitable education, in order to qualify him the bet-

ter to perform those services which in his maturity he was bound to render.

When the male-heir arrived to the age of twenty-one, or the heir-female to

that of sixteen, they might sue out their livery or ousterlemain ; (k) that is, the

delivery of their lands out of their guardian's hands. For this they were obliged

to pay a fine, namely, half a yea?s profit of the land ; though this seems

expressly contrary to mapnacarta. (I) However, in consideration of their lands

having been so long in ward, they were excused all reliefs, and the king's

tenants also all primer seisins. (»») In order to ascertain the profits that arose
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to the crown by these first fruits of tenure, and to grant the heir his livery, the

itinerant justices, or justices in eyre, had it formerly in charge to make inqui-

sition concerning them by a jury of the county, (») commonly called an inquintio

post mortem ; which was instituted to inquire (at the death of any man of

F*69 1 fortune) *ne value of his estate, the tenure by which it was *holden, and

*• J who, and of what age his heir was ; thereby to ascertain the relief and

value of the primer seisin, or the wardship and livery accruing to the king

thereupon. A manner of proceeding that came in process of time to be greatly

abused, and at length an intolerable grievance; it being one of the principal

accusations against Empson and Dudley, the wicked engines of Henry VII, that

by colour of false inquisitions they compelled many persons to sue out livery

from the crown, who by no means were tenants thereunto, (o) And afterwards,

a court of wards and liveries was erected, (p) for conducting the same inquiries

in a more solemn and legal manner.

When the heir thus came of full age, provided he held a knight's fee in

capite under the crown, he was to receive the order of knighthood, and was

compellable to take it upon him, or else pay a fine to the king. For in those

heroical times, no person was qualified for deeds of arms and chivalry, who had

not received this order, which was conferred with much preparation and

solemnity. We may plainly discover the footsteps of a similar custom in what

Tacitus relates of the Germans, who, in order to qualify their young men to

bear arms, presented them in a full assembly with a shield and lance ; which

ceremony, as was formerly hinted, ( q) is supposed to have been the original of

the feudal knighthood, (r) This prerogative, of compelling the king's vassals (7)

(k) Co. Litt. 77. (J) 9 Hen. Ill, c. 3. (m\ Co. Litt. 77. (n) Boveden, tub. Bic. I.

to) 4 Inst. 198. (p) Stat. 32 Hen. VTn. c. 46. (q) Book I. p. 404.

(r] " In into concUio >;! prtncipum nliffiiii, vel pater, ni propinquuf, icuto flvmeaque jurrimt or mm.'.

Haca apud aios toga, hie prtmut juventot honos i ante hocdomui par» videntur i max rcpttbiiax." De Jfor.

<;< rui. cap. 13.

(6) [If an infant tenant by knight service was created a knight, the king was no longer

entitled to the wardship of his person, nor to the value of his marriage. Sir John Radcliffe's

Case, Plow. 267. And the reason there assigned ia, that " when he is made a knight by the

king, who is the chief captain of all chivalry, or by some other great captain assigned by the

king for that purpose, he is thereby allowed and admitted to be able to perform knight's service;

and then his body ought not to be in ward, because his imbecility ceases, and cessant causa, oes-

sabit effectus."]

(7) [I do not find that this prerogative was confined to the king's tenants: Lord Coke doe*

not make that distinction in his commentary on the statute dr. milit. 2 Iiwt. 593. Not is the
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to be knighted, or to pay a fine, was expressly recognized in parliament by

the statute de militibus, 1 Bdw. II.; was exerted as an expedient for raising

money by many of our best princes, particularly by Edward VI, and Queen

Elizabeth ; but yet was the occasion of heavy murmurs when exerted by Charles

I; among whose many misfortunes it was, that neither himself nor his people

seamed able to distinguish between the arbitrary stretch, and the legal exertion

of prerogative. However, among the other concessions made by *that

unhappy prince, before the fatal recourse to arms, he agreed to divest

himself of this undoubted flower of the crown, and it was accordingly abolished

by statute 16 Car. I, c. 20.

5. But, before they came of age, there was still another piece of authority, which

the guardian was at liberty to exercise over his infant wards; I mean the right

of marriage (maritaaium, as contradistinguished from matrimonium), which

in its fedual sense signifies the power which the lord or guardian in chivalry

had of disposing of his infant ward in matrimony. For, while the infant was

in ward, the guardian had the power of tendering him or her a suitable match,

without disparagement or inequality; which if the infants refused, they forfeited

the value oi the marriage, valorem maritagii; (s) that is, so much as a jury

would assess, or any one would bonafide give to the guardian for such an alli-

ance ; (t) and, if the infants married themselves without the guardian's consent,

they forfeited double the value, duplicem valorem maritagii. (u) (8) This seems

to have been one of the greatest hardships of our ancient tenures. There were
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indeed substantial reasons why the lord should have the restraint and control

of the ward's marriage, especially of his female ward; because of their tender

years, and the danger of such female ward's intermarrying with the lord's

enemy; (to) but no tolerable pretence could be assigned why the lord should

have the sale or value of the marriage. Nor indeed is this claim of strictly

feudal original; the most probable account of it seeming to be this: that by the

custom of Normandy the lord's consent was necessary to the marriage of

his female wards; (a;) which was introduced into England, together with the

rest of the Norman doctrine of feuds: and it is likely that the lords usually

took money for such their consent, since, in the often-cited charter of Henry

the First, he engages for the future to take nothing for his consent; which

also he promises in general to give, provided such female ward were not

""married to his enemy. But this, among other beneficial parts of that ,-„„, -,

charter, being disregarded, and guardian's still continuing to dispose of "• ' J

their wards in a very arbitrary, unequal manner, it was provided by King John's

great charter that heirs should be married without disparagement, the next of

kin having previous notice of the contract; (y) or, as it was expressed in the

first draught of that charter, ita maritentur ne disparagenter, et per consilium

propinquorum de consanguinitate sua. (z) But these provisions in behalf of

the relations were omitted in the charter of Henry III; wherein (a) the clause

stands merely thus, " hteredes maritentur absque disparagatione:" meaning

certainly, by hesredes, heirs female, as there are no traces before this to be found of

the lord's claiming the marriage (b) of heirs male; and as Glanvil (c) expressly

confines it to heirs female. But the king and his great lords thenceforward

took a handle (from the ambiguity of this expression) to claim them both sive

sit masculus sivefwmina, as Bracton more than once expresses it: (d) and also

as nothing but disparagement was restrained by magna carta, they thought

<») Litt. } 110. (t) Stat. Mert. c. 8. Co. Litt. 82. <•»; Litt. S110. (v) Bract. I. 2, c. 87, j 6.

(x) Gr. Const. 98. (y) Cap. 6. edit. Oxon. (»} Cap. 8, ibid. (a) Cap. 6.

fbj The words mnritare and maritaaium seem ex vi termini to denote the providing of an husband.

(c) L. 9, c. 9 £ 12, 4 1. 9, c. 4. (d) L. 2, c. 38, 4 1.

power of the commissioners limited to the king's tenants in the commissions issued 07 Edw. VI,

and Qnecn Elizabeth, which see in 15 Rym. Feed. 124 ami 493; see 16 Car. I, c. 20; 2 Rushw.

70; and book 1, p. 404. CHRISTIAN.]

(8) [That is, after a suitable match had been tendered by the lord. In the case of a tender

and refusal, and no marriage elsewhere, the lord had the single value. Female heirs were not

subject to the duplex valor maritagii. Co. Litt. 82, b.]
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themselves at liberty to make all other advantages that they could, (e) And

afterwards this right, of selling the ward in marriage, or else receiving the price

or value of it, was expressly declared by the statute of Merton; (/) which is the

first direct mention of it that I have met with, in our own or any other law. (9)

6. Another attendant or consequence of tenure by knight-service was that of

fines due to the lord for every alienation, whenever the tenant had occasion to

make over his land to another. This depended on the nature of the feudal

connexion ; it not being reasonable or allowed, as we have before seen, that a

feudatory should transfer his lord's gift to another, and substitute a new tenant

to do the service in his own stead, without the consent of the lord: and, as tho

F*72 1 *^eu^a^ obligation was considered as reciprocal, the lord also could not

'- J alienate his seignory without the consent of his tenant, which consent of

his was called an attornment. This restraint upon the lords soon wore away;

that upon the tenants continued longer. For when every thing came in pro-

cess of time to be bought and sold, the lords would not grant a license to their

tenant to aliene, without a fine being paid; apprehending that, if it was rea-

sonable for the heir to pay a fine or relief on the renovation of his paternal

estate, it was much more reasonable that a stranger should make the same

acknowledgment on his admission to a newly purchased feud. With us in Eng-

land, these fines seem only to have been exacted from the king's tenants in

capite, who were never able to aliene without a license: but as to common per-

sons, they were at liberty bjmagna carta, (a) (10) and the statute of quia emp-
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tores (h) (if not earlier), to aliene the whole of their estate, to be holden of the

same lord as they themselves held it of before. But the king's tenants in

capite not being included under the general words of these statutes, could not

aliene without a license; for if they did, it was in ancient strictne_ss an absolute

forfeiture of the land; (£) though some have imagined otherwise. But this

severity was mitigated by the statute 1 Edw. Ill, c. 12, which ordained, that in

such case the lands should not be forfeited, but a reasonable fine be paid to the

king. Upon which statute it was settled, that one-third of the yearly value

should be paid for a license of alienation; but if the tenant presumed to aliene

without a license, a full year's value should be paid. (A) (11)

(t) Wright, 97. (f) SO Hen. in, c. 8. (g) Cap. 82. (h) IS Edw. I, o. 1.

(i) 9 Inst. 66. (It) Ibid. 67.

themselves at liberty to make all other advantages that they could, (e) And
afterwards this right, of selling the ward in marriage, or else receiving the price
or value of it, was expressly declared by the statute of Merton;(/) which is the
first direct mention of it that I have met with, in our own or any other law. (9)
6. Another attendant or consequence of tenure by knight-service was that of
fines due to the lord for every alienation, whenever the tenant had occasion to
make over his land to another. This depended on the nature of the feudal
connexion; it not being reasonable or allowed, as we have before seen, that a
feudatory should transfer his lord's gift to another, and substitute a new tenant
to do the service in his own stead, without the consent of the lord: and, as tho
[* 72 ] *feudal obligation was considered as reciprocal, the lord also could not
·
alienate his seignory without the consent of his tenant, which consent of
his was called an attornment. This restraint upon the lords soon wore away;
that upon the tenants continued longer. For when every thing came in process of time to be bought and sold, the lords would not grant a license to their
tenant to aliene, without a fine being paid; apprehending that, if it wa.s reasonable for the heir to pay a fine or relief on the renovation of his paternal
estate, it was much more reasonable that a stranger should make the same
acknowledgment on his admission to a newly purchased feud. With us in En~
land, these fines seem only to have been exacted from the king's tenants in
capi'.te, who were never able to aliene without a license: but as to common persons, they were at liberty by magna carta, (g) (10) and the statute of quia emptores (h) (if not earlier), to aliene the whole of their estate, to be holden of the
same lord as they themselves held it of before. But the king's tenants in
capite not being included under the genera.I words of these statutes, could not
ahene without a license; for if they did, it was in ancient strictness an absolute
forfeiture of the land; (i) though some have imagined otherwise. But this
severity was mitigated by the statute 1 Edw. III, c. 12, which ordained, that in
such case the lands should not be forfeited, but a reasonable fine be paid to the
king. Upon which statute it was settled, that one-third of the yearly value
should be paid for a license of alienation; but if the tenant presumed. to aliene
without a license, a full year's value should be paid. (k) (11)

(9) [TVTiat fruitful sources of revenue these wardships and marriages of the tenants, who

( t)

( f) 20 Hen. Ill, c. 8.
(i) ll ln11t. 86.

Wright, '¥1.

held lands by knight's service, were to the crown, will appear from the two following

(g) Cap. 81.

(k) Ibid. 61.

(1')

18 Edw. I, c. 1.

instances, collected among others by Lord Lyttleton, Hist. Hen. II, 2 vol. 296: " John, earl

of Lincoln, gave Henry the Third 3000 marks to have the marriage of Richard de Clare, for

the benefit of Matilda, his eldest daughter; and Simon de Montford gave the same king

10,000 marks to have the custody of the lands and heir of Gilbert do Unfrannlle, with the

heir's marriage, a sum equivalent to a hundred thousand pounds at present." In this case

the estate must have been large, the minor young, and the alliance honorable. For, as Itr.

Hargrave informs ns, who has well described this species of guardianship, " the guardian in

chivalry was not accountable for the profits made of the infant's lands during the wardship,

but received them for his own private emolument, subject only to the bare maintenance of

the infant. And this guardianship, being deemed more an interest for the profit of the

guardian than a trust for the benefit of tho ward, was salable and transferable, like the

ordinary subjects of property, to the best biddef; and if not disposed of, waa transmissible

to the lord's personal representatives. Thus, the custody of the infant's person, as well as the

care of hia estate, might devolve upon the most perfect stranger to the infant; one prompted

by every pecuniary motive to abuse the delicate and important trust of education, without

aiiv ties of blood or regard to counteract the temptations of interest, or any sufficient authority

to "restrain him from yielding to their influence." Co. Litt. 88, n. 11. One cannot read this

without astonishment that such should continue to be the condition of the country till the year

1660, which, from the extermination of these feudal oppressions, ought to be regarded as a

memorable era in the history of our law anJ liberty.]

(10) [The construction of ntagna vharta. from which this consequence is deduced, is not very

obvious, and has not alwavs been approved of. See Sulliv. Leot. p. 385.]

(11) Justice Coleridge ve'ry properly remarks that it is of the utmost importance, in discussing any

point relating to the feudal'system, to determine the time which is spoken of; thus, according to

feudal principles, and while those principles were strictly maintained, alienation without

(9) l What fruitful eonrces of revenue these wardships and marriages of the tenants, who
held lands by knight's service, were to the crown, will appear from the two following
instance~. collectecl among othe~ by Lord Lyttleton, Hist. Hell: II, 2 vo.L 296: "John, earl
of Lincoln, gave Henry the Third 3000 marktl to have the mamage of Richard de Clare, for
the benefit of Matilda, his eldest daughter ; and Simon de Montford gave the same king
10,000 marks to have the custody of the lands and heir of Gilbert do Unfranville, with the
heir's marriage, a sum equivalent to a h11Ddrod thousand pounds at present." In this case
the estate must have been large, the minor;oung, and the alliance honorable. For, 88 llr.
Hargrave informs us, who has well descri~ this species .of gn~ianship, ." the guardian. in
chivalry was not accountable for the profits ma.de of the lllfant s lands dunng the wardship,
but received them for his own private emolument, 11nbject onlr to the bare m&intenanc.e of
the infant. And this guardianship, being deemed more an mtercst for the profit . of the
guardian than a trust for the benefit of ~be ward, :VM Rala~le and transferable, ltk_e _the
ordinary subjects of property, to the betlt b1ddet: and if not disposed of, wiw transm18i!lble
to the lord's personal representative11. Thus, the custody of the infant's ~~n, as well as tho
care of his et1tate, might. devolve upon the m?~t perfect .stranger to the infant; o~e prol?lpted
by every pecuniary motive to abuse the dehcate 11:nd im~ortant trust of odu~tion, With<?nt
auv ties of blood or regard to counteract the temptations of mterest, or any suffiment anthont,r
to 'rc~train him from yielding to their infl'!-ence." Co. Litt. ~· n. 11. One cann?t read this
'\\ithout a:;tonishment that such ~hotild oontmne to be tho condit10n of the country till the year
1660, which, from the extennination of these feudal oppreAAions, ought to be regarded as a
·
memorable era in the bitJtory of our law aml liberty.]
(10) [The construction of mag11a charta. from whi~h t~~ conseqn?nce is deduced, is not -very
obvious and has not alwav11 been approved of. See Sulltv. Leet. p. 385.)
( 11) iusti<10 Coleridfl'.e viry properly remarks .that it is <;tf the u~m~st importance, in discussi~g any
point relatinir to the feudal aystem, to d_ete_nnme the time_ which is. apo!cen of; f:bus, .acoo~ng t-0
feudal principle~. and while th.ose pnnctples were strictly mamtmnod, ahenat10n without
license must have involvl'd forft•iture; for the tenant of con~e could not have compelled the
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license must have involved forfeiture; for the tenant of course could not have compelled the
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7. The last consequence of tenure in chivalry was escheat; which is the deter-

mination of the tenure, or dissolution of the mutual bond between the lord and

tenant from the extinction of the blood of the latter, by either natural or civil

means: if he died without heirs of his blood, or if his blood was corrupted and

stained by commission of treason or felony; (12) whereby every inheritable

quality was entirely blotted out *and abolished. In such cases the lands r *„„ -i

escheated, or fell back to the lord of the fee; (I) that is, the tenure was •• •*

determined by breach of the original condition expressed or implied in the

feudal donation. In the one case, there were no heirs subsisting of the blood

of the first feudatory or purchaser, to which heirs alone the grant of the feud

extended; in the other, the tenant, by perpetrating an atrocious crime, shewed

that he was no longer to be trusted as a vassal, having forgotten his duty as a

subject; and therefore forfeited his feud, which he held under the implied con-

ditition that he should not be a traitor or a felon. The consequence of which in

both cases was, that the gift, being determined, resulted back to the lord who

gave it. (m)

These were the principal qualities, fruits, and consequences of tenure by

knight-service: a tenure, by which the greatest part of the lands in this king-

dom were holden, and that principally of the king in capite, till the middle of

the last century; and which was created, as Sir Edward Coke expressly testi-

fies, (n) for a military purpose, viz.: for defence of the realm by the king's own

Erincipal subjects, which was judged to be much better than to trust to hire-
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ngs or foreigners. The description here given is that of a knight-service

proper; which was to attend the king in his wars. There were also some other

species of knight-service; so called, though improperly, because the service or

render was of a free and honourable nature, and equally uncertain as to the

time of rendering as that of knight-service proper, and because they were

attended with similar fruits and consequences. Stich was the tenure by grand

serjeanty, (13) per magnum servitium, whereby the tenant was bound, instead

of serving the Icing generally in his wars, to do some special honorary service to

the king m person ; (14) as to carry his banner, his sword, or the like; or to be

his butler, champion, or other officer, at his coronation, (o) It was in most

other respects like knight-service; (p) only he was not bound to pay aid, (q) or

escuage; (r) *aud, when tenant by knight-service paid five pounds for a T*HA -,

relief on every knight's fee, tenant by grand serjeanty paid one year's *- J

(!) Co. Lttt. 13. (m) Feud. I. 2, t. 86. (n) 4 lust. 193. («) Lilt. } 153.

(p) Ibid, i 158. (q) 2 lust. 233. (r) 1,111. {168.

lord to receive the homage and fealty of anew tenant, and by his own act he had renounced his

own holding. But it is obvious that there was always a struggle in the advancing spirit of the

age to loosen the bonds of feudal tenure; and it may not be possible to fix the period at which

7. The last consequence of tenure in chivalry was esclieat; which is the determination of the tenure, or dissolution of the mutual bond between the lord and
tenant from the extinction of the blood of the latter. bv either natural or civil
me.ans: if he died without heirs of his blood, or if his blood was corrupted and
stained by commission of treason or felony; {12) whereby every inheritable
quality was entirely blotted out *and abolished. In such cases the lands [ • 73 ]
escheated, or fell back to the lord of the fee; (l) that is, the tenure was
determined by breach of the original condition expressed or implied in the
feudal donation. In the one case, there were no heirs subsisting of the blood
of the first feudatory or purchaser, to which heirs alone the grant of the feud
extended; in the other, the tenant, by perpetrating an atrocious crime, shewed
that he was no longer to he trusted as a Yassal, having forgotten his duty as a
subject; and therefore forfeited his feud, which he held under the implied conditition that he should not be a traitor or a felon. The consequence of which in
both cases was, that the gift, being determined, resulted back to the lord who
gave it. (m)
These were the principal qualities, fruits, and consequences of tenure by
knight-service: a tenure; by which the greatest part of the lands in this kingdom were holden, a.nd that principally of the king in capite, till the middle of
the last century; and which was created, as Sir Edward Coke expressly testifies, (n) for a military purpose, viz.: for defence of the realm by the king's own
principal subjects, which was judged to be much better than to trust to hirelings or foreigners. The description here given is that of a. knight-service
proper; which was to attend the king in his wars. There were also some other
species of knight-service; so called, though improperly, because the service or
render was of a free and honourable nature, and equally uncertain as to the
time of rendering as that of knight-service proper, and because they were
attended with similar fruits and consequences. Such was the tenure by grand
serjeanty, (13) per magnum servitium, whereby the tenant was bound, instead
of servin~ the king generally in his wars, to do some B'pecia.l honorary service to
the king m person; (14) as to carrv his banner, his sword, or the like; or to be
his butler, champion, or other officer, at his coronation. (o) It was in most
other respects like knight-service; ( p) only he was not bound to pay aid, (q) or
escuage; (r) •and, when tenant by 'Knight-setviC'e prod fiye pounds for a [* 74 ]
relief on every knight's fee, tenant by grand eerjeanty paid one year's
(l) Co. Litt. 13.

(m) FtiUd. I. i,

(p)

(q)

Ibid. J 1511.

2 lost. 23a.

t. 86.
(r)

(n)' lnst.19'J.
LUt. J158.

(0) Litt•• 1611.

the practice of alienation became too strong for tBe' law, and, Doing first winked at, was finally

legalized.

(12) The doctrine of corruption of blood was peculiar to England. In the United States

attainder of treason can work corruption of blood or forfeiture only during the life of the person

attainted. Const, art. 3, $ 3. And since the statute 3 and 4 "Win. IT, c, 106, enlarging 54 Geo.

Ill, c. 145, attainder in England for any crime cannot extend to the disinheriting of heirs except

during the life of the offender.

(13) [Mr. Hargrave (note 1 to Co. Litt. 108 a) observes, that the tenure by grand serjeanty

still continues, though it is so regulated by the 12th of Car. II, c. 24, as to be made in effect

free and common socage, except so far as regards the merely honorary parts of grand ser-

jeanty.]

(14) [Perhaps, more correctly, "to do some special honorary service in person to the king,"

thu general rule being that it was to be done by the tenant in person, if able, though there are

many instances iu which it was not to be done to the king in person. This may explain why he

who held in grand serjeanty paid no escnage. The devout attachment to the lord's person, which

was so much fostered by the feudal sytem, is in none of its minor consequences more conspicuous

than in the nature of the personal services which the haughtiest barons were proud to render to

their lord paramount. To be the king's butler or carver are familiar instances. Mr. Madox

mentions one more singular, of a tenure in grand serjeanty by the service of holding the

king's head in the ship which carried him in his passage between Dover and Whitsand. Bafonia,

3, c. 5.]
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lord to rec~ive the homage and fealty of a new tenant, and by his own act he had renounced his
own holding. But it is obvious that there was always a struggle in the advancing spirit of the
age to loosen the boud11 of feudal tenure; and it may not be po1.1Sible to fix thcleriod at which
the practice of alienation became too strong for tlie' la'w, and, being first winke at, was finally
legalized.
{lil) The doctrine of corruption of blood W88 peculiar to England. In the United Stateg
attainder of treason can work corruption of blood or forfeiture only during the life of the pel'llOn
atWnte<l. Const. art. 3, § 3. .And since the statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, enlarging 54 Geo.
III, c. 145, attainder in England for any crime cannot extend to the disinheriting of heirs e:xce11t
during the life of the offender.
(1:~) [Mr. Hurgra>e (note 1 to Co, Litt. lO!:l a) observes, that the tenure by grn.ud serjeauty
still continues, though it is so regulated by the 12th of Car. II, c. 24, as to he made in effect
free and common socage, except tlO far as regards the merely honorary parts of grand serjeanty.]
( 14) [Perhaps, more correctly, "to do some special honorary service in per!!On to the king,"
tho general rule being that it was to be done by tho tenant in parson, if able, though there are
many in><tance:1 in which .it was not to be done to the king in person. ThiR may explain why he
who held in grand serjeanty paid no escnage. The devout attachment to tbe lord's person, which
w88 t>ll much fostered by the feudal sytem, is in none of it.'! minor consequences more conspicuous
than in the nature of the personal servicel! which the haughtiest baron:; were 11rond to rt~udor to
their lord paramount. To he the king's butler or carver are familiar im;timces. Mr. Mndox
mentions oue more singular, of a tenure in grand serjeanty by tho i;erYice of holding tho
king'fl head in the ship which carried him in his passage between Dover and Whit.sand. Baronin.,

a,c.r..J
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value of his land, were it mnch or little. («) Tenure by carnage, (15) which was

to wind a horn when the Scots or other enemies entered the land, in order to

warn the king's subjects, was (like other services of the same nature) a species

of grand serjeanty. (t)

These services, both of chivalry and grand serjeanty, were all personal, and

uncertain as to their quantity or duration. But, the personal attendance in

knight-service growing troublesome and inconvenient in many respects, the

tenants found means of compounding for it; by first sending others in their

stead, and in process of time making a pecuniary satisfaction to the lords in

lieu of it. This pecuniary satisfaction at last came to be levied by assessments,

at so mnch for every knignt's fee; and therefore this kind of tenure was called

scutagium in Latin, or servitium scuti ; scutum being then a well-known denom-

ination for money: and, in like manner, it was called, in our Norman French,

escuage ; being indeed a pecuniary, instead of a military, service. (16) The first

time this appears to have been taken was in the 5 Hen. II, on account of his

expedition to Toulouse; but it soon came to be so universal, that personal

attendance fell quite into disuse. Hence we find in our ancient histories, that,

from this period, when our kings went to war, they levied scutages on their

tenants, that is, on all the landholders of the kingdom, to defray their expenses,

and to hire troops; and these assessments in the time of Hen. II seem to have

been made arbitrarily, and at the king's pleasure. Which prerogative being

greatly abused by his successors, it became matter of national clamour; ana
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King John was obliged to consent by his magna carta, that no scutage should

be imposed without consent of parliament. (M) But this clause was omitted in

p~K -I his son Henry Ill's charter, where we only find (w) that scutages *or

L •" escuage should be taken as they were used to be taken in the time of

Henry II: that is, in a reasonable and moderate manner. Yet afterwards, by

statute 25 Edw. I, cc. 5, 6, and many subsequent statutes, (x) it was again pro-

vided, that the king should take no aids or tasks but by the common consent

of the realm: hence it was held in our old books, that escuage or scutage could

not be levied but by consent of parliament; (y) such scutages being indeed the

groundwork of all succeeding subsidies, and the land-tax of later times.

Since therefore escuage differed from knight-service in nothing, but as a com-

pensation differs from actual service, knight-service is frequently confounded

with it. And thus Littleton (z) must be understood, when he tells us, that tenant

by homage, fealty, and escuage, was tenant by knight-service: that is, that this

tenure (being subservient to the military policy of the nation) was respected (a)

as a tenure in chivalry, (b) But as the actual service was uncertain, and depended

upon emergencies, so it was necessary that this pecuniary compensation should

be equally uncertain, and depend on the assessments of the legislature suited to

those emergencies. For had the escnage been a settled, invariable sum, payable

at certain times, it had been neither more nor less than a mere pecuniary rent;

and the tenure, instead of knight-service, would have then been of another kind,

called socage, (c) of which we shall speak in the next chapter.

(>} Ibid. ^ 154. ft) IMd. f 156.

(ii) tfuttum scutagium ponaiur in regno no.--trn, ntti per dommune cotaOium regni nottri. Cap. B.

(w) Cap. 37. fx) See book I, page 140. fy} Old Ten. at. footage- (*) * '«*-

(a) Wright, 12S. (b) Profeodo militari ftputatur. Flet. 1. 2, c. 14, S 7. (c) Lilt. { 97, 120.

(15) [The well-known cane of the Pusey horn, where a bill in chancery was brought for its

recovery, Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273, wan an inHtance where land had been held by the Pnsey

\'alue of his land, were it much or little. (s) Tenure by cornage, (15) which was
to wind a horn when the Scots or other enemies entered the land, in order to
warn the king's subjects, was (like other services of the same nature) a species
of grand serjeanty. (t)
·
These services, both of chivalry and grand serjeanty, were all personal, and
uncertain as to their quantity or duration. But, the personal attendance in
knight-service growing troublesome and inconvenient in many respects, the
tenants found means of compounding for it; by first sending others in their
stead, and in process of time making a pecuniary satisfaction to the lords in
lieu of it. This pecuniary satisfaction at last came to be levied by assessments,
at so much for every knight's fee; and therefore this kind of tenure was called
sc11,tagium in Latin, or servitium scuti; scutum being then a well-known denomination for money: and, in like manner, it was called, in our Norman French,
escuage; being indeed a pecuniary, instead of a military, service. (16) The first
time this appears to have been taken was in the 5 Hen. II, on account of his
expedition to Toulouse; but it soon came to be so universal, that personal
attendance fell quite into disuse. Hence we find in our ancient histones, that,
from this period, when our kings went to war, they levied scutages on their
tenants, that is, on all the landholders of the kingdom, to defray their expenses,
and to hire troops; and these assessments in the time of Hen. II seem to have
been made arbitrarily~ and a.t the king's pleasure. Which prerogative being
g__reatly abused by his successors, it became matter of national clamour ; and
.King John was obliged to consent by his "'!1fl'lta carta, that no scutage should
he imposed without consent of parliament. (u) But this clause was omitted in
( • 75 ] his son Henry Ill's charter, where we only find (w) that scu~es *or
escua.ge should be taken as they were used to be taken in the time of
Henry II : that is, in a reasonable and moderate manner. Yet aft;erwards, by
statute 25 Edw. I, cc. 5, 6, and many subsequent statutes, (x) it was again provided, that the king should take no aids or tasks but by the common consent
of the realm: hence it was held in our old books, that escuage or scutage could
not be levied but by consent of parliament; (11) such scuta.ges being indeed the
groundwork of all succeeding subsidies, and tlie land-tax of later times.
Since therefore escuage differed from knight-service in nothing, but as a compensation differs from actual service, knight-service is frequently confounded
with it. And thus Littleton (z) must be understood, when he tells us, that tenant
by homage, fealty, and escua.ge, was tenant by knight-service: that is, that this
tenure (being subservient to the military policy of the nation) was respected (a)
as a tenure in chivalry. (b) But as the actual service was uncertain, and depended
upon emergencies, so it was necessary that this pecuniary com~nsation should
be equally uncertain, and depend on the assessments of the legislature suited to
those emer~encies. For had the escua.ge been a settled, invariable sum, payable
at certain times, it had been neither more nor less than a mere pecuniary rent;
and the tenure, instead of knight·service, would have then been of another kind,
called socage, (c) of which we shall speak in the next chapter.
Ibid. t IM.
(I) Ibid. t 1!l6.
(u.) Nu.Uu.m 1/:utagium ponatur In regru> no1tf'o, nUI pt1' Commune conftllua ffgn' noatri. Cap. 12.
(to) Ca:p. 37.
(:&)See boot I, page HU.
(If) Old Ten. tU. &~
(11) t 103.
(a) Wright, 12'l.
(b) Proftodo milllarl r'tputatur. Flet. l. 2, c. U, t 7.
(c) Litt. f 97, lill.
(1)

family by " a horn anciently given to their ancestors by Canute, the Danish king." Camd. Brit.

Berks, p. 203, ed. 1607. The inscription on the horn was as follows: " Kyng Knowd gave

Wyllyam Powse, this home to hold oy thy londe/']

(16) [But Littleton, Coke and Bracton render it the service of the shield, i. e. of arms, being

a compensation for actual service. Co. Litt. 68, b.

Sir M. Wright considers that escuage, though in somo instances the compensation made to the

lord for the omission of actual service, was also in many others a pecuniary aid or tribute originally

reserved by particular lords instead of personal service, varying in amount according to the expen-

diture which the lord had to incur in his personal attendance upon the king in his wars. This

explanation tends to elucidate the distinction between knight-service and escuage in the old.

authors. See Wright, 121, 134; Litt. s. 98, 120.]
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(tr)) [The well-known c&lle of the Pusef horn, where a. bill in chancery WAA brought for it.s
recovery, Pu.iey v. Puiley, l Vern. 273, wa.~ an inRtance where land had been held by the Pusey
family by "a. horn anciently gi\'en to their t~nce~tor11 by Canute, the Danish king.'' Ca.ind. Brit.
Berks. l>· 20:3, ed. 1607. The inscription on the horn wai! as follows: "Kyng Knowd gave
Wyllyum Puw~e, thi>1 borne to bold by thy londc,"]
(16) (But Littleton, Coke and Braeton render it the Kernce of the shield, i.e. of arms, being
a compen,.;ation for actual service. Co. Litt. &~, b.
Sir M. Wright considers that e~cul\ge, though in ~omo im1tanl'11s the compen8ation made t.o the
lord for the omis.~ion of a.ctual service, wa.s al110 in many others a pecuniary a.id or tribute originally
re>1erved by particular lords instead of l!eraonal service, >Arying in amount accordin~ to the expenditure which the lord had to incur in hii! ;personal att-Oudance upon the king in his wan<. This
explanation tends to elucidate the distinction between kni~ht·s1>rviee and e~t·tmge in the ol<l
authors. See Wright, 121, 134; Litt. s. 98, 120.]
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For the present I have only to observe, that by the degenerating of knight-

service, or personal military duty, into escuage, or pecuniary assessments, all the

advantages (either promised or real) of the feudal constitution were destroyed,

and nothing but the hardships remained. Instead of forming a national militia

composed of barons, knights, and gentlemen, bound by their interest, their

honour, and their oaths, to defend their king and country, the whole of this

system of *tenures now tended to nothing else but a wretched means of r*«g -i

raising money to pay an army of occasional mercenaries. In the mean L J

time the families of all our nobility and gentry groaned under the intolerable

burthens, which (in consequence 01 the fiction adopted after the conquest) were

introduced and laid upon them by the subtlety and finesse of the Norman law-

yers. For, besides the scutages to which they were liable in defect of personal

attendance, which however were assessed by themselves in parliament, they might

be called upon by the king or lord paramount for aids, whenever his eldest son

was to be knighted, or his eldest daughter married; not to forget the ransom of

his own person. The heir on the death of his ancestor, if of full age, was plun-

dered of the first emoluments arising from his inheritance, by way of relief and

n° ter seisin; and if under age, of the whole of his estate during infancy,

then, as Sir Thomas Smith (d) very feelingly complains, '• when he came

to his own, after he was out of wardship, his woods decayed, houses fallen down,

stock wasted and gone, lands let forth and ploughed to be barren," to reduce him

still farther, he was yet to pay half a year's profits as a fine for suing out his
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livery ; and also the price or value of his marriage, if he refused such wife as his

lord and guardian had bartered for, and imposed upon him; or twice that value

if he married another woman. "Add to this, the untimely and expensive honour

of knighthood, to make his poverty more completely splendid. And when by

these deductions his fortune was so shattered and ruined, that perhaps he was

obliged to sell his patrimony, he had not even that poor privilege allowed him

without paying an exorbitant fine for a license of alienation. (17)

A slavery so complicated, and so extensive as this, called aloud for a remedy

in a nation that boasted of its freedom. Palliatives were from time to time

applied by successive acts of parliament, which assuaged some temporary griev-

ances. Till at length the humanity of King James I consented, (e) in considera-

tion of a proper equivalent, to abolish them all; though the plan *proceeded i-*™™ -i

not to effect; in like manner as he had formed a scheme, and begun to *• '' J

put it into execution, for removing the feudal grievance of heritable jurisdiction

in Scotland, (/) which has since been pursued and effected by the statute 20

Geo. II, c. 43. (g) King James's plan for exchanging our military tenures seems

to have been nearly the same as that which has been since pursued; only with

this difference, that, by way of compensation for the loss which the crown and

other lords would sustain, an annual fee-farm rent was to have been settled and

inseparably annexed to the crown and assured to the inferior lords, payable out

of every knight's fee within their respective seignories. An expedient seemingly

much better than the hereditary excise, which was afterwards made the principal

equivalent for these concessions. For at length the military tenures, with all

their heavy appendages (having during the usurpation been discontinued,) were

destroyed at one blow by the statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, which enacts, " that the

court of wards and liveries, and all wardships, liveries, primer seisins, and ous-

terlemains, values, and forfeitures of marriage, by reason of any tenure of the

king or others, be totally taken away. And that all fines for alienations, tenures

by homage, knight-service, and escuage, and also aids for marrying the daughter

or knighting the son, and all tenures of the king in capite, be likewise taken

(d) Coinmonw. J. 3. c. 3. fe) 4 Inst. 202. (f) Dalrymp. of Tends, 292.

(a) By another statute of the same year (20 Oeo. 11. c. no.) the tenure of umrdholding (equivalent to the

knight-service of England) IB forever abolished ID Scotland.

For the present I have only to observe, that by the degenerating of knightservice, or personal military duty, into escuage, or pecuniary assessments, all the
advantages (either promised or real) of the feudal constitution were destroyed,
and nothing but the hardships remained. Instead of forming a national militia
composed of barons, knights, and gentlemen, bound by their interest, their
honour, and their oaths, to defend their king and country, the whole of this
system of •t;euures now tended to nothing else but a wretched means of [* 76 ]
raising moneY. to pay an army of occasional mercenaries. In the mean
time the families of all our nobilitl and gentry groaned under the intolerable
burthens, which (in consequence o the fiction adopted after the conquest) were
introduced and laid upon them by the subtlety and finesse of the Norman lawyers. For, besides the scutages to which they were liable in defect of personal
attendance, which however were assessed by themselves in parliament, they might
be called upon by the king or lord paramount for aids, whenever his eldest son
was to be knighted, or his eldest daughter married; not to forget the ransom of
his own person. The heir on the death of his ancestor, if of full age, was plundered of the first emoluments arising from his inheritance, by way of relief and
primer seisin; and if under age, of the whole of his estate during infancy.
And then, as Sir Thomas Smith (d) very feelingly complains, '-when he came
to his own, after he was out of wardship, his woods decayed, houses fallen down,
stock wasted and gone, lands let forth and ploughed to be barren," to reduce him
still farther, he was yet to pay half a year's profits as a fine for suing out his
livery; and also the price. or value of his rnarriage, if he refused such wife as his
lord and guardian had bartered for, and imposed upon him; or twice that value
if he married another woman. Add to this, the untimely and expensive honour
of knighthood, to make his poverty more completely splendid. And when by
these deductions his fortune was so shattered and ruined, that perhaps he was
obliged to sell his patrimony, he had not even that poor privilege allowed him
without paying an exorbitant fine for a license of alienation. (17)
A slavery so complicated, and so extensive as this, called aloud for a remedy
in a nation that boasted of its freedom. Palliatives were from time to time
applied b>: successive acts of parliament, which assuaged some temporary ~riev
ances. rr11l at length the humanity of King James I consented, (e) m consideration ofa proper equivalent, to abolish them all; though the plan *proceeded [* 77 ]
not to effect; in like manner as he had formed a scheme, and begun to
put it into execution, for removing the feudal grievance of heritable jurisdiction
m Scotland, (/) which has since been pursued and effected by the statute 20
Geo. II, c. 43. (g) King J ames's plan for exchanging our military tenures seems
to have been nearly the same as that which has been since pursued; only with
this difference, that, by wu.y of compensation for the loss which the crown and
other lords would sustain, an annual fee-farm rent was to have been settled and
inseparably annexed to the crown and assured to the inferior lords, payable out
of every knight's fee within their respective seignories. An expedient seemingly
much better than the hereditary excise, which Wail afterwards made the principal
equivalent for these concessions. For at length the military tenures, with all
their heavy appendages (having during the usurpation been discontrnued,) were
destroyed at one blow by the statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, which enacts, "that the
court of wards and liveries~ and all wardships, liveries, primer seisins, and ousterlemains, values, and forfeitures of marriage, by reason of any tenure of the
king or others, be totally taken away. And that all fines for alienations, tenures
by hom~e, knight-service, and escuage, and also aids for mat·rying the daughter
or knighting the son, and all tenures of the king in capite, be likewise taken
0

(17) [The license was to be paid by the alienee; that is, he was liable for it; but of course it

formed part of the purchase-money of the land.]
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(f) Dalrymp. of Fends, 292.
(p) By another statute of the same year ('JO Geo. n;-c. l!O,) the tenure of 1Dard11oltUng (equivalent to the
k1ught-servlce or England) ill forever abolished lo Scotland.
(d) Commonw. l. 3.

.

(17) [The license wa:i to be paid by the alienee; that is, he was liable for it; but of course it
formed part of the purchase-money of the land.]
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away. (18) And that all sorts of tenures, held of the kin? or others, be turned

into" free and common socage: save only tenures in frankalmoign, copyholds,

and the honorary services (without the slavish part) of grant serjeanty." A

statute, which was a greater acquisition to the civil property of this kingdom

than even magna carta itself; since that only pruned the luxuriances that had

grown out of the military tenures, and thereby preserved them in vigour; but

the statute of King Charles extirpated the whole, and demolished both root and

branches.

OHAPTEK VI.

away. (18) And that all sorts of tenures, held of the king or others, be turned
into free and common socage: save only tenures in frankalmoign, copyhold~
and the honorary services (without the slavish pa.rt) of grant serjeanty." A
statute, which was a. greater acquisition to the civil property of this kingdom
than even magna carta itself; since that only pruned the luxuriances that had
grown out of the military tenures, and thereby preserved them in vigour; but
the statute of King Charles extirpated the whole, and demolished both root and
branches.

OF THE MODERN ENGLISH TENURES.

ALTHOUGH, by the means that were mentioned in the preceding chapter, the

oppressive or military part of the feudal constitution itself was nappily done

away, yet we are not to imagine that the constitution itself was utterly laid

CHAPTER VI.

aside, and a new one introduced in its room: since by the statute 12 Car. ft, the

tenures of socage and frankalmoign, the honourary services of grand serjeanty,

OF THE MODERN ENGLISH TENURES.

and the tenure by copy of court roll, were reserved; nay all tenures in general,

except frankalmoign, grand serjeanty, and copyhold, were reduced to one gen-

eral species of tenure, then well known, and subsisting, called free and common

socage. And this being sprung from the same feudal original as the rest, demon-

strates the necessity of fully contemplating that ancient system; since it is that

alone to which we can recur, to explain any seeming or real difficulties that may

arise in our present mode of tenure.
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The military tenure, or that by knight-service, consisted of what were reputed

the most free and honourable services, but which in their nature were unavoid-

ably uncertain in respect to the time of their performance. The second species

of tenure, or free-socage, consisted also of free and honourable services; but

such as were liquidated and reduced to an absolute certainty. And this tenure

i-*™ i n°t OQly subsists to *this day, but has in a manner absorbed and swal-

•• •" lowed up (since the statute of Charles the Second) almost every other

species of tenure. And to this we are next to proceed.

II. Socage, in its most general and extensive signification, seems to denote a

tenure by any certain and determinate service. And in this sense it is by our

ancient writers constantly put in opposition to chivalry, or knight-service, where

the render was precarious and uncertain. Thus Bracton; (a) if a man holds by

rent in money, without any escuage or serjeanty, " id tenementum did pote»t

socagium:" but if you add thereto any royal service, or escuage, to any, the

smallest amount, "illud dicipoterit feodum militare." So, too, the author of

Fleta; (b) " ex donationibus, servitia militaria vel magna serjantia non conti-

nentibus, or^tur nobis quoddam nomen generate, quod est socagium." Littleton

also (c) defines it to be, where the tenant holds his tenement of the lord by any

faj L. «, ft 16, { 8. (b) L. 8, c. 14, ( 9. (c) ^ 117.

(18) [Both Mr. Madox and Mr. Hargrove have taken notice of this inaccuracy in the title

and body of the act, viz. of taking away tenures in capite: Mad. Bar. Ang. 238: Co. Litt. 10S,

n. 5; for tenure in capite signifies nothing more than that the king is the immediate lord of the

land-owner; and the land might have been either of military or socage tenure. The

same incorrect language was held by the speaker of the house of commons in his pedantic

address to the throne upon presenting this bill: " Royal sir, your tenures in capite are not

only turned into a tenure in socage (though that alone will forever give your majesty a just

right and title to the labor of our plows, and the sweat of our brows), but they are likewise

ALTHOUGH, by the means that were mentioned in the preceding char.ter, the
oppressive or military part of the feudal constitution itself was happily done
away, yet we a.re not to imagine that the constitution itself was utterly laid
aside, and a new one introduced in its room: since by the statute 12 Car. !I, the
tenures of socage and frankalmoign, the honourary services of grand serjeanty,
and the tenure by copy of court roll, were reserved; nay all tenures in general,
except frankalmoign, grand serjeanty, and copyhold, were reduced to one geneml species of tenure, then well known, and subsisting, called free and common
socage. And this being sprung from the same feudal original as the rest, demonstrates the necessity of fully contemplating that ancient system; since it is that
alone to which we can recur, to explain any seeming or real difficulties that ma.y
arise in our present mode of tenure.
The military tenure, or that by knight-service, consisted of what were reputed
the most free and honourable services, but which in their nature were unavoidably uncertain in respect to the time of their performance. The second species
of tenure, or free-socage, consisted also of free and honourable sen-ices; but
such as were llquidated and reduced to an absolute certainty. And this tenure
[ ,.. 79 ] not only subsists to *this day, hut has in a manner absorbed and swallowed up (since the statute of Charles the Second) almost every other
species of tenure. And to this we are next to proceed.
II. Socage, in its most general and extensive signification, seems to denote a
tenure by any certain and determinate service. And in this sense it is by our
ancient writers constantly put in opposition to chivalry, or knight-service, where
the render was precarious and uncertain. Thus Bracton: (a) if a man holds by
rent in money, without any escuage or serjeanty, "id tenementum dici pote...<tt
soca.gium:" but if you add thereto any royal service, or eacuage, to any, the
smallest amount, "illud dici poterit feodum militare." So, too, the author of
Fleta ; ( h) " ex donatt'.onibu.,, servitia militaria vel magnm serjantim non rxmtinenUhu.~, or,it-ur nobis quoddam nomen generale, quod est socagium." Littleton
also (c) defines it to be, where the knant bolds his tenement of the lord by any

turned into a tenure in eorde. What your majesty had before in your court of wards, yon

(a) L. 2,

c. 16, t 9.

(b) L. 8,

c. U, t 9.

(c) t 117.

will be sure to find it hereafter in the exchequer of your people's hearts." Journ. I»nm. Proc. 11

vol. 234.]
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(18) [Both Mr. Madox and Mr. Hargrave have taken notice of this inaccuracy in the title
and body of the act, viz. of taking awa;r tenures ttl capiw : Mad. Bar. Ang. 238: Co. Litt. 100,
n. 5 ; for tenure iii ca11ite signifies nothing more than that the king is t.he immediate lonl of the
land-owner; ancl the Janel might have been either of military or socage tenure. The
smne incorrect language WM held by the speaker of the houRe of common8 in his pedantio
address to the throne npon presenting this bill : "Royal sir. your tenures in capire are not
only turned into a tenure in Nocage (though that a.lone will forever give your majesty a jnst
right and title to the labor or our plows, and the sweat of our brows), but they arc likew:i!le
turned into a tenure in rorde. What your maje~ty had before in your court of wsrd11, you
will be sure to find it hereat\er in the exchequer of your people's hearts." Journ. Dom. Proc. 11
vol. 234.]
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certain service in lieu of all other services; so that they be not services of chiv-

alry, or knight-service. And therefore afterwards (d) he tells us, that whatsoever

is not tenure in chivalry is tenure in socage: in like manner as it is defined

by Finch, (c) a tenure to bo done out of war. The service must therefore be cer-

tain, in order to denominate it socage: as to hold by fealty and 20s. rent; or,

by homage, fealty and "ZOs, rent: or, by homage and fealty without rent or, by

fealty and certain corporal service, as ploughing the lord's land for three days;

or by fealty only without any other service: for all these are tenures in socage. (/)

But socage, as was hinted in the last chapter, is of two sorts: free socage,

•where the services, are not only certain, but honourable; and villein-socage,

where the services, though certain, are of a baser nature. Such as hold by the

former tenure are called in Glanvil, (g) and other subsequent authors, by the

name of liberi sokemanni, or tenants in free-socage. Of this tenure we are first

to speak; and this, both in the *nature of its service, and the fruits and r^g^ -i

consequences appertaining thereto, was always by much the most free and '• •"

independent species of any. And therefore I cannot but assent to Mr. Som-

ner's etymology of the word; (h) who derives it from the Saxon appellation soc,

which signifies liberty or privilege, and being joined to a usual termination, is

called socage, in Latin socagium; signifying thereby a free or privileged tenure.(t)

This etymology seems to be much more just than that of our common lawyers

in general, who derive it from soca, an old Latin word, denoting (as they tell us)

a plough: for that in ancient time this socage -tenure consisted in nothing else
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but services of husbandry, which the tenant was bound to do to his lord, as to

plough, sow, or reap for him; but that in process of time, this service was

changed into an annual rent by consent of all parties, and that, in memory of

its original, it still retains the name of so_cage or plough service, (k) But this

by no means agrees with what Littleton himself tells us, (I) that to hold by fealty

only, without paying any rent, is tenure in socage; for here is plainly no com-

mutation for plough-service. Besides, even services, confessedly of a military

nature and original (as escuage, which, while it remained uncertain, was equiv-

alent to knight-service), the instant they were reduced to a certainty changed

both their name and nature, and were called socage. (m) It was the certainty

therefore that denominated it a socage tenure; and nothing sure could be a

greater liberty or privilege, than to have the service ascertained, and not left to

the arbitrary calls of the lord, as the tenures of chivalry. Wherefore also Brit-

ton, who describes lands in socage tenure under the name of fraunke ferme, (n)

tells us, that they are " lands and tenements whereof the nature of "the fee is

changed by feoffment out of chivalvy for certain yearly services, and in respect

whereof neither homage, ward, marriage, nor relief can be demanded." Which

leads us also to another observation, that if socage tenures were of such base

and servile 'original, it is hard to account for the very great immunities I-^Q., -i

which the tenants of them always enjoyed; so highly superior to those L ••

of the tenants by chivalry, that it was thought, in the reigns of both Edward I

and Charles II, a point of the utmost importance and value to the tenants, to

reduce the tenure by knight-service to fraunke ferme or tenure by(socage. We

may, therefore, 1 think, fairly conclude in favour of Somner's etymology, and

the liberal extraction of the tenure in free socage, against the authority even of

Littleton himself.

Taking this then to be the meaning of the word, it seems probable that the

socage tenures were the relics of Saxon liberty: retained by such persons as had

neither forfeited them to the king, nor been obliged to exchange their tenure,

for the more honourable, as it was called, but, at the same time, more burthen-

some, tenure of knight-service. This is peculiarly remarkable in the tenure

which prevails in Kent called gavelkind, which is generally acknowledged to

be a species of socage tenure; (o) the preservation whereof inviolate from the

fd) 9 118. fej L. 147. (f) Litt. « 117, 118, 119. (g) L. 3, c. 7. fkj Gavelk. 138.

(i) In like manner Skene, In his exposition of the Scots' law, title tocage, tell us, that it is " any kind of

lioMinfr of lands quhen ODV man Is Infcft freely." <fc.

(I:) Lltt. ? 119. (fl * 118. (m) 3 98.120. (n) C. 66. (o) Wright, 211.
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innovations of the Norman conqueror is a fact universally known. And

those who thus preserved their liberties were said to hold in free and common

socage.

As therefore the grand criterion and distinguishing mark of this species of

tenure are the having its renders or services ascertained, it will include under it

all other methods of holding free lands by certain and invariable rents and

duties: and, in particular, petit serjeanty, tenure in burgage, and gavelkind.

We may remember that, by the statute 12 Car. II, grand serjeanty is not

itself totally abolished, but only the slavish appendages belonging to it: for the

honorary services (such as carrying the king s sword or banner, officiating as

his butler, carver, &c., at the coronation) are still reserved. Now petit sergeanty

bears a great resemblance to grand serjeanty; for as the one is a personal service,

so the other is a rent or render, both tending to some purpose relative to the

pool king^s *person. Petit serjeanty,as defined by Littleton, (p) consists in

L -1 holding lands of the king by the service of rendering to him annually

some small implement of war, as a bow, a sword, a lance, an arrow, or the like.

This, lie says, (q) is but socage in effect: for it is no personal service, but a

certain rent: and, we may add, it is clearly no predial service, or service of the

plough, but in all respects liberum et commune socagium: only being held of

the king, it is by way of eminence dignified with the title ofparvum servitium

regis, or petit serjeanty. And magna carta respected it in this light, when it

enacted, (r) that no wardship of the lands or body should be claimed by the king
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in virtue of a tenure by petit serjeanty. (1)

Tenure in burgage is described by Glanvil, (s) and is expressly said by Little-

ton, (0 to be but tenure in socage: and it is where the king or other person is

lord of an ancient borough, in which the tenements are held by a rent certain. («)

It is indeed only a kind of town socage; as common socage, by which other

lands are holden, is usually of a rural nature. A borough, as we have formerly

seen, is usually distinguished from other towns by the nght of sending members

to parliament, and, where the right of election is by burgage tenure, that alone

is a proof of the antiquity of the borough. Tenure in burgage, therefore, or

burgage tenure, is where houses, or lands which were formerly the site of houses,

in an ancient borough, are held of some lord in common socage, by a certain

established rent And these seem to have withstood the shock of the Norman

encroachments principally on account of their insignificancy ; which made it

not worth while to compel them to an alteration of tenure; as an hundred of

them put together would scarce have amounted to a knight's fee. Besides, the

owners of them, being chiefly artificers and persons engaged in trade, could not

with any tolerable propriety be put on such a military establishment, as the

tenure in chivalry was. And here also we have again an instance, where a

tenure is confessedly in socage, and yet could not possibly ever have been held by

r*g'j I plough-service; since the "tenants must have been citizens or burghers,

I J the situation frequently a walled town, the tenement a single house;

so that none of the owners was probably master of a plough, or was able to use

one, if he had it. The free socage therefore, in which these tenements are held,

seems to be plainly a remnant of Saxon liberty; which may also account for the

great variety of customs, affecting many of these tenements so held in ancient

(p) < IW. (q) i 180. (r) Cap. 87. (I) Lib. 7, cap. 3. (*) 1162. («) Utl. * 162. 163.

(1) [The tenure of petit serjeanty is not named in 12 Car. II, but the statute is not without

its operation on this tenure. It being necessarily a tenure in capite, though in effect only so by

socage, Urery and primer seisin were of course incident to it on a descent, and these are

expressly taken away by the statute from every species of tenure in capite, as well socage in

innovations of the Norman conqueror is a fuct universally known. And
those who thus preserved their liberties were said to hold in free and co11u1101i
socage.
As therefore the grand criterion and distinguishing mark of this species of
tenure are the having its renders or services ascertained, it will include under it
all other methods ot holding free lands by certain and inyariable rents and
duties: and, in particular, petit serjeantg, tenure in hurgage, and gaiielkind.
We ma.v remember that, by the statute 12 Oar. II, grand serjeanty is not
itself totally abolished, but only the slavish apr_endages belonging to it: for the
honorary services (such as carrying the kings sword or banner, officiating as
his butler, carver, &c., at the coronation) are still reserved. Now petit sergeanty
bears a great resemblance to grand serjeanty; for as the one is a personal service,
so the other is a rent or render, both tending to some purpose relative to the
[*S2 ] king's *person. Petit serjeanty, as defined by Littleton, (p) consists in
holding lands of the king by the service of rendering to him annually
rome small implement of war, as a bow, a sword, a ltt.nce, an arrow, or the like.
This, he says, (q) is but socage in effect: for it is no personal service, but a
certain rent: and, we may add, it is clearly no predial service, or service of the
plough, but in all respects liberum et commune socagium: only being held of
the king, it is by way of eminence dignified with the title of parvum servt'.tium
reg-is, or petit serjeanty. And magna carta respected it in this light, when it
enacted, (r) that no wardship of the lands or body should be claimed by the king
in virtue of a tenure by petit serjesnty. (1)
'l'ennre in burgage is described by Glanvil, (s) and is expressly said by Littleton, (t) to be but tenure in socage: and it is where the king or other person is
lord of an ancient borough, in which the tenements are held by a rent certain. (u.)
It is indeed only a kind of town socage ; as common socage, by which other
lands are holden, is usually of a rural nature. A borou~h, as we have formerly
seen, is usually distinguished from other t.owns by the nght of sending members
to parliament, and, where the right of election is by burgage tenure, that alone
is a proof of the antiquity of the borough. Tenure in burgage, therefore, or
burga.ge tenure, is where houses, or lands which were formerly the site of houses.
in an ancient borough, are held of some lord in common socage, by a certain
established rent. And these seem to have withstood the shock of the Norman
encroachments principally on account of their insignificancy ; which made it
not worth while to compel them to an alteration of tenure; as an hundred of
them put together would scarce have amounted to a knight's fee. Besides, the
owners of them, being chiefly artificers and persons engaged in trade, could not
with any tolerable propriety be put on such a military establishment, as the
tenure m chivalry wa.s. And here also we have again an instance, where n.
tenure is confessedly in socage, and yet could not possibly ever have been held by
[ • 83 ] plough-service; sin~ the •tenants must have been citizens or burghers,
the situation frequently a walled town, the tenement a single house;
so that none of the owners was probably master of a plough, or was able to use
one, if he had it. The free socage therefore, in which these tenements are held,
seems to be plainly a remnant of Saxon liberty; which may also account for the
great variety of customs, affecting many of these tenements so held in ancient
(p)

1159.

(q) § 160.

(r)

Cap. '11.

(•)Lib. 7, cap. 3.

(fl f Ult.

(u) LIU. § 162, UIS.

capite as knight's service in capite. But we apprehend that in other respects petit nerjeanty is

the same as it was before, that it continues in denomination and still is a dignified branch of

the tenure by socage, from which it only differs in name on account of its reference to war.

Harg. and Bull. Co. Litt. 108, b. n. 1. The tenure by which the grants to the duke of Marl-

borongh and the duke of 'Wellington, for their great military services, are held, are of this kind,

each rendering a small flag, or ensign annually, which ie deposited in Windsor caatle.]

380

(1) [The tenure of pctit serjeanty is not named in 12 Car. II, but the 11tatute is not without
operation on thii: tenure. It being necessarily a tenure in capite, though in effect only so by
socagc, li1•cn1 and primer seisin were of course incident to 1t on a de1<Cent, and these are
cxpre1111ly taken away by the Rtatute from every specio11 of tennre tn capite, ILll well ~age '"
r-apife as knight's service in ca]lite. But we apprehend that in other re~pects petit ~erjeanty ill
the ~muc a.<1 it was before, that it continues in denomination and fltill iR a dignified branch of
the tenure hy socage. from which it only differs in name on account of its reference to war.
Harg. and Butl. Co. Litt. 108, b. n. 1. The tenure b.f. which the grants to the dnke of Marlborou~h and the duke of Wellingt.on, for tht1ir great military 11ervices, are held, are of this kind,
each rendering a small flag, or ensign annually, which ii! depoRited in Windsor C88tle.]
it~
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burgage: the principal and most remarkable of which is that called Borough

English, (2) so named in contradistinction as it were to the Norman customs,

and which is taken notice of by Glanvil, (w) and by Littleton; (x) viz.: that the

youngest son, and not the eldest, succeeds to the burgage tenement on the deatli

of his father. For which Littleton (y) gives this reason; because the younger

son, by reason of his tender age, is not so capable as the rest of his brethren to

help himself. Other authors (z) have indeed given a much stranger reason for

this custom, as if the lord of the fee had anciently a right of concubinage with

his tenant's wife on her wedding night; and that therefore the tenement

descended not to the eldest, but the youngest son, who was more certainly the

offspring of the tenant. But I cannot learn that ever this custom prevailed in

England, though it certainly did in Scotland (under the name of mercheta or

marcheta), till abolished by Malcolm III. (a) And perhaps a more rational

account than either may be fetched (though at a sufficient distance) from the

practice of the Tartars; among whom, according to father Duhalde, this custom

of descent to the youngest son also prevails. That nation is composed totally of

shepherds and herdsmen; and the elder sons, as soon as they are capable of

leading a pastorial life, migrate from their father with a certain allotment

of cattle; and go to seek a new habitation. The youngest son, therefore, who

continues latest with his father, is naturally the heir of his house, the rest being

already provided for. And thus we find that, among many other northern

nations, it was the custom for all the sons but one to migrate from the father,
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which one *became his heir. (6) So that possibly this custom, wherever r*oj-i

it prevails, may be the remnant of that pastoral state of our British and L -"

German ancestors, which Caesar and Tacitus describe. Other special customs

there are in different bin gage tenures; as that, in some, the wife shall be

endowed of all her husband's tenements, (c) and not of the third part, only, as

at the common law: and that, in others, a man might dispose of his tenements

by will, (d ) which, in general, was not permitted after the conquest till the reign

of Henry the Eighth; though in the Saxou times it was allowable, (e) A

pregnant proof that these liberties of socage tenure were fragments of Saxon

liberty. (3)

(u>) Ubi supra, (x) ! 165. (y) I 211. (z) 3 Mod. Pref.

(a) Seld. tit. of hon. 2.1, 17. Reg. Ifag. I. 4, c. 31.

{b\ Pater cuncto» fllios adultos a sepeUelial, prcettr unum quern haredem sui juris relinguebat. (Wallingh.

Upodigm. Neustr. c. I.)

(c) l'.iti. t 1IS& ''1} * 167. (e) Wright, 172.

(2) [This custom prevailed in the rnaaere of Ford, Cundover, 'Warn, and Loppington, in

Staffordshire; Bishop Hampton, Herefordshire; Havenham, Sussex; Maiden, Essex; Skid by.

East Hiding, Yorkshire; and some others.

In some places the custom is confined to the children of the deceased proprietor; in others,

in default of children, the youngest brother or other collateral male relation is preferred.

But the former, custom is the most usual. In some places the youngest female relations, lin-

eal and collateral, inherit on failure of heirs male.]

(3) [Custom, if properly pleaded and proved, seems to be conclusive in all questions as to

descent in borough English. In Chapman v. Chapman, March, 54, pi. 82, a custom respecting

certain lands in borough English, that, if there were an estate in fee in those lands, they should

descend to the younger son, according to the custom; but if the estate was in tail, they should

descend to the heir at common law; was held to be good. The customary descent may, in

particular places, be confined to estates in fee simple. Reeve v. Malster, w. Jones, 363; and

see Append, to Bobbins, on Gavelk. But it may extend to fee tail, or any other inheritance.

Lord Coke says: 1 Inst. 110, b; "if lands of the nature of borough English be letten to a

man and his heirs during the life of J.S, and the lessee dieth, the youngest son shall enjoy

it." And, in the same place, he tells us, " the customary descent may in particular places,

extend to collaterals;" but then it must be specially pleaded; for, the custom is in most

places confined to cases of lineal descent: Bay ley «. Stevens, Cro. Jac. 198; Reve ». Barrow,

Cro. Car. 410; and where lands would at common law descend to the issue of the eldest son.

jure reprcesentationis, they will, by the custom of borough English, descend upon the issue of

the youngest. Clements v. Scudamore, 2 Lord Raym. 1024; S. C., 1 P. "Wins. 63; and 1 Salk.

243. The coarse of descent of lands held in gavelkind, or hi borough English, cannot, be

altered by any limitation of the parties; for customs which go with the land, and direct the

course of inheritance, can be altered only by parliament. Co. Litt. 27, a; Jenkins Cent, page

220; S. P., Dyer, 179, b.; Roe v. Aistrop, 2 W. Blacks. 1229; 2 Hale'a Hist of Com. L. 103.
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The nature of the tenure in gavellcind affords us a still stronger argument. It
is universally known what struggles the Kentish men made to preserve their
ancient liberties, and with how much success those struggles were att.ended. ( 4)
And as it is principally here that we meet with the custom of ga"Velkind (though it
·was and is to be found in some other parts of the kingdom, (f) we may fairly conclude that this was a part of those liberties; agreeably to .Mr. Selden's opinion, that
gavelkind before the Norman conquest was the general custom of the realm. ( g)
'l'he distinguishing properties of this tenure are various; some of the principal are these: 1. 'fhe tenant is of age sufficient to aliene his estate by feofilnent
at the ago of fifteen. (h) 2. The estate does not escheat in case of an attainder
and execution for felony; their maxim being "the father to the bough, the son
to the plough.'' (i) 3. In most places he had a power of devising lands by will,
before the statute for that purpose was ma.de. (k) 4. The lands descend, not to
the eldest, youngest, or any one son only, but to all the sons together; (l) which
[ *Sr: ] wus indeed anciently the most usual •course of descent all over Eng" land, ( m) tl1ough in particular places particular customs prevailed. These,
among other properties, distinguished this tenure in a most remarkable manner:
and yet it is said to be only a species of a socage tenure, modified by the custom
of the country; the lands being holden by suit of court and fealty, which is a
service in it~ nature certain. (n) Wherefore bya charter of King John, (o) Hubert,
archbishop of Canterbury was authorized to exchange the gavelkind tenures
holden of the see of Canterbury, into tenures by knight's service; and by statute
31 Hen. VIII, c. 3, for disgaveling the lands of divers lords and gentlemen in
the countv of Kent, thev are directed to be descendible for the future like other
laruls which were never holden by service of socage. Now the immunities which
the tenants in gavelkind enjoyed were such, as we cannot conceive should be
conferred upon mere ploughmen and peasants; from all which I think it sufficiently clear that tenures in free socage are in general of a nobler original than
is assigned by Littleton, and after him by the bulk of our common lawyers.
Having thus distributed and distinguished the several species of tenure in free
socage, I proceed next to shew that this also partakes very stron$'lY of the feudal
nature. Which may probably arise from its ancient Saxon onginal; since (a&
was before obF!erved) (p) feuds were not unknown among the Saxons, though
they did not form a part of thP.ir military policy, nor were drawn out into such
arbitrary consequences as amon~ the Normans. It seems therefore reasonable to
imagine, that socage tenure ex1stt-d in much the same state before the conquest

The nature of the tenure in gavelkind affords us a still stronger argument. It

is universally known what struggles the Kentish men made to preserve their

ancient liberties, and with how much success those struggles were attended. (4)

And as it is principally here that we meet witli the custom of gavelkind (though it

was and is to be found in some other parts of the kingdom, (/) we may fairly con-

clude that this was a part of those liberties ; agreeably to Mr. Selden's opinion, that

gavelkind before the Norman conquest was the general custom of the realm,

The distinguishing properties of this tenure are various; some of the prin-

cipal are these : 1. The tenant is of age sufficient to aliene his estate by feoflment

at the age of fifteen. (//) 2. The estate docs not escheat in case of an attainder

and execution for felony; their maxim being "the father to the bough, the son

to the plough." (t) 3. In most places he had a power of devising lands by will,

before the statute for that purpose was made, (k) 4. The lands descend, not to

the eldest, youngest, or any one son only, but to all the sons together ; (0 which

was indeed anciently the most usual *course of descent all over Eng-

land, (in) though in particular places particular customs prevailed. These,

among other properties, distinguished this tenure in a most remarkable manner :

and yet it is said to be only a species of a socage tenure, modified by the custom

of tne country ; the lands being holden by suit of court and fealty, which is a

service in its nature certain. («) Wherefore by a charter of King John, (o) Hubert,

archbishop of Canterbury was authorized to exchange the gavelkind tenures

holden of the see of Canterbury, into tenures by knight's service ; and by statute
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31 Hen. VIII, c. 3, for disgaveling the lands of divers lords and gentlemen in

the county of Kent, they are directed to be descendible for the future like other

lands which were never holden by service of socage. Now the immunities which

the tenants in gavelkind enjoyed were such, as we cannot conceive should be

conferred upon mere ploughmen and peasants ; from all which I think it suffi-

ciently clear that tenures in free socage are in general of a nobler original than

is assigned by Littleton, and after him by the bulk of our common lawyers.

Having thus distributed and distinguished the several species of tenure in free

socage, I proceed next to shew that this also partakes very strongly of the feudal

nature. Which may probably arise from its ancient Saxon original ; since (as

was before observed) (p) feuds were not unknown among the Saxons, though

they did not form a part of their military policy, nor were drawn out into such

arbitrary consequences as among the Normans. It seems therefore reasonable to

imagine, that socage tenure existed in much the same state before the conquest

(/) Stat. 33 Hen. Vni, c. 29. Kltch. of courts, 200.

(ff) In toto rcgno, ante duds adventum, frequent it nKitirta fuit •. pont«a cateris adtmpta, *fd privatia quo-

rundam locorum cotimetudmllrus alibi postea regerminant ; Cantumis iolum integra et inviolata remaniit.

(fl Stal. 3':l Hen. vm, c. 29. Klteh. of courts, 200.
lg) Jn toto rr,gno, ante d"da ad~um, j'f'e.qvena d u.udta j'UU , po•lea COIUrU adstpla, atJtl prWJatU IJllOruildum locorum 001i;aududinlbtu alibi poateu regerminana 1 Cantkmia 1olum tnteora a ~ remanrit.

(AnaUcl. I. 2. c. 7.)

(A) Lamb. Peramb. 614. (<> Lamb 634. (£) F. X. B. 198. Cro. Car HI. (2) Litt f 210.

(..4naled. 1. 2. c. 7.)

(AJ J,amb. Peramb. 61•.
(m) Glall\·ll, l. 1, c. S.

(m) Glamil, 1. 7, c. 3. (n) Wright, Ml. (o) Spelm. cod. vet. leg. SBS. (p) Page «.

But there is a great difference between the descent of snch land and the purchase thereof: for

(i• Lamb 63t.
(n) Wright, 211.

·

(ll Lilt. t 210.

(k) F. N. B . 19:1. Cro. Car !Wll.

(o) Bpelm. cod. vet. kg. SM.

(p) Page '8.

if upon such purchase a remainder be limited to the right heir of the purchaser, or of any-

But thero h1 a great difference between the descent of !ltlch land and the purchase thereof: for
if upon l'Uch purchase a remainder be limited to the right heir of the purchaser, or of any
other penron, the heir at common law will take it, and not the customary heir. For, th.,
remainder, being newly created, could not be considered within the old custom. Counden t:.
Clerk, HolJ. :n. On the other hand, if a man seized in fee of landi! in gavel.kind, make a gift
in tail, or a fo8i<e to a Rtro.nger for life, with remainder to his OWD right heirs, it seems all WS
sons will take; for the remainder limited to the right heirs of the donor is not s new purchase, hut only a reversion, which will follow the customary course of descent. Co. Litt. 10
a; Chester v. Chester, 3 P. Wms. 63.
If the court of chancery i~ called upon to administer a will, creatinir an executory trust
respecting lands held in borough English, or gavelkind, and the c68tuis quc trust are to take 88
purchasers, the lauds will be directed to be conveyed not to heirs according to the cID1tom,
but to the heini at common law. Roberts v. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 609; Starkey v. Starkey1 7 Bae.
Ab. 179. And all gavelkind and borough EugliBh lands are now devit!able; but, 81Iloe tho
Statute of Fraud~, 29 Car. II, c, 3, devise of these, as of other lauds, must be in writing.]
(4) The modem hiRtoriaus, however. deny that the Kentish men made any such struggles
for their Ji1Jertiel1 a~ are here suppose<l, and they quote ancilmt authorities in support of their
pn,:ition. See Hume, Lingo.rd and Turner ; also Taylor's History of Gavelkind. These author.
1ties inter that it was the more ready submission of the Kentish people that secured them this
f1,yor, rather than their moro detennjneQ. resist&nce,

other person, the heir at common lav will take it, and not the customary heir. For, the

remainder, being newly created, could not be considered within the old custom. Counden c.

Clerk, Hob. 31. On the other hand, if a man seized in fee of lands in gavelkind, make a gift

in tail, or a lease to a stranger for life, with remainder to his own right heirs, it seems all Tiis

sons will take ; for the remainder limited to the right heirs of the donor is not a new pur-

chase, but only a reversion, which will follow the customary course of descent. Co. Litt 10

a; Chester «. Chester, 3 P. Wins. 63.

If the court of chancery is called upon to administer a will, creating an executory trust

respecting lands held in borough English, or gavelkind, and the eestuis que trust are to take aa

purchasers, the lands will be directed to be conveyed not to heirs according to the custom,

but to the heirs at common law. Roberts v. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 609; Starkey v. Starkey, 7 Bao.

Ab. 179. And all gavelkind and borough English lands are now devisable; but, Binoe the

Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, devise of these, as of other lauds, must be in writing.]

(4) The modern historians, however. deny that the Kentish men made any such struggles

for their liberties as are here supposed, and they quote ancient authorities in support of tneir

position. See Hume, Lingard and Turner ; also Taylor's History of Gavelkind. These author-

ities infer that it was the more ready submission of the Kentish people that secured them this

:1~2

favor, rather than the!; more determined resistance.
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as after ; that in Kent it was preserved with a high hand, as our histories inform

us it was ; and that the rest of the socage tenures dispersed through England

escaped the general fate of other property, partly out of favour and affection to

their particular owners, and partly from their own insignificancy : since I do

not apprehend the number of socage tenures soon after the conquest to have

been very considerable, nor their value by any means large ; till by successive

*charters of enfranchisement granted to the tenants, which are particularly r*ao -i

mentioned by Britton, (q) their number and value began to swell so far, "• -I

as to make a distinct, and justly envied, part of our English system of tenures.

However this may be, the tokens of their feudal original will evidently appear

from a short comparison of the incidents and consequences of socage tenure with

those of tenure in chivalry ; remarking their agreement or difference as we go along.

1. In the first place, then, both were held of superior lords ; one of the king,

either immediately, or as lord paramount, and (in the latter case) of a subject

or mesne lord between the king and his tenant. (5)

2. Both were subject to the feudal return, render, rent, or service of some sort

or other, which arose from a supposition of an original grant from the lord to the

tenant. In the military tenure, or more proper feud, this was from its nature

uncertain ; in socage, which was a feud of the improper kind, it was certain,

fixed, and determinate (though perhaps nothing more than bare fealty), and so

continues to this day.

3. Both were, from their constitution, universally subject (over and above all
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other renders) to the oath of fealty, or mutual bond of obligation between the

lord and tenant, (r) Which oath of fealty usually draws after it suit to the lord's

court. And this oath every lord, of whom tenements are holden at this day,

may and ought to call upon his tenants to take in his court baron ; if it be only

for the reason given by Littleton, (a) that if it be neglected, it will by long con-

tinuance of time grow out of memory (as doubtless it frequently hath done)

whether the land be holden of the lord or not ; and so he may lose his seignory,

and the profit which may accrue to him by escheats and other contingencies, (t)

4 The tenure in socage was subject, of common right, to aids for knighting

the son and marrying the eldest *daughter : (u) which were fixed by the r^8» -•

statute of Westm. 1, c. 36, at 20s. for every 201. per annum so held; as 1- J

in knight-service. These aids, as in tenure by chivalry, were originally mere

benevolences, though afterwards claimed as a matter of right ; but were all

abolished by the statute 12 Car. II.

5. Relief is due upon socage tenure, as well as upon tenure in chivalry : but

the manner of taking it is very different. The relief on a knighfs fee was 5Z.

or one-quarter of the supposed value of the land ; but a socage relief is one

year's rent or render, payable by the tenant to the lord, be the same either great

or small : (w) and therefore Bracton (a;) will not allow this to be properly a

relief, but qucedam prcestatio loco relevii in recognitionem domini. So too

the statute 28 Edw. I, a 1, declares, that a free sokeman shall give no relief, but

shall double his rent after the death of his ancestor, according to that which he

hath used to pay his lord, and shall not be grieved about measure. Beliefs in

knight-service were only payable, if the heir at the death of his ancestor was of

full age : but in socage they were due even though the heir was under age,

because the lord has no wardship over him. (y) Tne statute of Charles II re-

serves the reliefs incident to socage tenures : and, therefore, wherever lands in

fee-simple are holden by a rent, relief is still due of common right upon the

death of a tenant (z) (6)

fgj C. 66. (r) Lilt. 1 117, 181. (>) { 130.

(t) So maxime praitandum ett, ne dubium reddatur jiu domini et vcttutatc temporit obecuretur, (Corvin.

rafeod.l.Z, t.l.)

as a.ft.er; that in Kent it was preserved with a. high hand, as our histories inform
us it was; and that the rest of the socage tenures dispersed through England
escaped the general fate of other property, partly out of favour and affection to
their particular owners, and partly from their own insignificancy : since I do
not apprehend the number of socage tenures soon after the conquest to have
been very considerable, nor their value by any means large; till by successive
*charters of enfranchisement granted to the tenants, which are particularly [*S 6 ]
mentioned by Britton, (q) their number and ,·a.Jue began to swell so far,
as to make a. distinct, and justly envied, part of our English system of tenures.
However this may be, the tokens of their feudal original will evidently appear
from a short comparison of the incidents and consequences of soca.ge tenure with
those of tenure in chivalry; remarking their agreement or difference as we go along.
1. In the first place, then, both were held of superior lords; one of the king,
either immediately, or as lord paramount, and (in the latter case) of a subject
or mesne lord between the king and his tenant. (5)
2. Both were subject to the feudal return, render, rent, or service of some sort
or other, which arose from a supposition of an original grant from the lord to the
tenant. In the military tenure, or more proper feud, this was from its nature
uncertain; in socage, which was a feud of the improper kind, it was certain,
fixed, and determinate (though perhaps nothing more than bare fealty), and so
continues to this day.
3. Both were, from their constitution, universally subject (over and above all
other renders) to the oath of fealty, or mutual bond of obligation between the
lord and tenant. (r) Which oath of fealty usually draws after it suit to the lord's
court. And this oath every lord, of whom tenements a.re holden at this day,
may and ought to call upon his tenants to take in his court baron; if it be only
for the reason given by Littleton, (s) that if it be neglected, it will by long continua.nee of time grow out of memory (as doubtless it frequently hath done)
whether the land be holden of the lord or not; and so he may lose his sei~nory,
and the profit which may accrue to him by eschea.ts and other contingencies. (t)
4. The tenure in socage was subject, of common right, to aids for knighting
the son and marrying the eldest *daughter: (it) which were fixed by the [*S 7 ]
statute of Westm. 1, c. 36, at 20s. for every 20l. per annuni so held; as
in knight-service. These aids, as in tenure by chivalry, were originally mere
benevolences, though afterwards claimed BS a matter of right; but were a.11
abolished by the statute 12 Car. II.
5. Relief is due upon socage tenure, as well as upon tenure in chivalry: but
the manner of taking it is very different. The relief on a knight's fee was 51.
or one-quarter of the supposed value of the land ; but a socage relief is one
year's rent or render, payable by the tenant to the lord, be the same either great
or small: (w) and therefore Bracton (x) will not allow this to be properly a
relief, but quredam pr<Sstatio loco relevii in rOCfJgnitionem dQTJiini. So too
the statute 28 Edw. I, c. 1, declares, that a free sokema.n shall give no relief, but
shall double his rent after the death of his ancestor, according to that which he
hath used to pay his lord, and shall not be grieved about measure. Reliefs in
knight-service were only payable, if the heir at the death of his ancestor was of
full age: but in socage they were due even though the heir was under age,
because the lord has no wardship over him. (y) The statute of Charles II reserves the reliefs incident to socage tenures: and, therefore, wherever lands in
fee-simple are holden by a. rent, relief is still due of common right upon the
death of a. tenant. (z) (6)
(1) C. 66.
(r) LIU. 1117, 181.
(1) f 180.
( ) Eo ~ prmdartdum ut, ,.. dubium reddatur jUI dotMm et ttettutatdfllltporil obicuM1'r,

fuj Co. Litt. 91. fm) Litt. « 126. (x) L. 2, c. 37, 5 «. (y) Litt. } 127. (z) S Lev. 145.

(5) Justice Coleridge says, there is some mistake in introducing the word " one " into this

sentence, because both might be held of the king in chief, and both,of him as lord paramount.

(R) [ Where the tenure is by fealty only, of course there can of common right, be no relief.

being a year's rent, it cannot be calculated it no rent be payable. Co. Litt, 93, a. But by

ftuftod. l. 2, t. 1.)

(u) Co. Litt. 91.

-

··- -·---

(m) Litt. 1126.

- --

- · -- - --

(z) L. 2, c. :fl, I!!.

-

(1J) Litt. I 127.

(Corrin.

(111) S Lev. 14.5.

- · -- -- -

(5) Justice Coleridge says, there is some mistake in introducing the word "one" into this
sentence, because botb might be held of the king in chief, and both, of him &ll lord paramount.
(6) [Where the t.enure is by fo~lty only, of course there can of common right, be no relief,
bt'!ln,r a yea.r's rent, it cannot be c&lculated it no rent be payable. Co. I,itt, 93, a. Blli hy
;~R~
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6. Primer seisin was incident to the king's socage tenants in captte, as well

as to those by knight-service, (a) But tenancy in capite as well as primer

seisins are, among the other feudal burthens, entirely abolished by the statute.

7. Wardship is also incident to tenure in socage; but of a nature very dif-

ferent from that incident to knight-service. For if the inheritance descend to an

infant under fourteen, the wardship of him does not, nor ever did, belong to the

F*881 ^or(^ °^ *ne ^' Decau8e i*1 kl"s tenure, no military or "other personal

L J service being required, there was no occasion for the lord to take the

profits, in order to provide a proper substitute for his infant tenant; but his

nearest relation (to whom the inheritance cannot descend) shall be his guardian

in socage, and have the custody of his land and body till he arrives at the age

of fourteen. The guardian must be such a one, to whom the inheritance by no

possibility can descend; as was fully explained, together with the reasons for

it, in the former book of these commentaries, (b) At fourteen this wardship in

socage ceases; and the heir may oust the guardian and call him to account for

the rents and profits: (c) for at this age the law supposes him capable of choos-

ing a guardian for himself. It was m this particular, of wardship, as also in

that of marriage, and in the certainty of the render or service, that the socage

tenures had so much the advantage of the military ones. But as the wardship

ceased at fourteen, there was this disadvantage attending it; that young heirs,

being left at so tender an age to choose their own guardians till twenty-one,

might make an improvident choice. Therefore, when almost all the lands in
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the kingdom were turned into socage tenures, the same statute, 12 Car. II, c 24,

enacted, that it should be in the power of any father by will to appoint a guardian,

till his child should attain the age of twenty-one. And, if no such appointment

be made, the court of chancery will frequently interpose, and name a guardian,

to prevent an infant heir from improvidently exposing himself to ruin.

8. Marriage, or the valor maritagii, was not m socage tenure any perquisite

or advantage to the guardian, but rather the reverse. For, if the guardian

married his ward under the age of fourteen, he was bound to account to the ward

for the value of the marriage, even though he took nothing for it, unless he

married him to advantage, (a) For, the law in favor of infants is always jeal-

ous of guardians, and therefore, in this case it made them account, not only for

what they did, but also for what they might, receive on the infant's behalf;

F*891 *'e8* kv wine collusion the guardian should have received the value, and

"• J not brought it to account; but the statute having destroyed all values of

marriages, this doctrine of course hath ceased with them. At fourteen years of

age the ward might have disposed of himself in marriage, without any consent

of his guardian, till the late act for preventing clandestine marriages. These

doctrines of wardship and marriage in socage tenure were so diametrically oppo-

site to those in knight-service, and so entirely agree with those parts of King

Edward's laws, that were restored by Henry the First's charter, as might alone

convince us that socage was of a higher original than the Norman conquest

9. Fines for alienation were, I apprehend, due for lands holden of the king

in capite by socage tenure as well as in case of tenure by knight-service: for

the statutes that relate to this point, and Sir Edward Coke s comment on

them, (e) speak generally of all tenants in capite, without making any distinc-

tion : but now all fines for alienation are demolished by the statute of Charles

the Second.

10. Escheats are equally incident to tenure in socage, as they were to tenure

by knight-service; except only in gavelkind lands, which are (as is before men-

Co) Co. I.ill. 77. H'l Book I, page 461. (c) I.itt. «. 133. Co. I.ilt. 89.

(•/) Lilt B. 123. «!) 1 i.isr. 48. STnSt. 65, 66, 67.

custom or express reservation there may be a relief wholly unconnected with the yearly rent,

and this, it is presumed, may be payable when there is no yearly rent. In Hargrave and But-

ler's Co. Litt. is a learned note by the former, p. 93, a. n. 2, pointing ont several differences

between socage relief proper and improper, or payable only by special custom or express reser-

6. Primer seisin was incident to the king's socage tena.nts in capite, as well
to those by knight-service. (a) But tenancv in capite as well as primer
seisins are, among the other feudal burthens, entfrely abolished by the st.atute.
7. Wardship is also incident to tenure in socage; but of a nature very different from that incident to knight-service. For if the inheritance descend to an
infant under fourteen, the wardship of him does not, nor ever did, belong to the
[*88 ] lord of the fee; because in this tenure, no militarv or *other personal
service being required, there was no occasion for the lord to take the
profits, in order to provide a proper substitute for his infant tenant; but his
nearest relation (to whom the inheritance cannot descend) shall be his guardian
in socage, and have the custody of his land and body till he arrives at the age
of fourt.een. The guardian must be such a one, to whom the inheritance by no
possibility can descend; as was fully explained, together with the reasons for
it, in the former book of these commentaries. (b) At fourt.een this wardship in
socage ceases; and the heir may oust the guardian and call him to account for
the rents and profits: (c) for at this as-e the law supposes him capable of choosing a guardian for himself. It was m this particular, of wardship, as also in
that of marriage, and in the certainty of the render or service, that the s~e
tenures had so much the advantage of the military ones. But as the wardship
ceased at fourteen, there wa.s this disadvantage attending it; that young heirs,
being left at so tender an age to choose their own guardians till twenty-one,
might make an improvident choioe. Therefore, when almost all the lands in
the kingdom were turned into 1mcage tenures, the same statute, 12 Ca.r. II, c 24,
enacted, that it should be in the power of any father by will to appoint a guardian,
till his child should attain the age of twenty-one. And, if no such appointment
be made, the court of chancery will frequently interpose, and name a guardian,
to prevent an infant heir from improvidently exposing himself to ruin.
8. Marriage, or the valor maritagii, was not in socage tenure a.ny perquisit.e
or advantage to the guardian, but rather the reverse. For, if the guardian
married his ward under the age of fourteen, he was bound to account to the ward
for the value of the marriage, even though he took nothing for it, unless he
married him to advantage. (d) For, the law in favor of infant.a is always jealous of guardians, and tlierefore, in this case it made them account, not only for
what they <lid, but also for what they might, receiTe on the infant's behalf;
[ • 89 ] *lest by some collusion the guardian should have received the value, and
not brought it to account; but the statute having destroyed all values of
marriages, this doctrine of course ha.th ceased with them. At fourteen years of
age the ward might have disposed of himself in marriage, without any consent
of his guardian, till the late a.ct for preventing clandestine marring-es. These
doctrines of wardship and marriage in ~e tenure were so diametncally opposite to those in knight-service, and so entrrely agree with those parts of King
Edward's laws, that were restored by Henry the First's charter, as might alone
convince us that soca~e was of a higher original than the Norman conquest.
9. Fines for alienation were, I apprehend, due for lands holden of the king
in capite by socage tenure as well as in case of tenure by kni?ht-sen·ice: for
the statutes that relate to this point, and Sir Edward Cokes comment on
them, (e) speak genera.Uy of all tenants in capite, without making any distinction : but now all fines for alienation are demolished by the statute of Charles
the Second.
10. Eschea.ts are equally incident to tenure in socage, as they were to tenure
by knight-service; except only in gavelkind lands, which are (a.sis before menRB

(b) Book I, page 461.
(e) Litt.
(e) l ln11t. 48. ~Tusi. 65, 86, OT.

la) Co. Litt. 77.
(II) Litt e. J23.

1.

123. Co. Litt. 89.
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tioned) subject to no escheats for felony, though they are to escheats for want of

heirs. (/)

Thus much for the two grand species of tenure, under which almost all the

free lands of the kingdom were liolden till the restoration in 1660, when the for-

mer was abolished and sunk into the latter; so that lands of both sorts are now

holden by one universal tenure of free and common socage.

The other grand division of tenure, mentioned by feracton, as cited in the

preceding chapter, is that of villenage, as contradistinguished from liberum

tenementum, or frank tenure. And this (we may remember) he subdivided into

two classes, pure and privileged villenage: from whence have arisen two other

species of our modern tenures,

*III. From the tenure of pure villenage have sprung our present copy- r*nn -\

hold tenures, or tenure by copy of court roll at the will of the lord: in "• '

order to obtain a clear idea of which, it will be previously necessary to take a short

view of the original and nature of manors.

Manors are in substance as ancient as the Saxon constitution, though perhaps

differing a little, in some immaterial circumstances, from those that exist at this

day; (g) just as we observed of feuds, that they were partly known to our

ancestors, even before the Norman, conquest. A manor, manerium, a man-

endo, (7) because the usual residence of the owner seems to have been a district

of ground, held by lords or great personages; who kept in their own hands so

much land as was necessary for the use of their families, which were called
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terrce dominicales or demesne lands; being occupied by the lord, or dominus

manerii, and his servants. The other, or tenemental, lands they distributed

among their tenants; which from the different modes of tenure were dis-

tinguished by two different names. First, book-land, or charter-land, which

was held by deed under certain rents and free services, and in effect differed

nothing from the free-socage lands; (A) and from hence have arisen most of the

freehold tenants who hold of particular manors, and owe suit and service to the

same. The other species was called folk-land, which was held by no assurance

in writing, but distributed among the common folk or people at the pleasure of

the lord, and resumed at his discretion; being indeed land held in villenage,

which we shall presently describe more at large. (8) The residue of the manor,

being uncultivated, was termed the lord's waste, and served for public roads,

and for common or pasture to the lord and his tenants. Manors were formerly

called baronies, as they are still lordships: and each lord or baron was empow-

ered to hold a domestic court, called the court-baron, for redressing misde-

meanors and nuisances within the manor; and for settling disputes of property

among the tenants. This court is an inseparable ingredient of every manor;

and if the number *of suitors should so fail as not to leave sufficient r^-, -,

to make a jury or homage, that is, two tenants at least, the manor itself L ai J

is lost (9)

(/) Wright, 210. (g) Co. Cop. 8. 2 410. (h) Co. Cop. s. 8.

(7) [Although a mansion house is not now a necessary part of a manor, yet such an

appendage appears formerly to have been always included in the notion of a manor, as the place

tioned) subject to no escheata for felony, though they are to escheats for we.nt of
heirs. (f)
'rhus much for the two grand species of tenure, under which almost all the
free ]ands of the kingdom were holden till the restoration in 1660, when the former we.s abolished and sunk into the latter; so that ]ands of both sorts are now
holden by one universal tenure of free and common socage.
The other grand division of tenure, mentioned bv Bra.cton, as cited in the
preceding chap~r, is that of villenage, as contra.distinguished from liberum
ten6mentum, or frank tenure. And this (we ma.y remember) he subdivided into
two classes, pure and privileged villenage: from whence have a.risen two other
species of our modern tenures,
*III. From the tenure of pure villena.ge have sprung our present copv- ["'90 ]
hold tenures, or tenure by copy of court roll at the will of the lord: in
order to obtain a clear idea of which, it will be previowtly necessary to take a short
view of the original and nature of manors.
Manors a.re in substance as ancient as the Saxon constitution, though perhaps
differing a little, in some immaterial circumstances, from those that exist at this
day; (g) just as we observed of feuds, that they were partly known to our
ancestors, even before the Norman conquest. A ma.nor, numerium, a manendo, (7) because the usual residence of the owner seems to have been a. district
of ground, held by lords or great personages; who kept in their own hands so
much le.nd as was necessary for the use of their families, which were called
terrm dominicales or demesne lands; being occupied by the lord, or dom£nU8
nuinerii, and his servants. The other, or t8M'mental, lands they distributed
amon~ their t.enants; which from the different modes of t.enure were distinguished by two different names. First, boolc-land, or charter-land, which
was held by deed under certain rents and free services, and in effect differed
notrung from the free-soca.ge lands; (Ii) and from hence have arisen most of the
freehold tenants who hold of particu.la.r manors, and owe suit and service to the
same. 'rhe other species was called.folk-land, which was held by no ussu.rance
in writing, but distributed among the common folk or people at the pleasure of
the lord, and resumed at his discretion ; being indeed laud held in villenage,
which we shall presently describe more at large. (8) The residue of the manor,
being uncultivated, was termed the lord's waste, and served for public roads,
and for common or pasture to the lord and his tenants. Manors were formerly
cu.Bed baronies, as they are still lordships: and each lord or baron was empowered to hold a domestic court, called the court-baron, for redressing misdemeanors a.nd nuisances within the ma.nor; and for settling disputes of property
among the tenants. This court is an inseparable ingredient of every manor;
and if the number *of suitors should so fail tLS not to leave sufficient [*91 ]
to make a jury or homage, that is, two tenants at least, the ma.nor itself
is lost. (9)

at which the tenants were to render and perform their services and duties. See 5 Man. and R.

(f) Wright, 210.

154, n.]

(g) Co.

Cop.

8.

2 & 10.

(h) Co. Cop. 8. 3.

(8) [The lands here designated folk lands are no other than the modern copyholds, and seem

rather to form part of the demesne lands of the lord of the manor."]

(9) [In the case of Glover v. Lane, 3 T. R. 447, Lord Kenyon said that to constitute a manor it

wan necessary, not only that there should be two freeholders within the manor, but two freeholders

holding of the manor subject to escheats.

The reason assigned for this number is, that freemen could only be tried by their peers, and if

there be one tenant only, he has no peer or jud^e. But this reason would evince the necessity

of there being more than two, for if one were plaintiff and the other defendant, no court at all

could be holden to try the cause. In Brooke's Abr. tit. cause a remover plea pi. 35, it is said

that the parol was removed from the court baron because there were only four suitors, and he

niakes a quere of the smallest competent number. The reference is to the Register, f. 11, where

such a precedent is given in a mart d. anncestor.']
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(7) [.Although a mansion house is not now a neces:;ary part of a manor, yet such an
appendage appears formerly to hat'e been always included in the notion of a manor, as the place
at whlch the tenants were to render and perform their services and duties. See 5 Man. and R.
154, n.]
(8) [The lands here designated fo7Jc lands Me no other than the modem copyholds, and seem
rather to form part of the demesne lauds of the lord of the wanor. l
(9) [In the ca~ of Glover v. Lane, 3 T. R. 447, Lord Kenyon said that to constitute a manor it
WM neces.->ary, not only that there should be two freeholdeI'!l within the manor, but two freeholders
holding of the manor subject to eecheats.
The reason assigned for this number i11, that freemen could only be tried by their peers, and if
there be one tenant only, he ha..~ no peer or judge. But this rellllOn would evince the necessity
of there being more than two, fur if one were plaintiff and the other defendant, no court at all
could be holden to try the cause. In Brooko'11 Abr. tit. cause a remoi·er plea pl. 35, it is said
that the parol W8fl removed from the court baron because there were only four suitors, and he
makes a quere of the smallest competent munber. The reforen~e js to the Register, f. 11, whe~
such a precedent is given in a mo-rt d. annceator.]
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In the early times of our legal constitution, the king's greater barons, who

had a large extent of territory held under the crown, granted out frequently

smaller manors to inferior persons to be holden of themselves: which do there-

fore now continue to be held under a superior lord, who is called in such cases

the lord paramount over all these manors; and his seignory is frequently termed

an honour, not a manor, especially if it hath belonged to an ancient feudal

baron, or hath been at any time m the hands of the crown. In imitation

whereof these inferior lords began to carve out and grant to others still more

minute estates, to be held as of themselves, and were so proceeding downwards

in infinitum: till the superior lords observed, that by this method of subinfeuda-

tion they lost all their feudal profits of wardships, marriages, and escheats,

which fell into the hands of these mesne or middle lords, who were the immediate

superiors of the terre-tenant, or him who occupied the land; and also that the

mesne lords themselves were so impoverished thereby, that they were disabled

from performing their services to their own superiors. This occasioned, first,

that provision m the thirty-second chapter of magna carta, 9 Hen. Ill, (which

is not to be found in the first charter granted by that prince, nor in the great

charter of King John,) (i) that no man should either give or sell his land, with-

out reserving sufficient to answer the demand of his lord; and afterwards the

statute of Westm. 3, or quid emptores, 18 Edw. I, c. 1, which directs, that, upon

all sales or feoffments of land, the feoffee shall hold the same, not of his imme-

diate feoffor, but of the chief lord of the fee, of whom such feoffor himself held
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it. But these provisions, not extending to the king's own tenants in capite, the

like law concerning them is declared by the statutes of prerogative, regis, 17

Edw. II, c. 6, and of 34 Edw. Ill, c. 15, by which last all subinfeudations, pre-

T*921 vi°us1° tne reign of King *Edward I, were confirmed: but all subsequent

•- -1 to that period were left open to the king's prerogative. And from hence

it is clear, that all manors existing at this day nmst have existed as early as King

Edward the First: for it is essential to a manor, that there be tenants who hold

of the lord ; and by the operation of these statutes, no tenant in capite since the

accession of that prince, and no tenant of a common lord since the statute of quia

emptores, could create any new tenants to hold of himself. (10)

Now with regard to the folk-land, or estates held in villenage, this was a

species of tenure neither strictly feudal, Norman, or Saxon; but mixed and

compounded of them all: (k) and which also, on account of the heriots that

usually attend it, may seem to have somewhat Danish in its composition.

Under the Saxon government there were, as Sir William Temple speaks, (I) a

sort of people in a condition of downright servitude, used and employed in the

most servile works, and belonging, both they, their children and effects, to the

lord of the soil, like the rest of the cattle or stock upon it. These seem to have

been those who held what was called the folk-land, from which they were

removable at the lord's pleasure. On the arrival of the Normans here, it seems

not improbable, that they who were strangers to any other than a feudal state

mig^ht give some sparks of enfranchisement to such wretched persons as fell to

their share, by admitting them, as well as others, to the oath of fealty; which

conferred a right of protection, and raised the tenant to a kind of estate superior

to downright slavery, but inferior to every other condition, (m) This they called

villenage, and the tenants villeins, either from the word vilis, or else, as Sir

Edward Coke tells us, (n) a villa,; because they lived chiefly in villages, and

were employed in rustic works of the most sordid kind: resembling the Spartan

helotes, to whom alone the culture of the lands was consigned; their rugged

masters, like our northern ancestors, esteeming war the only honourable employ-

ment of mankind.

(i) See the Oxford editions of the charters. (k) Wright, 215.

(I) Introd. Hist. Engl. B9. («tj Wright. 217. (n) 1 Inst

Inst. 116.

(10) [See, however, 5 Man. and Ry. 156, n, and a case arising out of certain patents granted

In the early times of our legal constitution, the king's greater barons, who
had a large extent of territory held under the crown, granted out frequently
smaller manors to inferior persons to be holden of themselves: which do therefore now continue to be held under a superior lord, who is called in such cases
the lord paramount over all these manors; and his seignory is frequentlv termed
an honour, not a. manor, especially if it hath belonged to an ancient feudal
baron, or hath been at any time m the hands of the crown. In imitation
whereof these inferior lords began to carve out and grant to others still more
minute estates, to be held as of themselves, and were so proceeding downwards
in infinitum: till the superior lords observed, that by this method of subinfeudation they lost all their feudal profits of wardships, marriages, and esche.at.s,
which fell into the hands of these mesne or middle lords, who were the immediate
superiors of the terre-tenant, or him who occupied the land ; and also that the
mesne lords themselves were so impoverished thereby, tl111t they were disabled
from performin~ their services to their own superiors. This occasioned, first,
that provision m the thirty-second chapter of magna carta, 9 Hen. III, (which
is not to be found in the first charter granted bv that prince, nor in the great
chart.er of King John,) (i) that no man should either give or sell his land, without reserving sufficient to answer the demand of his lord ; and afterwards the
statute of Westm. 3, or quia emptores, 18 Edw. I, c. 1, which directs, that, upon
all sales or feoffments of land, the feoffee shall hold the same, not of his immediate feoffor, but of the chief lord of the fee, of whom such feoffor himself held
it. But these provisions, not extending to the king's own tenants in capite, the
like law concerning them is declared by the statutes of prerogativa regi.8, 17
Edw. II, c. 6, and of 34 Edw. III, c. 15, by which last all subinfeudations, pre[ .92] vious to the reign of King *Edward I, were confirmed: but all subsequent
to that period were left open t.o the king's prerogative. And from hence
it is clear, that all manors existing at this day must have existed as early as King
Edward the First: for it is essential to a manor, that there be tenants who hold
of the lord; and by the operation of these statutes, no tenant in capite since the
accession of that prince, and no tenant of a. common lord since the statute of quia
ernptores, could create any new tenants to hold of himself. (10)
Now with regard to the folk-land, or estates held in villenage, this was a
species of tenure neither strictlv feudal, Norman, or Saxon; but mixed and
compounded of them a.II: (k) and which also, on account of the heriots that
usually attend it, may seem to have somewhat Danish in its composition.
Under the Saxon government thore were, as Sir William Temple speaks, (l) a
sort of people in a condition of downright servitude, used and employed in the
most eervile works, and belonging, both they, their children and effects, to the
lord of the soil, like the rest of the cattle or stock upon it. These seem to have
been those who held what was called the folk-land, from which they were
removable at the lord's pleasure. On the arrival of the Normans here, it seems
not improbable, that they who were strangers to any other than a feudal state
might give some sparks of enfranchisement to such wretched persons as fell to
their share, by admitting them, as well as others, to the oath of fealty; which
conferred a right of protection, and raised the tenant to a kind of estate superior
t-0 downright slavery, but inferior to every other condition. (m.) This they called
villena~e, and the tenants villeins, either from the word vilis, or else, as Sir
Edward Coke tells us, (n) a villa; because they lived chiefly in villages, and
were employed in rustic works of the most sordid kind: resembling the Spartan
ltelotes, to whom alone the culture of the lands was consigned; their rugged
masters, like our northern ancestors, esteeming war the only honourable employment of mankind.

by Charles II, of lands in Ireland, giving rights to create manors notwithstanding Qtiin Pmptorfs.

Delacherois v. Delaeherois, 11 H. £. 62.]

(i)
(l)

See the Oxford edltlona of the charters.
(1:) Wright. 215.
Introd. Hist. Engl. 69.
(,,,) Wright. 217.
(n) 1 lnsl 118.

3SO

(10) [See, however, 5 Man. and Ry. 156, n, and a case arising out of certain patents granted
br Charle'" II, of lands in Irellllld, giving rights to create manors notwithstanding 9wili $mptorea.
Delucheroi8 v. Delacherois, 11 H. L~ 62.]
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*These villeins, belonging principally to lords of manors, were either r*qo-i

villeins regardant, that is, annexed to the manor or land: or else they •• J

were in gross, or at large, that is, annexed to the person of the lord and trans-

ferable by deed from one owner to another, (o) They could not leave their lord

without his pi-mission; but if they ran away, or were purloined from him,

might be claimed and recovered by action, like beasts or other chattels. They

held indeed small portions of land by way of sustaining themselves and families;

but it was at the mere will of the lord, who might dispossess them whenever he

pleased; and it was upon villein services, that is, to carry out dung, to hedge

and ditch the lord's demesnes, and any other the meanest offices: (p) and their

services were not only base, but uncertain both as to their time and quantity, (q)

A villein, in short, was in much the same state with us, as Lord Molesworth (r)

describes to be that of the boors in Denmark, and which Stiernhook (s) attributes

also to the traals or slaves in Sweden; which confirms the probability of their

being in some degree monuments of the Danish tyranny. A villein could

acquire no property either in lands or goods: but, if he purchased either, the

lord might enter upon them, oust the villein, and seize them to his own use,

unless he contrived to dispose of them again before the lord had seized them;

for the lord had then lost his opportunity, (t) (11)

In many places also a fine was payable to the lord, if the villein presumed to

marry his daughter to any one without leave from the lord, (u) and, by the com-

mon law, the lord might also bring an action against the husband for damages
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in thus purloining his property, (to) For the children of villeins were also in the

same state of bondage with their *parents; whence they were called in r*nA-]

Latin, nativi, which gave rise to the female appellation of a villein, who L J

was called a wife, (x) In case of a marriage between a freeman and a neife, or

a villein and a freewoman, the issue followed the condition of the father, being

free if he was free, and villein if he was villein; contrary to the maxim of the

civil law, fh&tpartus sequiter ventrem. But no bastard could be born a villein,

because of another maxim in our law, he is nullius filius : and as he can gain

nothing by inheritance, it were hard that he should lose his natural freedom by

it (y) The law however protected the persons of villeins, as the king's subjects,

against atrocious injuries of the lord: for he might not kill or maim his vil-

lein : (2) though he might beat him with impunity; since the villein had no

action or remedy at law against his lord, but in case of the murder of his ances-

tor, or the maim of his own person. (12) Neifes indeed had also an appeal of

rape in case the lord violated them by force, (a)

villeins might be enfranchised by manumission, which is either express or

implied: express, as where a man granted to the villein a deed of manumis-

sion : (b) implied, as where a man bound himself in a bond to his villein for a

sum of money, granted him an annuity by deed, or gave him an estate in fee,

for life or years; (c) for this was dealing with his villein on the footing of a free-

man ; it was in some of the instances giving him an action against his lord and

in others vesting in him an ownership entirely inconsistent with his former state

of bondage. So also if the lord brought an action against his villein, this

enfranchised him; (d) for as the lord might have a. short remedy against his

(o) I-ilt. 8. 181. (p) Ibid. 8. 127.

(7) TUe qwi tenet in vttlenagio faciet quicquid eiprceceptumfuerii, two tdre debet tero quidfacere debet in

crastino, etsemper tenebitur ad incerta. CBracton, I. 4, tr . I. c. 28.)

(r) C. 8. («) Dejure Sueonum, I. 2, c. 4. (<) LiU. B. 177. («) Co. LHt. 140.

. •r_i;hese villeins, belonging principally to lords of manors, were either [•93]
v1llems regardant, that is, annexed to the manor or land: or else they
were fo gross, or at large, that is, annexed to the person of the lord and transferable by deed from one owner to another. (o) They could not leave their lord
without his permission ; but if they ran away, or were purloined from him,
might be claimed and recovered by action, like beasts or other chattels. They
held indeed small portions of land by way of sustaining themselves and families;
but it was at the mere will of the lord, who might dispossess them whenever he
pleased; and it was upon villein services, that is, to carry out dung, to hedge
and ditch the lord's demesnes, and any other the meanest offices : ( p) and their
services were not only base, but uncertain both as to their time and quantity. (q)
A villein, in short, was in much the same state with us, as Lord :Molesworth (r)
describes to be that of the boors in Denmark, and which Stiernhook (s) attributes
also to the traal.~ or slaves in Sweden ; which confirms the probability of their
bein~ in some degree monuments of the Danish tyranny. A villein could
acqmre no property either in lands or goods: but, if he purchased either, the
lord might enter upon them, oust the villein, and seize them to his own use,
unless he contrived to dispose of them again before the lord had seized them;
for the lord had then lost his opportunity. (t) (11)
In many places also a fine was payable to the lord, if the villein presumed to
marry bis daughter to any one without leave from the lord, (u) and, by the common law, the lord might also bring an action against the husband for damages
in thus purloining his property. (w) For the children of villeins were also in the
same state of bondage with their "'parents; whence they were called in ["' 94 ]
Latin, nativi, which gave rise to the female appellation of a villein, who
was called a neife. (x) In case of a marriage between a freeman and a neife, or
a villein and a freewoman, the issue followed the condition of the father, being
free if he was free, and villein if he was villein; contrnrv to the maxim of the
ch;l law, that partus seq_ititer i•entrem. But no bastard could be born a villein,
because of another maxim in our law, he is nullius _filius : and as he can gain
nothing by inheritance, it were hard that he should lose his natural freedom by
it. (y) The law however protected the persons of villeins, as the king's subjects,
agamst atrocious injuries of the lord: for he might not kill or maim bis villein: (z) though he might beat him with impunity; since the villein had no
action or remedy at law against his lord, but in case of the murder of his ancestor, or the maim of his own person. (12) Neifes indeed had also an appeal of
rape in case the lord violated them by force. (<t)
Villeins might be enfranchised by manumission, which is either express or
implied: express, as where a man granted to the villein a deed of manumission: {b} implied, as where a man bound himself in a bond to his villein for a
sum of money, granted him an annuity by deed, or gave him an estate in fee,
for life or years; (c) for this was dealin&" with his villein on the footing of a freeman; it was in some of the instances giving him an action ag-ainst his lord and
in others vesting in him an ownership entirely inconsistent with his former state
of bondage. So also if the lord brought an action against his villein, this
enfranchised him; (d) for as the lord might have ~ short remedy against his

<>', Lilt. 8. 202. (z) Ibid. a. 187. (y) Ibid. s. 187, 188. (.:) Ibid. B. 189, 194.

(a) Ibid. 8.190. (b) Ibid. a. 204. (c) S. 204, S, 6. (d) Lilt, s.'208.

(11) [Villeins were not protected by magna charta; nullus liber homo capiatur vel impriso-

netur, &c., was cautiously expressed to exclude the poor villein; for, as Lord Coke tells us, the lord

might beat his villein, and if it be without cause, he cannot have any remedy.

(ol Litt.

8.

181.

(Pl l 'tM. e. 127.

(q) Tu. qtri tend In ~gio faclet qtdcquld el praicqitvm ~. ~ aclre clebd •tro <Jf,1"1 /~ clebd W.
craaHno, d 1emper tenel>Uvr ad incerta. CBracton, l. t, Ir . JLc. 28.1
(rJ C. 8.
(•) De Jure Stiwnum, l. 2, c. 4.
(t) itt. " · 177.
(u) Co. Litt. HO.
(to1 Litt. s. ten.
(a:) Ibid. s. 187.
(JI) I bid. s. lti7, 1!18.
(z) Ibid. 8. 189, 19-l.
(a) I bid. 8. JOO.
(b) Jbi(l. 8. ~.
(C) l:i. 2'M, 6, 6.
(d) Litt. s."208.

What a degraded condition for a being endued with reason!]

(12) [In case of mayhem, he had no remedy by action or appeal, for the damages recovered

in either case might immediately have been seized by the lord, and so the proceeding would have

been illusory, But the lord was subject to an indictment at the king's suit. Litt. s. 194.

387

(11) [Villeins were not protected by rnagna charta; tmllus Uber homo capiatur vtil impriao-

netur &c., was cautiously exl?rcsscd to exclude the poor "rillein; for, as Lord Coke tells us, the lord
might beat his villein, and if it be without caut!e, he cannot have any remedy.
Wbat a degraded condition for a being endued with relll\On !]
(12) [In case of mayhem, he had no remedy by action or appeal, for the dam~ges recovered
in either case midit immediately ha,·e been sei~ed. by the lord, an~ so the yroce~g would have
been illusory, Jfot tlle lorll Wl}S subject to an mdictment at the king's suit. Litt. s. 194.
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villein, by seizing his goods (which was more than equivalent to any damages

he could recover,) the law, which is always ready to catch at any thing in favour

of liberty, presumed that by bringing this action he meant to set his villein on

f*q5i the same footing with himself, and therefore held it an implied *manu-

"• -" mission. But, in case the lord indicted him for felony, it was otherwise;

for the lord could not inflict a capital punishment on his vilfein, without calling

in the assistance of the law.

Villeins, by these and many other means, in process of time gained consider-

able grounds on their lord; and in particular strengthened the tenure of their

estates to that degree, that they came to have in them an interest in many places

full as good, in others better than their lords. (13) For the good-nature and

benevolence of many lords of manors having, time out of mind, permitted their

villeins and their children to enjoy their possessions without interruption, in a

regular course of descent, the common law, of which custom is the life, now gave

them title to prescribe against their lords; and, on performance of the same

services, to hold their lands, in spite of any determination of the lord's will. For

though in general they are still said to hold their estates at the will of the lord,

yet it is such a will as is agreeable to the custom of the manor; which customs

are preserved and evidenced by the rolls of the several courts baron in which

they are entered, or kept on foot by the constant immemorial usage of the several

manors in which the lands lie. And, as such tenants had nothing to shew for

their estates but these customs, and admissions in pursuance of them, entered
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on those rolls, or the copies of such entries witnessed by the steward, they now

began to be called tenants by copy of court-roll, and their tenure itself a copy-

hold, (e) (14)

Thus copyhold tenures, as Sir Edward Coke observes, (/) although very meanly

descended, yet come of an ancient house; for, from what has been premised it

appears, that copyholders are in truth no other but villeins, who by a long

series of immemoral encroachments on the lord, have at last established a cus-

tomary right to those estates, which before were held absolutely at the lord's

l"*961 w Which *affords a very substantial reason for the great variety of

L J customs that prevail in different manors with regard both to the descent

of the estates, and the privileges belonging to the tenants. And these encroach-

ments grew to be so universal, that when tenure in villenage was virtuallv

abolished (though copyholds were reserved) by the statute of Charles II, there

was hardly a pure villein left in the nation. For Sir Thomas Smith (g) testifiess

that in all his time (and he was secretary to Edward VI) he never knew any

villein in gross throughout the realm; and the few villeins regardant that were

then remaining, were such only as had belonged to bishops, monasteries, or other

ecclesiastical corporations, in the preceding times of popery. For he tells us,

that " holy fathers, monks, and frairs, had m their confessions, and especially in

their extreme and deadly sickness, convinced the laity how dangerous a practice

it was, for one Christian man to hold another in bondage: so that temporal

men, by little and little, by reason of that terror in their consciences, were glad

to manumit all their villeins. But the said holy fathers, with the abbots and

priors, did not in like sort by theirs: for they also had a scruple in conscience

to impoverish and despoil the church so much, as to manumit such as were bond

to their churches, or to the manors which the church had gotten; and so kept

their villeins still." By these several means the generality of villeins in the

kingdom have long ago sprouted up into copyholders; their persons being

enfranchised by manumission or long acquiescence; but their estates, in strict-

ness, remaining subject to the same servile conditions and forfeitures as before;

(«) F. N. B. 12. (/) Cop. 8. 32. (g) Commonwealth, b. 8, c. 10.

(13) As to the I'm:11 disappearance of villenage in England, see Cooler, Constitutional Lim-

itations, 295-m

(14) [See this subject very ingeniously handled in Hallam's Middle Ages, o. viii, part 3,J
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villein, by seizing his goods (which was more than equivalent to any damages
he could recover,) the law, which is always ready to catch at any thing in favour
of liberty, presumed that by bringing this action he meant to set his villein on
[ • 95 ] the 8ame footin~ with himself, and therefore held it an implied *manumission. But, m case the lord indicted him for felony, it was othenvise;
for the lord could not inflict a capital punishment on his villein, without calling
in the assistance of the law.
Villeins, by these and many other means, in process of time gained considerable grounds on their lord; and in particular strengthened the tenure of their
estates to that degree, that they came to have in them an interest in many places
full as good, in others better thu.n their lords. (13) For the good-nature and
benevolence of many lords of manors having, time out of mind, permitt.ed their
Yilleins and their children to enjoy their possessions without interruption, in a
regular course of descent, the common law, of which custom is the life, now gave
them title to prescribe against their lords; and, on performance of the sume
senices, to hold their lands, in svite of any determination of the lord's will. For
though in general they are still said to hold their estates at the will of the lord,
yet it is such a will as is agreeable to the custom of the manor; which cust.oms
are presened and evidenced by the rolls of the several courts baron in which
they are entered, or kept on foot by the constant immemorial usn~e of the several
manors in which the lands lie. And, as such tenants had nothmg to shew for
their estates but these customs, and admissions in pursuance of them, entered
on those rolls, or the copies of such entries witnessed by the steward, they now
began to be called tenants by copy of rourt-roll, and their tenure itself a. copyhold. (e) (14)
Thus copyhold tenures, as Sir :Edward Coke observes,(/) although very meanlv
descended, yet come of an ancient house; for, from what has been premised ft
appears, that copyholders are in truth no other but villeins, who by a long
series of immcmoral encroachments on the lord, have at last established a customary right to those estates, which before were held absolutely at the lord's
[ • 96 ] will. Which *affords a very substantial reason for the great variety of
customs that prevail in different manors with regard both to the descent
of the estates, and the privileges belonging to the tenants. And these encroachments grew to he so universal, that when tenure in villenage waa virtuallv
abolished (though copyholds were reserved) by the statute of Charles II, there
was hardly a pure villein left in the nation. For Sir Thomas Smith (g) testifies.
that in all his time (and he was secretary to Edward VI) he never knew anv
villein in $'l'OSS throughout the realm; and the few villeins regartlant that were
then remaming, were such only as had belonged to bishops, monasteries, or other
ecelesiastical corporations, in the J?recedin~ times of popery. For he tells us,
that "holy fathers, monks, and fra1rs, had m their confessions, and especially in
their extreme and deadly sickness, convinced the laity how dangerous a practice
it was, for one Christian man to hold another in bondage: eo that temporal
men, by little and little, by reason of that t.error in their consciences, were glad
to manumit all their villeins. But the said holy fathers, with the abbots and
priors, did not in like sort by theirs: for they u.lso had a scruple in conscience
to impoverish and despoil the church so much, as to manumit such 88 were bond
to their churches, or to the manors which the church had gotten; and so kept
their villeins still." By these several means the generality of villeins in the
kingdom have long ago sprouted up into copyholders; their persons being
enfranchised by manumission or long acquiescence; but their estates, in strictness, remaining subject to the same servile conditions and forfeitures as before;
(e)

F. N. B. 12.

(f) Cop. 8. 32.

(g)

Commonwealth, b. 8, c. 10.

(13) As to the fina.l disappearance of tillenage in England, see Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, :l95-299.

(14) [See this subject very ingeniously handled in Hallam'e ),Jiddle .A.~81 o, yill,
~88
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though, in general, the vellein services are usually commuted for a small pecu-

niary quit-rent, (h)

*As a further consequence of what has been premised, we may collect ,-*„„ -,

these two main principles, which are held (f) to be the supporters of the >• -"

copyhold tenure, and without which it cannot exist: 1. That the land be parcel

of, and situate within that manor, under which it is held. 2. That they have

been demised, or demisable, by copy of court-roll immemorially. For immemo-

rial custom is the life of all tenures by copy; so that no new copyhold can,

strictly speaking, be granted at this day. (15)

In some manors, wliere the custom hath been to permit the heir to succeed

"the ancestor in his tenure, the estates are styled copyholds of inheritance; (16)

in others, where the lords have been more vigilant to maintain their rights, they

remain copyholds for life only: for the custom of the manor has in both cases

so far superseded the will of the lord, that, provided the services be performed

or stipulated for by fealty, he cannot, in the first instance, refuse to admit the

heir of his tenant upon his death, nor, in the second, can he remove his present

tenant so long as he lives, though he holds nominally by the precarious tenure

of his lord's will. (IT)

The fruits and appendages of a copyhold tenure, that it hath in common with

free tenures, are fealty, services (as" well in rents as otherwise), reliefs, and

escheats. The two latter belong only to copyholds of inheritance; the former

to those for life also. But besides these, copyholds have also heriots, wardship,
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and fines. Heriots, which I think are agreed to be a Danish custom, and of

which we shall say more hereafter, (_/ ) are a render of the best beast or other

good (as the custom may be) to the lord on the death of the tenant. This is

plainly a relic of vellein tenure; there being originally less hardship in it, when

all the goods and chattels belonged to the lord, and he might have seised them

even in the villein's lifetime. These are incident to both species of copyhold;

but wardship and fines to those of inheritance only. Wardship, in copyhold

fit) In HIMIC manors the copyholders were bound to perform the most servile offices, as to hedge and

ditch the lord's grounds, to lop his trees, and reap his corn, and the like ; the lord usually finding them

meat and drink, and sometime (as is still the use in the highlands of Scotland) a minstrel or piper for their

diversion. (Rot. Maner. de Edgware Comm. Mid.) As in the kingdom of Whidah, on the slave Roast of

Africa, the people are bound to cut and carry in the king's corn from off bis demesne lands, and are at-

tended by music during nil the time ot their labor. (Mod. Un. lli.it. xvi, 429.)

ftj Co. Lltt. 88. (j) See ch. 28.

(15) [1 "Walk. Cop. 33; 2 T. B. 415; 3B. and P. 346; Doe d. Lowes t>. Davidson, 2 M. and S.

175 ; 2 B. and Aid. 189 ; Boulcott v. 'Winmill, 2 Camp. 261; Paine v. Ryder, 24 Bear. 154. As

to where there is a special custom, see the provision made by 4 and 5 Tic. c. 35, s. 91.]

(16) [It is to be noticed that the heir of copyhold lands is to be ascertained by the custom of

the manor, and often according to rules very different from those which regulate the descent of

freehold lands. There often exists considerable difficulty in ascertaining the customary heir.

Bee Lock v. Colman, 1 M. and Cr. 423 ; 2 id. 42 and 635; Trask o. Wood, 4 M. and Cr. 324 ; Mng-

gleton «. Barnett, 2 H. and N. 252; Bickley ». Bickley, Law R. 4 Eq. 216. A similar difference

between the customary and common law exists as to the rights of a widow in her deceased hus-

band's lands. See Smith v. Adams, 5 D. G. M. and 6. 712.]

(17) [As soon as the death of a copyhold tenant is known to the homage, it should be pre-

eented at the next general court, and three several proclamations should be made at three

successive general courts for the heir or other person claiming title to the land whereof such

copyholder died seised, to come in and be admitted. Proclamation is said to be unnecessary

where the heir appears in court, either personally or by attorney; but, until such presentment

and proclamations, the heir, though of full age, is not bound to come into court to be admitted.

If, after the third proclamation, no such person claims to be admitted, a precept may be issued

by the lord, or steward, to the bailiff of the manor, to seize the lands into the lords hands for

want of a tenant. Watkins on Copyholds, 239; H. Chitty's Descent's 165 ; 1 Keb. 287;

Etch. 246; 1 Leon. 100; 3 id: 221; 4 id. 30; 1 Scriv. 341, 342. But the seizure must be

quousque, etc.. and not as an absolute forfeiture, unless there be a custom to warrant it. 3 T. R.

162.

The admittance is merely as between the lord and the tenant, Cowp. 741, and the title of the

heir to a copyhold is, as against all but the lord, complete without admittance. If the heir is

refused admittance, he shall be terre-tenant, even though the lord loses his fine. Couayn, 245.

For the lord is only trustee for the heir, and merely the instrument of the custom for the purpose

of admittance. 1 Watt. Cop. 281; Cro. Car. 16; Co, Cop. s. 41.]
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r*qc i estates, *partakes both of that in chivalry and that in socage. Like that

•- -I in chivalry, the lord is the legal guardian; (18) who usually assigns some

relation of the infant tenant to act in his stead ; and he, like the guardian in

socage, is accountable to his ward for the profits. Of fines, some are in the

nature of primer seisins, due on the death of each tenant, others are mere fines

for the alienation of the lands; in some manors only one of these sorts can be

demanded, in some both, and in others neither. They are sometimes arbitrary

and at the will of the lord, sometimes fixed by custom ; but, even when arbitrary,

the courts of law, in favor of the liberty of copyholds, have tied them down to

he reasonable in their extent; otherwise they might amount to a disherison of

the estate. No fine therefore is allowed to be taken upon descents and alien-

ations (unless in particular circumstances) (19) of more than two years' improved

value of the estate, (k) (20) From this instance we may judge of the favourable

disposition that the law of England (which is a law of liberty) hath always

shewn to this species of tenants; by removing, as far as possible, every real

badge of slavery from them, however some nominal ones may continue. It suf-

fered custom very early to get the better of the express terms upon which they

held their lands; by declaring, that the will of the lord was to be interpreted by

the custom of the manor: and, where no custom has been suffered to grow up

to the prejudice of the lord, as in this case of arbitrary fines, the law itself inter-

poses with an equitable moderation, and will not suffer the lord-to extend his

power so far as to disinherit the tenant.
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Thus much for the ancient tenure of pure villenage, and the modern one of

copyhold at the will of the lord, which is lineally descended from it.

Iv. There is yet a fourth species of tenure, described by Bracton under the

name sometimes of privileged villenage, and sometimes of villein-socage. This,

he tells us, (I) is such as has been held of the kings of England from the conquest

F*991 *^ownwards; that the tenants herein, " villana faciunt servitia, sed certa

L -1 et determinata ;" that they cannot aliene or transfer their tenements by

grant or feoffment, any more than pure villeins can : but must surrender them

to the lord or his steward, to be again granted out and held in villenage. And

from these circumstances we may collect, that what he here describes is no other

than an exalted species of copyhold, subsisting at this day, viz.: the tenure in

ancient demesne; to which, as partaking of the baseness of villenage in the

nature of its services, and the freedom of socage in their certainty, he has there-

fore given a name compounded out of both, and calls it villanum socagium.

Ancient demesne consists of those lands or manors, which, though now per-

haps granted out to private subjects, were actually in the hands of the crown in

the time of Edward the Confessor, or William the Conqueror; and so appear to

have been by the great survey in the exchequer called domesday-book. (m) The

(Is) 2 Ch. Rep. 181. (1) L. 4, tr. 1, e.. 88. (m) F. X. B. 11, 16.

(18) [This authority of the lord must be by virtue of a special custom in a manor; for, by the

12 Car. II, c. 24, s. 8 and 9, a father may appoint a guardian by his will as to the copyholds of his

* ] estates, •partakes both of that in chivalry and that in socage. Like tha.t
[ 98 in chivalry, the Jord is the legal guardian ; (18) who usually assigns some
relation of the infant tenant to act in his stea.d ; and he, like the guardian in
socage, is accountable to his ward for the profits. Of fines, some are in the
nature of primer seisins, due on the death of each tenant, others are mere fines
for the alienation of the lands; in some manors only one of these sorts can be
demanded, in some both, and in others neither. '!'hey are sometimes arbitrary
and at the will of the lord, sometimes fixed by custom ; but, even when arbitrary,
the courts of law, in favor of the liberty of copyholds, have tied them down to
he reasonable in their extent; otherwise they might amount to a disherison of
the estate. No tine therefore is allowed to be taken upon descents and alienations (unless in particular circumstances) (19) of more than two
improved
value of the estate. (k) (20) From this instance we may judge o the favourable
disposition that the law of England (which is a law of liberty) hath always
shewn to this species of tenants; by removing, as far as possible, every real
badge of slavery from them, however some nommal ones may continue. It suffered custom very early to get the better of the express terms upon which they
held their lands; by declarmg, that the will of the lord was to be interpreted by
the custom of the manor : and, where no custom has been suffered to grow up
to the prejudice of the lord, as in this case of arbitrary fines, the law itself interposes with an equitable moderation, and will not suffer the lord .to extend his
power so far as to disinherit the tenant.
'l'hus much for the ancient tenure of pure villenage, and the modern one of
copylwld at the will of the lord, which is lineally descended from it.
IV. There is yet a fourth species of tenure, described by Bracton under the
name sometimes of prfoileged villenage, and sometimes of villein-socage. This,
he tells us, (l) is such as has been held of the kings of England from the conquest
• 99 *downwards; that the tenants herein, "villana faciunt servitia, sed ~rta
[
] et determ-inata ;" that they cannot aliene or transfer their tenements by
grant or feoffment, any more than pure villeins can: but must surrender them
to the lord or his steward, to be again granted out and held in villenage. And
from these circumstances we may collect, that what he here describes is no other
than an exalted species of copyhold, subsisting at this day, viz.: the tenure in
ancient demesne; to which, as partaking of the baseness of villenage in the
nature of its services, and the freedom of socage in their certainty, he has therefore given a name compounded out of both, and calls it villanum socagium.
Ancient demesne consists of those lands or manors, which, though now perhaps granted out to private subjects, were actually in the hands of the crown in
the time of Edward the Confessor, or William the Conqueror; and so appear to
have been by the great survey in the exchequer called domesday-book. (m) The

;ea.rs'

child; and though this custom is not abolished in terms, nor can be said to be taken away by im-

(k) i Ch. Rep. 18'.

plication in this statute, yet, where the custom does not exist in a manor, the better opinion is

(l) L. '·

tr. 11 c. ll8.

(111) F. N. B. 1', 16.

that the statute will operate, and even where the custom prevails, Mr. Walking thinks, the father

may by this statute appoint a guardian of the person of his child, if not of his copyhold property.

See 2 Watk. on Copyh. 104, 105.] "

(19) [These are where the lord is not compellable to admit, and where the grant on his part is

voluntary, as in case of copyholds for lives where there is no right of renewal, or even where

there is a binding custom to renew, but which allows the copyholder to put in more than one life

at a time, for there in fact two admissions take place at once, and therefore there can be no hard-

ship in a double fine. See Scrivon on Copyholds, 374.]

(20) [It is now established as a universal rule, that where the fine upon the descent or alien-

ation of a copyhold is arbitrary, it cannot be more than two years' improved value. In ascertain-

ing the yearly value, the quit-rents must be deducted, but not the land-tax. Doug. 697.

The fine may be recovered by the lord in an action of assumpsit. But he has no right to it

until the admission of the tenant. 2 T. R. 484. The lord assesses the fine at his peni; if he

imsess it too high, be is not entitled to recover it. See as to fines, Doug. 724, n.; 7 Bing. 327; 2

1$. and Ad. 350; 5 Mees. and W. 608 ; 10 Ad. and El. 236; 3 Scott, 623.]
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(18) [This authority of the lord must be by virtue of a special custom in a ma.nor; for, by the
12 Car. II, c. 24, s. 8 and 9, a. father may appoint a guardian by his will as to the copyholds of his
child ; and though this custom is not abolished in terms, nor can be said to be taken away by implication in this statute, yet, where the custom does not exist in a manor, the better opinion is
that the statute will operate, and even where the custom prevails, Mr. Watkins think!I, tlie father
may by this statute appoint a guardian of the person of his child, if not of his copyhold property.
See 2 W atk. on Copyh. 104, 105.)
(19) [These are where the lord is not compellable to admit, and where the grant on his part is
voluntary, a.11 in Ce.Be of copyholds for lives where there is no right of renewal, or even where
there is a binding custom to renew, but which o.J.lows the copyholder to put in more than one life
at a time, for there in fact two admissions take place at once, e.nd therefore there can be no hardship in a double fine. See Scriven on Copyhold8, 374.)
(20)
is now established as a nniver8al rule, that where the fine upon the descent or alien&tion of a copyhold is arbitrary, it c1mnot be more than two years' improved value. In &Beertaining the yearly value, the quit-renw mn8t be deducted, but not the land-tax. Doug. 697.
'rhe fine may be recovered by the lord in an action of assumpsit. But he has no ri~ht to it
until the admhision of the tenant. 2 T. R. 484. The lord &.'lt!e8ses the fine at his penl; if he
1~,;ess it too high, be i8 not entitled to recover it. See as to fines, Doug. 724, n.; 7 Bing. 327; 2
ll. and .Ad. 3fl0; 5 Mees. and W. 008 ; 10 .Ad. and El. 236; 3 Scott, 6'23.]
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tenants of these lands, under the crown, were not all of the same order or degree.

Some of them, as Britton testifies, (n) continued for a long time pure and abso-

lute villeins, dependent on the will of the lord; and those who have succeeded

them in their tenures now differ from common copyholders in only a few

points, (o) Others were in a great measure enfranchised by the royal favour;

being only bound in respect of their lands to perform some of the better sort of

villein services, but those determinate and certain; as, to plough the king's land

for so many days, to supply his court with such a quantity of provisions, or

other stated services: all of which are now changed into pecuniary rents: and

in consideration hereof they had many immunities and privileges granted to

them ; (p) as to try the right of their property in a peculiar court of their own,

called a court of ancient demesne, by a peculiar process, denominated a writ of

Tight close ; (g) not to pay toll or taxes ; not to contribute to the expenses of

knights of the shire ; not to be put on juries; and the like, (r)

*These tenants therefore, though their tenure be absolutely copyhold, r,,.. QQ -•

yet have an interest equivalent to a freehold : for notwithstanding their >- •"

services were of a base and villenous original, (s) yet the tenants were esteemed

in all other respects to be highly privileged villeins; and especially for that their

services were fixed and determinate, and that they could not be compelled (like

pure villeins) to relinquish these tenements at the lord's will, or to hold them

against their own: " et idea," says Bracton, " dicuntur liberi," Britton also,

from such their freedom, calls them absolutely sokemans, and their tenure soke-
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manries ; which he describes (t) to be " lands and tenements which are not held

by knight-service, nor by grand serjeanty, nor by petit, but by simple services,

being, as it were, lands enfranchised by the king or his predecessors from their

ancient demesne." And the same name is also given them in Fleta. (u) Hence

Fitzherbert observes (w) that no lands are ancient demesne, but lands holden in

socage; that is, not in free and common socage, but in this amphibious subor-

dinate class of villein-socage. And it is possible, that as this species of socage

tenure is plainly founded upon predial services, or services of the plough, it may

have given cause to imagine that all socage tenures arose from the same original;

for want of distinguishing, with Bracton, between free socage or socage of frank

tenure, and villein-socage or socage of ancient demesne.

Lands holden by this tenure are therefore a species of copyhold, and as such

preserved and exempted from the operation of the statute of Charles II. Yet

they differ from common copyholds, principally in the privileges before men-

tioned : as also they differ from freeholders by one special mark and tincture

of villenage, noted by Bracton, and remaining to this day, viz.: that they cannot

be conveyed from man to man by the general common-law conveyances of

feoffment, and the rest; but must pass by surrender, to the lord or his steward,

in the manner of common copyholds: *yet with this distinction, (a;) that •-,„ +~* -,

in the surrender of these lands in ancient demesne, it is not used to say ' J

"to hold at the will of the lord" in their copies, but only, "to hold according to

the custom of the manor."

Thus have we taken a compendious view of the principal and fundamental

points of the doctrine of tenures, both ancient and modern, in which we cannot

but remark the mutual connection and dependence that all of them have upon

each other. And upon the whole it appears, that whatever changes and altera-

tions these tenures have in process of time undergone, from the Saxon sera to

12 Car. II, all lay tenures are now in effect reduced to two species; free tenure

in common socage, and base tenure by copy of court-roll.

I mentioned lay tenures only; because there is still behind one other species

of tenure, reserved by the statute of Charles II, which is of a spiritual nature,

and called the tenure in frankalmoign.

V. Tenure in frankalmoign in libera eleemosyna, or free alms, is that whereby

a religious corporation, aggregate or sole, holdeth lands of the donor to them

(n) C. 86. (o) P. N. B. 228. (p)l. Inst. 269, (q) F. N. B. 11. (r) Ibid. U.

b. liist. ofcxcb. ICandSO. ft)C. 88. («)£. l,c. 8. (toj N. B. 13. (x)Kitchen on courts, 191.
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tenants of these lands, under the crown, were not all of the same order or degree.
Some of them, as Britton testifies, (n) continued for a long time pure and absolute villeins, dependent on the will of the lord; and those who have succeeded
them in their tenures now differ from common copyholders in only a few
points. (o) Others were in a great measure enfranchised by the royal favour;
bein~ only bound in respect of their lauds to perform some of the better sort of
yiIJem services, but those determinate and certain; as, to plough the kins-'s land
for so many days, to supply his court with such a quantity of provisions, or
other stated services: all of which are now changed mto pecuniary rents: and
in consideration hereof they had many immunities and privileges granted to
them; (p) as to try the right of their property in a peculiar court of their own,
called a court of ancient demesne, by a peculiar process, denominated a writ of
right close; (q) not to pay toll or taxes; not to contribute to the expenses of
kniRhts of the shire; not to be put on juries; and the like. (r)
•rhese tenants therefore, though their tenure be absolutely copyhold, ["' 100 ]
yet have an interest equivalent to a freehold: for notwithstanding their
services were of a base and villenous original, (s) yet the tenants were esteemed.
in all other respects to be highly privileged villeins; and especially for that their
services were fixed and determinate, and that they could not be compelled (like
pure villeins) to relinquish these tenements at the lord's will, or to hold them
against their own : " et ideo," says Bracton, "dicuntur liheri," Britton also,
from such their freedom, calls them absolutely sokemans, and their tenure sokemanries; which he describes (t) to be" lands and tenements which are not held
by knight-service, nor by grand serjeauty, nor by petit, but by simple services,
being, as it were, lands enfranchised by the kin~ or his predecessors from their
ancient demesne." And the same name is also given them in Fleta. (u) Hence
Fitzherbert observes (w) that no lands are ancient demesne, but lands holden in
socage; that is, not in free and common socage, but in this amphibious subordinate class of villein-socage. And it is possible, that as this species of socage
tenure is plainly founded upon predial servic'eS, or services of the plough, it may
have given cause to imagine that all socage tenures arose from the same original;
for want of distinguishing, with Bracton, betwe·en free socage or socage of frank
tenure, and villein-socage or socage of ancient demesne.
Lands holden by this tenure are therefore a species of copyhold, and a.s such
preserved and exempted from the operation of the statute of Charles II. Yet
they differ from common copyholds, principally in the privileges before mentioned: as also they differ from freeholders by one special mark and tincture
of villenage, noted by Bracton, and remaining to this day, viz.: that they cannot
be conveyed from man to man by the general common-law conveyances of
feoffment, and the rest; but must pa.ss by surrender, to the lord or his steward,
in the manner of common copyholds: •yet with this distinction, (x) that [* lOl ]
in the surrender of' these lands in ancient demesne, it is not used to say
"to h.old at tlie 10ill of the lord" in their copies, but only, "to hold according to
tlie custom of the manor."
Thus have we taken a compendious view of the principal and fundamental
points of the doctrine of tenures, both ancient and modern, in which we cannot
but remark the mutual connection and dependence that all of them have upon
each other. And upon the whole it appears, that whatever changes and alterations these tenures have in process of time undergone, from the Saxon rera to
12 Car. II, all lay tenur~s are now in effect reduced to two species; free tenure
in common socage, and base tenure by copy of court-roll.
I mentioned lay tenures only; because there is still behind one other species
of tenure, reserved by the statute of Charles II, which is of a spiritual nature,
and called the tenure in frankalmoign.
V. Tenure infrankalmoign in lihera eleemosyna, or free alms, is that whereby
n religious corporation, aggregate or sole, holdeth lands of the donor to them
(n) C.66.
(a) Gilb. hist.

(o)t' . N. B. 228.
ofcxch. lG nnd30.

Dig ize b

(t)

(pJ4 Inst.11il9,
(q) F. N. B. 11.
fr) Ibid. H.
C. 06.
(u) L. 1, c. 8. (w) N. B.13. (xJ Kitchen on courts, 101.
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and their successors forever, (y) The service which they were bound to render

for these lands was not certainly defined; but only in general to pray for the

soul of the donor and his heirs, dead or alive; and therefore, they did no fealty,

(which is incident to all other services but this,) (z) because this divine service

was of a higher and more exalted nature. (a) This is the tenure, by which almost

all the ancient monasteries and religious nouses held their lands; and by which

the parochial clergy, and very many ecclesiastical and eleesmosynary foundations,

hold them at this day; (b) the nature of the service being upon the reformation

F* 1021 a^*red, an<* ma(ie comformable to the purer doctrines *of the church of

I -" England. It was an old Saxon tenure; and continued under the Norman

revolution, through the great respect that was shewn to religion and religious

men in ancient times. Which is also the reason that tenants in frankamoign

were discharged of all other services, except the trinoda necessitas, of repairing

the highways, building castles, and repelling invasions: (c) just as the Druids,

among the ancient Britons, had omnium rerum immunitatem. (d) And, even at

present, this is a tenure of a nature very distinct from all others; being not in

the least feudal, but merely spiritual. For if the service be neglected, the law

gives no remedy by distress or otherwise to the lord of whom the lands are

holden: but merely a complaint to the ordinary or visitor to correct it. (e)

Wherein it materially differs from what was called tenure by divine service ; in

which the tenants were obliged to do some special divine services in certain;

as to sing so many masses, to distribute such a sum in alms, and the like; which,
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being expressly denned and prescribed, could with no kind of propriety be called

free alms; especially as for this, if unperformed, the lord might distrein, without

any complaint to the visitor. (f) All such donations are indeed now out of use:

for, since the statute of quia emptores, 18 Edw. I, (21) none but the king can

give lands to be holden by this tenure, (g) So that I only mention them because

frankalmoign is excepted by name in the statute of Charles II, and therefore

subsists in many instances at this day. Which is all that shall be remarked con-

cerning it: herewith concluding our observations on the nature of tenures. (22)

(y) Lit*. 8. 188. (z) Ibid. B. 181. fa) Ibtd. 8. 185.

(bJBnctonl. 4, tr. 1, c. to, 11. (c) Sold. Jan. 1, «. (d) Castor de bell. Qall. I 6, c. 13.

(e) Litt. a. 136. (f) IMd. 1ST. (g) Ibid. 140.

(21) [This statute enacts that "it shall be lawful to every freeman to sell at his own pleasure

his lands and tenements, or part of them, so that the feoffee shall hold the name of the chief lord

and their successors forever. (y) The service which they were bound to render
for these lands was not certainly defined; but only in general to pray for the
soul of the donor and his heirs, dead or alive; and therefore, they did no fealty,
(which is incident to all other services but this,) (z) because this divine service
was of a higher and more exalted nature. (a) 'l'his is the tenure, by which almost
all the ancient monasteries and religious houses held their lands; and by which
the parochial clergy, and very many ecclesiastical and eleesmosynary foundations,
hold them at this day; (b) the nature of the service being upon the reformation
[ • 102 ] altered, and me.de comfonnable to the purer doctrines *of the church of
England. It was an old Saxon tenure; and continued under the Norman
revol~tion, ~hrou~h the ~t :r:espect that was shewn to religi?n and religious
men m ancient times. '\Vhich 18 also the reason that tenants m frankalmoign
were discharged of all other services, except the trinoda necsssitas, of repairing
the highways, building castles, and repelling invasions: (c) just as the Druida,
among the ancient Britons, had cmmium rerum i11imtmitatem. (d) And, even at
present, this .is a tenure of a nature very distinct from all others; being not in
the least feudal, but merely spiritual. For if the service be neglected, the law
gives no remedy by distreSB or otherwise to the lord of whom the lands are
holden: but merelv a complaint to the ordinary or visitor to correct it. (e)
Wherein it materially differs from what was called tenure by divine seroice ,; in
which the tenants were obliged to do some special divine services in certain ;
as to sing so many·masses, to distribute such a sum in alms, and the like; which,
being expressly defined and prescribed, could with no kind of propriety be called
free alms; especially us for this, if unperformed, the lord might d1strem, without
any complaint to the visitor. (/) All such donations are indeed now out of use:
for, since the statute of quia 81nptores, 18 Edw. I, (21) none but the king can
give lands to be holden by this tenure. (g) So that i only mention them because
frankalmoign is excepted by name in the statute of Charles II, and therefore
subsists in many instances at this day. Which is all that shall be remarked concerning it: herewith concluding our observations on the nature of tenures. (22)
(11) Litt. a. 1811.
(•) 1 bid. 1. 181.
(a) Ibid. a. 186.
(b) Braeton l. 4, tr. I. c. ill, f I.
(c) Seld. Jafl. 1, 42.
(e) Litt. s. 136.
· (/) [Md. 137.
(g) Ibid. 140.

(d) Ctuar de bell. Gall. I. 6, c. IS.

of the same fee by such service and customs as Msfeoffor held before.""]

(22) We may properly add in this place a few words in regard to tenures in America. Al-

though the feudal system never obtained much foothold in this country, there are many things

in our law of real estate which can only be understood by bearing in mind the fact that our

system is based upon the common low of England, and that that law grew up while the feudal

system was in force. As lands in England were held under that system, and its maxima

thoroughly pervaded the law of real estate, it was not to be expected that, when grants of land

were made in this country, under circumstances unknown in England, a new system of law, with

new terms and maxims, would at once spring into existence to provide for the new condition of

things, and bearing no trace of the system which it supplanted.

As a matter of fact, however, the early grants in America were made with reference to a

continuation of something like feudal tenure, and many incidents of that system attached them-

selves to these grants. The tenure prescribed was, tenure in free and common socage to be

held of the king, as of some manor in England. When the colonies threw off allegiance to

the crown, and became independent state*, each of them succeeded to all the rights of the

crown within its limits, while the United States as a sovereignty succeeded to all the rights of

the crown to unoccupied territory not within the limits of any of the states and not previously

conveyed.

Being thus possessed of the vacant lands, the United States and the several individual states

have proceeded to make sale and conveyance thereof, and to give titles which, though called fees,

were in truth allodial. At the same time the states, by statutory and constitutional provisions,

have gradually abolished such of the feudal incidents as still attached to the estates previously

granted by the crown, until, as Chancellor Kent says, 3 Com. 513, "by one of those singular

revolutions incident to huuian affairs, allodial estates, once universal in Europe, and then almost

universally exchanged for feudal tenures, have now, after the lapse of many centuries, regained

their primitive estimation in the minds of freemen."

We still, indeed, iu America recognize the sovereignty as the source of all title, and as

entitled to succeed thereto in default of heirs; but this' right is not peculiar to the feudal

392

(21) [ThiR statute enacts that "it shall be lawful to every freeman to !!ell at hit! own ple88Ul'8
his lands and tenemenL!, or part of them, eo that the ftloft'ee 11ball hold the ll8me of the chief lord
of the t<&me fee by 8t«:h 8crvice and Ctl8fonl.! a8 lri8 feoffor Mid before."]
(22) We may properly add in this place a few wordil in regard to tenure11 in America. Al·
though the feudal 11y11tem ne\°er obtained much foothold in thi11 country, there are many things
in our law of real estate which can onlf be understood by bearing in mind the fact that oar
system is baBed upon the common law o England, and that that law grew up while the feudal
sy!!tem wae in force. As lands in England were held under that 11ystem, and its maxima
thoroughly pe"aded the law of real estat.e, it wu not to be expected that, when grants of land
were made in this country, under circumstances unknown in England, a new system oflaw, with
new terms and maxims, would at once sprin~ into existence to provide for the new condition of
things, and bearing no trace of the syi.tem wh1ch it 11upplanted.
AH a matter of fact, however, the early grants in America were made with reference to a
continuation of l!ODlething like feudal tenure, and many incident.I! of that system attached themselves to the11e grnntll. The tenure J?reE<cribed w11o11, tenure in free and common soc~ to be
held of the king, as of some manor m England. When the colonies threw oft' allegiance to
the crown, and became independent state.'11 each of them suooeeded to all the rights of the
crown within its limits, while the United States as a sovereignty succeeded to all the right.s of
the crown to unoccupied territory not within the limit.a of any of the states and not previously
conveved.
Being thus possessed of the vacant lands, the United States Rnd the several individual siates
have proceeded to mRke we and conveyance thereof, and to give titles which, though called~·
were m truth allodio.l. At the 11&me time the 11tate11, by statutory and constitutional prol'ismns,
have gradually abolit1hed such of' the feudal inciclents ~ i;till attached to the eRtates previon;tly
granted hy the crown, until, 1~s C'hanccllor Kent 110.ys, 3 Com. 513, "by one of tho11e singnlar
revolutions incident to human affairs, o.llodial eHtates, once universal in Eltropo, and then alm<>t<t
univl'ln1ally exchRnged for f1mdal umure11, have now, after the lapse of many centuries, regained
their primitive estimation in the mind~ of freemen.''
We still, indeed, in America rncog'nize the sotureignty 11.'l the source of all title, and 81!
entitled to Kucceed thereto in default of heirs; but this right h1 ·not peculiM to the feudal
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CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VII.

OF FREEHOLD ESTATES OF INHERITANCE.

THE next objects of our disqnisitions are the nature and properties of estates.

An estate in lands, tenements, and hereditaments, signifies such interest as the

tenant has therein: so that if a man grants all of Ms estate in Dale to A and

OF FREEHOLD ESTATES OF INHERITANCE.

his heirs, every thing that he can possibly grant shall pass thereby, (a) (1) It is

called in Latin status; it signifying the condition, or circumstance, in which

the owner stands with regard to his property. And to ascertain this with pro-

per precision and accuracy, estates may be considered in a three-fold view: first,

with regard to the quantity of interest which the tenant has in the tenement:

secondly, with regard to the time at which that quantity .of interest is to be

enjoyed: and, thirdly, with regard to the number and connexions of the tenants.

First, with regard to the quantity of interest which the tenant has in the

tenement, this is measured by its duration and extent. Thus, either his right

of possession is to subsist for an uncertain period, during his own life, or the

life of another man: to determine at his own decease, or to remain to his de-

scendants after him: or it is circumscribed within a certain number of years,

months or days: or, lastly, it is infinite and unlimited, being vested in him

and his representatives forever. And this occasions the primary division of

•"estates into such as are freehold, and such as are less than freehold. •- tin^-i

An estate of freehold, liberum tenementum, or franktenement, is de- >• -"

fined by Britton (b) to be the "possession of the soil by a freeman." And St.
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Germyn (c) tells us, that " the possession of the land is called in the law of Eng-

land the franktenement or freehold." Such estate, therefore, and no other, as

requires actual possession of the land, is, legally speaking, freehold: which ac-

tual possession can, by the course of the common law, be only given by the

ceremony called livery of seisin, which is the same as the feudal investiture.

And from these principles we may extract this description of a freehold; that

it is such an estate in lands as is conveyed by livery of seisin, or in tenements

of any incorporeal nature, by what is equivalent thereto. And accordingly it is

laid down by Littleton, (d) that where a freehold shall pass, it behoveth to have

livery of seisin. As, therefore, estates of inheritance and estates for life could

not by common law be conveyed without livery of seisin, these are properly es-

tates of freehold; and as no other estates were conveyed with the same solemnity,

therefore no others are properly freehold estates.

Estates of freehold (thus understood) are either estates of inheritance, or

estates not of inheritance. The former are again divided into inheritances

absolute, or fee-simple; and inheritances limited, one species of which we usually

call fee-tail.

I. Tenant in fee-simple (or, as he is frequently styled, tenant in fee) is he that

hath lands, tenements, or hereditaments, to hold to him and his heirs forever: (e)

generally, absolutely, and simply; without mentioning what heirs, but referring

fa) Co. LJtt 346. (b) C. «t. (e) Dr. & Stud. b. 2, d. 23. (dj { 59. (ejUtt. II.

system, neither is the right of eminent domain, which is sometimes referred to in this connec-

tion as being one of the incidents of that system which still remains. The right of eminent

domain is a right existing in the necessities of government, not attaching to land merely, and

not dependent upon nay peculiar tenure of land.

(1) [In 1 Preston on Estates, 20, the term is thus defined: "The interest which any one has

in lands, or any other subject of property, is called his estate, and to this term, at least in a

THE next objects of our disquisitions are the nature and properties of estates.
An estate in lands, tenements, and heredita.ments, signifies such interest as the
tenant has therein: so that if a man grant.a all of his estate in Dale to A and
his heirs, every thing that he can possibly grant shall pass thereby. (a) (1) It is
called in Latin status; it signifying the condition, or circumstance, in which
the owner stands with regard to his property. And to ascertain this with proper precision and accuracy, estat.es may be considered in a three-fold view : first,
with regard to the quant?'ty of t'.nterest which the tenant has in the tenement:
:mxmdly, with re~rd to the time at which that quantity .of interest is to be
enjoyed : and, tlurdly, with regard to the 1tumber and connexions of the ten11.nts.
First, with regard to the quantity of intsrest which the tenant has in the
tenement, this is measured by its duration and extent. Thus, either his right
of possession is to subsist for an uncertain period, during his own life, or the
life of another man : to determine at his own decease, or to remain to his descendants after him: or it is circumscribed within a certain number of yea.rs,
months or days: or, lastly, it is infinite and unlimited, being vested in him
and his representatives forever. And this occasions the primary division of
*estates in to such as are frBehold. and such as are less than freelwld.
[ ,..104 ]
An estate of freehold, libenun tenementum, or fra.nktenement, is defined by Britton (b) to be the "possession of the soil by a freeman." And St.
Germyn (c) tells us, th~t " the possesaion of the land is called in the law of England the frankt.enement or freehold." Such estate, therefore, and no other, as
requires actual possession of the land, is, legally speaking, freeliold: which actual possession can, by the course of the common law, be only given by the
ceremony called livery of seisin, which is the same as the feudal investiture.
:\~d from these pri!1c1ples we m~y extract this. descriptio~ .of a fi:eehold ; that
it 1s such an estate m lands as 1s conveyed by hvery of se1sm, or m tenements
of any incorporeal nature, by what is equivalent thereto. And accordingly it is
laid down by Littleton, {d) that where a freehold shall pass, it behoveth to have
livery of seisin. As, therefore, estates of inheritance and estates for life could
not by common law be conveyed without livery of seisin, these &i'e properly estates of freehold; and as no other estates were conveyed with the same solemnity,
therefore no others are properly freehold estates.
Estates of freehold (thus understood) are either estates of inheritance, or
estates not of inheritmice. The former a.re again divided into inheritances
absolute, or fee-simple; and inheritances limited, one species of which we usually
call fee- tail.
I. Tenant in fee-simple (or, as he is frequently styled, tenant in fee) is he that
bath lands, tenements, or hereditaments, to hold to him and his heirs forever: (e)
generally, absolutely, and simply; without mentioning 1ohat heirs, but referring
(a) Co. LJU. 346.
(b) c. 39.
(C) Dr. & Stud. b. II, d. ti.
(dJH9.
(e) Litt.fl.

conveyance by deed, some adjunct or expression should be added, when the time for which

the estate is to continue, as for years, for life, in tail or in fee, or the manner in which it is to

be held, as on condition, in joint tenancy, Ac., is to be described; thus, it is said, a man has an

estate in fee, in tail, for life, for years, on condition, etc." Sometimes the term " estate "is used

merely as a local description, as "all my estate at Ashton;" but the word "estate" when so

used in a will, always carried the fee to the devisee, unless restrained by other words, though

it is otherwise in a conveyance by deed.]
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srstem, neither is the right of eminent domain, which is sometimes referred to in this connection a..~ being one of the incidenk! of that system which still remains. The right of eminent
domain i~ a right exh1tiug in the nece!ISitfos of government, not attaching to land merely and
not dependent upon any peculiar tenure of land.
'
( 1) [In 1 Pre1:1ton on &tates, 20, the tenn is thus defined: "The interest which any one has
in landli, or any other subject of property, is called his eatate, and to this term, at least in a
conYeyanee by deed, some adjunct or expression should be added, wheu the time for which
the ei;tate ii:! to continue, as for years, for life, in tail or in fee, or the manner in which it is to
be held, n.<1 on condition, in joint tenancy, &o., is to be described; thus, it i~ said, a man has an
estate in fee, in tail, for life, for years, on condition, etc.'' Sometimm1 the term " e~tate " is used
merely lk! a local description, as "all my estate at Ashton;" but the word "e:;tate" when so
used in a ~ll, al waY1' carried the fee to the devisee, unless restrained by other words though
it i11 otherwise in a conveyance by deed.]
'
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that to his own pleasure, or to the disposition of the law. The true meaning of

the word fee (feodum) is the same with that of feud or fief, and in its original

f*105l 8e°se i**8 *taken in contradistinction to allodiumj(f) which latter the

' -1 writers on this subject define to be every man's own land, which he pos-

sesseth merely in his own right, without owing any rent or service to any super-

ior. This is property in its highest degree; and the owner thereof hath

absolutum et directum dominium, and therefore is said to be seised thereof ab-

solutely in dominico suo, in his own demesne. But feodum, or fee, is that which

is held of some superior on condition of rendering him sen-ice; in which

superior the ultimate property of the land resides. And therefore Sir

Henry Spelman (g) defines a feud or fee to be the right which the vassal

or tenant hath in lands, to use the same, and take the profits thereof to

him and his heirs, rendering to the lord his due services: the mere allodial pro-

priety of the soil always remaining in the lord. This allodial property no subject

in England has; (h) it being a received, and now undeniable principle in the

law, that all the lands in England are holdeu mediately or immediately of the

king. The king therefore only hath absolutum et directum dominium: (i) but

all subjects' lands are in the nature of feodum or fee: whether derived to them

by descent from their ancestors, or purchased for a valuable consideration; for

they cannot come to any man by either of those ways, unless accompanied with

those feudal clogs which were laid upon the first feudatory when it was origi-

nally granted. A subject therefore hath only the usufruct, and not the absolute
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property of the soil; or, as Sir Edward Coke expresses it, (k) he hath dominium

utile, but not dominium directum. And hence it is, that, in the most solemn

acts of law, we express the strongest and highest estate that any subject can

have, by these words: " he is seised thereof in his demesne, as of fee." It is a

man's demesne, dominicum, or property, since it belongs to him and his heirs

forever: yet this dominicum, property, or demesne, is strictly not absolute or

allodial, but qualified or feudal: it is his demense, as of fee: that is, it is not

purely and simply his own, since it is held of a superior lord, in whom the

ultimate property resides.

F *1061 Jhis is the primary sense and acceptation of the word/ee. But (as

"• J Sir Martin Wright very justly observes) (1) the doctrine, "that all lands

are holden," having been for so many ages a fixed and undeniable axiom, our

English lawyers do very rarely (of late years especially) use the word fee in this

its primary original sense, in contradistinction to allodium or absolute property,

with which they have no concern; but generally use it to express the continu-

ance or quantity of estate. A fee therefore, in general, signifies an estate of

inheritance; being the highest and most extensive interest tnat a man can have

in a feud: and when the term is used simply, without any other adjunct, or has

the adjunct of simple annexed to it (as a fee or a fee-simple,) it is used in con-

tradistinction to a fee conditional at the common law, or a fee-tail by the

statute; importing an absolute inheritance, clear of any condition, limitation,

or restrictions to particular heirs, but descendible to the heirs general whether

male or female, lineal or collateral. And in no other sense than this is the king

said to be seised in fee, he being the feudatory of no man. (m)

Taking therefore fee for the future, unless where otherwise explained in this

its secondary sense, as a state of inheritance, it is applicable to, and may be had

in, any kind of hereditaments either corporeal or incorporeal, (n) But there is

this distinction between the two species of hereditaments: that, of a corporeal

inheritance a man shall be said to be seised in his demesne, as of fee; of an in-

corporeal one, he shall only be said to be seised as of fee, and not in his

demesne, (o) For, as incorporeal hereditaments are in their nature collateral

to, and issue out of, lands and houses, (p) their owner hath no property, domin-

(/) See pp. 48. 47. (g) Of feuds, o. 1. (h) Co. Lltt. 1.

(i) Pr&dium ilomini regit eat directum domlrmm, cujus nullus eat author nisi Deui. Ibid.

it) Co. Litt. 1. (J) Often, 148. (m) Co. Lltt. 1.

(n) Feodum ett quod qnit tenet tfbi et haredibus suis, me sit tenemcntum, oive reditut, rfc. Flet. 1.6, e. 0. i 7

lo) Lltt. {in. (j>) Seepage 20.
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that to his own pleasure, or to the disposition of the law. The true meaning of
the word fee (feodum) is the same with that of feud or fief, and in its origmal
[ *l 05 ] sense it is *taken in contradistinction to allodium;(f) which latter the
writers on this subject define to be eyery man's own Innd, which he possesseth merely in his own right, without owing any rent or service to any superior. This is property in its highest degree; and the owner thereof hath
absolutum et directum dominfom, and therefore is said to be seised thereof absolutely in dominir:o suo, in his own demesne. Hut feodum, or fee, is that which
is held of some superior on condition of renderin&: him sen-ice; in which
superior the ultimate property of the land resides. And therefore Sir
Henry Spelman (g) defines a. feud or fee to be the right which the vassal
or tenant ha.th in lands, to use the same, and take the profits thereof to
him and his heirs, rendering to the lord his due services: the mere allodial propriety of the soil always remaining in the lord. This allodial property no subject
in England has; (h) it being a. received, and now undeniable principle in the
law, that all the lands in England are holden mediately or immediately of the
king. The king therefore only hath absolutum et directum dominium: ( i) but
all subjects' lands a.re in the nature of feodum or fee: whethe1· derived to them
by descent from their ancestors, or purchased for a yaluable consideration; for
they cannot come to any man by either of those ways, unless accompanied with
those feudal clogs which were laid upon the first feudatory when it. was originally granted. A subject therefore hath only the usufruct, and not the absolute
property of the soil; or, as Sir Edward Coke expresses it, (k) he hath dominium
utile, but not dominium directum. And hence it is, that, in the most solemn
acts of law, we express the strongest and highest estate that any subject. can
have, by these words: "he is seised thereof in his demesne, as of fee." It is a
man's demesne, dmninicum, or property, since it belongs to him and his heirs
forever: yet this dominicu.m, property, or demesne, is strictly not absolute or
allodial, but qualified or feudal: it is his demense, as of fee: that is, it is not
purely and simply his own, since it is held of a superior lord, in whom the
ultimate pror.;,rty resides.
* rhis is the primary sense and acceptation of the word fee. But (as
[ *lOS]
Sir Martin Wright very justly observes) (l) the doctrine, "that all lands
are holden," having been for so many ages a fixed 11.nd undeniable axiom, our
English lawyers do very rarely (of late years especially) use the word fee. in this
its primary original sense, in contradistinction to all-Odium or absolute property,
with which they have no concern; but generally use it to express the continuance or quantity of estate. A fee therefore, in general, signifies an estate of
inheritance; being the highest and most extensive interest that a man can h:ne
in a feud: and when the term is used simply, without any other adjunct, or has
the adjunct of simple annexed to it (a.a a. fee or a fee-simple,) it is used in contradistinction to a fee conditional at the common law, or a fee-tail by the
statute; importing an absolute inheritance, clear of any condition, limitation,
or restrictions to particular heirs, but descendible to the heirs general whether
male or female, lineal or collateral. And in no other sense than this is the king
said to be seised in fee, he being the feudatory of no man. (m.)
Taking therefore fee for the future, unless where otherwise explained in thh:
its secondary sense, as a state of inheritance, it is applicable to, and may be had
in, any kind of hereditaments either corporeal or incorporeal. (n) But there is
this distinction between the two species of hereditaments: that, of a corporeal
inheritance a man shall be said to be seised in his demesne, as of fee; of an incorporeal one, he shall only be said to be seised as of fee, and not in his
demesne. (o) For, as incorporeal hereditaments are in their nature collateral
to, and issue out of, lauds and houses, (p) their owner hath no property, dominlfl See pp. '4. ·~· .
(gl Orfeuds, c. 1.
(hl Co. Litt. I.
(l) Pradium donnn• regfa eat directum domlm1m, cujus 11ullu.a eat author niri Detu. Ibid.
1kl Co. Litt. 1.
(l) Often, 148.
(m) Co. Litt. 1.
(n) Feodum eat quod qt1ill tend ribi et halrtdibiu 111ill1 nt1e Bit tenementum, riot retlUfu, lfc. FleL I. II, e.11. j 7
10) Litt. § IO.
(Pl See page !al.
3~H

Dig 1ze o

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

Chap. 7.]

106

FEE-SIMPLE.

Chap. 7.J FEE-SIMPLE. ]06

icum, or demesne, in the thing itself, but hath only something derived out of

it; resembling the servitutes, or services, of the civil law. (q) The dominicum

or property is frequently *in one man, while the appendage or service is r *-\QH -i

in another. Thus Gains may be seised as of fee of a way leading over *• -"

the land, of which Titius is seised in his demesne as of fee. (2)

The fee-simple or inheritance of lands and tenements is generally vested and

resides in some person or other; though divers inferior estates may be carved

out of it. As if one grants a lease for twenty-one years, or for one or two lives,

the fee-simple remains vested in him and his heirs; and after the determina-

tion of those years or lives, the land reverts to the grantor or his heirs, who

shall hold it again in fee-simple. Yet sometimes the fee may be in abeyance,

that is, (as the word signifies,) in expectation, remembrance, and contemplation

in law; there being no person in esse in whom it can vest and abide: though

the law considers it as always potentially existing, and-ready to vest whenever a

proper owner appears. (3) Thus, in a gjrant to John for life, and afterwards to

the heirs of Richard, the inheritance is plainly neither granted to John nor

Richard, nor can it vest in the heirs of Richard till his death, nam nemo est

hceres viventis: it remains therefore in waiting or abeyance, during the life of

Richard, (r) (4) This is likewise always the case of a parson of a church, who

hath only an estate therein for the term of his life; and the inheritance remains

in abeyance, (s) And not only the fee, but the freehold also, may be an abey-

ance ; as, when a parson dies, the freehold of his glebe is in abeyance, until a
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successor be named, and then it vests in the successor, (t) (5)

(g) Servitus eft jus. quo res mm iMerius rei vet persona sen-it. Ff. 8. 1. 1.

(r) Co. Lltt. 342. <«) Litt. t 046. (<) Ibid, t r,IT..

(2) [See page 20, where the author does not confine incorporeal hereditaments to things

icum, or demesne, in the thing itself, but hath only something derived out of
it; resembling the servitutes, or services, of the civil law. ( q) The dominicum
or property is frequently *in one man, while the appendage or service is [ • 107 ]
in another. 'fhus Ga.ins may be seised as of fee of a way leading over
the land, of which 'ritius is seised in his demesne as of fee. (2)
·
The fee-simple or inheritance of lands and tenements is generally vest~d and
resides in some person or other; though divers inferior estates may be carved
out of it. As if one grants a. lease for twenty-one years, or for one or two lives,
the fee-simple remains ,·ested in him and his heirs; and after the determination of those years or lives, the land reverts to the grantor or his heirs, who
shall hold it again in fee-simple. Yet sometimes the fee may be iu abeyance,
that is, (as the word signifies,) m expectation, remembrance, and contemplation
in law; there being no person in esse in whom it can vest and abide: though
the law considers it as always potentially existing, and· ready to vest whenever a
proper owner appears. (3) Thus, in u. ~rant to John for life, and afterwards to
the heirs of Richard, the inheritance is plainly neither granted to John nor
Richard, nor can it vest in the heirs of Richard till his death, na-m nemo est
hmres vivenlis: it remains therefore in waiting or abeyance, during the life of
Richard. (r) ( 4) This is likewise always the case of a/arson of a church, who
hath only an estn.t.e therein for the term of his life; an the inheritance remains
in abeyance. (s) And not only the fee, but the freehold also, may be an abeyance; as, when a parson dit•s, the freehold of his glebe is in abeyance, until a
successor be named, and then it vests in the successor. (t) (5)
(q) Serrilua utjfu,

(r) Co. Llti. SU.

quo rea mea nllerifU rel vel personai serAt. Ff. 8. I. I.
(a) Litt. 0 6~.
(t) 1 IM. 0 6i7.

issuing out of lands and houses, but to things issuing out of any thing corporate, real or per-

sonal. But the true reason of the distinction is clearly, not that the owner of the derivative nas

no property in the land or house from which it is derived, but that the thing in which he has a

property, the right of way for instance, is incorporeal, and incapable of being in manu, or actual

possession.

When a man is said to be seised in his demesne, it seems rather to be intended to express that

he has the actual beneficial property, and not a mere seignory or right to services. This is the

well known meaning of the term when the demesne lands of a i minor are spoken of.]

(3) [This rule ana its exceptions are thus distinctly stated by Mr. Preston in his treatise oil

Estates, 1 vol. 216, 217. " It may be assumed as a general rule, that the first estate of freehold

passing by any deed, or other assurance operating under the rules of the common law, cannot

be put in abeyance. 5 Rep. 94; 2 Bla. Com. 165; 1 Burr. 107. This rale is so strictly ob-

served : 2 Bla. Com. 165; 5 Rep. 194; Com. Dig. Abeyance; that no instance can be shewn in

which the law allows the freehold to be iu abeyance by the aot of the party. The case of a par-

son is not an exception to the rule : for it is by the act of law, and not of the party, that the free-

hold is, in this instance, in abeyance, from the death of the incumbent till the induction of

his successor: 1 Inst. 341, a; and considered as an exception, it is not within the reason of the

rule."]

(4) [The inheritance or remainder in such a case has been said to be in abeyance, or in nubibus.

or in gremio legis; but Mr. Pearne, with great ability and learning, has exposed the futility of

these expressions, and the erroneous ideas which have been conveyed by them. Mr. Fearne pro-

duces authorities, which prove beyond controversy, " that where a remainder of inheritance is

limited in contingency by way of use, or by devise, the inheritance in the mean time, if not other-

wise disposed of, remains in the grantor and his heirs, or in the heirs of the testator, until the

contingency happens to take it out of them." Pearne Cont. Rem. 513, 4th edit.

But although, as Mr. Pearne observes, " different opinions have prevailed in respect to the ad-

mission of this doctrine in conveyances at common law:" id. 526; yet he adduces arguments and

authorities which render the doctrine as unquestionable in this case as in the two former of uses

and devises. If, therefore, in the instance put by the learned judge, John should determine his

estate either by his death or by a feoffment in foe, which amounts to a forfeiture, in the Ufa

time of Richard, under which circumstance the remainder never could vest in the heirs of

Richard, in that case the grantor and his heir may enter and resume the estate.!

(5) [Mr. Pearne having attacked with so much success the doctrine of abeyance, the editor

may venture to observe with respect to the two last instances, though they are collected from

the text of Littleton, that there hardly seems any necessity to resort to abeyance, or to the

- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (2) [See page 20, where the author does not confine incorporeal hereditaments to things
issuing out of lands and housefl, but to things issuing out of any thing corporate, teal or per·
110nal. But the true rea.<;on of the distinction is clearly, not that the owner of the derivative has
no property in the land or house from which it is derived, but that the thing in which he has a
propertr, the right of way for instance, is incorporeal, and incapable of being ''~ manu, or actual
posseWhssion.
· sru"d •be se1se
· dm
· h"l!l demesne, 1"t seems rather to be mten
·
ded to express that
en a man 18
IAI
he has the actual beneficial property, and not a mere seignory or right to Rervices. This is the
well known meaning of the tenn when the demesne lands of a manor are spoken of.]
(3) [This role and its exceptions are thut> distinctly stated by Mr. Preston in his treatise on
Estates, 1 vol. 216, 217. "It may be assumed as a general rule, that the first estate of freehold
passing by any deed, or other a11~urance operating under the rules of the e<>mmon law, cannot
be put in abeyance. 5 Rep. 94; 2 Bla. Com. 16.5; 1 Burr. 107. This rule is so strictly observed: 2 Bia. Com. 16.5; 5 Rep. 194; Com. Dig. Abeyance ; that no instance can be shewn in
which the law allows tho freehold to be in abeyance by the act of the party. The case of a parson is not an exception to the ntle : for it is by the act of law, and not of the party, that the freehold is, in this instance, in abeyance, from the death of the incumbent till the induct.ion of
his successor: 1 Inst. 341, a; and considered os an exception, it is not within tho reason of the
rule."]
(4) [The inherit.ance or remainder in i>uch a case has been 1!3id to be in abeyance, or in nubibus1
or in gre111i-O legis; hut Mr. .l<'earne, with great ability and learning, has exposed the futility ot
these expressions, and the erroneous ideas which have been conveyed by them. Mr. Fee.me produces authorities, which prove beyond controT"ersy, "that where a remo.inder of inheritance is
limited in contingency by way of use, or by devise, the inheritance in the mean time, if not otherwise disposed of, remains in the grantor and his hei~, or in the heirs of the te11tator, until the
contingency happens to take it out of them." Fearne Cont. Rem. 513, 4th edit.
But althou~h, as Mr. Feame observes, "different opinionR have prevailed in respect to the admission of th1R doctrine in conveyances at common law :" id. 526; yet ho adduces arguments and
authoritie:i which render the doct-riue as unquestionable in this case as in the two forme.r of uses
and det'i.~es. If, therefore, in the instance put by the learned judge, John should determine his
estate either by hi11 death or by a feotfment in foe, which amounts to a forfeiture, in the life
time of Richard, under which circumstance the remainder never could vest in the heirs of
Richard, in that case the grantor and his heir may enter and resume the cAtate. l
(5) [Mr. Fearne having attacked with so much success the doctrine of abeyance, the editor
may venture to observe with respect to the two last instances, though they are collected from
the text of Littleton, that there hardly seems any necessity to resort to abeyance, or to tlio
clouds, to explain the residence of the inheritance, or of the freehold. In the tint case, the
whole fee simple is conveyed to a sole corporation, the person and his succe;;son; ; but if any
interest is not conveyed, it still remains, wi in the former note, in the grant,0r and hi11 heirs, to

clouds, to explain the residence of the inheritance, or of the freehold. In the first case, the

:J:J5

whole fee simple is conveyed to a sole corporation, the parson and his successors; but if any

interest is not conveyed, it still remains, as in the former note, in the grantor and his heirs, to
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The word " heirs " is necessary in the grant or donation, in order to make

a fee, or inheritance. For if land be given to a man forever, or to him and his

assigns forever, this vests in him but an estate for life. (M) This very great

nicety about the insertion of the word " heirs " in all feoffments and grants, in

order to vest a fee, is plainly a relic of the feudal strictness; by which we may

r *108 I remember (w) it was required, *that the form of the donation should be

' J punctually pursued; or that, as Cragg (x) expresses it in the words of

Baldus, " donationes sint stricti juris, ne quis plus donasse prasumatur quam in

donatione expresserit." And therefore, as the personal abilities of the donee

were originally supposed to be the only inducements to the gift, the donee's

estate in the land extended only to his own person, and subsisted no longer than

his life; unless the donor, by an express provision in the grant, gave it a longer

continuance, and extended it also to his neirs. But this rule is now softened

by many exceptions, (y)

For, 1. It does not extend to devises by will; (6) in which, as they were intro-

duced at the time when the feudal rigour was apace wearing out, a more liberal

(it) IMd. } 1. (v) See page 56. (x) 1.1, t. 9,117. (9} Co. Litt. 9.10.

•whom, upon the dissolution of the corporation, the estate will revert See book 1, 484. AM

The word "heirs " is neceBB&ry in the grant or donation, in order to make
a fee, or inheritance. For if land be given to a mwi forever, or to him and his
assigns forever, this vests in him but an estate for life. (") This very great
nicety about the insertion of the word "heirs" in all feoffments and grants, in
order to vest a fee, is plainly a relic of the feudal strictness ; by which we may
[ *lOS] remember (w) it was required, *that the form of the donation should be
punctually pursued; or that, as Cragg (x) expresses it in the words of
Baldus, "donationes sint stricti .furis, ne quis plus donasse pr<8.mmatur quarn in
donatione expresserit." And therefore, as the personal abilities of the donec
were originally supposed to be the only inducements to the gift, the donee's
estate in the land extended only to his own person, and subsisted no longer than
his life; unless the donor, by an express provision in the grant, gave it a longer
continuance, and extended it also to his heirs. But this rule is now softened
by many exceptions. (y)
For, 1. It does not extend to devises by will; (6) in which, as they were introduced at the time when the feudal rigour was apace wearing out, a more liberal

in the second case the freehold seems, in fact, from the moment of the death of the parson, to rest

(U) Ibid.

f 1.

(ID) See

page M.

(11:)

l. 1,

t. 9, t 17.

(f)

Co. LIU. 9. 10.

and abide in the successor, who is brought into view and notice by the institution and indnction;

for after induction he can recover all the rights of the church, which accrued from the death of

his predecessor.] See 6 Cl. and Fin. 850.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

(6) [See post, the 23d chapter of this book, page 380. Lord Coke teaches us, 1 Inst. 322, b,

that it was the maxim of the common law, and not, as has been sometimes said, Idle v. Cook, 1

P. Wms. 77, a principle arising out of the wording of the statutes of wills : 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1;

34 Hen. VIII, c. 5 ; " quod ultima voluntas testatoris eat perimplenda, secundum veram inten-

tifinem twain." For this reason, Littleton says, scot. 586, if a man deviseth tenements to another,

habendum in perpetmim, the devisee taketh a fee simple; yet, if a deed of feoffinent had been

made to him In the devisor of the said tenements, habendum ribi in perpetuum, he should have

an estate but for term of his life, for want of the word heirs. In Webb ». Herring, 1 RolleV Rep.

399, it was determined, that a devise to a man and his successors, gives a fee. But, whether a

devise to a man and his posterity would give an estate tail, or a fee, was doubted in The Attor-

ney-General ». Bamfield, 2 Kreom. 2(58. Under a devise to a legatee, " for her own use, and to

give away at her death to whom she pleases," Mr. Justice Fortescue said, there was no doubt a

fee passed: Timewell r. Perkins, 2 Atk. 103; and the same doctrine was held in Goodtitle r.

Otway, 2 Wils. 7 ; see also infra. And a devise of the testator's lands and tenements U> his

executors, " freely to be possessed and enjoyed by them alike," was held, in Loveacres r. Blight,

COWD. 357, to carry the fee: for the testator had charged the estate with the payment of an

annuity, which negatived the idea, that, by the ward freely he only meant to give the estate free

of incumbrances: the free enjoyment, therefore, it was held, must mean, free from all limitations.

But, if the testator had not put anv charge on the estate, this would not have been the necessary

construction; nor would so extended a meaning have been given to those words against the heir,

in any case where it was not certain that the testator meant more than that his devisee should

possess and enjoy the estate, free from all charges, or, free from impeachnwnt ofvasle. Good-

right v. Barren, 11 East, 224.

Thus, if a man devises all his freehold estate to big wife, during her natural life, and also at

her disposal afterwards, to leave it to vihom she pleases, the word leave confines the :iutlmrit >,• of

the devisee for life to a disposition by will only. Doe u. Thorley, 16 East, 443; and see infra.

This, it will at once be obvious, is by no means inconsistent with what was laid down in

Timewell r. Perkins, as before cited. The distinction is pointed out in Tomlinson r. Dig^hton :

1 P. Wins. 174; thus, where a power is given, with a particular description and limitation of

the estate devised to the donee of the power, the power is a distinct gift, coming in by way

of addition, but will not enlarge the estate expressly given to the devisee; though, when the

devise is general and indefinite, with a power to dispose of the fee, there the devisee himself

takes the fee. In some few instances, indeed, courts of equity have inclined to consider a

right of eujovment for life, coupled with a power of appointment, as equivalent to the absolute

property. $tenden e. Standen, 2 Ves. Jun. 594. A difference, however, seems now to be

firmly established, not so much with regard to the party possessing a power of disposal, as

out of consideration for those parties whose interests depend upon the non-execution of that

power. Croft v. Slee, 4 Vcs. 64. Confining the attention to the former, there may be no

reason why that which he has power to dispose of should not be considered as his property;

but the interests of the latter ought not to be affected in any other manner than that specified at

the creation of the power. Holmes v. Cogbill, 7 Ves. 506; Jones v. Curry, 1 Swanst. 73; Reid

whom, upon the di1111olution of the corporation, the estate will revert. See book 1, 484. An1l
in the second case the freehold ~eems, in fact, from the moment of the death of the parson, to rest
and abide in the successor, who is brought into new and notice by the institution and induction;
for after induction he can recover all the rights of tho church, which accrued from the death of
hi!! predecei!:!Or.] See 6 Cl. and Fin. 850.
(6) [Src post. the 23d chapter of this book, page 380. Lord Coke teaches us, 1 Inst. 322, b,
that it was the maxim of the common law, and not, as has been sometimes said, Idle t'. Cook, 1
P. Wm::i. 77, a principle atiRing out of the wording of the statutes of wills: 3'2 Hen. VIII, c. 1;
34 Hen. VIII, c. 5; "<JUOd ultima voluntas teatawris eat perimplenda, secrmdum veram inknti-Onet11 RUam." For this roa1mn, Littleton says, sect. 586, if a man deviseth tenements to another,
'kabm1d11m in perp"tuum, the devisee taketh a fee simple; yet, if a deed of feoft'ment had been
made to him by the devisor of the said tenements, llabendum Bibi in perpetuum, he should ha,·o
an eRtate but for term of hit1 life, for want of the word lu!ira. In Webb v. Herring, 1 Rolle'R Rep.
399, It was determined, that a devi11e to a man and his succ68sors gives a fee. But, whether a
devise to a man and his postr.rity would give an estate tail, or a fee, W&R doubted in The Attorney-General v. Bamfield, 2 F'reem. 21:i8. Under a devi1m to a legatee, "for her own use, and to
give away at her death to whom she ple11.11e11," :Mr. Justice Fortescue 11aid, there WBI! no doubt a
foe pa.'ll!ed: Timewell "· PcrkinR, 2 Atk. 103; and the same doctrine WM held in Goodtitle "·
Otway, 2 Wih1. 7 ; see also infra. .And a devise of the tc11tatcor'1.1 lands and tenements to his
executors. " freely to be posse~sed and enjoyed by them alike," Wal! held,_ in l..oveacres "· Blight,
Cowl!. 357, to carry the fee: for the telltator had charged the estate Wlth the payment of an
annwty, which negatived the idl',a, that, by the word f1·eely he only meant to give the estate fre.e
of incttmb1m1cea: the free enjoyment, therefore, it Wal! held, must mean, free from all limitatioru;.
But, if the te:1tatm had not put any charge on the estate, this would not ha¥e been the neceR~·
construction ; nor v.-ould so extended a meaning have been given to those words against the heir.
in any case where it was not certain that the testator meant more than that his devi11ee should
po11sess and enjoy the estate, fr88 f'roM au charfJ88, or, free from im~h11uml of 1CIJ8te. Goodright v. Barron, 11 East, 224.
%us, if a man devises all his freehold 011tate to hiB wife, dvring Mr natvral lift1, and also at
lier disposal af~ards, to kave it to whom IJM p1Ma811, the word ltJavt1 confines the authority of
the devisoo for life to a disposition by will only. Doe v. Thorley, 16 East, 443; and aee i•fra.
ThiR, it will at once be obvious, ill by no means inconsistent with what WBll laid down in
Timcwcll r. Perkins, as before cited. The distinction ill pointed out in Tomlinson v. Di~hton :
1 P. Wm11. 174; thus, where a power is given, with a particular det!Criptiou and limitation of
the eRtatc devised to the donee of the power, the power is a. distinct ~i.t\, coming in by "·ay
of addition, but will not enlarge the eetate expressly given to the dev111ee; though, when the
devise if! genernl and indefinite, with a power to dispose of the fee, there the dev1see him11elf
takes the fee. In 11ome few instances, indeed, courtll of equity have inclined to consider a
right of cujovmcnt for life, coupled with a power of appointment, as equivalent w the ab>'Olute
property. Standen v. Standen, 2 Ves. Jun. 694. .A difference, however, SOOIIlll now to be
firmly et1tablished, not so much with regard to the party possessing a power of di:1po!\Bl, &1>
out of consideration for thoKe parties who11e lntere11ti! depend upon the non-execution of that
power. Croft. v. Slee, 4 Ve~. 64. Confining the attention to the former, there may be no
re~ why that which he h811 power to dispose of should not be considered as his property;
but the intere11ti1 of the latter ought not to be affected in any other manner t.han that 1.1pecifioo at
tho creation of the power. Holme1.1 v. Cogbill, 7 Vcs. 506; Jones v. Curry, 1 Swanst. 7:J; Rl'id
v. 8hergold, 10 Ves. 383. When, therefore, a devise or bequest (for the principle seems to
apply equally to realty 88 to personalty), is made to any one expreealy for life, with a. power

396

v. Shergold, 10 Ves. 383. When, therefore, a devise or bequest (for the principle seems to

apply equally to realty as to personalty), is made to any one expressly for life, with a power
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construction is allowed; and therefore by a devise to a man forever, or to one

and his assigns forever, or to one in fee-simple, the devisee hath an estate of

inheritance ; for the intention of the devisor is sufficiently plain from the words

of perpetuity annexed, though he hath omitted the legal words of inheritance.

But if the devise be to a man and his assigns, without annexing words of per-

of appointment, by will only, supcradded, that power (88 already has been intimated) must be

executed in the manner prescribed; for, the property not being absolute in the first taker, the

objects of the power cannot take without a formal appointment; but, where the devise or

bequest is made indefinitely, with a superadded power to dispose by will or deed, the property

(as we have seen) vests absolutely. The distinction may, perhaps, seem slight, but it has oeen

judicially declared to be perfectly settled. Bradly v. Westcott, 13 Tea. 463; Anderson v.

Dawson, 15 id. 536; Barford v. Street, 16 id. 139; Nannock v. Horton, 7 id. 398; Irwin

t>. Farrer, 19 id. 87. Where an estate is devised absolutely, without any prior estate limited

to such uses as a person shall appoint, that is an estate in fee. Langham v. Nenny, 3 Ves.

470. And the word "estate," when used by a testator, and not restrained to a narrower

signification by the context of the will, Doe v. Hurrell, 5 Barn, and Aid. 21, is sufficient to

carry real estate: Barnes v. Patch, 8 Ves. 608; Woollam v. Kenworthy, 9 id. 142; and that

not merely a life interest therein, but the fee, although no words of limitation in perpetuity

are added. Roe v. Eight, 7 East, 268; Right v. Sidebotham, 2 Dougl. 763; Charlton v. Taylor,

3 Ves. and Bea. 163; Pettiward v. Prescott, 7 Ves. 545 ; Nicholls v. Butcher, 18 id. 195. And

the subsequent clauses of devise are inexplicit, the introductory words will hare an effect on

the construction, as affording some indication of the testator's intention. Ibbetson v. Beckwith,
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Ca. temp. Talb. 160; Goodright v. Stocker, 5 T. R. 13; Doe r. Buckner, 6 id. 612; Gulliver

u. Poyntz, 3 Wils. 143; Smith «. Coffin, 3 H. Bla. 450. But though slight circumstances may

be admitted to explain obscurities : Randall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. 77 ; and words may be enlarged,

abridged, or transposed, in order to reach the testator's meaning, when such liberties are

necessary to make the will consistent: Keiley «. Fowler, Wilm. notes, 309; still, no operative

and effective clause in a wEl must be controlled by ambiguous words occurring in the intro-

ductory parts of it, unless this is absolutely necessary in order to furnish a reasonable inter-

pretation of the whole : Lord Oxford v. Churchill, 3 Ves and Bea. 67 ; Hampson v. Brandwood,

1 Mad. 388 ; Leigh v. Norbnry, 13 Ves. 344 ; Doe v. Pearoe, 1 Pr. 365 : neither can a subsequent

clause of limitation as to one subject of devise, be governed by words of introduction which,

though clear, are not properly applicable to that particular subject: Nasfi v. Smith, 17 Ves. 33;

Doe v. Clayton, 8 East, 144; Denn v. Gaskin, Cowp. 661; while, on the other hand, an express

disposition in an early part of a will must not receive an exposition from a subsequent passage,

affording only a conjectural inference. Roach v. Hynes, 8 Ves. 590; Barker v. Lea, 3 Ves. and

Bea. 117; S. C., 1 Turn, and Russ, 416; Jones v. Colbeck, 8 Ves. 42; Parsons v. Baker, 18 id.

478; Thackeray v. Hampson, 2 Sim. and Stn. 217.

Where an estate is devised, and the devisee is subjected to a charge, which charge is not

directed to be paid out of the rents and profits, the devise will carry a fee-simple, notwithstand-

ing the testator has added no words of express limitation in perpetuity. Upon this point, the

distinction is settled, that, where the charge is on the person to whom the land is devised (in

general terms, not where he has an estate-tail given him, Dean v. Slater, 5 T. R. 337), there he

must take the fee; but not where the charge is upon the land devised, and payable out of it. And

the reason given why, in the former case, the devisee must take the fee, is because otherwise the

estate may not be sufficient to pay the charge during the life of the devisee, which would make

him a loser, and that could not have been the intention of the devisor. Goodtitle v. Maddern, 4

East, 500 ; Doe r. Holmes, 8 T. R. 1; Doe v. Clarke, 2 New Rep. 349; Roe v. Daw, 3 Mau. and

Sel. 522; Baddeley v. Leapingwell, Wilrn. Notes, 235; Collier's Case, 6 Rep. 16.

With regard to the operation of the word " hereditaments" in a win, Mr. Justice Bnllur

said, there nave been vanous opinions ; in some cases it has been held to pass a fee, in others

not: Doe v. Richards, 3 T. K. 360; but the latter construction seems now to be firmly

established as the true one. The settled sense of the word " hereditaments," Chief Baron

Macdonald declared in Moore r. Denn, 2 Bos. and Pull. 251, is, to denote such things as may be

the subject-matter of inheritance, but not the inheritance itself; and cannot, therefore, by its

own intrinsic force, enlarge an estate which isprima facie a life estate, into a foe. It may have

weight, under particular circumstances, in explaining the other expressions in a will, from

•whence it may be collected, in a manner agreeable to the rules of law, that the testator

intended to give a fee; but in Canning v. Canning, Mosely, 242, it was considered as quite

settled by the decision in Hopewell v. Acklaud, 1 Salk. 239, that a fee will not pass merely by the

use of the word "hereditament." And see the same case of Denn v. Moore, in its previous stages

of litigation: 3 Anstr. 787; 5 T. R. 563; as also Pocock v. The Bishop of Lincoln, 3 Brod. and

Bing. 33.]

By the wills act, 1 Vic. c. 26, s. 28, it is provided that a devise of any real estate without words

of limitation, shall carry the fee-simple, or the whole interest, whatever it may be, of the testa-

tor, unless a contrary intention appear by the will.
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petuity, there the devisee shall take only an estate for life; for it does not appear

that the devisor intended any more. 2. Neither does this rule extend to fines

or recoveries considered as a species of conveyance; for thereby an estate in fee

passes by act and operation of law without the word " heirs," as it does also, for

particular reasons, by certain other methods of conveyance, which have relation

to a former grant or estate, wherein the word " heirs" was expressed, (z) 3. In

creations of nobility by writ, the peer so created hath an inheritance in his title,

without expressing the word " heirs;" for heirship is implied in the creation,

unless it be otherwise specially provided: but in creations by patent, which are

stricti juris the word " heirs" must be inserted, otherwise there is no inherit-

ance. 4. In grants of lands to sole corporations and their successors, the word

" successors " supplies the place of " heirs;" for as heirs take from the ancestor,

r H.IQO I 8° doth the successor from the predecessor. (7) Nay, in *a grant to a

L J bishop, or other sole spiritual corporation, in frankalmoign; the word

"frankalmoign " supplies the place of " successors " (as the word " successors "

supplies the place of "heirs") ex vi termini; and in all these cases a fee-simple

vests in such sole corporation. But, in a grant of lands to a corporation aggre-

gate, the word "successors" is not necessary, though usually inserted: for,

albeit such simple grant be strictly only an estate for life, yet, as that corpora-

tion never dies, such estate for life is perpetual, or equivalent to a fee-simple,

and therefore the law allows it to be one. (a) 5. Lastly, in the case of the king,

a fee-simple will vest in him, without the word " heirs" or " successors" in
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the grant; partly from prerogative royal, and partly from a reason similar to

the last, because the king in judgment of law never dies, (b) But the general

rule is, that the word " heirs " is necessary to create an estate of inheritance. (8)

(:) Co. Lilt. 9. (u) See Book I. p. 484. fl>) See book I, p. «48.

(7) [But the word " heirs" in a grant to a corporation sole, will not convey a fee, any more

than the word " successors " in a grant to a natural person. Co. Litt. 8, b.]

(8J In many of the states of the American union, the strict rule of the common law requiring

the use of the word "heirs" ha* been changed by statutes, which make a deed convey an estate

of inheritance where it appears from the instrument that such was the intent of the parties. In

the absence of such statutes, however, the common law rule is still in force. Sedgwiek v. Laflin,

10 Allen, 430; Clearwater v. Eose, 1 Blackf. 137; Adams u. Boss, 1 Vroom, 511; Jones t.

Bramblet, 1 Scain. 276; Tan Horn v. Harrison, 1 Doll. 137.

And generally no other words, though conveying to the unprofessional mind a clear intent to

transfer an inheritance, will be sufficient for the purpose. A strong illustration of this is the case

of Foster v. Joice, 3 Wash. C. C. 498. where a deed to M. "and his generation, to endure so long as

the waters of the Delaware ruu," was held to convey a life estate only. See an exceptional case in

Johnson v. Gilbert, 13 Rich. Eq. 42. In Vermont, it was held that a lease of premises to hold, "as

long as wood grows and water runs," conveyed a fee: Arms ». Burt, I Yt. 303; but this case is not

in harmony with the others above referred to. See 4 Kent, 6. A legislative grant, it has been held,

may convey a fee without making use of the technical words essential in a deed. Rutherford p.

Greene, 2 Wheat. 196. And a government deed given to carry into efl'ect a donation previously con-

firmed by the proper authorities, and which runs to the donee "or his heirs," in trust for the person

or persons rightfully entitled, will be regarded as intending to convey the fee to the donee, if living,

and to his heirs if he be dead. Ready v. Kearsley, 14 Mich. 215. See Freidman v. Goodwin, 1 McAfl.

142; Griffing v. Gibb. Ibid. 212. A government grant in any form the legislature may prescribe is

sufficient, and it will take effect according to the intent. Patton v. Easton, 1 Wheat. 476; Ruther-

ford v. Greene, 2 Wheat. 196; Strother v. Lucas, 6 Pet. 763.

That where, by will, lands are devised in terms which indicate an intent to pass all the tes-

tator's interest, a fee (if he has it) will pass without the use of the word " heirs, see the follow-

ing American cases; Newkerk v. Newkerk, 2 Caines, 345 ; Morrison t>. Semple, 6 Binn. 94; Jack-

son D. Merrill, 6 Johns. 192; Jackson v. Housel. 17 id. 281; Fogg v. Clark, 1 N. H. 163; Baker F.

Bridge, 12 Pick. 31; Godfrey v. Humphrey, 18 id. 537; Lambert v. Paine, 3 Cranch, 97; Kellogg

v. Blair, 6 Mete. 322: Tracy v. Kilborn, 3 Gush. 557; Lilliard v. Robinson, 3 Litt. 415.

Another important class of cases ought to be mentioned here as an exception to the general rule,

that the use of the word "heirs" is essential to pass a fee. We refer to conveyances in trust, in

which case the trustee mnst be held to take an estate as large as may be necessary for the purposes

of the trust, whether the instrument of conveyance contains words of inheritance or not. Illustra-

tions of this exception may be seen in the following cases: Spessard v. Rhorer, 9 Gill, 261; Newhall

v. Wheeler, 7 Moss. 189; Farquharson v. Eichelberger, 15 Md. 63; Gould v. Lamb, 11 Mete. 87;

Angell t>. Rosenbury, 12 Mich. 241; Fisher v. Fields, 10 Johns. 495; Welch r. Allen, 21 Wend. 147;

Attorney-General r. Proprietors, etc., 3 Gray, 48; Neilson ». Lagow, 12 How. 98; Korn«. Cutler, 36

Conn. 4; North v. Philbrook, 34 Me. 532. See as to this rule Weller v. Rolason, 2 Green, N. J., 13;

Perry on Trusts, sec. 312 to sec. 320. A grant to a sovereignty requires no words of inheritance.

Josephs v. United States, 1 Court of Claims R. 197.
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II. Wo are next to consider limited fees, or such estates of inheritance as are

clogged and confined with conditions, or qualifications, of any sort. And these

we may divide into two sorts: 1. Qualified, or base fees; and, 2. Fees conditional,

so called at the common law; and afterwards fees-tail, in consequence of the

statute de donis.

1. A base, or qualified fee, is such a one as hath a qualification subjoined

thereto, and which must be determined whenever the qualification annexed to

it is at an end. As, in the case of a grant to A and his heirs, tenants of the manor

of Dale; in this instance, whenever the heirs of A cease to be tenants of that

manor, the grant is entirely defeated. So when Henry VI granted to John

Talbot, lord of the manor of Kingston-Lisle in Berks, that he and his heirs,

lords of the said manor, should be peers of the realm, by the title of barons o£

Lisle; here John Talbot had a base or qualified fee in that dignity, (c) and, the

instant he or his heirs quitted the seignory of this manor, the dignity was at an

end. This *estate (9) is a fee, because by possibility it may endure for- r „, ,„ -,

ever in a man and his heirs: yet as that duration depends upon the L J

concurrence of collateral circumstances, which qualify and debase the purity of

the donation, it is therefore a qualified or base fee.

2. A conditional fee, at the common law, was a fee restrained to some par-

ticular heirs, exclusive of others: "donatio stricta et coarctata; (d) sicut certis

hceredibus, quibusdam a successione exclusis;" as to the heirs of a man's body,

by which only his lineal descendants were admitted, in exclusion of collateral
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heirs; or to the heirs male of his body, in exclusion both of collaterals, and

lineal females also. It was called a conditional fee, by reason of the condition

expressed or implied in the donation of it, that if the donee died without such

particular heirs, the land should revert to the donor. For this was a condition

annexed by law to all grants whatsoever; that, on failure of the heirs specified

in the grant, the grant should be at an end, and the land return to its ancient

proprietor, (e) Such conditional fees were strictly agreeable to the nature of

feuds, when they first ceased to be mere estates for life, and were not yet arrived

to be absolute estates in fee-simple. And we find strong traces of these limited,

conditional fees, which could not be alienated from the lineage of the first pur-

chaser, in our earliest Saxon laws. (/)

Now, with regard to the condition annexed to these fees by the common law,

our ancestors held, that such a gift (to a man and the heirs of his body)

was a gift upon condition, that it should revert to the donor if the donee had

no heirs of his body; but, if he had, it should then remain to the donee. They

therefore call it a fee-simple, on condition that he had issue. (10) Now we

must observe, that, when any condition is performed, it is thenceforth entirely

gone; and the thing to which it was before annexed becomes absolute,

(c) Co. Litt. 27. (d) Flet. I. 3, c. 8, if 5. (e) Plowd. 241.

I/) .S7 quit terram tuereditariam habeat, earn rum vendat a cognatit haredibut suit, tt OH viro prohibition

tit, '/'" """ "I' initio acquisivit, ut itafacere negueat. LL. jEyred, c. S7.

(9) [The proprietor of a qualified or base fee has the same rights and privileges over his

estate, till the contingency upon which it is limited occurs, as if he were tenant in fee simple.

II. We are next to consider limited fees, or such estates of inheritance as are
clogged and confined with conditions, or qualifications, of any sort. And these
we may divide into two sorts: 1. Qualified, or base fees; and, 2. Fees conditional,
so called at the common law; and afterwards fees-tail, in consequence of the
statute de donis.
1. A base, or qualified fee, is such a one as hath a qualification subjoined
thereto, and which must be determined whenever the qualification annexed to
it is at an end. As, in the case of a grant to A and his heirs, tenants of the manor
of Dale; in this instance, whenever the heirs of A cease to be tenants of that
manor, the grant is entirely defeated. So when Henry VI granted to John
'rnlhot, lord of the manor of Kingston-Lisle in Berks, that he and his heirs,
lords of the said manor, should be peers of the realm, by the title of barons o~
Lisle; here John Talbot had a base or qualifie.d fee in that dignity, (c} and, the
instant he or his heirs quitted the seignory of this manor, the dignity was at an
end. Thie *estate (9) is a fee, because by possibility it may endure for- [ *llO]
ever in a man and his heirs: yet as that duration depends upon the
concun-ence of collateral circumstances, which qualify and debase the purity of
the donation, it is therefore a qualified or base fee.
2. A conditional fee, at the common law, was a fee restrained to some particular heirs, exclusive of others: "donatio stricta et coarctata; (d) sicut certis
hmredibus, q1tibusdam a successione exclusis ;" as to the heirs of a man's body,
by which only his lineal descendants were admitted, in exclus'ion of collateral
heirs; or to the heirs male of his body, in exclusion both of collaterals, and
lineal females also. It was called a conditional fee, by re.a.son of the condition
expressed or implied in the donation of it, that if the donee died without such
particular heirs, the land should reYert to the donor. For this was a condition
annexed by law to all grants whatsoever; that, on failure of the heirs specified
in the grant, the grant should be at an end, and the land return to its ancient
proprietor. (e) Such conditional fees were strictly agreeable to the nature of
feuds, when they first ceased to be mere estates for life, and were not yet arrived
to be absolute estates in fee-simple. And we find strong traces of these limited,
conditional fees, which could not be alienated from the lineage of the first purchaser, in our earliest Saxon laws. (f)
Now, with regard to the condition annexed to these fees by the common law,
onr ancestors held, that such a gift (to a man and the heirs of hie body)
was a gift upon condition, that it should revert to the donor if the donee bad
no heirs of his body; but, if he had, it should then remain to the donee. 'fhey
therefore call it a foe-simple, on condition that he had issue. (10) Now we
must observe, that, when any condition is performed, it is thenceforth entirely
gone; and the thing to which it was before annexed becomes absolute,
(c) Co. Litt. '17.
(d) Flet. l. 3, c. 8, t ll.
(e) Plowd. 241.
tf) Si q14ia ~m "'"°editaf"i{1m llabeal. Mm non 1'tfldat a ~gnatU hairedibtu 111ia, ri UU 1'iro proMl>Uum
.U, qui eatn ab inUlo a<:quUivU, ut Uafacere MqUeat. LL. .£1,fred, c. lf1.

Walsingham's Case, Plowd. 557.]

(10) [In the great case of Willion ». Berkeley, Plowd. 233, Lord C. J. Dyer said, upon the

grant of a conditional fee, the fee-simple vested at the beginning; by having issue, the donee

acquired power to alien, which he had not before, but the issue was not the cause of his

having the fee, the first gift vested that: and in p. 835 it was said, when land was given (before

the statute de donis) to a man and the heirs of his body, this was a fee-simple, with a condition

annexed, that, if the donee died without such heirs, the land should revert to the donor; to

whom, therefore, the common law gave a formedon in reverter. But he was not entitled to a

writ of formedon in remainder, for no remainder could be limited upon such an estate, which,

though determinable, was considered a fee-simple, until the statute ot de donis was made: since

the statute we call that an estate-tail, which before was a conditional fee: id. p. 239; and

while it continued so, if the donee had issue, he had power to alienate the fee, and to bar not

only the succession of his issue, but the reversion of the donor in case his issue subsequently

failed. To redress which evils (as they were thought to be), the act de donis conditionalibua

was made. Id. p. 242, 245.]
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(9) [The proprietor of a qualified or base fee has the same rights and privileges over his
estate, till the continp;ency upon which it is limited occurs, as if he were tenant in fee simple.
Walsingham'R CB.'le, Plowd. 557.]
(10) [In the l!reat case of Willion v. Berkeley, Plowd. 233, Lord C. J. Dyer said, upon the
grant o( a condit10nal fee, the fee-simple vested e.t the beginning; by haling issue, the donee
acquired power to alien, which he had not l>efore, but the issue was not the cause of his
having the fee, the first gift vested that: and in J.l· 235 it was Raid, when laud wuM given (before
the statute de donis) to a man and the heinl of his body, this was a fee-simple, with a condition
annexed, that, if the donee died without such heirs, the land should revert to the donor; to
whom, therefore, the common law gave a foNMdon in reverter. But he Wl\S not entitled to a
writ offormedon in remainder, for no remainder could be limited upon such nn estate, which,
though determinable, was considered a fee-simple, until the statute of de doni.~ WM made: since
the statute we call that e.n estate-tail, which before was a conditional fee: id. p. 239; and
while it continued so, if the donee had ii!sue, he had power to alienate the foe, and to l>ar not
only the succeilllion of his issue, but the reversion of the donor in case his issue sub8equently
failed. To redrel!!! which evils (BB they were thought to be), the a.ct de donis conditionalibus
was made. Id. p. 242, 245.]
·
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r*llll *an^ wholly unconditional. (11) So that, as soon as the grantee had any

*• -" issue born, his estate was supposed to become absolute, by the perform-

ance of the condition; at least for these three purposes: 1. To enable the

tenant to aliene the land, and thereby to bar not only his own issue, but also

the donor of his interest in the reversion, (g) 2. To subject him to forfeit it for

treason; which he could not do, till issue born, longer than for his own life;

lest thereby the inheritance of the issue, and reversion of the donor, might have

been defeated, (h) 3. To empower him to charge the land with rents, commons,

and certain other incumbrances, so as to bind his issue, (i) And this was

thought the more reasonable, because, by the birth of issue, the possibility of

the donor's reversion was rendered more distant and precarious; and his interest

seems to have been the only one which the law, as it then stood, wag solicitous

to protect; without much regard to the right of succession intended to be vested

in the issue. However, if the tenant did not in fact aliene the land, the course

of descent was not altered by this performance of the condition; for if the issue

had afterwards died, and then the tenant, or original grantee, had died, without

making any alienation; the land, by the terms of the donation, could descend

to none but the heirs of his body, and therefore, in default of them, must have

reverted to the donor. For which reason, in order to subject the lands to the

ordinary course of descent, the donees of these conditional fee-simples took care

to aliene as soon as they had performed the condition by having issue; and

afterwards repurchased the lands, which gave them a fee-simple absolute, that
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would descend to the heirs general according to the course of the common law.

And thus stood the old law with regard to conditional fees: which things, says

Sir Edward Coke, (k) though they seem ancient, are yet necessary to be known;

as well for the declaring how the common law stood in such cases, as for the

sake of annuities, and such like inheritances, as are not within the statutes of

entail, and therefore remain as at the common law.

F *1121 *The inconveniences which attended these limited and fettered in-

"• J heritances, were probably what induced the judges to give way to this

subtle finesse of construction (for such it undoubtedly was), in order to shorten

the duration of these conditional estates. But, on the other hand, the nobility,

who were willing to perpetuate their possessions in their own families, to put a

stop to this practice, procured the statute of Wesminster the second (I) (com-

monly called the statute de donis conditionalibus) to be made; which paid a

greater regard to the private will and intentions of the donor, than to the pro-

priety of such intentions, or any public consideration whatsoever. This statute

revived in some sort the ancient feudal restraints which were originally laid on

alienations, by enacting, that from thenceforth the will of the donor be observed;

and that the tenements so given (to a man and the heirs of his body) should at

all events go to the issue, if there were any; or, if none, should revert to the

donor.

Upon the construction of this act of parliament, the judges determined that

the donee had no longer a conditional fee-simple, which became absolute and at

his own disposal, the instant any issue was born; but they divided the estate

into two parts, leaving in the donee a new kind of particular estate, which they

denominated a fee-tail; (m) and investing in the donor the ultimate fee-simple

(;/) Co. LIU. 19. 9 lust. 233. (») Co. TJtt., ibid. 2 lust. 234. (0 Co. Lilt. 19.

(i) 1 Inst. in. «) 13 Edw. I, c. 1.

(ml The expression fee-tall, or feodnm taUiatum, was borrowed from the feudUt*) (see Crag. J. 1. 1.10, ».

[ *lll] *and whoUy unconditional. (11) So that, as soon as the grantee had any
issue born, his estate was supposed to become absolute, by the performance of the condition; at lea.st for these three purposes: 1. To enable the
tenant to aliene the land, and thereby to bar not only his own issue, but also
the donor of his interest in the reversion. ( g) 2. To subject him to forfeit it for
treason; which he could not do, till issue born, longer than for his own life;
lest thereby the inheritauC{' of the issue, and reversion of the donor, might have
been defeated. (h) 3. To empower him to charge the land with rents, commons,
and certain other incumbrauces, so as to bind his issue. (i) And this was
thought the more reasonable, because, by the birth of issue, the possibility of
the donor's reversion was rendered more distant and precarious; and Ms interest
~ems to have been the only one which the law, as it then stood, was solicitous
to prot.ect; without much regard to the right of succession intended to be -vest.ed
in the issue. However, if the tenap.t did not in fUA::t aliene the land, the course
of descent was not altered by this performance of the condition; for if the issue
had afterwards died, and then the tenant, or original grantee, had died, without
making any alienation; the land, by the tennB of the donation, could descend
to none but the heirs ~f Ids bod!/, and therefore, in default of them, must have
reverted to the donor. For which reason, in order to subject the lands to the
ordinary course of descent, the donees of these conditional fee-simples took care
to aliene as soon as they had performed the condition by having issue; and
afterwards repurchased the lands, which g-ave them a fee-simple aosolute, that
would descend to the heirs genera.I according to the course of the common law.
And thus stood the old law with regard to conditional fees: which things, says
Sir Edward Coke, (k) though they seem ancient, are yet necessary to be known;
as well for the declaring how the common law stood in such cases, as for the
sake of annuities, and such like inheritances, as are not within the statutes of
entail, and therefore remain as at the common law.
*The inconveniences which attended these limited and fettered in[ • 112 ]
heritances, were probably what induced the judges to gi..-e way to this
subtle finesse of construction (for such it undoubtedly was), in order to shorten
the duration of these conditional estates. But, on the other hand, the nobilit'\',
who were willing to perpetuate their possessions in their own families, to pufa
stop to this practice, procured the statute of Wesminster the second (l) (commonly called the statute de donis condUionalibus) to be made; which paid a
greater regard to the pri..-ate will and intentions of the donor, than to the propriety of such intentions, or any public consideration whatsoever. This statute
revived in some sort the ancient feudal restraints which were originally laid on
alienations, by enacting, that from thenceforth the will of the donor be observed;
and that the tenements so given (to a man and the heirs of his body) should e.t
all events go to the issue, if there were any; or, if none, should revert to the
donor.
Upon the construction of this act of parliament, the judges determined that
the donee had no longer a conditional fee-simple, which became absolute and at
his own disposal, the instant any issue was born; but they divided the estate
into two parts, leaving in the donee a new kind of particular estate, which they
denominated a fee-tail; (m.) and investing in the donor the ultimate fee-simple

24, 25); among whom it signified any mutilated or truncated Inheritance, from which the neira general

were cut off; being derived from the barbarous verb taliare, to cut; from which the French talier and the

Italian tagliare arc formed. (Spolm., Gloss. 631.)

(11) [Where the person to whom a conditional fee was limited had issue, and suffered it to

descend to such issue, they might alien it. But, if they did not alien, the donor would still

(gl Co. Lltl. 19. ll Inst. 2.13.
(l) Co. Litt., Q>(d, 2 In11t. 2lU.
('1 Co. Llti. 19.
ill 13 Edw. I, e. 1.
(ml The expression fee-t<iil, or fwd.um taUiatum, was borrowed t'rom the tendlet.'I \eee Crag. l. 1. t. 10, •·
ti, 2.~) ; among whom lt 8igni1led any mntllated or truncated lnherltanoe, Crom which the llein general
were cut on"; being dorlrnol from tile barb11rona verb talion, to cui; from which die French taUer and I.he
Italian tagliare arc formed. (Spelm., Glos•. li.'Jl.)
\k) 1 lnet. l!l.

have been entitled to his right of reverter; for the estate would have continued subject to the

limitations contained in the original donation. Uevill's Case, 7 Rep. 124; yillion f. Berkeley,

Plowd. 247. This authoritF supports the statement of our author, to a similar effect, lower

down in the page; but it hardly authorizes the assertion that, after issue, the estate became

wholly unconditional.]
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(11) (Where the person to whom a conditional fee was limited had issue, and suffered it to
descend to such i~:me, they might alien it. But, if they did not a.lien, the donor would still
have btmn entitled to hhi right of reverter; for the ostate would have continued subject to the
limitations contained in the original donation. Nevill'R Case, 7 Rep. 124; Willi on ti. Berkeley,
Plowd. 247. Tills authoritv supports the statement of our author, to a similar effect, lowl.'r
down in the l'agu; hut it hardly authorises tlle assertion that, &tier issue, the estate became
wholly unconditional.]
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of the land, expectant on the failure of issue: which expectant estate is what we

now call a reversion, (n) And hence it is that Littleton tells us (o) that tenant

in fee-tail is by virtue of the statute of Westminster the second.

Having thus shewn the original of estates-tail, I now proceed to consider,

what things may, or may not, be entailed *under the statute de donis. r *,, ,„ i

Tenements is the only word used in the statute; and this Sir Edward *• '

Coke(jo) expounds to comprehend all corporeal hereditaments whatsoever; and

also all incorporeal hereditaments which savour of the reality, that is, which

issue out of corporeal ones, or which concern, or are annexed to, or may be

exercised within, the same; as, rents, estovers, commons, and the like. Also

offices and dignities, which concern lands, or have relation to fixed and certain

places, may be entailed, (q) But mere personal chattels, which savour not at

all of the realty, cannot be entailed. Neither can an office, which merely relates

to snch personal chattels: nor an annuity, which charges only the person, and

not the lands of the grantor. But in these last, if granted to a man and the

heirs of his body, the grantee hath still a fee-conditional at common law, as

before the statute; and by his alienation (after issue born) may bar the heir or

reversioner. (r) (12) An estate to a man and his heirs for another's life cannot

be entailed: («) for this is strictly no estate of inheritance (as will appear here-

after), and therefore not within the statute de donis. Neither can a copyhold

estate be entailed by virtue of the statute ; for that would tend to encroach

upon and restrain the will of the lord: but, by the special custom of the manor,
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a copyhold may be limited to the heirs of the body; (t) for here the custom

ascertains and interprets the lord's will. '..

Next, as to the several species of estates-tail, and how they are respectively

created. Estates-tail are either general or special. Tail-general is where lands

and tenements are given to one, and the heirs of his body begotten: which is

called tail-general, because, how often soever such donee in tail be married, his

issue in general by all and every such marriage is, in successive, order, capable

(n) 2 Inst. 336. (o) J 13. fpj 1 Inst. 19. 20. (q) 7 Rep. 33. . • '

(r) Co. litt. 19, 20. (I) 9 Vern. 425. (t) 3 Rep. 8.

(12) [If an annuity is granted out of personal property to a man and the heirs of his body, it

of the land, expectant on the failure of' issue: which expectant estate is what we
now call a. reversion. (n) And hence it is that Littleton tells us (o) that tenant
in fee-tail is by virtue of the statute of Westminster the second.
Having thus shewn the original of estates-tail, I now proceed to consider,
fDhat things may, or may not, be entailed *under the statute de donis. [ • 1131
Tenements is the only word used in the statute; and this Sir Edward
Coke (p) expounds to comprehend all corporeal hereditameuts whatsoever; and
also all incorporeal heredita.menra which savour of' the reality, that is, which
issue out of corporeal ones, or which concern, or are annexed to, or may be
exercised within, the same; as, rents, estovers, commons, and the like. Also
offices and dignities, which concern lands, or have relation to fixed and certain
places. may be entailed. (q) But mere ~rsonal chattels, which savour not at
all of the realty, cannot be entailed. Neither can an office, which nu~rely relates
to such personal chattels: nor an annuity, which charges only the person, 3nd
not the lands of' the grantor. But in these l&et, if granted to a in~n and the
heirs of his body, the grantee ha.th still a fee-conditional at common law, as
before the statute; and by his alienation (after issue born) may bar the heir or
reversioner. (r) (12) An estate to a man and his heirs for another's life cannot
be entailed: (s) for this is strictly no estate of inheritance (as will appear hereafter), and therefore not within the statute de donis. Neither 9an a copyhold
estate be entailed by virtue of the statute; for that would tend to encroach
upon and restrain the will of the lord: but, by the special custom of the manor,
a copyhold may be limited to the heirs of the body; (t) for here the.custom
ascertains and interprets the lord's will.
.
Next, as to the several species of estates-tail, and how they are respectively
created. Estates-tail are either general or special. Tail-genera.l:is where lands
and tenements are ginn to one, and the hBirs of his body be~(Jf.te·n: :wbich is
called tail-general, because, how often soe.ver sncli donee in tail _be mjl.rrjed, his
issue in general by all a.nd every such marriage is, in successive,.y~er, ~apable

is a fee-conditional at common law, and there ran be no remainder or further limitation of it, and

when the grantee has issue, he has the full power of alienation, and of barring the possibility of

(R)
('t")

2 Inst. 835.
Co. Litt. 19, 90.

(o) t 13.
(1) 2 Vern. 2'11.

(p) 1 Inst. 19, 90.
(t) 3 Rep. 8.

(q) 7 Rep. 33.. '

'

its reverting to the grantor by the extinction of his issue. 2 Yes. 170;. 1 Bro. 3SJ5.

But out of a term for years, or any personal chattel, except in the instance of an annuity,

neither a fee-conditional nor an estate-tail can be created; for, if they are granted or devised by

snch words as would convey an estate-tail in real property, the grantee or devisee has the entire

and absolute interest without having issue; and as soon as such au interest is vested in any one,

all subsequent limitations of consequence become null and void. 1 Bro. 274; Harg. Co. Li ft.

20; Fearne, 345, 3d ed.; Roper on Legacies, chap, xvii; see post, 398.

An annuity, when granted with words of inheritance, is descendible. It may be granted in

fee: of course it may as a qualified or conditional fee; but it cannot be entailed, for it is not

within the statute de donis; and, consequently, it has been held, there can be no remainder limi-

ted upon such a grant: but it seems there may be a limitation by way of executory devise,

provided that is within the prescribed limits, and does not tend to a perpetuity. An annuity may

be granted as a fee-simple conditional; but then, it must end or become absolute, in the life of a

particularized person. Turner t>. Turner, 1 Bro. 325; S. 0., Ambl. 782; Earl of Stafford v. Buck-

fey, 2 Tea. Sen. 160. An annuity granted to one, and the heirs male of his body being a grant

not coming within the statute de donis, all the rules applicable to conditional fees at common

law still hold, with respect to such a grant. Nevill's Case, 7 Rep. 125.

The instance of an annuity, charging merely the person of the grantor, seems to be the only

one in which a fee-conditional of a personal chattel can now be created. Neither leaseholds,

nor any other descriptions of personal property (except such annuities as aforesaid) can be lim-

ited so as to make them transmissible in a course of succession to heirs; they must go to per-

sonal representatives. Countess of Lincoln v. Dnke of Newcastle, 12 Ves. 225; Keiley v. Fowler,

Wilm. Notes, 310. There is consistency, therefore, in holding, that the very same words may

be differently construed, and have very different operations, when applied, m the same instru-

ment, to different descriptions of property, governed by different rules. Forth v. Chapman,

1 P. "Wms. 667; Elton r. Eason, 19 Ves. 77. Thus, the same words which would only give

an estate-tail in freehold property, will carry the absolute interest in leasehold or other per-

sonal property. Green v. Stephens, 19 Yes. 73; Crook v. De Yandes, 9 id. 203; Tothill v. Pitt, 1

Mad. 509.]

(12) [If an annuity ie granted out of peraonal property to a man and the heirs of his body, it
i11 a fee-conditional at common law, and there can be no remainder or further limitation of it, and
when the grantee bas i111me, he has the full power of aijenation, and of barring the possibility of
its reverting to the grantor by the extiuotion of his issue. 2 Ve~. 170; 1 Bro. 3'.l5.
But out o-f a term for year,;, or any per:Jonal chattel, except in the ingtance of an annuity,
neither a fee-conditional nor an estate-tail can be created; for, if they are granted or devised by
ench words &R would convey an estate-tail in real property, the grantee or duvi11ee ha.s the entire
and absolute interest without having issue; and a.s soon as such au intere11t is vested in any one,
all subsequent limitations of consequenc~ become n~.ll and void. 1 Bro. 274; Ha.rg. Co. Litt.
20 ; Feame, 345, 3d ed. ; Roper on Legac1esl chap. xvu ; see post, 398.
.
.An annuity, when gmnted with words ot inheritance, is desoondible. It may ~e granted in
fee : of course it may as a qualified or conditional fee i but it cannot be entailed, for it is not
within the statute de donia ; and, consequently, it has been held, there can be no remainder limited upon such a grant : but it seems tbere may be a limitation by way of oxooutory devise,
provided that is within the prescribed limits, a.nd does not tend to a perpetuity. An, annuity may
be granted as a fee-simple conditional; but then, it mut1t eml or become abi>olnte, in the life of a
particularised penon. Turner"· 'l'urner, 1 Bro. 325; S. C., Ambl. 78'.l; Earl of Stafford "· Buckley, 2 Ves. Sen. 180. .An annuity granted to one, and the heirs male of hii> body being a grant
not coming within the statute de donis, all the rule11 applicable to conditional fees at common
law still hold, with respect to such a grant. Nevill's Case, 7 Rep. 125.
The instance of an annuity, charging memly the pen-on of the grantor, seems to be the only
one in whieh a fee-conditional of a personal chattel cim now bll created. N llither leaseholds,
nor any other desoriptioDB of personal 1,>roperty (except such annuities a.s aforesaid) can be limited so as to make diem transmissible m a course of succession to heiri:i; they must go to personal representatives. Countess of Lincoln 11. Duke of Newcastle, 12 V es. 2'E>; Keiley v. Fowler,
Wilm. Notes, 310. There is consistency, therefore, in holding, that tho ver.y same words may
he differentll construed, and have very different operatiom1, when applied, m the same instrument, to different desoriptions of property, governed by different rules. Forth 11. Chapman,
1 P. Wms; 667; Elton "· Eason, 19 Ves. 77. Thus, the ll&llle words which would only give
an est.at.e-tail in freehold property, will carry the absolute interest in leasehold or other perl!Ona.l property. Green 11. Stephans, 19 Ves. 7:J; Crook 11. De Vandee, 9 id. 203; Tuthill 11. Pitt, l
Koo. 509.]
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of inheriting the estate-tail, per formmn doni. (u) Tenant in tail special is

where the gilt is restrained to certain heirs of the donee's body, and does not go

f *1141 to a^ °^ them in general. And this may "happen several ways, (w) I

>- J shall instance in only one; as where lands and tenements are given to a

man and the heirs of his body on Mary Ms now wife to be begotten; here no issue

can inherit, but sucn general issue as is engendered between them two ; not such

as the husband may have by another wife; and therefore it is called special tail.

And here we may observe, that the words of inheritance (to him and his Iteirs)

give him an estate in fee: but they being heirs to be by him begotten, this makes

it a fee-tail; and the person being also limited, on whom such heirs shall be

forgotten (viz.: Mary his present, wife), this makes it a fee-tail special.

Estates, in general and special tail, are farther diversified by the distinction

of sexes in such entails; for both of them may either be in tail male or tail

female. As if lands be given to a man, and his heirs male of his body begotten,

this is an estate in tail male general; but if to a man and the heirs female of his

body on his present wife begotten, this is an estate in tail female special. And,

in case of an entail male, the heirs female shall never inherit, nor any derived

from them; nor e converso, the heirs male, in case of a gift in tail female.(a;) Thus,

if the donee in tail male hath a daughter, who dies leaving a son, such grandson,

in this case cannot inherit the estate-tail; for he cannot deduce his descent

wholly by heirs male, (y) And as the heir male must convey his descent wholly

by males, so must the heir female wholly by females. And therefore if a man
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hath two estates-tail, the one in tail male, the other in tail female; and he hath

issue a daughter, which daughter hath issue a son; this grandson can succeed

to neither of the estates; for he cannot convey his descent wholly either in the

male or female line, (z)

As the word heirs is necessary to create a fee, so in farther limitation of the

strictness of the feudal donation, the word body, or some other words of pro-

creation, are necessary to make it a fee-tail, and ascertain to what heirs in par-

r „,.. 5 -, ticular *the fee is limited. If, therefore, either the words of inheri-

1 -• tance, or words of procreation be omitted, albeit the others are inserted

in the grant, this will not make an estate-tail. As, if the grant be to a man and

his issue of his body, to a man and his seed, to a man and his children, or off-

spring : all these are only estates for life, there wanting the words of inheritance,

his heirs, (a) So, on the other hand, a gift to a man, and his heirs male or fe-

male, is an estate in fee-simple, and not in fee-tail: for there are no words to

ascertain the body out of which they shall issue, (b) Indeed, in last wills and

testaments, wherein greater indulgence is allowed, an estate-tail may be created

by a devise to a man and his seed, or to a man and his heirs male; or by other

irregular modes of expression, (c) (13)

There is still another species of entailed estates, now indeed grown out of use,

yet still capable of subsisting in law; which are estates in libero maritagio, or

frankmarriage. These are defined (d) to be, where tenements are given by one

man to another, together with a wife, who is the daughter or cousin of the

donor, to hold in frankmarriage. Now, by such gift, though nothing but the

word frankmarriage is expressed, the donees shall nave the tenements to them,

iind the heirs of their two bodies begotten; that is, they are tenants in special

tail. For this one word, frankmarriage does ex vi termini not only create an

inheritance, like the word frankalmoign, but likewise limits that inheritance;

supplying not only words of descent, but of procreation also. Such donees in

frankmarriage are liable to no service but fealty; for a rent reserved thereon is

(u) r.iit. 5 14.15. (w) Ibid, t 16, 28, 27, K, 28, ix) IMd. { 21, 23.

(B) riiiil. i 24. (*) Co. Lilt. 25. (q) Co. Lilt. 20.

(8) Litt. S 31. Co. Lit*. 27. (c) Co. Litt. 9, 27. (<J1 Litt. « 17.

(13) [Or to a man and his children, if he has no children at the time of the devise: 6 Co. 17;

of inheriti~~ ~he est~te-tail, per form'fm d~ni. ( u) Tenant in tail special is
where the gift lS restramed to certam heirs o! the donee's body, and does not go
[ ,..114 ] to all of them in general. And this may *happen several ways. ( w) I
shall instance in only one; as where lands and tenements are given to a
man and the lwfrs of ld.s body on Mary Mis now wife to be begotten; here no issue
can inherit, but such general issue as is engendered between them two ; not such
as the husband may have by another wife; and therefore it is called special tail.
And here we may observe, that the words of inheritance (to him and his heiril)
~ve him an estate in fee: but they being heirs to be by Mm begotten, this makes
it a fee-tail ; and the person being also Jimited, on whom such heirs shall be
forgotten (viz.: Mary hi.<t present wife), this makes it a fee-tail special.
Estates, in general and special tail, are farther diversified by the distinction
of sexes in such entails; for both of them may either be in tail male or tail
female. As if lands be giYen to a man, and his heirs male of his body begotten,
this is an estate in tail male general ; but if to a man and the heirs female of Ms
body on his present wife begotten, this is an estate in tail female special. And,
in case of an entail male, the heirs fema]e shall never inherit, nor any deriYed
from them; nor e converso, the heirs male, in case of a gift in tail female.(x) Thus,
if the donee in tail male ha.th a daughter, who dies leaving a. son, such grand.son,
in this case cannot inherit the estate-tail; for he cannot deduce his descent
wholly by heirs male. (y) And as the heir male must conYey his descent wholly
by males, so must the ht:ir female wholly by females. And therefore if a man
hath two estates-tail, the one in tail male, the other in tail female ; and he hath
issue a daughter, which daughter hath issue a son; this grandson can succeed
to neither of the estates; for he cannot convey his descent wholly either in the
male or female line. ( z)
As the word heirs is necessary to create a fee, so in farther limitation of the
strictness of the feudal donation, the word body, or some other words of procreation, are necessary to make it a fee-tail, and ascertain to what heirs in par[ ,.. 115 ] ticular *the fee is limited. If, therefore, either the words of inheritance, or words of procreation be omitted, albeit the others are inserted
in the grant, this will not make an estate-tail. As, if the grant be to a man and
his issue of his body, to a man and his seed, to a man e.nd his cltildrcn, or offspring: all these are only estates for life, there wanting the words of inheritance,
his heirs. (a) So, on the other haad, a gift to a. man, and his heirs male or female, is an estate in fee-simple, and not in fee-tail: for there are no words to
ascertain the body out of which they shall issue. (b) Indeed, in last wills and
testaments, wherein greater indulgence is allowed, an estate-tail l!lay be creat~
by a devise to a man and his seed, or to a man and his heirs male; or by other
irregular modes of expression. (c) (13)
There is still another species of entailed estates, now indeed grown out of use,
yet still capable of subsisting in law; which o.re estates in libero maritagio, or
frankmarriage. These are defined (d) to be, where tenements are given by one
man to another, together with a wife, who is the daughter or cousin of the
donor, to hold in frankmarriage. Now, by such gift, though nothing but the
word frank·marriage is expressed, the donees shall have the tenements to them,
nncl the heirs of their two bodies begotten; that is, they are tenants in special
fail. For this one word, frankmarriage does ex vi termini not only create an
inheritance, like the word frankalmoign, but likewise limits that inheritance;
supplying not only words of descent, but of procreation also. Such donees in
fra.nkmarriage are liable to no service but fealty; for a rent reserved thereon is

or to a man and his posterity: 1 H. Bl. 447; or by any other words, which show an intention

to restrain the inheritance to the descendants of the devisee. See % Jarm. on Wills, 239

et seq.]
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(u)

Litt. t 14, 111.

(JI) I

bid. ~ 2'.

(to) Ibid. t 16,
(s) Co. LIU. ill.

(b) Litt. t 31. Co. Litt. 'n.

26, '111, 18, 29,
(a)

(C) Co. Litt. 9, 'Zf.

(z)

Ibid. f 21, i'J.

Co. Litt. 20.
(d)

Lltl 0 17.

(13) [Or t.o a man and his children, if he has no ohildren at the time of the devise : 6 Co. 17 ;
or to a man and his posterity: 1 H. Bl. 447; or by any other words, which show an intention
t.o restrain the inheritance t.o the doscendante of the deviffee. See ~ J~. Oll Wills, 23j
et seq.]
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void, until the fourth degree of consanguinity be past between the issues of the

donor and donee, (e)

The incidents to a tenancy in tail, under the statute Westm. 2, are chiefly

these. (/) 1. That a tenant m tail may commit waste on the estate-tail, by fell-

ing timber, pulling down houses, or the like, without being impeached, or called

to account for the same. *2. That the wife of the tenant in tail shall have r *i i c -i

her dower, or thirds, of the estate-tail. 3. That the husband of a female "- -I

tenant in tail may be tenant by the curtesy of the estate-tail. 4. That an estate-

tail may be barred, or destroyed by a fine, by a common recovery, or by lineal

warranty descending with assets to the heir. All which will hereafter be

explained at large.

Thus much for the nature of estates-tail: the establishment of which family

law (as it is properly styled by Pigott) (g) occasioned infinite difficulties and

disputes, (h) Children grew disobedient when they knew they could not be set

aside: farmers were ousted of their leases made by tenants in tail; for, if

such leases had been valid, then under colour of long leases the issue might

have been virtually disinherited; creditors were defrauded of their debts; for,

if a tenant in tail could have charged his estate with their payment, he might

also have defeated his issue, by mortgaging it for as much as it was worth ; in-

numerable latent entails were produced to deprive purchasers of the lands they

had fairly bought; of suits in consequence of which our ancient books are full:

and treasons were encouraged; as estates-tail were not liable to forfeiture, longer
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than for the tenant's life. So that they were justly branded, as the source of

new contentions, and mischiefs unknown to the common law; and almost uni-

versally considered as the common grievance of the realm, (i) But as the

nobility were always fond of this statute, because it preserved their family estates

from forfeiture, there was little hope of procuring a repeal by the legislature,

and therefore, by the connivance of an active and politic prince, a method was

devised to evade it.

About two hundred years intervened between the making of the statute de

donis, and the application of common recoveries to this intent, in the twelfth

year of Edward IV; which were then openly declared by the judges to be a

'sufficient bar of an estate-tail, (k) For though the courts had, so long r*iirv-i

before as the reign of Edward III, very frequently hinted their opinion L -I

that a bar might be effected upon these principles, (I) yet it was never carried

into execution; till Edward IV, observing (m) (in the disputes between the

houses of York and Lancaster) how little effect attainders for treason had on

families, whosft estates were protected by the sanctuary of entails, gave his

countenance to this proceeding, and suffered Taltarum's case to be brought be-

fore the court; (n) wherein, in consequence of the principles then laid down, it

was in effect determined, that a common recovery suffered by tenant in tail

should be an effectual destruction thereof. What common recoveries are, both

in their nature and consequences, and why they are allowed to be a bar to the

estate-tail, must be reserved to a subsequent inquiry. At present I shall only

say, that they are fictitious proceedings, introduced by a kind of piafraus, to

elude the statute de donis, which was found so intolerably mischievous, and

which yet one branch of the legislature would not then consent to repeal: and

that these recoveries, however clandestinely introduced, are now become by long

use and acquiescence a most common assurance of lands; and are looked upon

as the legal mode of conveyance, by which tenant in tail may dispose of his

lands and tenements: so that no court will suffer them to be shaken or reflected

on, and even acts of parliament (o) have by a sidewind countenanced and estab-

lished them.

ic) Ibid. ^ 19. 20. (/) Co. r.itt. 22t. (0) Com. Recov,5. (A) 1 Rep. 131.

(«) Co. Litt 19. Moor, 186. 10 Rep. 38. (t)l Rep. I'd. 6 Rep. 40. (I) 10 Rep. 87, 38.

(m) Pigott, 8.

(n) Year-book, 12 Kdw. IV, 14. 19. Kltzb. Air. tit. faux rtetn. 20 Bro. t'Mrf. 30 HI. rocov. involve, \:i.

tit. tail*. :m.

(o) 11 Henry \U, o. 20. 7 Henry VHI, o. 4. S« and 35 Henry Vm, e. 20. 14 Kite. c. 8. 4 and 5 Ann, o. 10.

HUeo.II, e. 20.
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This expedient having greatly abridged estates tail with regard to their dura-

tion, others were soon invented to strip them of other privileges. The next

that was attacked was their freedom from forfeitures for treason. For, not-

withstanding the large advances made by recoveries, in the compass of about

threescore years, towards unfettering these inheritances, and thereby subjecting

the lands to forfeiture, the rapacious prince then reigning, finding them fre-

f *118 1 *iluen^y ^resettled in a similar manner to suit the convenience of fami-

L -• lies, had address enough to procure a statute (p) whereby all estates of

inheritance (under which general words estates-tail were covertly included)

are declared to be forfeited to the king upon any conviction of high treason.

The next attack which they suffered in order of time, was by the statute 32

Henry VIII, c. 28, whereby certain leases made by tenants in tail, which do not

tend to the prejudice of the issue, were allowed to be good in law, and to bind

the issue in tail. But they received a more violent blow, in the same session of

parliament, by the construction put upon the statute of fines, (^) by the statute 32

Henry VIII, c. 36, which declares a fine duly levied by tenant in tail to be a com-

plete bar to him and his heirs, and all other persons claiming under such entaiL

This was evidently agreeable to the intention of Henry VII, whose policy it

was (before common recoveries had obtained their full strength and authority)

to lay the road as open as possible to the alienation of landed property, in order

to weaken the overgrown power of his nobles. But as they, from the opposite

reasons, were not easily brought to consent to such a provision, it was therefore
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couched, in his act, under covert and obscure expressions. And the judges,

though willing to construe that statute as favorably as possibly for the defeat-

ing of entailed estates, yet hesitated at giving fines so extensive a power by

mere implication, when the statute de donis had expressly declared, that they

should not be a bar to estates-tail. But the statute of Henry VIII, when the

doctrine of alienation was better received, and the will of the prince more im-

plicitly obeyed than before, avowed and established that intention. Yet, in order

to preserve the property of the crown from any danger of infringement, all

estates-tail created by the crown and of which the crown has the reversion, are

excepted out of this statute. And the same was done with regard to common

recoveries, by the statute 34 and 35 Henry VIII, c. 20, which enacts, that 110

feigned recovery had against tenants in tail, where the estate was created by the

F *119 1 *crown> (r) an(l tne remainder or reversion continues still in the crown,

L J shall be of any force and effect. Which is allowing, indirectly and col-

laterally, their full force and effect with respect to ordinary estates-tail, where

the royal prerogative is not concerned.

Lastly, by a statute of the succeeding year, (s) all estates-tail are rendered lia-

ble to be charged for payment of debts due to the king by record or special

contract ; as since, by the bankrupt laws, (t ) they are also subjected to be sold

for the debts contracted by a bankrupt. (14) And, by the construction put on

rpJSOHen. Vlll.o. IS (q) I Hen. VII, c. 24 (r) Co. Lltt. 372.

(»J m Hen. VIII, o. 89, « 75 ftj Stat. 21 Jao. I, c. 19.

(14) 6 Geo. IV, c. 16, s. 65.

And now in England, by stat. 3 and 4 "William IV, o. 74, the tenant in tail is enabled " by an

ordinary deed of conveyance (if duly enrolled), and without resort to the indirect and operose

expedient of a fine or recovery (which the statute wholly abolishes} to aliene in fee-simple abso-

This expedient ha.V"in~ greatly abridged estates tail with regard to their duration, others were soon mvented to strip them of other privileges. 'l'he next
that was attacked was their freedom from forfeitures for treason. For, notwithstanding the large advances made by recoveries, in the compass of about
threescore years, towards unfettering these inheritances, and thereby subjecting
the lands to forfeiture, the rapacious prince then reigning, finding t.hem fre[ • 118 ] 9.uently •resettled in a similar manner to suit the convenience of families, had address enough to procure a. statnte (p) whereby all estates of
inheritance (under which general words estates-tail were covertly included)
are declared to be forfeited to the king upon any conviction of high treason.
The next attack which they suffered in order of time, was bv the statute 32
Henry VIII, c. 28, whereby certain leases made by tenants in tail, which do not
tend to the prejudice of the issue, were allowed to be good in law, and to bind
the issue in ta.ii. But they receiYed a more violent blow, in the same session of
parliament, by the construction put upon the statute of fines, (IJ) by the statute 32
Henry VIII, c. 36, which declares a fine duly levied by tenant m tail to be a complere bar to him and his heirs, and all other persons claiming under such entail.
This was evidently agreeable to the inrention of Henry VII, whose policy it
was (before common recoveries had obtained their full strength and authority)
to lay the road as open as possible to the alienation of landed property, in order
to weaken the overgrown power of his nobles. But as they, from the opposite
reasons, were not easily brought to consent to such a provision, it was therefore
couched, in his a.ct, under covert and obscure expressions. And the judges,
though willing to construe that stature as favorably as possibly for the defeating of entailed estates, yet hesitated at giving fines so extensive a power by
mere implication, when the statute de donis had expressly declared, that they
should not be a bar to estates-tail. But the statute of Henry VIII, when the
doctrine of alienation was better received, and the will of the prince more implicitly obeyed than before, a.vowed and established that intention. Yet, in order
to preserve the property of the crown from any danger of infringement, all
estates-tail created by the crown and of which the crown has the reversion, are
exceptoo out of this statute. And the same was done with regard to common
recoveries, by the statute 34 and 35 Henry VIII~ c. 20, which enacts, that uo
feigned recovery had against tenants in tail, where the esbi.t;e was created by the
[ • 119 ] *crown, (r) and the remainder or reversion continues still in the crown,
shall be of any force and effect. Which is allowing, indirectly and collaterally, their full force and effect with respect to ordinary estates-tail, where
the royal prerogative is not concerned.
Lastly, by a statute of the succeeding year, ( s) all estates-tail are rendered lie,..
ble to be charged for payment of debts due to the king by record or special
contract; as sinoe, by the bankrupt laws, (t) they are also subjected to be sold
for the debts contracted by a bankrupt. (14} And, by the construction put on
(p) 211 Hen. Vlll. c. IS
(1) 3S Hen. VIII, o. 89, t

lute, or for any less estate, the lands entailed, and thereby to bar himself, and his issue and all

persons having any ulterior estate therein. Yet this is subject to an important qualification,

designed for the protection of family settlements. For in these it is usual to settle a life

estate (which is a freehold interest) on the parent, prior to the estate-tail limited to the chil-

dren ; and the nature of a recovery (by which alone interests ulterior to the estate-tail could

formerly be barred) was such as to make the concurrence of the immediate tenant of the

freehold indispensable to its validity. In order therefore to continue to the parent (or other

prior taker) a control of the same general description, the act provides that where, under the

game settlement which created the estate-tail, a prior estate of freehold, or for years dete.rniin-

able with hfe, shall have been conferred, it shall not be competent for the tenant in tail t«

bar any estate taking effect upon the determination of the estate-tail, without consent of the

person to whom snch prior estate was given; who receives for that reason the appellation of
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{q)' Hen. VII, cJ U
(I) Stat. 21 J l\C.

I, c. 19.

.

(r)

Co. Litt. S7l!.
.

(14) 6 Geo. IV, c. 16, s. 65.
And now in England. by stat. 3 and 4 William IV, c. 74, the ten,.n,t in tail is enabled "by an
ordinary deed of conveyance (if duly enrolled), and without resort to the indirect and operoee
expedient of a fine or recovery (which the Rtatute wholly abolishes~ to 8.liene in fee-simple absolute, or for any Jei;s e11tate, the lands entailed, and thereby to bar hnnself, and hie i11eue and all
pel'llons having any ulterior estate therein. Yet this is subject to an important qualification,
deHiltlled for the protection of family settlements. For in these it iii usual to settle a life
eiita.te (which ie o. freehold interest) on the parent, prior to the estate-tail limited to the children; and the nature of a recovery (by which a.lone interests ulterior to the estate-tail could
formerly be barred) was snch as to make the concurrence of the immediate tenant of the
freehold indispell88.ble to its validity. In order therefore to continue to the · parent (or other
prior taker)" a control of the same general description, the act provides th~t where, under the
same settlement which created the e1<tate~tail, a prior estate of freehold, or for years determinable with life, she.II have been conferred, it 1<hall not be oompetent tor the tenant in ta.ii t"
bar any es~te taking effect upon the determination of the estate-tiW, withollt. consent of the
person to w~om such prior estate was given i who receives for that re~n the appellftiou of
~04
1£.
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the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4, an appointment (u) by tenant in tail of the lauds

entailed, to a charitable use, is good without fine or recovery.

Estates-tail, being thus by degrees unfettered, are now reduced again to

almost the same state, even before issue born, as conditional fees were in at

common law, after the condition was performed, by the birth of issue. For,

first, the tenant in tail is now enabled to aliene his lands and tenements by fine,

by recovery, or by certain other means; and thereby to defeat the interest as

well of his own issue, though unborn, as also of the reversioner, except in the

case of the crown: secondly, he is now liable to forfeit them for high treason:

and lastly, he may charge them with reasonable leases, and also with such of

his debts as are due to the crown on specialties, or have been contracted with his

fellow-subjects in a course of extensive commerce. (15)

CHAPTER VIII.

the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4, an appointment (u) by tenant in tail of the lands
entailed, to a charitable use, is good without fine or recovery.
Estates-tail, being thus by degrees unfettered, are now reduced again t-0
almost the same state, even before issue born, as conditional fees were in at
common law, after the condition was performed, by the birth of issue. For,
first, the tenant in tail is now enabled to aliene his lands and tenements by fine,
by recovery, or by certain other means; and thereby to defeat the interest as
well of his own issue, though unborn, as also of the reversioner, except in the
case of the crown: secondly, he is now liable to forfeit them for hi~h treason:
and lastly, he may charge them with reasonable leases, and also with such of
his debts as are due to the crown on specialties, or have been contriwted with his
fellow-subj~cts in a course of extensive commerce. (15)

OF FREEHOLDS, NOT OF INHERITANCE.

WE are next to discourse of such estates of freehold, as are not of inheritance,

but for life only. And of these estates for life, some are conventional, or ex-

pressly created by the act of the parties; others merely legal, or created by

construction and operation of law. (a) We will consider them both in their

order.

CHAPTER VIII.

1. Estates for life, expressly created by deed or grant (which alone are prop-

erly conventional), are where a lease is made of lauds or tenements to a man,

to hold for the term of his own life, or for that of any other person, or for more

OF FREEHOLDS, NOT OF INHERITANCE.
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lives than one: in any of which cases he is styled tenant for life; only when he

holds the estate by the life of another, he is usually called tenant per auter

vie. (b) These estates for life are, like inheritances, of feudal nature; and were,

for some time, the highest estate that any man could have in a feud, which (as

•we have before seen) (c) was not in its original hereditary. They are given or

conferred by the same feudal rights and solemnities, the same investiture or liv-

:«) I Yern. 153. Chan. Free. 16. (a) Wright, ino. (6) LIU. J 86. (c) Page, 86.

protector of the settlement. But the object not being to restrain the power of the tenant in tail

over the estate-tail itself (which he could have barred before the statute by fine, without any

other person's concurrence) his alienation (in the manner prescribed by the act) is allowed to

be effectual, even without the consent of the protector, so far as regards the barring of him-

self and his issue." 1 Stephen's Commentaries, 237. And later than the statute above men-

tioned, by 1 and 2 Tic. c. 110, estates-tail were made liable to judgments recovered for ordinary

debts.

Mr. Stephen remarks that "estates-tail have thus been gradually unfettered; and are now

subject to even less restraint than attached to conditional fees at common law, after the condi-

WE are next to discourse of such estates of freehold, as are not of inheritance,
but/or life only. And of these estates for life, some are conventional, or expressly created by the act of the parties; others merely legal, or created by
construction and operation of law. (a) We will consider them both in their
order.
1. Estates for life~ expressly created by deed or grant (which alone are properly conventional), are where a lease is made of lands or tenements to a man,
to hold for the term of his own life, or for that of any other person, or for more
lives than one: in any of which cases he is styled tenant for life; only when he
holds the estate by the life of another, he is usually called tenant -per auter
vie. (b) These estates for life are, like inheritances, of feudal nature; and were,
for some time, the highest estate that any man could have in a feud, which (as
we have before seen) (c) was not in its original hereditary. They are given or
conferred by the same feudal rights and solemnities, the same investiture or liv-

tion was performed by the birth of issue. For, first, the tenant in tail is now enabled by any

ordinary deed of conveyance (enrolled) to alien his lands and tenements in fee-simple absolute,

C•l t Vern. '311. Chan. Pree. 16.

(al Wright, 180.

(b) Litt. t 116.

(c) Page, M.

or otherwise, and thereby to bar his issue (born or unborn) and all ulterior claimants, subject

only to the necessity, so far as the latter are concerned, of obtaining the consent of the protec-

tor, where there is one. Secondly, he is liable to forfeit them for treason. Thirdly, ne may

charge them with reasonable leases, even by deed not enrolled; and lastly, they are subject to

be sold for payment of his debts to the same extent to wnich he would himself have had power

to dispose of them."

(15) Estates-tail were introduced into the American colonies with other elements of the

common law, and in some of the colonies the mode of barring them by common recovery

obtained before the revolution. But now these estates are either changed into fee-simples, or

reversionary estates in fee-simple, and do not exist at all as estates-tail, or may be converted

into estates in fee-simple by familiar forms of conveyance in the several states, by force of their

respective statutes. 1 TVashburn on Real Property, 83, 84. It is competent for the legislature

to make this change in the nature of estates. Cooley on Const. Lim. 360, and cases there cited.

405

protuwr of the settlement. But the object not being to restrain the power of the tenant in tail
over the estate-tail itself (which he could have barred before the statute by fiM, without any
other penion's concurrence) his alienation (in the manner prescribed by the a.ct) is allowed to
be effectual, even without the consent of the protector, so far as regards the barring of himself and hill iSl!Ue." 1 Stephen's Commentaries, 237: And later than the statute above mentioned, by 1 and 2 Vic. c. 110, estates-tail were made liable to judgments recovered for ordinary
debt.a.
llr. Stephen remarks that "estates-tail have thus been gradually unfettered; and are now
subject to even leKS restraint than attached to conditional fees at common law, after the condition waii performed by the birth of issue. For, first, the tenant in tail is now enabled by any
ordinary deed of conveyance (enrolled) to alien his lands and tenements in fe1H;implo al.J;;:olute,
or otherwi.;e, and thereby to bar his i.'ll!ue (born or unborn) and all ulterior claimants, sul.Jject
only to the nece:isity, ij() far as the latter are concerned, of obtaining the consent <if the protector, where there ill one. Secondly, he is liable to forfeit them for trea.~on. Thirdlv, he mnv
charge them with reasonable leases, eTen by deed not enrolled ; and lastly, they are 8nbject tO
be eo1d for payment of his debts to the same extent to which he would himself have had power
to di!!p060 of them."
(15) Estates-tail were introduced into the American colonies with other elements of the
common law, and in some of the colonies the mode of barring them by common recovery
obtained before the revolution. But now these e8tates are either changed into fee-simple8, or
reversionary ei!tateg in fee-llinlplc, and do not exist at all as estates-tail, or may be converted
into estates in foe-t1imple by familiar forms of conveyance in the several states1 by force of their
respective statutes. 1 WS8hhurn on Real Property, S:J, 84. It i~ competent tor the legislature
to make this change in the nature of estates; Cooley on Const. Lim. 360, and cases there cited.
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ery of seisin, as fees themselves are; (1) and they are held by fealty, if demanded,

and such conventional rents and services as the lord or lessor, and his tenant or

lessee, have agreed on.

F *1211 Estates for life may be created, not only by the express words before

*• J mentioned, but also by a general grant, without denning or limiting

any specific estate. As, if one grants to A B the manor of Dale, this makes

him tenant for life, (d) For though, as there are no words of inheritance or

heirs mentioned in the grant, it cannot be construed to be a fee, it shall how-

ever be construed to be as large an estate as the words of the donation will bear,

and therefore an estate for life. Also such a grant at large, or a grant for term

of life generally, shall be construed to be an estate for the life of the grantee ; (e)

in case the grantor hath authority to make such grant: for an estate for a man's

own life is more beneficial and of a higher nature than for any other life; and

the rule of law is, that all grants are to be taken most strongly against the

grantor, (/) unless in the case of the king.

Such estates for life will, generally speaking, endure as long as the life for

which they are granted: but there are some estates for life, which may deter-

mine upon future contingencies, before the life, for which they are created

expires. As, if an estate be granted to a woman during her widowhood, or to a

man until he be promoted to a benefice; in these, and similar cases, whenever

the contingency happens, when the widow marries, or when the grantee obtains

a benefice, the respective estates are absolutely determined and gone, (g) Yet
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while they subsist, they are reckoned estates for life: because, the time for

which they will endure being uncertain, they may by possibility last for life, if

the contingencies upon which they are to determine do not sooner happen.

And, moreover, in case an estate be granted to a man for his life, generally, it

may also determine by his civil death: as if he enters into a monastery, whereby

he is dead in law: (/*) for which reason in conveyances the grant is usually made

"for the term of a man's natural life;" which can only determine by his natu-

ral death, (t)

T *1221 The incidents to an estate for life are principally the following;

<- ' which are applicable not only to that species of tenants for life, which

are expressly created by deed; but also to those which are created by act and

operation of law.

1. Every tenant for life, unless restrained by covenant or agreement, may of

common right take upon the land demised to him reasonable estovers (k) or

bates. (1) For he hath a right to the full enjoyment and use of the land. and

all its profits, during his estate therein. But he is not permitted to cut down

timber, or do other waste upon the premises: (m) for the destruction of such

things as are not the temporary profits of the tenement is not necessary for the

tenant's complete enjoyment of his estate; but tends to the permanent and

lasting loss of the person entitled to the inheritance. (2)

fdj Co. Lltt. 42. fei 1 bid. ff) Ibid. M. (g) Co. Lltt. «2. 3 Bep. 20.

(h) V Sep. 48. fij See book I. p. 133. (k) See p. 35. (I) Co. Utt. 41. (m) Ibid. 6S.

(1) [An estate for life may be created by any of the modes of assurance or conveyance proper

for passing freehold estates; as by bargain and sale operating under the statute of uses; by

ery of seisin, as foes themselves are; (1) and they are held by fealty, if demanded,
and such conventional rents and sen-ices as the 1ord or lessor, and his tenant or
lessee, have awccd on.
*Estates for life may be created, not only by the express words before
[ • 121 ]
mentioned, but also by a general grant, without defining or limiting
any specific estate. As, if one grants to A B the manor of Dale, this makes
him tenant for life. (d) For though, as there are no words of inheritance or
heirs mentioned in the grant, it cannot be construed to be a fee, it shall however be construed to be as large an estate as the words of the donation will bear,
and therefore au estate for life. Also such a grant at large, or a grant for term
of life generally, shall be construed to be an estate for the life of the grmitee ~· (e)
in case the grantor hath authority to make such grant: for an estate for a man's
own life is more beneficial and of a higher nature than for any other life ; and
the rule of law is, that all grants are to be taken most strongly against the
grantor, (/) unless in the case of the king.
Such estates for life will, generally speaking, endure as long as the life for
which they are granted: but there are some estates for life, which may determine upon future contingencies, before the life, for which they are created
expires. As, if an estate be granted to a woman during her widowhood, or to a
man until he be promoted to a benefice; in these, and similar cases, whenever
the contingency happens, when the widow marries, or when the grantee obtains
a benefice, the respective estates are absolutely determined and gone. (g) Yet
while they subsist, they are reckoned estates for life: because, the time for
which they will endure being uncertain, they may by possibility last for lif~ if
the contingencies upon which they are to determme do not sooner happen.
And, moreover, in case an estate he granted to a man for his life, generally, it
may also determine by his ci11il death: as if he enters into a monastery, whereby
he is dead in law: (h) for which reason in conveyances the grant is usually made
"for the term of a man's natural life;" which can only determine by his natural death. ( iJ
The incidents to an estate for life are principally the following;
[ • 122 ]
which are applicable not only to that species of tenants for life, which
are expressly created by deed; but also to those which are created by act and
operation of law.
1. Every teMnt for life, unless restrained by covenant or agreement, may of
common right take upon the land demised to him reasonable estover3 (k) or
botes. (l) For he hath a right to the full enjoyment and use of the land, and
all its profits, during his estate therein. But he is not permitted to cut down
timber, or do other waste upon the premises: (m) for the destruction of such
things as are not the temporary profits of the tenement is not necessary for the
tenant's complete enjoyment of his estate; but tends to the permanent and
lasting loss of the person entitled to the inheritance. (2)
(cl) Co. Llit. ti.
(h) 2 Rep. '8.

(eJ 1 bid.
r!J IIM. 36.
(g) Co. Litt. 41. 3 Rep. l!IO.
(() See book I, p. lS'il.
(le} Seep. 36.
(l) Co. Litt. 41.
(•) Ibid. 63.

release from the reversioner to the tenant for years; by grant of a reversion to a stranger, or, as

mentioned in the text, by feoffment. In each of these conveyances words of inheritance are

necessary to confer an estate of inheritance; and if no words of inheritance and nothing equiva-

lent to them occur, the conveyance passes but an estate for the life of the grantee. J

(2) [ Where the commission of acts of waste, such as cutting down timber that is falling into

decay, is clearly for the benefit of all persons interested in the property, the courts have permitted

a tenant for life to cut it, the proceeds being invested for the benefit of the remaindermen, but

the annual interest being given to the tenant for life. Tooker v. Annesley, 5 Sim. 235; Waldo

v. "Waldo, 7 id. 261; PhUlips v. Barlow, 14 id. 263: Bateman v. Hotchkin, 31 Beav. 436.]

Estates may be created without impeachment of waste, in which case the tenant has a much

larger power, though eveu then he must not commit acts which tend to the destruction of the

estate, such as the demolition of a castlo : Vane v. Lord Barnard, 2 V~ern. 73S; or ornamental

trees : Aston v. Aston, 1 Ves. Sen. 2(i5. But the doctrine that he must not cut down timber is not

entirely applicable to the condition of the American States, in some parts of which and under some

circumstances it would be regarded as beneficial to both parties for the tenant to clear and improve a

portion of the laud. See Crockett v. Crockett, 2 Ohio X. 3. 180 ; McCoy e. Wait, 51 Barb. 2-.J5.
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(1) (.An estate for life may be created by any of the modes of assurance or conveyance proper
for passing freehold estates ; a.s by bargain and salo operating under ~he statute of uses; by
release from the reversioner to the tenant for years ; by grant of a. revers10n to a. stran~r, or, as
mentioned in the text, by feoffment. In c!l{'h of these conveya.nces words of inhentan(•.e are
necessary to confer a.n estate of inheritance; and if no words of inherita.nce and nothing equit"alent to them oc-cur, the conveyance p~e" but an estnte for the life of the grantee.l
(2) [Where the commir1Rion of acts of Wl\.~te, such as cutting down timoer that ts falling int..,
decay, is clearly for the benefit of all per.ions interested in the property, the courts have permitted
a tena.nt for life to cut it, the proceed<i being inveflted for the benefit of the rema.i.ndermen, but
the annual interest being ~riven to the tenant for life. Tooker v. Anue~ley, 5 Sim. 235; Waldo
v. Waldo, 7 id. 261; Philhp>i "· Barlow, 14 id. 203: Bateman v. Hotchkin, 31 Beav. 436.]
Estates may be created without impeachment of waste, in which case the tenant ha.~ a mnch
larger power, though even t.hen he mu~t not cu1m:ilit l\<lt.8 which tend to the destruction of the
estate, such M the demolition of a ca.-1tle: Vane 1'. Lord Barnard, 2 Vern. 73d; or ornamental
troos: Aston v. Aston, 1 Ve~. Sen. 2H5. Bttt t.hu (foct.rine that he mu~t not cut down timber i;. not
entirely 11pplice.ble to the condition of the Am1~ric1m Statc:1, in ~ome parts of which arnl under ~omo
circum:itances it would ue regarded&.'! IJ!'nelieial to both 1mrties for the tenllllt to clear and impro"re a
portion of the laud. See Crockett v. Crockett, 2 Ohio~. S. lt!O; McCay v. Wait, 51 Baru. :l'Ja.
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3. Tenant for life, or his representatives, shall not be prejudiced by any sud-

den determination of his estate, because such a determination is contingent and

uncertain, (w) Therefore if a tenant for his own life sows the lands and dies

before harvest, his executors shall have the emblements or profits of the crop: (3)

for the estate was determined by the act of God, and it is a maxim in the law,

that actus Dei nemini facit injuriam. The representatives, therefore, of the

tenant for life shall have the emblements to compensate for the labour and

expense of tilling, manuring and sowing the lands; and also for the encourage-

ment of husbandry, which being a public benefit, tending to the increase and

plenty of provisions, ought to have the utmost security and privilege that the

law can give it. Wherefore by the feudal law, if a tenant for life died between

the beginning of September and the end of February, the lord, who was entitled

to the reversion, was also entitled to the profits of the whole year; but if he died

between the beginning of March and the end *of August, the heirs of r *i 031

the tenant received the whole, (o) From hence our law of emblements L J

seems to have been derived, but with very considerable improvements. So it is,

also, if a man be tenant for the life of another, and cestui que vie, or he on

whose life the land is held, dies after the corn sown, the tenant per auter vie

shall have the emblements. The same is also the rule, if a life estate be deter-

mined by the act of law. Therefore if a lease be made to husband and wife

during coverture (which gives them a determinable estate for life), and the

husband sows the land, and afterwards they are divorced a vinculo matrimonii,
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the husband shall have the emblements in this case; for the sentence of divorce

is the act of law. (p) But if an estate for life be determined by the tenant's

own act (as, by forfeiture for waste committed; or, if a tenant during widow-

hood thinks proper to marry), in these,- arid similar cases, the tenants, having

thus determined the estate by their own acts, shall not be entitled to take the

emblements. (a) (4) The doctrine of emblements extends not only to corn sown,

but to roots planted, or other annual artificial profit, but it is otherwise of fruit

trees, grass, and the like; which are not planted annually at the expense and

labour of the tenant, but are either a permanent or natural profit of the earth, (r)

For when a man plants a tree, he cannot be presumed to plant it in contempla-

tion of any present profit; but merely witn a prospect of its being useful to

(n) IWd. M. (o)Feud 1. 2, t. 88. (p) 5 Eep. 116. (q) Co. Lltt. «.

(r) Co. Lilt, to, 66. 1 Roll. Abr. 728.

f:!) This means such crops as ore produced by annual planting and culture, and not such

as grass, fruit and the like, as are the annual produce from permanent roots. Stewait r.

Doughty, 9 Johns. 108. But hops, it is said, are an exception, and will go to the tenant as

emblements, because they require annual training and culture: 1 TVashb. Real. Prop. 102; and

so will trees, shrubs, &c., planted by gardeners and nurserymen for sale. Penton v. Robart, 2 East,

88. The mere preparation of the sou for crops will give the tenant no right to emblements, if

they have not been actually planted when his estate terminates. Stewart v. Doughty, 9 Johns.

108; Thompsons. Thompson, 6 Munf. 514; Price v. Pickett, 21 Ala. 741.

(4) [Emblements are considered for most purposes as goods and chattels; they go, as has

been seen, to the executors, they may be taken in execution, and contracts relating to them

have been held not to be contracts relating to any interest in lands within the statute of frauds,

in contradistinction to contracts relating to growing grass, crops of fruit, <fec. 2 Brod. and B. 368;

5 B. and C. 829; 8 Dowl. and Ry. 611; 4 Mee. and W. 363.]

To entitle the tenant to emblements, his estate must be of uncertain duration, and must have

been terminated in some other manner than by his own act. For if he knows when his

estate is to cease, and plants crops which will not ripen during the term, it is his own folly,

and the reversioner is not to be the sufferer in consequence. And the law will not protect him

against the consequences of his act if he voluntarily puts an end to an estate before his crops

are matured. Kittredge t%. Woods, 3 If. H. 503; WThtmarsh ». Cutting. 10 Johns. 360; Hams

v. Carson, 7 Leigh, 632; Davis r. Brocklebank, 9 K H. 73; Chandler v. Thurston, 10 Pick. 20.r>;

Chesley v. Welch, 37 Me. 106. Therefore a widow holding land during widowhood is not

entitled to emblements if she terminates the estate by marriage. Hawkins v. Skeggs, 10 Humph.

31. Nor is a parson who resigns his living.- Bnlwer v. Bulwer, 2 B. and Aid. 470. See Davis

r. Eyton, 7 Bmg. lf>4.

Incident to the right to emblements, is the right to go upon the premises for the purpose of

cultivation and harvest, the reversioner being m possession for M other purposes. 1 Washb.

Real Prop. 105,106.
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him in future, and to future successions of tenants. The advantages also of

emblements are particularly extended to the parochial clergy by the statute 2$

Hen. VIII, c. 11. For all persons, who are presented to any ecclesiastical bene-

fice, or to any civil office, are considered as tenants for their own lives, unless

the contrary be expressed in the form of donation.

3. A third incident to estates for life relates to the under-tenants, or lessees.

For they have the same, nay, greater indulgences than their lessors, the original

F *124 1 *enaQt8 f°r life- ^ne same j f°r the law of estovers and emblementg *with

' •" regard to the tenant for life, is also law with regard to his under-tenant,

who represents him and stands in his place: («) and greater; for in those cases

where tenant for life shall not have the emblements, because the estate deter-

mines by his own act, the exception shall not reach his lessee, who is a third

person. As in the case of a woman who holds durante viduitate: her taking

husband is her own act, and therefore deprives her of the emblements; but if

she leases her estate to an under-tenant, who sows the land, and she then mar-

ries, this her act shall not deprive the tenant of his emblements, who is a

stranger, and could not prevent her. (t) The lessees of tenants for life had also

at the common law another most unreasonable advantage; for at the death of

their lessors, the tenants for life, these under-tenants, might if they pleased quit

the premises, and pay 110 rent to any body for the occupation of the land since

the last quarter day, or other day assigned for the payment of rent. («) To

remedy which it is now enacted, (v) that the executors or administrators of
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tenant for life, on whose death any lease determined, shall recover of the lessee

a ratable proportion of rent from the last day of payment to the death of such

lessor. (5)

II. The next estate for life is of the legal kind, as contradistinguished from

conventional; viz: that of tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct. This

happens where one is tenant in special tail; and a person, from whose body the

issue was to spring, dies without issue; or, having left issue, that issue becomes

extinct: in either of these cases the surviving tenant in special tail becomes tenant

in tail after possibility of issue extinct. As where one has an estate to him and his

heirs on the body of his present wife to be begotten, and the wife dies without

issue: (w) in this case the man has an estate-tail, which cannot possibly descend

to any one; and therefore the law makes use of this long periphrasis, as abo-

lutely necessary to give an adequate idea of his estate. For if it had called him

r *1251 Darely tenant in fee-tail special, that *would not have distinguished him

*• J from others; and besides, he has no longer an estate of inheritance or

fee, (x) for he can have no heirs capable of taking per formam doni. Had it

called him tenant in tail without issue, this had only related to thepresent fact,

and would not have excluded the possibility of future issue. Had he been

styled tenant in tail without possibility of issue this would exclude time past as

well as present, and he might under this description never have had any possi-

bility of issue. No definition therefore could so exactly mark him out, as this

of tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct, which (with a precision pecu-

liar to our own law) not only takes in the possibility of issue in tail which he

once had, but also states that this possibility is now extinguished and gone.

This estate must be created by the act of God, that is, by the deatn of that

person out of whose body the issue was to spring; for no limitation, conveyance,

or other human act can make it For, if land DC given to a man and his wife,

and the heirs of their two bodies begotten, and they are divorced a vinculo

(») Co. LItt. 55. (tJCro.EUi.iai. 1 Boll. Abr. 727; fui 10 Rep. 1*7.

d-> Hint. 11 Geo. 11, o. 19, j 12. fn-> LItt. * 32. (-•) 1 Roll. Rep. 184. 11 Rep. 80.

(5) At the common law a tenant for life, unless expressly authorized by the instrument creating

the estate, could grant no lease which would have force after the termination of the life estate;

but by statute, 19 and 20 Tie. c. 120, amended by later statutes, leases of the lands, excepting

him in future, and to future successions of tenants. The advantages also of
emblements are particularly extended to the pnrochial clergy by the statute 28
Hen. VIII, c. 11. For all persons, who are presented to any ecclesiastical benefice, or to any civil office, are considered as tenants for their own live~ unlesa
the contrary be expressed in the form of donation.
3. A third incident to estates for life relates to the under-tenants, or lessees.
For they have the same, nay, greater indulgt:nces than their lessors, the original
[ *l 24 J tenants for life. The same; for the law of estoversand emblements *with
regard to the tenant for life, is also law with regard to his under-tenant,
who represents him and stands in his place: (s) and greater; for in those cases
where tenant for life shall not have the emblements, because the estate determines by his own act, the exception shall not reach his lessee, who is a third
person. As in the case of a woman who holds durante viduUate: her taking
husband is her own a.ct, and therefore deprives her of the emblements; but if
she leases her estate to an under-tenant, who sows the land, and she then marries, this her set shall not deprive the tenant of his emblements, who is a
stranger, and could not prevent her. (t) The lessees of tenants for life had also
at the common law another most unreasonable advanta~e; for at the death of
their lessors, the tenants for life, these under-tenants, might if they pleased quit
the premises, and pay no rent to any body for the occupation of the land since
the la.st quarter day, or other day assigned for the payment of rent. (u) To
remedy which it is now enacted, (v) that the executors or administrators of
t.enant for lite, on whose death any lease determined, shall recover of the lessoo
a rat.able proportion of rent from the last day of payment to the death of such
lessor. (5)
II. The next estate for life is of the legal kind, as contradistinguished from
conventional; viz: that of teriant in tail after posS'ibility of isaue extinct. This
happens where one is tenant in s~ial t.ail ; and a person, from whose body the
issue was to spring, dies without issue; or, having left issue, that iBBue becomes
extinct: in either of these cases the surviving tenant in special tail becomes tenant
in tail after possibility of issue extinct. As where one has an estate to him and his
heirs on the body of his present wifo to be begotten, and the wife diea without
issue: (w) in this case the man has an estate-tail, which cannot ~ssibly descend
to any one; and therefore the law makes use of this long ~r1phrasis, as abolutely necessary to give an ad~uate idea of his estate. For 1f it had called him
[ • 125 ] barely tenant in fee-tail special, that *would not have distinguished him
from others ; and besides, he has no longer an estate of inheritance or
fee, (x) for he can have no heirs capable of taking per formam doni. Had it
cu.lle.d him tenant in tail without issue, this had only related to the present fact,
and would not have excluded the possibility of future issue. Had he been
styled tenant in tm:l witlwut posS'ilrility of issue this would exclude time past as
well as present, and he might under this description never have had any possibility of issue. No defimtion therefore could so exactly mark him out, as this
of tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct, which (with a precision peculiar to our own law) not only takes in the possibility of issue in tail which he
once had, but also states that this possibility is now extinguished and gone.
This estate must be created by the ad of God, that is, by the death of that
person out of whose body the issue was to spring; for no limitation, conveyance,
or other human act can make it. For, if land be given to a man and his wife,
and the heirs of th.eir two bodies begotten, and they are divorced a vinculo
(R) Co. Litt. M.
(t) Cro. Eliz. 461. 1 Roll. Abr. m,
(u) 10 Re11. lf7.
(v}

Stat. 11 Geo. II, o. 19, t lli.

(ID)

Litt. t :N.

(z)

1 Roll. Rep. 18'. 11 Rep. 80.

the manor house and the demesnes and lands usually occupied with it, may be made for any term

not exceeding twenty-one years, to take effect in possession; and eten longer leases may be

given by consent of the court of chancery.

408

(5) .At the common law a tenant for life, unless expressly authorized by the in:>trument creating
the estate, could gra.nt no lease which woulcl have force aft.er the tennination of the life estate;
but ll\' ><t~1t11W HI and 20 Vie. c. 120, amended by later statutes, leases of the lands, ei:ceptinit
the nianur house aud the dernesnell ancl lands usually occupied with it, may be made for any term
not exceediug twt>nty-one yP1Hl', to take effect in IX'tl86.~ion; ancl eten lonser leas&i may be
given by coutient of the court uf chancery.
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matrimonii, they shall neither of them have this estate, but be barely tenants for

life, notwithstanding the inheritance once vested in them, (y) A possibility of

issue is always supposed to exist, in law, unless extinguished by the death of the

parties; even though the donees be each of them an hundred yeaxs old. (z)

This estate is of an amphibious nature, partaking partly of an estate-tail, and

partly of an estate for life. The tenant is, in truth, only tenant for life, but with

many of the privileges of a tenant in tail; as not to be punishable for waste,

&c.; (a) (6) or, he is tenant in tail, with many of the restrictions of a tenant for

(y) Co. I.itt. 28. (~) J.itt. 3 84. Co. Litt. 88. (a) Co. I.ill. 27.

matrim1>nii, they shall neither of them have this estate, but be barely tenants for
life, notwithstanding the inheritance once vested in them. (y) A possibility of
issue is always supposed to exist, in law, unless extinguished by the death of the
parties; eYen though the donees be each of them a.n hundred y~i.rs old. (z)
This estate is of an amphibious nature, partaking partly of an estate-tail, and
partly of an estate for life. The tenant is, in truth, only tenant for life, but with
many of the privileges of a tenant in tail; as not to be punishable for waste,
&c.; (a) (6) or, he is tenant in tail, with many of the restnctions of a tenant for

(6) [See post, chapter 18 of this book, p. 383. All authorities agree, that tenant in tail after

(f) Co.

Utt. 28.

(ll)

Litt. I M. Co. Litt. !8.

(a)

Co. Litt. 'n.

possibility of issue extinct is dispunishaMe for waste: Doctor and Student, dial. 2, c. 1; but,

in Herlakendeu's Case, 4 Kep. 63, C. J. \V my is reported to have said, that, although tenant in

tail after possibility, <fcc., cannot be punished in waste for cutting down trees upon the land

he holds as such tenant; yet he cannot have the absolute interest in the trees, and if he sells

them, cannot retain the price. This dictum is noticed by Mr. Hargrave in his 2d note to Co. Litt.

27 b; and is countenanced by another dictum in Abraham r. Bnbb, 2 Freeman, 63; Mr. Chris-

tian, top, in his annotation upon the passage of the text, considers it as settled law, that, if a

tenant in tail after possibility, 4-e., cuts down trees, they do not become bis property, but will

belong to the party who has the first estate of inheritance. In opposition, however, to the

doctrine imputed to C. J. "Wray, and the obiter dictum in Abraham v. Bubb, it was distinctly

resolved by the whole court of king's bench, (consisting of Coke, Crooke, Doddridge, and

Hanghton,) in the case of Bowles v. Bertee, 1 Rolle's Rep. 184; S. C., 11 Rep. 84, that a tenant
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after possibility has the whole property in trees which he either causes to be cut down, or

which are blown down, on the estate. And this seems to be now firmly settled by the case of

"Williams «. "Williams. "When that case was before Lord Chancellor Bldon, his lordship (as

reported in 15 Yes. 427) intimated, that he could not imagine how it was doubted that the

tenant, being dispunishable, had not, as a consequence, the property in the trees. That it was

singular there should be an argument raised, that such a tenant should be restrained from

committing malicious waste, by cutting ornamental timber: Garth v. Cotton, 1 Dick. 209; if it

•was understood to be the law that he could not commit waste of any kind. Attorney-General

v. Duke of Marlborough, 3 Mad. 539. However, as all the previous cases in which tenant in

tail after possibility of issue extinct had been determined to be dispunishable of waste, were

cases in which the tenant had once been tenant in tail with the other donee in possession; and

in the case of Williams v. Williams the tenant claimed in remainder, after the death of the

joint donee; Lord Eldon thought it advisable, before he made a final decree, to direct a case

to the court of King's Bench, not describing the claimant as tenant in tail after possibility of

issue extinct, but stating the limitations of the settlement under which the claim was made. The

case was accordingly argued at law, and a certificate returned: that the claimant was tenant in

tail after possibility of issue extinct; was unimpeachable of waate upon the estate comprised in

the settlement; and, having cut Umber thereon, was entitled to the timber so cut as her own

property. 12 East, 221.

A tenant for life, without impeachment of waste, and a tenant in tail after possibility of issue

extinct, seem to stand upon precisely the some footing in regard to all questions of waste:

Attorney-General v. Duke of Marlborongh, 3 Mad. 539; and a tenant for life, dispunishable for

waste, is clearly not compellable to pursue such a course of management of the timber upon the

eetate, as a tenant in fee might think most advantageous. "Whatever trees are fit for the purpose

of timber he may cut down, though they may be still in an improving state. Smythe «. Smythe,

2 Swanst. 252; Brydges r. Stevens, id. 152, n ; Coffin v. Coffin, Jacob's Rep. 72. Jfo tenant for

life, however, of any description, although not subject to impeachment for waste, must cut down

trees planted for ornament or shelter to a mansipn-hxrase, or saplings not fit to be felled as tim-

ber, for this would not be a fairly beneficial exercise of the license given to him, but a malicious

and fraudulent injury to the remainder-man. Chamberlayne v. Dammer, 2 Br. 549; Cholmeley

v. Paxton, 3 Bing. 212; Lord Tamworth v. Lord Ferrers, 6 Ves. 420. In this respect, the claim

•which might, perhaps, be successfully asserted in a court of law, as to the right of felling any tim-

ber whatsoever, is controlled in courts of equity: Marquis of Downshire v. Lady Sandys, 6 Ves.

114; Lord Bernard's Case, Free, in Cha. 455; and that even on the application of a mere tenant

for life in remainder. Davies ». Leo, 6 Yes. 787. And not only wanton malice, but fraud and

collusion, by which the legal remedies against waste may be evaded, will give to courts of equity

a jurisdiction over such cases, often beyond, and even contrary to, the rules of law. Garth «.

Cotton, 3 Atk. 755.

A tenant for life, without impeachment of waste, has no interest in the timber on the estate

(6) [See poat, chapter 18 of this book, p. 283. All authorities agree, that tenant in tail after
poi!lllbility of issue extinct is dispnnii!hable for waste: Doctor and Student, dial. 2, c. 1 ; but,
in Herla.kenden's Case, 4 Rep. 63, C. J. Wrny is reported to he.vo said, that, although tenant in
tail after possibility, &e., cannot be punished in waste for cutting down trees upon the land
he holds as such tenant; yet he cannot have the o.bsolut.e interest in tte trees, Bnd if be eell11
them, cannot retain the price. This dictum iii noticed by Mr. Hargrave in his 2d note to Co. Litt.
~ b; and is countenanced by another dictum. in Abraham "· Bubb, 2 Freeman, 03; Mr. Christi.an, too, in his annotation upon the p8i1.~e of the text, coDBiders it as settled law, that, if a
tenant in tail after possibility, &c·., cut.~ down tree11, they do not become his property, but will
belong to the party who hall the fir:;t estate of inheritance. In opposition, however, to the
doctrine imputed to C. J. Wray, and the obiter dictum in Abraham "· Bubb, it wu distinctly
resolved by the whole court of king's bench, (consisting of Coke, Crooke, Doddridge, and
Haughton,) in the cMe of Bowlm1 u. Bertee, 1 Rollo's Rep. 184; S. C., 11 Rep. 84, that a tenant
after poBSibility has the whole pruperty in tree8 which he either causes to be cut down, or
which are blown down, on the cstat-0. And this Reeins to be now firmly Rettled by the case of
Williams 11. William!!. When that case was before Lord Chancellor Eldon, his lordship (as
reported in 15 Ves. 427) intimated, that he could not imagine how it was doubted that the
tenant, being dispnnishable, had not, as & consequence, the property in the trees. That it was
singular there should be an argument raised, that surh a tenBnt should be restrained from
committing maliciou8 wastei by cutting ornamental timber: Garth v. Cotton, 1 Dick. ~; if it
WBB understood to be the aw that he could not commit waste of any kind. .Attorney-General
"· Duke of llarlborougb, 3 Mad. 539. However, as all the previous cases in which tenant in
tail after possibility or il!8Ue extinct had been determined to be dispunishable of waste, were
cases in which tho tenant had once been tenant in tail with the other donee in possession; and
in the case of Williams "· Williams the tenant claimed in rema•nder, after the death of the
joint donee ; Lord Eldon thonght it advisable, before he made a final decree, to direct a case
to the court of King's Bench not describing the claimant 88 tenant in tail after poBllibility of
issue extinct, but stating the linittatioru; of the settlement under which the claim WBl! made. The
c88e was aceordingly argued at law, and a certificate returned: that the claimant was tenant in
tail alter possibility of is.me extinct; was unimpeachable of waste upon the estate comprised in
the settlement ; and, having cut timber thereon, was entitled to the timber so cut asber own
property. 12 E&Rt, 221.
A tenant for life, without impeachment of WIJ.8te, and a tenant in tail aft.er po~ibility of issne
extinct, seem to stand upon preciKely the same footing in regard to all questions of w88te :
.Attorney-General ti. Dnke of Marlborough, 3 Mad. 539 ; and a tenBnt for life, dispunishabl.e for
waste, is clearly not compellable to pursue such a course of management of the timber upon the
estate, as a tenant in fee might. think most advanta.jreous. Whntcvor trees are fit for the purpo~e
of timber he may cut down, though they mar be t<till in an improving state. Smythe v. Smythe,
2 SwBnst. 252; Brydges v. Stevens, id. 152, n; Coffin"· Coffin, ,Jacob's Rep. 72. No tenBnt for
life, however, of any description, although not eubject to impeachment for waste, must cut down
trees planted for oma.mont or shelter to a mansion-house, or saplings not fit to be felled as timber, for this would not be a fairly beneficial exercise of the license given to him, but a malicious
and fraudulent injury to the remainder-man. Chamberlayne v. Dammer, 2 Br. 549 ; Cholmeley
11. Pai:ton, 3 Bing. 212; Lord Tamworth "· Lord Ferrere, 6 Ves. 420. In this re11pect, the claim
which might, perhaps, be suCOOlll!fully 11BS0rted in a oourt of law, as to the right of felling any timber what.Moever, i11 controlled in courts of equity: .Me.rquis of Downshire 11. Lady Sandye, 6 Ves.
114i ..Lord Bernard's Case, Pree. in (,'he.. 455; and that even on the application of a mere tenant
for lite in remainder. Davies 11. Leo, 6 Ve11. 787. And not only wanton malice, but fraud and
collusion, by which the legal remedies against waste may be evaded, will give to courts of equity
a jurisdiction over such cases, oft.en beyond, and even contrary to, the rules of law. Garth"·
Cotton, 3 .A.tk. 755.
.A tenant for life, wit.bout impeachment of waste, has no interest in the timber on the estate
while it is standing : nor can he convey any interest in such growing timber to another:
Cholmeley v. Paxton, 3 Bing. 211 ; if, in execution of a power, he should sell the estate, with
the timber growing thereon, he cannot retain, for his own absolute use, the.t part of the pnrchBBe money which was the consideration for the timber; though, before he sold tho estate,
he might, it seems, have cut down every Billable tree, and put the produce into his pocket.
D<>ran "· Wiltl!hire, 3 SwBnRt. 701. .And the peculiar privileges which " tenant for life after

while it is standing: nor can ne convey any interest in such growing timber to another:

Cholmeley v. Paxton, 3 Bing. 211; if, in execution of a power, he should sell the estate, with

VoL. I.-52

the timber growing thereon, he cannot retain, for his own absolute use, that part of the pur-

chase money which was the consideration for the timber; though, before he sold the estate,

he might, it seems, have cat down every suable tree, and put the produce into his pocket.

Doran v. Wiltshire, 3 Swanst. 701. And the peculiar privileges Which a tenant for life after
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life; as to forfeit his estate, if he alieues it in fee-simple: (b) whereas such

alienation by tenant in tail, though voidable by the issue, is no forfeiture of the

f *126 1 es*a*e k° tne reversioner: who is not concerned in interest, *till all

L J possibility of issue be extinct. But, in general, the law looks upon this

estate as equivalent to an estate for life only; and, as such, will permit this

tenant to exchange his estate with a tenant for life, which exchange can only

be made, as we shall see hereafter, of estates that are equal in their nature.

III. Tenant by the curtesy of England, is where a man marries a woman

seised of an estate of inheritance, that is, of lands and tenements in fee-simple or

fee-tail; and has by her issue, born alive, which was capable of inheriting her

estate. In this case, he shall, on the death of his wife, hold the lands for his

life, as tenant by the curtesy of England, (c) (7)

This estate, according to Littleton, has its denomination, because it is used

within the realm of England only; and it is said in the Mirronr (d) to have

been introduced by King Henry the First; but it appears also to have been the

established law of Scotland, wherein it was called curialitas, (e) so that probably

our word curtesy-was understood to signify rather an attendance upon the lord's

court or curtis (that is, being his vassal or tenant), than to denote any peculiar

favour belonging to this island. And therefore it is laid down (/) that by

having issue, the husband shall be entitled to do homage to the lord, for the

wife's lands, alone: whereas, before issue had, they must both have done it

together. It is likewise used in Ireland, by virtue of an ordinance of King
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Henry III. (g) It also appears (h) to have obtained in Normandy; and was

likewise used among the ancient Almains or Germans, (i) And yet it is not

generally apprehended to have been a consequence of feudal tenure, (&) though

1 think some substantial feudal reasons may be given for its introduction. For

if a woman seised of lands hath issue by her nusband, and dies, the husband

is the natural guardian of the child, and as such is in reason entitled to

f *127 1 **ne Pro^8 °f *he lands in order to maintain it; for which reason the heir

"• J apparent of a tenant by the curtesy could not be in ward to the lord of the

fee, during the life of such tenant. (I) As soon, therefore, as any child was born,

the father began to have a permanent interest in the lands; he became one of

the pares curtis, did homage to the lord, and was called tenant by the curtesy

initiate ; and this estate being once vested in him by the birth of the child, was

not suffered to determine by the subsequent death or coming of age of the infant.

There are four requisites necessary to make a tenancy by the curtesy; marriage,

seisin of the wife, issue, and death of the wife, (m) 1. The marriage must DC

canonical and legal. 2. The seisin of the wife must be an actual seisin, or

possession of the lands; not a bare right to possess, which is a seisin in law, but

an actual possession, which is a seisin in deed. (8) And therefore a man shall

not be tenant by the curtesy of a remainder or reversion. (9) But of some

incorporeal hereditaments a man may be tenant by the curtesy, though there

(b) Co. Litt. 28. (c) Litt. J 85, 52. (d) c. 1, } 8. ft) Crag. J. 2. c. 19, f 4.

(f) Litt. f 90. Co. Litt. 30, 87. (g) Pat. 11 H. III. m. 80, In 2 BBC. Abr. 659. (k) Brand Covttu*. e. 119.

fi) Lindenbrog. /,/,. Alnwin. t. 92 (k) Wright, 294. (1) F. N. B 143. (in) Co. Litt 30.

possibility of issue extinct is allowed to enjoy, because the inheritance was once in him, are per-

sonal privileges; if he grants over hia estate to another, his grantee will be bare tenant for life.

2 Inst. 302; George Ap Rice's Case, 3 Leon. 241.]

(7) [See a reference to some old instances of curtesy of titles and offices of honor, Co. Litt. 29,

a. Mr. Hargrave says: " I cannot learn that there have been any claims of dignities by curtesy

since Lord Coke's time."]

(8) [ Entry is not always necessary to an actual seisin or seisin in deed; for, if the land be in lease

for years, curtesy may be without entry or even receipt of rent, the possession of the lessee being

the possession of the nusband and wife. Co. Litt. 29, a. n. 3; 3 Atk. 469. But if the lands were

not let, and the wife died before entry, there could be no curtesy. Co. Litt. 29.]

(9) [A man will not be entitled to tenancy by the curtesy of, nor a woman to dower out of, a

reversion or remainder expectant vjton an estate of freehold; but npon a reversion expectant

upon an estate for years, both these rights (of dower and of ourtesy) accrue: Stoughton v. Leigh.

1 Taunt. 410; for the possession of the tenant for years constitutes a legal seisin of the freehold

in reversion. De Gray t>. Richardson, 3 Atk. 470; Goodtitle ». Newman. 3 "Wils. 521.]
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have been no actual seisin of the wife: as in case of an advowson, where the

church has not become void in the lifetime of the wife: which a man may

hold by the curtesy, because it is impossible ever to have actual seisin of it,

and impotentia excusat legem. (n) If the wife be an idiot, the husband shall not

be tenant by the curtesy of her lands; for the king by prerogative is entited to

them, the instant she herself has any title; and since she could never be right-

fully seised of the lands, and the husband's title depends entirely upon

her seisin, the husband can have no title as tenant by the curtesy. (o) (10)

3. The issue must be born alive. Some have had a notion that it must be

heard to cry; but that is a mistake. Crying indeed is the strongest evidence of

its being born alive; but it is not the only evidence, (p) (11) The issue

also must be born during the life of the mother; for if the mother dies in

labour, and the Caesarean operation is performed, the husband in this case shall

not be tenant by the *curtesy; because, at the instant of the mother's r *i no -i

death he was clearly not entitled, as having had no issue born, but L J

the land descended to the child while he was yet in his mother's womb; and the

estate being once so vested, shall not afterwards be taken from him. (q) In

gavelkind lands, a husband may be tenant by the curtesy, without having any

issue, (r) But in general there must be issue born : and such issue as is also

capable of inheriting the mother's estate. (*) Therefore, if a woman be tenant

in tail male, and hath only a daughter born, the husband is not thereby entitled

to be tenant by the curtesy; because such issue female can never inherit the
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estate in tail male, (t) And this seems to be the principal reason why the hus-

band cannot be tenant by the curtesy of any lands of which the wife was not

actually seised; (12) because, in order to entitle himself to such estate, he must

have begotten issue that may be heir to the wife: but no one, by the standing

rule of law, can be heir to the ancestor of any land, whereof the ancestor was

not actually seised: and therefore, as the husband hath never begotten any issue

that can be heir to those lands, (13) he shall not be tenant of them by the

(n) Co. Litt. 29. (o) Co. Utt. 80. Plowd. 313. (f) Dyer 25. 8 Bep. 34.

(q) Co. Lltt. 29. (r) IHd. 30. (» Utt. J 66. (i) Co. Lltt. W.

(10) There can be no curtesy in such case, because the marriage was absolutely void, for the

want of legal capacity on the part of the woman to form the relation. See book 1, p. 438, 439;

Ex part K Bamsley, 3 Atk. 168; Foster v. Means, 1 Speers, Ivq. 569; Cramp v. Morgan, 3 Ired.

Bq. 91.

(11) See Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige, 35; Brock v. Kellack, 30 L. J. Ch. 498.

(12) The seisin of the wife need not be of a legal estate; for if the lands are held for her in

trust, and she is entitled to the rents and profits in fee, she has such a seisin as will give the

husband an equitable estate by the curtesy. Hearlo v. Grcenbank, 3 Atk. 717; Davis v. Mason,

1 Pet 603; Morgan t> Morgan, 5 Madd. 408. But if her equitable estate of inheritance is

settled upon her to her separate use, curtesy will not attach. 1 Washb. Real Prop. 130;

Cockran v. O'Hern. 4 W. and S. 95. But it is otherwise by statute in some states. See 1

Washb. Heal Prop. 131; Tillinghast«. Coggenhall, 7 R. I. 363. If the wife has the legal estate,

a constructive seisin is sufficient; as where the lauds are vacant or are held under lease by tenant

for years: Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow. 74; Chew v. Commissioners, &c., 5 Rawle, 160; Day

v. Cochran, 24 Miss. 261; Stephens ». Hume, 25 Mo. 349; Davis v. Mason, 1 Pet. 506; Pierce

v. Wanett, 10 Ired. 446; WeUs v. Thompson, 13 Ala. 7U3; McCorry ». King, 3 Humph. 267;

Lowry t>. Steele, 4 Ohio, 170. But in Kentucky actual seisin in the wife appears to be neces-

sary ; Neely e. Butler, 10 B. Monr. 48; Stinebaugh v. "Wisdom, 13 id. 467; though if the wife is

in the receipt of the rents and profits, this is sufficient; the possession of her tenant being regarded

as her possession. Powell v. Gossom, 18 id. 179. If the wife's seisin is only of a reversionary

interest, after the determination of a prior freehold estate, and such freehold estate does not

terminate in her lifetime, the. husband has no curtesr; Malone ». McLaurin, 40 Miss. 163;

Tayloe v. Gould, 10 Barb. 388 ; Reed v. Reed, 3 Head, 491; Stewart v. Barclay, 2 Bush. 550; and

generally whatever defeats or determines the wife's estate will defeat cnrtesy'also. On this sub-

ject see 1 Washb. Real Prop. 131-135.

If the wife is only seized as trustee for another, the husband has no ourtesy; and if she has

sold lands before the marriage and received payment, but has not yet conveyed, the husband is

not entitled to curtesy, as in equity she is regarded as merely trustee for the purchaser. Welch

v. Chandler, 13 B. Mon. 431.

(13) [This is not stated with our author's usual precision. The issue, in the case put, might

be heir to the lands, though he could not take as heir to his mother, but as heir to his ancestor,

•who was last actually seised. See post, chapter 14 of this book, pp. 209, 227; see also 1 Inst.

lib.]
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curtesy. (M) And hence we may observe, with how much nicety and considera-

tion the old rules of law were framed; and how closely they are connected and

interwoven together, supporting, illustrating, and demonstrating one another.

The time when the issue was born is immaterial, provided it were during the

coverture; for, whether it were born before or after the wife's seisin of the lauds,

whether it be living or dead at the time of the seisin, or at the time of the

wife's decease, the husband shall be tenant by the curteey. (w) The husband

by the birth of the child becomes (as was before observed) tenant by the curtesy

initiate (x) (14) and may do many acts to charge the lands, but his estate is

not consummate till the death of the wife; which is the fourth and last requisite

to make a complete tenant by the curtesy. (y)

r *J29 -i *IV. Tenant in dower is where the husband of a woman is seised (15)

L ' of an estate of inheritance, and dies; in this case, the wife shall have the

third (16) part of all the lands and tenements whereof he was seised at _

time during the coverture, to hold to herself for the term of her natural life, (z

Dower is called in Latin by the foreign jurists doarium, but by Bracton auc

our English writers dog: which among the Romans signified the marriage por-

tion which the wife brought to her husband ; but with us is applied to signify

this kind of estate, to which the civil law, in its original state, had nothing that

bore a resemblance: nor indeed is there anything in general more different,

than the regulation of landed property according to the English and Roman

laws. Dower out of the lands seems also to have been unknown in the early part
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of our Saxon constitution; for, in the laws of King Edmond, (a) the wife is

directed to be supported wholly out of the personal estate. Afterwards, as may

be seen in gavelkind tenure, the widow became entitled to a conditional estate

in one-half of the lands; with a proviso that she remained chaste and unmar-

ried (b); as is usual also in copyhold dowers or freebench. (1?) Yet some

(u) Co. Lltt. 40. (v>> Co. Lltt. ». (x) Ibid. 30. fyl Ibid.

(t) Liu., j 36. (a) Will, 75. (I-1 Somner. Gavelk. 81. Co. I.ill. 33. Bro. Dover, 70.

curtesy. ( tt) And hence we may observe, with how much nicety and consideration the old rules of law were framed; and how closely they are connected and
interwoven together, supporting, illustrating, and demonstrating one another.
The time when the issue W88 born is immaterial, proYided it were during the
coverture; for, whether it were born before or after the wife's seisin of the lands,
whether it be living or dead at the time of the seisin, or at the time of the
wife's decease, the husband shall be tenant by the curlesy. (w) The husband
by the birth of the child becomes (as was before observed) tenant by the curtesy
initiate (x) (14) and may do many a.cts to char~e the lands, but his estate i8
not consummate till the aeath of the wife ; which 18 the fourth and last requisite
to make a complete tenant by the curtesy. (y)
[ • 129 ]
*IV. •renant in dQWer is where the husband of a woman is seised (15)
of an estat.e of inheritance, and dies; in this case, the wife shall have the
third (16) part of all the lands and tenements whereof he was seised at an~
time during the coverture, to bold to herself for the term of her na.tural life. (z
Dower is called in Latin by the foreign jurists doarium., but by Bract.on an
our En~lish writers dos: whwh among the Romans signified the marriage portion which the wife broufl'ht to her husband ; but with nl! is applied to signify
this kind of estate, to wluch the civil law, in its original state., had nothing that
bore a resemblance: nor indeed is there anything in genera.I more different,
than the regulation of landed property according to the English and Roman
laws. Dower out of the lands seems als0 to have been unknown in the early part
of our Saxon constitution; for, in the laws of King Edmond, (a) the wife is
directed to be supported wholly out of the persona.I estate. Afterwards, as may
be seen in gavelkind tenure., the widow became entitled to a conditional estate
in one-half of the lands; with a proviso that she remained chaste and unmarried (h); as is usual also in copyhold dowers or freebench. (17) Yet some

(14) When the right to enrtesy is initiate, the husband is seized of the freehold, and he has

such an estate as may be sold on execution against him. "Wickes v. Clarke, 8 Paige, 172;

(u) C-0. Litt. 40.
(t:) Litt. t 36.

("') C-0. Litt. Ill.
Wilk. 75.

(a)

(Z) lb4d. 30.
(bJ Somncr. Gavclk. Ill.

(f) lb4d.
Co. Litt. aa.

Bro. I>otot!r, 70.

Canby's Lessee t. Porter, 12 Ohio, SO. And it would pass to the assignee in a general assign-

ment for the benefit of creditors. Gardner r. Hooper, 3 Gray, 398. The seism however, is

the joint seisin of the husband and wife, and must be so stated in pleading. Melvin r. Pro-

prietors, Ac., 16 Pick. 161. And the right at the common law to take the husband's interest on

execution during the life time of the wife, is taken away in some of the American states by the

statutes for the protection of the rights of married women. See Curry o. Bott, 53 Penn. St. "400;

Staples v. Brown, 13 Allen, 64. In some also curtesy is abolished or greatly changed. See

Thurber v. Townsend, 22 N. T. 517; Beamish r. Hoyt, 2 Rob. 307; Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich.

73; Shields «. Keys, 24 Iowa 298; 1 "Washb. on Real Prop. 129.

(15) The statute 3 and 4 William IV. c. 105, enacts that widows shall be entitled to dower

out of equitable estates, and that seisin in the husband shall not be necessary to give the

widow title, to dower; but on the other hand it is enacted that no widow shall*be entitled to

dower out of any land which shall have been absolutely disposed of by her husband in his

life time, or by his will; and all charges, debts and contracts to which his lands are liable

shall be effectual as against his widow's right to dower. It is also enacted that a husband

may, either subject to restrictions or totally bar his widow's right to dower, by a declara-

tion in a deed or in his will. And a devise by a husband of any real estate (liable to dower)

to his widow, shall bar her claim to dower out of any other land of her husband, unless a

contrary intention shall be declared by his will. Provided that courts of equity may still enforce

any covenant or agreement, entered into by any husband not to bar the right of his widow to

dower.]

(16) [But of gavelkind-lands, a woman is endowed of a moiety while she remains chaste and

unmarried. Co. Litt. 33. b; Rob. Gavelk. 159. And of borough English lands, the widow is

entitled for her dower to the whole of her husband's lands held by that tenure. But of

copyhold lands, a woman is endowed only of such lands whereof her husband was seized at

the time of his death. Cowp. 481. And her title to dower or free-bench is governed by the

custom; according to its authority she may take a moiety, or three parts, or the whole, or

even less than a third, but it must be found precisely as it is pleaded. Boraston e. Hay, Cro.

during

see also Garth. 275; 2 Tes. 633, 638; Cowp. 481; and Gilb. Ten. ed. Walking, n. 164. The

custom of free-bench prevails in the manors of East and West Enborne, and Chadloworth, in
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(14) When the right to curte.iy is initiate, the hueband is seized of the freehold, and he ha11
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Canby's Lessee t'. Porter, 12 Ohio, 80. And it would pass to the ~'ll!ignee in a ~nera.l s.~ign
ment for the benefit of creditors. Gantner r. Hooper, a Gray, 396. The !leism howe"'er. i.1
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'l'hurber v. Townscntl, 22 N. Y. 517; Beamish"· Hoyt, 2 Rob. 307; Tong 11. Marvin, 15 llich.
73; Shields"· Keys, 24 Iowa. 298; 1 We...~hb. on Real Prop. 129.
(15) The statute 3 and 4 William IV, c. 105, ena.ctA tbat widows shall be entitled to do"Wer
out of equitable estates, and that seisin in the husband !!hall not be necessary to give the
\\;dow title to dower ; but on the other band it is enacted that no widow shall be entitled to
dower out of any land which shall ha\'e been absolutely dispot!ed of by her husband in his
life time, or by his will; and all charges, debts and contractd to which hie lands are liat.le
shall be effectual as against hie widow's right to dower. It is also enacted that a hmband
may, either subject to restrictions or totally bar his widow's right to dO'l1,er, by a declaration in a deed or in his will. And a devi11e by a husband of any real 011t.ate {liable to dower}
to his widow, shall bar her claim to dower out of any other land of her hnsband, unl888 a
contrary intention shall be declared b:y hi11 will. Provided that court8 of eqnity may still enforce
o.ny covenant or agreement, entered mto by any husband not to bar the right of hie widow to
du\\'Cr.]
(16) [But of gavellrind-land11, a woman 18 endowed of a moiety while Rho remains oh&Rte and
u11married. Co. Litt. 33. b ; Rob. Gavelk. 159. .And of borough English lands, the widow is
entitled for her dower to the whole of her huRband'e landR held by that tenure. But of
copyhold le.ndri, a woman is endowed only of such lands whereof her husband was ireized at
the time of hie death. Cowp. 481. .And her title to dower or free.. bench ill governed by the
cu11tom; accordin~ to it.s authority she may take a moiet:r, or three parts, or the whole, or
even less than a. thrrd, but it mu~t be found precisely 811 it 1s pleaded. BonM!ton tJ. Hay, Cm.
Eliz. 15.1
(17) [The distinction between free-bench and d-01cer is, t?A.t free-bench is a ~dow'.a estate in
such lands &11 her husband dies MiHed of; where11>1. dower 1s the esl.&te of t.he Widow m all lauds
of which the husband was seised during the coverture. Godwin 11. Winemore, 2 Atk. 52;> ;
see alw Carth. 275; 2 Ves. 63.1, 638; Co-wp. 481; 1111d Gilb. Ten. ed. Watkins, n. 164. The
custom of frMJ-benc/1 prevails in the manors of East and West Enbome, and Cbadleworth, in
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have ascribed the introduction of dower to the Normans, as a branch of

their local tenures; though we cannot expect any feudal reason for its inven-

tion, since it was not a part of the pure, primitive, simple laws of feuds, but

was first of all introduced into that system (wherein it was called triens ter-

tia (d) and dotaUtium) by the Emperor Frederick the Second; (e) who was con-

temporary with our King Henry III. It is possible, therefore, that it might be

with us the relic of a Danish custom: since, according to the historians of that

country, dower was introduced into Denmark by Swein, the father of our Canute

the Great, out of gratitude to the Danish ladies, who sold all their *jewels r «MOA \

to ransom him when taken prisoner by the Vandals. (/) However this <- '

be, the reason which our law gives for adopting it, is a very plain and sensible

one; for the sustenance of the wife, and the nurture and education of the younger

children. (g)

In treating of this estate, let us, first, consider who may be endowed; secondly,

of what she may be endowed; thirdly, the manner how she shall be endowed;

and, fourthly, how dower may be barred or prevented.

1. Who may be endowed. She must be the actual wife of the party at the

time of his decease. If she be divored a vinculo matrimonii, she shall not be

endowed; for ubi nullum matrimonium ibi nulla dos. (h) (18) But a divorce a

mensa et thoro only, doth not destroy the dower; (t) no, not even for adultery

itself by the commop law. (k) Yet now by the statute Westm. 2, (I) if a woman

voluntarily leaves (which the law calls eloping from) her husband, and lives
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with an adulterer, she shall lose her dower, unless her husband be voluntarily

reconciled to her. (19) It was formerly held, that the wife of an idiot might be

endowed, though the husband of an idiot could not be tenant by the curtesy; (m)

but as it seems to be at present agreed, upon principles of sound sense and reason,

that an idiot cannot marry, being incapable of consenting to any contract, this

doctrine cannot now take place. (20) By the ancient law, the wife of a person

(a) Bract. 1. 2, c. 39. Co. Lilt. 30. (A) Bract. I. 2, c. 39, 4 4. (t) Co. Lilt. 32.

if) Yet, among the ancient Goths, an adulteress was punished by the loss of her dotalttii et Mentis ex

bonis mobiHtnu tSH. (Stiernh. I. 3, c. 2.)

(d) Crag. 1. 2, t. 22, 5 9. (e) IMd. (/) Mod. tin. Hist. xxxll, 91.

(a) Bract. 1. 2, c. 39. Co. Litt. SO. (ft) ~ ' - '

if) Yet, among the ancient Goths, an adul

onis mobiNbtu rirt. (Stiernh. I. 3. c. 2.)

(1} 13 K.hv. I, e. 34. («) Co. Litt. 31.

the county of Berks; at Torr, in Devonshire; Kilmersdon, in Somersetshire; and other places

in the west of England. ]

(18) See McCraney v. MeCraney, 5 Iowa, 232; Whitsell ». Mills, C Ind. 229. This is so

even where the divorce was decreed for the adultery or other misconduct of the husband.

Cropseyv. Ogden, 11 N. T. 228. The hardship of this rule is obviated by the power in the

court granting the decree to compel the husband to make suitable provision for his wife; and

in some of the states the statute gives her dower notwithstanding the divorce.

(19) The statute "Westm. 2 is part of the American common law. Cogswell v. Tibbets, 3 H".

H. 41; Bell v. Nealy, 1 Bailey, 312. But the statutes of gome of the states on the subject of

dower are perhaps inconsistent with it. See Reynolds ». Reynolds, 24 "Wend. 193; Lakin v.

1 -iikin, 2 Allen, 45; Bryan v. Batcheller 6 R. I. 543. The statute is applicable to the case of a

woman who, while living separate from her husband, commits adultery and afterwards

remains with the adulterer. Hetherington t>. Graham, 6 Bing. 137. And the husband after

such misconduct is not obliged to receive her back again. Govier ». Hancock, 6 T. R. 603.

See, further, "Woodward v. Dowse, 10 C. B. H>8. 722; Bostook v. Smith, 34 Beav. 57.

(20) The marriage must be a legal one, or if voidable, it must not have been avoided during

the lifetime of the husband. A marriage with an idiot, or with an insane person, unless during a

lucid interval, is absolutely void. Ex parte BarnsJey, 3 Atk. 168; Poster v. Means, 1 Spears,

Eq. 569; Crump ». Morgan, 3 Ired. Eq. 91; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2 Dana, 102; "Wightman v.

'Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 347. So is a second marriage while either party has a former husband

or wife living, from whom no divorce from the bonds of matrimony has been obtained. So

is a marriage which is incestuous by the law of nature; but it seems that no marriage is to be

ao considered except between persons in the direct line of consanguinity, and brothers and

Bisters. Button v. Warren, 10 Mete. 451. Certain marriages are also, by statute, expressly pro-

hibited and declared void; as between persons of different races in gome cases. And in all

such cases the woman would not be entitled to dower. A marriage, where one of the parties

is under the age of consent, is voidable by either party when the proper age is reached. A

marriage procured by force or fraud is voidable at the option of the party compelled or

defrauded. In either of these cases dower will attach if the marriage is not actually avoided

in the husband's lifetime.
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attainted of treason or felony could not be endowed; to the intent, says Staun-

forde, (») that if the love of a man's own life cannot restrain him from such

atrocious acts, the love of his wife and children may, though Britton (o) gives

it another turn: viz.: that it is presumed the wife was privy to her husband's

crime. However, the statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, abated the rigour of the common

law in this particular, and allowed *the wife her dower. But a sub-

sequent statute (p) revived this severity against the widows of traitors,

who are now barred of their dower (except in the case of certain modern trea-

sons relating to the coin,) (q) but not the widows of felons. An alien also caunot

be endowed, (21) unless she be queen consort; for no alien is capable of holding

lands, (r) The wife must be above nine years old at her husband's death, other-

wise she shall not be endowed: («) though in Bracton's time the age was

indefinite, and dower was then only due " si uxor possit dotem promereri, et

virum sustinere." (t)

2. We are next to inquire, of what a wife may be endowed. And she is now by

law entitled to be endowed of all lands and tenements, of which her husband was

seised in fee-simple or fee-tail, at any time during the coverture; and of which

any issue, which she might have had, might by possibility have been heir. (M)

Therefore, if a man be seised in fee-simple, hath a son by his first wife, and after

marries a second wife, she shall be endowed of his lands; for her issue might by

possibility have been heir, on the death of the son by the former wife. But if

there be a donee in special tail who holds lands to him and the heirs of his body
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begotten on Jane his wife; though Jane may be endowed of these lands, yet if

Jane dies, and he marries a second wife, that second wife shall never be endowed

of the lands entailed; for no issue that she could have, could by any possibility

inherit them, (v) A seisin in law of the husband will be as effectual as a seisin

in deed, in order to render the wife dowable; for it is not in the wife's power to

bring the husband's title to an actual seisin, as it is in the husband's power to do

with regard to the wife's lands: which is one reason why he shall not be tenant

by the curtesy, but if such lands whereof the wife, or he himself in her right,

was actually seised in deed, (w) The seisin of the husband, for a transitory

r *, go i instant *only, when the same act which gives him the estate conveys it

"• ' -1 also out of him again (as where, by a fine, land is granted to a man, and he

immediately renders it back by the same fine,) such a seisin will not entitle the

wife to dower; (x) (22) for the land was merely in transitu, and never rested in

the husband, the grant and render being one continued act. But, if the land

abides in him for the interval of but a single moment, it seems that the wife

(n) P. C. b. 8. c. 8. (o) c. 110. (p) 5 * 6 Edw. VI, c. 11.

(?) Stat. :, Eliz, c. 11. 18 Ellz. c. 1. 8 & 0 W. HI o. 86. IS * 1« Geo. II, e. 28.

(r) Co. Litt. 81. (•) Litt. « 36. (*) 1.1. c. 9. { 8. (u) Litt « 36, S3. (») Ibid. | 53.

(M| Co. Litt 31. (x) Cro. Jac. 616. 2 Hep. 67. Co. l.itt. 31.

The validity of a marriage, except where it is incestuous or polygamous, is to be determined

by the law of the country where it was celebrated: if valid there, it is generally to be held

attainterl of treason or felony could not be endowed; to the int.ent, says Staunforde, (n) that if the love of a ma.n's own life cannot restrain him from such
atrocious acts, the love of his wife and children may, though Britton (o) gives
it another turn: viz.: that it is presumed the wife was privy to her husband's
crime. However, the statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, abated the rigour of the common
[ *lal] law in this particular, and allowed *the wife her dower. But a. subsequent sta.tut.e ( p) revived this severity against the widows of traitors,
who are now barred of their dower (except in the case of certain modern treasons relating to the coin,) (q) but not the widows of felons. An alien also cannot
be endowed, (21) unless she be queen consort; for no alien is capable of holding
lands. (r) The wife must be above nine years old at her husband's death, otherwise she shall not be endowed: (s) though in Bracton's time the age was
indefinite, and dower was then only due "si uxor possit dotem prrwnereri, et
vfrum smdinere." (t)
2. We a.re next to inquire, of what a. wife may be endowed. And she is now by
law entitled to be endowed of all lands and tenements, of which her husband was
seised in fee-simple or fee-tail, at any time during the coverture; and of which
any issue, which she might have had, might by possibility have been heir. (tt)
Therefore, if a man be se1sed in fee-simple, ha.th a son by his first wife, and after
marries a second wife, she shall be endowed of his lands; for her issue might by
possibility have been heir, on the death of the son by the former wife. But if
there be a donee in special tail who holds lands to him and the heirs of his body
begotten on Jane his wife; though Jane may be endowed of these lands, yet if
Jane dies, and he marries a second wife, that se.cond wife shall never be endowed
of the lands entailed; for no issue that she could have, could by any possibility
inherit them. (v) A seisin in law of the husband will be as effectual as a seisin
in deed, in order to render the wife dowable; for it is not in the wife's power t.o
bring the husband's title to an actual seisin, as it is in the husband's power to do
with regard to the wife's lands: which is one reason why he shall not be tenant
by the curtesy, but if such lands whereof the wife, or he himself in her right,
was actually seised in deed. (w) The seisin of the husband, for a transitory
[ • 132 ] instant *onllf, when the same act which gives him the estat.e conveys it
also out of lnm again (as where, by a fine, land is ~nted to a. man, and he
immediately renders it back by the same fine,) such a seisin will not entitle the
wife to dower; (x) (22) for the land was merely in tran.'lifo, and never rested in
the husband, the grant and render being one continued act. But, if the land
abides in him for the interval of but a. single moment, it seems that the wife
(ft) P. c. b. 81 c. a.
(0) c. 110.
(p) II & 6 Edw. VI, c. 11.
(q)

Stat. 5 El z, c. 11. 18 Eliz. c. 1. 8 .t; D W. ill. c. 26. 16 & 16 Geo. II, o. ll8.
(•) Litt. t 86.
(t) l. 2. c. 9i...t 8.
(u) Litt. ff 36, 63.
(Z) Cro. Jae. 616. 2 Rep. 67. '-ii). Litt. 81.

(r) Co. Litt. 81.
Co. Litt. 81.

(111)

(") Ibid. t 5.1.

valid every where.

(21) This is no longer the law. See statute 7 and 8 Vic. c. 66.

(IfcJ) The time during which the seisin continues is wholly immaterial, so that it be a bene-

ficial seisin in the husband. Broughton v. Randall, Cro. Eliz. 502. But if one receive the

title for the purpose solely of passing it over to another, or as naked trustee, his wife has no

dowor. MeCauley v. Grimes, 2 Gill and J. 318. And if one buy land and give a mortgage for

the purchase price, his wife will have dower only subject to the mortgage, even though it

may have been given at a time subsequent to the giving of the deed. Wheatley v. Calhonn,

12 Leigh. 264. See, further. Clark v. Munroe, 14 Mass. 351; Mayburry v. Brien, 15 Pet, 39;

Smith c. Stanley, 37 Me. 11. But the wife in such cases has dower in the whole lands, aa

against every one but the mortgagee or those claiming under him. Bullard r. Bowers, 10 If.

H. 500; Keckley v. Keckley, 2 Hill Ch. 250; Washb. on Real Prop. 175-179.

It ia not always essential, in order to establish the right of the wife to dower, that she

should prove an actual or constructive seisin in the husband. If one is in possession of lauds

claiming title, and has derived his possession and claims from the husband, either by descent

or by purchase, the widow is prima facia entitled to dower; and it has sometimes been held

that the party so in possession was estopped from disputing her right, but this, it is believed, is

not the true rule. See this subject fully examined in Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N. Y. 242.
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shall be endowed thereof, (y) And, in short, a widow may be endowed of all her

husband's lands, tenements, and hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal, (23)

under the restrictions before mentioned; unless there be some special reason to

the contrary. Thus a woman shall not be endowed of a castle built for defence

of the realm: (z) nor of a common without stint; for, as the heir would then

have one portion of this common, and the widow another, and both without

stint, the common would be doubly stocked, (a) Copyhold estates are also not

liable to dower, being only estates at the lord's will; unless by the special custom

of the manor, in which case it is usually called the widow's free bench, (b) But

where dower is allowable, it matters not though the husband aliene the lands

during the coverture ; for he alienes them liable to dower, (c) (24)

3. Next, as to the manner in which a woman is to be endowed. There are now

subsisting four species of dower; the fifth, mentioned by Littleton, (d) de la

plus belle, having been abolished together with the military tenures, of which it

was a consequence. 1. Dower by the common law; or that which is before

described. 2. Dower by particular custom ; (e) as that the wife should have half

the husband's lands, or in some places the whole, and in some only a quarter.

3. Dower ad ostium ecclestai, (/) (25) which is where tenant in fee-*simple r *i qq -i

of full age, openly at the church door, where all marriages were formerly <- -I

celebrated, after affiance made and (Sir Edward Coke in his translation of Lit-

tleton, adds) troth plighted between them, doth endow the wife with the whole,

or such quantity as he shall please, of his lands; at the same time specifying
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and ascertaining the same; on which the wife, after her husband's death, may

enter without further ceremony. 4 Dower ex assensu patris; (a) which is only

a species of dower ad ostium ecdesice, made when the husband s father is alive,

and the son by his consent, expressly given, endows his wife with parcel of his

father's lands, in either of these cases, they must (to prevent frauds) be made (A)

in facie ecclesiw et ad ostium ecclesicB ; non enim valent facia in lecto mortah,

nee in camera, aut alibi ubi clandestina fuere conjugia.

It is curious to observe the several revolutions which the doctrine of dower

has undergone, since its introduction into England. It seems first to have been

of the nature of the dower in gavelkind, before mentioned; viz.: a moiety of

the husband's lands, but forfeitable by incontinency or a second marriage. By

the famous charter of Henry I, this condition of widowhood and chastity was

only required in case the husband left any issue; (i) and afterwards we hear no

more of it. Under Henry the Second, according to Glanvil, (k) the dower ad

ostium ecclisicB was the most usual species of dower; and here, as well as in

(ij) This doctrine was extended very far by a Jury in Wales, where the father and son were both hanged

one cart, but the son was supposed to ha< • •--• •*- - ••

shall be endowed thereof. (y) And, in short, a. widow may be endowed of a.11 her
husband's lands. tenements, and hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal, (23)
under the restrictions before mentioned ; unless there be some special reason to
the contrary. 'rhus a woman shall not be endowed of a castle built for defence
of the realm: (z) nor of a common without stint; for, as the heir would then
have one portion of this common, and the widow another, and both without
stint, the common would be doubly stocked. (a) Copyhold estates are also not
liable to dower, being- only estates at the lord's will; unless by the special custom
of the manor, in whwh case it is usually called the widow's free bench. (b) But
where dower is allowable, it matters not though the husband aliene the lands
during the coverture; for he alienes them liable to dower. (c) (24)
3. Next, as to the manner in which a woman is to be endowed. 'rhere are now
subsisting four species of dower; the fifth, mentioned by Littleton, (d) de la
plus belle, having been abolished together with the military tenures, of which it
was a consequence. 1. Dower by the common law; or that which is before
described. 2. Dower by particular custom; (e) as that the wife should have half
the husband's lands, or in some places the whole, and in some only a quarter.
3. Dower ad ost-ium eccleS'i~, (f) (25) which is where tenant in fee-"'simple [ ,..133 ]
of full age, openly at the church door, where all marriages were formerly
celebrated, after affiance made and (Sir Edward Coke in his translation of Littleton, adds) troth plighted between them, doth endow the wife with the whole,
or such quantity as he shall please, of his lands; at the same time specifying
and ascertaining the same; on which the wife, after her husband's death, may
enter without further ceremony. 4. Dower ex assensu patris; ( 1-) which is only
a species of dower ad ostium eeclesi<B, made when the husband. s father is alive,
and the son by his consent, expressly given, endows his wife with parcel of his
fo.ther's lands. In either of these cases, they must (to prevent frauds) be made (h)

in facie ecclesi<8 et ad ostium occlesi<B; non enim valent facta in lecto mortali,
w•c in camera, aut alibi ubi clande..<:tina fuere conjugia.
It is curious to observe the several revolutions which the doctrine of dower
hus undergone, since its introduction into England. It seems first to have been
of the nature of the dower in gavelkind, before mentioned; Tiz.: a moiety of
the husband's lands, but forfeitable by incontinency or a second marriage. By
the fomous charter of Henry I, this condition of widowhood and chastity was
only required in case the husband left any issue; (i) and afterwards we hear no
more of it. Under Henry the Second, according to G1anvil, (k) the dower ad
ostium ecclisi<8 was the most usual species of dower; and here, as well as in

in one cart, but the son was supposed to have survived the father, by appearing to straggle long

whereby he became seised of an estate in fee by survivorship, In consequence of which seisin his widow

had a verdict for her dower, (<><>. Eliz. 603 J

ft) Co. Lltt. 31. 3 Lev. 401. fa}-Uo. Litt. 32. 1 Jon. 816. (b) 4 Rep. 22.

(e) <;o. Lltt. 32. (d) Co. Lltt. « W, 49. (t> Litt. $ 67. (f) Ibid. } 89. (a) Ibid. } 40.

(h) Bracton, i. 8, c. ft), f 4. • '

(1) Si mortuo viro uxor thu remauterU, et tine tiberis fuerit, dotem ntam habebit ,•—li vero uxor cum liberif

remaitserit, dotem quidem habebit, dum corpus suum legitime servaverit. (Cart. Hen. /, A. D. 1001.) Intro-

ilnc. to great charter, edit. Oxon. pag. Iv.

(ff} Thia doctrine Wllll extende•l very lar by a jury in Walea, where the f&ther and eon were both hanged
In one <',art, but the eon was euppol'ed t-0 have survived the father, by appearing to atm~le longest;
whereby he became scl1e1l of an estate in fee by sur\"ivorship, In consequence of which selstn his widow
hnd a ,·enlir.t for her dower, (Cro. Eliz. 603.)
(z) Co. Litt. 31. 3 Lev. 401.
(a.)·l.io. Litt. 3"l. I Jon. Sill.
(b) 'Rep. 22.
(c) Co. LIU. 92.
(d) Co. Litt. fl "8; i9.
(eJ Litt. t 67.
(/} Ibid. f 89.
(g) Ibid. t 4.0.
(11) Bracton, l. 2, c. 30, t 4.

(f) Si mcrluo viro uzor t;}w rema1uerU, flt •ine liberia /l,tll"N, doUrn Nallt habebit ~• oero uzor cum liberk
remamerlt, dotem qulthm habebU, dum CMptU auum kgUime 1eniaverU. (Carl. Htm. I, .A. D. 1001.) Introtl11c. to great charier, edU. Oxon. pag. Iv.
(/I) l. 6, c. 1 and 2.

(it) 1. 8, c. 1 and 2.

(23) [Our author, we may be sure, did not mean to intimate that a widow was entitled to

dower out of all her husband's incorporeal hereditaments, of what nature soever; but only

out of such incorporeal hereditaments as savor of the realty. Buekeridge v. Ingram, 2 Ves. Jun.

664.]

(24) [ If a man has made an exchange of lands, his widow must not be endowed both out of the

lands given in exchange, and also of those taken in exchange, though the husband was seized of

both during the coverture. The widow, however, may make her election outof which of the two

estates she will take her dower. Co. Litt. 31 b.]

In the United States dower is generally held to attach to estates of inheritance to which the

husband is entitled as cestui que trust; but in some states the doctrine is otherwise. See 1 Washb.

on Real Prop. 163.

In England the wife now has dower in the husband's equitable estates of inheritance. Stat. 3

and 4 Wm. IT, c. 105.

(23) [Ou.r author, we may be sure, dicl not mean to intimate that a wiclow we.s entitled to
dower out of all her husband's incorporeal hereditaments, of what nature Roever; but only
out of such incorporeal hereditaments ai> &i.\or of the realty. Buckcridgo v. Ingram, 2 Ves. Jun.
664.]
(24) [If a man has made an exchange of lands, his widow must not be endowed both out of the
lands given in exchange, and also of those taken in exchange, though the husband Wll.'l seized of
both during the coverture. The widow, however, may make her election out of which of the two
estates she will take her dower. Co. Litt. 31 b.]
In the United States dower is generally held to attach to estates of inheritance to which the
bn~ba.nd iH entitled as cutui qtre trust; but in some states the doctrine is otherwise. See 1 W ashb.
on Real Prop. 163.
In England the wife now has dower in the husband's equitable estates of inheritance. Stat. 3
and 4 Wm. IV, c. 105.
(25) [Dower ad ostium eccle8t<8, and dower «x: assenn pa'"81 are both abolished by statute 3
and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, s. 13.]
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(25) [Dower ad ostium ecclesiw, and dower ex assensu patris, are both abolished by statute 3

and 4 Wm. IT, c. 105, s. 13.]
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Normandy, (1) it was binding upon the wife, if by her consented to at the time

of marriage. Neither, in those days of feudal rigour, was the husband allowed

to endow ner ad ostium ecclesia* with more than the third part of the lands

whereof he then was seised, though he might endow her with less ; lest by such

liberal endowments the lord should be defrauded of his wardships and other

F *134-1 ^eu(^a^ profits, (m) But if no specific dotation was made at the *church

L -I porch, then she was endowed by the common law of the third part (which

was called her dos rationabilis) of such lands and tenements as the husband was

seised of at the time of the espousals, and no other; unless he specially engaged

before the priest to endow her of his future acquisitions: (n) and, if the husband

had no lands, an endowment in goods, chattels, or money, at the time of

espousals, was a bar of any dower (o) in lands which lie afterwards acquired, (p)

In King John's mag-na carta, and the first chapter of Henry III, (q) no mention

is made of any alteration of the common law, in respect ot the lands subject to

dower: but in those of 1217 and 1224, it is particularly provided, that a widow

shall be entitled for her dower to the third part of all such lands as the husband

had held in his lifetime: (r) yet in case of a specific endowment of less ad

ostium ecclesia, the widow had still no power to waive it after her husband's

death. And this continued to be law during the reigns of Henry III and

Edward I. («) In Henry IV's time it was denied to be law, that a woman can

be endowed of her husband's goods and chattels: (f) and, under Edward IV,

p IM 3g -I Littleton lays it down *expressly, that a woman may be endowed ad
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L 1«}0 J ostium ecclesia with more than a third part; (u) and shall have her

election, after her husband's death, to accept such dower or refuse it, and betake

herself to her dower at common law. (w) Which state of uncertainty was prob-

ably the reason, that these specific dowers, ad ostium ecclesicB and ex assensu patris,

have since fallen into total disuse. (26)

I proceed, therefore, to consider the method of endowment or assigning dower,

by the common law, which is now the only usual species. By the old law,

grounded on the feudal exactions, a woman could not be endowed without a

fine1 paid to the lord; neither could she marry again without his license ; lest

she should contract herself, and so convey part of the feud, to the lords

enemy, (ar) This license the lords took care to be well paid for; and, as it seems,

would sometimes force the dowager to a second marnage, in order to gain the

fine. But, to remedy these oppressions, it was provided, first by the charter of

Henry I, (y) and afterwards by magna carta, (z) that the widow shall pay

nothing for her marriage, nor shall be distrained to marry afresh, if she chooses

to live without a husband ; but shall not however marry against the consent of

the lord; and farther, that nothing shall be I a km for assignment of the widow's

(I) Or. Coustum. c. 101. (m) Bract. I. 2. c. 39, ( 6.

(n) De qutstu mo. (Glan. 16.)—* territ acgvitUii et acquiraidit. (Bract. Hi.) (o) Glanr. c. 1

(p) When special endowments were made <ul outturn ecclestu*, the husband:after affiance made, and troth

plighted, iisea to declare with what specific lands he meant to endow his wife (quod ilotam aim de tali ma-

nerio cumpertinentiig, tfc. Bmct. ibid.) and therefore in the old York ritual (Seld. Ux. SAr. 2. 2, c. S7).

there is, at this part of the matrimonial service, the following rubric : sacerdos interroget dotem mulieris'

et, ri terra ei in dotfm detur, tune dicatur psnlmus itte, <)"''•' When the wife was endowed generally '«W

quit uxorem sunm dvtaverit in generali, df omnibus terructtenementit; Bract, ib.) the husband seems to have

said, " with all my lands and tenement*) I thee endow ;" and then they all became liable to her dower.

When he endowed her with personalty only, he used to say. " with all my wordly goods (or, as the Salis-

bury ritual has it, ii'il/i all my worldly chattel] 11 her endow;'' which entitled the wife to her thirds, or part

rtitwnabiliH, of his personal estate, which is provided for by magna carta, cup. 26, and vdll be farther

treated of in the concluding chapter of this book; though the retaining this last expression in our modern

liturgy, If of any meaning at all, can now refer only to the right of maintenance, which she acquires during

covertnre, out of her husband's personally.

(q) A. D. 1418, c. 7, edit. Oxon.

(r) Aifignetur autem ei pro date sua lertla pun totiut Ifrnr maritt mi qua sun futt in ritii mo, ntn de

minori dotata fuerit nd ostium ecclfnirf C 7. (Ibid.)

(II Bract. «W tunrn. Britton, c. 101,102. Flet. I. 5, c. 28, }f 11,19.

(t) P. 7 Sen. IV, 13,14. (u) ( 38. F. N. B. 140. (w) (41. (x) Mlrr. e. 1, } 8.

(f) UMtupra. (*) cap. 7.

(26) The only species of dower which exist in the United States are : 1. Dower at the com-

mon law, under which head would be included all eases in which dower exists independent

of statute, or only regulated hy it; and 2. Dower by statute, where something is given as a

substitute for that to which the widow was entitled as dower before. See 1 "Washb. Real Prop.

149.
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dower, but that she shall remain in her husband's capital mansion house for

forty days after his death, during which time her dower shall be assigned.

These forty days are called the widow's quarantine, a term made use of in law

to signify the number of forty days, whether applied to this occasion, or any

other, {a) The particular lands, to be held in dower, must be assigned (b) by

the heir of the husband, or his guardian; not only for the sake of notoriety,

but also to entitle the lord of the fee to demand his services of the heir, in

respect of the lands so holden. For the heir by this entry becomes tenant

*thereof to the lord, and the widow is immediate tenant to the heir, by r „, „„ -,

a kind of sub-infeudation, or under-tenancy completed by this investi- «• -"

ture or assignment; which tenure may still be created, notwithstanding the stat-

ute of quia emptores, because the heir parts not with the fee-simple, but only

with an estate for life. If the heir or his guardian do not assign her dower

within the term of quarantine, or do assign it unfairly, she has her remedy at

law, and the sheriff is appointed to assign it. (c) Or if the heir (being under

age) or his guardian assign more than she ought to have, it may be afterwards

remedied by writ of admeasurement of dower, (d) If the thing of which she is

endowed be divisible, her dower must be set out by metes and bounds; but if it

be indivisible, she must be endowed specially; as the third presentation to a

church, the third toll-dish of a mill, the third part of the profits of an office,

the third sheaf of tithe, and the like, (e) (27)

Upon preconcerted marriages, and in estates of considerable consequence,
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tenancy in dower happens very seldom: for the claim of the wife to her dower

at the common law diffusing itself so extensively, it became a great clog to

alienations, and was otherwise inconvenient to families. Wherefore, since the

alteration of the ancient law respecting dower ad ostium ecclesice, which hath

occasioned the entire disuse of that species of dower, jointures have been intro-

duced in their stead, as a bar to the claim at common law. Which leads me to

inquire, lastly,

4. How dower may be barred or prevented. (28) A widow may be barred of

her dower not only by elopement, divorce, being an alien, the treason of her

husband, and other disabilities before mentioned, but also by detaining the title

deeds or evidences of the estate from the heir, until she restores them: (/) and,

by the statute of Gloucester, (g) if a dowager alienes the land assigned her for

dower, she forfeits it ipso *'facto, and the heir may recover it by action.(29) r „., „„ -,

A woman also may be barred of her dower, by levying a fine, or suffering ^ '

(a) It signifies, In particular, the forty days, which persona coming from Infected countries are obliged to

wait, before thry are permitted to land in Enghiml.

il>\ Co. Liu. 34. 35. (e) Ibid. (d) K. X. B. 148. Finch. L. 3U. Stat. Westro. 2. 13 Edw. I, c. 7.

<lower, but that she shall remain in her husband's capital mansion house for
forty duys after his death, during which time her dower shall be assigned.
'fhese forty days are called the widow's quarantine, a term made use of in law
to signify the number of forty days, whether applied to this occasion, or any
other. (a) The particular lands, to be held in dower, must be assigned (b) by
the heir of the husband, or his guardian; not only for the sake of notoriet_y,
but also to entitle the lord of the fee to demand his services of the heir, m
respect of the lands so holden. For the heir by this entry becomes tenant
*thereof to the lord, and the widow is immediate tenant to the heir, by [ ,.. 136 ]
a kind of sub-infeudation, or under-tenancy completed by this investiture or assignment; which tenure may still be created, notwithstanding the statute of quia emptores, because the heir parts not with the fee-simple, but only
with an estate for life. If the heir or his ~uardian do not assign her dower
within the term of CJ,U&rantine, or do assign 1t unfairly, she has her remedy at
law, and the sheriff lS appointed to assign it. (c) Or if the heir (being under
age) or his guardian assign more than she ought to have, it may be afterwards
remedied by writ of adm(',(UJurement of dower. (d) If the thing of which she is
endowed be diyisiblc, her dower must be set out by metes and bounds; but if it
be indivisible, she must be endowed specially; as the third presentation to a
church, the third toll-dish of a mill, the third part of the profits of an office,
the third sheaf of tithe, and the like. (e) (27)
Upon preconcertcd marriages, and in estates of considerable consequence,
tenancy in dower happens very seldom: for the claim of the wife to her dower
at the common law diffusing itself so extensively, it became a great clog to
alienations, and was otherwise inconvenient to families. Wherefore, since the
alteration of the ancient law respecting dower ad ostium ecclesim, which hath
occasioned the entire disuse of that species of dower, jointures have been introduced in their stead, as a bar to the claim at common law. Which leads me to
inquire, lastly,
4. How dower may be barred or prevented. {28) A widow may be barred of
her dower not only by elopement, divorce, bemg an alien, the treason of her
husband, and other disabilities before mentioned, but also bv detaining the title
deeds or evidences of the estate from the heir, until she restOres thern: (/) and,
by the statute of Gloucester, ( g) if a dowager alienes the land assigned her for
dower, she forfeits it ipso "'facto, and the heir may recover it by action.(29) [ ,..137 ]
A woman also may be barred of her dower, by levying a fine, or suffering

(e) Co. Liu. 32. (/) Jt,id. 89. I./) 6Kdw. I, c. 7.

(27) The widow's quarantine is considerably enlarged in the United States by statute, but

the rule, we suppose, still obtains that dower should oe assigned during its continuance. The

following may be stated as the modes in which she may obtain an assignment: 1. The owner

(al It elgnl4es, In pat'tlcular, the forty daye, which persons coming Crom lnftleted conn tries are obliged to
wait, before they are pem1ltted to land In Engh,nrl.
(b) Co. Lit&. 3~. SCI.
(c) Ilrid.
(d) F. N. B. 1-&8. Finch. L. 314. Stat. Weatm. 2. 18 Edw. I, c. 7.
(e) Co. Litt. 32.
(/) Ilrid. 39.
IUl 6 Jo:dw. I, c. 7.

of the reversion should make assignment; and in that case no writing is necessary, but it is

sufficient if made by parol and accepted by the dowress. Meserve r. Meserve, 19 S. H. 240;

MeConnickt). Taylor, 2 Ind. 336; Jones v. Brewer, 1 Pick. 314; Blood ». Blood, 23 id. 80.

But the dowress is not compelled to accept the assignment of the reversioner, and in that

case, 2. Dower may be assigned, as of common right, by legal proceedings on the application

of the reversioner. Precisely what those legal proceedings must be, will depend upon the

statutes of the state. 3. The courts empowered to take cognizance of proceedings in the

settlement of estates of deceased persons are usually empowered, as incidental to such settle-

ment, to assign dower to the widow in all the lands of which her husband died seised of an

estate of inheritance, but not in any which he had previously conveyed. 4. If dower be not

assigned in either of the preceding modes, the widow may bring her action at law for it, or a suit

in equity. Palmer v. Casperson, 2 Green N. J. 204; Brooks v. "Woods, 40 Ala. 538. •

(28) [By the custom of Kent, the wife's dower of the moiety of gavelkind lands was in

no case forfeitable for the felony of the husband, but where the heir should lose his inher-

itance. Key's Max. 28. But this custom does not extend to treason. Wright's Tenures, 118;

Rob. Gavelk. 230.]

(29) ["The mischief before the making of this statute, Gloucester, c. 7, was not where a

gift or feofftnent was made in fee or for term of life (of a stranger) by tenant in dower, for in

that case, he in the reversion might enter for the forfeiture, and avoid the estate. But the
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(27) The widow's quarantine is considerably enlarged in the United States b,r statnte, but
the rule, we suppose, still obtains that dower Hhould be &11Signed during its continuance. The
following ma,r be stated as the modes in which she may ol>tain an ai;signment: 1. The owner
of the revenuon shonld make a&!ignment; and in that C88C no writing is necessarv, but it is
snflicien~ if made by parol and accfJpted by the dowress., .Mei!erve tJ • .Meserve, 19 N. ~· 240;
McCornnck v. Taylor, 2 Ind. 336; Jones v. Brower, 1 Pick. 314; Blood v. Blood, 23 id. 80.
But the dowress is not compelled to accept the 11.11signment of the revel'Rioner, and in that
e&11e, 2. Dower may be assigned, as of common right, by legal proceedingi; on the application
of the reversioner. Precil!ely what those legal proceedingii must be, will depend upon the
statutes of the state. 3. The courts empowered to take cognizance of proceeding11 in the
settlement of estates of deceased pel'l!Ons are mmally empowered, as incidental to such settlement, to assign dower to the widow in all the lands of which her husband died seised of an
estate of inheritance, but not in any which he had previoutily conveyed. 4. If dower be not
~ssign~d in either of the precedin~ modes, the widow may bring her action at law. fo~ it, or a 11uit
m eqn1ty. Palmer"· Casperson, 2 Green N. J. 204; Brooks v. Woodll, 40 Ala. 538.
(28) [By the oust.om of Kent, the wife's dower of the moiety of gavel.kind lands was in
no case forfeitable for the felony of the husband, but where the heir should lose his inheritance. Noy's .Max. 28. But this custom does not extend to tree.son. Wright's Tenures, 118;
Rob. Gavelk. 230.]
(29) ["The mi110hief before the making of this statute, Gloucester, c. 7, WM not where a
gift or feoffment was made in fee or for term of life (of a stranger) by tenant in dower, for iu
that case, he in the reversion might enter for the forfeiture, and avoid the estate. But tho
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a recovery of the lands, during her coverture, (h) (30) But the most usual

method of barring dowers is by jointures, as regulated by the statute 27

Hen. VIII, c. 10. (31)

A jointure, which, strictly speaking, signifies a joint estate, limited to

both husband and wife, but in common acceptation extends also to a sole estate,

limited to the wife only, is thus defined by Sir Edward Coke; (t) " a competent

livelihood of freehold for the wife, of lands and tenements; to take effect, in

profit or possession, presently after the death of the husband, for the life of the

wife at least" This description is framed from the purview of the statute 27

Henry VIII, c 10, before-mentioned; commonly called the statute of uses, of

which we shall speak fully hereafter. At present I have only to observe, that

before the making of that statute, the greatest part of the land of England was

conveyed to uses; the property or possession of the soil being vested in one man,

and the use, or profits thereof, in another; whose directions, with regard to the

disposition thereof, the former was in conscience obliged to follow, and might

be compelled by a court of equity to observe. Now, though a husband had the

use of lands in absolute fee-simple, yet the wife was not entitled to any dower

therein; he not being seised thereof: wherefore it became usual, on marriage, to

settle by express deed some special estate to the use of the husband and his wife,

for their lives, in joint-tenancy, or jointure; which settlement would be a

provision for the wife in case she survived her husband. At length the statute

of uses ordained, that such as had the use of lands should, to all intents and
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purposes, be reputed and taken to be absolutely seised and possessed of the soil

itself. In consequence of which legal seisin, all wives would have become

dowable of such lands as were held to the use of their husbands, and also entitled

at the same time to any special lands that might bo settled in jointure: had not

F *1381 *^e same 8*;a'iut* provided, that *upon making such an estate in jointure

L J to the wife before marriage, she shall be forever precluded from her

dower, (k) But then these four requisites must be punctually observed: 1. The

(A) Pig. of recov. 66. u"i 1 last. 86. (*) 4 Rep. 1. 2.

mischief was, that when the feoffee, or or any other, died seised, whereby the entry of him in

the reversion was taken away, he in the reversion could have no writ of entry ad communem

l(i/i H/ until after the decease of tenant in dower, and then the warranty contained in her deed

a recovery of the lands, during her coverture. (li.) (30) But the most usual
method of barring dowers is by jointures, as regulated by the statute 27
Hen. VIII, c. 10. (31)
A jointure, which, strictly speaking, signifies a. joint estate, limited to
both husband and wife, but in common acceptation extends also to a sole estate,
limited to the wife only, is thus defined by Sir Edward Coke; (i) "a competent
livelihood of freehold for the wife, of lands and tenements; to take effect, in
profit or possession, presently after the death of the husband, for the life of the
wife at lea.st." This description is framed from the purview of the statute 27
Henry VIII, c. 10, before-mentioned; commonly called the statute of uses, of
which we shall speak fully hereafter. At present I have only to obserre, that
before the making of that statute, the greatest part of the land of England was
conveyed to uses ; the property or possession of the soil being vested in one man,
and the use, or profits thereof, in another; whose directions, with regard to the
disposition thereof, the former was in conscience obliged to follow, and might
be compelled by a court of equity to observe. Now, though a husband had the
use of lands in absolute fee-simple, yet the wife was not entitled to any dower
therein; he not being seised thereof: wherefore it became usual, on marriage, to
settle b.y express deed some special estate to the use of the husband and his wife,
for their hves, in joint-tenancy, or join tu re; which settlement would be a
provision for the wife in case she survived her husband. At length the statute
of uses ordained, that such as had the use of lands should, to all intents and
purposes, be reputed and taken to be absolutely seised and possessed of the soil
itself. In consequence of which legal seisin, u.11 wives would have become
dowable of such lands as were held to the use of their husbands, and also entitled
at the same time to any special lands that might bo settled in jointure: had not
[ • 138 ] the same statutt> provided, that •upon making such an estate in jointure
to the wife before marriage, she shall be forever precluded from her
dower. (k) But then these four requisites must be punctually observed: 1. The
(il l Inst. 36,
(1) Pig. or reeov. 66.
(k) 'Rep, 1. 2.

barred him in the reversion if he were her heir, as commonly he was; and for the remedy uf

this mischief this statute gave the writ of entry in casu proviso in the lifetime of tenant in

dower." 2 Inst. 309. But the statute was not intended to restrain tenant in dower from

aliening for her own life, for such an estate wrought no wrong. Id.]

(30) The most usual mode of barring dower in America is by the wife joining with the

hnsband in a deed of conveyance of his lands, and acknowledging the same in such manner

as the statute prescribes shall be effectual for this purpose. The statutes are not uniform in

their provisions, but generally they provide for some examination of the wife by an officer,

separate and apart from the husband, in order to make certain that she is not acting nnder

compulsion. These provisions must be strictly complied with, or the bar will not be effectual.

Elwoodfl. Klock, 13 Barb. 50; Sibley P.Johnson, 1 Mich. 380; Barstow e. Smith, "Wai. Ch.

394; Jordan t>. Corey, 2 Ind. 385; Witter ». Biscoa, 8 Eng. 422; Manning v. Laboree, 33 Me.

343. The wife mnst be twenty-one years of age to render the act effectual, as the statute only

relieves her from the disability of coverture. Hughes 0. Watson, 10 Ohio, 127; Jones v. Todd. 2

J. J. Marsh. 359; Thomas v. Ganimel; 6 Leigh, 9; Priast c. Cummings, 16 Wend. 617, and SO

id.:'.".!- ; and the deed ought to contain words of release on her part. Catlin c. Ware, 9 Mass.

218; Stevens ». Owen, 25 Me. 94 ; Leavitt v. Lamprey, 13 Pick. 382 ; Witter v. Biscoe, 8 Eng.

422. Bnt in some states this is not necessary. See Burge v. Smith, 7 Fost. 332. The wife can-

not release her contingent right of dower by paroL Keeler v. Tatnell, 3 N. J. 62. And even her

agreement by parol with one to whom as administratrix on the estate of her husband she sells the

land, that she will not claim dower in it, will not be binding upon her. Wright r. De Groff, 14

Mich. 164. But see as to this, Connolly v. Branstler, 3 Bush, 702. In some of the states it the

husband's estate is sold for the satisfaction of his debts, the wife's right of dowar is gone; but this is

not the general rule. The foreclosure of a mortgage giyen by the husband before the marriage, or

given afterwards and executed by the wife in due form of law, will bar her right. Farwell v.

Cotting, 8 Allen, 211; Nottingham «. Calvert, 1 Ind. 527; Lewis ». Smith, 9 K. T. 502. By

agreement in a deed of separation, a wife may also bar herself of all claim to dower. Stephennou

«. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119; Hitter's Appeal, 54 Penn. St. 110.

(31) Upon the subject of Jointure see Cruise Dig. J9C and index, tit Jointure, and 1 Washb.

Real Prop. Book 1, en. 8. Jointures are uncommon in the United States, and questions con-

mischief was, that when the feoffec, or or any other, died Keised, whereby the entry of him in
the rever11ion wa.s taken away, he in the reversion could have no writ of entry ad comn1101e111
legem until after the decease of tenant in dower, and then the warranty contamcd in her dt•ed
barred him in the re>cn!ion if he were her heir, &I! commonly he was; and for the remedy of
this mischief this statute gave the writ of entry in casu proviso in the lifetime of tenant in
dower.'' 2 Inst. 309. But the 11tatute was not intended to restrain tenant in dower from
aliening for her ow" life, for rnch an et1tate wrought no wron~. Id.]
(30) The mm;t mmal mode of liarring dower in Amence. is by the wife joining with the
husband in a deed of conveyance of his lands, and acknowledging the same in such manner
as the Rtatnte prescribes shall he effectual for this purpose. The litatutes are not uniform in
their pro\'isioni1, but generally they provide for some examination of the wife by an officer,
separate and apart from the husband, in order to make certain that she is not acting under
compulsion. These :erovision,; must lie strictly complied with, or the bar will not be effectual.
Elwood v. Klock, 13 Barb. 50; Sibley 11. Johnson, 1 Mich. 3t!O; Barstow v. Smith, Wal. Cb.
394; Jordan t' . Corey, 2 lnd. :185; Witter v. Biscoe, 8 Eng. 422; Manning t•. Laboree, 33 Ye.
343. The wife must be twenty-one years of age to render the act effectual, as the statute only
relieves her from the dhsability of coverture. Hughos v. Watllon, 10 Ohio, 127; Jones 11. Todd. 2
J. J, Man;h. 359; Thoma.> ''· Gammel; 6 Leigh, 9; Priest t'. Cummings, 16 Wend. 617, a.nd 20
irl. 338; and the deed ought to contain words of release on her part. Catlin ti. Ware, 9 ¥888.
21:;; Ste,·eus 11. Owen, :lS Me. 94 ; Leantt v. Lamprey, 13 Pick. 38'.!; Witter ti. Bisooe, 8 Eng.
4t'.l, But in ~omc 11tates this is not necessary. See Burge v, Smith, 7 Fost. 332. The wife cannot releai!e her continisent right of dower by paroL Keeler v. Tatnell, 3 :N. J. 62. And even h"r
agreement by parol with one to whom ae administratrix on the estate of her husband she sell! the
land, that t1ho will not claim dower in it, will not be binding upon her. Wright v. De Groff, 14
Mich. 164. But see M to this, Connolly ti. Branetler, 3 Bush, 70'l. In BOIJle of the stat.e>l it the
hu11band's e11tnte is sold for the satisfaction of his debts, the wife's right of dower is gone ; but thii! is
not the geflernl rule. The foreclosure of a mortgage giyen by the husband before the ma.niagtl, or
given afterwards and executed by the wife in due form of law, will be.r her right. Farwell v.
Cotting, 8 .Allen, 211; Nottingham"· Calvert, 1 Ind. 527; Lewis ti. Smith, 9 N. Y. 50"1. By
agreement in a deed of separation, a wife may ali!O bar herself of all claim to dowar. Stephl•n~n
v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119; Hitner's Appeal, 54 Penn. St, 110.
(31) Upon the subject of Jointure 1100 Cruise Dig. f96 and ind.ex1 tit. Jointure, and 1 Washb.
Real Prop. Book 1, ch. 8. Jointures are uncommon ~ the UniteQ. S~s, ll!ld questions con·
cerning them arise but seldom.
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jointure must take effect immediately on the death of the husband. 2. It

must be for her own life at least, and not per auter vie, or for any term of years,

or other smaller estate. (32) 3. It must be made to herself, and no other in

trust for her. 4. It must be made, and so in the deed particularly expressed to

be, (33) in satisfaction of her whole dower, and not of any particular part of it.

If the jointure be made to her after marriage, she has her election after her

husband's death, as in dower ad ostium ecclesice, and may either accept it, or

refuse it and betake herself to her dower at common law; for she was not capable

of consenting to it during coverture. (34) And if, by any fraud or accident, a

(32) [Although the estate must be in point of quantity for her life, jet it may be snob, as may

be determined sooner by her own act. Tims, an estate durante mdititate is a good jointure,

jointure must take effect immediatelv on the death of the husband. 2. It
must be for her own life at least, and not per auter vie, or for any term of years,
or other smaller est.ate. (32) 3. It must be made to herself, and no other in
trust for her. 4. It must be made, and so in the deed particularly expressed to
be, (33) in satisfaction of her whole dower, and not of any particular part of it.
If the jointure be moo~ to her after marriage, she has her election after her
husband's death, as in dower ad ostium eccl8sice, and may either accept it, or
refuse it and betake herself to her dower st common law; for she was not capable
of consenting to it during coverture. (34) And if, by any fraud or accident, a

because unless sooner determined by herself, it continues to her for life. Mary Yemon's Case, 1

Kep.3.]

(33) [Or it may be averred to be. 4 Rep. 3. An assurance was made to a woman, to the

intent it should be for her jointure, but it was not so expressed in the deed. And the opinion

of the court was, tbat it might be averred that it was for a jointure, and that such averment

was traversable. Owen, 33. But since the Statute of Frauds, which expressly enacts, that no

estates or interests of freehold shall be surrendered unless by a deed or note in writing, there

have been several decisions that such averment is not admissible. Charles c. Andrews, 9 Mod.

152. Tinney v. Tinney, 3 Atk. 8.]

(34) [It is well established, an general doctrine, that since dower is a legal right, the intention

to exclude that right, by a devise or bequest of something else, must be demonstrated, if not by
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express words, at least by (what appears to the court to amount to) necessary implication. Jit

is only where the claim of dower would be inconsistent with the will, or plainly tend to defeat

some other part of the testator's disposition of his property, that the widow can be compelled

to elect whether she will take her dower, or the interest devised to her. Strahan <•. Sutton, 3

Yes. 252; Thompson v. Nelson, 1 Cox, 447. Of course, acceptance of a bequest of personalty

can never operate in bar of dower, unless an intention to that effect can be unequivocally

established: Ayres ». Willis, 1 Yes. Sen. 230; nor will a devise to the testator's widow of part

of those lands out of which she might claim dower, exclude that claim with respect to the

remainder of such lands: Lawrence v. Lawrence, 1 Br. P. C. 591; S. C., 2 Freem. 234; Lord

Dorchester v. Lord Effingham, Coop. 324; Hitchins v. Hitchins, 2 Freem. 241; unless the

terms of the devise express, or clearly imply, that it was the testator's intent, the bequest of

part of the lands, if accepted, should be in satisfaction of dower out of the remainder: Chal-

mers v. Storil, 2 Yes. and Bea. 224; Dickson c. Robinson, Jacob's Rep. 503; and a devise of a

contingent remainder to a woman for life, in the whole of the lands out of which her dower is

demandable, it is well settled, will not, by implication, exclude her immediate title to dower;

for there is nothing inconsistent in the two interests. Inclcdon v. Northcote, 3 Atk. 435. In

short, wherever a clear, incontrovertible result does not arise from the testator's will, that he

meant to exclude his widow from dower, she will not be put to her election; he may not have

known that she would, under the circumstances, bo dowable; but this will not be enough to

exclude her right: it must appear that he did know it, and meant to bar her; or at least, that

her demand of dower would be repugnant to the dispositions he has made. French v. Davies,

2 Yes. Jim. 577, 581. Although a testator has devised his estate to trustees, charged with an

annuity, or a gross sum, to nis widow; still, as a wife's title to dower is paramount to the

devise, a Court of equity will not readily infer that, because the testator has given all his

property to trustees, it was necessarily his intention to give them that which was not Ws.

Foster v. Cook, 3 Br. 351; Pitts v. Snowden, 1 Br. 292; Greatrex v. Gary, 6 Yes. 616. But,

although this would be inadmissible as a general construction, circumstances may justify it:

Druce v. Dennison, 6 Yes. 400; Judd v. Pratt, 13 Ves. 174; Attorney-General v. Grote, 3 Meriv.

320; Penticost v. Ley, 2 Jac. and Walk. 210; Hewson v. Reed, 5 Madd. 451; Forester ti. Cotton,

1 Eden, 535; Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swanst. 374; if the estates would be insufficient to satisfy the

charges expressly imposed upon them, in case the title to dower were sustained, that might show

an intention to bar the claim of dower; and, it seems, a reference to ascertain that fact will be

granted. Pearson r. Pearson, 1 Br. 292; French c. Davies, 2 Yes. Jun. 580. Still the admissi-

bility of parol evidence to enlarge the effect of the terms used in a will, though not in all cases

absolutely rejected, is strongly discountenanced by the very highest authority. Doe v. Chiohes-

ter, 4 Dow, 89, 93,

A legacy given by a testator to his widow, as the price of her release of dower, must be fully

paid before any mere legatees can claim: Burridge >: Bradyll, 1 P. Wms. 127; Davenhill v.

Fletcher, Ambl. 245; for the widow, in such case, is a purchaser, and justly entitled to a

preference: Blower v. Morrett, 2 Yes. Sen. 242; and it will not vary the principle of the case,

(32) [Although the estate must be in point of quantity for her life, yet it may be such as may
be determined sooner by her own act. Thus, an estate durantll tJiduitatll is a good jointure,
bocau11e unless sooner determined by h61'86Jf, it continues t.o her for life. .Mary Vernon's Case, 4
Rep. 3.]
(33) [Or it may be averred to be. 4 Rep. 3. An assurance was mnde to a woman, t.o the
intent it should be for her Jointure, but it was not so cxpro3>1ed in the deed. And the opinion
of the court was, that it nught be averred that it was for a jointure, and that such averment
we.a traversable. Owen, 33. But since the Statute of Frauds, which expressly enacts, that no
estates or interest!! of freehold shall be surrendered unless by a deed or note in writing, there
have been several decisions that such averment is not admissible. Charles v. Andrews, 9 Mod.
152. Tinney v. Tinney, 3 Atk. 8.]
(34) [It is well established, a11 general doctrine, that since dower is a legal right, the intention
to exclude that right, by a devise Qf' bequest of something else, must be demonstrated, if not by
express words, at least by (what appears to the court to amount to) necessary implication. It
is only where the claim of dower would be inconsistent with the will, or plainly tend to defeat
some other part of the testator's disposition of his property, that the widow can be compelled
to elect whether she will take her dower, or the mterel!t devised to her. Strahan v. Sutton, 3
Ves. 252; Thompsonv. Nelson, 1Cox,447. Of oourse, acceptance of a bequest of personalty
can ne;er operate in bar of dower, unless an intention to that effect can be unequivocally
established: Ayres"· Willis, 1 Ves. Sen. 230; nor will a devise to the testator's widow of part
of those lands out of which she might claim dower, exclude that claim with respect t.o the
remainder of such landt1: Lawrence v. Lawrence, 1 llr. P. C. 591; S. C., 2 Frcem. 234; Lord
Dorchester v. Lord Effingham, Coop. 3'24; Hitching v. Hitchin11, 2 Freem. 241; unless the
t.enns of the devi11e express, or clearly imply, that it was the testator'" intent, tho bequest of
pa.rt of the lands, if accepted, should be in satisfaction of dower out of the remainder : Chalmers v. Storil, 2 Ves. and Bea. 224; Dickson v. Robinson, Jacob's Rep. 503; and a devise of a
eo-ntt11gent remainder to a woman for life, in the whole of the lands out of which her dower is
demandable, it is well settled, will not, by implication, exclude her immerliate title to dower;
for there ii; nothing ineonttl:1tent in the two interests. Inclcdou v. Northcote, 3 Atk. 435. In
short, wherever a clear, incontrovertible regult does not arise from the teRtator's will, that he
meant to exclude his widow from dower, she will not be put to her election; he may not have
known that she would, under the cireumstances, be dowablc; lmt thill will not be enough to
exclude her right: it must appenr that he did know it, and meant to bar her; or o.t least, that
her demand of dower would be repugnant to the dii;poHitioni; he has mo.de. French v. Davies,
2 Ves. Jun. 577, 681. Although a testator he.8 devised his estate to tru~tees, charged with an
annuity, or a gross sum, t.o his widow· still, as a wife's title to dower is paramount t.o the
devise, a Court of equity will not readily iufer that, because the testat.or has given all his
property t.o trustees, it was neces;iarily his intention to give them that which was not 11'8.
Foster v. Cook, 3 Br. 351; Pitt.~ v. Snowden, 1 Br. ~i; Greatrex v. Cary, 6 Vee. 616. But,
although this would be inadmissible as a genera.I construction, circumstances may justify it :
Druce "·Dennison, 6 Ves. 400; Judd 11. Pratt, 13 Ves. 174; Attorney-General v. Grote, :l Meriv.
320; Penticost v. Ley, 2 Jae. and Walk. 210; Hewson v. Reed, 5 Madd. 451; Forester v. Cotton,
1 Eden, 535; Dillon 11. Parker, 1 Swanst. 374; if the estates would be insufficient to satisfy the
charges expressly imposed upon them, in case the title to dower were su8tained, that might show
an intention to bar the claim of dower ; and, it seems, a reference to ascertain that fact will be
granted. Pearson"· Pearson, 1 Br. 292; French ti. Davies, 2 Ves. Jun. 580. Still the admissibility of parol e\"idence to enlar~e the effect of the terms used in a will, though not in all cases
abt!Olutely rejected, is strongly discountenanced by the very highest authority. Doe v. Chichester, 4 Dow, 89, 93,
.A legacy given by a teste.t.or to his widow, as the price of her release of dower, must be [ully
paid before any mere legatees can claim: Burridge ti. Bradyll, 1 P. Wms. 127; Davenhill ti.
Fletcher, .A.mbl. 245; for the widow, in such case, is a purchaser, and justly entitled to a
preference: Blower"· Morrett, 2 Vee. Sen. 242; and it will not vary the principle of the case,
to show that the legacy was not the only consideration for the release of dower. Heath v. Dendy,
1 Russ. 545.
Where a widow has accepted, and continued in the enjoyment of an interest, between which
and her title to dower, she might have elected, that efection, though she has not expressly
declared it, will be fairly inferred from such circumstances: A.rdeeoifo v. Bennett, 2 Dick. 467 ;

to show that the legacy was not the only consideration for the release of dower. Heath v. Dendy,

1 Enss. 545.

Where a widow has accepted, and continued in the enjoyment of an interest, between which

and her title to dower, she might have elected, that election, though she has not expressly

declared it, will be fairly inferred from such circumstances: Ardesoife v, Bennett, 2 Dick. 467 ;
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139 ESTATES LESS THAN FREEHOLD. [Book II.

jointure made before marriage proves to be on a bad title, and the jointress is

evicted, or turned out of possession, she shall then (by the provisions of the

same statute) have her dower pro tanto at the common law. (I) (35)

There are some advantages attending tenants in dower that do not extend to

jointresses; and so, vice versa, jointresses are in some respects more privileged

than tenants in dower. Tenant in dower by the old common law is subject to

no tolls or taxes; and hers is almost the only estate on which, when derived

from the king's debtor, the king cannot distrein for his debt; if contracted dur-

r *i QQ -I ing the coverture, (m) But, on the other *hand, a widow may enter at

' ' J once, without any formal process, on her jointure land; as she also might

have done on dower ad ostium ecclesice, which a jointure in many points resem-

bles ; and the resemblance was still greater, while that species of dower continued

in its primitive state: whereas no small trouble, and a very tedious method of

proceeding, is necessary to compel a legal assignment of dower, (n) And, what,

is more, though dower be forfeited by the treason of the husband, yet lands

settled in jointure remain unimpeached to the widow, (o) Wherefore Sir

Edward Coke very justly gives it the preference, as being more sure and

safe to the widow, than even dower ad ostium eeclesice, the most eligible species

of any.

CHAPTER IX.

OF ESTATES LESS THAN FREEHOLD.

OF estates that are less than freehold, there are three sorts: 1. Estates for

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

years: 2. Estates at will: 3. Estates by sufferance.

I. An estate for years is a contract for the possession of lands or tenements,

for some determinate period; and it takes place where a man letteth them to

another for the term of a certain number of years, agreed upon between the

(I) These settlements, previous to marriage, seem to hare been in nse among the ancient Germans, and

their kindred nation the Gauls. Of the former Tacitus gives us this account. " Dotem non vxor oiariic,

ted uxori maritus affert; iniermnt parentei et propingui. et munera probant." (De mar. Germ. c. 1S.J And

Caesar fde bello Go&co, I. 6, c. IS j has given us the terms of a marriage settlement among the Hauls, aa

nicely calculated as any modern jointure. " Viri, quantai pecuniat ab vxoribut dotin nomine acctperuat,

tania* ex suis bonfa, rfstimatione facta, cum dotibun communicant. Hujua omnia pecunitv conjvnftim rntut

habetur, frvciutgve sentintur. Uter eorum vita tuperavit. ad earn pare utrivsque cum fractious gupertonm

temporum pervenit." The dauphin's commentator on Cfesar supposes that this Gaulish custom was the

ground of the new regulations made by Justinian (Nov. 97) with regard to the provision for willows ainonjc

the Romans; but surely there Is as much reason to suppose, that it gave the hint for our statutable jointures.

(m) Co. Litt. 31, a. F. N. B. ISO. (n) Co. Litt. 86. (o) Ibid. 87.

and her partial accession to a settlement may be held an election to abide by the whole. Milner

v. Lord Hare wood, 17 Ves. 277. But, generally speaking, acts done by a party before he, or she,

is fully informed of his or her rights, will not amount to an election. Pauey t>. Desbouverie. 3 P.

Wins. 321; Chalmers ». Storil, 2 Ves. and Bea. 225; Dillon v. Parker, 1 Swanst. 381; Whistler

v. Webster, 2 Ves. Jun. 371; Edwards c. Morgan, M'Clel. 551.

A trust estate may constitute a good equitable jointure in bar of dower; and if a jointure be

made of freehold estates in trust for an infant, this will, in equity, be a bar to her claim of dower.

It was, indeed, once doubted whether a jointure, however formal, settled on an infant before mar-

riage, was a bar to dower; but it has been determined that such a jointure is binding upon the

infant, who cannot waive it after her husband's death, and claim her dower. Karl of Bucking-

ham ». Drury, 2 Eden, 73.]

(35) In addition to the modes of barring dower specified in the text may be mentioned that by

nan-claim ; where the widow fails to assert her right within the time allowed by the statute of

limitations. It has also been held that if the lands have been appropriated to public uses under

the right of eminent domain, in the lifetime of the husband, the right to dower is gone : Moore r.

New York, 8 N. Y. 110; and the same is true where they have been dedicated to public uses by

the husband. Guynne v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio, 24.
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lessor and lessee, (a) and the lessee enters thereon, (b) (1) If the lease be but for

half a year or a quarter, or any less time, this lessee is respected as a tenant for

years, and is styled so in some legal proceedings; a year being the shortest term

which the law m this case takes notice of. (c) And this may, not improperly,

lead ns into a short digression, concerning the division and calculation of time

by the English law.

The space of a year (2) is a determinate and well-known period, consisting

fa) We may here remark, once for all, that the termination of " —or" and '•—ee" (obtain in law, the one

an active, the other a passive signification; the formornsually denotiugthedoerof anyacl. the latter him

to whom it is done. The feofforla he that maketh a feoffment; the feoffee is he to whom it is made; the

• luiiur Is one that giveth lands in tail; the donee is he who receiveth it; he that granteth a lease is denom-

inated the lessor; and he to whom it is granted the lessee, ri.iti. s 57.;

(1) Ibid, 58. (cj Ibfd, 07.

(1) [Of course otir author will be understood to put this case of letting, only as a particular

instance of one mode in which an estate for years may be created. See post, p. 143. There

are obviously various ways in which such an estate may arise. Thus, where a person devises

lands to his executors for payment of his debts, or until his debts are paid, the executors take

an estate, not of freehold, but for so many years as are necessary to raise the sum required.

Carter v. Barnardiston, 1 P. Wins. 509; Hitchens v. Hitchens, 2 Tern. 404; S. C., 2 Preem. 242:

Doe v. Simpson, 5 Bast, 171; Doe v, Nichplls, 1 Bam. and Cress. 342. Though, in such case, if

a gross sum ought to be paid at a fixed time, and the annual rents and profits will not enable

them to make the payment within that time, the court of chancery will direct a sale or mort-
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gage of the estate, as circumstances may render one course or the other most proper. Berry v.

Astham, 2 Vern. 26; Sheldon v. Dormer, id. 311; Green ». Belchier, 1 Atk. 506; Allen v. Back-

house. 1 Ves. and Bea. 75; Bootel «. Blundell, 1 Meriv. 233.]

So if the vendor put the vendee, under an executory contract for the purchase of lands, into

possession, and by the contract the latter is to have possession so long as he makes without

default thepayments specified in the contract, this makes him tenant for years, and not at will

merely, white v. Livingston, 10 Gush. 259.

One of the most difficult questions in this connection often is, whether a particular instru-

ment operates as a present demise of the premises, or a contract for a future one. Mr. 'Wash-

bum, in 1 Washb. on Real Property, 300 et seq., has collected the cases in which this question

has arisen, and has shown the difficulty in reconciling them all. The question, he says,

• • seems to turn on whether the writing shows that the parties intend a present demise and

parting with the possession by the lessor to the lessee; for if it does, it will operate as a lease,

though it is contemplated that a future writing should be drawn more explicit in its terms.

And it may be a good lease, in distinction from an executory contract to lease, though it be

to commence in futuro. Whitney «. Allaire, 1 Comst. 305, 311. But if a fuller lease is to be

prepared and executed before the demise is to take effect, and possession given, it is an agree-

ment for a lease, and not a lease which creates an estate. Aiken i: Smith, 21 V i. 172; People v.

Gillis, 24 Wend. 201; Jenkins t>. Eldredge,3 Story, 325; Bnell». Cook, 4 Conn. 238."

To constitute one a tenant for years he must have an interest in the land, and a right to its

possession and use. Maverick v. Lewis, 3 McCord, 211; Adams v. McKesson, 53 Penn. St. 83.

One who puts in a crop upon the laud of another upon shares, is not tenant for years, but only

tenant in common of the crop, and the possession of the land, except so far as may be neces-

sary to enable him to cultivate and harvest the crop, is in the owner of the laud. Bradish v.

Schenck, 8 Johns. 151; Monlton v. Robinson, 7 Fost. 550; Putnam ». Wise, 1 Hill, 234; Aiken

r. Smith, 21 Yt. 172. But if the party is put in possession of the land, and is to pay rent in

produce, he is tenant for years, as much as if he paid iu money. Newcomb «. Ramer, 2 Johns,

421; Putnam t>. Wise, 1 Hill, 234; Gould v. School District, 8 Minn. 431; Dixon e. JJiceolls. 39

111., 372.

(2) [Before 1752, the year commenced on the 25th of March, and the Julian calendar was

used, and much inaccuracy and inconvenience resulted, which occasioned the introduction of

the new style by the 24 Geo. II, c. 23, which enacts, that the 1st January shall be reckoned to

be the first day of the year, and throws out eleven days in that year, from the 2d Septem-

ber to the 14th, and in other respects regulates the future computation of time, with a saving

of ancient customs, <fcc. See the statute set forth in Burn Eoc. L. tit. Kalendar. It has been

held, that in a lease or other instrument under seal, if the feast of Michaelmas, <fec., be men-

tioned, it must be taken to mean New Michaelmas, and parol evidence to the contrary is not

admissible : 11 East, 312 ; but upon a parol agreement it is otherwise. 4 B. and A. 588.

The year consists of three hundred and sixty-five days; there are six hours, within a few

minutes, over in each year, which every fourth year makes another day, viz.: three hundred

and sixty-six, and being the 29th February, constitute the bissextile or leap-year. Where a

statute speaks of a year, it shall be computed by the whole twelve months, according to the

calendar, and not by a lunar mouth: Cro. Jac. 166; but if a statute direct a prosecution to be

within twelve months, it is too late to proceed after the expiration of twelve lunar mouths.

Carth. 407. A twelve-month, in the singular number, includes all the year; but twelve months

shall be computed according to twenty-eight days for every month. 6 Co. 62.

Half a year consists of one hundred and eighty-two days, for there shall be no regard to a
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F *1411 commonly°f 365 days; for though in *bissextile or leap-year, it con-

1 -" sists properly of 366, "yet, by the statute 21 Hen. Ill, the increasing day

in the leap-year, together with the preceding day, shall be accounted for one

day only. That of a month is more ambiguous: there being, in common use,

two ways of calculating months; either as lunar, consisting of twenty-eight

days, the supposed revolution of the moon, thirteen of which make a year: or,

as calendar months of unequal lengths, according to the Julian division in our

common almanacks, commencing at the calends of each month, whereof in a

year there are only twelve. A month in law is a lunar month, or twenty-eight

days, unless otherwise expressed; not only because it is always one uniform per-

months shall be reckoned half a year, or one hundred and eighty-two days, and not lunar month s.

[ ,.. 141 ] commonly of 365 days; for though in *bissextile or leap-year, it consists properly of 366, yet, by the statute 21 Hen. III, the increasing day
in the leap-year, together with the preceding day, shall be accounted for one
day only. That of a month is more ambiguous: there being, in common US(:,
two ways of calculating months; either as lunar, consisting of twenty-eight
days, the supposed revolution of the moon, thirteen of which make a year: or,
as calendar months of unequal lengths, according to the Julian division in onr
common almanacks, commencing at the calends of each month, whereof in a
year there are only twelve. A month in law is a lunar month, or twenty-eight
days, unless otherwise expressed; not only because it is always one uniform per-

Cro. Jao. 166; 6 Co. 61.

So a quarter of a year consists but of ninety-one days, for the law does not regard the six

hours afterwards. Co. Litt. 135, b.; 2 Roll. 521, 1. 40; Com. Dig. Ann. A.

But both half years and <j i mrt ITS are usually divided according to certain feasts or holidays,

rather than a precise division of days, as Lady-day, Midsummer-day, Michaelmas-day, or

Christmas, or Old Lady-day, (6th April), or Old Michaelmas-day, (the llth October). In these

cases, such division of the year by the parties is regarded by the law, and therefore, though

half a year's notice to quit is necessary to determine a tenancy from year to year, yet a notice

served on the 29th September to quit on the 25th March, being half a year's notice according

to the above division, is good, though there be less than one hundred and eighty-two, viz.: one

hundred and seventy-eight, days. 4 Esp. R. 5 and 198; 6 id. 53.
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A month is solar, or computed according to the calendar, which contains thirty or thirty-one

days, or lunar, which consists of twenty-eight days. Co. Litt. 135, b. In temporal matters,

it is usually construed to mean lunar; in ecclesiastical, solar or calendar. 1 Bla. B. 450; 1 M.

and S. Ill; 1 Bing. Rep. 307. In general, when a statute speaks of a month without adding

" calendar," or other words showing a contrary intention, it shall be intended a lunar month

of twenty-eight days. See cases Com. Dig. Ann. B.; 6 Term. Rep. 224; 3 East, 407; 1 Bingh.

R. 307. And generally, in all matters temporal, the term " month" is understood to mean lunar;

but in matters ecclesiastical, as non-residence, it is deemed a calendar month; because in each

of these matters a different mode of computation prevails; the term, therefore, is taken in that

sense which is conformable to the subject matter to which it is applied; 2 Roll. Ab. 521, 51;

Hob. 179; 1 Bla. R. 450; 1 M. and S. 117; 1 Bing. R. 307; Com. Dig. Ann. B.; and, therefore,

when a deed states calendar months, and in pleading the word calendar be omitted, it is not

necessarily a variance. 3 Brod. and B. 186.

When a deed speaks of a month, it shall be intended a lunar month, unless it can be collected

from the context that it wag intended to be calendar. 1 M, and S. Ill; Com. Dig. Ann. B.;

Cro. Jac. 167; 4 Mod. 185. So in all other contracts : 4 Mod. 185; 1 Stra, 446; unless it be

proved that the general understanding in that department of trade is, that bargains of that

nature are according to calendar months. 1 Stra. 652; 1 M. and S. 111. And the custom of

trade, as in case of hills of exchange and promissory notes, has established, that a month named

in those contracts shall be deemed calendar. 3 Brod. and B. 187.

In all legal proceedings, as in commitments, pleadings, Ac., a month means four weeks. 3 Bur.

1455; 1 Bla. R. 450; Dougl. 463, 446. When a calendar month's notice of action is required,

the day on which it is served is included, and reckoned one of the days; and therefore, if a

notice be served on 28th of April, it expires on 27th of May, and the action may be

commenced on 28th of May. 3 T. R. 623; 2 Campb. 294. And when a statute requires the

action against an officer of customs to be brought within three months, they mean lunar, though

the same act requires a calendar month's notice of action. 1 Bing. R. 307.

A day is natural, which consists of twenty-four hours; or artificial, which contains the tome

from the rising of the sun to the setting. Oo. Litt. 135, a. A day is usually intended of a

natural day, as in an indictment for burglary we say, hi the night of the same day: Co.

Litt. 135, a.; 2 Inst. 318. Sometimes days are calculated exclusively, as where an act required

ten clear days' notice of the intention to appeal, it was held, that the ten days are to be taken

exclusively, both of the day of serving the notice and the day of holding the sessions. 3 B.

and A. 581. A legal act done at any part of the day will in general relate to the first period

of that day. 11 East, 498.

The law generally rejects fractions of a day. 15 Ves. 257; Co. Litt. 135, b.; 9 East. 154; 4

T. R. 660; 11 East/496, 498; 3 Co. 36, a. But though the law does not in general allow of

the fraction of a day, yet it admits it in cases where it is necessary to distinguish for the pur-

poses of justice; and I do not see why the very hour may not be so too where it is necessary,

and can be done, for it is not like a mathematical point which cannot be divided. Per La.

months shall be reckoned half a year, or one hundred and eighty-two days, and not lunar months..
Cro. Jae. 166; 6 Co. 61.
So a quarter of a year. consists but of ninety-one days, for the law does not regard the six
hours afterwards. Co. Litt. 135, b.; 2 Roll. 521, I. 40; Com. Dig. Ann. A.
But both half years and 9uartefll are usually divided according to certain feasts or holid&ya,
rather than a precise division of days, Bl! Lady-day, Midsummer-day, Michaelmas-day, or
Christmas, or Old Lady-day, (6th .April), or Old MichaelmM-day, (the 11th October). In these
cases, such division of the year by the parties is regarded by the law, and therefore, though
half a yea.r's notice to quit is necesea.ry to determine a tell&llcy from year to year, yet a notice
served on the 29th September to quit on the 25th March, being half a yea.r's notice according
to the above division, is good, though there be leRS than one hundred and eighty-two, vis.: one
hundred and seventy-eight, days. 4 E~p. R. 5 and 198; 6 id. 53.
A month is solnr, or computed accordin~ to the calendar, which cont.a.ins thirty or thirty-one
da;vs, or lunar, which consist:! of twenty-eight days. Co. Litt. 135, b. In temporal matters,
it 18 usually con11trued to mean lunar; in ecclesiastical, eolar or calendar. 1 Bla.. R. 450; 1 ll.
and S. 111; 1 Bing. Rep. 307. In general, when a statute speaks of a month without adding
"calendar," or other words showing a contrary intention, it shall be intended a lunar month
of twenty-eight days. See caseR Com. Dig. Ann. B.; 6 Term. Rep. 224; 3 East, 407; 1 Bingh.
R. 307. And generally, in all matters temporal, the term "month" ie understood to mea.n lunar;
but in matters ecclesiastical, as non-residence, it is deemed a calendar month ; because in each
of these matteI'l! a different mode of computation prevails ; the term, therefore, is taken in that
sense which is conformable to the subject matter to which it is applied ; 2 Roll. Ab. 521, 51 ;
Hob. 179; 1 Bla. R. 450; 1 M. and S. 117; 1 Bing. R. 307; Com. Dig. Ann. B.; and, therefore,
when a deed states calendar months, and in pleading the word calendar be omitted, it is not
necei:isn.rily a variance. 3 Brod. and B. 186.
When a deed speaks of a month, it shall be intended a lunar month, unleBB it can be collected
from the context that it was intended to be calendar. 1 M, and S. 111; Com. Dig. Ann. B.;
Cro. Jae. 167; 4 Mod. 185. So in all other CQ'7ltracta: 4 Mod. 185; 1 Stra. 446; unless it be
proved that the general underst.anding in that department of trade is, that bargains of that
nature are according to calendar months. 1 Stra. 652; 1 M. and S. 111. .And the eu&tQnJ of
trtuk, as in case of bills of exchange and promissory notes, has established, that a month named
in those contracts shall be deemed calendar. 3 Brod. and B. 187.
In all "legal proceedings, as in commitments, pleadings, &c., a month means four weeks. 3 Bur.
1455; 1 Bia. R. 450; Dongl. 463, 446. When a calendar month' a notice of action is reqnired,
the day on which it is served ie included, and reckoned one of the d&ys ; and therefore, if a
notice be sen·ed on 28th of April. it expires on 27th of May, and the action may be
commenced on 28th of May. 3 T. R. b'2:1; 2 Campb. 294. .And when a statute requires the
act.ion against an officer of customs to be brought within three months, they mean lunar, though
the same oot requires a calendar month's notice of action. 1 Bing. R. 307.
.A. day is natural, which consists of twenty-four hours; or artificial, which contains the time
from the rising of the sun to the setting. Co. Litt. 13.5, a. A day is nsnally intended of a
natural day, as in an indictment for burglary we say, in the night of the same d&y: Co.
Litt. 135, a..; 2 Inst. 318. Sometimes days arc calculated exclusively, a.s where an act required
ten clear days' notice of the intention to appeal, it was held, that the ten days are to be ta.ken
exclusively, both of the day of serving the notice and the day of holding the sell8ions. 3 B.
and A. 581. A legal act done at any part of the day will in general relate to the first period
of that day. 11 Ea,;it, 498.
The law generally rejects fractions of a day. 15 Ve11. 257; Co. Litt. 13?, b.; 9 East, 154; 4
T. R. 660; 11 E&1:1t, 496, 498; a Co. 36, a.. But though the law does not m general allow of
the fraction of a day, yet it admit11 it in cases where it i1' necessary to distinguish for the purposes of ju11tice; and I do uot see why the very hour may not be so too where it is ne{~e~.
and can he done, for it is not like e. wathematieal point which cannot be divided. Per Ld.
Mansfield, 3 Burr, 1434; 9 East, 154; ;l Coke Rep. 3fi, a.. 'fherefore fraction of a day W&'!
admitted in support of a commissiou of liankruptcy, hy allowing evidence that the act of
bankruptcy, though on the same day, wa..~ previour! t-0 issuing the comllliNlion. 8 Yes. 30. So
where goods are Meized uncler e fieri foci.as the flame day that the pal'ty commit,; an act of hank·
mptcy, it is open to inquire at what time of the day the goods were seized aud the act of
~t2

Mansfield, 3 Burr, 1434; 9 East, 154; A Coke Rep. 3fi, a. Therefore fraction of a day was

admitted in support of a commission of bankruptcy, by allowing evidence that the act of

bankruptcy, though on the same day, was previous to issuing the commission. 8 Ves. 30. So

where goods are seized under a fieri facias the same day that the party commits an act of bank-

ruptcy, it is open to inquire at what time of the day the goods were seized and the act of
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iod, but because it falls naturally into a quarterly division by weeks. (3) There-

fore a lease for "twelve months" is only for forty-eight weeks; but if it be for

a " twelvemonth" in the singular number, it is good for the whole year, (d)

For herein the law recedes from its usual calculation, because the ambiguity be-

tween the two methods of computation ceases; it being generally understood

that by the space of time called thus, in the singular number, a twelvemonth, is

meant the whole year, consisting of one solar revolution. In the space ef a day

all the twenty-four hours are usually reckoned, the law generally rejecting all

fractions of a day, in order to avoid disputes, (e) (4) Therefore, if I am bound

to pay money on any certain day, I discharge the obligation if I pay it before

twelve o'clock at night; after which the following day commences. But to

return to estates for years.

These estates were originally granted to mere farmers or husbandmen, who

every year rendered some equivalent in money, provisions, or other rent, to the

lessors or landlords; but, in order to encourage them to manure and cultivate

the ground, they had a permanent interest granted them, not determinable at

the will of the lord. And yet their possession was esteemed of so little conse-

quence, that they were rather considered as the bailiffs of servants of the lord, who

were to *receive and account for the profits at a settled price, than as r *, ^. -,

having any property of their own. And therefore they were not allowed •- -I

to have a freehold estate: but their interest (such as it was) vested after their

deaths in their executors, who were to make up the accounts of their testator
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with the lord, and his other creditors, and were entitled to the stock upon the

farm. The lessee's estate might also, by the ancient law, be at any time defeated

by a common recovery suffered by the tenant of the freehold; (/) which

annihilated all leases for years then subsisting, unless afterwards renewed by the

recoverer, whose title was supposed superior to his by whom those leases were

granted.

(<IJ 6 Rep. 61. (>') Co. I .HI. 185. (f) Co. r.itt. 46.

bankruptcy was committed; and the validity of the execution depends on the actual priority. 4

iod, but because it falls naturally into a quarterly division by weeks. (3) Therefore a lease for "twelve months" is only for forty-eight weeks; but if it he for
a "twelvemonth" in the singular number, it 1s good for the whole year. (d)
For herein the law recedes from its usual calculation, because the ambiguity between the two methods of computation ceases ; it being generally understood
that by the space of time called thus, in the singular number, a twelvemonth, is
meant the whole year, consisting of one solar revolution. In the space ef a day
all the twenty-four hours are usually reckoned, the law generally rejecting all
fractions of a day, in order to avoid disputes. (e) (4) Therefere, if I am bound
to pay money on any certain day, I discharge the obligation if I pay it before
twelve o'clock at mght; after which the following day commences. But to
return to estates for years.
'l'hese estates were originally granted to mere farmers or husbandmen, who
every year rendered some equivalent in money, provisions, or other rent, to the
lessors or landlords; but, in order to encourage them to manure and cultivate
the ground, they had a permanent interest granted them, not determinable at
the will of the lord. And yet their possession was e11teemed of so little consequence, that they were rather considered as the bailiffs or servants of the lord, who
were to *receive and account for the profits at a settled price, than as [ *l4:2]
having any property of their own. And therefore they were not allowed
to have a freehold estate: but their interest (such as it was) vested after their
deaths in their executors, who were to make up the. accounts of their testator
with the lord, and his other creditors, and were entitled to the stock upon the
farm. The lessee's estate might also, by the ancient law, be at any time defeated
by a common recovery suffered by the tenant of the freehold; (.f) which
annihilated all leases for years then subsisting, unless afterwards renewed by the
recoverer, whose title was supposed superior to his by whom those leases were
granted.

Camp. 197; 2 B. and A. 586.

There is a distinction in law as to the certainty of stating a month or a day, and an hour when

(d) 6 Rep. 61.

(e)

Co. Litt. IM.

(/) Oo. Litt. '6.

a fact took place; "circa horam" is sufficient; but not so ax to a day, which mnst be stated with

precision, though it may be varied from the proof. 2 Inst. 318.

It has been considered an established rule, that if a thing is to be done within such a time

after such a fact, the day of the fact shall be taken inclusive. Hob. 139; Dougl. 463; 3T. R.

623; Com. Dig. Temps. A.; 3 East, 407. And therefore where the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 19, s.

2, enacts, that a trader lying in prison two months after an arrest for debt shall be adjudged a

bankrupt, that includes the day of the arrest. 3 East, 407. When a month's notice of action

is necessary, it begins with the day on which the notice is given: 3 T. K. 623; and if a robbery

be committed on the 9th October, the action against the hundred must be brought in a year

inclusive of that day. Hob. 139. But where it is limited within such a time after the date of

a deed, .(•<•.. the day of the date of the deed shall be taken exclusive; as if a statute require

the enrollment within a specified time after date of the instrument. Hob. 139; 2 Campb. 294;

Cowp. 714. Thus where a patent dated 10th May contains a proviso that a specification shall be

enrolled within one calendar month, next and immediately after the date thereof, and the specifi-

cation was enrolled on the 10th June following, it was held, that the month did not begin to run

till the day after the date of the patent, and that the specification was in time. 2 Campb. 294;

see 15 Ves. 248.]

(3) This rule of the common law is generally changed by statutes in the United States, and

" month" is declared to mean a calendar month. And in England a month will be held to mean

a calendar month where such is the apparent intent of the parties. R. v. Chawton, 1 Q. B. 247;

Hipwell «. Knight, 1 T. and C. 401.

(4) Fractions of a day are not regarded except for the purpose of guarding against injustice:

Blydenburgh v. Cotheal, 4 N. Y. 418; or for the purpose of determining the actual priority of con-

flicting rights which have accrued on the same day. A week means a full week of seven days;

and therelore if by statute or rule of court a notice is to be published for a certain number of

weeks, the publication is not completed until that number of weeks has fully expired from the

time of the hrst publication. Thus, if the publication is to be once in each week for six successive

weeks, and the first publication is on Tuesday, the publication is not completed without includ-

ing Monday of the seventh week, which is the forty-second day, and whatever was to be done

dependent on such publication could not be done earlier than Tuesday of that week. Bunce ».

bankruptcy was committed ; a.nd the validity of the execution depends on the a.ctua.l priority. 4
Camp. 197; 2 B. and .A. 586.
There is a distinction in law 88 to the certainty of stating a month or a da.y, and an hour when
a fact took place; "circa lwram" iii sufficient; but not so&..~ to a. da.y, which must be stated with
precision, though it may be varied from the proof. 2 Inst. 318.
It has been con11idered an established rule, that if a. thin~ is to be done within such a time
after rnch a fact, the day of the fact shall be taken incluSive. Hob. 139; Dougl. 46.1; 3 T. R.
&i:J; Com. Dig. Temps. A.; 3 E88t, 407. And therefore where the statute 21 Jae. I, c. 19, s.
2, enacts, that a trader lying in prison two months after an arrest for debt !:!hall be adjudged a
bankrupt, that includes the day of the arrest. 3 East, 407. When a. month's notice of action
is necessary, it begin~ with the day on which the notice is given: 3 T. R. &23; and if a robbery
be committed on the 0th October, the oction ~st the hundred must be brought in a year
inclusive of that day. Hob. 139. But where it is limited within such a time aft.er the date of
a deed, &c., the day of the date of the deed she.11 be taken exclusive; a.a if a. statute require
the enrollment within a specified time after date of the instrument. Hob. 139; 2 Ca.mph. 294;
Cowp. 714. Thu1:1 where a. patent dated 10th May contains a proviso that a specification shall be
enrolled within one calendar month, next and immediately aft.er the date thereof, and the specification was enrolled on the loth June following, it was held, that the month did not begin to nm
till the day after the date of the patent, and that the specification was in time. 2 Campb. 294;
see 15 V es. 248.]
(3) Thi1.1 role of the common law is generally chan~ed by statutes in the United States, and
"month" is declared to mean a oalendar month. And m England a month will be held to mean
a calendar month where 1.mch h1 tho apparent intent of the parties. R. "· Cha.wton, 1 Q. B. 247 ;
Hipwell v. Knight, 1 Y. and C. 401.
( 4) Fractions of a day are not regarded except fot the purpose of guarding againi;t injuHtice :
Blydenburgh v. Cothoe.I, 4 N. Y. 4 Hl ; or fur the purpotltl of determining the actual priority of confticting rights which have accrued on the same dl\iy. .A week means a full week of seven days ;
and theretore if by 11tatute or rule of court a notice is to be published fur a certain number of
weeks, the J!Ublication is not completed until that number of weeks has fully expired from the
time of the fir~t publication. Thus, if the publication iH to be once in eoch week for six succe!'sivc
weeks, and the firi;t publication is on Tuesday, the publication is not completed without inclulling Monday of tho sernnth week, which is the forty-see<md day, and whatever was to be done
dependent on such publication could not be done earlier than Tuesday of that week. Bunce v.
Reed, 16 Barh. 34i; Olcott t'. Robinson, 20 id. 148. Saving's Society v. Thompson, 32 Ce.I. 347;
Bowman!'. Wood, U III. 203
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Bowman p. Wood, 41 111. 203
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While estates for years were thus precarious, it is no wonder that they were
usually very short, like our modern leases upon rack rent; and indeed we are
told (g) that by the ancient law no leases for more than forty :years were allowable, because any longer possession (especially when ~iven without any livery
declaring the nature and duration of the estate) might tend to defeat the
inheritance. Yet this law, if ever it existed, was soon antiquated; for we may
observe.in Madox's collection of ancient instruments, some leases for vea.rs of a
pretty early date, which considerably exceed that period: (h) and long terms,
for three hundred years or a. thousand, were certainly in use in the time of
Edward III, (i) a.nd probably of Edward I. (k) But certainly, when by the
statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 15, the termor (that is, he who is entitled to the term of
years) was protected against these fictitious recoveries, and his interest rendered
secure and permanent, long terms began to be more frequent than before; and
were afterwards extensively introduced, bein~ found extremely conyenient for
family settlements and mortgages: continumg subject, however, to the same
[ *l4a] rules of succession, *ana with the same inferiority to freeholds, as when
they were little better than tenancies at the will of the landlord.
Every estate which must expire at a period certain and prefixed, by whatever
words created, is an estate for years. And therefore this estate is frequently
called a term, terminus, because its duration or continuance is bounded,
limited, and determined: for every such estate must have a certain beginning
and certain end. (l) But id certum est, quod certum reddi potest: therefore if a
man make a lease to another, for so many years as J S shall name, it is a good
lease for years; (m) for though it is at present uncertain, yet when J S hath
named the years, it is then reduced to a certainty. If no day of commencement
is named in the creation of this estate, it begins from the making, or delivery,
of the lease. ( n) (5) A lease for so many years as J S shall live, is Yoid from
the beginning, (o) for it is neither certain, nor can ever be reduced to a certainty,
during the continuance of the lease. And the same doctrine holds, if a parson
make a lease of his glebe for so many years as he shall continue parson of Dale;
for this is still more uncertain. But a lease for twenty or more years, if J S
shall so long live, or if he should so long continue parson, is good: (p) for there
is a certain period fixed, beyond which it cannot last ; though it may determine
sooner, on the death of J S or his ceasing to be parson there.
We have before remarked, and endeavoured to assign the re88on of, th~
inferiority in which the law places an estate for years, when compared with an
estate for life, or an inheritance: observing, that an estate for life, even if it be
per auter vie, is a freehold; but that an estate for a thousand years is only a
chattel, and reckoned part of the personal estate. (q) (6) Hence it follows, that
a leliBe for years may be made to commence in{uturo, though a lease for life
cannot. As, if I grant lands to Titius to hol from Michaelmas next for
[ • 144 ] *twenty years, this is good; but to hold from Michaelmas next for the
term of his natural life, is void. For no estate of freehold can commence

While estates for years were thus precarious, it is no wonder that they were

usually very short, like our modern leases upon rack rent; and indeed we are

told (a) that by the ancient law no leases for more than forty years were allow-

able, because any longer possession (especially when given without any livery

declaring the nature and duration of the estate) might tend to defeat the

inheritance. Yet this law, if ever it existed, was soon antiquated; for we may

observe .in Madox's collection of ancient instruments, some leases for years of a

prettv early date, which considerably exceed that period: (h) and long terms,

for three hundred years or a thousand, were certainly in use in the time of

Edward III, (i) and probably of Edward I. (k) But certainly, when by the

statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 15, the termor (that is, he who is entitled to the term of

years) was protected against these fictitious recoveries, and his interest rendered

secure and permanent, long terms began to be more frequent than before; ami

were afterwards extensively introduced, being found extremely convenient for

family settlements and mortgages: continuing subject, however, to the same

F *1431 ru'e8 °f succession, *and with the same inferiority to freeholds, as when

L •" they were little better than tenancies at the will of the landlord.

Every estate which must expire at a period certain and prefixed, by whatever

words created, is an estate for years. And therefore this estate is frequently

called a term, terminus, because its duration or continuance is bounded,

limited, and determined: for every such estate must have a certain beginning

and certain end. (1) But id cerium est, quod cerium reddi potest: therefore if a
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man make a lease to another, for so many years as J 8 shall name, it is a good

lease for years; (m) for though it is at present uncertain, yet when J S hath

named the years, it is then reduced to a certainty. If no day of commencement

is named in the creation of this estate, it begins from the making, or delivery,

of the lease, (n) (5) A lease for so many years as J S shall live, is void from

the beginning, (0) for it is neither certain, nor can ever be reduced to a certainty,

during the continuance of the lease. And the same doctrine holds, if a parson

make a lease of his glebe for so many years as he shall continue parson of Dale;

for this is still more uncertain. But a lease for twenty or more years, if J S

shall so long live, or if he should so long continue parson, is good: (p) for there

is a certain period fixed, beyond which it cannot last; though it may determine

sooner, on the death of J S or his ceasing to be parson there.

We have before remarked, and endeavoured to assign the reason of, the

inferiority in which the law places an estate for years, when compared with an

estate for life, or an inheritance: observing, that an estate for life, even if it be

per auter vie, is a freehold; but that an estate for a thousand years is only a

chattel, and reckoned part of the personal estate, (g) (6) Hence it follows, that

a lease for years may be made to commence in future, though a lease for life

cannot. As, if I grant lands to Titius to hold from Michaelmas next for

F *1441 **wen*J years? this is good; but to hold from Michaelmas next for the

L J term of his natural life, is void. For no estate of freehold can commence

(g) Mirror, c. 2,» 27. Co. Litt. 45, 46.

(k) Madox Formulture Anglican, n". 239. fol. 140. Demi8eforeightyycare.21Rio.il, . . . Ibid. n*.

245,/oM46, for the like term, A. D. 1429. . . . . Ibid.. n°. 248,. fol. 148, for fifty years, 7 Edw. IV.

Mirror, c. 2, j 'n. Co. Litt.'-'>, 46.
(h} Madox For11mlare .Anglioon. n°. 239. fol. 140. Demise for eighty years, 21 Rio. ll, . . . JNd. n•.
246, fol. 146, for th~ like tenn, A. D. 1429. . . . . 1 bid., n°. 248,. fol. 1.S, for tiny yeani, 7 Edw. IV.
(i) 32 Ass. pl. 6. Bro. A br. t. mordauncutor, 42; apoliaUon, 6.
(k} Stat. ormortmaln, 7 Edw. L
{l) Co. Litt. 46.
(m) 6 Rep. 311.
(n) Co. Litt. 46
(o} Ibid. 46.
(p) Ibid.
(9) Ibid. 46.
(g)

(i) S2 Ass. pi. 6. Bro. Abr. t. mordauncettor, 42; spoliation, 8. (k) suit, of mortmain, 7 Edw. I.

(I) Co. LIH. 46. (m) 6 Hep. 35. (n) Co. Litt. 46 (o) Ibid. 46. (p) Ibid. fy)IUd.W.

(5) Our author means here, we apprehend, that the instrument, if in auch form only as would

be requisite to create an estate for years, is void, for a conveyance by feoffment in these terms

(5) Our author means here, we apprehend1 that the instrument, if in such form only as would
be requisite to create an estate for years, 1s void, for a conveyance by feoffment in these terms
might be good as an estate for the life of J S.
. A devise of la.ndr> to an executor for the payment of debts, creates an estate for ye&rs under
t.he maxim referred to in the tflxt. 1 Cruise Dig. 223 ; and see Batchelder a. Dean, 16 N. H. 268.
A lee.se "for years," without mentioning how many, is for two certain. Dunn t•. Cartright, -4
East, 29. And a lease for 11even years, or for fourteen years, is for seven years, and for fourtee.n
as soon M tho lessee Rhall so elect. Doe ''· Dixon, 9 Ea.'lt, 15. As to tenancies from year to year,
see note p. 147, post.
.
.
.
(6) Sec Matter of Gay, 5 Ma.~s. 419: Brewster t'. Hill, 1 N. H. 3....0; Bisbee v. Hall, 3 Ohio,
449; DillinfZharn t'. Jenkins, 7 S. and Y. 479 ; Spangler t'. Stanier, 1 Md. Ch. Dee. :l6. The con11titutiom; of Now York and Michigan forbid lenseH of agricnltural lands for a longer period than
twelve ye!U'!l.

might be good as an estate for the life" of J S.

. A devise of lands to an executor for the payment of debts, creates an estate for years under

the maxim referred to in the text. 1 Cruise Dig. 223; and see Batehelder e. Dean, 16 N. H. 868.

A lease " for years," without mentioning how many, is for two certain. Dunn t>. Gartright, 4

Bast, 29. And a lease for seven years, or for fourteen years, is for seven years, and for fourteen

as soon an the lessee shall so elect. Doe t>. Dixou, 9 East, 15. As to tenancies from year to year,

see note p. 147, post.

(6) See Matter of Gay, 5 Mass. 419: Brewster r. Hill, 1 N. H. 350; Bisbe* v. Hall, 3 Ohio,

449; Dillingham v. Jenkins, 7 S. and M. 479; Spangler <>. Stanler, 1 Md. Ch. Dec, 36. The con-

stitutions of New York and Michigan forbid leases of agricultural lands for a longer period than

twelve years.
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in future ; (7) because it cannot be created at common law without livery of

seisin, or corporal possession of the land; and corporal possession cannot be

given of an estate now, which is not to commence now, but hereafter, (r) And,

because no livery of seisin is necessary to a lease for years, such lessee is not said

to be seised, or to have true legal seisin of the lands. Nor indeed does the bare

lease vest any estate in the lessee; but only gives him a right of entry on the

tenement, which right is called his interest in the term, or interesse termini: but

when he has actually so entered, and thereby accepted the grant, the estate is

then, and not before, vested in him, and he is possessed, not properly of the land,

but of the term of years: (s) the possession or seisin of the land remaining still

in him who hath the freehold. Thus the word, term, does not merely signify

the time specified in the lease, but the estate also and interest that passes by

that lease; and therefore the term may expire, during the continuance of the

time; as by surrender, forfeiture, and the like. For which reason, if I grant a

lease to A for the term of three years, and after the expiration of the said term,

to B for six years, and A surrenders or forfeits his lease at the end of one year,

B's interest shall immediately take effect: but if the remainder had been to B

from and after the expiration of the said three years, or from and after the

expiration of the said time, in this case B's interest will not commence till the

time is fully elapsed; whatever may become of A's term, (t) (8)

Tenant for term of years hath incident to and inseperable from his estate,

unless by special agreement, the same estovers, which we formerly observed («)
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that tenant for life was entitled w>; that is to say, house-bote, fire-bote, plough-

bote, and hay-bote; (w) terms which have been already explained, (x) (9)

(r) 5 Rep 94. (>) Co. Liti. 46: (t\ JIM. 45.

(u) Page 122. (it'i Co. l.itt. 45. (x) Puge 35.

(7) [That is, no estate of freehold in future can pass by a common lav conveyance, as by

feoffment; but, by a conveyance under the statute of uses, there may be a grant of a freehold

to commence in future, and in the mean time the rent undisposed of will be a resulting trust.

Sand, on TJ. and T. 1 vol. 128; 2 vol. 7.]

(8) It is a general rule that one who is put in possession of premises by a lessor, as his tenant,

shall not be allowed, while he retains such possession, to question his lessor's title in any suit

brought by the latter to recover either the rent agreed upon, or the possession of the premises,

or to enforce any of the stipulations or agreements contained in the lease. Gray v. Johnson

14 IT. H. 414; "Brown v. Dysinger. 1 Rawle, 408; Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 219; Hodges ».

Shields, 18 B. Monr. 830; Coburn v. Palmer, 8 Gush. 124; Moore v. Beasley, 3 Ohio, 294;

Caldwell v, Harris, 4 Humph. 84; Leo v. Payne, 4 Mich. 106. The tenant in such ease is said

to be estopped from disputing the landlord's title; and the rule of estoppel applies also to a

sub-tenant, or any other person who may hare been put into possession by the tenant: Phillips

v. Rothwell, 4 Bibb, 33; and it applies in favor of any one who may have become the assignee

of the lessor. Funk's Lessee v. Kincaid, 5 Md. 404. And any agreement of the tenant to

attorn or pay rent to a third person, is so far void that the tenant himself may repudiate it.

Byrne v. Beeson, 1 Doug. Mich. 179. Tho estoppel, however, only continues during the term.

Page v. Kinsman, 43 N. H. 331; Zeller's Lessee v. Kckert, 4 How. 289; Jackson v. Collins, 11

Johns. 1; Duketi. Harper, 6 Yerg. 230; Doe v. Reynolds, 27 Ala. 376. And if the lessor's title

has expired during the term, the tenant may avail himself of that fact to resist the landlord's

demands. Jackson v. Rowland, 6 "Wend. 666; Wild's Lessee v. Serpell, 10 Gratt. 415; Tilgh-

man v. Little, 13 111. 241. He may show, also, that he has been evicted by legal proceedings,

under a title paramount to that of the landlord, or that on demand of possession being made

under such a title, he has yielded to it and surrendered possession. Simers v. Saltus, 3 Denio,

217; Morse v. Goddard, 13 Mote. 177 ; Stewart v. Roderick, 4 W. and S. 188. But if he sur-

render to an adverse claim without legal proceedings, he takes upon himself the burden of

proving that such adverse claim was a valid one. If a tenant buys in an outstanding title, he

should nevertheless surrender possession: Hodjres v. Shields, 18 B. Monr. 832; and afterwards

he is in position to assert his own title. Williams v. Garrison, 29 Geo. 503. If the tenant is

evicted from part of the premises under paramount title, he is entitled to an abatement of rent

in proportion : Lawrence ». French, 25 Wend. 443; Martin i>. Martin, 7 Md. 375; but if he is

disturbed in the possession (if any part of the premises by the landlord, or if the conduct of

the latter renders a reasonable enjoyment of the premises impracticable, the tenant may treat

it as an eviction, and defeat the collection of rent. Dyett o. Pendleton,' 8 Cow. 727 ; Lewis v

Payu, 4 Wend 423; Wilson r. Smith, 5 Yerg. 379: Shumway v. Collins, 6 Gray, 227.

(9) In general, where the lessee of premises has not exacted of the lessor any covenants respect-

ing the condition of the premises, or the preservation or repair of the buildings, he takes them

in the condition in which thpy are at the time, and he cannot oblige the landlord to put them
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r *145 I *With regard to emblements, or the profits of lands sowed by tenant

1 J for years, there is this difference between him and tenant for life; that

where the term of tenant for years depends upon a certainty, as if he holds from

midsummer for ten years, and in the last year lie sows a crop of corn, and it is

not ripe and cut before midsummer, the end of his term, the landlord shall have

it; for the tenant knew the expiration of his term, and therefore it was his own

folly to sow what he could never reap the profits of. (y) But where the lease for

years depends upon an uncertainty: as, upon the death of a lessor, being him-

self only tenant for life, or being a husband seised in right of his wife; or if

the term of years be detenninable upon a life or lives; in all these cases the

estates for years not being certainly to expire at a time foreknown, but merely by

the act of God, the tenant, or his executors, shall have the emblements in the

same manner that a tenant for life or his executors shall be entitled thereto, (z)

Not so, if it determine by the act of the party himself: as if tenant for years

does any thing that amounts to a forfeiture: in which case the emblements shall

go to the lessor and not to the lessee, who hath determined his estate by his own

default, (a)

II. The second species of estates not freehold, are estates at will. An estate

at will is where lands and tenements are left by one man to another, to have

and to h»ld at the will of the lessor; and the tenant by force of this lease

obtains possession, (b) Such tenant hath no certain indefeasible estate, nothing

that can be assigned by him to any other; because the lessor may determine
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his will, and put him out whenever he pleases. But every estate at will, is at

the will of both parties, landlord and tenant; so that either of them may deter-

mine his will, and quit his connexions with the other at his own pleasure, (c)

r *i4g I Yet this must be understood with some restriction. *For if the tenant

' -• at will sows his land, and the landlord, before the corn is ripe, or before

it is reaped, put him out, yet the tenant shall have the emblements, and free

ingress, egress, and regress, to cut and carry away the profits, (d) And this for

the same reason upon which all the cases of emblements turn; viz.: the point

of uncertainty: since the tenant could not possibly know when his landlord

would determine his will, and therefore could make no provision against it;

(y) Litt. J 88 (*) Co. Lilt. 56. (r) It/id. 55.

(b) Lilt} 88. (c) Co Litt. 55. (d) Itnd. 56.

in tenantship condition. Sutton c. Temple, 12 M. and W. 52; Hart v. Windsor, id. 68 ;

Arden ». Pnllen, 10 M. and "W. 321; Foster v. Peyser, 9 Gush. 242; M cliluslian r. Tallmadge,

37 Bnrb. 313; Elliott v. Aiken, 45 N. H. 36. And if the principal value of the premises con-

*With regard to emblements, or the profit.a of lands sowed bJ. tenant
for years, there is this difference between him and tenant for hfc; that
where the term of tenant for years depends upon a certaintv, as if he holds from
mid1:mmmer for ten years, and in the last year he sows a crop of corn, and it is
not ripe and cut before midsummer, the end of his term, the landlord shall haYe
it; for the tenant knew the expiration of his term, and therefore it was his own
folly to sow what he could never reap the profits of. (y) But where the lease for
years depends upon an uncertainty: as, upon the death of a lessor, being himself only tenant for life, or being a husband seised in right of his wife; or if
the term of years be determinable upon a life or IiYes; in all these cases the
estates for years not being certainly to expire at a time foreknown, but merely by
the act of God, the tenant, or his executors, shall have the emblements in the
same manner that a tenant for life or his executors shall be entitled thereto. (z)
Not so, if it determine by the act of the party himself: as if tenant for years
does any thing that amounts to a forfeiture: in which case the emblements shall
go to the lessor and not to the lessee, who hath determined his estate by his own
default. (a)
II. The second species of estates not freehold, are estates at will. An estate
at will is where lands and tenements are left by one man to another, to have
and to held at the will of the lessor; and the tenant by force of this lease
obtains possession. (b) Such tenant hath no certain indefeasible estate) nothing
that can be assigned by him to any other; because the lessor may determine
his will, and put him out whenever he pleases. But every estate at will, is at
the will of both parties, landlord and tenant; so that either of them may determine his will, and quit his connexions with the other at his own pleasure. (c)
[ • 146 ] Yet this must be understood with some restriction. *For if the tenant
at will sows his land, and the landlord, before the corn is ripe, or before
it is reaped, put him out, yet the tenant shall have the emblements, and free
ingress, egress, and regress, to cut and carry away the profits. (d) And this for
the same reason upon which all the cases of emblements tum; viz.: the point
of uncertainty: since the tenant could not possibly know when his landlord
would determine his will, and therefore could make no provision against it;
[ *l-45 ]

(tJ) LIU. t 68
(b) LIU. J 68.

(:rJ Co. Litt. ll6.
(t:)

Co Llit. 611.

(r)

Ibid. M.

(d) 11>14. 56.

sists of buildings, and after the term commences the buildings are accidentally destroyed, the

tenant, in the absence of an express agreement to that effect, can neither compel the landlord

to rebuild, nor can he resist the payment of the rent agreed upon. Pindar t>. Ainsley, cited, I

T. R. 312; Hallett v. "Wylie, 3 Johns. 44; Phillips v. Stevens, 16 Mass. 238. And equity can

give no relief in such a case. Holtzapffel v. Baker, 18 Yes. 115. But the statutes of some states

have made provision for such cases. If the premises leased consist of a single room only, and

that is wholly destroyed, the right to further rent is gone. Graves v. Berdan, 29 Barb. 100, and

26 N. T. 498. And see Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio, 477.

A tenant may assign his interest under the lease, or give sub-leases, if he has not covenanted

in the lease not to do so ; and a covenant not to do the one will not preclude his doing t In • other.

Robinson v. Perry, 21 Geo. 183; Copland v. Parker, 4 Mich. 660. As to what constitutes an

assignment, and what a sub-letting, see 1 "Washb. on Real Prop. 333. The parting by the tenant

of his entire interest in the term is an assignment, but if he make a lease to another under whioh

he will have any reversionary interest in the term, it is a sub-letting.

As regards private nuisances upon leased premises, it may be remarked that a landlord who

has leased his premises in good condition and not covenanted to repair, is not responsible for

injuries cansed by a nuisance created during the tenancy. Bears e. Ambler, 9 Penn. St 193;

Lowell r. Spanlding, 4 Cush. 277. A tenant for years—and the rule is the same as regards an

alienee of lands—is not liable for the continuance of a nuisance existing at the time of the

transfer of the land to him. until notified thereof and requested to remove it. Penruddook's

Case, 5 Co. 102; Picwon v. Glean. 2 X. J. 37; Johnson*. Lewis, 13 Conn. 303; Woodman r.

Tuft*, 9 N. H. 88; Nichols r. Boston, 98 Mass. 39; Dodge v. Stacy, 39, Vt. 559. But see Cald-

well r. Gale, 11 Mich, 77; Bonner r. Welborn, 7 Ges. 314. If, however, the tenant roluntarily

continue the nuisance, it seems he may be held responsible to the party injured thereby. Morris

B. and C. Co. v. Ryerson, 3 Dutch. 457; Crommelino. Coxe, 30 Ala. 318.
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in tenant.able condition. Sutton "· Temple, 12 H. and W. 52; Hart "· Windsor, id. 68;
Arden "· Pullen, 10 H. ancl W. 321; l<'ostor v. Peyser, 9 Cush. 242; HoGlMha.n "· Tallmadge,
37 Bl\l'b. 313; Elliott"· Aiken, 45 N. H. 36. And if the principal valne of the premilles oontdRts of buildings, and after the term commences the buildings are accidentally destroyed. the
tenant, in the absence of an expreR~ agreement to that effect, can neither compel the landlord
w rebuild, nor can he resist the payment of the rent agreed upon. Pindar "· .Ainsley, cited, 1
T. R. 312 · Hallett v. Wylie, 3 Johns. 44; Phillips v. Stevens, 16 ll&88. 238. And equity can
give no rellef in such a case. Holtzapff'el "· Baker, 18 Ves. J 15. But the statutes of some states
have made provi11ion for such ca.~eR. If the premises leased consist of a single room only, and
that iR wholly destroyed, the right to further rent is gone. Graves "· Berdan, 29 Barb. 100, and
26 N. Y. 498. And see Winton"· Cornish, 5 Ohio, 477.
A tennnt may &81!ign his interest under the lease, or give sub-leases, if he has not covenanted
in the lease not to do so ; and a covenant not to do the one will not proolnde his doing the other.
Robineon "· Perry, 21 Geo. 183; Copland "· Parker, 4 Hieb. 660. As to what constitutes &n
:i.sKignment, and what a sub-letting, see 1 Washb. on Real Prop. 333. The parting by the tenant
of his entire intereKt in the term itt an assignment, but if he make a lease to another under which
he will have any reveI'!lionary interest in the term, it is a sub-letting.
As regards private nui11ance;,i upon leaiied premises, it may be remarked that a landlord who
ha.~ leased his premise!I in good condition and not covenanted to repair, is not responsible for
injuries cansecl by a nuisanr.e r.reatod during the tenancy. Bears ti. Ambler, 9 Penn. St. 19'J;
Lowell "· Spaulding, 4 Cush. '.t'i7. A tenant for yea.rs-and the rule is the same as regards an
nlienee of lands-i~ not liable for the c.ontinuance of a nuisance existing at the time of the
trnni:fer of the land to him. until notified thereof and requested to remove it. Penruddook'a
Ca."e, 5 Co. 102; Pier<'On ". Glean, 2 N. J. 37 ; Johnson "· Lewiti, 13 Conn. 303 ; Woodman i-.
Tuna, 9 N. H. 88; Nichol11 t' . Hoston, 98 Hass. 39; Dodge"· Stacy, 39, Vt. 659. But see Caldwell"· Gale, 11 Mich, 77; Bonner"· Welborn, 7 Ges. 314. If, however, the tenant tJOlMRtan~
continue the nuisance, it ~ems he may be held re~ponsible to the party injured thereby. llorris
B. and C. Co. "· Rye1'8<111, 3 Dtttch. 457; Crommehn v. Coxe, 30 .A.I&. 318.
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and haying sown the land, which is for the good of the public, upon a reason-

able presumption, the law will not suffer him to be a loser by it But it is other-

wise, and upon reason equally good, where the tenant himself determines the

•will; for in this case the landlord shall have the profits of the land, (e)

What act does, or does not, amount to a determination of the will on either

side, has formerly been matter of great debate in our courts. But it is now, I

think, settled, that (besides the express determination of the lessor's will, by

declaring that the lessee shall hold no longer; which must either be made upon

the land, (/) or notice must be given to the lessee) (g) (10) the exertion of any

act of ownership by the lessor, as entering upon the premises and cutting tim-

ber, (A) taking a distress for rent, and impounding it thereon, (i) or making a

feoffment, or Tease for years of the land, to commence immediately; (&) (11) any

act of desertion by the lessee, as assigning his estate to another, or committing

waste, which is an act inconsistent with such a tenure, (/) (12) or, which is

instar omnium, the death or outlawry of either lessor or lessee: (m) puts an end

to or determines the estate at will.

The law is, however, careful that no sudden determination of the will by one

party shall tend to the manifest and unforeseen prejudice of the other. This

appears in the case of *emblements before mentioned; and, by a parity r *i 4* i

of reason, the lessee, after the determination of the lessor's will, shall L -"

have reasonable ingress and egress to fetch away his goods and utensils. (») And

if rent be payable quarterly or half-yearly, and the lessee determines the will,
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the rent shall be paid to the end of the current quarter or half year. (0) And,

upon the same principle, courts of law have of late years leaned as much as

possible against construing demises, where no certain term is mentioned, to be

tenancies at will; but have rather held them to be tenancies from year to year

so long as both parties please, especially where an annual rent is reserved: (13)

fej Ibid, to. (t) Ibid. (g) 1 Ventr. 248. fh> Co. Lltt. 65.

(i) Ibid. 67. (t) 1 Hoi. Abr. 8GO. 2 Lev. 38. (I) Co. I.HI. 55.

and having sown the land, which is for the good of tho public, upon a reasonable presumption, the law will not suffer him to be a loser by it. But it is otherwise, and upon reason equally good, where the tenant himself determines the
will; for in this case the landlord shall have the profits of the land. (e)
What act does, or does not, amount to a determination of the wilt on either
side, has formerly been matter of great debate in our courts. But it is now, I
think, settled, that (besides the express determination of the lessor's will, by
declaring that the lessee shall hold no longer; which must either be made upon
the land, (/) or notice must be given to the lessee) (g) (10) the exertion of any
act of ownership by the lessor, as entering upon the premises and cutting timber, (h) ta.king a distress for rent, and impounding it thereon, (i) or making a
feoffment, or lease for years of the land, to commence immediately; (k) (11) any
act of desertion by the lessee, as assigning his estate to another, or committing
waste, which is an act inconsistent with such a tenure, (l) (12) or, which is
·instar omnium, the death or outlawry of either lessor or lessee: lm) puts an end
to or determines the estate at will.
The law is, however, careful that no sudden determination of the will by one
party shall tend to the manifest and unforeseen prejudice of the other. This
appears in the case of *emblements before mentioned; and, by a parity [ ,..147 ]
of reason, the lessee, after the determination of the lessor's will, shall
have reasonable ingress and egress to fetch a.wav his goods and utensils. (n) And
if rent be payable guarterly or half-yearly, and the lessee determines the will,
the rent shall be paid to the end of the current 1uarter or half year. (o) And,
upon the same principle, courts of law have of ate years leaned as much as
possible against construing demises, where no certain term is mentioned, to be
tenancies at will; but have rather held them to be tenancies from year to year
80 long as both parties please, especially where an annual rent is reserved: (13)

fmj 5 Sep. 116. Co. Litt. 57, 62. fnj Lltt. J 69. (o) Snlk. 4H. 1 Sid. 839.

(10) As to the necessity of notice in order to determine an estate at will at the common law,

see Ellis v. Paige, 2 Pick. 71 and note. Notice is generally provided for by statutes in the TTnited

M.
(f) Ibid.
(g) 1 Ventr. MS.
f'J I bid. 57.
(1') 1 Roi. Abr. ~- 2 Lev. 88.
rm) 5 .Rep. ll6. Co. Litt. 57, 62.
(n) Litt. t 69.

(e) Ibid.

(1') Co. Utt. li6.
(l) Co. Llti. 55.
(o) Salk.
1 Sid. 839.
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States. If notice is given in any case, and possession is not surrendered in compliance with it,

it will be deemed to be waived i? the landlord shall afterwards accept rent for the premises for a

period subsequent to the time specified in the notice for the surrender; or shall do jny other act

inconsistent with an intention to insist upon the notice. Prindle v. Anderson, 19 "Wend. 391;

Collins v. Canty, 6 Gush. 415; Jackson v. Sheldon, 5 Cow. 448.

(11) See Benedict v. Morse, 10 Mete. 223; Kelly «. "Waite, 12 id. 300; Curtis v. Galvin, 1

Allen, 215; Howard v. Merriam, 5 Cush. 563. If the landlord take possession of part of the

premises, or commit waste thereon, this is a determination of the tenancy at the election of the

tenant. Dickinson v. Goodspeed, 8 Cush. 119.

(12) See Daniels v. Pond, 21 Pick. 367 ; Phillips v. Covert, 7 Johns. 1.

(13) A tenancy from year to year is where tenements are expressly or impliedly demised

by the landlord to the tenant to hold from year to year, so long as the parties shall respect-

ively please; and there cannot be such a tenancy detorminable only at the will of the tenant,

for then it would operate as a tenancy for his life, which is not creatable by parol, but only

by feoffment or other deed. 8 East, 167. What was formerly considered as a tenancy at will,

has, in modem times, been construed to be a tenancy from year to year, and from a general

occupation such a tenancy will be inferred, unless a contrary intent appear. 3 Burr. 1609;

1 T. R. 163; 3 id. 16; 8 id. 3. And so in the cases in which the statute against frauds, 29

Car. II, c. 3, declares that the letting shall only have the effect of an estate at will, it

operates as a tenancy from year to year. 8 T. K. 3; 5 id. 471. So where rent is received

by a landlord, that raises an implied tenancy from year to year, though the tenant was orig-

inally let in under an invalid lease. 3 East, 451. So if a tenant hold over by consent after

the expiration of a lease, he becomes tenant from year to1 year: 5 Esp. R. 173; even where the

lease was determined by the death of the lessor tenant for life in the middle of a year. 1 H.

Bl. 97.

But if the circumstances of the case clearly preclude the construction in favor of such a

tenancy, it will not exist; as where a party let a shed to another for so long as both parties

should like, on an agreement that the tenant shoiild contert it into a stable, and the defendant

should have all the dung for a compensation, there being no reservation referable to any

aliquot part of a year, this wivs construed to be an estate at will. 4 Taunt. 128. And it

(10) .As to the necessity of notice in order to determine an estate at will at the common law,
see Ellis ti. Pai~e, 2 Pick. 71 a.nd note. Notice is generally provided for by statutes in the United
States. If notice is given in any case, and possession iR not surrendered in compliance with it,
it will be deemed to be waived if the landlord shall afterwards accept rent for tha premises for a
period subsequent to the time specified in the notice for the surrender ; or !<hall do ..my other act
mcon.sistent with a.n intention to insist upon the notice. Prindle ti• .Anderson, 19 Wend. 391;
Collillll ti. Canty, 6 Cut>h. 415; Jackson v. Sheldon, 5 Cow. 448.
ll) See Benedict v. Morae, 10 Mete. 223; Kelly ti. Waite, 12 id. 300; Curtis v. Galvin, 1
en, 215; Howard ti. Merriam, 5 Cush. 563. If the landlord take pos$eSRion of part of the
premises, or commit waste thereon, this is a determination of the tenancy at the election of the
tenant. Dickinson v. Goodspeed, 8 Cm1h. 119.
(12) See Daniels v. Pond, 21 Pick. 367; Phillips v. Co>ert, 7 Johns. 1.
(13) .A tenancy from year to year is where tenements are exprest!ly or impliedly demised
by the landlord to the tenant to hol<l from year to year, so long as the partieR shall rei;pectively please; and there cannot be such a tenancy detenninable only at the will of the tenant,
for then it would operate 68 a tenancy for his lifo, which is not creatable by parol, but only
by feoffment or other deed. 8 East, 167. What was fom1erly considered as a tenancy at willf.
baa, in modem times, been construed to be a tenancy from year to year, and from a genera
occupation such a tenancy will be inferred, unless a contrary intent appear. 3 Burr. l~i
1 T. R. 163; 3 id. 16; 8 id. 3. .And so in the ce.set! in which the statute against frauds, ~
Car. II, c. 3, declares that the letting shall only have the effect of an estate at will, it
operates as a tenancy from year to year. 8 T. R. 3; 5 id. 471. So where rent is received
by a landlord, that rruses an implied tenancy from year t-0 year, though tbt'I tenant was origin&lly let in under an invalid lease. 3 East, 451. So if a tenant hold over by consent after
the expiration of a lease, he becomeR tenant from year to ye~i 5 Esp. R. li3; even where the
lea...;e was detennined by the death of the lessor tellilnt for 1.i.re in the middle of a year. 1 H .
.Bl. 9i.
But if the circumstances of the ca.~e clearly preclude the construction in favor of such a
umancr. it will not exist ; as where a party let a shed to another for so long 68 both parties
l!houlrl like, on an agrAemeut that the tenant ithottld contert it int-0 a st~ble, and the clefcndnnt
i-hunld hiwe all the dung for a compen:-iation, there being no reserration referable to a.nr.
aliquot part of a war, thiH wa-1 e1:nstnw1l to be an eHtate at will. 4 Taunt. 128. And it
nrnr<t by no llll'IUlK lie under~too!l that a 11trict tenancy at will cannot exist at the present day,

.J
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in which case they will not suffer either party to determine the tenancy even at

the end of the year, without reasonable notice to the other, which is generally

understood to be six months, (p) (14)

There is one species of estates at will that deserves a more particular regard

than any other; and that is, an estate held by copy of court-roll: or, as we

usually call it, a copyhold estate. This, as was before observed, (^) was in its

original and foundation nothing better than a mere estate at will. But, the

kindness and indulgence of successive lords of manors having permitted these

estates to be enjoyed by the tenants and their heirs, according to particular cus-

toms established in their respective districts; therefore, though they still are

held at the will of the lord, and so are in general expressed in the court-rolls to

he, yet that will is qualified, restrained and limited, to be exerted according to

the custom of the manor. This custom being suffered to grow up by the lord,

is looked upon as the evidence and interpreter of his will: his will is no longer

arbitrary and precarious; but fixed and ascertained by the custom to he the

same and no other, that has time out of mind been exercised and declared by

his ancestors. A copyhold tenant is therefore now full as properly a tenant by

(p) Thlg kind of lease was in use as long ago as the reign of Henry VIII, when half a year's notice seems

to have been required to determine it (T. 13 Hen. nil, 15, 10.;

(g) Page 93.

for it may clearly b« created by the express agreement of the parties. 5 B. and A. 604; 1

Dowl. and R. 272. So under an agreement that the tenant shall always be subject to quit at

in which case they will not suffer either party to determine the tenancy even at
the end of the year, without reasonable notice to the other, which is generally
understood to be six months. (p) (14)
rrhere is one species of estates at will that deserves a more particular regard
than any other ; and that is, an estate held by copy of court-roll : or, as we
usually call it, a copyhold estate. 1-'his, as was before observed, ('J') was in its
original and foundation nothing better than a mere estate at w1ll. But, the
kindness and indulgence of successive lords of manors having permitted these
estates to be enjoyed by the tenants and their heirs, according to particular customs established in their respective districts; therefore, though they still are
held at the will of the lord, and so are in general expressed in the court-rolls to
be, yet that will is qualified, restrained and limited, to be exerted according t.o
the custom of the manor. This custom being suffered to grow
by the lord,
is looked upon as the evidence and interpreter of his will: his wil is no longer
arbitrary and precarious; but fixed and ascertained by the custom to be the
same and no other, that has time out of mind been exercised and declared by
his ancestors. A copyhold tenant is therefore now full as properly a tenant by
(p) Thle kind or leue wu in use as long ago u the retgn of Honry vm, when half a year's noUee lle8Dla

uf

to bave been required to determine It. ( T. 1ll Hew.. VIII, 15, 16.)
tq) Page 98.
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three months' not ice, he is not tenant from year to year, but from quarter to quarter. 3

Camp. 510.]

Estates at will are never regarded with favor, and by construction of law will be changed

into estates from year to year whenever the circumstances are such that an intention that

they shall continue for at least a year can fairly be implied. This implication is generally a

necessary one where an annual rent is reserved, and if, after the expiration of one year, the

tenant is allowed to hold over, he will be regarded as in for another year, on the same terms

as before. Conwaj v. Starkweather, 1 Denio, 113 : Prindle «. Anderson, 19 Wend. 393; Prickett

v. Hitter, 16 111. 96; Williamson v. Paxton, 18 Grat. 475. But the holding over must be for such

time and under such circumstances that the consent of the landlord thereto may fairly be

implied. Den c. Adams, 7 Halst. 99. And the tenant is then entitled, in the absence of statu-

tory regulation, to a Rix months' notice to quit, the notice to terminate at the end of a year. 1

Washb. Real Prop. 38Si. If the rent is payable at periods less than a year, the tenant is in for the

whole of one of such periods, and the same rule as to holding over for the period covered by the

payment of rent, will afterwards apply as is above stated where the rent is annual. And the

notice to quit must expire at the end of one of such periods. Hanchctt v. "Whitney, 1 Vt. 311;

Prescott v. Elm, 7 Cush. 346.

A vendee put in possession of land by the vendor, under an executory contract of sale

which is silent on the subject of possession, is a species of tenant at will. Dakin t>. Allen, 8

Cush. 33. But he is under no obligation to pay rent while not in default on his contract.

Dwight«. Cutler, 3 Mich. 566; McNair v. Schwartz, 16 HI. 24. And his possession may be

terminated at any time without the notice which tenants at will, properly so called, are en-

titled to.

(14) [When a lease or demise is determinable on a certain event, or at a particular period,

no notice to quit is necessary, because both parties are equally apprised of the determination

of the term: 1 T. R. 162; but in general when the tenancy would otherwise continue, there

must be given half a year's notice to quit expiring at that time of the year when the ten-

ancy commenced, whether the tenancy was of land or buildings: 1 T. R. 159; and where

the tenant enters on different parts of the premises at different times, the notice should be

given with reference to the substantial and principal part of them, and will be good for all.

and what is the substantial part is a question for the jury. See instances 2 Bla. R. 1224; 6

East, 120; 7 id. 551; 11 id. 498. As to the case of lodgings, that depends on a particular con-

tract, and is an exception to the general rule. The agreement between the parties may be for a

month or less time, and there a much shorter notice may suffice: 1 T. R. 162; and usually

the same space of time for the notice is required as the period for which the lodgings were

originally taken, as a week's notice when taken by the week, and a month's notice when taken

by the month, and so on. 1 Esp. Rep. 94; Adams 124. If lodgings are taken generally at so

much per annum, it is construed to be only a taking for one year, and no notice to quit is" neces-

sary. 3 B. and C. 90.

When it is doubtful at what time of the year the tenancy commenced, it is advisable to serve

a notice " to quit at the expiration of the current year of your tenancy, which shall expire next

for it may clearly be created by the express agreement of the parties. 5 B. and .A. 604 ; 1
Dowl. and R. 272. So under an agreement that the tenant aha.ll always be subject to quit at
three months' notice, he is not tenant from year to year, bnt from quarter to qnart.er. 3
Camp. 510.)
Efltates at will are never regarded with favor, and by construction of law will be changed
into estates from year to year whenever the circumstances are such that an intention th&t
they shall continne for at leBSt a year can fairly be implied. Thie implication is generally a
necessary one where an annual rent is reserved, and if, aft.er the expiration of one year, the
tenant is allowed to hold over, he will be regarded all in for another year, on the same term~
88 before. Conwa_} "· Starkweather, 1 Denio, 113: Prindle "· .Anderson, 19 Wend. 393; Prickett
"· Ritter, 16 Ill. 96; Williamson "· Paxton, 18 Grat. 475. But the holding over must be for euch
time and under such circum11tances that the consent of the landlord thereto may fairly be
implied. Den "· Adams, 7 Brust. 99. .And the tenant i11 then entitled, in the absence of statutory regulation, to a 1:tix months' notice to quit, the notice to terminate at the end of a year. 1
Washb. Real Prop. 381!. If the rent is pnyable at periods less than a year, the tenant is in for the
whole of one of such periods, a.nd the same rule M to holding over for the period c-0vered by the
payment of rent, will afterwards apply 88 is above stated wbere the rent is annual. And the
notice to quit mnst expire at the end of one of such periods. Hanchett v. Whitney, 1 Vt. 311 ;
Prescott "· Elm, 7 Cn~h. 346.
.A vendee put in possession of land by the vendor, under an executory contract of Bale
which iEI silent on the subject of poRsession, is a species of tenant at will. Dakin "· .Allen, B
Cush. 33. Bnt he iR under no obligation to pay rent while not in default on his contract.
Dwiisht 11. Cutler, 3 Mich. 566; .McNair 11. Schwe.rt.11 16 Ill. 24. And his possession may be
tenmnated at any time without the notice which tenants at will, properly eo called, are entitled to.
(IA) [When a lease or demise is determinable on a certain event1 or at a ])&l'ticula.r J>eriod,
no notice to quit is necessary, because both parties are equally appnsed of tfie determination
of the term : 1 T. R. 162; but in general wlien the tenancy would otherwise continue, there
must be given half a year's notice to quit expiring at that time of the year when the tenancy commenced, whether the t~nancy was of land or buildings: 1 T. R. 159; and where
the tenant enters on different parts of the premises at different times, the notice should be
given wit.h reference to the substantial and principal part of them, and will be good for all,
iind what is the 1<ubstantiw part is a question for the jury. See instances 2 Bla. R. l:.?24: ti
Ee.st, 120; 7 id. 551; 11 id. 498. As to the ca8e of lodgings, that depend11 on a particular <'-ODtroot, and i~ an exception to the geneml rule. The agreement between the parties may be for a
month or les11 time, and there a much shorter notice may suffice: 1 T. :R. 162; and u!lllally
the same space of time for the notice is required as the period for which the lodgings were
originally taken, as a week'~ notice when ta.ken by the week, and a month's notice when ta.ken
bv the month, and so on. 1 E~p. Rep. 94; Adams 124. If lodgings are taken generallv at 110
much per annum, it i~ constmcd to be only a taking for one year, and no notice to quit is· necessary. 3 B. and C. 90.
When it is doubtful at what time of the year the tenancy commenced, it is advisable t-0 BerVe
a notice "to quit at the expiration of the current year of r.our tenancy, which shall expire next
aft.er one half year from the time of your being 11erved Wlth this notice.'' 2 Esp. R. 589. See
further 11.11 to notices to quit, the semce and waiver thereof, Adams on Ejectment, 96 to 140; I
l:!aunderi, by Patteson and Willia:ns, 276, note a.]
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after one half year from the time of your being served with this notice." 2 Esp. R. 589. See

further as to notices to quit, the service and waiver thereof, Adams on Ejectment, 90 to 140; I

SaundefB, by Patteson and Williams, 276, note a.]
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the custom as a tenant at will; the custom *having arisen from a series

of uniform wills. And, therefore, it is rightly observed by Calthorpe, (r)

that " copyholders and customary tenants differ not so much in nature as in

name; for although some be called copyholders, some customary, some tenants

by the verge, some base tenants, some bond tenants, and some by one name and

some by another, yet do they all agree in substance and kind of tenure; all the

said lands are holden in one general kind, that is, by custom and continuance of

time; and the diversity of their names doth not alter the nature of their tenure."

Almost every copyhold tenant being therefore thus tenant at the will of the

lord according to the custom of the manor; which customs differ as much as the

humour and temper of the respective ancient lords (from whence we may account

for their great variety), such tenant, I say, may have, so far as the custom war-

rants, any other of the estates or quantities 01 interest, which we have hitherto

considered, or may hereafter consider, and hold them united with this customary

estate at will. A copyholder may, in many manors, be tenant in fee-simple, in

fee-tail, for life, by the curtesy, in dower, for years, at sufferance, or on con-

dition : subject however to be deprived of these estates upon the concurrence of

those circumstances which the will of the lord, promulgated by immemorial

custom, has declared to be a forfeiture, or absolute determination of those

interests; as in some manors the want of issue male, in others the cutting down

timber, the non-payment of a fine, and the like. Yet none of these interests

amount to a freehold; for the freehold of the whole manor abides always in the
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lord only, (s) who hath granted out the use and occupation, but not the cor-

poreal seisin or true legal possession, of certain parcels thereof, to these his

customary tenants at wul.

The reason of originally granting out this complicated kind of interest, so

that the same man shall, with regard to the same land, be at one and the same

time tenant in fee-*simple, and also tenant at the lord's will, seems to r *i jn -i

have arisen from the nature of villenage tenure; in which a grant of any •- J

estate of freehold, or even for years absolutely, was an immediate enfranchisement

of the villein, (t) The lords therefore, though they were willing to enlarge the

interest of their villeins, by granting them estates which might endure for their

lives, or sometimes be descendible to their issue, yet not caring to manumit

them entirely, might probably scruple to grant them any absolute freehold; and

for that reason it seems to have been contrived, that a power of resumption at

the will of the lord should be annexed to these grants, whereby the tenants were

still kept in a state of villenage, and no freehold at all was conveyed to them in

their respective lands: and of course, as the freehold lands of all must necessarily

rest and abide somewhere, the law supposed it still to continue and remain in

the lord. Afterwards, when these villeins became modern copyholders, and had

acquired by custom a sure and indefeasible estate in their lauds, on performing

their usual services, but yet continued to be styled in their admissions tenants at

the will of the lord, the law still supposed it an absurdity to allow that such as

were thus nominally tenants at will could have any freehold interest; and there-

fore continued and now continues to determine, that the freehold of lands so

holden abides in the lord of the manor, and not in the tenant; for though he

really holds to him and his heirs forever, yet he is also said to hold at another's

will. But with regard to certain other copyholders of free or privileged tenure,

which are derived from the ancient tenants in villein-socage, (u) and are not said

to hold at the will of (he lord, but only according to the custom of the manor,

there is no such absurdity in allowing them to be capable of enjoying a freehold

interest: and therefore the law doth not suppose the freehold of such lands to

rest in the lord of whom they are holden, but in the tenants themselves; (v) who

are sometimes called customary freeholders, being allowed to have a freehold

interest, though not a freehold tenure.

(r) On copyholds, 81, 54 («) Litt. i 81. 2 Inst. 326.

(«) Mlrr. c. 2, ! js. Lltt. H 2M, 5, 6. (v) See pave, 98, Ac.

(r) Fitz. Abr. tit. corona. 810, custom. IVBro. Abr. fit. custom, 2, 17 ; tenant per coptt. 22. 9Kep.76. Co.

Litt. S9. Co. Copyh. f 32. Cro. Car. 229. 1 Roll. Abr. 862. 2 Ventr. 143. (Jarth. 432. Uwd Raym. 1825.
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T *1501 *However, in common cases, copyhold estates are still ranked (for the

L J reasons above-mentioned) among tenancies at will; though custom,

which is the life of the common law, has established a permanent property in

the copyholders who were formerly nothing better than bondmen, equal to that

of the lord himself, in the tenements hoklen of the manor; nay sometimes even

superior; for we may now look upon a copyholder of inhertance, with a fine

certain, to be little inferior to an absolute freeholder in point of interest, and in

other respects, particularly in the clearness and security of his title, to be fre-

quently in a better situation.

III. An estate at sufferance, is where one comes into possession of hind by

lawful title, but keeps it afterwards without any title at all. As if a man takes

a lease for a year, and after a year is expired continues to hold the premises

without any fresh leave from the owner of the estate. Or if a man maketh a

lease at will and dies, the estate at will is thereby determined: but if the tenant

continueth possession, he is tenant at sufferance, (w) (15) But no man can be

tenant at sufferance against the king, to whom no laches, or neglect in not

entering and ousting the tenant is ever imputed by law; but his tenant, so

holding over, is considered as an absolute intruder, (x) But, in the case of a

subject, this estate may be destroyed whenever the true owner shall make an

actual entry on the lands and oust the tenant: for, before entry, he cannot

maintain an action of trespass against the tenant by sufferance, as he might

against a stranger: (y) and the reason is, because the tenant being once in by

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

a lawful title, the law (which presumes no wrong in any man) will suppose him

to continue upon a title equally lawful; unless the owner or the land, by some

public and avowed act, such as entry is, will declare his continuance to be tortious,

or, in common language, wrongful. (16)

F *1511 *Thus stands the law with regard to tenants by sufferance, and land-

•- J lords are obliged in these cases to make formal entries upon their

lands, (z) and recover possession by the legal process of ejectment;(17) and at

the utmost, by the common law, the tenant was bound to account for the profits

of the land so by him detained. (18) But now, by statute 4 Geo. II, c. 28, in

case any tenant for life or years, or other person claiming under or by collusion

with such tenant, shall wilfully hold over after the determination of the term,

and demand made and notice in writing given by him, to whom the remainder

or reversion of the premises shall belong, for delivering the possession thereof;

such person, so holding over or keeping the other out of possession, shall pay

for the time he detains the hinds, at the rate of double their yearly value. And,

(w) Co. l.itt 57. (J-) IMd. (y) IWd. (e) 6 Mod. 334.

(15) [At the common law, in the absence of any special agreement, after the execution of a

*HoweYer, in common cases, copyhold estates are still ranked (for t.he
reasons above-mentioned) among tenancies at will; though custom,
which is the life of the common law, has established a permanent property in
the copyholders who were formerly nothing better than bondmen, equal to that
of the lord himself, in the tenements holden of the manor; nay sometimes eYen
superior; for we may now look upon a copyhol<ler of inhertance, with a fine
certain, to be little inferior to an absolute freeholder in point of interest, and in
other respects, particul1trly in the clearness and security of his title, to be frequently in a better situation.
III. An estate at suJfn·ance, is where one comes into possession of land by
lawful title, but keeps it afterwards without any title at all. As if a man takes
a lease for a year, and after a year is expired continues to hold the premises
without any fresh leave from the owner of t.he estate. Or if a man maketh a
lease at will and dies, the estate at will is thereby determined: but if the tenant
continueth possession, he is tenant at sufferance. (w) (15) But no man can be
tenant at sutfernnce against the king, to whom no laches, or neglect in not
entering and ousting the tenant is ever imputed by law; but his tenant, so
holding over, is considered as an absolute intruder. (x) But, in the case of a
subject, this estate may be destroyed whenever the true owner shall make an
actual entry on the lands and oust the tenant: for, before entry, he cannot
maintain an action of trespass against the tenant by sufferance, as he might
against a stranger: (y) and the reason is, because the tenant being once in by
a lawful title, the law (which presumes no wrong in any man) wilf suppose him
to continue upon a title equally lawful; unless the owner ot the land, by some
public and avowed act, such as entry is, will declare his continuance to be tortions,
or, in common language, wrongful. (16)
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*Thus stands the law with regard to tenants by sufferance, and landlords are obliged in these cases to make formal entries upon their
lands, (z) and recover possession by the legal process of ejectment; (17) and at
the utmost, by the common law, the tenant was bound to account for the profits
of the land so by him detained. (18) But now, by statute 4 Geo. II, c. 28, in
case any tenant for life or years, or other person claiming under or by collusion
with such tenant, shall wilfully hold over after the determination of the term,
and demand made and notice m writing giYen by him, to whom the remainder
or reYersion of the premises shall belong, for delivering the possession thereof;
such person, so holding over or keeping the other out of possession, shall pay
for the time he detains the lands, at the rate of double their yearly value. And,
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legal mortgage, the mortgagor, so long as he retains possession, is tenant at sufferance of the

mortgagee; but if there is a general agreement, either verbal or by writing, that he shall

(to) Co. Litt. 67.

(Z)Ibld.

lrlI"trid.

1•1 6 Mod. S!U.

retain the possession, and no term is specified, he is tenant at will. See 1 Salk. 209; 3 Scott,

271; 1 T. B. 378; 3 Man. and B. 107 ; 2 B. and Ad. 473.]

(16) Jackson ». Parkhurst, 5 Johns. 128; Rising v. Stannard. 17 Mass. 282. After entry

made, the owner may maintain trespass against the tenant; Dorrell ». Johnson, 17 Pick, 266;

unless the statute requires notice to terminate the tenancy, in which case the tenant will not be

liable to trespass before snch notice.

(17) [It has been a generally received notion, that if a tenant for a term, from year to year,

at will or at sufferance", hold over, and do not quit on request, the landlord is put to his action of

ejectment, and cannot take possession; but see 7 T. R. 431; 1 Price Rep. 53; 1 Bing. Rep.

158; 6 Taunt. 20*2-7; from which it appears, that if the landlord can get possession, without

committing a breach of the peace, he may do so; and indeed if he were to occasion a breach

of the peace, and be liable to be indicted for a forcible entry, still he would have a defence to

any action at the snit of the party wrongfully holding over, because the plea of liberum tene-

mentum, or other title in the lessor, would necessarily be pleadable in bar. 1 See Jones c.

Chapman, 2 Exch. 803; Harvev v. Brydges, 14 M. and V. 437 ; Davis «. Bnrrell, 10 C. B. 821;

Pollen p. Brewer, 7 C. B., N. S". 371.

(18) Where the tenancy, by the statute, is to be determined by notice, the tenant holding over

after notice is liable to pay rent. Hogsett v, Ellis, 17 Mich. 357.
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(15) [At the common law, in the ab8ence of any special agreement, aft.er the execution of &
legal mortgajl(!, the mortgagor, so long as be retam11 possession, is tenant at sufferance of the
mortgagee ; but if there is a general agreement, either verbal or by writing, that he shall
retain the po8~ession, and no term is specified, he is tenant at will. See 1 Salk. 209; 3 Scot~
271 ; 1 T. R. 378; 3 Man. and R. 107 ; 2 B. and Ad. 473.]
(16) Jackson c. Parkhul'l!t, 5 John~. 128; RiRing "· Stannard, 17 Mass. 282. After entry
made, the owner may maintain tre~pa.qs a:rain11t tho tenant; Dorrell "· Johnson, 17 Pick, 266;
unlei>s the statute requires notice to torminute the tenancy, in which case the tenant will not be
liable to tresp8AA before l!Ucb notice.
(17) [It ha.~ been a generally receh·ed notion, that if a tenant for a term, from year to year,
at wifl or at sufferance; hold over, and do not quit on request, the landlord h1 put to hie action of
ejectment, and cnnnot take po~lleHsion ; but see 7 T. R. 431 ; 1 Price Rep. 53; 1 Bing. Rep.
158; 6 Taunt. 20"2-7; from which it appears, that if the landlord can get poRSessiun, without
committing a breach of the peace. he may do so; and indeed if he were to occasion a breach
of the peace, and be liable to be indicted for a forcible entry, still he would ha\"e a defence to
any acti-On at the suit of the party wrongfully holding over, because the plea of liberum tenementum, or other title in the lei<sor, would necessarily be pleadable in bar. l See Jones "·
Chapman, 2 Exch. 803; Harvey t'. Brydges, 14 Y. and W. 437 ; Davis "· Burre1l, 10 C. B. 821;
Pollen 11. Brewer, 7 C. B., N. S. 371.
(18) Where the t.enancy, by the statute, is t-0 be determined by notice, the tenant holding over
after notice is liable io p11oy rent. Hogsett "· lfilis, 17 llfoh. 357.
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by statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, in case any tenant, having power to determine his

lease, shall give notice of his intention to quit the premises, and shall not deliver

up the possession at the time contained in such notice, he shall thenceforth pay

double the former rent, for such time as he continues in possession. These

statutes have almost put an end to the practice of tenancy by sufferance, unless

with the tacit consent of the owner of the tenement. (19)

CHAPTER X.

OF ESTATES UPON CONDITION.

BESIDES the several divisions of estates, in point of interest, which we have

considered in the three preceding chapters, there is also another species still

remaining, which is called an estate upon condition; (1) being such whose

existence depends upon the happening or not happening of some uncertain

event, whereby the estate may be either originally created, or enlarged, (2) or

finally defeated, (a) (3) And these conditional estates I have chosen to reserve

till last, because they are indeed more properly qualifications of other estates,

than a distinct species of themselves; seeing that any quantity of interest, a fee,

a freehold, or a term of years, may depend upon these provisional restrictions.

(a) Co. LItt. 0)1.

(19) For still more summary remedies, see the statutes 1 and 2 Yic. c. 74, and 9 and 10 Vic. o.

94, s. 122. Some of the American statutes entitle a tenant at sufferance to notice before pro-

ceedings are taken to dispossess him. It is not quite clear what these mean, but it is assumed

that the mere holding over does not entitle the occupant to notice, unless the holding is continued
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under circumstances from which an implication of assent on the part of the owner can arise. See

Kowan «. Lytle, 11 Wend. 616; Livingston v. Tanner, 12 Barb. 481, and 14 N. Y. 64; Allen «. Car-

penter, 15 Mich. 25.

(1) [As to things executed (a conveyance of lands, for instance), a condition, to be valid, must

be created and annexed to the estate at the time that it is made, not subsequently; the condition

may, indeed, be contained in a separate instrument, but then, that must be sealed and delivered

at the same time with the principal deed. Co. Litt. 236, b; Touch. 126. As to things executory

(such as rents, annuities, <lv.). a grant of them may be restrained by a condition created after the

execution of such grant. Co. Litt. 237, a. Littleton (in his 328th and three following sections)

gays, divers words there be, which, by virtue of themselves, make estates upon condition. Not

only the express words, " upon condition," but also the words " provided always," or " so that,"

will make a feoffment, or deed, conditional. And again (in his 331st section) he says, the words

"if it happen" will make a condition in a deed, provided a power of entry is added. 'Without

the reservation of such a power, the words " if it nappen " will not, alone, and by their own force,

make a good condition. This distinction is also noticed in Sheph. Touch. 122, where it is also

laid down, that although the words "proviso," "so that," and "on condition," are the most

proper words to make a condition; yet they have not always that effect, but frequently serve for

other purposes; sometimes they operate as a qualification or limitation, sometimes as a covenant.

And when inserted among the covenants in a deed, they operate as a condition, only when attended

•with the following circumstances: 1st. When the clause wherein they are found is a substantive

one, having no dependence upon any other sentence in the deed, or rather, perhaps, not being

nsed merely in qualification of such other sentence, but standing by itself. 2u. When it is com-

pulsory upon the feoffee, donee, or lessee. 3d. When it proceeds from the part of the feoffor,

donor, or lessor, and declares his intention, (but as to this point, see Whichcote t>. Fox, Cro. Jac.

398; Cromwell's Case, 2 Kep. 72, and infra). 4th. When it is applied to the estate, or other sub-

ject matter. As to what words will constitute a condition, see Whichcote v. Fox, Cro, Jac. 398;

Co. Litt. 203, b.; Bnglefield's Case, Moor, 307 ; S. C., 7 Rep. 78; Berkley ». The Earl of Pem-

broke, Moor, 707; S. C., Cro. Eliz. 306, 560; Browning v. Beeston, Plowd. 131.]

(2) [A particular estate may be limited, with a condition, that, after the happening of a certain

event, the person to whom the first estate is limited shall have a larger estate. Such a condition,

may be good and effectual, as well in relation to things which lie in grant as to things which lie

in livery, and may be annexed as well to an estate-tail, which cannot oe drowned, as to an estate

for life or years, which may be merged by the access of a greater estate.]

(3) [It is a rule of law, that a condition, the effect of which is to defeat or determine an estate

to which it is annexed, must defeat the whole of such estate; not determine it in part only,

leaving it good for the residue. Jennin ». Arscot, stated by Chief Justice Anderson, in Corbet's

Case, 1 Bep. 85, b., and see ibid. 86, b.; Chndleigh's Case, 1 Rep. 138, b.]
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Estates, then, upon condition thus understood, are of two sorts : 1. Estates upon

condition implied : 2. Estates upon condition expressed : under which last may

be included, 3. Estates held ///. vadio, gage, or pledge : 4. Estates by statute

merchant, or statute staple : 5. Estates held by eleait.

L Estates upon condition implied in law, are where a grant of an estate has a

condition annexed to it inseparably, from its essence and constitution, although

no condition be expressed in words. As if a grant be made to a man of an office,

generally, without adding other words ; the law tacitly annexes hereto a secret con-

dition, that the grantee shall duly execute his office,(J) on breach of which condi-

*153 1 on **' '8 law^ul f°r *ne grant°r> or his heirs, to oust him and grant it to

-1 another person.(c) For an office, either public or private, may be forfeited

by mis-user or non-user, both of which are breaches of this implied condition.

1. By mis-user, or abuse ; as if a judge takes a bribe, or a park-keeper kills deer

without authority. 2. By non-user, or neglect; which in public offices, that

concern the administration of justice, or the commonwealth, is of itself a direct

and immediate cause of forfeiture ; but non-user of a private office is no cause of

forfeiture, unless some special damage is proved to be occasioned thereby, (d )

For in the one case delay must necessarily be occasioned in the affairs of the

public, which require a constant attention : but, private offices not requiring so

regular and unremitted a service, the temporary neglect of them is not necessa-

rily productive of mischief: upon which account some special loss must be

proved, in order to vacate these. Franchises also, being regal privileges in the
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hands of a subject, are held to be granted on the same condition of making a

proper use of them ; and therefore they may be lost and forfeited, like offices,

either by abuse or by neglect (e) (4)

Upon the same principle proceed all the forfeitures which are given by law of

life estates and others ; for any acts done by the tenant himself, that are incom-

patible with the estate which he holds. As if tenants for life or years enfeoff a

stranger in fee-simple : this is, by the common law, a forfeiture of their several

estates ; being a breach of the condition which the law annexes thereto, viz. :

that they shall not attempt to create a greater estate than they themselves are

entitled to. (/) So if any tenants for years, for life, or in fee, commit a felony ;

the king or other lord of the fee is entitled to have their tenements, because

their estate is determined by the breach of the condition, " that they shall not

commit felony," which the law tacitly annexes to every feudal donation.

F *154 1 * ^n es^a*:e on condition expressed in the grant itself is where an estate

L J is granted, either in fee-simple or otJterwise, with an express qualification

fb) Lltt. j S78. (c) Ibid. ) 879. (d) Co. Utt. S33. (e) 9 Rep. BO. (f) Co. Litt. 815.

(4) The grant of a franchise to be a corporation is always upon the implied condition that the

grantees shall act up to the end or design for which they are incorporated, and any misuser of

the corporate privileges will render them liable to forfeiture as for condition broken. Ang. and

A. on Corp. J 774-776 ; People «. Bank of Niagara, 6 Cow. 196 ; Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh

Coal Co., 4 Rawle, 9 ; Mclntyre School v. Zanesville Canal Co., 9 Ohio, 203 : People v. River

Raisin and Lake Erie R. R. Co., 12 Mich. 339. So corporate franchises may be lost by non-user ;

but what length of non-user shall be requisite for that purpose must depend very much upon the

circumstances and the character of the franchise and consequent interest the public may have in

its exercise. See State v. Commercial Bank, 10 Ohio, 535 ; People v. Bank of Pontiao, 12 Mich.

537 ; Matter of Jackson Marine Ins. Co., 4 Sandf. Ch. 559 ; Ward ». Sea Ins. Co., 7 Paige, 294.

The state alone can take advantage of a breach of the condition, and it must be done by a pro-

ceeding instituted directly for that purpose, and not in any collateral or incidental proceeding.

Commonwealth v. Union Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 230 ; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Connecticut R. R. Co.,

7 Conn. 46 ; Crump v. U. S. Mining Co., 7 Gratt. 352 ; Planter's Bank t>. Bank of Alexandria, 10

Gill and J. 346; Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio, 283; Bank of GallipoHs v. Trimble, 6 B.

Monr. 599 ; Smith v. Mississippi R. R. Co., 6 S. and M. 179 ; Cahill v. Kalamazoo M. Ins. Co., 2

Doug. Mich. 141 ; Vermont and Canada R. R. Co. ». Vermont Central R. R. Co., 34 Vt. 57 ; State

t). Mississippi R. R. Co., 20 Ark. 495 ; BrookvUle T. Co. v. McCarty, 8 Ind. 392 ; Wood e. Coosa,

Ac., R. R. Co., 32 Ga. 273. And the state may waive the broken condition as an individual

might. Ang. and A. on Corp. $ 777. As to what shall be deemed a waiver, see Commercial

Bank v. State, 6 S. and M. 622 ; State v. Bank of Charleston, 2 McMullan, 439 ; People r. King-

ston T. Co.. 23 Wend. 193; People ». Phoenix Bank. 24 id. 431 ; People v. Bank of Pontiac, 13

Mich. 527.
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annexed, whereby the estate granted shall either commence, be enlarged or be de-

feated, upon performance or breach of such qualification or condition.^) (5) These

conditions are therefore either precedent or subsequent. (6) Precedent are such

as must happen or be performed before the estate can vest or be enlarged: sub-

sequent are such, by the failure or non-performance of which an estate already

vested may be defeated. (7) Thus, if an estate for life be limited to A upon his

marriage with B, the marriage is a precedent condition, and till that happens no

estate (A) is vested in A. Or, if a man grant to his lessee for years, that upon

payment of a hundred marks within the term he shall have the fee, this also is

a condition precedent, and the fee-simple passeth not till the hundred marks be

paid. (/) But if a man grants an estate in fee-simple, reserving to hmself and

his heirs a certain rent; and that if such rent be not paid at the times limited,

it thall be lawful for him and his heirs to re-enter, and avoid the estate: in this

case the grantee and his heirs have an estate upon condition subsequent, which

is defeasible if the condition be not strictly performed, (k) (8) To this class may

also be referred all base fees, and fee-simples conditional at the common law. (I)

Thus an estate to a man and his heirs, teiiants of the manor of Dale, is an estate

on condition that he and his heirs continue tenants of that manor. And so, if

a personal annuity be granted at this day to a man and the heirs of his body, as

(g) Ibid. SOI. (h) Show. Parl. Cas. 83, Ac. ftj Co. Lltt. J17.

(It) l.lll. ( 325. (I) See pages 109,110, 111.

(5) The instances of conditions which now most frequently arise in practice are those con-
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tained in leases or agreements between lessor and lessee, and are principally conditions sub-

sequent, provided for in the usual clauses of re-entry in case of a breach of a particular, or

any covenant in the lease, as non-payment of rent, not repairing, not insuring, not residing on

the premises, or in case of an assignment, or parting with the possession, or of bankruptcy,

or insolvency, 4c. See the cases upon this subject, 2 Cruise Dig. 10, 11, 13; 4 Cruise, 506;

Adams, Bjectm. index, Covenant; 2 Saunders, by Patteson and Williams, index, Forfeiture.]

(6) [Equity will not allow any one to take advantage of a bequest over, who has himself

been instrumental in causing the breach of a condition. Garrett v. Pretty, stated from Keg.

Lib. in 3 Meriv. 120; Clark v. Parker, 19 Ves. 12; D'Aguilar v. Drinkwater, 2 Yes. and Bea.

295. But, it is a general rule, that where a condition is annexed by will to a devise or

bequest, and no one is bound to give notice of such condition, the parties must themselves

take notice and perform the condition in order to avoid a forfeiture. Chauncy v. Graydon, 2

Atk. 619; Fry v. Porter, 1 Mod. 314; Burgess v. Kobinson, 3 Meriv. 9; Phillips v. Bury, Show.

P. C. 50. Infancy will be no excuse, in such case, for non-performance of the condition.

Bertie r. Lord Falkland, 2 Freem. 221; Lady Ann Fry^s Case, 1 Tentr. 200. The application

of this general rule, however, is subject to one restriction: where a condition is annexed to a

devise of real estate to the testator's heir at law, there notice of the condition is necessary

before he can incur a forfeiture; for, an heir at law, will be supposed to have entered and made

claim by descent, not under the will. Burleton v Komfray, Ambl. 250. ]

(7) There are no technical words to distinguish conditions precedent and jubsequent, but

whether they be the one or the other is matter of construction, and depends upon the inten-

tion of the party creating the estate. 4 Kent, 125 i Kogan v. Walker, 1 \V is. 555; Burnett t>.

Strong, 26 Miss.'116; Finlayti. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. 346; Hothamu. East India Co., 1 T. R.

645.

JB) Tan Rensselaer v. Ball, 19 X. Y. 100. So a condition that a conveyance shall be void

ess within a specified time a certain sum of money is paid. Brannan v. Mesick, 10 Cal.

108. So a condition in a conveyance of land to a child that the grantee shall support the

grantor in a particular manner. Willard v. Henry, 2 N. H. 120. But the condition must be

something substantial; if it be merely nominal, as to pay an ear of Indian corn for a grant

of land, tor the first ten years if lawfully demanded, a failure to perform will be no ground

of forfeiture, People «. Society, <fec., 1 Paine, C. C. 652; King's Chapel v. Pelham, U Mass. 501.

And in any case a mere stipulation in a deed that the grantee shall do or abstain from doing

a particular act is not to be regarded as a condition; the law presuming that the grantor

rehed upon the personal responsibility of the grantee instead of any security which a con-

dition would afford. The construction is therefore always against conditions where the lan-

guage will admit of it, and the grantee will have the benefit of all doubts. Merrifield v.

Cobleigh, 4 Gush. 178. And if held to be conditions, they will be strictly construed. A

grant, upon condition that the land shall be used for a raceway, is not forfeited, if it is used

for that purpose, because of being used for other purposes also. McKelway v. Seymour, 5

Dutch. 322. And a condition that a grantee shall maintain a fence, not naming his heirs or

assigns, will not be broken by the neglect of his heirs after his death to maintain it. Emerson r.

Simpson, 43 N. H. 475; see Gadbeny v. Sheppard, 27 Miss. 202; Bradstreet r. Clark, 21 Pick.

389 ; Mead «. Ballard, 7 Wai. 290.
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this is no tenement within the statute of Westminister the second, it remains as

at common law, a fee-simple on condition that the grantee has heirs of his bodv.

Upon the same principle depend all the determinable estates of freehold, which

we mentioned in the eighth chapter: as durante viduitate, &c.; these are estates

upon condition that the grantees do not marry, and the like. And, on the breach

r „, 55 -I of any of these *subsequent conditions, by the failure of these contin-

"• J gencies ; by the grantee's not continuing tenant of the manor of Dale,

by not having heirs of his body, or by not continuing sole; the estates which

were respectively vested in each grantee are wholly determined and void. (9)

A distinction is however, made between a condition in deed and a limitation,

which Littleton (TO) denominates also a condition in law. For when an estate

is so expressly confined and limited by the words of its creation, that it cannot

endure for any longer time than till the contingency happens upon which the

estate is to fail, this is denominated a limitation: as when land is granted to a

man so long as he is parson of Dale, or while he continues unmarried, or until

out of the rents and profits he shall have made 5001., and the like, (n) In such

case the estate determines as soon as the contingency happens (when he ceases

to be parson, marries a wife, or has received the 500?.) and the next subsequent

estate, which depends upon such determination, becomes immediately vested,

without any act to be done by him who is next in expectancy. But when an

estate is, strictly speaking, upon 'condition in deed (as if granted expressly upon

condition to be void upon the payment of 402. by the grantor, or so that the
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grantee continues unmarried, or provided he goes to York, &c.), (o) the law per-

mits it to endure beyond the time when such contingency happens, unless the

grantor or his heirs or assigns take advantage of the breach of the condition,

and make either an entry or a claim in order to avoid the estate, (p) (10) Yet,

though strict words of condition be used in the creation of the estate, if on

breach of the condition the estate be limited over to a third person, and does

not immediately revert to the grantor or his representatives (as if an estate be

granted by A to B, on condition that within two years B intermarry with C,

and on failure thereof then to D and his heirs), this the law construes to be a

F *1561 liroitetion and not a ""condition: (q) because if it were a condition, then,

"- J upon the breach thereof, only A or his representatives could avoid the

estate by entry, and so D's remainder might be defeated by their neglecting to

enter; but, when it is a limitation, the estate of B determines, and that of D

commences, and he may enter on the lands the instant that the failure happens.

So also, if a man by his will devises land to his heir at law, on condition that he

(in) $ 380. 1 lust. ill. (,<) 10 Rep. 41. (o) I Mil. 42.

(p) Litt. J 347. Stat. 32 Hen. VIII. o.34. (q) 1 Vent, 20S.

(9) But a condition subsequent in general restraint of marriage is void: Morley t>. Rennold-

son, 2 Hare, 570; "Williams t>. Cowdcn, 13 Mo. 211; though one imposing reasonable restraints,

as that the grantee shall not marry without consent of parent, guardian or trustee, or not to

a person or persons named, or not to a native of a particular country, and the like will be

sustained. See Perrin ». Lyon, 9 East, 170; Daley v. Desbouvorie, 2 Atk. 261. And a hus-

band hag such an interest in nis wife remaining single after his death that he may make that

a valid condition of a grant or devise. Lloyd r. Lloyd, 16 Jurist, 306; Dumey r. Schoffler, 24

Mo. 170; Vaughn r. Lovejoy, 34 Ala. 437; Pringle v. Dunkley, 14 Sm. and M. 16; Common-

wealth ». Stauffer, 10 Perm. St. 385.

(10) The material distinction between a condition and a limitation is, that a condition does

not defeat the estate, though it be broken, until entry by the grantor or his heirs, while a limita-

tion actually determines the estate without any act or ceremony whatsoever. 4 Kent, 436,

427: Proprietors, <fcc., v. Grant, 3 Gray, 147 ; Tallman v. Snow, 35 Me. 342; Lockyer t. Savage.

2 Strange, 947; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 457, 458. The right to make entry for bleach of condition

is not assignable separate from any reversion in the land to which the condition relates. Tficoti

v. N. Y. and E. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 121.

The person entitled to make entry for breach of condition may waive the right to do so,

and will be regarded as having done so by any act inconsistent with an intent to rely upon the

forfeiture. As where a leasehold estate has become forfeited for non-payment of rent, and the

lessor accepts from the tenant rent which has accrued subsequent to the breach. See Chalker ••

Chalker, 1 Conn. 79; Coon v. Briokett, 2 N. H. 163; Jackson «. Allen, 3 Cow. 220; Gray r.

Blanchard, 8 Pick. 284; Sharon Iron Co. v. Erie, 41 1 Vim, St. 349.

434

Chap. 10.] ESTATES IN MORTGAGE. 156

Chap. 10.]

156

ESTATES IN MORTGAGE.

pays a sum of money, and for non-payment devises it over, this shall be considered

as a limitation ; otherwise no advantage could be taken of the non-payment, for

none but the heir himself could have entered for a breach of condition, (r)

In all these instances, of limitations or conditions subsequent, it is to be

observed, that so long as the condition, either express or implied, either in deed

or in law, remains unbroken, the grantee may have an estate of freehold, pro-

vided the estate upon which such condition is annexed be in itself of a freehold

nature; as if the original grant express either an estate of inheritance, or for

life; or no estate at all, which is constructively an estate for life. For, the

breach of these conditions being contingent and uncertain, this uncertainty

preserves the freehold; (s) because the estate is capable to last forever, or at

least for the life of the tenant, supposing the condition to remain unbroken.

But where the estate is at the utmost a chattel interest, which must determine

at a time certain, and may determine sooner (as a grant for ninety-nine years,

provided A, B and C, or the survivor of them, shall so long live), this still con-

tinues a mere chattel, and is not, by such its uncertainty, ranked among estates

of freehold.

These express conditions, if they be impossible at the time of their creation,

or afterwards become impossible by the act of God or the act of the feoffor

himself, (11) or if they be contrary to law or repugnant to the nature of the

estate, are void. In any of which cases, if they be conditions subsequent, that

*is, to be performed after the estate is vested, the estate shall become r $, .„ -i
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absolute in the tenant. As, if a feoffment be made to a man in fee- *- J

simple, on condition that unless he goes to Home in twenty-four hours; or

unless he marries with Jane S. by such a day (within which time the woman

dies, or the feoffor marries her himself); or unless he kills another; or in case

he alienes in fee; that then and in any of such cases the estate shall be vacated

and determine: here the condition is void, and the estate made absolute in the

feoffee. For he hath by the g^rant the estate vested in him, which shall not be

defeated afterwards by a condition either impossible, illegal, or repugnant.(£) (12)

But if the condition be precedent, or to be performed before the estate vests, as a

grant to a man that, if he kills another or goes to Rome in a day, he shall have

an estate in fee; here, the void condition being precedent, the estate which

depends thereon is also void, and the grantee shall take nothing by the grant:

for he hath no estate until the condition be performed. («)

There are some estates defeasible upon condition subsequent, that require a

more peculiar notice. Such are,

III. Estates held in vadio, in gage, or pledge; which are of two kinds, vivum

vadium, or living pledge; and mortuum vadvwm, dead pledge, or mortgage.

(r) Cro. Eliz. 206. 1 Roll. Abr. til. (t) Co. Lltt. 42. (t) Co. Liu. 306. (u) Ibid.

(11) See Merrill t>. Emery, 10 Pick. 507. Or by the course of public events, as where a grant

is made on condition that certain settlements be made upon it, and a change of jurisdiction, or

the disturbed state of the country render it impracticable. TJ. S.». Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691; TJ. S.

t>. Fremont, 17 How. 560; TJ. S. v. Reading, 18 How. 1. And so where a condition is designed for

pays a sum of money, and for non-payment devises it over, this shall be considered
as a. limitation; otherwise no advantage could be taken of the non-payment, for
none but the heir himself could have entered for a breach of condition. (r)
In all these instances, of limitations or conditions subsequent, it is to be
observed, that so long as the condition, either express or implied, either in deed
or in law, remains unbroken, the grantee may have an estate of freehold, provided the estate upon which such condition is annexed be in itself of a freehold
nature; as if the original grant express either an estate of inheritance, or for
life; or no estate at all, which is constructively an estate for life. For, the
breach of these conditions being contingent and uncertain, this uncertainty
preserves the freehold; (s) because the estate is capable to last forever, or at
least for the life of the tenant, supposing the condition to remain unbroken.
But where the estate is at the utmost a chattel interest, which must determine
at a time certain, and may determine sooner (88 a grant for ninety-nine years,
provided A, B and C, or the survivor of them, shall so long live), this still continues a mere chattel, and is not, by such its uncertainty, ranked among estates
of freehold.
These express conditions, if they be irnpossible at the time of their creation,
or afterwards become impossible by the act of God or the act of the feoffor
himself, (11) or if they be contrary to law or rep1tgnant to the nature of the
estate, are void. In any of which cases, if they be conditions subsequent, that
*is, to be performed after the estate is vested, the estate shall become [ • 157 ]
absolute in the tenant. As, if a feoffment be made to a. man in feesimple, on condition that unlesa he goes to Rome in twenty-four hours ; or
unless he marries with Jane S. by such a day (within which time the woman
dies, or the feoffor marries her himself) ; or unless he kills another; or in case
he alienes in fee; that then and in any of such cases the estate shall be vacated
and determine: here the condition is void, and the estate made absolute in the
feoffee. For he hath by the grant the estate vested in him, which shall not be
defeated afterwards by a condition either impossible, illegal, or repugnant.(t) (12)
But if the condition be precedent, or to be performed before the estate vests, as a
grant to a man that, if he kills another or goes to Rome in a day, he shall have
an estate in fee; here, the void condition being precedent, the estate which
depends thereon is also void, and the grantee shall take nothing by the grant:
for he hath no estate until the condition be performed. (u)
There are some estates defeasible upon condition subsequent, that require a
more pecullu.r notice. Such are,
III. Estates held in vadio, in gage, or pled~e; which are of two kinds, vivum
fJadium, or living pledge; and mortuum vadium, dead pledge, or mortgage.
(I) Co. Litt. ,2.
(t) Co. Litt. U.
(r) Cro. Eliz. 21116. 1 Roll. Abr. ,11.
(") Ibid.

the benefit of a third person, who by his own act renders performance impossible. Jones v. Doe,

(11) See Merrill ti. Emery, 10 Pick. 507. Or by the

1 Scam. 276; Bee Jones r. Walker, 13 B. Monr. 163.

(12) A condition in general rest mint of alienation, either by the grantee himself or on legal

proceedings against him, is void in a conveyance in fee, as repugnant to the estate conveyed.

Blackstone Bank ». Davis, 21 Pick. 42; Taylor o. Sutton, 15 Geo. 103; see Newtek v. New-

kerk, 2 Caines, 345. But reasonable restraints upon the mode in which premises are to be

used, may be made conditions even in grants of the fee. See Gillis t>. Bailey, 1 Fost. 149;

Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 253; Wheeler t'. Earle, 5 Gush. 31; Terplank v. Wright, 23 Wend.

506. A condition that land granted for a church and a school shall be used only for a church ig

void for repugnancy. Canal Bridge Go. v. Methodist Society, 13 Mete. 335. If the act of the

law renders performance impossible, the party is excused. Anglesea v. Church Wardens, 6 Q. B.

114.

Although equity will sometimes relieve against condition* where the act to be done was such

that the injury from failure to perform it is capable of a certain compensation in damages, it

will not assist in enforcing them by forfeiture, but will leave parties to their remedy at law,

Warner v. Bennett, 31 Conn. 478; Crane p, Dwyer, 9 Mich. 350.
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of public events, as where a grant

is made on condition that certa.in settlements be made upon it, and a change of jurisdiction, or

the disturbed stare of the country render it impracticable. U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691 ; U. S.
Fremont, 17 How. 560; U. S. v. Reading, 18 How. 1. .And so where a condition is designed for
the benefit of a third person, who by his own act renders performance impossible. Jones ti. Doe,
1Scam.276; see Jones ti. Walker, 13 B. Yonr. 16.'l.
(12) A condition in general restraint of alienation, either by the grantee himself or on legal
proceedings against him, is void in a conveyance in fee, as repugnant to the estat.e conveyed.
Blackstone Bank v. Davis, 21 Pick. 42; Ta:rlor v. Sutton, 15 Geo. 103; see Newkerk ti. Newkerk, 2 Caines, 345. But reasonable restraints upon the mode in which premises are to be
used, may be made conditions even in grants of the fee. See Gillis "· Bailey, 1 Fost. 149;
Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 253; Wheeler t•. Earle, 5 Gu11h . .'ll; Verplank v. Wright, 23 Wend.
506. A condition that land grant.ed for a church and a school 11hall be used only for a church is
void for repugnaucy. Canal Bridge Co. v. Methodist Society, 13 Mete. 335. If the act of the
law renders performance impossible, the party is excused. Anglesea v. Church Wardens, 6 Q. B.
114.
Although equity will sometimes relieve against conditiom where the act to be done was such
that the injury from failure to perform it is capable of a certain compell.8Stion in damages, it
will not easist in enforcing them by forfeiture, but wiJl leave parties to their remedy at law,
Warner"· }Jennett, 31 Conn. 478; Orane ,,, DWYer, 9 Mich. 350~
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Vivum vadium, or living pledge, is when a man borrows a sum (suppose 200/.)

of another ; and grants him an estate, as of 201. per annum, to hold till the

rents and profits shall repay the sum so borrowed. This is an estate conditioned

to be void, as soon as such sum is raised. And in this case the land or pledge

is said to be living; it subsists, and survives the debt; and immediately on the

discharge of that, results back to the borrower, (w) But mortuum vadium, a

dead pledge, or mortgage (which is much more common than the other), is where

F *158 1 a man borrows °f another a specific sum (e. g. 2001.) *and grants him

L -"an estate in fee, on condition that if he, the mortgagor, shall repay the

mortgagee the said sum of 2001. on a certain day mentioned in the deed, that

then the mortgagor may re-enter on the estate so granted in pledge; or, as is

now the more usual way, that then the mortgagee shall re-convey the estate to

the mortgagor: in this case, the land, which is so put in pledge, is by law, in

case of non-payment at the time limited, forever dead and gone from the mort-

gagor ; and the mortgagee's estate in the lands is then no longer conditional,

but absolute. But, so long as it continues conditional, that is, between the time

of lending the money, and the time allotted for payment, the mortgagee is called

tenant in mortgage, (x) But as it was formerly a doubt, (y) whether, by taking

such estate in fee, it did not become liable to the wife's dower, and other incum-

brances, of the mortgagee (though that doubt has been long ago overruled bv

our courts of equity), (z) it therefore became usual to grant only a long term of

years by way of mortgage; with condition to be void on re-payment of the mort-
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gage-money ; which course has been since pretty generally continued, principally

Because on the death of the mortgagee such term becomes vested in his personal

representatives, who alone are entitled in equity to receive the money lent, of

whatever nature the mortgage may happen to be. (13)

As soon as the estate is created, the mortgagee may immediately enter on the

lands; but is liable to be dispossessed, upon performance of the condition by

payment of the mortgage-money at the day fimited. And therefore the usual

way is to agree that the mortgagor shall hold the land till the day assigned for

payment; when, in case of failure, whereby the estate becomes absolute, the

mortgagee may enter upon it and take possession, without any possibility at law

of being afterwards evicted by the mortgagor, to whom the land is now forever

dead. But here again the courts of equity interpose; and though a mortgage

r «,.59 -, be thus forfeited, and the *estate absolutely vested in the mortgagee at

L -" the common law, yet they will consider the real value of the tenements

compared with the sum borrowed. And, if the estate be of greater value than

(v) Ibid. SOB. (x) l.itt. i 332. (y) Ibid, { 357. Cro. Car. 191. (*) Hardr. «6.

(13) There are two parts to a mortgage, the conveyance and the defeasance. These are usually

embraced in the same instrument, which is executed by the mortgagor alone, and convevs the

land at the same time that it specifies the condition on which the conveyance shall be defeated.

Vivum vadium, or Ii ving pledge, is when a man borrows a sum (suppose 2001.)
of another ; and grants him an estate, as of 20l. per annum, to hold till the
rents and profits shall repay the sum so borrowed. This is an estate conditioned
to be void, as soon as such sum is raised. And in this case the land or pledge
is said to be living; it subsists, and survives the debt; and immediately on the
discharge of that, results back to the borrower. (10) But mortuum vadium, a
dead pledge, or mortgage (which is much more common than the other), is where
[ ,.. 158 ] a man borrows of another a specific sum (e.g. 200l.) •and grant.<! him
an estnte in fee, on condition that if he, the mortgagor, shall repay the
mortgagee the said sum of 2001. on a certain day mentioned in the deed, that
then the mortgagor may re-enter on the estate so granted in pledge; or, as is
now the more usual way, that then the mortgagee shall re-convey the estate to
the mortgagor: in this case, the land, which is so put in pledge, is bv law, in
case of non-payment Qt the time limited, forever dead and gone -from the mortgagor ; and the mortgagee's estate in the lands is then no longer conditional,
but absolute. But, so long as it continues conditional, that is, between the time
of lending the money, and the time allotted for payment, the mortgagee is called
tenant in mortgage. (x) But as it was formerly a doubt, (y) whether, by taking
such estate in fee, it did not become liable to the wife's dower, and other incumbrances, of the mortgagee (though that doubt has been long ago overruled bv
our courts of equity), (z) it therefore became usual to grant only a long term of
years by way of mortgage ; with condition to be mid on re-payment of the mortgage-money; which course has been since pretty generally continued, ~rincipally
because on the death of the mort~ce such term becomes vested in his personal
representatives, who alone are entitled in equity to receive the money lent, of
whate"Ver nature the mortgage may happen to be. (13)
As soon as the estate is created, the mortgagee may immediately enter on the
lands ; but is liable to be dispossessed, upon ;eerformance of the condition by
payment of the mortgage-money at the day limited. And therefore the usual
way is to agree that the mortgagor shall hold the land till the day assigned for
payment; when, in case of failure, whereby the estate becomes absolute, the
mort~gee may enter upon it and take possession, without any possibility at law
of bemg afterwards evicted by the mortgagor, to whom the land is now fore;er
dead. But here again the courts of equity interpose; and though a mortgage
[ ,..159 ] be thus forfeited, and the •estate absolutely vested in the mortgagee at
the common law, yet they will consider the real value of the tenements
compared with the sum borrowed. And, if the estate be of greater value than

But sometimes they are executed separately, in which case the mortgagor executes the convey-

(Ill) 1 bid. lll06.

(Z) J.ltt.

t 332.

<r> Ibid, I 367.

Cro. Car. 191.

l•l Hardr. 468.

ance, and the mortgagee executes and delivers to the mortgagor an instrument of defeasance.

A deed absolute in form without any written defeasance is nevertheless a mortgage if given to

secure a pre-existing debt, and resort may be had to the surrounding circumstances to determine

whether that was the real purpose or not. And in some of the states it is held thataparol agree-

ment cotemporaneons with the giving of a deed may be shown in order to establish that a deed

was to be a mortgage only. See authorities collected in Emerson r. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12. An.!

see Hodges v. Ins. Co., 8 K T. 416; Despard v. Walbridge, 15 id. 374.

The vendor of real estate who has not been fully paid the purchase money has a lien upon the

land for the payment, in the absence of any express contract on the subject, unless he has received

security for the payment, or the circumstances are such as to preclude the idea that the parties

expected such a lien to exist White v. Williams, 1 Paige, 502; Sears v. Smith, 2 Mich. 243;

Chilton v. Braiden's Admr., 2 Black, 458; Tobey «. McAlister 9 Wis. 463; Neil f, Kinney, 11

Ohio, N. S. 58; Boos ». Swing, 17 Ohio, 500; Manly e. Slason, 21 Vt 277; Lusk v. Hopper. 3

Bush. 179; Piedmont, Ac. Co. v. Green, 3 W. Va. 64; Boynton «. Champlin, 42 111, 57. This

lien continues so long as the land remains in the hands of the purchaser, and would also follow it

in the hands of one who received a conveyance with knowledge of the lieu or without consider-

ation. See Mackroth r. Symmons, 15 Tes. 329, and notes thereto in 1 Lead. Gas. in Equity.

The lien is enforced in equity as an equitable mortgage. This lien does not appear to exist IB

•u- Simpson v. Mnndee, 3 Kansas, 172.
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( 13) There are two ~ to a mortgage, the conveyance and the defeasance. These a.re usually
embraced in the same m11trument, which it1 executed by the mortgagor alone, and eonve,·~ the
land at the 8Sme time that it specifie11 the condition on which the conveyance shall be defeated.
But sometimes they are executed separately, in which <'MB the mortgagor executes the conn>yruwe, and the mortgagee executes and deliveni to the mortgagor an instrument of defe&!&llce.
.A deed abwlute in form without any written defeasauce is nevertheless a mortgage if given t-0
11ecure a pre-existing debt, and resort may be had to the surrounding circumstances to determine
whether that was the real purpose or not. .And in some of the states it is held that a parol agreement cotemporaneons with the giving of a deed may be shown in onler to establish that a det>d
was to be a mortgage only. See authorities collected in Emerson "· .Atwater, 7 llich. 12. Aud
11oe HodgeR v . lnR. Co., tl N. Y. 416; Despard"· Walbridge, 15 id. 374.
The vendor of real estate who has not been fully paid the purchase money hae a lien upon the
land for the payment, in the absence of any express contract on the subject, unle8i! he has rcceh·ed
tiecurity for the payment, or the circumstances are such as to preclude the idea that the p&rti'8
exl?ected such a lien to exist. Whit.a "· Williams, 1 Paige, 50'.l; Sea.rs ti. Smith, 2 llich. 2'3 ;
Chilton"· Braiden'e Adtnr., 2 Black, 458; Tobey "· Kc.Alister 9 Wis. 463; Neil 111 Kinney, 11
Ohio, N. S. 58; Boos t1. Ewing, 17 Ohio, 500; llanly "· Slason, 21 Vt. Zl7; Lusk v, HopJM!r. 3
Bush. 179; Piedmont, &c. Co."· Green, 3 W. Va. 64; Boynton ti. Champlin, 42 Ill, 57. Thi>
lien continues so long as the land romaine in the hands of the purcha:!er, and would also follo w it
in the hands of one who received a convAyance with knowledge of the lieu or without con:'ickration. See Maokreth "· Symmons, 15 Vee. 3"29, and notes thereto in 1 Lead. Ca11. in E<!nitr
The lien is enforced in equity 811 an equitable mortgage. Tllis Uen does not appe~ to ~t m
Kansas. Simpson ti. Mundee, 3 Kan1!88, 1~.
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the sum lent thereon, they will allow the mortgagor at any reasonable time to

recall or redeem his estate; (14) paying to the mortgagee his principal, interest,

and expenses: for otherwise, in strictness of law, an estate worth 1000Z. might

be forfeited for non-payment of 1001. or a less sum. This reason? hie advantage,

allowed to mortgagors, is called the equity of redemption: and tiiis enables a

mortgagor to call on the mortgagee, who has possession of his estate, to deliver

it back and account for the rents and profits received, on payment of his whole

debt and interest; thereby turning the mortuum into a kind of vivum vadium.

But, on the other hand, the mortgagee may either compel the sale of the estate,

in order to get the whole of his money immediately; or else call upon the mort-

gagor to redeem his estate presently, or in default thereof, to be forever foreclosed

From redeeming the same; that is, to lose his equity of redemption without

possibility of recall. (15) And also, in some cases of fraudulent mortgages, (a)

fa) Stot. 4 and !i W. A M. o. 16.

the sum lent thereon, they will allow the mortgagor at any reasonable time to
recall or redeem his estate; (14) paying to the mortgagee his principal, interest,
and expenses: for otherwise, in strictness of law, an estate worth lOOOl. might
be forfeited for non-payment of 100[. or a less sum. This reason1 "'">le advantage,
allowed to mortgagors, is called the equity of redemption : and tLtis enables a
mortgagor to call on the mortgagee, who has possession of his estate, to deliver
it back and account for the rent.a and profits received, on payment of his whole
debt and interest; thereby turning the mortuum into a kind of vivum vadium.
But, on the other hand, the mortgagee may either compel the sale of the estate,
in order to get the whole of his money immediately; or else call upon the mortgagor to redeem his estate presentl,r, or in default thereof, to be forever foreclosed
from redeeming the same; that 1s, to lose his equity of redemption without
possibility of recall. (15) And also, in some cases of fraudulent mortgages, (a)

(14) [The policy of the statute of limitations applies as strongly to a mortgaged estate as to

(a)

any other. So long as the estate can be shonn to have been treated as a pledge, so long there

S&ni. 4 and 5 w . .t M. o. 16.

is a recognition of the mortgagor's title : Hodle v. Healey, 1 Ves. and Bea. 540: 9. 0. 6 Mad.

181; Grubb ». Woodhonse, 2 Freem. 187; but from the time when all accounts have ceased to

be kept by the mortgagee; and provided, also, he has in no other way (either in communications

to the mortgagor or in dealings with third parties : Hansard r. Hardy, 18 Yes. 459; On! v. Smith,

Sel. Ca. in Cna. 10) admitted the estate to be held as a security only; the statute will begin to

run, unless the mortgagor's situation bring him within some of tin- sayings of the statute; and
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if he do not within twenty years assert his title to redeem, his right will nave been forfeited by

his own laches. Marquis of Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 Jao. and Walk. 180, et seq.; Whit-

ing v. White, Coop. 4; S. C., 2 Cox, 300; Barren t>. Martin, 19 Ves. 327. But to show that an

estate has been treated as one affected by a subsisting mortgage, within twentv years immediately

proceeding a bill brought for redemption, parol evidence is admissible. Ree&tiv. Postlethwaite,

Coop. 170; Perry v. Marston, cited 2 Cox, 295; BdseU v. Buchanan, 2 Tes. Jun. 84.

In the case of Montgomery v. The Marquis of Bath, 3 Ves. 560, a decree was made for a fore-

closure as to the share of one of several joint mortgagees; but, it is to be observed, no opposi-

tion was made by the mortgagor in that case; and it is very doubtful whether a decree for a

partial foreclosure ought ever to be made. See Cockbnrn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. 324, n. It

u, at all events, certain, there can be no foreclosure or redemption, unless the whole of the

parties entitled to any share of the mortgage money are before the court: Lowe v. Morgan, 1 Br.

368; Palmer v. The Earl of Carlisle, 1 Sim. and Stn. 425; it being always the object of a court

of equity to make a complete decree, embracing the whole subject, and determining (as far as

possible) the rights of all the parties interested. Palk v. Clinton, 12 Ves. 58; Cholmondeley v.

Clinton, 2 Jac. and Walk. 134. Upon analogous principles, not only the mortgagor but a subse-

quent mortgagee, who comes to redeem the mortgage of a prior mortgagee, must offer to redeem

it entirely; although the second mortgage may affect only part of the estates comprised in the

first, and the titles are different. Palk v. Clinton, 12 Ves. 59.]

(15) Besides the conveyance and defeasance, there is also in the mortgages commonly given in

the United States a third part, called the power of sale, which is an authority given by the mort-

gagor to the mortgagee to sell the land for the satisfaction of his debt, rendering the surplus

moneys, if any, to the mortgagor. Where the mortgage contains this power of sale, the follow-

ing modes of foreclosure may exist:

1. The mortgagee may dispossess the mortgagor and any one who has come into possession

under him since the giving of the mortgage, and apply the rents and profits of the premises to the

satisfaction of his debt. But the right to possession before an actual foreclosure of the mortgage

by legal proceedings is now taken away by statute in some of the states. See Waring v. Smyth,

2 Barb. Ch. 135; Caruthers v. Humphrey, 12 Mich. 270.

2. The mortgagee may sell under his power of sale. The proceedings on such sale are regulated

by statute, and it is generally required to be at public unction after advertisement in some news-

paper, and to be made by the mortgagee or by some public officer. The statute must be followed

in all its substantial requisites, or the purchaser would only become assignee of the mortgage.

3. The mortgagee may file his bill in equity and obtain decree that the mortgagor redeem within

some time fixed by the court, or be foreclosed. But generally the court, instead of making such

decree—which is called a decree of strict foreclosure—will order the premises sold to satisfy the

mortgage and costs.

4. The possession of the mortgagee in any case may ripen into an absolute title if continued for

twenty years without any application of rente and profits upon the mortgage, or any recognition

of the right of the mortgagor to redeem.

(14) [The policy of the statute of limitations applies as strongly to a mortgaged estate as to
any other. So long as the 011tate can be shown to have been treated as a pleoge, so long there
is a recognition of the mortgagor's title : Hodle v. Healey, 1 Ves. and Bea. 540; S. C. 6 Mad.
181 ; Grubb ti. Woodhouse, 2 .l<'reem. 187; but from the time when all account.8 have ceased to
he kept by the mortgaitee ; and provided, also, he ha.! in no other way (either in communications
to the mortgagor or m dealingti with third parties : Hansard ti. Hardy, 18 Ves. 459; Ord ti. Smith,
Sel. Ca. in Cha. 10) admitt.ed the estate to be held Bii a security only; the statute will begin to
run, unle11s the mortgagor's situation bring him within some of the savings of the statute; and
if he do not within twenty years assert his title to redeem, his right will have been forfeit.ed by
his own laches. Marquis of Cholmondeley ti. Lord Clinton, 2 Jae. and Walk. 180, et seq.; Whiting 11. White, Coop. 4; S. C., 2 Cox, 300 ; Barren ti. Martin, 19 Ves. 327. But to show that an
estate has been treated as one affected by a subsisting mortgage, within twent.,. years immediately
preceeding a bill brought for ~edemption, parol evidence is admi88ible. Reea11 11. Postlethwaite,
Coop. 170; Perry ti. Marston, cited 2 Cox, 295; Edsell ti. Buchanan, 2 Ves. Jun. 84.
In the case of Montgomery t1. The Marquis of Bath, 3 Ves. 560, a decree wae made for a foreclosure as to the share of one of several joint mo~es; but, it is to be obl!erved, no opposition was made by the mortgagor in that case; and it 111 very doubtful whether a decree for a
partial foreclosure ought ever to be made. See Cockburn ti. Thompson, 16 Ves. 324, n. It
lll, at all events, certain, there can be nfl foreclosure or redemption, unleSR the whole of the
parties entitled to any share of the mo~age money are before the court: Lowe ti. Morgan, 1 Br.
368 ; Palmer 11. The Earl of Carlisle, 1 Sim. and Stu. 425; it bein~ always the ob)ect of a court
of equity to make a complete decree, embracing the whole subject, and determming (as far as
possible) the rights of all the parties interested. Palk t1. Clinton, rn Ves. 58; Cholm.ondeley t1.
Clinton, 2 Jae. and Walk. 134. Upon analogou11 principles, not only the mortgagor but a subsequent mortgagee, who comes to redeem the mortgage of a prior mortgagee, must offer to redeem
it entirely; although the second mortgage may affect only part of the estates comprised in the
fi~t, and the titles aro different. Palk ti. Clinton, 12 Vee. 59.]
(15) Besides the conveyance and de!easance, there ie also in the mortgiwis commonly given in
the united States a third part, called the power of sale, which is an authonty given by the mortgngor to the mortgagee to sell the land for the satisfaction of his debt, rendering the surplus
moneys, if any, to the mortgagor. Where the mortgage contains this power of sale, the followinir modes of foreclosure may exist :
1. The mortgap:ee may dispossess the mortgagor and any one who hae come into passe88ion
under him since the giving of the mortgage, and apply the rents and profits of the prellllses to the
satisfaction of his debt. But the right to possession before an actual foreclosure of the mortgage
by legal ~roceedinge is now taken away by statute in some of the states. See Waringt1. Smyth,
2 Barb. Ch. 135; Caruthers t1. Humphrey, 12 Mich. 270.
2. The mortgagee may sell under hi11 power of sale. The proceedings on such sale are regulated
by statute, and it is generally required to be at public auction after advertisement in some newt1paper, and to be made by the mortgagee or by some public officer. The statute must be followed
m all its t1Ubt1tantial requisites, or the purohaser would only become BRsignee of the mortgage.
3. The mortgagee may file his bill in equity and obtain decree that the mortgagor redeem within
110me time fixed by the court, or be foreclosed. But generally the eourt, instead of making such
decre&-which is called a decree of strict foreclosure-will order the premises sold to eatiefy the
mortgage and coi;ts.
4. The possession of the mortgagee in any case may ripen into an absolute title if continued for
twenty yelll'I! without any application of rents and profits upon the mortgage, or any recognition
of the right of the mortgagor to redeem .
.And tho mortgagee, instead of resorting to a foreclosure, has a right to pUl'l!Ue any perROnal
remedy against the mortgagor, if the latter is bound by bond or otherwise for the mortgage debt.
The foreclosure under the power of sale is now regulated in England by statute 23 and 24 Vic.
c. 145, and six months' notice to the mortgagor is required.
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The foreclosure under the power of sale is now regulated in England by statute 23 and 24 Vio.
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the fraudulent mortgagor forfeits all equity of redemption whatsoever. (16) It

is not however usual for mortgagees to take possession of the mortgaged estate,

unless where the security is precarious, or small; or where the mortgagor neg-

lects even the payment of interest: when the mortgagee is frequently obliged to

bring an ejectment, (17) and take the land into his own hands in the nature of

a pledge, or the pignus of the Koman law: whereas, while it remains in the

hands of the mortgagor, it more resembles their hypotheca, which was, where

the possession of the thing pledged remained with the debtor, (b) But by

statute 7 Geo. II, c. 20, after payment or tender by the mortgagor of principal,

interest, and costs, the mortgagee can maintain no ejectment; but may be com-

pelled to re-assign his securities. In Glanvil's time, when the universal method

r »i OQ -] of conveyance was by livery of seisin *or corporal tradition of the lands,

L -" the gage or pledge of lands was good unless possession was also delivered

to creditor; "si non sequator ipsius vadii traditio, curia do/mini regis hujusmodi

privatas conventions tueri non solet;" for which the reason given is, to prevent

subsequent and fraudulent pledges of the same land: " cum in tali casu possit

eadem res pluribus aliis creditoribus tumprius turn posterius invadiari. (c) And

the frauds which have arisen since the exchange of these public and notorious

conveyances for more private and secret bargains, have well evinced the wisdom

of our ancient law. (18)

(b) Pignoris appellations earn proprlefeateontineri ilirimns, qua ximul etiam tradttur, creditor*. At am,

qtue tine traditions nuda conventtom tenttur, proprie hypotheca appeliatione contineridicimtu. Inst. 1. i, <. 6, { 7.
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(ej 1.10, c.8.

(16) [By the 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 16, if any person mortgages his estate, and does not previ-

ously inform the mortgagee in writing of a prior mortgage, or of any judgment or incumbrance,

which he has voluntarily brought upon the estate, the mortgagee shall hold the estate as an abso-

lute purchaser, free from the equity of redemption of the mortgagor. ]

(17) [The mortgagee is not now obliged to bring an ejectment to recover the rents and profits

of the estate, for it nag been determined that where there is a tenant in possession, by a lease

prior to the mortgage, the mortgagee may at any time give him notice to pay the rent to him;

and he may distrain for all the rent which is due at the time of the notice, and also for all that

accrues afterwards. Moss r. Gallimore, Dong. 279. The mortgagor has no interest hi the premises,

but by the mere indulgence of the mortgagee; he has not even the estate of a tenant at will, for

it is held he may be prevented from carrying away the emblements, or the crops which he himself

has sown. Ib. 2 Fonblanqne on Equity, 258.

If the mortgagor grants a lease after the mortgage, the mortgagee may recover the possession

of the premises in an ejectment against the tenant in possession without a previous notice to quit.

3 East, 449; Keech r. Hall. 1 Doug. 21.]

(18) [If a mortgagee neglect to take possession of, or if he part with the title deeds of, the

mortgaged property, with a view to enable the mortgagor to commit frauds upon third persons,

he will be postponed to incumbrancers who have been deceived, and induced to advance money,

by his collusion with the mortgagor; but the mere circumstance of not taking or keeping posses-

sion of the title deeds, is not, of itself, a sufficient ground for postponing the first mortgagee;

unless there be fraud, concealment, or some such purpose, or concurrence in such purpose; or

that gross negligence which amounts to evidence of a fraudulent intention: Evans r. Bicknell, 6

Ves. 190; Martinez v. Cooper, 2 Buss. 216; Barnett e. "Weston, 12 Ves. 133; Bailey e. Permor,

9 Pr. 267; Peter v. Russell, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 123; and, of course, a prior incnmbrancer, to whose

charge on the estate possession of the title deeds is not a necessary incident, cannot be postponed

to subsequent incumbrancers, because he is not in possession of the title deeds. Harper v. Faul-

der, 4 Mad. 138; Tonrle v. Rand, 2 Br. 652.

Among mortgagees, where none of them have the legal estate, the rule in equity is, that,

quiprior est tempore potior est jure; and the several incumbrances must be paid according to

their priority in point of time. Brace v. Duchess of Marlborongh, 2 P. Wins. 495; Clarke r.

Abbott, Bernard, Ch. Rep. 460; Earl of Pomfret v. Lord "Windsor, 2 Tes. Sen. 486; Maundrell

v. Maundrell, 19 Tes. 260; Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 354. But when, of several persons

having equal equity in their favor, one has been fortunate or prudent enough to get in the

legal estate, he may make all the advantage thereof which the law admits, and thus protect

his title, though subsequent in point of time to that of other claimants; courts of equity will

not interfere in such cases, but leave the law to prevail. In conformity to this settled doctrine,

if an estate be encumbered with several mortgage debts, the last mortgagee, provided he lent

his money bona fide and without notice, may, by taking in the first incumbrance, carrying

with it the legal estate, protect himself against any intermediate mortgage; no mesne mort-

g_agee can take the estate out of hi--, hands, without redeeming the last incumbrance as well as

the first. "Wortley ». Birkhead, 2 Ves. Sen. 573; Morret v. Paske, 2 Atk. 53; Frere r. Moore, 8

Pr. 487; Barnett v. "Weston, 12 Ves. 135. But, to support the doctrine of tacking, the fairness
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Chap. 10.] ESTATE BY ELEQIT. 160

IV. A fourth species of estates, defeasible on condition subsequent, are those

held by statute merchant, and statute staple; which are very nearly related to

the vivum vadium before mentioned, or estate held till the profits thereof

shall discharge a debt liquidated or ascertained. For both the statute merchant

and statute staple are securities for money; the one entered into before the

chief magistrate of some trading town, pursuant to the statute 13 Edw. I, de

mercatoribus, and thence called a statute merchant; the other pursuant to the

statute 27 Edw. Ill, c. 9, before the mayor of the staple, that is to say, the grand

mart for the principal commodities or manufactures of the kingdom, formerly

held by act of parliament in certain trading towns, (d) from whence this security

is called a statute staple. They are both, I say, securities for debts acknowl-

edged to be due; and originally permitted only among traders, for the benefit

of commerce; whereby not only the body of the debtor may be imprisoned, and

his goods seized in satisfaction of the debt, but also his lands may be delivered

to the creditor, till out of the rents and profits of them the debts may be satis-

fied ; and, during such time as the creditor so holds the lands, he is tenant by

statute merchant or statute staple. There is also a similar security, the recog-

nizance in the nature of a statute staple, acknowledged before either of the chief

justices, or (out of term) before their substitutes, the mayor of the staple at

Westminster and the recorder of London"; whereby the benefit of this mercan-

tile transaction is extended to all the king's subjects in general, by virtue of the

statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 6, amended by 8 Geo. I, c. 25, wnich directs such recog-
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nizances to be enrolled and certified into chancery. But these by the Statute

of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, are only binding upon the lands in the hands of bona

fide purchasers, from the day of their enrolment, which is ordered to be marked

on the record.

V. Another similar conditional estate, created by operation of law, for security

and satisfaction of debts, is called, an *estate by eteqit. What an elegit r*ici-i

is, and why so called, Will be explained in the third part of these Com- L J

mentaries. At present I need only mention that it is the name of a writ,

founded on the statute (e) of Westm. 2, by which, after a plaintiff has obtained

judgment for his debt at law, the sheriff gives him possession of one-half of the

defendant's lauds and tenements, to be occupied and enjoyed until his debt and

(d) See Book 1,0.8. (e) 18 Edw. I, o. 18.

of the circumstances under which the loan desired to he tacked was made, must he liable to

IV. A fourth species of esta.tl's, defeasible on conilition subsequent, are those
held by statute rnerchant, and statu,te staple; which are very nearly related to
the vivum vadium before mentioned, or estate held till the profits thereof
shall discharge a debt liquidated or ascertained. For both the statute merchant
and statute staple are securities for money; the one entered into before the
chief ma.~istrate of some trading town, pursuant to the statute 13 Edw. I, ds
mercatoribus, and thence called a statute merchant; the other pursuant to the
statute 27 Edw. III, c. 9, before the mayor of the staple, that is to say, the grand
mart for the principal commodities or manufactures of the kingdom, formerly
held by act of parliament in certain trading towns, (d) from whence this security
is called a statute staple. They are both, I say, securities for debts acknowledged to be due; and originally permitted only among traders, for the benefit
of commerce; whereby not only the body or the debtor may be imprisoned, and
his goods seized in satisfaction of the debt, but also his lands may be delivered
t.o the creditor, till out of the rents and profits of them the debts may be satisfied; and. during such time as the creditor so holds the lands, he is tenant by
statute merchant or statute staple. There is also a similar security, the recognizance in the nature of a statute staple, acknowledged before either of the chief
justices, or (out of term) before their substitutes, the mayor of the staple at
Westminster and the recorder of London:; whereby the benefit of this mercantile transaction is extended to all the king's subjectia in general, by virtue of the
statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 6, amended by 8 Geo. I, c. 25, which directs such recognizances to be enrolled and certified mto chancery. But these by the Statute
of Frauds, 29 Oar. II, c. 3, are only binding upon the lands in the hands of bona
fide purchasers, from the day of their enrolment, which is ordered to be marked
on the record.
V. Another similar conditional estate, created by operation of law, for security
and satisfaction of debts, is called, an •estate by elegit. What an elegit [ • 161 ]
is, and why so called, will be explairred in the third part of these Commentaries. At present I need only mention that it is the name of a writ,
founded on the statute (e) of Westm. 2, by which, after a plaintiff has obtained
judgment for his debt at law, the sheriff gives him posseBB10n of one-half of the
defendant's lands and tenements, to be occupied and enjoyed until his debt and

no impeachment: Manndrell r. Maundrell, 10 Yes. 260; and, though the point has never

(d) &le Book I, c. 8.

called for decision, it has been said to be very doubtful, whether a third mortgagee, by taking

(t)

18 Edw. I, c. 18.

in the first mortgage, can exclude the second, if the first mortgagee, when he conveyed to

the third, knew of the second. Mackreth D. Symmons, 15 Yes. 335. Indisputably, a mort-

gagee purchasing the mortgagor's equity of redemption, or a /»ii.«Hr incumbranoer, cannot

set up a prior mortgage of his own, (nor, consequently, a mortgage which he has got hi)

against mesne incumbrances of which he had notice. Toulmin v. Steere, 3 Meriv. 224; Mocatta

p. Murgatroyd, 1 P. Wins. 393; Morret v. Paske, 2 Atk. 62. Upon analogous principles, if the

first mortgagee stood by, without disclosing his own incumbrance on the estate, when the

second mortgagee advanced his money, under the pursuasion that the estate was liable for no

prior debt; the first mortgagee, in just recompense of his fraudulent concealment, will be

postponed to the second. Ami the rule, as well as the reason, of division is the same, where

the mortgagor has gained any other advantage, iu subsequent dealings respecting the mort-

gaged estate, by the connivance of the mortgagee. Becket v. Cordley, 1 Br. 357; Berrisford v.

Milward, 2 Atk. 49. Part of this note is extracted from 2 Hoven'den on Frauds, 183, 196.]

The doctrine of tacking mortgages does not prevail in the United States. 4 Kent, 176. Here

a system of registry exists under which the records of a public office in the county or town in

which the lands lie are supposed to give full information of the grants or liens affecting a title,

and any one who has a deed or mortgage which he fails to put on record iu this office, is liable to

have his rights cut off by a subsequent deed or mortgage from the same grantor, provided

the grantee therein receives the same in good faith and for valuable consideration paid, and

gets it duly recorded. But such second grantee will not be protected if he actually knew of

the existence of the first conveyance at the time of receiving his own, or if he was notified

thereof. But a notice afterwards and before his conveyance is recorded will not defeat his

priority if he succeeds in getting his conveyance upon record first. 1 'Washb. Real Prop. 536,

537; 4 Kent, 173.
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in the first mortgage, can exclude the second, if the first mortgagee, when he conveyed to
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set up a prior mortgage of his own, (nor, consequently, a mortgage which he hall got in)
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v. Murgatroyd, 1 P . WmR. 393; .Morret v. Paske, 2 A.tk. 62. Upon analogous principles, if the
fir.it mortgagee stood by, without diwlosing his own incumbmnce on the estate, when the
second mortgagee advanced his money, under tho pursu~ion that the estate wa.~ liable for no
prior debt; the fir;it mortgagee, in ju~t recompense of his fraudulent concealment, will be
postponed to the second. And the rule, as well as the reason, of decision ifl the same, where
the mortgagor has gained e.ny other advantage, in subsequent dealings respecting the mort·
gaged ef!tste, by the connil"ance of the mortgagee. Becket v. Cordley, 1 Br. !l:>7; Berrisford lJ.
M:ifward, 2 Atk. 49. Part of this note iR extrl!-Cted from 2 Hovenden on Frauds, 183,. 196.)
The doctrine of taclrin~ mortgages doe:1 not prevail in the United State1:1. 4 Kent, 176. Hero
a s:ystem of registry exists under which the record1-1 of a public office in the county or town in
which the lands lie arc supposed to givo full information of the grants or lion:1 affecting a title,
and any one who h&i a deed or mortgage which he fails to put on record in this office, is liable to
have h1:-1 rights cut off by a subsequent deed or mortgage from the same grantor, provided
the ~ntee therein receives the same in good faith and for ve.lue.ble consideration paid, and
gets it duly recorded. But RUch 11ocond grantee will not be protected if he actually knew of
the existence of the 6.rst conveyance at the time of receiving hi:1 own, or if he wss notified
thereof. But a notice afterwards and before his conveyance is recorded will not defeat his
priority if he succeeds in getting his conveyance upon record firt!t. 1 Wai!hb. Real Prop. 536,
fJ"I; 4 Kent, 173.
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damages are fully paid: and during the time he so holds them, he is called

tenant by elegit. It is easy to observe, that this is also a mere conditional estate,

defeasible as soon as the debt is levied. Bat it is remarkable that the feudal re-

straints of alienating lands, and charging them with the debts of the owner,

were softened much earlier and much more effectually for the benefit of trade

and commerce, than for any other consideration. Before the statute of quia

emptores, (f) it is generally thought that the proprietor of lands was enabled to

alienate no more than a moiety of them: the statute therefore of Westm. 2,

permits only so much of them to be affected by the process of law, as a man was

capable of alienating by his own deed. But by the statute de mercatoribits

(passed in the same year) (g) the whole of a man's lands was liable to be

pledged in a statute merchant, for a debt contracted in trade; though only half

of them was liable to be taken in execution for any other debt of the owner. (19)

I shall conclude what I had to remark of these estates, by statute merchant*

statute staple, and elefjit, with the observation of Sir Edward Coke, (h) " These

tenants have uncertain interests in lands and tenements, and yet they have but

chattels and no freeholds;" (which makes them an exception to the general

rule) " because though they may hold an estate of inheritance, or for life, ut

liberum tenementum, until their debt be paid; yet it shall go to their executors:

for ut is similitudinary; and though to recover their estates, they shall have the

same remedy (by assize) an a tenant of the freehold shall have, (t) yet it is but

F *1621 ^e *similitude of a freehold, and nullum simile est idem." This indeed.
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*• * only proves them to be chattel interests, because they go to the execu-

tors, which is inconsistent with the nature of a freehold; but it does not assign

the reason why these estates, in contradistinction to other uncertain interests,

shall vest in the executors of the tenant and not the heir; which is probably owing

to this: that, being a security and remedy provided for personal debts due to

the deceased, to which debts the executor is entitled, the law has therefore thus

directed their succession; as judging it reasonable from a principle of natural

equity, that the security and remedy should be vested in those to whom the

debts if recovered would belong. For upon the same principle, if lands be de-

vised to a man's executor, until out of their profits the debts due from the

testator be discharged, this interest in the lands shall be a chattel interest, and

on the death of such executor shall eo to his executors: (k) because they, being

liable to pay the original testator's debts, so far as his assets will extend, are in

reason entitled to possess that fund out of which he has directed them to be paid.

CHAPTER XI.

OF ESTATES IN POSSESSION, REMAINDER, AND REVERSION.

HITHERTO we have considered estates solely with regard to their duration, or

the quantity of interest which the owners have therein. We are now to con-

sider them in another view; with regard to the time of their enjoyment, when

the actual pernancy of the profits (that is, the taking, perception, or receipt,

of the rents and other advantages arising therefrom) begins. Estates therefore

with respect to this consideration, may either be in possession, or in expectancy:

(f) 18 EUW. I. (g) 13 Edw. I (h) 1 Inst. 42. 4S.

(f) The words of the statute de mercatorOna are, •• jttiisse porter brefde novelt disseuine, auxi sii-um de

franktenementa.

(k) Co. Lltt. 42,

(19) The remedy by elegit has been greatly enlarged by recent statutes, which will be refer-

red to hereafter.
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Chap. 11.] ESTATES IN REMAINDER. 163

and of expectancies there are two sorts; one created by the act of the parties,

called a remainder; the other by act of law, and called a reversion. (1)

I. Of estates in possession (which are sometimes called estates executed,

whereby a present interest passes to and resides in the tenant, not depending on

any subsequent circumstance or contingency, as in the case of estates executory),

there is little or nothing peculiar to be observed. All the estates we have hith-

erto spoken of are of this kind; for, in laying down general rules, we usually

apply them to such estates as are then actually in the tenant's possession. But

the doctrine of estates in expectancy contains some of 'the nicest and most ab-

struse learning in the English law. These will therefore require a minute

discussion, and demand some degree of attention.

II. An estate then in remainder, may be defined to be an estate limited to

take effect and be enjoyed after another estate is determined.(2) *As if a r *jg^ -i

man seised in fee-simple granteth lands to A for twenty years, and, after *- J

the determination of the said term, then to B and his heirs forever: here A is

tenant for years, remainder to B in fee. In the first place, an estate for years is

created or carved out of the fee, and given to A; and the residue or remainder

of it is given to B. But both these interests are in fact only one estate; the

present term of years and the remainder afterwards, when added together, being

equal only to one estate in fee. (a) They are indeed different parts, but they

constitute only one whole; they are carved out of one and the same inheritance;

they are both created, and may both subsist, together; the one in possession,
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the other in expectancy. So if"land be granted to A for twenty years, and after

the determination of the said term to B for life; and after the determination of

B's estate for life, it be limited to C and his heirs forever; this makes A tenant

for years, with remainder to B for life, remainder over to C in fee. Now here

the estate of inheritance undergoes a division into three portions; there is first

A's estate for years carved out of it; and after that B's estate for life; and then

the whole that remains is limited to C and his heirs. And here also the first

estate, and both the remainders, for life and in fee, are one estate only; being

nothing but parts or portions of one entire inheritance; and if there were a

hundred remainders, it would still be the same thing; upon a principle grounded

in mathematical truth, that all the parts are equal, and no more than equal, to

the whole. And hence also it is easy to collect, that no remainder can be limited

after the grant of an estate in fee-simple: (b) because a fee-simple is the highest

and largest estate that a subject is capable of enjoying; and he that is tenant

in fee hath in him the whole of the estate; a remainder therefore, which is only

a portion, or residuary part, of the estate, cannot be reserved after the whole i's

disposed of. A particular estate, with all *the remainders expectant r +*»* -,

thereon, is only one fee-simple: as 40Z. is part of 100?. and 601. is the *- J

remainder of it; wherefore, after a fee-simple once vested, there can no more

be a remainder limited thereon, than, after the whole 100Z. is appropriated, there

can be any residue subsisting.

(aj Co. LIB. H3. (b) Plowd. 28. Vaugh. 269.

(1) An estate in possession exists where the owner is entitled to immediate possession; an

estate in expectancy is where the right to possession is postponed to a future period.

and of expect.anciee there are two eorte ; one created by the act of the parties,
called a remainder; the other by act of law, and ca.Bed a reversion. (1)
I. Of est.ates in possession (which are sometimes called estates executed,
whereby a present interest passes to and resides in the tenant, not depending on
any subsequent circumstance or contingency, as in the case of estates executory),
there is little or nothing peculiar to be observed. All the estates we have hitherto spoken of are of this kind; for, in laying down general rules, we usually
apply them to such estates as are then actually in the t.enant's possession. But
the doctrine of estates in expectancy contains some of 'the nicest and most abstruse learning in the English law. These will therefore require a minute
discussion, and demand some degree of att.ention.
II. An estate then in remainder, may be defined to be an estate limited to
take effect and be enjoyed after another estate is determined.(2) *As if a [ • 164 ]
man seised in fee-simple granteth lands to A for twenty years, and, after
the determination of the said term, then to B and his heirs forever : here A is
tenant for years, remainder to Bin fee. In the first place, an estate for years is
created or carved out of the fee, and ~iven to A; and the residue or remainder
of it is given to B. But both these mterests are in fact only one e.state; the
present t.enn of years and the remainder afterwards, when added together, being
equal only to one estate in fee. (a) They are indeed different parts, but they
constitute only one whole; they are carved out of one and the same inheritance;
they a.re both created, and may both subsist, together; the one in possession,
the other in expectancy. So if land be granted to A for twenty years, and after
the determination of the said term to B for life ; and after the det.ennination of
B's estate for life, it be limited to C and his heirs forever; this makes A tenant
for years, with remainder to B for life, remainder over to C in fee. Now here
the estate of inheritance undergoes a division into three portions; there is first
A's estate for years carved out of it; and after that B's estate for life; and then
the whole that remains is limited to 0 and his heirs. And here also the fil'Bt
estate, and both the remainders, for life and in fee, are one estate only ; being·
nothing but ~arts or portions of one entire inheritance; and if there were a
hundred remamders, it would still be the same thing; upon a principle grounded
in mathematical truth, that all the parts are equal, and no more than equal, to
the whole. And hence also it is easy to collect, that no remainder can be limited
after the grant of an est.ate in fee-simple: (b) because a fee-simple is the highest
and largest estate that a subject is capable of enjoying; and he that is t.enant
in fee ha.th in him the whole of the e.state; a remainder therefore, which is only
a portion, or residuary part, of the estate, cannot be reserved after the whole 2s
disposed of. A particular estate, with all *the remainders expectant [ • 165 ]
thereon, is only one fee-simple: as 401. is part of 1001. and 601. is the
remainder of it; wherefore, after a fee-simple once vested, there can no more
be a remainder limited thereon, than, after the whole 1001. is appropriated, there
can be any residue subsisting.

A remainder is a future estate, to take effect in possession on the determination of a precedent »

(a) Co. Utt. 143.

estate which is created by the same instrument. It is a vested remainder when there is a person

(b) Plowd. !II.

Vaugh. 969.

in being who would have an immediate right to possession upon the ceasing of the precedent

estate. It is a contingent remainder if the person to whom, or the event upon which it is lim-

ited, is uncertain.

A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor, or in the heirs of a testator, and to

which he or they will succeed in possession on the determination of a particular estate granted

or devised by him.

(2) The law regarding remainders has been much changed by statutes in some of the Ameri-

can stateti. and without attempting to point out the changes specifically, the reader is referred to

the 57th Lecture of Chancellor Kent, and to 2Washb. on Real Property, 264. The author last

named gives references to the statutes of the several states.
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(1) .An estate in possession exists where the owner is entitled to immediate possession; an ·
estate in e:tpectancy is where the right to possession is postponed to a future period.
.
.A remainder is a future estate, to take effect in possession on the determination of a precedent~
estate which is created by the same instrument. It is a vested remainder when there is a person
in being who would have an immediate right to possession upon the ceasing of the precedent
estate. It is a contingent remainder if thl! perl!On to whom, or the event upon which it is limited, is uncertain.
A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor1 or in the heirs of a testator, and to
which he or they will succeed in pot!80t!sion on the detenmnation of a pa.rticular estate granted
or del"ised by him.
(2) The law re~arding remainders has been much changed by statutes in some of the American state~. and without attempting to point out the changes specific"lly, the reader is referred to
the 57th Lecture of Chancellor Kent, and to 2 Washb. on Real Property, 264. The author last
na.rued gives reference~ to the l!tatutes of the several states.
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Thus much being premised, we shall be the better enabled to comprehend the

rules that are laid down by law to be observed in the creation of remainders,

and the reasons upon which those rules are founded.

1. And, first, there must necessarily be some particular estate precedent to

the estate in remainder, (c) As, an estate for years to A, remainder to B for

life; or, an estate for life to A, remainder to B in tail. This precedent estate is

called the particular estate, as being only a small part, orparticula, of the in-

heritance ; the residue or remainder of which is granted over to another. The

necessity of creating this preceding particular estate, in order to make a good

remainder, arises from this plain reason: that remainder is a relative expression,

and implies that some part of the thing is previously disposed of; for where the

whole is conveyed at once, there cannot possibly exist a remainder; but the

interest granted, whatever it be, will be an estate in possession.

An estate created to commence at a distant period of time, without any inter-

vening estate, is therefore properly no remainder; it is the whole of the gift,

and not a residuary part. And such future estates can only be made of chat-

tel interests, which were considered in the light of mere contracts by the ancient

law, (d) to be executed either now or hereafter, as the contracting parties should

agree; but an estate of freehold must be created to commence immediately.

For it is an ancient rule of the common law, that an estate of freehold cannot

be created to commence in futuro ; but it ought to take effect presently either

F *166 1 ™ Posse88'011 or remainder; (e) because at *common law no freehold in
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•- J lands could pass without livery of seisin; which must operate either

immediately, or not at all. It would therefore be contradictory, if an estate,

which is not to commence till hereafter, could be granted by a conveyance which

imports an immediate possession. Therefore, though a lease to A for seven

years, to commence from next Michaelmas, is good; yet a conveyance to B of

lands, to hold to him and his heirs forever from the end of three years next

ensuing, is void.(3) So that when it is intended to grant an estate of freehold,

whereof the enjoyment shall be deferred till a future time, it is necessary to

create a previous particular estate, which may subsist till that period of time is

completed; and for the grantor to deliver immediate possession of the land to

the tenant of this particular estate, which is construed to be giving possession

to him in remainder, since his estate and that of the particular tenant are one

and the same estate in law. As, where one leases to A for three years, with

remainder to B in fee, and makes livery of seisin to A; hereby the livery of the

freehold is immediately created, and vested in B, during the continuance of A's

term of years. The whole estate passes at once from the grantor to the grantees,

and the remainder-man is seised of his remainder at the same time that the

termor is possessed of his term. The enjoyment of it must indeed be deferred

till hereafter; but it is to all intents and purposes an estate commencing t'n

prcesenti, though to be occupied and enjoyed in futuro.

As no remainder can be created without such a precedent particular estate,

therefore the particular estate is said to support the remainder. But a lease at

will is not held to be such a particular estate as will support a remainder over. (/")

For an estate at will is of a nature so slender and precarious that it is not

looked upon as a portion of the inheritance; and a portion must first be taken

out of it, in order to constitute a remainder. Besides, if it be a freehold

remainder, livery of seisin must be given at the time of its creation; and the

r *, 6~ -• entry o*f the grantor to do this determines the estate at will *in the very

*• J instant in which it is made: (g) or if the remainder be a chattel interest,

(c) Co. LItt. 49. Plowd. 25 (d) It;iym. 151. (e) 5 Rep. M, (f) 8 Rep. 75. (g) Dyer, 18.

(3) This doctrine, however, does not apply to conveyances having operation under the statute

of uses; such as bargain and sale, covenant to stand seized, <tc., under which the use, until the

time limited, will result to the bargainer and his heirs. And by statute in many of the Amer-

ican states the rule as stated iu the text is abolished or essentially modified. See 2 Washb. Real

Thus much being premised, we shall be the better enabled to comprehend the
rules that are laid down by law to be observed in the creation of rema.inde~
and the reasons upon which those rules a.re founded.
1. And, first, there must necessarily be some particular estate precedent to
the estate in remainder. (c) As, an estate for years to A, remainder to B for
life; or, an estate for life to A, remainder to B in tail. This precedent estate is
called the particular estate, as being only a small part, or particula, of the inheritance; the residue or remainder of which is granted over to another. The
necessity of creating this preceding particular estate, in order to make a good
remainder, arises from this plain reason : that remainder is a relative expression,
and implies that some pa.rt of the thing is previously disposed of; for where the
whole is conveyed at once, there cannot possibly exist a remainder; but the
interest granted, whatever it be, will be an estate in possession.
An estate created to commence at a distant period of time, without any intervening estate, is therefore properly no remainder; it is the whole of the gift,
and not a residuary pa.rt. And such future estates can only be made of chattel interests, which were considered in the light of mere contracts by the ancient
law, (d) to be executed either now or hereafter, as the contracting parties shou Id
agree; but an estate of freehold must be created to commence immediately.
J.'or it is an ancient rule of the common law, that an estate of freehold cannot
be created to commence in futuro; but it ought to take effect presently dther
[ • 166 ] in possession or remainder; (e) because at •common law no freehold in
lands could pass without livery of seisin; which must o~rate either
immediately, or not at all. It would therefore be contradictory, if an estate,
which is not to commence till hereafter, could be granted by a conveyance which
imports an immediate possession. Therefore, though a lease to A for seven
years, to commence from next Michaelmas, is good; yet a conveyance to B of
lands, to hold to him and his heirs forever from the end of three yea.rs next
ensuing, is void.(3) So that when it is intended to grant an estate of freehold,
whereof the enjoyment shall be deferred till a future time, it is necessary to
create a previous particular estate, which may subsist till that period of time is
completed; and for the grantor to deliver immediate possession of the land to
the tenant of this particular estate, which is construed to be giving possession
to him in remainder, since his estate o.nd that of the particular tenant are one
and the same estate in law. As, where one leases to A for three years, with
remainder to Bin fee, nnd makes livery of seisin to .A; hereby the livery of the
freehold is immediately created, and vested in B, during the continuance of A's
term of years. The whole estate passes at once from the grantor to the grantres,
and the remainder-man is seisl'd of his remainder at the same time that the
termor is possessed of his term. The enjoyment of it must indeed be deferred
till hereafter; but it is to all intents and/urposes an estate commencing in
prmsenti, though to be occupied and enjoye in futuro.
As no rema.mder can be created without such a precedent particular estate,
therefore the particular estate is said to support the remainder. But a lease at
will is not held to be such a particular estate as will support a remainder over. (f)
For an estate at will is of a nature so slender and precarious that it is not
looked upon as a portion of the inheritance; and a portion must first be taken
ont of it, in order to constitute a remainder. Besides, if it be a freehold
remainder, livery of seisin must be given at the time of its creation; and the
[ *l67 ] entry of the grantor to do tliis determines the estate at wiJl *in the Yery
instant in which it is made: (g) or if the remainder be a chattel interest,
(c) Co. Litt. '9.

Plowd. 25

(d)

Raym. 161.

(e) tl

Rep. 9',

(f) 8 Rep. 75.

(g) Dyer, 18..

Prop. 264.
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though perhaps the deed of creation might operate as a future contract, if tho

tenant for years be a party to it, yet it is void by way of remainder: for it is ;i

separate, independent contract, distinct from the precedent estate at will; and

every remainder must be part of one and the same estate, out of which the pre-

ceding particular estate is taken, (h) And hence it is generally true, that if the

particular estate is void in its creation, or by any means is defeated afterwards,

the remainder supported thereby shall be defeated also: (i) (4) as where the par-

ticular estate is an estate for the life of a person not in esse; (k) or an estate for

life upon condition, on breach of which condition the grantor enters and avoids

the estate; (I) in either of these cases the remainder over is void.

SJ. A second rule to be observed is this; that the remainder must commence

or pass out of the grantor at the time of the creation of the particular estate, (m)

As, where there is an estate to A for life, with remainder to B in fee: here B's

remainder in fee passes from the gran tor at the same time that seisin is delivered

to A of his life estate in possession. And it is this which induces the necessity

at common law of livery of seisin being made on the particular estate, whenever

a freehold remainder is created. For, if it be even limited on an estate for years,

it is necessary that the lessee for years should have livery of seisin, in order to

convey the freehold from and out of the grantor, otherwise the remainder is

void, (n) Not that the livery is necessary to strengthen the estate for years;

but, as livery of the land is requisite to convey the freehold, and yet cannot be

given to him in remainder without infringing the possession of the lessee for
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years, therefore the law allows such livery, made to the tenant of the particular

estate, to relate and inure to him in remainder, as both are but one estate in

law. (o)

*3. A third rule respecting remainders is this: that the remainder r ~ 6g -•

must vest in the grantee during the continuance of the particular estate, <- *

or eo instanti that it determines. (p) (5} As, if A be tenant for life, remainder to

B in tail: here B's remainder is vested in him, at the creation of the particular

estate to A for life: or if A and B be tenants for their joint lives, remainder to

the survivor in fee; here, though during their joint lives, the remainder is

vested in neither, yet on the death of either of them, the remainder vests

instantly in the survivor: wherefore both these are good remainders. But, if

an estate be limited to A for life, remainder to the eldest son of B in tail, and

A dies before B hath any son; here the remainder will be void, for it did not

vest in any one during the continuance, nor at the determination, of the par-

ticular estate: and even supposing that B should afterwards have a son, he shall

not take by this remainder; for as it did not vest at or before the end of the

particular estate, it never can vest at all, but is gone forever, (q) And this depends

upon the principle before laid down, that the precedent particular estate, and

the remainder, are one estate in law; they must therefore subsist and be in

esse at one and the same instant of time, either during the continuance of the

first estate, or at the very instant when that determines, so that no other estate

can possibly come between them. For there can be no intervening estate between

the particular estate and the remainder supported thereby :(r) the thing supported

must fall to the ground, if once its support be severed from it. (6)

(M Baym. 151. (<) Co. Utt. 298. (k) 2 Roll. Abr. 416.

(1)1 Jon. 68. (m, Lltt. i 671. Plowd. 23. (n) Utt. J 60. (o) Co. Utt. 49..

(p)Plowd. 25. 1 !!(•['. -''- (g)l Rep. 138. (rj 3 Rep. 2l.

though perhaps the deed of creation might operate as a future contract, if rho
tenant for years be a party to it, yet it is void by way of remainder: for it is a
separate, independent contract, distinct from the precedent estate at will; and
every remainder must be part of one and the same estate, out of which the preceding particular estate is taken. ( h) And hence it is generally true, that if the
particular estate is void in its creation, or by any means is defeated afterwards,
the remainder supported thereby shall be defeated also: (i) (4) as where the particular estate is an estate for the life ofa person not in esse; (k) or an estate for
life upon condition, on breach of which condition the grantor enters and avoids
the estate; (l) in either of these cases the remainder over is void.
:l. A second rule to be observed is this; that the remainder must commence
or pass out of the grantor at the time of the creation of the particular estate. (m)
As, where there is an eatate to A for life, with remainder to B in fee: here B's
remainder in fee passe3 from the ~ntor at the same time that seisin is delivered
to A of his life estate in possession. And it is this which induces the necessity
at common law of livery of seisin being made on the particular estate, whenever
a freehold remainder is created. For, if it be even limited on an estate for years,
it is necessary that the lessee for years should have livery of seisin, in order to
convey the freehold from and ont of the grantor, otherwise the remainder is
void. (n) Not that the livery is necessary to strengthen the estate for years;
but, as livery of the land is requisite to convey the freehold, and yet cannot be
given to him in remainder without infringing the possession of the lessee for
years, therefore the law allows such livery, made to the tenant of the particular
estate, to relate ancl inure to him in remainder, as both are but one estate in
law. (o)
•3. A third rule respectin~ remainders is this: that the remainder • 16 ]
8
must vest in the grantee durmg the continuance of the particular estate, [
or eo imtmiti that it determines. ( p) (5) As, if A be tenant for life, remainder to
B in tail : here B's remainder is vested in him, at the creation of the particular
estate to A for life: or if A and B be tenants for their joint lives, remainder to
the survivor in fee; here, though during their joint lives, the remainder is
vested in neither, yet on the death of either of them, the remainder vests
instantly in the survivor: wherefore both these are good remainders. But, if
an estate be limited to A for life, remainder to the eldest son of B in tail, and
A dies before B ha.th any son ; here the remainder will be void, for it did not
vest in any one during the continuance, nor at the determination, of the particular estate : and even supposing that B should afterwards have a son, he shall
not take by this remainder; for as it did not vest at or before the end of the
particular estate, it never can vest at all~ but is gone forever. (q) And this depends
upon the principle before laid down, that the precedent particular estate, and
the remainder, are one est.ate in law; they must therefore subsist and be in
esse at one and the same instant of time, either during the continuance of the
first estate, or at the very instant when that determines, so that no other estate
can possibly come between them. For there can be no intervening estate between
the particular estate and the remainder supported thereby:(r) the thing supported
must fall to the ground, if once its support be severed from it. (6)

(4) It is provided otherwise by statute in several of the United States. 2 Washb. Real

Prop. 266.

(5) This rule is also changed by statute in some of the states. See 4 Kent, 246.

(~l Raym. J.ijl.
(i) Co. Litt.~.
Ck) 2 Roll. Abr. 41.ij.
(l) 1 Jon. 118.
(111 1 Litt. t 671. Plowd. ~.
(n) Litt. t 60.
(pl Plowd. 25. l Rep. 26.
(q) 1Rep.138.
(rJ S Rep. 91.

(o)

Co. Litt. 49..

(6) [By the feudal law, the freehold could not be vacant, or, as it was termed, m abeyance.

There must have been a tenant _ to fulfill the feudal duties or returns, and against whom the

rights of others might be mafntained. If the tenancy once became vacant, though but for

one instant, tho lord was warranted in entering on the lands; and the moment the particular

estate ended, by thn cession of the tenancv, f*U limitations of that estate were also at an end.

From these principles nre deduced the rules, that no freehold remainder can be well created,

unless it is supported by an immediate estate of freehold, vested in some person actually in

443

(4) It is provided otherwise by statute in several of the United States. 2 Washb. Real
Prup. 266.
(5) ThiR rule is also changed by Rtatute in some of the states. See 4 Kent, 246.
.
(6) [Dy the feudal law, the freehold could not be vacant, or, as it was termedf In abeyance.
There must have been a tenant to fulfill the feudal dutie1:1 or returns, and against whom the
rig-ht~ of other8 might be m1>i'ntaioed. If the tcnancv once became vacant, though bot for
one h1stant, the lord w1l.'> warranted in ent~ring on the fands ; and the moment the partienla.r
estate ('nded, by thn t"e~.<ion of the tenuncY, ltll limitations of that estate wero altto at e.n end.
From ther;e principlt-;i are deduce<l the rnfe~, that no freehold remainder can be well created,
uule~~ it i~ ~upport<•tl hr au innnl'dinte e~tat<l of freehold, Yested in some person l\Ctue.lly in
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It is upon these rules, but principally the last, that the doctrine of contingent

remainders depends. For remainders are either vested or contingent. Vested

remainders (or remainders executed, whereby a present interest passes to the

party, though to be enjoyed in futuro) are where the estate is invariably fixed,

F*169l *° rema"1 *° a determinate person, after the *particular estate is spent

' J As if A be tenant for twenty years, remainder to B in fee; here B's is a

vested remainder, which nothing can defeat or set aside.

Contingent or executory remainders (whereby no present interest passes) are

where the estate in remainder is limited to take effect, either to a dubious and

uncertain person, or upon a dubious and uncertain event; so that the particular

estate may chance to be determined, and the remainder never take effect. («) (7)

First, they may be limited to a dubious and uncertain person. As if A be

tenant for life, with remainder to B's eldest son (then unborn) in tail; this is a

contingent remainder, for it is uncertain whether B will have a son or no: but

the instant that a son is born, the remainder is no longer contingent, but

vested. Though, if A had died before the contingency happened, that is, before

B's son was born, the remainder would have been absolutely gone; for the par-

ticular estate was determined before the remainder could vest. Nay, by the

strict rule of law, if A were tenant for life, remainder to his own eldest son in tail,

and A died without issue born, but leaving his wife enseint, or big with child,

and after his death a posthumous son was born, this son could not take the land

by virtue of this remainder; for the particular estate determined before there
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was any person in esse, in whom the remainder could vest, (t) But, to remedy

this hardship, it is enacted by statute 10 and 11 Win. Ill, c. 16, that posthumous

children shall be capable of taking in remainder, in the same manner as if they

had been born in their father's lifetime: that is, the remainder is allowed to vest

in them, while yet in their mother's womb, (u) (8)

(•) Ibid. 20. («) Salk. 228. « Hod. 283. («) See Book I, p. 130.

existence, who may answer the prtecipe of strangers; and also, that it is necessary the remain-

der should take effect during the existence of such particular estate, or eo inttanti that it

determines. "Watk. on Conv. 94. But, as to a contingent remainder for years, there does not

It is upon these rules, but princip11.lly the last, that the doctrine of contingent
remainders depends. For remainders are either vested or contingent. Vukd
remainders (or remainders executed, whereby a present interest p888es to the
party, though to be enjoyed in /uturo) are where the estate is inTariably tixed,
{ • 169 ] to remain to a determinate person. after the •particular estate is spent.
As if A be tenant for twenty years, remainder to B in fee; here B's is a
vested remainder, which nothin~ can defeat or set aside.
Contingent or executory remamders (whereby no present interest passes) are
where the estate in remainder is limited to take effect, either to a dubious and
uncertain person, or upon a dubious and uncertain event; so that the particular
estate may chance to be determined, and the remainder never take effect. (s) (7)
First, they may be limit.00 to a dubious and uncertain person. As if A be
tenant for life, with remainder to B's eldest son (then unborn) in tail; this is a
contingent remainder, for it is uncertain whether B will have a son or no : but
the instant that a son is born, the remainder is no longer contingent, but
vest.00. Though, if A had died before the contingency happened, that is, before
B's son was born, the remainder would have been absolutely gone; for the particular estate was determined before the remainder could vest. Nay, by the
strict rule of law, if A were tenant for life, remainder to his own eldest son in tail,
and A died without issue born, but leaving his wife enseint, or big with child,
and after his death a posthumous son was born, this son could not take the land
by virtue of this remainder; for the particular estate determined before there
was any person in use, in whom the remainder could vest. (t) But, to remedy
this hardship, it is enacted by statute 10 and 11 Wm. III, c. 16, that posthumous
children shall be capable of taking in remainder, in the same manner as if they
had been born in their father's lifetime: that is, the remainder iB allowed to vest
in them, while yet in their mother's womb. (u) (8)
(CJ Salk. 228. 4 Mod. 2811.
(U) See Book I, p. 130.
<•l Ibid. to.

appear to be any necessity for a preceding freehold to support it. For, the remainder not

being freehold, no such estate appears requisite to pass out of the grantor, in order to give

effect to a remainder of that sort. And although every contingent freehold remainder must

be supported by a preceding freehold, yet it is not necessary that such preceding estate con-

tinue in the actual sfi-.ii/ of its rightful tenant; it is sufficient if there subsists a right to such

preceding estate, at the time the remainder should vest; provided such right shall be a present

right of entry, and not a right of action only. A right of entry implies the undoubted sub-

sistence of the estate; but when a right of action only remains, it then becomes a question

of law whether the same estate continues or not: till that question be determined, upon the

action brought, another estate is acknowledged and protected by the law. See Fearne, oh. 3.

Where the legal estate is vested iu trustees, that will be sufficient to support the limitations

of contingent remainders: see post, pp. 171, 172; and there will be no necessity for any

other particular estate of freehold; nor need the remainders vest at the time when the pre-

ceding trust limitations expire. Habergham ». Vincent, 2 Ves. Jun. 233; Gale ». Gale, 2 Coi,

153; Hopkins «. Hopkins, Ca. Temp. Talb. 151.]

(7) [See in general the celebrated work of Fearne on Contingent Remainders and Executory

Devises, edited by Butler; 2 Cruise Dig. 270.

A contingent remainder is a remainder limited so as to depend on an event or condition

which may never happen or be performed, or which may not happen or be performed till

after the determination of the preceding estate; for if the preceding estate (unless it be a term)

determine before such event or condition happens, the remainder will never take effect

Fearne ('mil. Bern. 3; Bridgm. index, title Remainder.]

It is not the uncertainty of enjoyment in future, but the uncertainty of the right to that

enjoyment which marks the difference between a vested and contingent interest. 4 Kent, 806;

2 Washb. Real Prop. 242>

(8) [The case of Reeve v. Long, 1 Salk. 227, which gives occasion to the statute mentioned

in the text, was to the following purport:

John Long devised lands to his nephew, Henry, for life, remainder to his first and other

sons in tail, remainder to his nephew, Richard, for life, <fcc. Henry died without issue born,

but leaving his wife pregnant. Richard entered as in his remainder, and afterwards ft

posthumous son of Henry was born. The guardian of the infant entered upon Richard: and

existence, who may answer the prrecipe of strangers ; and also, that it is necessary the remainder should take effect during the existence of such particular estate, or eo iMta7'ti that it
det.ermines. Watk. on Con\". 94. But, as to o. contingent remainder for years, there does not
apJ_1ear to be any necessity for a preceding freehold to support it. For, the remainder not
bemg freehold, no such estat.e appears requisit.e to p888 out of the gnwtor. in order to give
effect to a remainder of that sort. And although every contingent freehold remainder mu~t
be supported by o. preceding freehold, yet it is not nece88a?'Y that such preceding estate continue in the actuo.l seisin of its rightful t.enant; it is sufficient if there sub11Ms a right to such
preceding estate, at the time the remainder should vest; prorided such right shall be a present
right of entry, and not a right of action only. .A right of entry impliet! the undoubted subsistence of the eat.ate; but when a right of action only remains, it then becomes a question
of law whether the Aame estat.e continues or not : till that question be dot.ermined, upon the
action brought, another estate iA acknowledged and :erot.ected by the law. See Feame, ch. 3.
Where the legal estate is vested in trustees, that will be sufficient to support the limitations
of contingent remainders: see pm1t, pp. 171, 172; and there will be no necessity for any
other particular estat.e of freehold ; nor need the remainders vest at the time when the preceding trus~ limitation~ expjre. Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Jun. 233; Gale~. Gale, 2 Cox,
153; Hopkins v. Hopkins, Ca. Tomp. Talh. till.]
(7) [See in general the celebmted work of Fearne on Contingent Remainders and Exeoutory
Devises, edited by Butler ; 2 CruiRo Di~. 270.
·
A. contingent remo.inder is a remamder limit.ed so as to depend on an event or condition
which may never happen or be performed, or which may not happen or be performed till
after the determination of the preceding estate; for if the preceding eRtat.e (unless it be a term)
dot.ermine IJefore such event or condition happens, the remainder will never take etftoet,
F'earne Cont. Rem. 3 ; Bridgm. index, title Remainder.]
It is not the uncertainty of e11joyment in future, but the uncertainty of the right to that
enjoyment which mo.rks tho difference between a vested and contingent int.erest. 4 Kent, 206;
2 Washb. Real Prop. 242,
{8) [The case of Reeve v. famg, 1 Salk. 'm, which gives occasion to the statute mentioned
in the t.ext, was to the following purport :
John Long devised lands to hii:t nephew, Henry, for life, remainder to his first and other
BODS in tail, remainder to hiR nephew, Richard, for life, &c. Henry died without i1M1ue born,
but leaving hi<1 wife pregnant. Richard entered as in hie remainder, and afterwards a
J!OBthumous son of Henry wM born. The guardian of the infant entered upon Richard : and
it was held by the court.'> of common pleas and of king's bench, that nothing vested in the
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This species of contingent remainders to a person not in being, mnst however

be limited to some one, that may by common possibility, or potentia propinqua,

be in esse at or before the particular estate determines, (w) As if an estate be

*made to A for life, remainder to the heirs of B; now, if A dies before r *i »Q -i

B, the remainder is at end; for during B's life he has no heir, nemo est *• J

hceres viventis: but if B dies first, the remainder then immediately vests in his

heir, who will be entitled to the land on the death of A. This is a good contin-

gent remainder, for the possibility of B's dying before A is potentia propinqua,

and therefore allowed in law. (x) But a remainder to the right heirs of B (if

there be no such person as B in esse), is void, (y) For here there must two

contingencies happen; first, that such a person as B shall be born; and,

secondly, that he shall also die during the continuance of the particular estate;

which makes it potentia remotissima, a most improbable possibility. (9) A

remainder to a man's eldest son, who hath none (we have seen) is good, for by

common possibility he may have one; but if it be limited in particular to his

son John, or Richard, it is bad, if he have no son of that name; for it is too

remote a possibility that he should not only have a son, but a son of a particular

name.(z) A limitation of a remainder to a bastard before it is born, is not

good: (a) (10) for though the law allows the possibility of having bastards, it

presumes it to be a very remote and improbable contingency. Thus may a

remainder be contingent, on account of the uncertainty of the person who is to

take it.
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A remainder may also be contingent, where the person to whom it is limited

is fixed and certain, but the event upon which it is to take effect is vague and

uncertain. As, where land is given to A for life, and in case B survives him,

then with the remainder to B in fee; here B is a certain person, but the remainder

to him is a contingent remainder, depending upon a dubious event, the uncer-

tainty of his surviving A. During the joint lives of A and B it is contingent;

and if B dies first, it never can vest in his heirs, but is forever gone; but if A

dies first, the remainder to B becomes vested.

fa) 2 Rep. 81. (x) Co. Lltt 378. (y) Hob. 88. fzJSBep. 61. CaJCro.Ellz.fi09.

posthumous son, because a contingent remainder mast vest during the particular estate, or at the

moment of its determination.

This species of contingent remainders to a person not in being, must however
be limited to some one, that may by common possibility, or pote'Jitia propinqua;
be in esse at or before the particular estate determines. (w) As if an estate be
*made to A for life, remainder to the heirs of B; now, if A dies before [ • 170 ]
B, the remainder is at end; for during B's life he bas no heir, nemo est
luBres viventis: but if B dies first, the remainder then immediately vests in bis
heir, who will be entitled to the land on the dee.th of A. This is a. good contingent remainder, for the possibility of B's dyin~ before A is potentia prapinqua,
and therefore allowed in law. (x) But a remamder to the right heirs of B (if
there be no such person as B in esse), is void. (y) For here there must two
contingencies happen; first, that such a person as B shall be born; and,
secondly, that he shall also die during the continuance of the particular estate;
which makes it potentia t•emotissima, a most improbable possibility. (9) A
remainder to a man's eldest son, who hath none (we have seen) is good, for by
common possibility he may have one; but if it be limited in particular to his
son John, or Richard, it is bad, if he have no son of that name; for it is too
remote a possibility that he should not only have a son, but a son of a particular
name.(z) A limitation of a remainder to a baste.rd before it is born, is not
good: (a) (10) for though the law allows the possibility of having bastards, it
presumes it to be a very remote and improbable contingency. Thus may a
remainder be contingent, on account of the uncertainty of the person who is to
take it.
A remainder may also be contingent, where the person to whom it is limited
is fixed and certain, but the event upon which it is to take effect is vague and
uncertain. As, where land is given to A for life, and in case B survives him,
then with the remainder to Bin fee; here Bis a certain person, but the remainder
to him is a contingent remainder, depending upon a dubious event, the uncertaintl. of his surviving A. During the joint lives of A and B it is contingent;
and 1f B dies first, it never can vest in his heirs, but is forever gone; but if A
dies first, the remainder to B becomes vested.
(to) 2 Bep.111.

(Z) Co. Litt. 378.

('/)Hob . 83.

(•) 6 Rep. 61.

(a)

Gro. Eliz. ll09.

On an appeal to the house of lords, this judgment was reversed, against the opinion of all

the judges, who were much dissatisfied. 3 Lev. 408. To set the question at rest, the statute

was passed. Mr. Cruise, 2 Dig. 330, however remarks, it is somewhat singular that this statute

does not mention limitations or devises by will. But, he says, there is a tradition, that as the

case of Reeve v. Long, arose upon a will, the lords considered the law to have been settled by

their determination in that case, and were therefore unwilling to make any express mention of

limitations made in wills, lest it should appear to call in question the authority or propriety of

their determination. " Besides " he adds, " the words of the act may be construed, without

much violence, to comprise settlements of estates made by wills, as well as by deeds."

A posthumous child, claiming under a remainder in a settlement, is entitled to the inter-

mediate profits from the death oi the father, an well as to the estate itself. Basset v. Basset, 3

Atk. 203; Telluson v. Woodford, 11 Yes. 139. But aposthumous son, who succeeds by descent,

can claim the rents and profits only from the time of his birth. Qoodtitle v. Newman, 3 WiU

5^6; Co. Litt. 11, b, note 4.]

(9) [It is not merely there being two contingencies to happen, or what Lord Coke calls a

possibility on a possibility, in order to the vesting of the estate, which will make the possi-

bility too remote, but there must be some legal improbability in the contingencies. Mr. But-

ler mentions a case, Rontledge ». Dorril, 2 Yes. Jun. 357, where limitations of a money fund

•were held valid, and yet to entitle one of the objects to take under it. 1st. The husband and

wife must have had a child; 2d. That child must have had a child; 3d. The last-mentioned

child must have been alive at the decease of the survivor of his grandfather and grandmother;

4th. If a boy he must have attained twenty-one, if a girl, that age or married. Feame Con.

Kern. 251, n. c. 7th ed.]

(10) [This rule with respect to illegitimate children is not founded on any notion of the

improbability of the event of such children being bom, but rather on the policy of the law,

and the maxim that a bastard cannot with certainty be ascertained to be the issue of a par-

ticular man, and can only take, as such, under a gift made after he has become known by reputa-

tion as the child of that man. 17 Yea, 631; 1 Meriv. 153; 1 Sim. and Stu. 81; 1 Yes. and

posthumous son, because a contingent remainder must vest during the particular estate, or at the
moment of its determination.
On an appeal to the houi;e of lords, this judgment was reversed, against the opinion of all
the judges, who were much dissatiafied. 3 Lev. 408. To set the question at rest, the statute
was passed. Mr: Cruise, 2 Dig. 330, however remarks, it is somewhat singular that this statute
d06il not mention limitationt1 or devises by will. But, he says, there is a tradition, that as the
case of Reeve "· Long, arose upon a will, the lords considered the law to have been settled b1
their determination in that case, and were therefore unwilling to make any express mention o
limitation.~ made in wills, leRt it should appear to call in qne11tion the authority or propriety of
their determination. " Besides " he adds, " the words of the act may be oonstrned, without
much violence, to comprise Mettlemcuts of estates made by wills, as well as by deeds."
A posthumous child, claimin~ under a remainder in a settlemen~, is entitled to the inter~
mediate profits from the death ot the father, as well as to the estate itself. Basset fl. B&AAet, 3
Atk. 203; Telluson fl. Woodford, 11 Veil. 139. But a posthumous son, who succeeds by deACent,
can claim the rents and profits only from tho time of his birth. Goodtitle fl. Newman, 3 Wils.
;,~; Co. Litt. 11, b, note 4.]
(9) flt is not merely there being two contingencies to happen, or what Lord Coke calls a
posRi.bility on a possibility, in order to the vesting of the estate, which will make the possibility too remote, but there must be some legal improbability in the contingencies. Mr. Butler mentions a case, Routledge v. Dorri!, 2 Ves. Jun. 357, where limiUJ.tions of a money fund
wore held valid, and yet to entitle one of the objects to take nuder it. 1st. The husband and
wife must have had a child; 2d. That child must have had a child; 3d. The la.st-mentioned
child must have been alive at the decease of the survivor of his grandfather and grandmother;
4th. If a boy he must have attained twenty-one, if a girl, that age or married. ~'earne Con.
Rem. 251, n. c. 7th ed.]
(10) [This rule with respect to illegitimate children is not founded on any notion of the
improbability of the event of such children bein~ born, but rather on the policy of the law,
and the maxim that a bastard cannot with certainty be ascertained to be the issue of a particular man, and can only take, as ~uch, undera gift made after he has become known by reputation as the child of that man. 17 Ves. 631; 1 Meriv. 153; 1 Sim. and Stu. 81; 1 Ves. and
B. 44{j,
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F*1711 *Contingent remainder*, of either kind, if they amount to a freehold,

*• J cannot be limited on an estate for years, or any other particular estate,

less than a freehold. Thus if land be granted to A for ten years, with remainder

in fee to the right heirs of B, this remainder is void; (b) but if granted to A

for life, with like remainder, it is good. For, unless the freehold passes out of

the grantor at the time when the remainder is created, such freehold remainder

is void: it cannot pass out of him, without vesting somewhere; and in the case

of a contingent remainder it must vest in the particular tenant, else it can vest

nowhere; unless, therefore, the estate of such particular tenant be of a freehold

nature, the freehold cannot vest in him, and consequently the remainder is

void.

Contingent remainders may be defeated by destroying or determining the par-

ticular estate upon which they depend, before the contingency happens whereby

they become vested, (c) Therefore when there is tenant for life, with divers

remainders in contingency, he may, not only by his death, but by alienation,

surrender, or other methods, destroy and determine his own life-estate before

any of those remainders vest; the consequence of which is, that he utterly

defeats them all. (11) As, if there be tenant for life, with remainder to hfa

eldest son unborn in tail, and the tenant for life, before any son is born, sur-

renders his life estate, he by that means defeats the remainder in tail to his son :

for his son not being in esse, when the particular estate determined, the

remainder could not then vest: and, as it could not vest then, by the rules
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before laid down, it never can vest at all. In these cases, therefore, it is neces-

sary to have trustees appointed to preserve the contingent remainders; in whom

there is vested an estate in remainder for the life of the tenant for life, to com-

mence when his estate determines. (12) If therefore his estate for life determ-

ines otherwise than by his death, the estate of the trustees, for the residue of his

F *1721 na^ura^ life> wiN then take effect, and become a *particular estate in

*• -" possession, sufficient to support the remainders depending in contin-

fency. This method is said to have been invented by Sir Orlando Bridgman,

ir Geoffrey Palmer, and other eminent council, who betook themselves to con-

veyancing during the time of the civil wars; in order thereby to secure in family

settlements a provision for the future children of an intended marriage, who

before were usually left at the mercy of the particular tenant for life: (d) and

when after the restoration, these gentlemen came to fill the first offices of the

law, they supported this invention within reasonable and proper bounds, and

introduced it into general use.

Thus the student will observe how much nicety is required in creating and

securing a remainder; and I trust he will in some measure see the general rea-

sons upon which this nicety is founded. It were endless to attempt to enter

upon the particular subtleties and refinements, into which this doctrine, by the

variety of cases which have occurred in the course of many centuries, has been

spun out and subdivided: neither are they consonant to the design of these

(6) 1 Rep. 130. (e) I1M. <:<;. 139.

(d) See Moor. 486. 2 Roll. Abr. 797, pi. 13. 2 Sid. 159. S Chan. Rep. 170.

(11) [But a conveyance of a greater estate than he has by bargain and sale or by lease

*Contingent remainderb of either kind, if they amount to a freehold 7
cannot be limited on an estate for years, or any other particular estate7
less than a freehold. Thus if land be granted to A for ten years, with remainder
in fee to the right heirs of B, this remainder is void; (b) but if granted to A
for life, with like remainder, it is good. For, unless the freehold passes out of
the grantor at the time when the remainder is created, such freehold remainder
is void: it cannot pass out of him, without vesting somewhere; and in the case
of a contingent remainder it must vest in the particular tenant, else it can vest
nowhere ; unless, therefore, the estate of such particular tenant be of a freehold
nature, the freehold cannot vest in him, and consequently the remainder is
void.
Contingent remainders may be defeated by destroying or determining the particular estate upon which they depend, before the contingency hav.pens whereby
they become vested. (c) Therefore when there is tenant for hfe, with divers
remainders in contingency, he may, not only by his death, but by alienation,.
surrender, or other methods, destroy and determine his own life-estate before
any of those remainders vest; the consequence of which is, that he utterly
defeats them all. (11) As, if there be tenant for life, with remainder to his
eldest son unborn in tail, and the tenant for life, before any son is born, surrenders his life estate, he by that means defeats the remainder in tail to his son :
for his son not being in esse, when the particular estate determined, the
remainder could not then vest : and, as it could not vest then, by the rules
before laid down, it never can vest at all. In these cases, therefore, it is necessary to have trustees appointed to preserve the contingent remainders; in whom
there is vested an estate in remainder for the life of the tenant for life, to commence when his estate determines. (12) If therefore his estate for life determines otherwise than by his death, the estate of the trustees, for the residue of his
[ • 172 ] natural life, will then take effect, and become a •particular estate in
po88e88ion, sufficient to support the remainders depending in contingency. This method is said to have been invented by Sir Orlando Bridgman,.
Sir Geoffrey Palmer, and other eminent council, who betook themselves to conveyancing during the time of the civil wars; in order thereby to secure in family
settlements a provision for the future children of an intended marriage, who
before were usually left at the mercy of the particular tenant for life: (d) and
when after the restoration, these gentlemen came to fill the first offices of the
law, they supported this invention within reasonable and pro~r bounds, and
introduced it into general use.
•
Thus the student will observe how much nic.ety is required in creating and
securing a remainder ; and I trust he will in some measure see the general reasons upon which this nicety is founded. It we."e endless to attempt to enter
upon the particular subtleties and refinements, into which this doctrine, by the
variety of cases which have occurred in the course of many centuries, has been
spun out and subdivided: neither a.re they consonant to the design of these
[ *l 7l]

and release, is no forfeiture, and will not defeat a contingent remainder. 2 Leon. 60; 3

Mod. 151.

(b) 1Rep.130.
(C) JIM. f!6, 1311.
(d) Bee Moor. 486. 2 Roll . .41>fo. 797, pl. H. 2 Sid. lli9. 2 Chan. Rep. 170.

But the tenant for life may bar the contingent remainders by a feoffinont, a fine or a recovery.

1 Co. 66; Cro Eliz. 630; 1 Salk. 224.

"Where there is a tenant for life, with all the subsequent remainders contingent, and he Buffers

a recovery to the use of himself in fee, he has a right to this tortious fee against all persona bat

the heirs of the grantor or devisor. 1 Salk. 224.]

This rule is abolished by statute hi some of the United States. See 4 Kent, 246. And in

England, also, as to any contingent remainder vesting after Dee. 31, 1844, or created after the

taking effect of statutes 7 and 8 Tic. c. 106. Seo Festing t>. Allen, 12 M. and "W. 279; S. C..

5 Hare, 573.

(12) [Trustees to support contingent remainders are not essential in copyhold, the lord's estate

sufficing. 10 Ves. 282; 16 East, 406.]
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(11) [But a conveyance of a feater e1:1tate than he he.e by barge.in and sale or by le&tt&
and release, is no forfeiture, an will not defeat "' contingent remainder. 2 Loon. 60; 3
Mod. 151.
But the tenant for life mo.y bar the contingent remaindel'B by a feofl'ment, a fine or a rooovery.
1 Co. 66 ; Cro J<;liz. 630; 1 Salk. 2'l4.
Where there i11 e. tenant for life, with all the subsequent remainders contin~nt, and he ~utren
a recovery to the u~ of himself in fee, he has e. ri11:ht to this tortious fee a.gamst all persons but
the heir11 of the grantor or devisor. 1 Salk. 224.)
This rule is abolished by statute in some of the United States. See 4 Kent, 246. And in
En~land, also, o.s to any contingent remainder vesting after Dec. 31, 1844, or oreated after the
taking effect of statutes 7 and 8 Vic. c. 106. Seo Feating v. Allen, 12 ll. and W. 279; S. C.,
5 He.re, 573.

(12) [ Tl'U!ltees to support contingent remainders
suffi.cmg. 10 Ves. 282; 16 Ee.st, 406.)

e.r~

not essential in oopyhold, the lord's estate
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Chap. 11.]

172

ExEcUToRY DE\'fSEs.

elementary disquisitions. I must not however, omit, that in devises by last will

and testament (which being often drawn up when the party is inops consilii, are

always more favoured in construction than formal deeds, which are presumed to

be made with great caution, forethought, and advice), in these devises, I say,

remainders may be created in some measure contrary to the rules before laid

down: though our lawyers will not allow such dispositions to be strictly

remainders; but call them by another name, that of executory devises, or devises

hereafter to be executed.

An executory devise of lands is such a disposition of them by will, that thereby

no estate vests at the death of the devisor, but only on some future contin-

gency. (13) It differs from a remainder in three very material points; 1. That

it needs not any *particular estate to support it. 2. That by it a fee- r „,, ~o -i

simple, or other less estate, may be limited after a fee-simple. 3. That L -I

by this means a remainder may be limited of a chattel interest, after a particu-

lar estate for life created in the same.

1. The first case happens when a man devises a future estate to arise upon a

contingency; and, till that contingency happens, does not dispose of the fee-

simple, but leaves it to descend to his heirs at law. As if one devises land to a

feme-sole and her heirs, upon her day of marriage: here is in effect a contingent

remainder, without any particular estate to support it; a freehold commencing

infuturo. This limitation, though it would be void in a deed, yet is good in a

will, by way of executory devise, (e) For, since by a devise a freehold may pass
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without corporal tradition or livery of seisin (as it must do, if it passes at all),

therefore it may commence infuturo ; because the principal reason why it can-

not commence infuturo in other cases, is the necessity of actual seisin, which

always operates in prcesenti. And, since it may thus commence infuturo, there

is no need of a particular estate to support it; the only use of which is to make

the remainder, by its unity with the particular estate, a present interest. And

hence also it follows, that such an executory devise, not being a present interest,

cannot be barred by a recovery, suffered before it commences, (f)

2. By executory devise, a fee, or other less estate, may be limited after a fee.

And this happens where a devisor devises his whole estate in fee, but limits a

remainder thereon to commence on a future contingency. As if a man devises

land to A and his heirs; but if he dies before the age of twenty-one, then to B

and his heirs; this remainder, though void in deed, is good by way of executory

devise, (g) But, in both these species of executory devises, the contingencies

ought to be such as may happen within a reasonable time; as within one or

more life or lives in being, or within a *moderate term of years, for r^iw^-i

courts of justice will not indulge even wills, so as as to create a perpetuity, L J

which the law abhors: (h) because by perpetuities (or the settlement of an

interest, which shall go in the succession prescribed, without any power of

alienation), (i) estates are made incapable of answering those ends of social

commerce, and providing for the sudden contingencies of private life, for which

property was at first established. The utmost lengtfy that has been hitherto

(e) 1 Sid. 153. (/) Cro. Jao. 693. (;/) 2 Moil. 288.

(») 19 Mod. 287. 1 Vern. 161. (<) Salk. 2».'

(13) [The student will now be prepare^ to understand the celebrated rule of law com-

monly called The Rule in Shelly's CoJe, on account of the following distinct announcement of

it which occurred in that case. 1 Rep. 104, a. " It is a rule of law when the ancestor by any

gift or conveyance takes an estate or freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate

elementary disquisitions. I must not however, omit, that in devises by last will
and testament (which being often drawn up when the party is inops consilii, are
always more favoured in construction than formal deeds, which are pre1JUmed to
be made with great caution, forethought, and advice), in these devises, I say_,
remainders may be created in some measure contrary to the rules before laid
down: though our lawyers will not allow such dispositions to be strictly
remainders; but call them by another name, that of exeC1ttory devise.~, or devises
hereafter to be executeu.
An execntory devise of lands is such a disposition of them by will, that thereby
no estate vests at the death of the devisor, but only on some future contin~ency. (13) It differs from a remainder in three very material points; 1. That
1t needs not any *particular estate to support it. 2. That by it a fee- [ ,..173 ]
simple, or other less estate, may be limited after a fee-simple. 3. That
by this means a remainder may be limited of a chattel interest, after a particular estate for life created in the same.
1. The first case happens when a man devises a future estate to arise upon a
contingency; and, till that contingency happens, does not dispose of the feesimple, but leaves it to descend to his heirs at law. As if one devises land to a
feme-sole and her heirs, upon her day of marriage: here is in effect a contingent
remainder, without any ~articular estate to support it; a freehold commencing
in futuro. This limitat10n, though it would be void in a deed, yet is good in a
wifl, by way of executory devise. (e) For, since by a devise a freehold may pass
without corporal tradition or livery of seisin (as it must do, if it passes at all),
therefore it may commence in futuro; because the principal reason why it cannot commence in futuro in other cases, is the necessity of actual seisin, which
always operates in prmsenti. And, since it may thus commence in fu,turo, there
is no need of a particular estate to support it ; the only use of which is to make
the remainder, by its unity with the particular estate, a present interest. And
hence also it follows, that such an executory devise, not being a present interest,
cannot be barred by a recovery, suffered before it commences. (/)
2. By execntory devise, a fee, or other less estate, may be limited after a fee.
And this happens where a devisor devises his whole estate in fee, but limits a.
remainder thereon to commence on a future contingency. As if a man devises
land to A and his heirs; but if he dies before the a~e of twenty-one, then to B
and his heirs; this remainder, though void in deed, 1s good by way of executory
devise. (g) But, in both these species of executory devises, the contingencies
ought to be suCh as may happen within a reasonable time; as within one or
more life or lives in being, or within a *moderate term of years, for [ *l 4 ]
7
courts of justice will not indulge even wills, so as as to create a perpetuity,
which the law abhors: (h) because by perpetuities (or the settlement of an
interest, which shall go in the succession prescribed, without any power of
alienation}, (i) estates are made incapable of answering those ends of social
commerce, and providing for the sudden contingeq.cies of private life, for which
property was at first established. The utmost lengt4 th~t has been hitherto
(~) i

Sid. 153.
(fl Cro. Jao. &93.
(.Ill 2 Mqd. 289.
(A) JI Mod. 'li!T. 1 Vern. HW.
<'> Salk. 2SI.

is limited mediately or immediately to his heirs in fee or in tail, that always in such case ' the

heirs' are words of limitation of the estate, and not words of purchase." And this is a

strict rule of law which cannot be prevented by any expression of intention to the contrary.

Thus, if a limitation is made to Jane Wood/or life, remainder to Bfor life, remainder to C in

tail, remainder to the heirs of Jane Wood; she takes an estate for life with the ultimate remainder

to herself in fee; and such remainder descending to her hen-, would be descendible from him to the

heirs ex parte materna.]

Upon this rule, see Fearne, Con. Rem. 76; 1 Prest. Estates, 263; 2 Kent, 214. In some of

the United States the rule is abolished by statute.

(13) [The student will now be prepare' to undel'lltand the celebrated rule of law commonl.y called TM Rul6 in Shelly's Cake, on account of the following distinct announcement of
it which occurred in that case. 1 Rep. 104, a. "It is a role of law when the ancestor by any
~ft or conveyance takes an estate of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate
is limited mediately or immediately to his heirs in fee or in tail, that always in such case ' the
heirs' are words of limitation of the estate, and not words of purchMe." .And this is a
strict mle of law which cannot be prevented by any expression of intention to the con~.
Thus, if a limitation is mo.de to Jane Wood for l{fe, remainder to B for life, remainder to C m
tail, remainder to the heirs of Jane Wood; Rhe takes an estate for life with the ultimate remninder
t.o herself in fee ; and such remainder descending to her heir, would be descendible from him to the
heirs ex parte matema.]
Upou thiR rule, see Fearne, Con. Rem. 76; 1 Prest. E11tat.es, 263; 2 Kent, 214. In some of
tli!l U11ited States the l'llle is abolished by st(\tute.
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allowed for the contingency of an executory devise of either kind to happen in,

is that of a life or lives in being, and one and twenty years afterwards. As when

lands are devised to such unborn son of a feme-covert, as shall first attain the

age of twenty-one, and his heirs; the utmost length of time that can happen

before the estate can vest, is the life of the mother and the subsequent infancy

of her son: and this has been decreed to be a good executory devise, (k)

3. By executory devise a term of years may be given to one man for his life

and afterwards limited over in remainder to anotner, which could not be done

by deed; for by law the first grant of it, to a man for life, was a total disposi-

tion of the whole term; a life estate being esteemed of a higher and larger

nature than any term of years. (1) And, at first, the court* were tender, even

in the case of a will, of restraining the devisee for life from aliening the term;

but only held, that in case he died without exerting that act of ownership, the

remainder over should then take place: (m) for the restraint of the power of

alienation, especially in very long terms, was introducing a species of perpetuity.

But, soon afterwards, it was held, (n) that the devisee for life hath no power of

aliening the term, so as to bar the remainder-man: yet, in order to prevent the dan-

ger of perpetuities, it was settled, (o) that though such remainders may be lim-

ited to as many persons successively as the devisor thinks proper, yet they must

F *175 1 a^ k6 *tw **** during the life of the first devisee; for then all the candles

L •* are lighted and are consuming together, and the ulimate remainder is

in reality only to that remainder-man who happens to survive the rest: and it
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was also settled, that such remainder may not be limited to take effect, unless

upon such contingency as must happen (if at all) during the life of the first

devisee, (p) (14)

ft) Fort. SS2. (I) Bep. 96. (n) Bro. tit. rhnltelx, 28. Dyer, 74.

(*) Dyer, 868. 8 Hep. 9fl. (o) 1 Sid. 4S1. (p) Skinn.Stl. 3 P. Wms. 258.

allowed for the contingencv of an executory devise of either kind to happen in,
is that of a life or lives in being, and one and twenty years afterwards. As_ when
lands are devised to such unborn son of a feme-co,·ert, as shall first attam the
age of twentv-one, and his heirs; the utmost length of time that can happen
before the estate can vest, is the life of the mother and the subsequent infancy
of her son: and this has been decreed to be a good executory devise. (k)
3. By executory devise a term of years may be given to one man for his life
and llfterwards limited over in remamder to another, which could not be done
by deed; for by law the first grant of it, to a man for life, was a total disposition of the whole term; a life estate being esteemed of a higher and larger
nature than any term of years. (l) And, at first, the courts were tender, even
in the case of a will, of restraining the devisee for life from aliening the t.erm;
but only held, that in case he died without exerting that act of ownership, the
remainder over should then take place: (m) for the restraint of the power of
alienation, especially in very long terms, was introducing a species of perpetuity.
But, soon afterwards, it was held, (n) that the devisee for life hath no power of
aliening the term, so as to bar the remainder-man: yet, in order to prevent the danger of perpetuities, it was settled, ( o) that though such remainders may be limited to as many persons successively a.s the devisor thinks proper, yet they must
[ • 175 J all be *in esse during the life of the first devisee ; for then all the candles
are lighted and are consuming together, and the ulimate remainder is
in reality only to that remainder-man who happens to survive the rest: and it
was also settled, that such remainder may not be limited to take eff'ect, unless
upon such contingency as must happen (if at all) during the life of the first
devisee. (p) (14)

(14) [Peter Thelusson, Esq., an eminent merchant, devised the bulk of an immense property

to trustees for the purpose of accumulation during the lives of three SODS, and of all their

(Z:)
(A)

Fort. t.'lt.
(lJ Rep. 96.
(,.) Bro. ti&. cAattm, 28. Dyer1 7•.
Dyer, 868. 8 Hep. 96.
(0) 1 Sld. '61.
(p) Sklnn. Ml. lJ P. W1111. tllll.

sons who should be living at the time of bis death, or be born in due time afterwards, and

during the life of the survivor of them. Upon the death of this last, the fund is directed to

be divided into three shares, one to the eldest male lineal descendant of each of his three

sons; upon the failure of such a descendant, the share to go to the descendants of the other

sons; and upon the failure of all such descendants, the whole to go to the sinking fund.

When he died he had three sons living, who had four eons living, and two (win sons were born

soon after. Upon calculation it appeared that upon the death of the survivor of these nine,

the fund would probably exceed nineteen millions; and upon the supposition of only one

person to take, and a minority of ten years, that it would exceed thirty-two millions. It is

evident that this extraordinary will was strictly within the limits laid down in the text; and

it was accordingly sustained both in the court of chancery and in the house of lords. See 4 Yes.

Jnn. 227 ; 11 id. 112; 1 New Rep. 357.

This will, however, occasioned the passing of the 39 and 40 Geo. in, o. 98, by which are

prohibited any settlements of property, real or personal, for entire or partial accumulation

for any longer term than the life of the "settler, the period of twenty one years from his death,

the minority of any person or persons living, or en venire sa mere at the time of his death, or the

minority of any persons who would be beneficially entitled to the profits under the settlement,

if of full age. Any direction to accumulate beyond this, except for the purpose of paving

debts, raising portions for children, or in case of the produce of timber, is declared void, and the

profits are directed to be paid to such person as would have been entitled if there were no such

direction. In moving the judgment of the lords in Thelnsson's case, Lord Eldon, Ch. said of

this act, which had passed between the decisions of the original case and the appeal, " That act

was rather a matter of surprise upon me, and perhaps it is not one of the wisest legislative

measures. But it must be remembered that it expressly alters what it takes to have been the

former law, and confines the power of accumulation to twenty-one years; bnt if your lordships

were to exercise the power of accumulation in all the cases allowed by the act, the accumulation

would be enormous." 1 If. R. 397.]

For remarks upon Thelusson's Case see 4 Kent, 284. In the United States there are statutes

which preclude the absolute power of alienation being suspended except during the periods and

for the purposes which they specify; and to these the reader is referred.

[It has long been fully settled that a term for years, or any chattel interest, may be given bv

an executory devise to an unborn child of a person in existence, when it attains the age of

twenty-one; and that the limits of executory devises of real and personal property are pre-

cisely the same. Feame, 320. It is very common to beqneath chattel interests to A and his

(14) [Peter Thelu.'!IK>n, Esq., an eminent mt>rchant, devised the bulk of an immense propert,Y

to trustees for the purpose of accumulation during the lives of three 80Ds, and of all theu-

sons who should be livin~ at the time of his death, or be born. in due time afterwards, and
during the life of the sUl"Vlvor of them. Upon the death of this last, the fund is directed to
be divided into throe 11haros, one to the eldest ma.le lineal descendani of each of his three
eons ; upon the fa.ilure of 1mch a. descendant, the share to go to the descendants of the other
sons ; a.nd upon the failure of a.II such descendants, the whole to go to the sinking fund.
When he died he had three SOWi living, who had four sons living, and two twin 8Qil8 were born
soon a.ft.er. Gpon calculation it appeared that upon the death of the survivor of these nine,
the fund would probably exceed nineteen millions; and upon the supposition of only one
person to take, a.nd a minority of ten yea.rs, that it would exceed thirty-two millions. It is
evident that this extraordinary will was strictly within the limits laid down in the text ; and
it wa..ci a.ccordi!lgly ~u.Rtaincd both in !he court of chancery and in the holl86 of lords. See 4 Ve;;.
Jun. 227; 11 1d. 11~, 1 New Rep. 357.
This will, however, occa.Rioncd the passing of the 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 98, by which &re
prohibited any settlem11nts of property, real or persona.I, for entire or partial a.ccumulation
for any longer term thwi tho life of the settler, the period of twenty one years from hi" death,
the mmority of any pel'>!on or person11 living, or en f1entre sa mere at the time of his death, or the
minority of any persons who would be beneficially entitled to the profits under the settlement,
if of full age. Any direction to accumulate beyond this, except for the purpo1:1e of paying
debts, raisin~ portions for children, or in case of the produce of timber, is dec1ared void, and the
profits are dU"ected to be paid to such per.ion BS would have been entitled if there were no such
direction. In moving tho judgment of the lordii in Thelusson'R ca..~e, Lord Eldon, Ch. said of
this act, which had pMsed between the decisions of the ori~nal case and the appeal, "That act
was rather a matter of surpril!tl upon mil, and perhapK it 1s not one of the wisest legislativo
mell..'lures. But it must be remembered that it exprell<lly alters what it takes to have been the
former la.w, and confines the power of accumulation to twenty-one years; but if your lord8hips
were to exercise the power of 8Ccumnla.tion in all the cases allowed by the act, the aooumulation
would be enormous." 1 N. R. 39i.]
For remarks upon 'fhelusson's Case see 4 Kent, 284. In the United Stat.es there are sta.tutea
which preclude the abl!Olute power of alienation being suspended except during the periods and
for the purpo!!el! which they 11pooify; and to these the reader is referred.
[It has long been fully settled that a term for yeari!, or a.ny chattel interest, mar be given bv
au executory devise to an unborn child of a. person in existence, when it attains the age ol'
twenty-one; and that the limits of executory devises of real and personal property are precisely the same. Fearne, 320. It is very common to bequeath chattel interests to A and hi.a
js1me, and if he dies without i88Ue, to B. It aeems now to be determined, that where the
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Thus much for such estates in expectancy, as are created by the express words

of the parties themselves; the most intricate title in the law. There is yet

another species, which is created by the act and operation of the law itself, and

this is called a reversion.

III. An estate in reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor, to

commence in possession after the determination of some particular estate granted

out by him. (q) Sir Edward Coke (r) describes a reversion to be the returning

of land to the grantor or his heirs after the grant is over. As, if there be a

gift in tail, the reversion of the fee is, without any special reservation, vested in

the donor by act of law: and so .also the reversion, after an estate for life, years,

or at will, continues in the lessor. For the fee-simple of all lands must abide

somewhere; and if he, who was before possessed of the whole, carves out of it

any smaller estate, and grants it away, whatever is not so granted remains in

him. A reversion is never therefore created by deed, or writing, but arises from

construction of law; a remainder can never be limited, unless Toy either deed or

devise. But both are equally transferable, when actually vested, being both

estates in prcssenti, though taking effect in futuro.

The doctrine of reversions is plainly derived from the feudal constitution.

For when a feud was granted to a man for life, or to him and his issue male,

rendering either rent or other services; then, on his death or the failure of issue

male, the feud was determined, and resulted back to the *lord or pro- r *i wg i

prietor, to be again disposed of at his pleasure. And hence the usual "- -"
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incidents to reversions are said to be fealty and rent. When no rent is reserved

on the particular estate, fealty, however, results of course, as an incident quite

inseparable, and may be demanded as a badge of tenure, or acknowledgment of

superiority; being frequently the only evidence that the lands are holden at all.

Where rent is reserved, it is also incident, though not inseparably so, to the

reversion, (s) The rent may be granted away, reserving the reversion; and the

reversion may be granted away, reserving the rent; by special words; but by a

general grant of the reversion, the rent will pass with it, as incident thereunto;

though by the grant of the rent generally, the reversion will not pass. The

incident passes by the grant of the principal, but not e converso: for the maxim

of law is, "accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur, suumprincipals" (t)

These incidental rights of the reversioner, and the respective modes of descent,

in which remainders very frequently differ from reversions, have occasioned the

law to be careful in distinguishing the one from the other, however inaccurately

the parties themselves may describe them. For if one seised of a paternal

estate in fee makes a lease for life, with remainder to himself and his heirs, this

is properly a mere reversion, (u) to which rent and fealty shall be incident; and

which shall only descend to the heirs of his father's blood, and not to his heirs gen-

eral, as a remainder limited to him by a third person would have done: (w) for

it is the old estate, which was originally in him, and never yet was out of him.

And so likewise, if a man grants a lease for life to A, reserving rent, with rever-

sion to B, and his heirs, B hath a remainder descendible to his heirs general, and

not a reversion to which the rent is incident; but the grantor shall be entitled

to the rent, during the continuance of A's estate, (x)

*In order to assist such persons as have any estate in remainder, r „,.. „„ -,

reversion, or expectancy, after the death of others, against fraudulent L J

concealments of their death, it is enacted by the statute 6 Ann. c. 18, that all

persons on whose lives any lands or tenements are holden, shall (upon applica-

(?) Co. Litt. 22. (r) 1 lust. 143. (») Co. Utt. 143. (() INd. 161, 162.

(u) Cro. KHz. 321. (w) S Lev. 407. (x) 1 And. 28.

words are such as would have given A an estate-tail in real property, in personal property

Thus much for such estates in expectancy, as are created by the express words
of the parties themselves; the most intricate title in the law. There is yet
another species, which is created by the act and operation of the law itself, and
this is called a reversion.
III. An estate in reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor, to
commence in possession after the determination of some particular estate granted
out by him. (q) Sir Edward Coke (r) describes a reversion to be the returning
of hmd to the gmntor or his heirs after the grant is over. As, if there be a
gift in tail, the reversion of the fee is, without any special reservation, vested in
the donor by act of law: and so .also the reversion. after an estate for life, years,
or at will, continues in the lessor. For the fee-simple of all lands must abide
somewhere; and if he, who was before possessed of the whole, carves out of it
any smaller estate, and grants it away, whatever is not so ~ranted remains in
him. A reversion is never therefore created by deed, or writmg, but arises from
construction of ln.w; a remainder can never be limited, unless by either deed or
devise. But both are equally transferable, when actually vested, being both
estates in prcssenti, though taking effect in futuro.
The doctrine of reversions is plainly derived from the feudal constitution.
For when a feud was granted to a man for life, or to him and his issue male,
rendering either rent or other services; then, on his death or the failure of issue
male, the feud was determined, and resulted back to the *lord Qr pro- [ • 176 ]
J;>rietor, tp be again disposed of at his pleasure. And hence the usual
im:idents to reversions are said to be fealty and rent. When no rent is reserved
on the particular estate, fealty, however, results of course, as an incident quite
inseparable, and may be demanded as a badge of tenure, or acknowledgment of
superiority; being frequently the only evidence that the lands are holden at all.
Where rent is reserved, it is a.lso incident, though not inseparably so, tu the
reversion. (s) The rent may be granted away, reserving the reversion; and the
reversion may be grunted away, reserving the rent; by special words; but by a.
general grant of the reversion, the rent will pass with it, u.s incident thereunto;
though by the grant of the rent generally, the reversion will not pass. The
incident passes by the grant of the principal, but not e converso: for the maxim
of law is, "accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur, smtm principale." ( t)
'fhese incidental rights of the reversioner, and the respective modes of descent,
in which remainders very frequently differ from reversions, have occasioned the
law to be careful in distinguishing the one from the other, however inaccuratdy
the parties themselves may describe them. For if one seised of a paternal
estate in fee makes a lease for life, with remainder to himself and his h0irs, this
is properly a mere reversion, (u) to which rent and fealty shall be incident; and
which shall only descend to the heirs of his father's blood, and not to his heirs general, as a remainder limited to him by a third person would have done: ( w) for
it is the old estate, which was originally in him, and never yet was out of him.
And so likewise, if a man grants a lease for life to A, reserving rent, with reversion to B, and his heirs, B ho.th a remainder descendihle to his heirs general, and
not a reversion to which the rent is incident; but the grantor shall be entitled
t-0 the rent, during the continuance of A's estate. (x)
*In order to assist such persons as have any estate in remainder, [ • 177 ]
reversion, or expectancy, after the death of others, against fraudulent
conceu.lments of their death, it is enacted by the statute 6 Ann. c. 18, that all
persons on whose lives any lands or tenements a.re holden, shall (upon applica-

the subsequent limitations are void, and A has the absolute interest; hut. if it appears from

any clause or circumstance in the will, that the testator intended to give it over only in case

(q) Co. Litt. i'J.
(•) Cro. Eliz. 321.

(r) I Inst. In.
(IP) 3 Lev. (()7,

(ll Co. Litt. 143.
(Z)

1 And. iS.

(I) Ibid. 161, 162.

A had no issue living at the time of his death, upim that event the subsequent limitation will

be good as an executory devise. 8e« Feame, 371, and cases referred to in 3 COXC'B P.

Wms. 262.]
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words are such a.11 would have given .A. an estate-tail in real property, in personal property
the subsequent limitations are void, a.nd A baa the absolute interest; but if it appenrR from
l\DV clause or circumstance in the will, that the tcAtator intended to give it over only in case
A had no iiisue living at the time of hi11 death, upon that event the subsequent limitation will
be good a.q an executory devise. 8941 :fe&me, 371, and C88e8 referred to in 3 Coxc's P.
W mi!. 262.]
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tion to the court of chancery, and order made thereupon), once in every year, if

required, be produced to the court, or its commissioners; or, upon neglect or

refusal, they shall be taken to be actually dead, and the person entitled to such

expectant estate may enter upon and hold the lands and tenements, till the

party shall appear to be living. (15)

Before we conclude the doctrine of remainders and reversions, it may be

proper to observe, that whenever a greater estate and a less coincide and meet

in one and the same person, without any intermediate estate, (y) the less is

immediately annihilated; or, in the law phrase, it is said to be merged, (16) that

is, sunk or drowned in the greater. Thus, if there be tenant for years, and the

reversion in fee-simple descends to or is purchased by him, the term of years is

merged in the inheritance, and shall never exist any more. But they must come

to one and the same person in one and the same right; else, if the freehold be

in his own right, and he has a term in right of another (en outer droit), there

is no merger. Therefore, if tenant for years dies, and makes him who hath the

reversion in fee his executor, whereby the term of years vests also in him, the

term shall not merge; for he hath the fee in his own right, and the term of

years in the right of the testator, and subject to his debts and legacies. So also,

if he who hath the reversion in fee marries the tenant for years, there is no

merger; for he hath the inheritance in his own right, the lease in the right of

his wife, (z) An estate-tail is an exception to this rule: for a man may have in

his own right both an estate-tail and a reversion in fee: and the estate-tail,
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though a less estate, shall not merge in the fee. (a) For estates-tail are pro-

(») S Lev. 137. («) Plowd. US. Cro. Jac. 275. Co. Lltt. 338. (a) 2 Rep. 61. 8 Rep. 74.

(15) A.8 to this order see Ex-parte Grant, 6 Ves. 512; Ex-parte Whalley, 4 Russ. 561; Re

Isaac, 4 M. and Gr. 11.

tion to the court of chancery, and order made thereupon), once in every year, if
required, be produced to the court, or its commissioners; or, upon neglect or
refusal, they shall be taken to be actually dead, and the person entitled to such
expectant estate may enter upon and hold the lands and tenements, till the
party shall appear to be living. (15)
Before we conclude the doctrine of remainders and reversions, it may be
proper to observe, that whenever a. greater estate and a less coincide and meet
m one and the same person, without any intermediate estate, (y) the less is
immediately annihilated; or, in the law phrase, it is said to be merged, (16) that
is, sunk or drowned in the greater. Thus, if there be tenant for years, and the
reversion in fee-simple descends to or is purchased by him, the term of vears is
merged in the inheritance, and shall never exist any more. But they must come
to one and the same person in one and the sa.me right; else, if the freehold be
in his own right, and he has a term in right of another (en auter droit), there
is no merger. 'l'herefore, if t.enant for years dies, and makes him who hath the
reversion in fee his executor, whereby the t.erm of years vests also in him, the
t.erm shall not merge; for he hath the fee in his own right, and the term of
years in the right of the testator, and subject to his debts and legacies. So also,
if he who hath the reversion in fee marries the t.enant for years, there is no
merger; for he hath the inheritance in his own right, the lease in the right of
his wife.. (z) An est3te-tail is an exception to this rule: for a man may have in
his own right both an estate-tail and a reversion in fee: and the estate-tail,
though a less estate, shall not merge in the fee. (a) For estates-tail are pro(M) 8 Lev. '37.

(•) Plowd. il8. Cro. Jao. 275. Co. Litt. 338.

(al 2 Rep. 61. 8 Hep. 7'.

In most cases a person is presumed dead who has not been heard of for seven years, and.

the bigamy acts allow parties to act on that presumption. See Thome ». Eolffe, Dyer, 185;

Nepean v. Doe, 2 M. and W. 910; 1 Phil. Ev. by Edwards, 640.

(16) [Even if there be an intermediate contingent estate, it will be destroyed by the union

and coalition of the greater estate and the less, (unless the greater estate ia subjoined to the

less by the same conveyance), when such coalition takes place by the conveyance or act of

the parties. Purefoy v. "Rogers, 2 Saund. 387. But the reports of adjudged cases apparently

differ with respect to the destruction of an intermediate contingent estate, in cases where the

greater estate becomes united to the less by descent; these differences, however, may be recon-

ciled, by distinguishing between those cases where the descent of the greater estate is imme-

diate from the person by whose will the less estate, as well as the intermediate contingent

estate, were limited; and the cases where the less estate and the contingent remainders were

not created by the will of the ancestor from whom the greater estate immediately descends

on the less estate. In the first set of cases, the descent of the greater estate does not merec

and drown the intermediate contingent remainders: Boothley ». Vemon, 9 Mod. 147; Plunk-

ett v. Holmes, 1 Lev. 12; Archer's Case, 1 Rep. 66; in the second class of cases, it does merge

them. Hartpole v. Kent, T. Jones 77; S. C., 1 Ventr. 307; Hooker ». Hooker, Rep. temp.

Hardw. 13; Doe v. Scudamore, 2 Bos. and Pnll. 294; and see Fearno, p. 343, 6th ed., with

Serjt. Williams' note to 2 Saund. 382, a.

A distinction (as already has been intimated), must be made between the coses where a par-

ticular estate is limited, with a contingent remainder over, and afterwards the inheritance is

subjoined to the particular estate by the same conveyance; and those cases wherein the

accession of the inheritance is by a conveyance, accident or circumstance, distinct from that

conveyance which created the particular estate. In the latter cases, we have seen, the con-

tingent remainder is generally destroyed; in the former it is otherwise. For, where by the

fame conveyance a particular estate is first limited to a person, with contingent remainder

over to another, and with such a reversion or remainder to the first person as would, in its

own nature, drown the particular estate first given him ; this last limitation shall be consid-

ered as executed only sub modo; that is, upon such condition as to open and separate itself

from the first estate, when the condition happens; and by no means to destroy the contingent

estate. Lewis Bowies' Case, 11 Rep. 80: Fearne, 346, 6th ed.

A court of equity will in some cases relievo against the merger of a term, and make it

answer the purposes for which it was created. Thus, in Powell v. Morgan, 2 Tern. 90, a por-

tion was directed to be raised out of a term for years, for the testator's daughter. The fee

afterwards descended on her, and she, being under age, devised the portion. The court of

chancery relieved against the merger of the term; and decreed the portion to go according to

the will of the daughter. See also, Thomas v. Kentish, 2 Freem. 208; S. C., 2 Yern. 352;

(15) As to this order see Ex-parte Grant, 6 Vee. 512; Ex-pa.rte Whalley, 4 Russ. 561; Re

lsa&e, 4 M. and Cr. 11.

In most cases a person is presumed dead who has not been heard of for seven years, and
the bigamy acts allow parties to act .on that presumptio1:1. See Thome 11. Rolffe, Dyer, 185;
Nepean v. Doe, 2 Y. and W. 910; 1 Phil. Ev. by Edwards, 640.
(16) [Even if there be an intermediate oontingtmt eRtate, it will be destroyed by the union
·anO. coalition of the greater estate and the less, (unless the greater estate is subjoined to the
less by the same conveyance), when such coalition takes place by the conveyance or a.ct of
tho parties. Purefoy v. Rogel"!!, 2 Saund. 387. But the reports of adjudged ca.ses apparently
differ with respect to the destruction of an intermediate contingent e:1tatc, in cases where the
greater estate becomes united to tho less by descent; these differences, however, may be reconciled, by distinguiRhing between tho:oe Cll8es where the descent of the greater estate iR imnu~
dia.te from the person by whose will the Jess e8tate, 118 well as the intermediate contin~nt
estate, w~ero lim1ted; and the ca!lCH where the lesl! estate and the continf!:ent rema.i.ndem were
not created by the will of the ancestor from whom the greater estate 1mmediately descends
on tho Jess estate. In the first set of eases, the descent of the greater estate does not merge
and drown the intermediate contingent remainders: Boothley "· Vernon, 9 Mod. 147; Plunkett ti. Holmes, 1 Lev. 12; .Archer's Case, 1 Rep. 66; in the second class of cases, it does merge
them. Hartpole 11. Kent, T. Jones 77 ; S. C., 1 Ventr. 307; Hooker ti. Hooker, Rep. temp.
Hardw. l:l; Doe v. Scudamore, 2 Bos. and Pull. 294; and see Fearne, p. 343, 6th ed., with
Scrjt. Williams' note to 2 Saund. :J82, a .
.A distinction (as already has been intimated), must be made between the oases where a particular estate is limited, with a contingent remainder over, and a.flerwards the inheritance is
subjoined to the particular estate by the same conveyance; and those cases wherein the
ucce~~ion of the inheritance is by a conveyance, accident or circumstance, distinct from that
conveyance which created the particular estate. In the latter cases, we have seen, the contingent remainder is generally deatroyed; in the fonner it is otherwise. For, where hf the
~ume conveyance a particular estate ill firt>t limited to a person, with contingent rcmamder
over to another, and with Ruch a reversion or remainder to the first person as would, in its
own nature, drown the particular estate firnt given him ; this la.st limitation shall be considered a.~ executed only sub mod-0 ,· that is, upon such condition Bil to open and separate it....rut
from the first et1tate, when the condition happens; and by no means to destroy the contingent
e8tate. Lewis Bowles' Case, 11 Rep. 80: Fee.me, 346, 6th ed.
A court of equity will in some ca.seti relieve against the merger of a term, and maim it
answer the purposes for which it wa.'i created. Thus, in Powell ti. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90, a portion was directed to be raised out of a term for yea.rs, for the testators daughter. Tht• foe
afterwards descended on her, and she, being under age, devised the portion. The court of
chanc~ry relieved against the merger of the term; an~ decreed the portion to go according" to
the will of the daughter. See a.18o, Thomas 11. Kem.ish, 2 Freem. 208; S. C., 2 Vem. 352;
·
· - ·
11M_unders "· Bournford, Finch, 424.]
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tectecl and preserved from merger by the ""operation and construction,

though not by the express words, of the statute de donis: which opera-

tion and construction have probably arisen upon this consideration; that in the

common cases of merger of estates for life or years by uniting with the inherit-

ance, the particular tenant hath the sole interests in them, and hath full power

at any time to defeat, destroy, or surrender them to him that hath the reversion:

therefore, when such an estate unites with the reversion in fee, the law consid-

ers it in the light of a virtual surrender of the inferior estate, (b) But, in an

estate-tail, the case is otherwise: the tenant for a long time had no power at all

over it, so as to bar or destroy it, and now can only do it by certain special

modes, by a fine, a recovery, and the like: (c) it would therefore have been

strangely improvident to have permitted the tenant in tail, by purchasing the

reversion in fee, to merge his particular estate, and defeat the inheritance of his

issue; and hence it has become a maxim, that a tenancy in tail, which cannot

be surrendered, cannot also be merged in the fee.

CHAPTER XII.

OF ESTATES IN SEVERALTY, JOINT-TENANCY, COPARCE-

NARY, AND COMMON.

WE come now to treat of estates, with respect to the number and connexions

of their owners, the tenants who occupy and hold them. And, considered in

this view, estates of any quantity or length of duration, and whether they be in

actual possession or expectancy, maybe held in four different ways; inseveralty,
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in joint-tenancy, in coparcenary, and in common.

1. He that hold lands or tenements in severalty, or is sole tenant thereof,

is he that holds them in his own right onlv, without any other person being

joined or connected with him in point of interest, dunng his estate therein.

This is the most common and usual way of holding an estate; and therefore we

may make the same observations here, that we did upon estates in possession,

as contradistinguished from those in expectancy, in the preceding chapter: that

there is little or nothing peculiar to be remarked concerning it, since all estates

are supposed to be of this sort, unless where they are expressly declared to bo

otherwise; and that in laying down general rules and doctrines, we usually

apply them to such estates as are held in severalty. I shall therefore proceed to

consider the other three species of estates, in which there are always a plurality

of tenants.

*II. An estate in joint-tenancy is where lands or tenements are granted r *i QA -i

to two or more persons, to hold in fee-simple, fee-tail, for life, for years ^ •"

or at will. In consequence of such grants an estate is called an estate in joint-

tenancy, (a) and sometimes an estate in jointure, which word as well as the other

signifies an union or conjunction of interest; though in common speech the

term jointure is now usually confined to that joint-estate, which by virtue of

the statute 27 Hen VIII, c. 10, is frequently vested in the husband and wife

before marriage, as a full satisfaction and bar of the woman's dower, (b)

In unfolding this title, and the two remaining ones, in the present chapter, we

will first inquire how these estates may be created; next, their properties and

respective incidents; and lastly, how they may be severed or destroyed.

1. The creation of an estate in joint-tenancy depends on the wording of the

deed or devise, by which the tenants claim title: for this estate can only arise by

purchase or grant, that is, by the act of the parties, and never by the mere act

(/.) Cro. Eliz. 303. (c) See page 116. (a) Uit. 277. (!>) See page 137.
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of law. Now if an estate be given to a plurality of persons, without adding any

restrictive, exclusive, or explanatory words, as if an estate be granted to A anil

B and their heirs, this makes them immediately joint-tenants in fee of the lands.

For the law interprets the grant so as to make till parts of it take effect, which

can only be done by creating an equal estate in them both. As therefore the

grantor has thus united their names, the law gives them a' thorough union in

all other respects. (1) For,

2. The properties of a joint estate are derived from its unity, which is fourfold;

the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time, and the unity of posses-

sion; or, in other words, joint-tenants have one and the same interest, accruing

by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and

held by one and the same undivided possession. (2)

r +1g, -i * First, they must have one and the same interest. (3) One joint-ten-

' '" •" ant cannot be entitled to one period of duration or quantity of interest

in lands, and the other to a different; one cannot be tenant for life, and the

other for years; one cannot be tenant in fee, and the other in tail, (c) But if

land be limited to A and B for their lives, this makes them joint-tenants of

the freehold; if to A and B and their heirs, it makes them joint-tenants of the

inheritance, (d) (4) If land be granted to A and B for their lives, and to the

heirs of A; here A and B are joint tenants of the freehold during their respect-

ive lives, and A has the remainder of the fee in severalty: or if land be

given to A and B, and the heirs of the body of A; here both have a ^oint eetate
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for life, and A hath a several remainder in tail, (e) Secondly, joint-tenants

(e) Co. Litt. 188. (d) Lltt. J 277. (e) Ibid, i 285.

(1) [Joint-tenancies are now regarded with so little favor, both in courts of law and equitv.

that whenever the expressions will import an intention in favour of a tenancy in common, it

of law. Now if an estate be given to a plurality of persons, without adding anv
restrictive, exclusive, or explanatory words, as 1f an estate be granted to A and
B and their heirs, this makes them unmediately joint-tenants in fee of the lands.
For the law interprets the grant so as to make all parts of it take effect, which
can only be done by creatin~ an equal estate in them both. As therefore the
grantorhas thus united their names, the law gives them a ·thorough union in
all other respects. (1) For,
2. The properties of a joint estate are derived from its unity, which is fourfold;
t~e unity .of interest, the '!l~ity of title, the unity of time, and t~e unity of possusion; or, m other words, JOmt-tenants have one and the same mterest, accruing
by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and
held by one and the same undh·ided possession. (2)
[ *lSl ]
• F'i.rst, they must have one and the same interest. (3) One joint-tenant cannot be entitled to one period of duration or quantity of intere:."'t
in lands, and the other to a different; one cannot be tenant for hfe, and the
other for years; one cannot be tenant in fee, and the other in tail. (c) But if
land be limited to A and B for their lives, this makes them joint-tenants of
the freehold; if to A and Band their heirs, it makes them joint-tenants of the
inheritance. (d) (4) If land be ~ranted to A and B for their li>es, and to the
heirs of A; here A and B are jomt tenants of the freehold during their respective lives, and A has the remainder of the fee in se>eralty : or if land be
given to A and B, and the heirs of the body of A ; here both have a Joint ~t.ate
for life, and A hath a several remainder in tail. (e) Secondly, jomt-tenants

trill be given effect to. Fisher v. Wigg, 1 P. Wins. 14 n., and id., 1 Ixl. Raym. 622; 1 Salk. 392,

(C)

Co. IJti. 188.

(d) LUt.

U77.

(e)

Ibid. f t815.

note 8. Lord Cowper says, that a joint tenancy is in equity an odious "thing. 1 Salk. 15&.

See also 2 Ves. Sen. 258. " In wills the expressions " equally to be divided, share and share alike,

respectively between and amongst them," have been held to create a tenancy in common. 2 Atk.

121; 4 Bro. 15. The words equally to be divided make a tenancy in common in surrenders of

copyholds: 1 Salk. 391; 2 Salk. 620; and also in deeds which derive their operation from tiie

statute of uses: 1 P. Wins. 14; 1 Wils. 341; Cowp. 660; 2 Ves. Sen. 257; and it is believed

that the same words in a common law conveyance wouJd now create a tenancy in common.

When two or more purchase lauds, and pay in equal proportions, a conveyance being made

to them and their heirs, this is a joint-tenancy. But if they advance the money in unequal

proportions, they are considered in equity in the nature of partners; and if one of them die,

the others have not his share by survivorship, but are considered as trustees for the deceased's

representatives. 1 Eq. Ca, Abr. 291.]

(2) The principal distinguishing characteristic of estates in joint-tenancy is, that on the death

of one the right in the estate survives to the other to the exclusion of the heirs and representa-

tives of the deceased joint-tenant. The law of joint tenancy is based upon a supposed inten-

tion of a grantor, in conveying an estate as a unity to two or more persons, that it should not be

severed; and therefore if a conveyance be of separate undivided halves of the same land to

two different persons, an estate in joint-tenancy wUl not be created, even though the two halves

be conveyed by the same instrument.

The doctrine of survivorship is not regarded with favor in the United States, and statutes

have been passed in many of the states, either abolishing it, or changing joint tenancies into

tenancies in common, except in the case of conveyances in trust, or by way of mortgage, or to

husband and wife, and in cases where the instruments creating them expressly declare that

they shall be estates in joint-tenancy.

(3) [But two persons may have an estate in joint-tenancy for their lives, and yet hare

several inheritances. Litt. See. 283. 284; 1 Inst. 184, a; Cook t>. Cook, 2 Tern. 545; Cray r.

Willis, 2 P. Wms. 530. This is the case, where an estate is granted in joint-tenancy to per-

sons and the heirs of their bodies, which persons cannot intermarry. Soepost, p. 192. Bnt in

this case, there is no division between the estate for lives and the several inheritances, and the

joint tenants cannot convey away their inheritances after their decease; the estate for lives

and the inheritance are divided only in supposition and consideration of law, and to some pur-

poses the inheritance is executed. 1 Inst. 182, b.]

(4) [Lord Coke says, that if a rent charge of 101. be granted to A and B, to have and to hold

to them two, viz: to A till he be married, and to B till he be advanced to a benefice, the.v are

joint-tenants in the mean time, notwithstanding the limitations; and if A die before marriage,

(1) [Joint-tenancies are now re~ded with so little favor, both in courts of law and equity.
th:at wh~ever the expre~ions will. import an intention in f!'vour of a tenancy in common, it
will be given effect to. Ft8her v. Wig~, 1 P. Wms. 14 n., and 1d., 1 L<l. Raym. 622; 1 Salk. 39'l,
note 8. Lord Cowper says, that a jomt tenancy is in equity an odious thing. 1 Salk. lSB.
See also 2 Vee. Sen. 258. In wills the expressions "eqtuJlly to btl diri<k<l, sha,.6 and share ald:e,
respectively bettDcen and amongst them," have been held to create a tenancy in common. 2 Atk.
121 ; 4 Bro. 15. The wordt! equally to be divided make a tenancy in oommon in surrenders of
copyholds: 1 Salk. 391 ; 2 Salk. 6W ; and also in deeds which derive their operation from the
statute of uses: 1 P. Wms. U; 1 Wils. 341; Cowp. 660; 2 Vee. Sen. 'Jb7 ; and it is belined
that the same words in a common law conve1ance would now create a tenancy in common.
When two or more purchase lands, and pay m equal proportions, a conveyance being made
to them and their heirs, this is a joint-tenancy. But if they advance the money in unequal
proportions, they are considered in equity in the nature of partners ; and if one of them die.
the others have not his share by snrvirnrship, but are considered aa trustees for the deceased'!!
representatives. 1 E9. Ca, .Abr. 291.]
(2) The princi.pal distinguishing characteristic of estates in joint-tenancy is, that on the d<'.ath
of one the right m the estate survives to the other to the exclusion of the heini and represent.a·
tives of the deceased joint-tenant. The law of joint tenancy is baaed upon a supposed inten·
tion of a grantor, in conveying an estate as a unity to two or more/il"l!Ons, that it should not be
severed; and therefore if a conveyance be of separate undivide halves of the same land t.o
two different persoDB, an estate in joint-tenancy will not be created, even though the two halves
be conveyed by the same instrument.
The doctrine of survivorship is not regarded with favor in the United States, and et.atut.es
have been pMSed in many of the states, either abolishing it, or changing joint tenancies into
tenancies in common, except in the ca.se of conveyances in trust, or by way of mortgage, or to
husl>and and wife, and in ca.'!es where the instruments creating them expressly dooTare that
they :;hall be e:!tates in joint-tenancy.
(3) [~ut ~wo pen;o~s may have an estate in Joint-tenancy for their lives, and yet hue
l!Cveral whentances. Lttt. See. 283, 284; 1 lDBt. 184, a; Cook 11. Cook, 2 Vern. 545; Oray r.
Willis, 2 P. Wms. 530. This is the case, where an estate is granted in joint-tenancy to per·
soDB and the heirs of their bodies, which persons cannot intermarry. See poat, p. 192. But in
this case, there is no division between the estate for lives and the several inheritanoea, and the
joint tenants cannot convey away their inheritances aft.er their decease; the estate for liv08
and the inheritance are divided only in supposition and consideration of law, and to eome pur·
poses the inheritance is executed. 1 Inst. 18'l, b. l
( 4) [Lord Coke llays, that if a rent charge of 10?. be granted to A. and B, to have and to hold
to them two, ru: to A till he be married, and to B till he be advanced to a benefice, they &re
joint-tenants in the mean time, notwithlltanding the limitations; and if A. die before mania@e,
the rent shall survive to B. But if A had married, the rent should have ceased for a moietr,
et aic e oom;twso, on the other side. Co. Litt. 180, b; 2 Cruise Digest, 4U8.]
~2

the rent shall survive to B. But if A had married, the rent should have ceased for a moiety,

et sic e oonverso, on the other side. Co. Litt. 180, b; 2 Cruise Digest, 498.]
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must also have an unity of title ; their estate must be created by one and the

same act, whether legal or illegal: as by one and the same grant, or by one and

the same disseisin. (/) Joint-tenancy cannot arise by descent or act of law; but

merely by purchase or acquisition by the act of the party: and unless that act

be one and the same, the two tenants would have different titles; and if they

had different titles, one mightprove good and the other bad, which would abso-

lutely destroy the jointure. Thirdly, there must also be an unity of time ; their

estates must be vested at one and the same period, as well as by one and the

same title. As in case of a present estate made to A and B; or a remainder in

fee to A and B after a particular estate; in either case A and B are joint-tenants

of this present estate, or this vested remainder. But if, after a lease for life, the

remainder be limited to the heirs of A and B; and during the continuance of

the particular estate A dies, which vests the remainder of one moiety in his

heir; and then B dies, whereby the other moiety becomes vested in the heir of

B: now A's heir and B's heir are not joint-tenants of this remainder, but ten-

ants in common; for one moiety vested at one time, and the other moiety

vested at another, (of) *Yet where a feoffment was made to the use of r *i go i

a man, and such wife as he should afterwards marry for term of their *- J

lives, and he afterwards married; in this case it seems to have been held that the

husband and wife had a joint-estate, though vested at different times: (h) (5)

because the use of the wife's estate was in abeyance and dormant till the inter-

marriage ; and, being then awakened, had relation back, and took effect from
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the original time of creation. Lastly, in joint-tenancy there must be an unity

of possession. Joint-tenants are said to be seised per my et per tout by the half

or moiety, and by all: that is, they each of them have the entire possession, as

well of every parcel as of the whole, (i) They have not, one of them a seisin of

one-half or moiety, and the other of the other moiety; neither can one be

exclusively seised of one acre, and his companion of another; but each has an

undivided moiety of the whole, and not the whole of an undivided moiety. (/)

And therefore, if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are

neither properly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and wife

"being considered as one person in law, they, cannot take the estate by moieties,

but both are seised of the entirety, per tout, et non per my: the consequence of

which is, that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without

the assent of the other, but the whole must remain to the survivor, (k) (6)

f/J Ibid. J 278. (g) Co. Litt. 188. (H) Dyer 340. 1 Hep. 101. (i) Litt. } J88. 5 Hep. 10.

(j) (Juilibet lotum tenet et ni/iil tenet .• scilicet, totum in communt, et nihil separatim per te. Bract. 1. Fi, tr.

must also have an unity of title; their estate must be created by one and the
same act, whether legal or illegal: as by one and the same grant, or by one and
the same disseisin. (/) Joint-tenancy cannot arise by descent or act of law; but
merely by purchase or acquisition by the act of the :party: and unless that act
be one and the same, the two tenants would have different titles; and if they
had different titles, one might pro\'e good and the other bad, which would absolutely destroy the jointure. Tltirdly, there must also be an unity of time; their
estates must be vested at one and the same period, as well as by one and the
same title. As in case of a present estate made to A and B; or a remainder in
fee to A and B after a particular estate; in either case A and B are joint-tenants
of this present estate, or this vested rem!l.inder. But if, after a lease for life, the
remainder be limited to the heirs of A and B; and during the continuance of
the particular estate A dies, which vests the remainder of one moiety in his
heir ; and then B dies, whereby the other moiety becomes vested in the heir of
B: now A's heir and B's heir are not joint-tenants of this remainder, but tenants in common ; for one moiety vested at one time, and the other moiety
vested at another. (V,) *Yet where a feoffinent waa made to the use of [ • 182 ]
a man, and such Wlfe as he should afterwards marry for term of their
lives, and he afterwards married; in this case it seems to have been held that the
husband and wife had a joint-estate, though vested at different times: (h) (5)
because the use of the wife's estate was in abeyance and dormant till the intermarriage ; and, being then awakened, had relation back, and took effect from
the original time of creation. J..;astly, in joint-tenancy there must be an unity
of possessJ'.on. Joint-tenants are said to be seisedper my et per tout by the half
or rMiety, and by all: that is, they each of them have the entire possession, as
well of every parcel as of the wltole. (i) They have not, one of them a seisin of
one-half or moiety, and the other of the other moiety; neither can one be
exclusively seised of one acre, and his companion of another; but each has an
undivided moiet.Y. of the whole, and not the whole of an undivided moiety. (j)
And therefore, if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are
neither properly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and wife
being considered as one person in law, they, cannot take the estate by moieties,
but both are seised of the entirety, per tout, et non per my: the consequence of
which is, that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without
the assent of the other, but the whole must remain to the survivor. (k) (6)

6c. 26.

(It) Litt. ^ 6®. Co. Litt. 187. Bro. Abr. t. cui in vita, 8. 2 Vern. 120. 2 Lev. 39.

(5)[Thatitisa joint claim by the same conveyance -which makes joint-truants, not the time of

vesting, has been held in various other coses. See Blamforde ». Blamforde, 3 Bulstr. 101; Earl

ff) Ibid.§ 2711.
(g) Co. Litt. 188.
(h) Dyer 340. 1Rep.101.
(i) Litt. t !88. 5 Rep. 10.
fjj QuilibeHowm lend d "'11il kNd, .mlkd, """•in com-ni, d nihil aeparatim per u. Bract. i. IS, tr.
ISc. 26.
(le) LIU.§ 6&>. Co. Litt. 187. Bro. ...fbr. I. cuHn vlta, 8. 2 Vern. 120. 2 Lev. 89.

of Sussex v. Temple, 1 Lord Raym. 312; Aylor v. Chep, Cro. Jac. 259; S. C. Yelv. 183; Gates

v. Jackson, 2 Str. 1172; Hales v. Risley, Pollexf, 373.

So, although some of the persons to whom an estate is limited, are in by the common law,

and others by the statute of noes, yet they will take in joint-tenancy: "Watts v. Lee, Noy. 124,

Sammies' Case, 13 Rep. 54; and Lord Thurlow held, that whether a settlement was to be con-

sidered as a conveyance of a legal estate, or a deed to uses, would make no difference, and

that in either case, the vesting at different times would not necessarily prevent the settled estate

from being taken m joint-tenancy. Stratton v. Best, 2 Br. 240.

(6) [5 Term Rep. 654. And if a grant is made of a joint-estate to husband and wife, and a

third person, the husband and wife shall have one moiety, and the third person the other

moiety, in the same manner as if it had been granted only to two persons. So if the grant is

to husband and wife and two others, the hn.sband and wife take one-third in joint-tenancy.

Litt. $ 291. But where an estate is conveyed to a man and a woman, who are not married

together, and who afterwards intermarry, as they took originally by moieties, they will con-

tinue to hold by moieties after the marriage. 1 Inst. 187, b; Moody c. Moody, Arab. 649; 2

Crn. I)ig. 511; Sid. 448.]

This peculiar estate is recognized by the American decisions, and is generally left unaffected

by statutes. See Jackson v. Stevens, 16 Johns, 110; Ross v. Garrison, 1 Dana, 35; Taul v.

Campbell, 7 Terg. 319; Fairehild v. Chastelleaux, 1 Penn.-St. 176; Den v. Whitemore, 2 Dev.

and Bat. 537; Brownson v. Hull, 16 Tt. 309; Bomar v. Mnllins, 4 Rich. Eq. 80; Gibson v. Zim-

(5)[Thatitisajoint. claim by the same conveyance which makes joint-tenants, not the time of
veisting, h&'! been held in variou11 other cases. See Bla.mforde "· Blamforde, 3 Bulstr. 101 ; Earl
of Sussex"· Temple, 1 Lord Raym. 312; Aylor"· Chep, Cro. Jae. 259; 8. C. Yeh-. 183; Oates
v. Jackson, 2 Str. 1172; Hale11 v. Risley, Pollexf, 373.
So, although some of the persons to whom an estate is limit.ad, are in by the common law,
and others by the Btatut.e of Ul'68, yet they will take in joint-tenancy: Watts v. Lee, Noy. 124,
Sammes' Case, 13 Rep. 54 ; and Lord Thurlow held, that whether a settlement was to he con·
sidered as a conveyance of a legal e8tat.e, or a deed to uses, would make no difference, and
that in either case, the vesting at different times would not necessarily prevent the settled estate
from being taken in joint-t.enancy. Stratton"· Best, 2 Br. 240.
(6) [5 Term Rep. 654. .And if a grMt ie made of a joint-estate to husband and wife, a.nd s
third pel"Ron, the hu11bsnd and wile shall have one moiety, and the third person the other
moiety, in the same manner as if it had been granted only t.o two persons. So if the grant is
to huRband and wife snd two other11, the hm1band and wife take one•third in joint·tenaucy.
Litt. ~ 291. But where an estate ii! conveyed to a. man and a woman, who are not married
t.ogether, and who aft-0rwards int.ermarry, as they took originally by moietie11, they will continue to hold by moieties after the marriage. 1 Inst. 187, b; Moody v. Moody, .A.mb. 649; 2
Gru. 1>ig. 511 ; 5 id. 448.]
'fhis peculil\r estate ie recognized by the American decil!ions, and is generally left unaffected
by statute11. See JackRon v. · StevenR, 16 JohnR, 110; RoSR v. Garriwn, 1 Dana, 3.5; Taul v.
Campbell, 7 Yer11:. 319; 1''airchild v. Chast.elleaux, 1 Penn: St. 176; Den v. Whitemore, 2 Dev.
and Bat. 537; Brownson v. Hull, 16 Vt. 309; Bomar v. Miillins, 4 Rich. Eq. 80; Gibson v. Zimmerman, 12 Mo. 385; 1 Wasb. Real Prop. 278.

merman, 12 Mo. 385; 1 Wash. Real Prop. 278.
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Upon these principles, of a thorough and intimate union of interest and pos-

session, depend many other consequences and incidents to the joint-tenant's

estate. If two joint-tenants let a verbal lease of their land, reserving rent to be

paid to one of them, it shall enure to both, in respect of the joint rever-

sion. (1) (7) If their lessee surrenders his lease to one of them, it shall also enure

to both, because of the privity, or relation of their estate, (in) On the same

reason, livery of seisin, made to one joint-tenant, shall enure to both of them: (n)

and the entry, or re-entry, of one joint-tenant is as effectual in law as if it were

the act of both, (o) (8) In all actions also relating to their joint-estate, one joint-

tenant cannot sue or be sued without joining the other, (p) (9) But if two or

more joint-tenants be seised of an advowson, and they present different clerks,

the bishop may refuse to admit either; because neither joint-tenant hath a

F *1831 8eyera^ right of patronage, but each is seised of *the whole; and if thev

L ' J do not both agree within six months, the right of presentation shafl

lapse. But the ordinary may, if he pleases, admit a clerk presented by either,

for the good of the church, that divine service may be regularly performed;

which is no more than he otherwise would be entitled to do, in case their dis-

agreement continued, so as to incur a lapse: and, if the clerk of one joint-tenant

be so admitted, this shall keep up the title in both of them; in respect of the

privity and union of their estate, (q) Upon the same ground it is held, that one

joint-tenant cannot have an action against another for trespass, in respect of

his land; (r) for each has an equal right to enter on any part of it But one
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joint-tenant is not capable by himself to do any act which may tend to defeat

or injure the estate of the other; (10) as to let leases, or to grant copyholds: (s)

and if any waste be done, which tends to the destruction of the inheritance,

one joint-tenant may have an action of waste against the other, by construction

of the statute Westm. 2, c. 22. (t) So too, though at common law no action oi

account lay for one joint-tenant against another, unless he had constituted him

his bailiff or receiver, («) yet now oy the statute 4 Ann. c. 16, joint-tenants may

have actions of account against each other, for receiving more than their due

share of the profits of the tenements held in joint-tenancy. (11)

From the same principle also arises the remaining grand incident of joint-

estates ; viz.: the doctrine of survivorship: by which when two or more per-

fl) Co. Lilt. 214. (m) ll.i-1. 192. (n) Ibid. 49. (o) Ibid. 319, 364. fa) lli-l. 195.

(q) Ibid. 186. (r) 3 Leon. 261. (t) 1 Leon. 234. (t) 2 Inst. 403. (u)Co. Liu. 300.

(7) [Per Abbott, 0. J.; 5 B. and A. 851. If there were originally a joint letting by parol, and

afterwards one of the two give notice to the tenant to pay nun separately, and his snare be paid ac-

Upon these principles, of a thorough and intimate union of interest and possession, depend many other consequences and incidents to the joint-tenant's
estate. If two joint-tenants let a verbal lease of their land, resen·ing rent to be
paid to one of them, it shall enure to both, in respect of the joint re'fersion. (l) (7) If their lessee surrenders his lcwm to one of them, it shall also enu.re
to both, because of the privity, or relation of their estate. (m) On the same
reason, livery of seisin, made to one joint-t-Onant, shall enure to both of them: ( n)
and the entry, or re-entry, of one joint-fonant is as effectual in law as if it were
the act of both. (o) (8) In all actions also relating to their joint-estate, one jointtenant cannot sue or be sued without joining the other. (p) (9) But if two or
more joint-tenants be seised of an advowson, and they present different clerks,
the bishop may refuse to admit either; because neither joint-tenant hath a
[ • 183 ] several right of patronage, but each is seised of *the whole; and if they
do not both agree within six months, the right of presentation shafl
lapse. But the ordinary may, if he pleases, udmit a clerk present.ed. by either,
for the good of the church, that divine service may be regularly performed;
which is no more than he otherwise would be entitled to do, in case their disagreement continued, so BS to incur a lapse: and, if the clerk of one joint-tenant
be so admitted, this shall kc(•p up the title in both of them; in respect of the
privity and union of their estate. (q) Upon the same ground it is held, that one
Joint-tenant cannot have an action against another for trespass, in respect of
his land; (r) for each has an equal right to enter on any part of it. But one
joint-tenant is not capable by himself to do any act which may tend to defeat
or injure the estate of the other; (10) as to let leases, or to grant co:pyholds: (s)
and it any waste be done, which tends to the destruction of the mheritance,
one joint-tenant may have an action of waste against the other, by construction
of the statute Westm. 2, c. 22. (t) So too, though at common law no action ot
account lay for one joint-tenant against another, unless he had constituted him
his bailiff or receiver, (u) yet now by the statute 4 Ann. c.16, joint-tenants may
ha.Ye actions of account against each other, for receiving more than their due
share of the profit~ of the tenements held in joint-tenancy. (11)
From the same principle also arises the remaining grand incidtnt of jointestates; viz.: the doctrine of survivorship: by which when two or more per(lJ Co. Litt. il4.
(q) Ibid. 186.

cordingly, this is evidence of a fresh, separate demise of his share, and he mast sue separately. Id.]

(rra) I bid. 19'J.
(r) 8 Leon. 21li.

(n) Ibid. '9.
(•) 1 Leon. 284.

(o) Ibid. 819, SM.
(t) 2 Inst. 403.

(p) Ibid. 1115.
(II)

Co. Litt. m.

(8) In ejectment the possession of one joint-tenant was formerly the possession of the

other, so as to prevent the statute of limitations from rnnning against him. Ford o. Lord

Grey, 6 Mod. 44; S. C. 1 Salk. 285. Bnt now by the 12th section of the statute 3 and 4 Geo. FV,

c. 27, it is enacted that the possession of one coparcener, joint-tenant or tenant in common, shall

not be deemed the possession of the others, unless their shares of the profits of the land were

received for their benefit by the party in possession.]

(9) [See last note. If four joint-tenants jointly demise from year to year, snch of them as

give notice to quit, may recover their several shares in ejectment on their several demises. 3

Taunt. 120.]

(10) [In consequence of the right of survivorship among joint-tenants, all charges made l>y

a joint-tenant on the estate determine by his death, and do not affect the survivor. For, it is

a maxim of law, that jus accrescendi prafertur oneribus. 1 Inst. 185 a.; Lilt. J 286. But, if the

grantor of the charge survives, of course, it is good. Co. Litt. 184, b. So, if one joint-tenant

sii ll'rrs a judgment in an action of debt to be entered up against him, and dies before execution

hod, it v. il 1 not be executed afterwards; but if execution be sued in the life of the cogniior, it

will bind the survivor. Lord Abergavenny's Case, 6 Rep. 79; 1 Inst. 184 a.

There is, however, one exception to the rule, that joint-tenants cannot charge the estate in

any way, so as to affect the interests of the survivors: for instance, if there are two joint-tenants

in fee, and one of them makes a lease for years to a stranger, it will be good against the survivor,

even though such lease in not made to commence till after the death of the joint-tenant who

executed it; because, the grant of a lease i- a disposition of the laud, made at the time of such

prant, though possession ii*Hot then given. Co. Litt. 185, a.; Litt, $ 2tJ9; Whittock r. Horton,

Cro. Jac. 91; Clerk v. Turner, 2 Veni. 323.]

(11) This action is now obsolete, and a bill in equity for an account is substituted.
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(7) [Per Abbott, O. J.; 5 B. and A. 851. If there were originally a joint letting by parol, &nd
afterwards one of the two give notice to the tenant to pay him separately, and his share be paid accordingly, this is e\;donce of a frellh, sepa.re.te demise of his she.re, and he mnst sue separately. Id.]
(8) In ejectment the posses!!ion of one joint-tenant WM formerly the possession of the
other, so as to prevent the statute of limitations from running against him. Ford o. Lord
Grey, 6 Mod. 44; S. 0. 1 Salk. 285. Bot now by the 12th section of the statute 3 e.nd 4 Geo. IV
c. Z'l, it is enacted that the possession of one coparcaner, joint-tenant or tene.nt in common, sh~
not be deemed the possession of the others, unless their shares of the profits of the laud were
received for their benefit by the party in po88e!.18ion.]
(9) [See le.st note. If four joint-tenants jointly demise from year to year, such of them as
give notice to quit, may recover their several shares in ejootment on their several demise&. 3
Taunt. 120.)
(10) [In consequence of the right of survivorship among joint-tenant.a, all charges made by
a joint-tenant on the estate determine by his deatb, and do not affect the survivor. For, it lS
a maxim of law, that jus accr68cendi praifcrtur oMribua. 1 Inst. 185 a.; Litt. § 286. Bot, if the
grantor of the charge Rurvives, of coUIBe, it is good. Co. Litt. 184, b , So, if one joint-tenant
;mJfol'll a judgment in an action of debt to be entered up against him, and dies before ei.ecution
he.d, it will not be executed afterwards; but if executrnn be sued in the life of the oogniaor, it
will bind the survivor. Lord .A.bergavenny's Case, 6 Rep. 79; 1 Inst. 184 a.
There is, however, one oxcHption to the rule, that joint-tenants cannot charge the estate in
any way, so II.I! to affect the intere:!t.i of the survirol'll: for inKta.nce, if there a.re t.wo joint· tenants
in fee, and one of tbrm make~ a lrAAe for yea.rs to a ~tmnger, it will be good against the survivor,
C\Pn though such lea.!e i~ not made to commence till after the death of the joint-tenant who
cxt(•uted it; becaU$C, the p;rnut of a lee..~e i~ a dispositi11n of the land, made at the time of 1m('h
~mnt, though poRHe~Rion i~ 11ot tht>n girnn. Co. Litt. 185, a.; Litt, § 289; Whittock t'. Horton,
lJro. Jae. 91; Vierk v. 'funwr. :l Vcm. :3'l:l.]
(11) 'fbi11 action iti now oh~olctn, and a hill in equity for a.n u.ccount is substituted.
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JOINT TENANCIES.

sons are seised of a joint-estate, of inheritance, for their own lives, or pur aider

vie, or are jointly possessed of any chattel-interest, the entire tenancy upon the

decease of any of them remains to the survivors, and at length to the last sur-

vivor ; and he shall be entitled to the whole estate, whatever it be, whether an

inheritance or a common freehold only, or even a less estate, (w) (12) This is the

natural and regular consequence of the union and entirety of their interest. The

interest of two joint-tenants *is not only equal or similar, but also is one r *i 04 n

and the same. One has not originally a distinct moiety from the other; •• -"

but, if by any subsequent act (as by alienation or forfeiture of either) the inter-

est becomes separate and distinct, the joint-tenancy instantly ceases. But, while

it continues, each of two joint-tenants has a concurrent interest in the whole;

and, therefore, on the death of his companion, the sole interest in the whole

remains to the survivor. For the interest which the survivor originally had is

clearly not divested by the death of his companion; and no other person can

now claim to have a, joint estate with him, for no one can now have an interest

in the whole, accruing by the same title, and taking effect at the same time with

his own; neither can any one claim a separate interest in any part of the ten-

ements ; for that would be to deprive the survivor of the right which he has in

all, and every part. As therefore the survivor's original interest in the whole

still remains ; and as no one can now be admitted, either jointly or severally, to

any share with him therein; it follows, that his own interest must now be entire

and several, and that he shall alone be entitled to the whole estate (whatever it
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be) that was created by the original grant.

This right of survivorship is called by our ancient authors (x) the jus accre-

scendi, because the right upon the death of one joint-tenant accumulates and

increases to the survivors: or, as they themselves express it, "pars ilia corn-

munis accrescit superstitibus, de persona in personam, usque ad ultimam

superstitem." And this jus accrescendi ought to be mutual; which I appre-

hend to be one reason why neither the king, (y) nor any corporation, (z)

can be a joint-tenant with a private person. For here is no mutuality;

the private person has not even the remotest chance of being seised of the

entirety, by benefit of survivorship; for the king and the corporation can

never die.

3. *We are, lastly, to inquire how an estate in joint-tenancy may be r *, Q. -i

severed and destroyed. And this may be done by destroying any of its L J

constituent unities. 1. That of time, which respects only the original com-

mencement of the joint-estate, cannot indeed (being now past) be affected by

any subsequent transactions. But, 2. The joint-tenants' estate may be destroyed,

without any alienation, by merely disuniting their possession. For joint-tenants

being seised per my et per tout, every thing that tends to narrow that interest,

so that they shall not be seised throughout the whole, and throughout every

part, is a severance or destruction of the jointure. And therefore, if two joint-

tenants agree to part their lands, and hold them in severally, they are no longer

joint-tenants: for they have now no joint interest in the whole, but only a sev-

eral interest respectively in the several parts. And for that reason, also, the

right of survivorship is by such separation destroyed, (a) By common law all

the joint-tenants might agree to make partition of the lands, but one of them

could not compel the other so to do: (b) for this being an estate originally

created by the act and agreement of the parties, the law would not permit any

one or more, of them to destroy the united possession without a similar universal

consent. But now by the statutes 31 Hen. VIII, c. 1, and 32 Hen. VIII, c. 32,

joint-tenants, either of inheritances or other less estates, are compellable by writ

(») Utt. « 280, 281. (x) Braoton. I. 4, tr. 3, c. 9,} 3. Flcta, I. 8, c. 4. .

'.</> Co. Lilt. 190. Finch, t,. S3. (z) 2Lev. 12. (a) Co. Liu. 188, 193: ('/> Lift. § 290.

(12) [And that free from any claim of dower or curtesy on account of the inheritance that was

in the deceased joint-tenant. Co. Litt. 37.]
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sons are seised of a joint-estate, of inheritance, for their own lives, or pui· auter
vie, or are jointly possessed of any chattel-interest, the entire tenancy upon the
decease of any of them remains to the survivors, and at length to the last survivor; and he shall be entitled to the whole estate, whatever it be, whether au
inheritance or a common freehold only, or even a less estate. (w) (12) 'rhis is the
natural and regular consequence of the union and entirety of their interest. The
interest of two joint-tenau ts *is not only equal or similar, but also is one [ *lS4]
and the same. One has not originally a distinct moiety from the other;
but, if by any subsequent act (as by alienation or forfeiture of either) the interest becomes separate and distinct, the joint-tenancy instantly ceases. But, while
it continues, each of two joint-tenants has a concurrent interest in the whole;
and, therefore, on the death of his companion, the sole interest in the whole
remains to the survivor. For the interest which the survivor originally had is
clearly not divested by the death of his companion; and no other person can
now claim to have a joint estate with him, for no one can now have an interest
in the whole, accruing by the same title, and tuking effect at the same time with
his own; neither can any one claim a separate interest in any p:trt of the tenements ; for that would be to deprive the survivor of the right which he has in
all, and every part. As therefore the survh-or's original interest in the whole
still remains; and as no one can now be admitted, either jointly or severally, to
any share with him therein; it follows, that his own interest must now be entire
and several, and that he shall alone be entitled to the whole estate (whatever it
be) that was created by the original grant.
This right of survivorship is called by our ancient authors (x) the jus accrescendi, because the right upon the death of one joint-tenant accumulates and
increases to the survivors: or, as they themselves express it, "pars illa communis accrescit superstiNbus, de persona in personam, usque ad itltimam
superstitem." And this .fus accrescendi ought to be mutual; which I apprehend to be one reason why neither the king, (y) nor any corporation, (z)
can be a joint-t~nant with a pri...ate person. 'E'or here is no mutuality;
the private person has not even the remotest chance of being seised of the
entirety~ by benefit of survivorship ; for the king and the corporation can
never die.
3. *We are, lastly, to inquire how an estate in joint-tenancy may be [ • 185 ]
severed and destroyed. And this may be done by destroying any of its
constituent unities. 1. That of time, which respects only the original commencement of the joint-estate, cannot indeed (being now past) be affected by
any subsequent transactions. But, 2. The joint-tenants' estate may be destroyed,
without any alienation, by merely disuniting their possession. For joint-tenants
being seised per my et per tout, every thing that tends to narrow that interest,
so that they shall not be seised throughout the whole, and throughout every
part, is a severance or destruction of the jointure. And therefore, if two jointtenants agree to part their lands, and hold them in severalty, they are no longer
joint-tenants: for they haYe now no joint interest in the whole, but only a several interest respectively in the several parts. And for that reason, also, the
right of survivorship is by such separation destroyed. (a) By common law all
the joint-tenants might agree to make partition of the lands, but one of them
could not compel the other so to do: (b) for this being an estate originally
created by the act and agreement of the parties, the law would not permit any
one or more of them to destroy the united possession without a similar uRiversal
consent. Bnt now by the statutes 31 Hen. VIII, c. 1, and 32 Hen. VIII, c. 32,
joint-tenants, either of inheritances or other less estates, are compellable by writ
(w) Litt. M 280, 281.
(z) Brn.cton. l. 4, tr. 3, c.
(JI) Co. Litt. 190. Finch. L. 83.
(z) 2 Lev. 12.

O, § S. Fleta, l. S, c. 4.
.
(a) <.:o. Litt. 188, 193;

lb) Litt. § 200.

(12) (And that free from any claim of dower or curtesy on account of the inheritance that was
in the deceAAed joint-tenant. Co. Litt. 37.]
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of partition to divide their lands, (c) (13) 3. The jointure may be destroyed by

destroying the unity of titk. As if one joint-tenant alienes and conveys hia

estate to a third person : here the joint tenancy is severed, and turned into ten-

ancy in common ; (d) for the grantee and the remaining joint-tenant hold by

different titles (one derived from the original, the other from the subsequent

grantor), though, till partition made, the unity of possession continues. (14)

)

F *186 1 ^u^ a Devise °f °ne's share by will *is no severance of the jointure : (15)

' -I for no testament takes effect till after the death of the testator, and by

such death the right of the survivor (which accrued at the original creation of

the estate, and has therefore a priority to the other (e) is already vested. (/) (16)

4. It may also be destroyed by destroying the unity of interest. And therefore,

if there be two joint-tenants for life, and the inheritance is purchased by or

descends upon either, it is a severance of the jointure ; {g) though, if an estate

is originally limited to two for life, and after to the heirs of one of them, the

freehold shall remain in jointure, without merging in the inheritance ; because,

being created by one and the same conveyance, they are not separate estates

(which is requisite in order to a merger), but branches of one entire estate, (h)

in like manner, if a joint-tenant in fee makes a lease for life of his share, this

defeats the jointure : (i) for it destroys the unity both of title and of interest.

And, whenever or by whatever means the jointure ceases or is severed, the right

of survivorship, or jus accrescendi, the same instant ceases with it(&) Yet, if
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one of three joint-tenants alienes his share, the two remaining tenants still hold

their parts by joint-tenancy and survivorship: (I) and if one of three joint-

tenants release his share to one of his companions, though the joint-tenancy is

destroyed with regard to that part, yet the two remaining parts are still held in

jointure; (m) for they still preserve their original constituent unities. But

when, by any act or event, different interests are created in the several parts of

the estate, or they are held by different titles, or if merely the possession is sep-

arated ; so that the tenants have no longer these four indispensable properties,

a sameness of interest, and undivided possession, a title vesting at one and the

same time, and by one and the same act or grant; the jointure is instantlj

dissolved.

F *187 1 *^n £enerftl *t is advantageous for the point-tenants to dissolve the

L J jointure ; since thereby the right of survivorship is taken away, and

each may transmit his own part to his own heirs. Sometimes, however, it is

disadvantageous to dissolve the joint estate : as if there be joint-tenants for life,

and they make partition, this dissolves the jointure ; and, though before they

each of them had an estate in the whole for their own lives and the life of their

(e) Tims, by the civil law. nemo invitut compellitur ad communionem. (Ff. 12, 6, 26, f 4. And again. tins*n

omnt> </«i ran communcm habent, sed certi ex hit, dividere desiderant ; hm: judicium inter eot accipi pottxt.

(Ff. 10, 8, S.)

(d) Litt. » 292. (e) Jut accrescendi prrtfertnr ultima volvntati. Co. Litt. 185. (f) Litt. » 387.

(in Cro. Ellz. 470. (h) 2 Bep. 110. Co. Lttt. 182. (i) Litt. (f 302. 303.

(KJ ffihil de re accrescit ei, out nihil in re quandojm accreaceret habet. Co. Litt. 188.

(1) Litt J 294. (m) Ibid, f 304.

(13) This writ is abolished, and a bill in equity fur partition is now the remedy in these cases.

By statute 31 and 32 Yic. c. 40, the court may order a sale, instead of partition, where that course

appears proper.

(14) [When an estate is devised to A and B, who are strangers to, and have no connexion

with, each other, the conveyance by one of them severs the joint-tenancy, and passes a moietr ;

but per Kenyon, Ch. J., it has been settled for ages, that when the devise is to husband and wire,

they take by entireties and not by moieties, and the husband alone cannot by his own con-

veyance, without joining his wife, divest the estate of the wife. 5 T. K. 654. If five trustees b«

joint-tenants, and if three execute a conveyance, it will sever the joint estate, and create a ten-

ancv in common, and the person to whom the conveyance was made may recover three-fifths in

ejectment. 11 East, 288. J

(15) [A covenant by a joint-tenant to sell, though it does not sever the joint-tenancy at law,

will do so in equity ; Browne v, Raindle, 3 Ves. 257 ; Hinton c. Hinton, 2 Ves. Sen. 639 ; provided

the agreement for sale be one of which a specific performance could be enforced. Pateriche r.

Powlctt, 2 Atk. 54 ; Hinton v. Hinton, 2 Ves. Sen. 634.]

(16) A joint-tenant wishing to devise his estate must first cause partition thereof to be made,

as otherwise the right of survivorship will exclude the devise.
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companion, now they have an estate in a moiety only for their own lives merely;

and, on the death of either, the reversioner shall enter on his moiety. («) And

therefore if there be two joint-tenants for life, and one grants away his part for

the life of his companion, it is a forfeiture: (o) for, in the first place, by the

severance of the jointure he has given himself in his own moiety only an estate

for his own life; and then he grants the same land for the life of another;

which grant, by a tenant for his own life merely, is a forfeiture of his estate: {p)

for it is creating an estate which may by possibility last longer than that which

he is legally entitled to.

III. An estate held in coparcenary (17) is where lands of inheritance descend

from the ancestor to two or more persons. It arises either by common law or

particular custom. By common law: as where a person seized in fee-simple or

in fee-tail dies, and his next heirs are two or more females, his daughters, sisters,

aunts, cousins, or their representatives; in this case they shall all inherit, as will

be more fully shown when we treat of descents hereafter; and these co-heirs are

then called co-parceners ; or, for brevity, parceners only, (a) Parceners by par-

ticular custom are where lands descend, as in gavelkind, to all the males in

equal degree, as sons, brothers, uncles, &c.(r) And, in either of these cases, all the

parceners put together make but one heir, and have but one estate among them.(s)

*The properties of parceners are in some respects like those of joint- .- „,, gg -,

tenants; they having the same unities of interest, title and possession. *- -"

They may sue and be sued jointly for matters relating to their own lands; (£)
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and the entry of one of them shall in some cases enure as the entry of them

all. («) They cannot have an action of trespass against each other; but herein

they differ from joint-tenants, that they are also excluded from maintaining an

action of waste; (w) for coparcenars could at all times put a stop to any waste

by writ of partition, but till the statute of Henry the Eighth, joint-tenants had

no such power. Parceners also differ materially from joint-tenants in four

other points. 1. They always claim by descent, whereas joint-tenants always

claim by purchase. Therefore, if two sisters purchased lands, to hold to them

and their heirs, they are not parceners, but joint-tenants; (a;) and hence it like-

wise follows, that no lands can be held in coparcenary, but estates of inheritance,

which are of a descendible nature: whereas not only estates in fee and in tail,

but for life dr years, may be held in joint-tenancy. 2. There is no unity of time

necessary to an estate of coparcenary. For if a man had two daughters, to

whom his estate descends in coparcenary, and one died before the other; the

surviving daughter and the heir of the other, or when both are dead, their two

heirs are still parceners; (y) the estates vesting in each of them at different

times, though it be the same quantity of interest, and held by the same title.

3. Parceners, though they have an unity, have not an entirety of interest. They

are properly entitled each to the whole of a distinct moiety; (z) and of course

there is no jus accrescendi, or survivorship between them; for each part

descends severally to their respective heirs, though the unity of possession con-

tinues. And as long as the lands continue in a course of descent, and united

in possession, so long are the tenants therein, whether male or female, called

parceners. But if *the possession be once severed by partition, they are r *i on -i

no longer parceners, but tenants in severalty; or if one parcener alienes <- -"

her share, though no partition be made, then are the lands no longer held in

coparcenary, but in common, (a)

Parceners are so called, saith Littleton, (b) because they may be constrained

to make partition. (18) And he mentions many methods of making it; (c) four

(n) 1 Jones. 55. (o) 4 Leon. 237. (p) Co. Lltt. 252. (q) Litt. « 241, 242.

(rjlbid. S265. (s) Co. Litt. 163 ft) Ibid. 164. fu) Ibid. 188. 243.

(v) » Inst. 403. (x) Litt. i 254. (a) Co. Lltt. 164,174. (z) Ibid. 163, 164.

(a} Litt. ^ 3<W. (b) i Ml. (c) }} 243 to 264.

companion, now they h11.ve an estate in a moiety only for their own lives merely;
and, on the death of either, the reversioner shall enter on his moiety. (n) .And
therefore if there be two joint-tenants for life, and one grants away his part for
the life of his companion, it is a. forfeiture: (o) for, in the first place, by the
severance of the jointure he ha.a given himself in his own moiety only an estate
for his own life; and then he grants the same land for the life of another;
which gmnt, by a tenant for his own life merely, is a. forfeiture of his estate: (P)
for it is creating a.n estate which may by possibility la.st longer than that which
he is legally entitled to.
III. .An estate held in coparcenary (17) is where lands of inheritance descend
from the ancestor to two or more persons. It arises either by common law or
particular custom. By common law: as where a. person seized in fee-simple or"
m fee-tail dies, and his next heirs are two or more females, his daughters, sisters,
aunts, cousins, or their representatives; in this case they shall all mherit, as will
be more fully shown when we treat of descents hereafter; and these co-heirs are
then called c-0-parceners; or, for brevity, parceners only. (q) Parceners by particular custom a.re where lands descend, as in gavelkind, to all the males in
equal degree, as sons, brothers, uncles, &c.( r) And, in either of these cases, all the
parceners put together make but one heir, and have but one estate among them.(s)
*The properties of parceners are in some respects like those of joint- [ ,..188 ]
tenants; they having the same unities of -interest, title and possession.
They may sue and be sued jointly for matters relating to their own lands; (t)
and the entry of one of them shall }n some cases enure as the entry of them
all. (u) They eannot have an action of trespass against each other; but herein
they differ from joint-tenants, that they are also excluded from maintaining an
action of waste; (w) for coparcenars could at all times put a stop to any waste
by writ of partition, but till the statute of Henry the Eighth, joint-temmts had
no such power. Parceners also differ materially from joint-tenants in four
other points. 1. They always claim bv descent, whereas joint-tenants always
claim by purchase. Therefore, if two sisters purchased lands, to hold to them
and their heirs, they are not parceners, but joint-tenants; (x) and hence it likewise follows, that no lands can be held in coparcenary, but estates of inheritance,
which are of a descendible nature: whereas not only estates in fee and in tail,
but for life <ft- years, may be held in joint-tenancy. 2. There is no unity of time
neces~ to an estate of coparcena.ry. For if a man had two daughters, to
whom his estate descends in coparcenary, and one died before the other; the
surviving daughter and the heir of the other, or when both are dead, their two
heirs are still parceners; (y) the estates vesting in each of them at different
times, though it be the same quantity of interest, and held by the same title.
3. Parceners, though they have an unity, ha;ve not an entirety of interest. They
are properly entitled each to the whole of a distinct moiety; (z) and of course
there is no jus accrescendi, or survivorship between them; for ea.ch part
descends severally to their respective heirs, though the unity of possession continues. And a.a long as the lands continue in a course of descent, and united
in possession, so long are the tenants therein, whether male or female, called
parceners. But if *the possession be once severed by partition, they are [ ,..189 ]
no longer parceners, but tenants in severalty; or if one parcener ahenes
her share, though no partition be ma.de, then are the lands no longer held in
coparcenary, but in common. (a)
Parceners are so called, saith Littleton, (b) because they may be constrained
to make partUion. (18) And he mentions many methods of making it; (c) four
(n) l Jones. M.
(r) Ibid. 1265.
(w) 8 lnat. 403.
(a) LIU. t :llll.

(17) TliH distinction between estates m common and estates in coparcenary can scarcely be

suiil to exist in America. See 4 Kent, 3(>7 ; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 415.

(18) Coparceners may convey to each other, both by feoffment and by release, because their

to some interests is joint, and to some several. Co. Litt. 200, b. Whereas joint-tenants
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(o) 4 Leon. 2.'17.
(8) Co. Litt. HIS
(x)

-

Lilt. ! 26,,

(b)l2H .

(p) Co. Litt. 252.
(t) Ibid. HU.
( 11) Co. Litt. 16', 17'.

(q) Litt. H 2U, 2'2.
(U) fbld. 18d1 _'.l43.
(z) Ibill.163, 164.

( c) §! \?43 to 2EU.

· - · - - - - --·-- -- - - - -- - - - - -

( li) Tho di$t.in<'tion between estate.i in rommon and e11tate~ in cnparcenary can scarcely be
will to exi8t in AnMira. See 4 Kent, :Jfi7; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 415.
( ltl) Coparccners 1nay rom·c,v to 1•nth ofoer, both by fooffment and by releai<e, because their
t<ei~in to ~ome int.creftf~ ii-i j1•int, and to wme several. Co. Litt. 200, b. WhereSR joitlt-tenants
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of which are by consent, and one by compulsion. The first is where they agree

to divide the lands into equal parts in severalty, and that each shall have such

a determinate part. The second is, when they agree to choose some friend to

make partition for them, and then the sisters shall choose each of them her

part according to seniority of age; or otherwise, as shall be agreed. The

privilege of seniority is in this case personal; for if the eldest sister be dead,

her issue shall not choose first, but the next sister. But, if an advowson descend

in coparcenary, and the sisters cannot agree in the presentation, the eldest and

her issue, nay her husband, or her assigns, shall present alone, before the

younger.(rf) (19) And the reason given is, that the former privilege of priority

in choice upon a division, arises from an act of her own, the agreement to make

partition; and therefore is merely personal: the latter, of presenting to the

living, arises from the act of the law. and is annexed not only to her person,

but to her estate also. A third method of partition is, where the eldest divides,

and then she shall choose last; for the rule of law is, cujus est divisio, alterius

est electio. The fourth method is, where the sisters agree to cast lots for their

shares. And these are the methods by consent. That by compulsion is, where

one or more sue out a writ of partition against the others; whereupon the

sheriff shall go to the lands, and make partition thereof by the verdict of a jury

there impanneled, and assign to each of the parceners her part in severalty.(e)

F *190 1 ^u' there are some things *which are in their nature impartible. The

"- •" mansion-house, common of estovers, common of piscary uncertain, or
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any other common without stint, shall not be divided; but the eldest sister, if

she pleases, shall have them, and make the others a reasonable satisfaction in

other parts of the inheritance: or, if that cannot be, then they shall have the

profits of the thing by turns, in the same manner as they take the advowson.f/")

There is yet another consideration attending the estate in coparcenary: that

if one of the daughters has had an estate given with her in frankmarriage by

her ancestor (which we may remember was a species of estates-tail, freely given

by a relation for advancement of his kinswoman in marriage),(<jr) in this case,

if lands descend from the same ancestor to her and her sisters in fee-simple, she

or her heirs shall have no share of them, unless they will agree to divide the

lands so given in frankmarriage in equal proportion with the rest of the lands

descending.(A) This mode of division was Known in the law of the Lombards; (?")

which directs the woman so preferred in marriage, and claiming her share

of the inheritance, mittere in confusum cum sororibus quantum pater aut f"rater

ei dederit, quando ambulaverit ad maritum. With us it is denominated bring-

ing those lands into Jiotch-pat: (k) which term I shall explain in the very words

of Littleton: (1) " it seemeth that this word hotch-pot, is in English a pudding :

for in a pudding is not commonly put one thing alone, but one thing with

other things together." By this housewifery metapnor our ancestors meant to

inform us (m) that the lands, both those given in frankmarriage and those

descending in fee-simple, should be mixed and blended together, and then

divided in equal portions among all the daughters. But this was left to the

choice of the donee in frankmarriage: and if she did not choose to put her

F *1911 "an<^s i"1'0 hotch-pot, she was presumed to be sufficiently *provided for,

L -I and the rest of the inheritance was divided among her other sisters.

(d) Co. Litt 103. 3 Hep. 22.

ft) By statute 8 and 9 Wm. in. c. 31, an easier method of carrying on the proceedings on a writ of parti-

tion, of lands held either in joint-tenancy, parcenary, or common, than was used at the common law, is

chalked out and provided.

(f) Co. Litt. 164, 165. (a) See page 115. (h) Bracton, l. 2. c. 84. Litt. » 266 to 873.

fi) 1.11. 14, c. 15. (k) firitton, c. 72. (I) I 267. (m) Litt. } 26S.

can release to, but not enfeoff each other, because the freehold is joint. Ib. And one

tenant in common may enfeoff his companion but not release, because the freehold is sev-

of which are by consent, and one by compulsion. The first is where they agree
to divide the lands into equal parts in severalty, and that each shall have such
a determinate part. rrhe second is, when they agree to choose some friend to
make partition for them, and then the sisters shall choose each of them her
part according to seniority of age; or otherwise, as shall be agreed. The
privilege of senioritv is in this case personal ; for if the eldest sisrer be dead,
her issue shall not choose first, but the next sister. But, if an ad.rnwson descend
in COJ>Srcenary, and the sisters cannot agree in the rresentation, the eldest and
her issue, nay her husband, or her assigus, shal present alone, before the
younger.(d) (19) And the reason given is, that the former privilege of priority
m choice upon a division, arises from an act of her own, the agreement to make
partition; and therefore is merely personal: the latter, of presenting to the
living, arises from the act of the law, and is annexed not only t-0 her person,
but to her estate also. A third method of partition is, where the elclest dh·ide~
and then she shall choose last; for the rule of law is, cujus est divfsio, alteriu8
est el,ectio. The fourth method is, where the sisters agree to cast lots for their
shares. And these a.re the methods by consent. That by compulsion is, where
one or more sue out a writ of partition against the others; whereupon the
sheriff shall go to the lands, and make partition thereof by the verdict of a jury
there impanneled, and assign to ea.ch of the parceners her part in severalty.(4')
[ • 190 ] But there are some things *which are in their nature impartible. The
mansion-house, common of estoYers, common of pisca.ry uncertain, or
any other common without stint, shall not be divided; but the eldest sister, if
she pleases, shall have them, and make the others a reasonable satisfaction in
other parts of the inheritance: or, if that cannot be, then they shall have the
profits of the thing by turns, in the same manner as they take the advowson.(f)
There is yet another consideration attending the estate in coparcena.ry: that
if one of the daughters has had an estate given with her in franhmarriag~ by
her ancestor (which we may remember was a species of estates-tail, freel,y given
by a relation for advancement of his kmswoman in marriage),(g) in this case,
if lands descend from the same ancestor to her and her sisters in fee-simple, she
or her heirs shall have no share of them, unless they will agree to divide the
!anus so given in frankmarriage in equal proportion with the rest of the lands
descending.(h) This mode of division was known in the law of the Lombards; ( i)
which directs the woman so preferred in marriage, and ch\iming her share
of the inheritance, mittere in c01~fttsum cum sororibus quantum pater aut (rater
ei dederit, quando ambulaverit ad maritum. With us it is denominated bringing those lands into lwtch-p&t: (k) which term I shall explain in the very words
of Littleton: (l) "it seemeth that this word hotch-pot, is m English a pudding:
for in a. pudding is not commonly put one thmg alone, but one thing with
other things together." By this hQusewifery metaphor our ancestors me.ant to
inform us (m) that the lands, both those given in fra.nkmarriage and those
descending in fee-simple, should be· mixed and blended to~ether, and then
divided in equal port10ns among alI the daughters. But this was left to the
choice of the donee in frankmarriage: and if she did not choose t-0 put her
[ *l9l ] lands into hot.ch-pot, she was presumed to be sufficiently •provided for~
and the rest of the inheritance was divided among her other sisters.
( <l) Co. Litt. 100. 3 l(ep. ll2.
(e) By statutcJ II and 9 Wm. III,

c. 31, an easier method Qf carrying on the proceedings on a writ of partition, of lands held either In joint-tenancy, paroenary, or common, than was used U the common I.aw, la
chalked out and pro1·idcd.
{f) Co. Litt. 164, 165.
{g)_See page 1111.
{1') Bracton, l. 2. c. 84. Litt. H 266 to 713.
(i) l. 2 t. 14, c. 111.
(I:) Britton, c. 'n.
{I) I~.
{m) Litt. I 2118.

eral. Ib.

Such partitions are now usually made by means of a bill in chancery in the Rome manner as

partition between joint tenants. ]

(19) [See 1 Yes. Sen. 340; Burn. Eccl. Law, vol. 1, p. 15; 7 Sim. 257.]
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The law of hotch-pot took place then only when the other lands descending

from the ancestor were fee-simple; for, if they descended in tail, the donee in

frankmarriage was entitled to her share, without bringing her lands so given

into hotch-pot, (n) And the reason is, because lands descending in fee-simple

are distributed, by the policy of law, for the maintenance of all the daughters;

and if one has a sufficient provision out of the same inheritance, equal to the

rest, it is not reasonable that she should have more: but lands descending in

tail, are not distributed by the operation of the law, but by the designation of

the giver, per formam doni; it matters not therefore how unequal this distribu-

tion may be. Also no lands, but such as are given in frankmarriage, shall be

brought into hotch-pot; for no others are looked upon in law as given for the

advancement of the women, or by way of marriage portion, (o) And, therefore,

as gifts in frankmarriage are fallen into disuse, I should hardly have mentioned

the law of hotch-pot, had not this method of division been revived and copied

by the statute for distribution of personal estates, which we shall hereafter con-

sider at large.

The estate in coparcenary may be dissolved, either by partition, which dis-

unites the possession; by alienation of one parcener, which disunites the title,

and may disunite the interest; or by the whole at last descending to and vesting

in one single person, which brings it to an estate in severally.

IV. Tenants in common are such as hold by several and distinct titles, but

by unity of possession; because none knoweth his own severally, and therefore
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they all occupy promiscuously. (p) This tenancy, therefore, happens where there

is a unity of possession merely, but perhaps an entire disunion of interest, of

titles and of time. For if there be two tenants in common of lands, one may

hold his part in fee-simple, the other in tail, or for life; so that there is no

*necessary unity of interest; one may hold by descent, the other by r *i go 1

purchase; or the one by purchase from A, the other by purchase from B; L J

so that there is no unity of title; one's estate may have been vested fifty years,

the other's but yesterday; so there is no unity of time. The only unity there

is, is that of possession: and for this Littleton gives the true reason, because no

man can certainly tell which part is his own; otherwise even this would be

soon destroyed.

Tenancy in common may be created, either by the destruction of the two

other estates in joint-tenancy and coparcenary, or by special limitation in a

deed. (20) By the destruction of the two other estates, I mean such destruction

as does not sever the unity of possession, but only the unity of title or interest:

As, if one of two joint-tenants in fee alienes his estate for the life of the alienee,

the alienee and the other joint-tenant are tenants in common; for they have

now several titles, the other joint-tenant by the original grant, the alienee by

the new alienation; (q) and they also have several interests, the former joint-

tenant in fee-simple, the alienee for his own life only. So, if one joint-tenant

gives his part to A in tail, and the other gives his to B in tail, the donees are

tenants in common, as holding by different titles and conveyances, (r) If one

of two parceners alienes, the alienee and the remaining parcener are tenants in

common; (s) because they hold by different titles, the parcener by descent, the

alienee by purchase. So likewise, if there be a grant to two men, or two women,

and the heirs of their bodies, here the grantees shall be joint-tenants of the life-

estate, but they shall have several inheritances; (21) because they cannot possibly

have one heir of their two bodies, as might have been the case had the limita-

tion been to a man and woman, and the heirs of their bodies begotten: (t) and

(n)/Wd. } 274. (oMMd.-m. (p}lMd.?SB. (g)/Wa. 993.

(r) Ibid. .".i-,. («) Ibid. 309. (() Ibid. 883.

(20) So in the United States tenancies in common exist where real estate descends to two

The law of botch-pot took place then only when the other lands dt-.scending
from the ancestor were fee-simple; for, if they descended in tail, the donee in
frankmarriage WBB entitled to her share, without bringing her lands so giYen
into botch-pot. (n} And the reason is, because lands descending in fee-simple
are distributed, by the policy of law, for the ma.intenance of all the daughters;
and if one has a sufficient provision out of the same inheritance, equal to the
rest, it is not reasonable that she should have more: but lands descending in
tail, are not distributed by the operation of the law, but by the designation of
the giver, per formam doni; it matters not therefore how unequal this distribqtion may be. Also no lands, but such as are given in frankmarriage, shall be
brought into hotch-pot; for no others are looked upon in law as given for the
advancement of the women, or by way of marriage portion. (o) And, therefore,
as gifts in frankmarriage are fallen into disuse, I should hardly have mentioned
the law of botch-pot, had not this method of division been revived and copied
by the statute for distribution of personal estates, which we shall hereafter consider at large.
The estate in coparcenary may be dissolzied, either by partition, which disunites the possession; by alienation of one parcener, whwh disunites the title,
and may disunite the interest; or by the whole at last descending to and yestmg
in one single person, which brings it to an estate in severalty.
IV. Tenants in common are such ll.B hold by several and distinct titles, but
by unity of possession; because none knoweth his own severalty, and therefore
they all occupy promiscuously. (p) This tenancy, therefore, happens where there
is a unity of possession merely, but perhaps an entire disunion of interest, of
titles and of time. For if there be two tenants in common of lands, one may
hold his part in fee-simple, the other in tail, or for life; so that there is no
*necessary unity of' interest; one may hold by descent, the other by [ • 192 ]
purchase; or the one by purchase from A, the other by purchase from B;
ao that there is no unity of title; one's estate may have been vested fifty years,
the other's but yesterday; so there is no unity of time. The only unity there
is, is that of possession: and for this Littleton gives the true reason, because no
man can certainly tell which part is his own; otherwise even this would be
soon destroyed.
Tenancy in common may be croated, either by the destruction of the two
other estates in joint-tenancy and coparcena.ry, or by special limitation in a
deed. (20) By the destruction of the two other estates, I me.an such destruction
as does not seycr the unity of possession, but only the unity of title or interest:
As, if one of two joint-tenants in fee alienes his estate for the life of the alienee,
the alienee and the other joint-tenant are tenants in common; for they have
now several titles, the other joint-tenant by the original grant, the alienee by
the new alienation; (q) and they also have several interests, the former jointtenant in fee-simple, the alienoo for his own life only. So, if one joint-tenant
gives his part to A in tail, and the other gives his to B in tail, the donees are
tenants in common, as holding by different titles and conveyances. (r) If one
of two parceners alienes, the alienee and the remaining parcener are tenants in
common; (s) because they hold by different titles, the parcener by descent, the
alienee by purchase. So likewise, if there be a grant to two men, or two W()'TTUn,
and the heirs of their bodies, here the grantees shall be joint-tenants of the lifeestate, but they shall have several inheritances; (21) because they cannot possibly
have one heir of their two bodies, as might have been the case had the limitation been to a man and woman, and the heirs of their bodies begotten: (t) and

or more persons ns heirs at law : and generally by statute, estates which, at the common law,

•would havis been estates in joint tenancy, are made estates in common.

(nl lbw. 1274.
(rl Ibid. 2M.

(O) I bid. Z71'i.
i•l Ibid. 309.

(Pl 1 bid. \?91l.
288.

(qJ Ibid. 993.

(t) I bid.

(21) [And the same is trnc of a limitation to two men or two women and their heirs gener-

ally. 4 MM. and TV. 229.1
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in this, and the like cases, their issue shall be tenants in common; because

they must claim by different titles, one as heir of A, and the other as heir of B ;

r », g, -I and those two not titles by *purchase, but descent In short, whenever

*• * an estate in joint-tenancy or coparcenary is dissolved, so that there be no

partition made, but the unity of possession continues, it is turned into a tenancy

in common.

A tenancy in common may also be created by express limitation in a deed;

but here care must be taken not to insert words which imply a joint estate;

and then if lands be given to two or more, and it be not joint-tenancy, it must be a

tenancy in common. But the law is apt in its constructions to favor joint-

tenancy rather than tenancy .in common;(u) because the divisible services

issuing from land (as rent, &c.) are not divided, nor the entire services (as fealty)

multiplied by joint-tenancy, as they must necessarily be upon a tenancy in com-

mon. Land given to two, to be holden the one moiety to one, and the other

moiety to the other, is an estate in common; (w) and, if one grants to another

half his land, the grantor and grantee are also tenants in common: (s) because,

as has been before (y) observed, joint-tenants do not take by distinct halves or

moieties; and by such grants the division and severalty of the estate is so

plainly expressed, that it is impossible they should take a joint interest in the

whole of tne tenements. But a devise to two persons to hold jointly and severally,

is said to be a joint-tenancy; (z) because that is necessarily implied in the won!

"jointly," the word "severally" perhaps only implying the power of partition ;
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and an estate given to A and B. equally to be divided between them, though in

deeds it hath been said to be a joint-tenancy (a) (for it implies no more than the

law has annexed to that estate, viz.: divisibility), (b) yet in ivills it is certainly a

tenancy in common, (c) because the devisor may be presumed to have meant

what is most beneficial to both the devisees, though his meaning is imperfectly

expressed. And this nicety in the wording of grants makes it the most usual

f *1941 M we^ M *ne 8a^s* wav> wnen a tenancy in common *is meant to be

I J created, to add express words of exclusion as well as description, and

limit the estate to A and B, to hold as tenants in common, and not as joint-

tenants.

As to the incidents attending a tenancy in common: tenants in common (like

joint-tenants) are compellable by the statutes of Henry VIII and William III,

before mentioned, (d) to make partition of their lands; which they were not at

common law. They properly take by distinct moieties, and have no entirety of

interest; and therefore there is no survivorship between tenants in common. {22)

Their other incidents are such as merely arise from the unity of possession;

and are therefore the same as appertain to joint-tenants merely upon that

account; such as being liable to reciprocal actions of waste, and of account, by

the statutes of Westm. 2, c. 22, and 4 Ann. c. 16. For by the common law no

tenant in common was liable to account with his companion for embezzling the

profits of the estate; (e) though, if one actually turns the other out of possession,

an action of ejectment will lie against him. (/) (23) But, as for other incidents

of joint-tenants, which arise from the privity of title, or the union and entirety

of interest (such as joining or being^ joined in actions, (g) unless in the case

where some entire or indivisible thing is to be recovered), (h) these are not appli-

. 892. (v) Litt. } 288. (x) IMd. 299. (y) Soe p. 182. ft) Poph. 58.

. Cag. Abr. 291. (b) 1 P. Wins. 17. fe) 3 Rep. 39. 1 Vent. 82. (d) Pages 188 and 189.

i. Utt. 199. (f) IWd. 200. (y) Litt. j 811. (h) Co. Litt. 197.

(22) [But a tenancy in common with benefit of survivorship may exist without being a

joint-tenancy, because survivorship is not the only characteristic of a joint-tenancy. Per

Bayley, 3. I M. and S. 435.]

See Hstton «. Finch, 4 Beav. 1«6; In re Drakeley's Estate, 19 id. 395; Turner c "WhitUker,

23 id. 196.

(23) See Sandford r. Ballard, 33 Beav. 401. AB to what is an exclusion of a co-tenant from

possession, see this case, and also Tyson v. Fairclough, 2 Sim. and S. 143. ,
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cable to tenants in common, whose interests are distinct, and whose titles are

not joint but several. (24)

Estates in common can only be dissolved two ways: 1. By uniting all the titles

and interests in one tenant, by purchase or otherwise; which brings the whole

to one severally: 2. By making partition between the several tenants in common,

which gives them all respective severalties. For indeed tenancies in common

differ in nothing from sole estates but merely in the blending and unity of pos-

session. And this finishes our inquiries with respect to the nature of estates.

CHAPTEE XIII.

OF THE TITLE TO THINGS REAL, IN GENERAL.

THE foregoing chapters having been principally employed in defining the

nature of things real, in describing the tenures by which they may be holden,

and in distinguishing the several kinds of estate or interest that may be had

therein ; I now come to consider, lastly, the title to things real, with the manner

of acquiring and losing it.

A title is thus defined by Sir Edward Coke (a) — Titulus e&tjusta causa possi-

dendi id quod nostrum est : or, it is the means whereby the owner of lands hath

the just possession of his property.

(24) [The rnle which determines whether tenants in common should sue jointly or severally,

is founded upon the nature of their interest in the matter or thing which is the cause of action.

For injuries to their common property, as trespass quare clausnm fregit, or a nuisance, <fec., or

the recovery of any thing in which they have a common right, as for rent reserved by them, or
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waste upon a lease for years, they should all be a party to the action ; but they must sue severally

in a real action generally, for they have several titles. Com. Dig. Abatement, B. 10 ; Co. latt. 197.

But if waste be committed where there is no lease by them all, the action by one alone is good.

2 Mod. 6*2. But one tenant in common cannot avow alone for taking cattle damage feosant,

but he ought also to make cognizance as bailiff of his companion. 3 Hen. Bla. 386 ; Sir \V m.

Jones, Rep. 253.]

A tenant in common may convey his interest in the whole estate so held without his co-tenant

joining, but he cannot convey his share in any particular part of the estate so held, by metes and

bounds, so as thereby to bind his co-tenant without his assent. And the reason is that such con-

veyance might injuriously affect the right of the co-tenant to partition by compelling him to take

bis share out of several distinct parcels, instead of having it all assigned together as one parcel,

as might otherwise have been done. But any such conveyance of a part is binding upon the

grantor himself, and, it seems, can be questioned only by the co-tenant whose interests are inju-

riously affected by it. See 1 Washb. Real Prop. 417 ; and cases there cited ; Campau v. Godfrey,

18 Mich. 27. And for the same reason it would seem that the share of one co-tenant in less than

the whole, cannot be sold on execution against him, and thereby the co-tenants be bound. Great

Falls Co. v. Worster, 15 K. H. 412 ; Soutter c. Porter, 27 Me. 405 ; Campauo. Godfrey, 18 Mich. 27.

Tenants in common and other joint owners are held to the utmost good faith toward each other

in respect to their joint interests, and neither will be allowed to take advantage of the relation to

make a profit at the expense of the other. One of them cannot acquire a tax title of the other's

interest. Brown v. Hogle, 30111. 119; Page v. "Webster, 8 Mioh. 263; Butler o. Porter, 13 id.

292 ; Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Penn. St. 419. ft or can he buy in an outstanding title and use it to the

prejudice of his co-tenant if the latter is willing to contribute pro rate to the purchase. Van

Home 11. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 407 ; Tenable v. Beauchamp, 3 Dana, 321 ; Owings ». McClain, 1

A. K. Marsh. 230; Brittin v. Handy, 20 Ark. 381; Rothwell v. Dewees, 2 Black, 613.

One tenant in common may compel the other to share the expense of such repairs as are abso-

lutely necessary to save the buildings on the common property going to decay. As to this see 1

Washb. Real Prop. 421. But he cannot compel the co-tenant to make improvements, or to con-

tribute pro rata to those he may make himself; but in the event of partition, improvements one has

made at his own expense may be taken into account, and the party making them may have them

set off to him, if it can be done without affecting injuriously the rights of the other.

Partition between tenants in common it has been held may be made by their voluntary action,

followed by exclusive possession by each in accordance with the partition, without any deed.

Jackson ». Harder, 4 Johns. 202 ; "Wood ». Fleet, 36 N". Y. 499. But see 1 Washb. oil Real Prop.

450, and cases cited. Whether such partition would affect the title or not, it would so far bind

the possession as to give to each co-tenant the rights and incidents of an exclusive possession of

the part set off to him. Washb. ubi supra.
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There are several stages or degrees requisite to form a complete title to lands

and tenements. We will consider them in a progressive order.

I. The lowest and most imperfect degree of title consists in the mere naked

possession, or actual occupation of the estate ; without any apparent right, or any

shadow or pretence of right, to hold and continue such possession. This may

happen when one man invades the possession of another, and by force or sur-

prise turns him out of the occupation of his lands ; which is termed a disseisin,

being a deprivation of that actual seisin, or corporal freehold of the lands, which

the tenant before enjoyed. Or it may happen, that after the death of the ances-

F *196 1 ^or an<^ be^ore ^)e entry of *the heir, or after the death of a particular

*• J tenant and before the entry of him in remainder or reversion, a stranger

may contrive to get possession of the vacant land, and hold out him that had a

right to enter. In all which cases, and many others that might be here sug-

gested, the wrong-doer has only a mere naked possession, which the rightful

owner may put an end to by a variety of legal remedies, as will more fully

appear in the third book 01 these Commentaries. But in the mean time, till

some act be done by the rightful owner to devest this possession and assert his

title, such actual possession is, prima facie, evidence of a legal title in the pos-

sessor ; and it may, by length of time, and negligence of him who hath the right,

by degrees ripen into a perfect and indefeasible title. (1) And, at all events,

without such actual possession no title can be completely good.

II. The next step to a good and perfect title is the right of possession, which
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may reside in one man, while the actual possession is not in himself, but in

another. For if a man be disseised, or otherwise kept out of possession, by any

of the means before mentioned, though the actual possession be lost, yet he has

still remaining in him the right of possession; and may exert it whenever he

thinks proper, by entering upon the disseisor, and turning him out of that

occupancy which he has so illegally gained. But this right of possession is of

two sorts: an apparent right of possession, which may be defeated by proving a

better; and an actual right of possession, which will stand the test against all

opponents. Thus if the disseisor, or other wrong-doer, dies possessed of the land

whereof he so became seised by his own unlawful act, and the same descends to

his heir; now by the common law the heir hath obtained an apparent right,

though the actual right of possession resides in the person disseised; and it

shall not be lawful for the person disseised to devest this apparent right by

mere entry or other act of his own, but only by an action at law: (b) (2) for,

until the contrary be proved by legal demonstration, the law will rather presume

T *197 1 ^e "&ht t° reside in the heir, whose ancestor died seised, than in one

I- J who has no such presumptive evidence to urge in his own behalf. Which

doctrine in some measure arose from the principles of the feudal law, which,

after feuds became hereditary, much favoured the right of descent; in order

that there might be a person always upon the spot to perform the feudal duties

and services; (c) and therefore when a feudatory died in battle, or otherwise, it

presumed always that his children were entitled to the feud, till the right

was otherwise determined by his fellow-soldiers and fellow-tenants, the peers

of the feudal court. But if he, who has the actual right of possession, puts in.

(b) i.iit, i 385. (c) Gilb. Ten. 18.

(1) [In general a person in actual possession of real property cannot be ousted unless the party

claiming can establish dome well-founded title, for it is a general rule, governing in all actions of

ejectment (the proper proceeding to recover possession of au estate), that the plaintiff must recover

There are several stages or degrees requisite to form a. complete title to lands
and tenements. We will consider them in a progreSBive order.
I. The lowest and most imperfect uegree of title consistB in the mere noJ:ecl
possession, or actual occupation of the estate; without any apparent right, or any
shadow or pretence of right, to hold and continue such possession. This may
happen when one man invades the possession of another, and by force or surpnse turns him out of the occupation of his lands; which is termed a disseisi'.n,
being a deprivation of that actual seisin, or corporal freehold of the lands, which
the tenant before enjoyecl. Or it mal. happen, that after the death of the ances[ • 196 ] tor and before the entry of the heir, or after the death of a particular
tenant and before the entry of him in remainder or reversion, a stranger
may contrive to get possession of the vacant land, and hold out him that had a.
right to enter. In all which cases, and many others that might be here suggested~ the wrong-doer has only a mere naked possession, which the rightful
owner may put an end to by a variety of legal remedies, as will more fully
appear in the third book of these Commentaries. But in the mean time, till.
some act be done by the rightful owner to devest this possession and assert his
title, such actual possession is, prima f acie, evidence of a legal title in the possessor; and it may, by lRngth of time, and negligence of him who hath the right,
by degrees ripen into a perfect and indefeasible title. {1} And, at all events,
without such actual possession no title can be completely good.
II. The next step to a good and perfect title is the right of passBBsion, which
may reside in one man, while the actual possession is not m himself, but in
another. For if a man be disseised, or otherwise kept out of possession, by any
of the means before mentioned, though the actual possession be lost, yet he has
still remaining in him the right of possession ; and may exert it whenever he
thinks proper, by entering upon the disseisor, and turning him out of that
occupancy which he has so illegally gained. But this right of possession is of
two sorts: an apparent right of possession, which may be defeated by proving a
better; and an acfoal right of possession, which will stand the test against all
opponents. Thus if the disseisor, or other wrong-doer, dies po88e88ed of the land
whereof he so became seised by his own unlawful act, and the same descends to
his heir; now by the common law the heir hath obtained an OJJparent righ~
though the actual, right of possession resides in the person disseised ; and it
shall not be lawful for the person disseised to devest this apparent right by
mere entry or other act of his own, but only by an action at law: (b) (2) for,
until the contrary be ,r.roved by legal demonstration, the law will rather presume
[ • 197 ] the right to reside in the heir, whose ancestor died seised, than in one
who has no such presumptive evidence to urge in his own behalf. Which
doctrine in some measure arose from the principles of the feudal law, which,
after feuds became hereditary, much favoured the right of descent; in order
that there might be a persoh always upon the spot to perform the feudal duties
and services; (c) and therefore when a feudatory died in battle, or otherwise, it
presumed always that his children were entitled to the feud, till the right
was otherwise determined by his fellow-soldiers and fellow-tenants, the peers
of the feudal court. But if he, who has the actual right of possession, put.a in

on the strength of his own title, and of course he cannot in general found his claim upon the

(b) LiU. • 385.

(C) Gilb. Ten. 18.

insufficiency of the defendant's: 5 T. R. 110, n. 1; 1 East, 246; 11 id., 488; 3 M. and S. 516;

for possession gives the defendant a right against every person who cannot show a sufficient

title, and the party who would chungn the possession must therefore first establish a legal

title. Id. ibid.; 4 Burr. 2487 ; 2 T. R'. 034 ; 7 id. 47.]

(2) [That is to say, a real action. Real actions (with some few exceptions) having been

abolished by the statute 3 and 4 Wm. 17, c. 27, this effect of a descent from a disseisor, called a

descent cast, was also taken away by the same statute, sec. 39.]
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(1) [In genera.I a pel'l'!on in acfllal posse-SBW1' of real property cannot be ousted unle!:'S the party
claiming can establii<h ~ome well-founded title, for it is a general rule, governing in 11.ll actions of
ejectment (the proper proceeding to recover possession of au estate), that the plaintiff must rec.over
on the strength of his own titl<i, and of coUl'ile he cannot in general found his claim upon the
insufficiencv of the defendant'8 : 5 T. R. 110, n. 1; 1 East, 246; 11 id., 488; 3 ll. and S. 516;
for poit110Rslon gi\·m• the defendant 11. right against every pen!On who cannot show a sufficient
title, and the party who woul<l ch:mge the pos;ioi1tlion mu;i.t therefore first establish a legal
title. Id. ibid.; 4 Burr. 2487; 2 T. R. li34; 7 id. 47.)
(2) [That is to say, a real action. Real actions (with some few exceptions) having been
ahoh11hed by the statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. Zl, this effect of a desoent from a dis&eisor, Called a
dewent cast, was also taken away hy the Ra.me statute, see. 39.]
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his claim, and brings his action within a reasonable time, and can prove by

what unlawful means the ancestor became seised, he will then by sentence of

law recover that possession, to which he hath such actual right. Yet, if he

omits to bring this his possessory action within a competent time, his adversary

may imperceptibly gain an actual right of possession, in consequence of the

other's negligence. And by this, and certain other means, the party kept out

of possession may have nothing left in him, but what we are next to speak of, viz.:

III. The mere right of property, the jus proprietatis, without either possession

or even the right of possession. This is frequently spoken of in our books

under the name of the mere right, jus merum ; and the estate of the owner is in

such cases said to be totally divested, and put to a right, (d) A person in this

situation may have the true ultimate property of the lands in himself: but by

the intervention of certain circumstances, either by his own negligence, the

solemn act of his ancestor, or the determination of a court of justice, the pre-

sumptive evidence of that right is strongly in favour of his antagonist; who has

thereby obtained the absolute right of possession. As, in the first place, if a

person disseised, or turned out of possession of his estate, neglects to pursue his

remedy within the time limited by law: by this means the disseisor or his heirs

gain tne actual right of possession: *for the law presumes that either r *i go -i

he had a good right originally, in virtue of which he entered on the •- •"

lands in question, or that since such his entry he has procured a sufficient title;

and, therefore, after so long an acquiescence, the law will not suffer his pos-
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session to be disturbed without inquiring into the absolute right of property.

Yet, still, if the person disseised or his heir hath the true right of property

remaining in himself, his estate is indeed said to be turned into a mere right;

but, by proving such his better right, he may at length recover the lands.

Again, if a tenant in tail discontinues his estate-tail, by alienating the lands to

a stranger in fee, and dies; here the issue in tail hath no right of possession,

independent of the right of property: for the law presumes pnma facie that the

ancestor would not disinherit, or attempt to disinherit, his heirs, unless he had

power to do so; and therefore, as the ancestor had in himself the right of pos-

session, and has transferred the same to a stranger, the law will not permit that

possession now to be disturbed, unless by showing the absolute right of property

to reside in another person. The heir, therefore, in this case has only a mere

right, and must be strictly held to the proof of it, in order to recover the lands.

Lastly, if by accident, neglect, or otherwise, judgment is given for either party

in any possessory action (that is, such wherein tne right of possession only, and

not that of property, is contested,) and the other party hath indeed in himself

the right of property, this is now turned to a mere right; and upon proof

thereof in a subsequent action denominated a writ of right, he shall recover

his seisin of the lands. (3)

Thus, if a disseisor turns me out of possession of my lands, he thereby gains

a mere naked possession, and I still retain the right of possession, and right of

property. If the disseisor dies, and the land descend to his son, the son gains

an apparent right of possession ; but I still retain the actual right both of pos-

session and property. If I acquiesce for thirty years, (4) without bringing any

action to recover possession of the lands, the son gains the actual right of pos-

session, and I retain *nothing but the mere right of property. And even r *i QQ -i

this right of property will fail, or at least it will be without a remedy, L •"

(d) Co. I.itl. 345.

(3) [This right of property, as distinguished from the right of possession, has been abolished

In almost every case by the abolition of those real actions in which alone it could have been vin-

dicated. Stat. 3 and 4 "Wm. IT, c. 27.]

his claim, and brings his action within a reasonable time, and can prove by
what unlawful means the ancestor became seised, he will then by senrence of
law recornr that possession, to which he hath such actual right. Yet, if be
omits to bring this his possessory action within a competent time, his adversary
may imperceptibly gain an actual right of possession, in consequence of the
other's negligence. And by this, and certain other means, the party kept out
of possession may have nothing left in him, but what we are next to speak of, viz.:
III. The mere right of property, the jus pr<>prietatis, without either possession
or even the right of possession. This is frequently spoken of in our books
under the name of the mere riglit,jus merum; and the estate of the owner is in
such cases said to bA totally divested, and put to a rigid. (d) A person in this
situation may have the true ultimate property of the lands in himself: but by
the intervention of certain circumstances, either by his own negligence, the
solemn act of his ancestor, or the determination of a court of justice, the presumptive evidence of that right is strongly in favour of his antagonist; who has
thereby obtained the absolute right of possession. As, in the first place, if a
person disscised, or turned out of possession of his estate, neglects to pursue his
remedy within the time limited by law : by this means the disseisor or his heirs
gain the actual right of possession: •for the law presumes that either [ • 198 ]
he had a good right origmally, in virtue of which he entered on the
lands in question, or that since such his entry he bas procured a sufficient title;
and, therefore, after so long an acquiescence, the law will not suffer his possession to be disturbed without inquiring into the absolute right of property.
Yet, still, if the person disseised or his heir bath the tme right of proPE'.rty
remaining in himself, his estate is indeed said to be turned into a mere nght;
but, by proving such his better right, he may at length recover the lands.
Again, if a tenant in tail discontinues his estate-tail, by alienating the lands to
a stranger in fee, and dies ; here the issue in tail hath no ri~ht of possession,
independent of the right of property: for the law presumes prima facie that the
ancestor would not disinhent, or attempt to disinherit, his heirs, unless he had
power to do so ; and therefore, as the ancestor had in himself the right of possession, and has transferred the same to a stranger, the law will not permit that
possession n-0w to be disturbed, unless by showing the absolute right of property
to reside in another person. The heir, therefore, in this case has only a mere
right, and must be strictly held to the proof of it, in order to recover the lands.
Lastly, if by accident, neglect, or otherwise, judgment is given for either party
in any possessory action (that is, such wherem the right ofposseBBion only, and
not that of property, is contested,) and the other party hath indeed in himself
the right of property, this is now turned to a mere rigid; and upon proof
thereof in a subsequent action denominated a writ of right, he shall recover
his seisin of the lands. (3)
Thus, if a disseisor turns me out of possession of my lands, he thereby gains
a mere naked possession, and I still retain the right of possession, and right of
property. If the disseisor dies. and the land descend fo his son, the son gains
an apparent right of possession; but I still retain the actual right both of possession and property. If I acquiesce for thirty years, (4) without bringing any
action to recover possession of the lunds, the son gains the actual rigid of po.<;session, and I retain •nothing but the mere rigltt of pro~erty. And eYen [ • 199 ]
this right of property will fail, or at least it will be without a remedy,
(d)

(4) The term is now twenty years ; see the statute of 3 and 4 Wm. TV, c. 27, s. 2. And by

Co. Litt. 8'6.

that statute it is provided that the right and title of the person who might, within the time

limited, have had the proper remedy, but who has failed to resort to it, shall be extinguished.

In general twenty years, after the right accrues, will be found to bo the period limited by

statute in the American states, within which the owner must bring action for recovery of real

estate. Exceptions are generally made in these statutes in favor of infants, married women,

insane persons, persons beyond the seas, and sometimes other classes.

(3) [Thi!! riir;ht of property, as

distin~ished

from the right of

po~ession, ha.~

been abolished

In almost every case bv the abolition of those real actions in which alone it could have been vin-

dicated. Stat. 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 27.]
(4) The term is now twenty yeal"l'; R<«~ the statute of 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 'rl, s. 2. .An<l by
that statute it is provided that the right and title of the person who miftht, within the time
limitetl, have had the pn>per remedy, but who has failed to re1mrt to it, shall be extinguislie<I.
In general twenty yearl', after the right accrues, will be found t-0 be the period limited by
statute in the American state~, within which the owner mul't bring action for recovery of real
estate. Exceptions are generally made in tbel!e statutes in favor of jnfa.ntll, married women,
insane p<>n<ont<, persons beyond the seas, and sometimes other classes.
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unless I pursue it within the space of sixty years. So also if the father be tenant

in tail, and alienes the estate-tail to a stranger in fee, the alienee thereby gains

the right of possession, aud the son hath only the mere right or right of property.

And hence it will follow, that one man may have thepossession, another the

right of possession, and a third the right of property. For if a tenant in tail

enfeoffs A in fee simple, aud dies, and B disseises A; now B will have the

possession, A the right of possession, and the issue in tail the right of property:

A may recover the possession against B; and afterwards the issue in tail may

evict A, and unite in himself the possession, the right of possession, and also

the right of property. In which union consists,

IV. A complete title to lands, tenements and hereditaments. For it is an

ancient maxim of the law, (e) that no title is completely good, unless the right

of possession be joined with the right of property; which right is then de-

nominated a double right, jus duplicatum, or droit droit. (f) And when to

this double right the actual possession is also united, when there is, according to

the expression of Fleta, (g) juris et seisino) conjunctio, then, and then only, is the

title completely legal.

CHAPTEE XIV.

OF TITLE BY DESCENT.

THE several gradations and stages, requisite to form a complete title to

tenements, and hereditaments, having been briefly stated in the preceding

chapter, we are next to consider the several manners, in which this complete
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title (and therein principally the right of property) may be reciprocally lost and

acquired: whereby the dominion of things real is either continued or transferred

from one man to another. And here we must first of all observe, that (as gain

and loss are terms of relation, and of a reciprocal nature) by whatever method

one man gains an estate, by that same method, or its correlative, some other

man has lost it. As where the heir acquires by descent, the ancestor has first

lost or abandoned his estate by his death: where the lord gains land by escheat,

the estate of the tenant is first of all lost by the natural or legal extinction of all

his hereditary blood: where a man gains an interest by occupancy, the former

owner has previously relinquished his right of possession : where one man claims

by prescription or immemorial usuage, another man has either parted with his

right by an ancient and now forgotten grant, or has forfeited it by the supine-

ness or neglect of himself and his ancestors for ages: and so, in case of forfeiture,

the tenant by his own misbehaviour or neglect has renounced his interest in the

estate; whereupon it devolves to that person who by law may take advantage

F *2011 °^ 8"c^ d°*aulfc: an<^> *n alienation by common assurances, *the two

1- -I considerations of loss and acquisition are so interwoven, and socoustantly

(e) Mirr. I. •->. e. 37. (f) Co. Lltt 286. Bract. 2. 5, tr. 3, c. 5. (<jj I. 3, e. IS, j 5.

To bar the owner's right under these st.nliii.es, it is necessary: 1. That the land should have

been in the actual possession of another: Jackson v. Sehoonmaker, 2 Johns. 234; Cobnrn r.

Hollis, 3 Met. 129; Doswell o. De La Lanza, 20 How. 32; Trapna ». Burton, 24 Ark. 271. 2.

That the possession should have been continuous for the full statutory period : Sorber » Willing,

10 Watts, 141; Holdfast v. Shepard, 6 Ired. 361; School District v. Lynch, 33 Conn. 333. 3.

That it should have been under a claim of right adverse to that of the owner, and not in recog-

nition of his title; or as a mere " squatter" : Gay e. Mitchell, 35 Ga. 139; and 4. That the pos-

session must have been ol that public and notorious character that the owner, if guilty of no

negligence, would have been made aware of it and of the claim of right accompanying it. Pro-

prietors. Ac., v. Springer, 4 Mass. 418; Morrison «. Kelly, 22 111. 610; Scruggs v. Scruggs. 43 Mo.

142. More acts of trespass on land do not constitute adverse possession. Hale v. Gliddeu, 10

N. H, 399 ; Loftin v. Cobb, 1 Jones N. C. 406 ; Denham v. Holeman, 26 Geo. 182 ; Braxdale r.

Speed, 1 A. K. Marsh. 106 ; Tmesdale v. Ford, 37 111. 210; Parker ». Parker, 1 Allen, 245. As

to what may be sufficient to establish adverse possession, see Stanley v. White, 14 East. 332;

Ewingv. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41; Johnston v. Irwin, 3 S. and R. 291; Barr r. Gratz, 4 Wheat.

213; Brown v. Porter, 10 Mass. 93; Morrison v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 72; Davidson v. Beatty, 3

H. and McH. 595; Farley*. Lenox, 6 S. and K. 392; Booth». Small, 25 Iowa, 177; Cos's r.

Richardson, 8 Cold. 28; Sheaffer v. Eakman, 56 Penn. St. 144; Wbitehead v. Foley, 28 Texas,

808. It is not necessary that the same person should continuously have occupied adversely; for
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receiving the ideas as well of the grantor as the grantee.

The methods therefore of acquiring on the one hand, and of losing on the other,

a title to estates in things real, are reduced by our law to two; descent, where

the title is vested in a man by the single operation of law: and purchase, where

the title is vested in him by his own act or agreement, (a) (1)

Descent, or hereditary succession, is the title whereby a man on the death of

his ancestor acquires his estate by right of representation, as his heir at law. An

heir, therefore, is he upon whom the law casts the estate immediately on the

death of the ancestor: and an estate, so descending to the heir, is in law called

the inheritance. (2)

The doctrine of descents, or law of inheritances in fee-simple, is a point of

the highest importance; and is indeed the principal object of the laws of real

property in England. All the rules relating to purchases, whereby the legal

course of descents is broken and altered, perpetually refer to this settled law of

inheritance, as a datum or first principle universally known, and upon which

their subsequent limitations are to work. Thus a gift in tail, or to a man and

the heirs of his body, is a limitation that cannot be perfectly understood without

a previous knowledge of the law of descents in fee-simple. One may well per-

ceive that this is an estate confined in its descent to such heirs only of the

donee, as have sprung or shall spring from his body; but who those heirs are

(a) Co. LItt. l.
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two or more persons may occupy successively, and if they are in privity with each other—as in

the case of grantor and grantee, or ancestor and heir—the latter is entitled to have the benefit

contemplated together, that we never hear of any conveyance, without at once
receiving the ideas as well of the grantor as the grantee.
The methods therefore of acquiring on the one hand, and of losing on the other,
a title to estates in things real, are reduced by our law to two; descent, where
the title is vested in a man by the single operation of law: and purchase, where
the title is vested in him by his own act or agreement. (a) (1)
Descent, or hereditary succession, is the title whereby a man on the death of
his ancestor a~quires his estate by right of representation, as his heir at law. An
heir, therefore, is he upon whom the law casts the estate immediately on the
death of the ancestor: and an estate, so descending to the heir, is in law called
the inheritance. (2)
The doctrine of descents, or law of inheritances in fee-simple, is a point of
the highest importance; and is indeed the principal objed of the laws of real
property in England. All the rules relating to purchases, whereby the legal
course of descents is broken and altered, perpetually refer to this sett1cd law of
inheritance, as a datum or first principle universally known, and upon which
their subsequent limitations are to work. Thus a gift in tail, or to a man and
the heirs of his body, is a limitation that cannot be perfectly understood without
a previous knowledge of the law of descents in fee-simple. One may well perceive that this is an estate confined in its descent to such heirs only of the
donee, as have sprung or shall spring from his body; but who those heirs are

of the possession of the one to whose right he has succeeded.

(a)

Co. Lili. L

(1) [Purchase in law is used in contradistinction to descent, and is any other mode of acquir-

ing real property, viz.: by a man's own act and agreement, by devise, and by every species of

gift, or grant; and as the land taken by purchase has very different inheritable qualities from

land taken by descent, the distinction is important. See post, pages 241, 243.

Mr. Hargrave in his note to Co. Litt. 18, b, distinguishes, perhaps too astutely, a title by

escheat both from a purchase and from a descent. Upon similar reasoning a further division

might be made in favor of title by prerogative, as where the crown takes land conveyed to an

alien, >tc.; but purchase is generally understood to be any acquisition otherwise than by descent]

The statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 106, enacts that the word " purchaser " in that act shall mean

the person who last acquired land otherwise than by descent, or than by escheat, partition or

inclosure, by the effect of which the land shall become part of, or descendible with, other land

acquired by descent.

(2) [The statute of 3 and 4 Win. IT, c. 106, for the amendment of the law of inheritance,

enacts, that in every case descent shall be traced from the purchaser, but the last owner shall

be considered to be the purchaser, unless it shall be proved that he inherited the laud. It is

also enacted, that an heir who is entitled under a will shall take as devisee, and not by

descent: and a limitation in any assurance to the grantor and his heirs shall create an estate

by purchase: but if any person acquires lands by purchase, under a limitation to the heirs, or

the heirs of the body, of any of his ancestors, such land shall descend, and the descent shall

be traced as if the ancestor named in such limitation had been the purchaser of the land. It

is further enacted, that no brother or sister shall be considered to inherit immediately from his

or her brother or sister, but shall trace descent through their common parent; and every lin-

eal ancestor may be heir to any of his issue, in preference to collateral persons claiming

through him; the male line to be preferred throughout in tracing descents; but, in case of

the failure of male paternal ancestors of the person from whom the descent is to be

traced upwards, and of their descendants, the mother of his more remote male paternal

ancestor, or her descendants, shall be the heir or heirs of such person, in preference to a less

remote paternal ancestor; and the mother of his more remote male maternal ancestor, and

her descendants, shall be heir or heirs, in preference to the mother of a less remote male

maternal anceutor. And it is further enacted, that any person related to the person from

whom the descent is to be traced by the half blood shall be capable of being his heir, and

shall stand next in order of inheritance after any relation of the same degree of the whole

blood, and his issue, where the common ancestor shall be a male, and next after the common

ancestor where such common ancestor shall be a female: and after the death of a person attainted

his descendants may inherit. The act does not extend to any descent which took place before

the 1st of January, 1834, nor to any assurance executed before the said date, or the will of any

•person who died before the said date, which assurance or will contains any limitation or gift to

the heir or heirs of any person under which the person or persons answering the description of

heir would have been entitled to an estate by purchase if this act had not been made; but such

two or more persons may occupy succef!llively, and _if they are in pri;itr with each other-as in
the 0880 of grant.or and grantee, or ance11tor and heir-the latter 18 entitled to have the benefit
of the~illlesl!ion of the one to whose right he hae succeeded.
(1) Pnrcha.se in law is ui;ed iu contradistinction to descent, and is any other mode of acquirre property, vis. : by B man's own act and agreement, by do;iRo, and by every BJ>ecies of
· , or grant; and 88 the land taken b;r purchSRe has very different inheritable qualities from
d taken by descent, the distinction is important. See post, pages 241, 243.
lrir. Hargra;e in hill note to Co. Litt. 18, b, distingwsholl, perhaps too astutely, a title by
ucheat both from a purchase and from a dei;cent. Upon similar rea.-1oniug a further division
might be made in favor of title by prerogative, !Ml where the crown takes land con;eyed to an
alien, &c. ; but J11frchase is generally understood to be any acqui~ition otherwise than by descent.)
The statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, enacts that the word" purchaser'' in that act shall mean
the person who last acquired land otherwise than by deooent, or than by escheat, partition or
inclosure, by the effect of which the land shall become part of, or deKCendiblc with, other land
acquired by descent.
(2) [The statute of 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, for the amendment of the law of inheritance,
enacts, that in every case descent shall be tra.ced from the purchaser, but the llMlt owner shall
be considered to be the purchMer, unless it shall be proved that he inherited the land. It is
also enacted. that an heir who iR entitled under a will shall take a.~ devisee, and not by
descent : and a limitation in any assurance to the grantor and his heirs shall create an estate
by pnrchalle : but if any person ~uiree lands by purchase, under a limitation to the heirs, or
the heirs of the body, of any of hill e.nccstore, ruch land shall descend, and the descent shall
be traced 88 if the ancestor named in such limitation had been the purchaser of the land. It
is further enacted, that no brother or sister shall be con.~idered to inherit immediately from his
or her brother or sister, but shall trace descent through their common parent; and every lineal anoeator may be heir to any of hie issue, in preference to collateral persons claiming
through him; the male line to be preferred throughout in tracing det'ICents ; but, in case of
the failure of male paternal ancestors of the person from whom the descent is to be
traced upwards, and of their descendants, the mother of hiR more remote male paternal
a.nceetor, or her deeoendante, shall be the heir or heirs of such person, in preference to a less
remote paternal e.ncestor; and the mother of his more remote male maternal ancestor, and
her del!Cewl&nte, shall be heir or heirs, in preference to the mother of a less remote male
maternal anOOMtor. .And it ie further enacted, that any person related to the person from
whom the descent i.e to be traced by the half blood shall be capable of being his heir, and
Bhall stand ne.1.t in order of i.aheritance after any relation of the same degree of the whole
blood, and hiR iSBUe, where the common ancestor shall be a male, e.nd next after the common
ancestor where such common e.ncestor shall be a female: and after the death of a person attainted
his descendants may inherit. The act does not extend to any descent which took place before
the let of January, 1834, nor to e.ny 88surance exeeuted before the said date, or the will of any
.person who died before the said date, which as~urance or will contain~ any limitation or ~ft to
the heir or heirs of any J!0rROn under which the person or persons an~wering the de~cript10n of
heir would have been entitled to an estate by purchase if this act had not been made; but Ruch
limitation or gift. shnl! take effect, whether the person named 88 ance&tor was or wae not living
on the said let d~ of January, 1834.1
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limitation or gift sluil! take effect, whether the person named as ancestor was or was not living

on the said 1st day of January, 1834.]
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whether all his children both male and female, or the male only, and (among the

males) whether the eldest, youngest, or other son alone, or all the sons together,

shall be his heirs; this is a point that we must result hack to the standing law

of descents in fee-simple to be informed of.

F *202 1 *"^n ort^er therefore to treat a matter of this universal consequence

L J the more clearly, I shall endeavour to lay aside such matters as will only

tend to breed embarrassment and confusion in our inquiries, and shall confine

myself entirely to this one object. I shall therefore decline considering at

present who are, and who are not, capable of being heirs; reserving that

for the chapter of escheats. I shall also pass over the frequent division of

descents into those by custom, statute, and common law: for descents by partic-

ular custom, as to all the sons in gavelkiud, and to the youngest in borough-

English, have already been often (b) hinted at, and may also be incidentally

touched upon again ; but will not make a separate consideration by themselves,

in a system so general as the present: and descents by statute, or fees-tail per

formam doni, in pursuance of the statute of Westminster the second, have also

"been already (c) copiously handled; and it has been seen that the descent in tail

is restrained and regulated according to the words of the original donation, and

does not entirely pursue the common law doctrine of inheritance; which, and

which only, it will now be our business to explain. (3)

And, as this depends not a little on the nature of kindred, and the several

degrees of consanguinity, it will be previously necessary to state, as briefly as
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possible, the true notion of this kindred or alliance in blood, (d)

Consanguinity, or kindred, is defined by the writers on these subjects to be

" irinculum personarum ab eodem stipite descendentium:" the connexion or rela-

tion of persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor. This con-

sanguinity is either lineal, or collateral.

F *2031 *Lineal consanguinity is that which subsists between persons, of

" •" whom one is descended in a direct line from the other, as between John

Stiles (the propositus in the table of consanguinity) and his father, grandfather,

•great-grandfather, and so upwards in the direct ascending line; or between

John Stiles and his son, grandson, great-grandson, and so downwards in the direct

descending line. Every generation, in this lineal direct consanguinity, constitutes

a different degree, reckoning either upwards or downwards: the father of John

Stiles is related to him in the first degree, and so likewise is his son; his grand-

sire and grandson in the second; his great-grandsire and great-grandson in the

third. This is the only natural way of reckoning the degrees in the direct line,

and therefore universally obtains, as well in the civil, (e) and canon, (/) as in the

common law. (g)

The doctrine of lineal consanguinity is sufficiently plain and obvious; but it

is at the first view astonishing to consider the number of lineal ancestors which

every man has, within no very great number of degrees; and so many different

bloods (h) is a man said to contain in his veins, as he hath lineal ancestors. Of

these he hath two in the first ascending degree, his own parents ; he hath four

in the second, the parents of his father and the parents of his mother; he hath

eight in the third, the parents of his two grandfathers and two grandmothers •

and by the same rule of progression, he hath an hundred and twenty-eight in

(b) See Book I, pages 74, 75. Book n. pages 83, 85. (c) See page 118, 4o.

<<>} For a I'll 11 rr explanation of the doctrine of consanguinity, and trie consequences resulting from a right

apprehension of ite nature, see an essay on collateral consanguinity. (Law tracts, Oxon. 1763.8vo.,orl771t 4tb )

fej f/. 38, 10,10. (f) Decretal. 1. 4, tit. 14. fgj Co. Litt. 23. (h) Ibid. 14.

(:!) [The devolution of an estate tail is oi n very different nature from a descent in fee-

Kimple at common law; in the former the heir of the original purchaser or donee in tail

succeeds; in the latter the succession devolved upon the heir of the person last seized; and con-

sequently the rule excluding the half blood, and the effect of a possessto fratrts had no applica-

tion to a descent iu tail: 8 T. R. 211; and, until 8 Hen. VIII, c. 28, each taker was so far con

sidered to take as a purchaser under the original gift, per formam doni, that his claim was not

hindered hy the attainder and corruption of the blood of his ancestor. 3 Kep. 10; 8 id. 165, a;

Cro. EUz. 28.]
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the seventh ; a thousand and twenty-four in the tenth : and at the twentieth

degree, or the distance of twenty generations, every man hath above a million

of ancestors, as common arithmetic will demonstrate, (t) This lineal consan-

guinity, we may observe, falls strictly within the definition of vinculum

*personarum ab eodem stipite descendentium ; since lineal relations are r ^ru i

such as descend one from the other, and both of course from the same •• J

common ancestor.

Collateral kindred answers to the same description : collateral relations agree-

ing with the lineal in this, that they descend from the same stock or ancestor ;

but differing in this, that they do not descend one from the other. Collateral

kinsmen are such, then, as lineally spring from one and the same ancestor, who

is the stirps, or root, the stipes, trunk, or common stock, from whence these re-

lations are branched out. As if John Stiles hath two sons, who have *each

a numerous issue ; both these issues are lineally descended from John

Stiles as their common ancestor; and they are collateral kinsmen to each other,

because they are all descended from this common ancestor, and all have a por-

tion of his 4blood in their veins, which denominates them consanquineos.

We must be careful to remember, that the very being of collateral consan-

guinity consists in this descent from one and the same common ancestor. Thus

Titius and his brother are related ; why ? because both are derived from one

father : Titius and his first cousin are related ; why ? because both descend

from the same grandfather ; and his second cousin's claim to consanguinity is
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this, that they are both derived from one and the same great grand-father. In short,

as many ancestors as a man has, so many common stocks he has, from which

collateral kinsmen may be derived. And as we are taught by holy writ, that

there is one couple of ancestors belonging to us all, from whom the whole race

of mankind is descended, the obvious and undeniable consequence is, that all

men are in some degree related to each other. For indeed, if we onlv suppose

each couple of our ancestors to have left, one with another, two children ; and

each of those children on an average to have left two more (and, without such

a supposition, the human species must be daily diminishing) ; we shall find

that all of us have now subsisting near two hundred and seventy millions of

kindred in the fifteenth degree, at the same distance from the several common

ancestors as ourselves are ; besides those that are one or two descents nearer to

or farther from the common stock, who may amount to as many more, (k) And if

(if This will seem surprising to those who are unacquainted with the increasing power of progressive

numbers ; but is palpably evident from the following table of u geometrical progression, in which the first

term is 2, and the denominator also 2 ; or, to speak more intelligibly, it is evident, for that eanh of us has

the seventh; a thousand and twenty-four in the t.enth: and at the twentieth
degree, or the distance of twenty generations, every man hath above a million
of ancestors, as common arithmetic will demonstrate. (i) This lineal consan~inity, we may observe, falls strictly within the definition of 1Jinculum
personarum ab eodem stipite descendentium ~· since lineal relations are [ • 204 ]
such as descend one from the other, and both of course from the same
common ancestor.
Collateral kindred answers to the same description : collateral relations agreeing with the lineal in this, that they descend from the same stock or ancestor ;
but differing in this, that they do not descend one from the other. Collateral
kinsmen are such, then, as lineally spring from one and the same ancestor, who
is the stirps, or root, the stipes, trunk, or common stock, from whence these relations are branched out. As if John Stiles hath two sons, who have *each •
a numerous issue; both these issues are lineally descended from John [ 205 J
Stiles as their common ancestor; and they are collateral kinsmen to each other,
because they are all descended from this common ancestor, and all have a portion of his blood in their veins, which denominates them consanguineos.
We must be careful to remember, that the very being of collateral consanguinity consists in this descent from one and the same common ancestor. Thus
Titius and his brother are related; why? because both are derived from one
father: Titius and his first cousin are related ; why? because both descend
from the same grandfather; and his second cousin's claim to consanguinity is
this, that they are both derived from one and the same great grand-father. In short,
as many ancestors as a man has, so many common stocks he has, from which
collateral kinsmen may be derived. And as we are taught by holy writ, that
there is one couple of ancestors belonging to us all, from whom the whole race
of mankind is descended, the obvious and undeniable consequence is, that all
men are in some degree related to each other. For indeed, if we only suppose
e.ach couple of our ancestors to have left, one with another, two children ; and
each of those children on an average to have left two more (and, without such
a supposition, the human species must be daily diminishing); we shall find
that all of us have now subsisting near two hundred and seventy millions of
kindred in the fifteenth degree, at the same distance from the several common
ancestors as ourselves are; besides those that are one or two descents nearer to
or farther from the common stock, who may amount to as many more. (k) And if

two ancestors in the first degree ; the number of whom is doubled at every remove, because each of our

ancestors has also two immediate ancestors of his own .

Unt

U Degrea. Number of Anetitort.

Lineal Degreet.

11

(iJ This will seem earprislng to those who are nna"'qaalnted with the lncre&11ing power of progressive
nnmben; but ill palpably evident from the following table ofa geomotrlcal progression . in which the first
term ls~. and the denominator also 2; or~ to speak more lntelllglbly. It Is evident, for that eaoh of us has
two ancestors In the ant degree; the numoer of whom Is doubled at every remove, beoaUll8 each of our
anoeatoni h&11 also two immediate ancestoni of bis own .
l'AMal IN;greu.
Nv.fltber of A.ncutora. Limal Degreu.
Numl>er of A.ncutor•.

1 ................ . .... . ....... ..... ...... ... ... .. :1

s... ............................................

Number of Ancettort.

3 ................................................ 8
' • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • .•• • • • • • • • . • . • • . • • • • • • • • • • 16
I .. • ••• .. • • .. • • • • • • •• • • • • •• •• • • • .. • • • • .. • • • • • • .. 31
8 .. .. .. •.. • • .. • • • • • • • • .. • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 64
T ... . ........ , • • • . • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • .. .. • • • 128
8 ............... . .. . .. . ...... .... . ......... . ... 206
9 ................... .. ......... . ......... . .... . 512
10 • • • • • .. • • •• • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • •• • .. • • • .. .. • • • • • • • IO'U

4096

819>

16384

16

fi5.136

128

IT

1310T3

2S6

18

ll .... .. ......................... . .. . ..... .. .. to48

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
llO

........... . ................................. 4086
.. . .......................................... 8191
........ . ...... . ..................... . ...... 16384
...................................... . ..... 337811
.. .. • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • .. 1161538
........................................... 1310'TI
....... .. . ................................. 8144
.......................................... . 524'88
................. ......................... 1°'85'16

A aborter method of tlnding the number or anll8stors at any even degree ill by squaring the number or
ancestors at balftba& number of degrees. Thus 16 (the number of anll8stors at lbar degrees) la the square
or the number of ancestors at two; ~ ls the squa~ of 16; 6111186 of:t56; and the number of ancestors at
aegrees would be the square of 1°'8676, or upwards of a million milllons.(41
(I:) This will swell more considerably than the fonner<1alculaUon; for here. thoagh the tlrst term 111 but I,
the denominator Is ol; that Is, there Is one kinsman (a brother) in the ant degree, who makes, together with
&be ~J the two d88Clendants from th11 arst couple of aall8ston1l· and In every other degree the num·
ber-otilndreti mµa~ be lbo quadruple or those1 in the degree which mmcdiately preood011 It.. For, since

'° 'J

282144

S1J

19

5242BB

I ..... 1024

1

»l

1048576

(4) [This c~culjltjon is right in numbers, but is founded on a false supposition, as is evident
from the reaultll; one of which is to give a man a greater number of ancestors all living at one
time than the whole population of the earth : another would be, that each man now living,
inirtead of bei!ln~eecended from Noah and his wife alone, might claim to have had at that time
an almost ind
'te number of relatives. Intermarriages among relatives are one check on this
incredible increase of relatives. This is noticed afterwards by Blackstone, as to collateral relatives.]

A shorter method of finding the number of ancestors at any even degree Is by squaring tho number of

ancestors at half that number of degrees. Thus 16 (the number of ancestors at linir degrees) is the square

of 4. the number of ancestors at two; 266 is the square of 16; 86636 of 256; and the number of ancestors at

40 degrees would be the square of 1048576, or upwards of a million millions.(4)

(k} This will swell more considerably than the former calculation; for here, thoagh the first term Is but 1,

the denominator is 4; that is, there is one kinsman (a brother) in the first degree, who makes, together with
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this calculation should appear incompatible with the number of inhabitants on

the earth, it is because, by intermarriages among the several descendants from

the same ancestor, a hundred or a thousand modes of consanguinity may be

consolidated in one person, or he may be related to us a hundred or a thousand

different ways.

F *20P 1 *rfne method of computing these degrees in the canon law, (?) which

L -1 our law has adopted, (w) is as follows : we begin at the common ances-

tor, and reckon downwards : and in whatsoever degree the two persons, or the

most remote of them, is distant from the common ancestor, that is the degree in

which they are related to each other. Thus Titius and his brother are related

f *207 1 *n *'ne n'rs' *^egree > f°r from the father to each of them is counted only

"- -" one; Titius and his nephew are related in the second degree ; for the

nephew is two degrees removed from the common ancestor; viz.: his own grand-

father, the father of Titius. Or (to give a more illustrious instance from our

English annals), King Henry the Seventh, who slew Eichard the Third in the

battle of Bosworth, was related to that prince in the fifth degree. Let ttiepro-

positus therefore in the table of consanguinity represent King Richard the

Third, and the class marked (e) King Henry the Seventh. Now their common

stock or ancestor was King Edward the Third, the abavus in the same table:

from him to Edmond, duke of York, the proavus, is one degree; to Eichard,

earl of Cambridge, the nvus, two; to Eichard, duke of York, the pater, three;

to King Eichard the Third, the propositus, four; and from King Edward the
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Third to John of Gant (a) is one degree ; to John, earl of Somerset, (b) two; to

John, duke of Somerset, (e) three; to Margaret, countess of Richmond, (b) four;

each couple of ancestors haa two descendants, who increase In a duplicate ratio, it (rill follow that the ratio,

in which all the descendants increase downwards, must be double to that in which the ancestors increase

this calculation should appear incompatible with the number of inhabitants on
the earth, it is because, by intermarriages among the several descendauts from
the same ancestor, a hundred or a tho usand modes of consanguinity may be
consolidated in one J>t3rson, or he may be related to us a hundred. or a thousand
different ways.
method of computing these degrees in the canon law, (l) which
[ *206 ] our*The
law has adopted, (rn) is as follows: we begin at the common ancestor, and reckon downwards: and. in whatsoever degree the two persons, or the
most remote of them, is distant from the common ancestor, that is the degree in
which they are related to each other. 'l'hns Titius and his brother are related
•
] in the first *degree; for from the father to each of them is counted only
[ 207 one; Titius and his nephew are related in the second de~ree; for the
nephew is two degrees removed from the common ancestor; viz.: hIB own grandfather, the father of Titius. Or (to give a more illustrious instance from our
English annals), King Henry the Seventh, who slew Richard the Third in the
battle of Bosworth, was related to that prince in the fifth deO'r ee. Let the pro1?,ositus therefore in the table of consanguinity represent iing Richard the
Third, and the class marked (e) King Henry the Seventh. Now their common
stock or ancestor was King Ed ward the Third, the abam"s in the same table:
from him to Edmond, duke of York, the proavus, is one degree; to Richard,
earl of Cambridge, the avi"s, two; to Richard, duke of York, the pater, three;
to King Richard the Third, the propositus, four; and from King Edward the
'rhird to John of Gant (a) is one degree ; to John, earl of Somerset, (b) two; to
John, duke of Somerset, {c) three; to Margaret, countess of Richmond, (~) four;

upwards ; bill we have seen that the ancestors increase upwards in a duplicate ratio t therefore the descend*

ante must increase downwards in a double duplicate, that is, in a quadruple ratio. (5)

Collateral Degrees. Number of Kindred. Collateral Degrees. Number of Kindred

1 1 11 1W85T6

2 4 12 4194304

3 18 13 16T77S1*

4 64 14 £7108864

i 2M 15 268435436

6 1024 16 1073741824

7 4096 17 42»t967296

8 16384 18 171798SU84

9 65536 19 68719476736

10 262244 SO 274377»06!M4

This calculation may also be formed by a more compendious process, viz. : by squaring the couples, or

half the number of ancestors, at uny given degree; which will furnish us with the number of kinured we

have in the name degree, at equal distance with ourselves from the common stock, besides those at unequal

distances. Thus, in the tenth lineal degree, the number of ancestors is 1024; its half, or the couples, amount

to 512; the number of kindred in the tenth collateral degree amounts therefore to 263144, or the square of

eooh couple of ancestors hM two descendants, who Increase In a duplicate ratio, It 1vill tollow that the ratio,
In which all the descendants Increase tlownwa.rds, must be double to that In which the nnceetors increase
upwards ; bnt we have seen that th(' ancestors Inc rease upwards in a dut>licate ratw r therelbre the deacend·
Ruts must increase downwards in a donble duplicate, thnt is, in a quaclrnple raw. (6)
Collateral Degrwi.
Number of Kindred. CoUateral Degrwi.
Number of Kindred
l ................... . ..... ... .. .. ... ..... ........ l

11 .................... . ..................... 1().18576

2 ................................................ 4

12 ......................... . ................ 419'304

3 .. ... .. .. .................................... .. 16
4 ............................................... 6'
5 ......................................... .. ... 258
& ............................................. 102.4
7 ........ . ................................ .. .. 4096

15 ....... . .... . ......... .. ................

8 ......... ...... ... .. ... . ............ .. .. .... 16384
9 .......... .................................. 65536
10 ............. ... .......................... . 2QU4

13 ...... .. ............................... .. 167r.'211i
14 ........................................ 6'il08864
269-l:IS-4~

16 ................ .. ......... .. .......... 107374111"!{
) 7 .................. . ......... . ... . . .. ... -l294!lb~

18 .............. . ............... . ... .. .. 1017906l)l8'
19 ........... ... .......... ... .. ......... 68719476':':16
20 .. • ... .. .. • .. • .. • .. • .. .. .. .. .. .. • . .. . lt'i487'l90ti9.M

Tbis calculation may also be formed by a more compemUom process, viz. : by 11qnarlng the couples, or
half the number or ancestors, at any gil·cn degree; which will furnish us with the numiier of kindred we
hal'e in the same de)l'rne, at eqL.al dist.nnce with ourselves from the common stock, besides thoee at uneqllAI
itistunces. 'l'lrns. In the tenth linen! degree, the number of ancestors is 10-U; Its half, or the couples, amoiuit
to 612; the number of kindre<I in the tenth collatcml degree amounts therefore to \!6'll-l4, or the square <>f
612. And if we will be at the trouble to recollect the state ot' tho several families withln our own knowled.,~,
and obse1·,•u bow !Ar they agree with this account: th:it is, whether on an average every man bas n ot one
brother or sister, four first coW!ins, sixteen second cousins, and so on; we sball <4nd that the present calculation Is very far from being overcbargel).
{I) Decretal. 4, 14, 3 and 9.
(ml Co. Litt. 23.

512. And if we will be at the trouble to recollect the state of the several families within our own knowledge,

and observe how far they agree with this account: that is, whether on an average every man has not one

brother or sister, four first cousins, sixteen second cousins, and so on; we shall find that the present calcu-

lation is verv far from being overcharged.

(2) Decretal. 4, It, 3 and 9. (m] Co. Litt. 23.

(5) [The learned judge's reasoning is just and correct; and that the collateral relations are

quadrupled in each generation may be thus demonstrated:—As we are supposed, upon an average,

to have one brother or sister, the two children by the father's brother or sister will make two

cousins, and the mother's brother or sister will produce two more, in all, four. For the same

reason, my father and mother must each have had four cousins, and their children are my second

cousins; so I have eight second cousins by iny father, and eight by my mother; together six-

teen. And thus again, I shall have thirty-two third cousins on my father's side, and thirty-two

on my mother's, in all, sixty-four. Hence it follows that each preceding number in the series

must be multiplied by twice two or four.

This immense increase of the numbers depends upon the supposition that no one marries a rela-

tion ; but to avoid such a connexion it will very soon be necessary to leave the kingdom. How

these two tables of consanguinity may be reduced by the intermarriage of relations, will appear

( 5) [Tho leumed judge's reasoning is just and correct; and that the collateral relations are
quadrupled in each generation may be thus demonstrated :-As we are supposed, upon an average,
to have one brother or sister, the two children by the father's brother or sister will make two
cousins, and the mother's brother or sister will produce two more, in all, four. For the same
reason, my father and mother must each have had four cousins, and their children are my second
cousins ; so I have eight second cousins by my father, and eight by my mother; togethor six·
teen. And thus again, I shall have thirty-two third cousins on my father's side, and thirty-two
on my mothe1Js, in all, sixty-four. Hence it follows that each preceding number in the seriei
must be multiplied by twice two or four.
This immense increa.~e of the numbers depends upon the supposition that no one marries a nilation; but to avoid such a connexion it will very soon be necessary to leave the kingdom. How
thet1e two tables of consanguinity may be reduced by the intermarriage of relations, will ap~ar
from the following simpfe caae : It two men and two women were put upon an uninhabited
island, and became two married couples, if they had on1y two children each, a me.le and female,
who respectively intermarried, and in like manner produced two children, who are thus continued
ad injinitmn; it is clear, that there would never be more than four persoM in each generation;
and if the parents lived to see their great-grandchildren, the whole number would n ever be more
than sixteen; and thus the families might be perpet~~te4 wittw11t any inoestu9µs connection.)
•

• ~

•

•

#

•

•

• • •• •

from the following simple case: if two men and two women were put upon an uninhabited

island, and became two married couples, if they had only two children each, a male and female,

468

who respectively intermarried, and in like manner produced two children, who are thus continued

ad infinitum ; it is clear, that there would never be more than four persona in each generation;

and if the parents lived to see their great-grandchildren, the whole number would never be more

than sixteen; and thus the families might be perpetuated without any incestuous connection.]

468
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to King Henry the Seventh, (t) five. Which last mentioned prince, being the

farthest removed from the common stock, gives the denomination to the de-

gree of kindred in the canon and municipal law. Though, according to the

computation of the civilians (who count upwards, from either of the persons re-

lated, to the common stock, and then downwards again to the other: reckoning

a degree for each person both ascending and descending), these two princes

were related in the ninth degree, for from King Richard the Third to Richard,

duke of York, is one degree; to Richard, earl of Cambridge, two; to Edmond,

duke of York, three; to King Edward the Third, the common ancestor, four;

to John of Gant, five; to John, earl of Somerset, six; John, duke of Somerset,

seven; to Margaret, countess of Richmond, eight; to King Henry the Seventh,

nine, (n) (6)

*The nature and degrees of kindred being thus in some measure r#oo8l

explained, I shall next proceed to lay down a series of rules or canons of L * '

inheritance, according to which, estates are transmitted from the ancestor

to the heir; together with an explanatory comment, remarking their original

and progress, the reasons upon which they are founded, and in some cases their

agreement with the laws of other nations.

1. The first rule is, that inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of

the person who last died actually seised in infinitum; but shall never lineally

ascend. (7)

To explain the more clearly both this and the subsequent rules, it must first
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be observed, that by law no inheritance can vest, nor can any person be the

actual complete heir of another, till the ancestor is previously dead. Nemo est

Jueres vivenlis. (8) Before that time the person who is next in the line of suc-

cession is called an heir apparent, or heir presumptive. Heirs apparent are

such, whose right of inheritance is indefeasible, provided they outlive the ances-

tor ; as the eldest son or his issue, who must by the course of the common law

be heir to the father whenever he Happens to die. Heirs presumptive are such

who, if the ancestor should die immediately, would in the present circumstances

of things be his heirs; but whose right of inheritance may be defeated by the

contingency of some nearer heir being born: as a brother, or nephew, whose

presumptive succession may be destroyed by the birth of a child or a daughter,

whose present hopes my be hereafter cut off by the birth of a son. Nay, even

if the estate hath descended, by the death of the owner, to such brother, or

nephew, or daughter, in the former cases, the estate shall be devested and taken

(n) See the table of consanguinity annexed: wherein all the degrees of collateral kindred to theproporitut

are computed eo far as the tenth of the civilians and the seventh of the canonists inclusive ; the former

being distinguished l>y the numeral letters, the latter by the common cyphers.

(6) [The difference of the computation by the civil and canon laws may be expressed shortly

thus: the civilians take the sum of the degrees in both lines to the common ancestor; the

to King Henry the Seventh, (t) five. Which last mentioned prince, being the
farthest removed from the eommon stock, gives the denomination to the degree of kindred in the canon and municipal law. Though, according to the
computation of the civilians (who count upwards, from either of the persons related, to the common stock, and then downwards a.gain to the other: reckoning
a. degree for each person both ascending and descending), these two :princes
were related in the ninth degree, for from King Richard the Third to Richard,
duke of York, is one degree; to Richard, ~rl of Cambridge, two; t.o Edmond,
duke of York, three; to King Edward the Third, the common ancestor, four;
to John of Gant, five; to John, earl of Somerset, six; John, duke of Somerset,
seven; to Margaret, countess of Richmond, eight; to King Henry the Seventh,
nine. (n) (6)

ex;~f:ed,it~~1i:i~x~efr::;Jft:i:;~w~e!ns~rt!u;f ~~1!~~ec:~:~r [ *208 ]
inherit.a.nee, according to which, estates are transmitted from the ancestor
to the heir; together with an explanatory comment, remarking their original
and progress, the reasons upon which they are founded, and in some cases their
agreement with the laws of other nations.
1. The first rule is, that inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of
the person who last died actually seised in infinitum; but shall never lineally
ascend. (7)
To expfnin the more clearly both this and the subsequent ruleS: it must first
be observed, that by law no inheritance can vest, nor can any person be the
actual complete heir of another, till the ancestor is previously dead. .Nemo est
hmres viventi.~. (8) Before that time the person who is next in the line of succ-ession is called an heir apparent, or heir presum~Jtive. Heirs apparent are
such, whose right of inherit.ance is indefeasible, provided they outlive the ancestor; as the eldest son or his issue, who must by the course of the common law
be heir to the father whenever he h\ppens to die. Heirs presumptive are such
who, if the ancestor should die immediately, would in the present circumst.ances
of things be his heirs ; but whose right of inheritance may be defeated by the
contingency of some nearer heir being born: as a brother~ or nephew, whose
presumptive succession may be destroyed by the birth of a child or a daughter,
whose present hopes my be hereafter cut off by the birth of a son. Nay, even
if the estate hath descended, by the death of the owner, to such brother, or
nephew, or daughter, in the former cases, the est.ate shall be devested and taken
(•) See the table of'collllllllplnlty annexed· wherein all the degreesofeolla&eral kindred to tbepropoaihu
are computed so -°'r as the tenth of the clvUlana and the seventh of the canonists inclusive ; the former
being distinguished by the numeral Jett.ere, the latter by the common cyphera.

canonists take only the number of degrees in the longest line. Hence, when tho canon law

prohibits all marriages between persons related to each other within the seventh degree, this

•would restrain all marriages within the 14th degree of the civil law. In the 1st book, 425, n.,

it is observed that all marriages are prohibited between persons who are related to each other

within the third degree, according to the computation of the civil law. This affords a solu-

tion to the vulgar paradox, that first cousins may marry and second cousins cannot. For first

consins and all cousins may marry by the civil law; and neither first nor second cousins can

marry by the canon law. But all the prohibitions of the canon law might have been dispensed

with. It is said, that the canon law computation has been adopted by the law of England ; yet

I do not know a single instance in which we have occasion to refer to it. But the civil law com-

putation is of great importance in ascertaining who are entitled to the administration, and to the

distributive shares, of intestate personal property. See post, 504, 515.]

(7) This canon of descent is very generally changed in the United States, so as to aduiit at

least the father and mother as heirs in the event of the failure of lineal descendants. It is also

altered in England by statute 3 and 4 "Win. IT. c. 106. See infra, p. 240, note.

(8) |_ID a devise, however, if lands be left to the heir of M it may be fpxMLa&designotio persona,

and he may take in the lifetime of M. Goodrigbt d. Brooking f. Wlnte, 2 Bla. 1010. There is

also an exception to this rule in the case of the duchy of Cornwall, which vests in the king's

first-born son by hereditary right in the lifetime of his father. 3 Bac. Ab. 4, 449; 8 Rep. 1;

Seld. tit. Hon. 2, 5.]

469

(6) [The difference of t.h e computation by the civil and canon laws may be expressed shortlv
thus: the civilians take the sum of the degrees in both lines to the common anct!stor; tlie
canonists take only the number of degrees in the longest line. Hence, when tho canon law
prohibits all marriages between persons related to each other within the seventh degree, this
would re11train all marriap:es within the 14th degree of the civil law. In th11 1st book; 425, n.,
it is ob11erved that all marriages are prohibited between pel'llOns who are relst;ed to ea.ch other
within the third degree, according to the computation of the civil law. This nffords a solu·
tion to the vulgar paradox, that first cousins may marry and socond cousins cannot. F'or first
coullin.s and a.ti co1lf.iine may marry by the civil law; and noitber finJt nor second cou~n8 cnn
marry hy the conon law. But all the prohihition11 of the csn<m law might hove been disp1m~ed
with. It is said, that t.he canon law computation hBS been adopt;ed by the law of Enp:land; y1it
I do not know a t!in~e instanc•e in which we bani occasion to refer to it. But the civil law romputation is of great lDl~rtance in ascerta.inin~ who are entitled to the administration. and to the
distributive shares, of mt.estate personal property. See post, 504, 515.]
(7) This canon of descent is very ~nerally changed m tho United Stat.es, so 611 to admit at
least the father and mother as heirs m the event of the failure of lineal descendant8. It iR also
altered in En~land by statute :land 4 Wm. IV , c. 10(}. See i11fra, p. 240, note.
(8) Lln adevi8o, however, if lands be left to the hoir of M it may be ~ood us derignotio persmire,
and he may take in the lifetime of M. Goodrip:!Jt d. Brooking v. White, 2 Bia. 1010. Thero is
alt'O au exception to this rule in the C&8e of the duchy of Comwiill, which vests in the king's
first-born son by hereditary right in the lifetime of his father. 3 Bae. .A.b. 4, 449; 8 Rep. 1;
Seid. tit. Hon. 2, 5.]
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away by the birth of a posthumous child; and, in the latter, it shall also be

totally devested by the birth of a posthumous son. (o) (9)

r *2oa i *^e must also remember, that no person can be properly such an

' J ancestor, as that an inheritance of lands or tenements can be derived

from him, unless he hath had actual seisin of such lands, either by his own

entry, or by the possession of his own or his ancestor's lessee for years, or by

receiving rent from a lessee of the freehold: (p) (10) or unless he hath had what

is equivalent to corporal seisin in hereditaments that are incorporeal; such as

the receipt of rent, a presentation to the church in case of an advowson, (q) and

the like. But he shall not be accounted an ancestor, who hath had only a bare

right or title to enter or be otherwise seised. And therefore all the cases

which will be mentioned in the present chapter, are upon the supposition that

the deceased (whose inheritance is now claimed) was the last person actually

seised thereof. For the law requires this notoriety of possession, as evidence

that the ancestor had that property in himself, which is now to be transmitted

to his heir. (11) Which notoriety had succeeded in the place of the ancient

feudal investiture, whereby, while feuds were precarious, the vassal on the

descent of lands was formerly admitted in the lord's court (as is still the practice

in Scotland), and there received his seisin, in the nature of a renewal of his

ancestor's grant, in the presence of the feudal peers; till at length, when the

right of succession became indefeasible, an entry on any part of the lands within

the county (which if disputed was afterwards to be tried by those peers), or other
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notorious possession, was admitted as equivalent to the formal grant of seisin,

and made the tenant capable of transmitting his estate by descent The seisin

therefore of any person, thus understood, makes him the root or stock, from

which all future inheritance by right of blood must be derived: which is very

briefly expressed in this maxim, seisinafacit stipitem.(r)

r in.. 0 T *When therefore a person dies so seised, the inheritance first goes to

L -I his issue: as if there be Geoffrey, John, and Matthew, grandfather, father,

and son; and John purchases lands, and dies; his son Matthew shall succeed

(o) Bro. tit. Oaornt, 88, (p) Co. Litt. 15, fgJlMd.ll. (r} Flet. 1. 6, o. 2,1S.

(9) [Bat besides the case of a posthumous child, if lands are given to a son, who, dies, leav-

ing a sister his heir; if the parents have at any distance of time afterwards another son, this

son shall devest the descent upon the sister, and take the estate as heir to his brother. Co.

away by the birth of a ~osthumous child; and, in the latter, it shall also be
totally devested by the birth of a posthumous son. (o) (9)
*We must also remember, that no person can be properly such an
209 ]
ancestor, as that an inheritance of lands or tenements can be derived
from him, unless he hath had acfoal seisin of such lands, either by his own
entry, or by the possession of his own or his ancestor's lessee for years, or by
receiving rent from a lessee of the freehold: (p) (10) or unless he hath had what
is equivalent to corporal seisin in hereditaments that are incorporeal; such as
the receipt of rent, a presentation to the church in case of an advowson, (q) and
the like. But he shall not be accounted an ancestor, who hath had only a bare
right or title to enter or be otherwise seised. And therefore all the caeea
which will be mentioned in the present chapter, are upon the supposition that
the deceased (whose inheritance is now claimed) was the last person actually
seised thereof. For the law requires this notoriety of possesaion, as evidence
that the ancestor had that property in himself, which is now to be transmitted
to his heir. (11) Which notoriety had succeeded in the place of the ancient
feudal investiture, whereby, while feuds were precarious, the vassal on the
descent of lands was formerly admitted in the lord's court (as is still the practice
in Scotland), and there recen-ed his seisin, in the nature of a renewal of his
ancestor's grant, in the presence of the feudal peers; till at length, when the
right of succession became indefeasible, an entry on any part of the lands within
the county (which if disputed was afterwards to be tried'bythosepeers),orother
notorious possession, was admitted as equivalent to the formal grant of seisin,
and made the tenant capable of transmitting his estate by descent. The seisin
therefore of any person, thus understood, makes him the root or stock, from
which all future inheritance by right of blood must be derived: which is very
briefly expressed in this maxim, seis1'.na facit stipitem. (r)
• 0
*When therefore a person dies so seised, the mheritance first goes to
[ 21 ] his issue: as if there be Geoffrey, JohJJ., and Matthew, grandfather, father,
and son; and John purchases lands, and dies; his son Matthew shall succeed

r•

(o)

Bro. tit. "-1, 88,

(p)

Co. Litt. 15.

(g) lbid. ll.

(r) Flet. J. 6, c.

S. fl.

Litt. 11; Dort. and Stud. 1 dial. c. 7. So the same estate may be frequently devested by the

subsequent birth of a nearer presumptive heir. As if an estate is given to an only child, who

dies, it may descend to an aunt, who may be stripped of it by an after-born uncle, on whom a

subsequent sister of the deceased may enter, and who will again be deprived of the estate by

the birth of a brother. It seems to be determined that every one has a right to retain the

rents and profits which accrued while he was thus legally possessed of the inheritance. Harg.

Co. Litt. 11; 3 "Wils. 526. This is in the case of descent, see H. Chit. Desc. 294; but whore a

posthumous child takes by purchase, he is entitled not only to the estate itself bat to the

intermediate profits of the estate also. Id. 296, 297, 298.]

(10) [It seems doubtful whether receiving rent reserved on a freehold lease, is equivalent to

corporal seisin of the lands; upon comparing the passage eited in Lord Coke as an authority,

with Co. Litt. 33, a, and 3 Rep. 42, a, it would seem that his opinion was in the negative. The

same point was ruled in cases cited from Hale's MSS.. and Mr, J. Glyn's MS., Rep. by Mr.

Hargrove: Co. Litt. 15, a. n. 83; and in Doe v. Kean, 7 T. R., 390, Lord Kenyon certainly

understands him so to have thought, and adopts it as a rule, that to give such seisin, rent must

have been received after the expiration or the freehold lease. See also Doe v. Whichelo

8 T. R. 213.1

(11) [This requisition of seisin does not, however, apply where the proposed ancestor was a

purchaser; for from him the estate or right to be inherited shall descend, whether he was

seized or not Pollex. 54; 2 "Wils. 29; 4 Scott, If. R. 449. A condition may descend upon

the heir, although no estate actually descends from the ancestor; and when the condition u

performed, the heir shall be in by descent, because of the condition descending. Cas. Tcrap.

Talbot, 123. Thus, the estate of a devisee or surrenderee of a copyhold is transmissible before

he is admitted. 5 Burr. 2786. It is said of remainders contingent as to the person, that ther

are not descendible until that contingency is determined: Fearne, Con. Rem. 371; Walk. Desc.

4; but this is only to say that you cannot trace the descent until you know from whom it is to

be traced.]
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(9) [But besides the case of a posthumous child, if lands are given to a son, who, diea, leaving a sister his heir; if the parents have e.t any distance of time afterwards another son, this
son shall devest the descent upon the sister, and take the estate e.s heir to his brother. Co.
Litt. 11; Doot. and Stud. 1 dial. c. 7. So the same estate may be frequently devested by the
subsequent birth of e. nearer presumptive heir, .As if e.n estate is given to e.n only child, who
dies, it may descend to an aunt, who may be stripped of it by an after-born uncle, on whom a
subsequent sist.er of the deceased may ent.er, and who will a.gain be deprived of the estatAl by
the birth of a brother. It seems to be determined that every one has a right to retain the
rents and profits which accrued while he was thus legally possessed of the inheritance. Harg.
Co. Litt. 11; 3 Wils. 526. This is in the case of descent, see H. Chit. Desc. 294 ; but whcre a
p<>sthumous child takes by purchase, he is entitled not only to the estate itself, but to the
mtermediate profits of the estat.e also. Id. 296, 'BT, 298.)
(10) [It seems doubtful whether receiving rent reserved on a freehold lease, is equivalent. to
corporal seisin of the lands; upon comparing the p8.!!Se.ge eited in Lord Coke as an authority,
with Co. Litt. 3'2, a, and 3 Rep, 42, &, it would seem that his opinion was in the negative. The
same point was ruled in cases cited from Hale's MSS., and Mr, J. Glyn's MS., Rep. by llr.
Hargrave: Co. Litt. 15, a. n. 83; and in Doe "· Kean, 7 T, R., 390, Lord Kenyon certe.inly
understands him so to have thought, and adopts it as a rule, that to give such seisin, rent musi
have been received aj'rer the e~ration of the freehold lease. See also Doe v. Whichelo,
8 T. R. 2HJ.l
(11) [This roqui1:1ition of seisin does not, however, apply where the proposed anoe11tor wu a

purchaser; for from him the estate or right to be inherited shall descend, whether he was
seized or not. Pollex. 54 ; 2 Wils. 29 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 449. .A condition may descend upon
the heir, although no est.ate actually descends from the ancestor; and when the c.ondition ii
performed, the heir shall be in by descent, because of the condition descending. Cas. Temp.
Talbot, 123. Thus, the estate of a devisee or surrenderee of a oopyhoid is transmissible before
he iR admitted. 6 Burr. 2786. It is said of remainders contingent as to the person, that ther
are not descendible until that contingency is det.ermined: Fee.rue, Oon. Rem. 371; Watk. Det!C.
4; but this is only to say that you cannot tmoe the descent until you know from whom it is to
bo traced.]
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him as heir, and not the grandfather, Goeffrey; to whom the land shall never

ascend, but shall rather escheat to the lord. («) (12)

This rule, so far as it is affirmative and relates to lineal descents, is almost

universally adopted by all nations; and it seems founded on a principle of natural

reason, that (whenever a right of property transmissible to representatives is

admitted) the possessions of the parents should go, upon their decease, in the

first place to their children, as those to whom they have given being, and for

whom they are therefore bound to provide. But the negative branch, or total

exclusion of parents and all lineal ancestors from succeeding to the inheritance

of their offspring, is peculiar to our own laws, and such as have been deduced

from the same original. For, by the Jewish Law, on failure of issue, the father

succeeded to the son, in exclusion of brethern, unless one of them married the

widow, and raised up seed to his brother, (t) And by the laws of Home, in the

first place, the children or lineal descendants were preferred; and on failure of

these, the father and mother or lineal ascendants succeeded, together with the

brethren and sisters; (u) though by the law of the twelve tables the mother was

originally, on account of her sex, excluded, (v) Hence this rule of our laws has

been censured and declaimed against as absurd, and derogating from the maxims

of equity and natural justice, (w) Yet that there is nothing unjust or absurd

in it, but that on the contrary it is founded upon very good legal reason, may

appear from considering as well the nature of the rule itself, as the occasion of

introducing it into our laws.
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*We are to reflect, in the first place, that all rules of succession to r ^n-., -•

estates are creatures of the civil polity, and juris positivi merely. The L -I

right of property, which is gained by occupancy, extends naturally no farther

than the life of the present possessor: after which the land by the law of nature

would again become common, and liable to be seised by the next occupant; but

society, to prevent the mischiefs that might ensue from a doctrine so productive

of contention, has established conveyances, wills, and successions; whereby the

property originally gained by possession is continued and transmitted from one

man to another, according to the rules which each state has respectively thought

proper to prescribe. There is certainly, therefore, no injustice done to individ-

uals, whatever be the path of descent marked out by the municipal law.

If we next consider the time and occasion of uitroducing this rule into our

law, we shall find it to have been grounded upon very substantial reasons. I

think there is no doubt to be made, but that it was introduced at the same time

with, and in consequence of, the feudal tenures. For it was an express rule of

the feudal law, (a;) that successionis feudi talis est natura, quod ascendentes non

succedunt; and therefore the same maxim obtains also in the French law to this

day. (y) (13) Our Henry the First, indeed, among other restorations of the old

Saxon laws, restored the right of succession in the ascending line : (z) but this

soon fell again into disuse; for so early as Glanvil's time, who wrote under

(») Litt.» 3. (t) Seld. tie succea. Ebraor. e. 12. (u) fy. 38. 15, 1. NOT. 118, 127.

(v) Inst. 3, 3, 1. (w) Craig, de jur. feud. 1. 2. *. 13, } 15. Locke on Gov. part 1, $ 90.

(x) 2 Feud, 50. fyj Domat, p. 2, 1. 2, t. 2. Montesq. Sp. L. 1. 31, c. 33. (z) LL. Hen. I, e. 70.

him as heir, and not the grandfather, Goeffrey ; to whom the lu.ncl shall neve.r
ascend, but shall rather escheat to the lord. (s) (12)
'£his rule, so far as it is affirmative and re1ates to lineal descents, is almost
universally adopt.ed by all nations; and it seems founded on a principle of natural
reason, that (whenever a right of property transmissible to representatives is
admitted) the possessions of the parents should go, upon their decease, in the
first place to their children, as those to whom they ha\·e given being, and for
whom they a.re therefore bound to provide. But the ne~tive branch, or total
exclusion of parents and all lineal ancestors from succeedmg to the inheritance
of their offspring, is peculiar to our own laws, and such as have been deduced
from the same original. For, by the Jewish Law, on failure of issue, the father
succeeded to the son, in exclusion ofbrethern, unless one of them married the
widow, and raised up seed to his brother. (t) And by the laws of Rome, in the
first place, the children or lineal descendants were preferred; and on failure of
these, the father and mother or lineal ascendants succeeded, together with the
brethren and sisters; (u) though by the law of the twelve tables the mother was
originally, on account of her sex, excluded. (v) Hence this rule of our laws has
been censured and declaimed against as absurd, and derogating from the maxims
of equity and natural justice. (w) Yet that there is nothing unjust or absurd
in it, but that on the contrary it is founded upon very good legal reason, may
appear from considering as well the nature of the rule itself, as the occasion of
introducing it into our laws.
.
•we are to reflect, in the first place, that all rules of succession to [ ,.. 211 ]
estates are creatures of the civil polity, and .furis positivi merely. The
right of property, which is gained by occupancy, extends naturally no farther
than the life of the present possessor: after which the land by the law of nature
would again become common, and liable to be seised by the next occupant; but
society, oo prevent the mischiefs that might ensue from a doctrine so productive
of contention, has established conveyances, wills, and successions; whereby the
property originally gained by possession is continued and transmitted from one
man to another, according to the rules whieh e~h state has respectively thought
proper to prescribe. There is certainly, tQ.erefore, no injustice done to individuals, whatever be ~he path o~ descent mark~ out .by the II!-unici~al law..
If we next consider the time and occas10n of w.trodncmg this rule mto our
law, we shall find it oo have been grounded upon very substantial reasons. I
think there is no doubt to be made. but that it was introduced at the same time
with, and in consequence of, the feudal tenures. For it was an express rule of
the feudal law, (x) that successionis feudi talis 6St natura, quod ascendentes non
succedunt J. and therefore the same maxim obtains also in the French law to this
day. (y) (13) Our Henry the First, indeed, among other restorations of the old
8axon laws, restored the right of succession in the ascending line: (z) but this
soon fell again into disuse; for so early as Glanvil's time, who wrote under

(12) [That is, the father shall not take the estate as heir to his son in that capacity; yet as

a father or mother may be cousin to his or her child, he or she may inherit to him as" such,

notwithstanding the relation of parent. Eastwood v. Vinke, 2 P. Wins. 613. So if a son pur-

(8)

MU. I 3.

(v) Inst. 3, 3, 1.
(z:) 2 Feud. !50.

(t) Seid. de mcc&a. Ebrmor. c. i2.
(u) Ff. 381 15, 1. Nov. 118, 127.
(to) Craig. tk jur. f~ . l. 2. t. 13, I 15. Loo1te on Gov. part 1, I 00.

(71) Domat, p.

i. l. 2, t. 2.

Montesq. Sp. L. l. 81, c. 33.

(z) LL. Hen. I, c. 70.

chases lands ana dies without issue, his uncle shall have the land as heir, and not the father,

though the father is nearer of blood: Litt. s. 3 ; but if in this case the uncle acquires actual seisin

and dies without issue, while the father is alive, the latter may then, by this cirouity, have tho

lands as heir to the uncle, though not as heir to the son, for that he cometh to the laud by

collateral descent, and not by lineal ascent. Craig, de Jur. Fond. 234 ; "Wright's Ton. 132, n.

(Z). So under a limitation to " the next of blood of A," the father would on the death of

the son without issue, take, in exclusion both of the brothers and uncle of A, who would have

first succeeded under the usual course of descent, as heirs of A : for a father is nearer in prox-

imity of blood than a brother or an uncle: Litt. s. 3; Co. L. 10, b. 11, a.; 3 Rep. 40 b.; 1 Vout.

414 ; Hale C. L. 323; and this is the reason why the father is preferred, in the administration of

the goods of the son, before any other relation, except his wife and children. ]

(13) But this is since altered. Code Civil, L. 3, tit. 1, 746.
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(12) [That i~, the father shall not take the estate a.." heir to his son in that capacity; yet as
a father or mother may be cousin to his or her child, he or Rhe may inherit to him as such,
notwithstanding the relation of parent. Eastwood v. Vinke, 2 P. Wm~. 6l:J. So if a sou purcha.se11 lands 11nd dies without issue, hi11 uncle shall have the land as heir, and not the father,
though the father is nearer of blood: Litt. s. 3; but ifiu this ce..~o the uncle acquires actual seisin
and dies without issue, while the father is alive, the latter may them, by this circuity, ham tho
lands as heir to tho uncle, though not as hoir to the son, for that he cometh to the land by
collateral descent, and not by lineal ascent. Craig. de .Tur. Fond. 234; Wright':1 Ten. 1132, n.
(Z). So under a limitation to " the next of blood of A," the father would on the cfoath of
the son without iR:iue, take, in exclusion both of the brother:i and uncle of A, who would h1we
!ll'~t succeeded under the usual course of de~cent, ~~ heir~ of .A : for a fathor is nearer in prox1m1ty of blood than a brother or an uncle: Litt. s..l; Co. L. 10, b. 11, a. ; 3 Rep. 40 b.; 1 Vent.
414; Hale C. L. 32:J; and this is the rea.<ion why the father iii preferred, in the administration of
the good~ of the ;;on, before any other relation, except his wife and children.]
(13) But this i;i ~iuce altered. Code Civil, L. 3, tit. 1, 746.
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Henry the Second, we find it laid down as established law, (a) that hosreditas num.

quam ascendit; which has remained an invariable maxim ever since. These cir-

cumstances evidently show this rule to be of feudal original; and taken in that

light, there are some arguments in its favour, besides those which are drawn

F *212 1 *merely fr°m ™e reason of the thing. For if the feud of which the

' '" -" son died seised, was really feudum antiquum, or one descended to him

from his ancestors, the father could not possibly succeed to it, because it must

have passed him in the course of descent, before it could come to the son;

unless it were feudum maternum, or one descended from his mother, and then

for other reasons ([which will appear hereafter) the father could in no wise

inherit it. And if it were feudum novum, or one newly acquired by the son,

then only the descendants from the body of the feudatory himself could succeed,

by the known maxim of the early feudal constitutions; (b) which was founded

as well upon the personal merit of the vassal, which might be transmitted to his

children, but could not ascend to his progenitors, as also upon this consideration

of military policy, that the decrepit grandsire of a vigorous vassal would be but

indifferently qualified to succeed him in his feudal services. Nay, even if this

feudum novum were held by the son ut feudum antiquum, or with all the

qualities annexed to the feud descended from his ancestors, such feud must

in all respects have descended as if it had been really an ancient feud; and

therefore could not go to the father, because if it had been an ancient feud, the

father must have been dead before it could have come to the son. Thus,
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whether the feud was strictly novum, or strictly antiquum, or whether it

was novum held ut antiquum, in none of these cases the father could possibly

succeed. These reasons, drawn from the history of the rule itself, seem to be

more satisfactory than that quaint one of Bracton, (c) adopted by Sir Edward

Coke, (d) which regulates the descent of lands according to the laws of gravi-

tation. (14)

II. A second general rule or canon is, that the male issue shall be admitted

before the female. (15)

F *213 1 *Thus, sons shall be admitted before daughters; or, as our male law-

L -I givers have somewhat uncomplaisantly expressed it, the worthiest of

blood shall be preferred.(e) As if John Stiles hath two sons, Matthew and

Gilbert, and two daughters, Margaret and Charlotte, and dies; first Matthew,

and (in case of his death without issue) then Gilbert, shall be admitted to the

succession in preference to both the daughters.

This preference of males to females is entirely agreeable to the law of suc-

cession among the Jews, (/)and also among the states of Greece, or at least

among the Athenians; (g) but was totally unknown to the laws of Rome (A)

(such of them I mean as are at present extant), wherein brethren and sisters

were allowed to succeed to equal portions of the inheritance. I shall not here

enter into the comparative merit of the Roman and the other constitutions in

this particular, nor examine into the greater dignity of blood in the male or

female sex: but shall only observe, that our present preference of males to

females seems to have arisen entirely from the feudal law. For though our

British ancestors, the Welsh, appear to have given a preference to males, (t) yet

our Danish predecessors (who succeeded them) seem to have made no distinc-

(a) I. 7, c. 1. fbj I Feud. 20.

(c) DetcendU ttaquejiu, yimtiponder

(d) llnst. 11. (t) Hal. H. C.

(li) Intt. 3, 1, 6. (I) Slot. Wall. It JMu. I.

(<•') DetcendU Uaquejui, quasi ponderosum ynid cadeta denrsum recta linen, et nunqunm rtatctndtt. 1. 2, e. 19.

(d) 1 Inst. 11. (e) Hal. H. C. L. 235. (f) Numb. o. 27. (ff) Petit. LL. Attic. J. 6, t. 6.

(14) [However ingenious and satisfactory these reasons may appear, there is little consist-

ency in the application of them ; for if the father does not succeed to the estate, because it

mint be presumed that it has passed him in the coarse of descent, the same reason would pre-

vent an elder brother from taking an estate by descent from the younger. And if it does not

pans to the father, lest the lord should have been attended by an aged, decrepit feudatory, the

same principle would be still stronger to exclude the father's eldest brother from the inheritance,

who is now permitted to succeed to his nephew.]

(15) [This canon of descent does not obtain in the United States.
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tion of sexes, but to have admitted all the children at once to the inheritance. (k)

But the feudal law of the Saxons on the continent (which was probably brought

over hither, and first altered by the law of King Canute) gives an evident pref-

erence of the male to the female sex. "Pater aut mater defuncti, filio non

filim hcereditatum relinquent. ..... Quidefunctus n<m filios sed filias relique-

rit, ad eas omnis hcereditas pertineat." (I) It is possible, therefore, that this pref-

erence might be a branch of that imperfect system of feuds, which obtained

here before the conquest ; especially as it subsists among the customs of gavel-

kind, and as, in the *charter or laws of King Henry the First, it is not r ^^ -i

(like many Norman innovations, given up, but rather enforced, (m) The *- * '

true reason of preferring the males must be deduced from feudal principles ;

for, by the genuine and original policy of that constitution, no female could

ever succeed to a proper feud, (n) inasmuch as they were incapable of perform-

ing those military services, for the sake of which that system was established.

But our law does not extend to a total exclusion of females, as the Salic law,

and others, where feuds were most strictly retained : it only postpones them to

males ; for though daughters are excluded by sons, yet they succeed before any

collateral relations ; our law, like that of the Saxon feudists before mentioned,

thus steering a middle course, between the absolute rejection of females, and the

putting them on a footing with males.

III. A third rule or canon of descent is this : that where there are two or

more males, in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit ; but the females all

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

together. (16)

As if a man hath two sons, Matthew and Gilbert, and two daughters, Margaret

and Charlotte, and dies ; Matthew, his eldest son, shall alone succeed to his

estate, in exclusion of Gilbert, the second son, and both the daughters ; but, if

both the sons die without issue before the father, the daughters Margaret and

Charlotte shall both inherit the estate as coparceners, (o)

This right of primogeniture in males seems anciently to have only obtained

among the Jews, in whose constitution the eldest son had a doubleportion of

the inheritance ; (p) in the same manner as with us, by the laws of King Henry

eldest son had the capital fee or principal feud of his father's

the First, (q) the eldest son had the capital

possessions, and no other pre-eminence ; and *as the eldest daughter

had afterwards the principal mansion, when the estate descended in

coparcenary, (r) The Greeks, the Romans, the Britons, the Saxons, and even

originally the feudists, divided the lands equally ; some among all the children

at large, some among the males only. This is certainly the most obvious and

natural way ; and has the appearance, at least in the opinion of younger brothers,

of the greatest impartiality and justice. But when the Emperors began to

create honorary feuds, or titles of nobility, it was found necessary (in order to

preserve their dignity]) to make them impartible, (s) or (as *hey styled them)

feuda individua, and in consequence descendible to the eldest son alone. This

example was further enforced by the inconveniences that attended the splitting

of estates ; namely, the division of military services, the multitude of infant

tenants incapable of performing any duty, the consequential weakening of the

strength of the kingdom and the inducing younger sons to take up with the

business and idleness of a country life, instead of being serviceable to them-

selves and the public by engaging in mercantile, in military, in civil, or in,

ecclesiastical employments, (t) These reasons occasioned an almost total change

in the method of feudal inheritances abroad; so that the eldest male began

ft) LL. Camtt. c. 68. (It TU. 7, tt 1 and 4. (m) c. 70. (n) 1 Feud. 8.

(oJlJ.lt. J5. Hale. H. 0. L. 08. rpjSelden, detucc.Ebr. c. 6. (q)c. 70.

(rj Glanvil, 1. 7, c. 3. d) t Feud. 55. ft) Hale, H. C, L. Ml.

(Ifi) [Daughters by different venters may inherit together as one heir to their common parent,

though hall' blood ig an impediment to the succession by descent from one to the other.

Thus Lord Hale says, Com. L. c. 11: " all the daughters, whether by the same or divers venters,

do inherit together to the father."

>In the United States the right of primogeniture is not recognized in the law of descents.
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tion of sexes, but to have admitted all the children at once to the inheritance. (l~)
But the feudal law of the Saxons on the continent (which was probably brought
o;er hither, and first altered by the law of King Canute) gives an e;ident preference of the male to the female sex. "Pater aut mater defuncti, filio non
ftli<B hmreditatum rez.inquent. . • . . . Qui defunctus non filios sed filias reliquerit, ad eas omnis kmreditas pertineat." (l) It is possible, therefore, tbat this preference might be a branch of that imperfect system of feuds, which obtained
here before the conquest; especially as it subsists among the customs of gu.Yelkind, and as, in the •charter or laws of King Henry the First, it is not [ • 214 ]
(like many Norman innovations, given up, but rather enforced. (m) The
true reason of preferring the males must be deduced from feudal principles;
for, by the genuine and original Policy of that constitution, no female could
eyer succeed to a proper feud, (n) masmuch as they were incapable of performing those military services, for the sake of which that system was established.
But our law does not extend to a total exclusion of females, as the Sa.lie law,
dnd others, where feuds were most strictly retained: it only postpones them to
males; for though daughters are excluded by sons, yet they succeed before any
collateral relations; our law, like that of the Saxon feudists before mentioned,
thus steeriug a middle course, between the absolute rejection of females, and the
putting them on a footing with males.
III. A third rule or canon of descent is this: that where there are two or
more males, in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit; but the females all
together. (16)
As if a man hath two sons, Matthew and Gilbert, and two daughters, Margaret
and Charlotte, and dies; Matthew, his eldest son, shall alone succeed to his
estate, in exclusion of Gilbert, the second son, and both the daughters; but, if
both the sons die without issue before the father, t.he daughters Margaret and
Charlotte shall both inherit the estate as coparceners. (o)
This right of primogeniture in males seems anciently to have only obtained
among the Jews, in whose constitution the eldest son had a double :eortion of
the inheritance; (p) in the same manner as with us, by the laws of Krng Henry
the First, (q) the e1dest son had the capital fee or principal feud of his fathers
possessions, and no other pre-eminence; and *as the eldest daughter [ • 215 ]
had afterwards the principal mansion, when the estate descended in
coparcenary. (r) The Greeks, the Romans, the Britons, the Saxons, and even
onginally the feudists, divided the lands equally; some among all the children
at large, some among the males only. This is certainly the most obvious and
natural way; and has the appearance, at least in the opinion of younger brothers,
of the greatest impartiality and justice. But when the Emperors began to
create honorary feuds, or titles of nobility, it was found necessary (in order to
preserve their dignity) to make them impartiblc, (s) or (as •hey styled them)
f~uda individua, and in consequence desccndible to the eldest son alone. This
example was further enforced by the inconveniences that attended the splitting
of estates; namely, the division of military sen·ices, the multitude of infant
tenants incapable of performing an,y duty, the consequential weakening of the
strength of the kingdom and the rnducing younger sons to take up with the
business and idleness of a country life, instead of bein~ serviceable to themselves and the public by engaging in mercantile, in military, in civil, or in.
ecclesiastical employments. (t) 1.'liese reasons occasioned an almost total change
in the method of feudal inheritances abroad; so that the eldest male began
(l) 711. 7, fl 1 and'·
(m) c. 70,
(rt) l Feud. 8.
Hale. H . C. L. 23:1.
(p) Selden, de succ.Ebr. c.11.
(q) c. 70.
l. 7, c. 3.
(1) 2 Fetid. 66.
(t) Hale, H. C .. L. ill.

(le) LL. CllMd. c. 68.

(o) Litt. t II.

(r) Glanvll,

- - -- --- -- - -

- -- - -

(Hi) [Daughter~ hy different venk>rs may inherit together as one heir

to their common parent,
though half l1lood is nn impediment to the i:1ncce81!ion by descent from one to the other.
Thul! Lonl Hale say><, Cow. L. c. 11 : "all the daughters, whether by the 88llle or divers ventera,
do inherit to~ether to the father."
-In the Urnted States the 1i~ht of primogeniture is not recognized in the law of descente.
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universally to succeed to the whole of the lands in all military tenures; and in

this condition the feudal constitution was established in England by William

the Conqueror.

Yet we find that socage estates frequently descended to all the sons equally,

so lately as when Glanvil («) wrote, in the reign of Henry the Second; and it is

mentioned in the Mirror (w) as a part of our ancient constitution, that knights*

fees should descend to the eldest son, and socage fees should be partible among

the male children. However, in Henry the Third's time we find by Bracton (x)

that socage lands, in imitation of lands in chivalry, had almost entirely fallen

into the right of succession by primogeniture, as the law now "stands,

r *316 -, *except in Kent, where they gloried in the preservation of their ancient

*• * -* gavelkind tenure, of which a principal branch was a joint inheritance

of all the sons; (y) and except in some particular manors and townships, where

their local customs continued the descent, sometimes to all, sometimes to the

youngest son only, or in other more singular methods of succession.

As to the females, they are still left as they were by the ancient law; for they

were all equally incapable of performing any personal service; and therefore

one main reason of preferring the eldest ceasing, such preference would have

been injurious to the rest; and the other principal purpose, the prevention of

the too minute subdivision of estates, was left to be considered and provided

for by the lords, who had the disposal of these female heiresses in marriage.

However, the succession by primogeniture, even among females, took place as
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to the inheritance of the crown; (z) wherein the necessity of a sole and deter-

minate succession is as great in the one sex as the other. And the right of

sole succession, though not of primogeniture, was also established with respect

to female dignities and titles of honour. For if a man holds an earldom to him

and the heirs of his body, and dies, leaving only daughters; the eldest shall not

of course be countess, but the dignity is in suspense or abeyance till the king

shall declare his pleasure: for he, oeing the fountain of honour, may confer it

on which of them he pleases, (a) (17) In which disposition is preserved a strong

of feuds,

trace of the ancient law of feuds, before their descent by primogeniture even

among the males was established; namely, that the lord might bestow them on

which of the sons he thought proper—"progressum eat ut ad filios deveniret, in

quern scilicet dominus hoc vellet beneficium confirmare." (b)

IV. A fourth rule, or canon of descents is this; that the lineal descendants

T *2171 tw infnitum, of any person deceased, *shall represent their ancestor;

I J that is, shall stand m the same place as the person himself would have

done, had he been living. (18)

Thus the child, grandchild, or great grandchild (either male or female) of

the eldest son succeeds before the younger son, and so in infinitum. (c) And

these representatives shall take neither more nor less, but just so much as their

principals would have done. As if there be two sisters, Margaret and Charlotte;

and Margaret dies, leaving six daughters; and then John Stiles, the father

of the two sisters, dies without other issue; these six daughters shall take

among them exactly the same as their mother Margaret would have done, had

she been living; that is, a moiety of the lands of John Stiles in coparcenary:

so that, upon partition made, if the land be divided into twelve parts, thereof

Charlotte the surviving sister shall have six, and her six nieces, the daughters

of Margaret, one apiece.

fa) I. 7, c. 3. (v>) c. I, i 3. (x) 1. 2, c. 30, 81. fyj Somner. Gavelk. 7,

(z) Co. Lltt. 166. (a) Itnd. (b) 1 Feud. 1. (e) Hale, H. (J. L. 236, 237.

(17) The king, in the case of coparceners of a title of honor, may direct which one of them

and her issue shall bear it. Co. Litt. 165, Harg. n.; In re Braye Peerage, 8 Scott, 108. See 10

Cl. and Fin. 957.

universally to succeed to the whole of the lands in all military tenures; and in
this condition the feudal constitution was established in England by William
the Conqueror.
Yet we find that socafe estates frequently descended to all the sons eqnall,y,
so lately as when Glanvi (u) wrote, in the reign of Henry the Second; and it 1s
mentioned in the Mirror (w) as a part of our ancient constitution, that knights'
fees shoul<l descend to the eldest son, and socage fees should be partible among
the male children. However, in Henry the 'fhird's time we find by Bracton (x)
that socage lands, in imitation of lands in chivalry, had almost entirely fallen
into the right of succession by primogeniture, as the law now stands,
[ • 216 ] "'except in Kent, where they gloried in the preservation of their ancient
gavelkind tenure, of which a principal branch was a joint inheritance
of all the sons; (y) and except in some particular manors and townships, where
their local customs continued the descent, sometimes to all, sometimes t<i the
youngest son only, or in other more singular methods of succession.
As to the females, they are still left as they were by the ancient law; for they
were all equally incapable of performing any personal service; and therefore
one main reason of preferring the eldest ceasing, such preference would have
been injurious to the rest; and the other principal purpose, the prewntion of
the too minute subdivision of estates, waa left to be considered and prm·ided
for by the lords, who had the disposal of these female heiresses in marriage.
However, the succession by primogeniture, even among females, took place as
to the inheritance of the crown; (z) wherein the necessity of a sole and determinate succession is as great in the one sex 8.8 the other. And the right of
sole succession, though not of primogeniture, was also established with respect
to female dignities and titles of honour. For if a man holds an earldom to him
and the heirs of his body, and dies, leaving only daughters; the eldest shall not
of course be countess, but the dignity is in suspense or abeyance till the king
shall declare his pleasure: for he, being the fountain of honour, may confer it
on which of them he pleases. (a) (17) In which disposition is preserved a strong
trace of the ancient law of feuds, before their descent by primogeniture even
among the males was established; namely, that the lord might bestow them on
which of the sons he thought proper-"progressum est ut ad .ftlios det!etliret, in
que'ln scilicet dominus hoc vellet beneficium con.ftrmare." (b)
IV. A fourth rule, or canon of descents is this; that the lineal descendants
[ ,.. 217 ] in in.ftm'.t.um, of any person deceased, "'shall represent their ancestor;
that is, shall stand m the same place as the person himself would have
done, had he been liYing. (18)
Thus the child, gnmdchi1d, or great grandchild (~ither male or female) of
the eldest son succeeds before the younger son, and so in infinitum. (c) And
these representatives shall take neither more nor less, but just so much as their
principals would have tlone. As if there be two sisters, Margaret and Charlotte ;
and Margaret dies, leaving six daughters; and then John Stiles, the father
of the two sisters, dies without other issue; these six daughters shall take
among them exactly the same as their mother Margaret woufd have done, had
she been living; that is, a moiety of the lands of John Stiles in coparcenary:
so that, upon partition made, if the land be divided into tweh'e parts, th<'reof
Charlotte the surviving sister shall have six, and her six nieces, the daughters
of Margaret, one apiece.
(u} l. 7, c. 3.
(tll} c. 1, § 3.
(f) Somner. Gaven:. 7,
(:i:J i. 2i...c. ao. s1.
(:i} Co. Litt. 1611.

(a}

Ibid.

(b) 1 .l"ead. 1.

(c} Hale, H . C. L . 236, 237.

(18) This rule is not universally adopted in the statutes of the United States, but in many of

them descendants take per stirpes only, when they stand in different degrees of relationship to

the common ancestor.
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(17) The king, in the case of coparceners of a title of honor, may direct which one of them
and her issue shall bear it. Co. Litt. 165, Harg. n. ; In re Braye Peerage, 8 Scott, 108. See 10
Cl. and Fin. 957.
(18) This rule is not univen1ally adopted in the statutes of the United States, but in many of
them descendants take per stirpes only. when they stand in different degrees of relationship to
the common ancestor.
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This taking by representation is called succession in stirpes, according to the

roots; since all the branches inherit the same share that their root, whom they

represent, would have done. And in this manner also was the Jewish succes-

sion directed; (d) but the Roman somewhat differed from it. In the descending

line the right of representation continued in infinitum, and the inheritance still

descended in stirpes: as if one of three daughters died, leaving ten children,

and then the father died; the two surviving daughters had each one-third of

his effects, and the ten grand-children had the remaining third divided between

them. And so among collaterals, if any person of equal degree with the

persons represented were still subsisting (as if the deceased left one brother, and

two nephews the sons of another brother), the succession was still guided by

the roots: but, if both of the brethren were dead, leaving issue, then (I appre-

hend) their representatives in equal degree became themselves principals,

*and shared the inheritance per capita, that is, share and share alike; r *oi g i

they being themselves now the next in degree to the ancestor, in their *• ' "

own right, and not by right of representation, (e) So, if the next heirs of Titius

be six nieces, three by one sister, two by another, and one by a third; his inherit-

ance by the Roman law was divided into six parts, and one given to each of the

nieces: whereas the law of England in this case would still divide it only into

three parts, and distribute it per stirpes, thus; one-third to the three children

who represent one sister, another third to the two who represent the second, and

the remaining third to the one child who is the sole representative of her
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mother.

This mode of representation is a necessary consequence of the double prefer-

ence given by our law, first to the male issue, and next to the first-born among

the males, to both which the Roman law is a stranger. For if all the children

of three sisters were in England to claim per capita, in their own right as next

of kin to the ancestor, without any respect to the stocks from whence they

sprung, and those children were partly male and partly female; then the eldest

male among them would exclude not only his own brethren and sisters, but

all the issue of the other two daughters; or else the law in this instance

must be inconsistent with itself, and depart from the preference which it

constantly gives to the males and the first-born, among persons in equal degree.

Whereas, by dividing the inheritance according to the roots, or stirpes, the rule

of descent is kept uniform and steady: the issue of the eldest son excludes all

other pretenders, as the son himself (if living) would have done; but the issue

of two daughters divide the inheritance between them, provided their mothers

(if living) would have done the same: and among these several issues, or

representatives of the res^pective roots, the same preference to males and the

same right of primogeniture obtain as would have obtained at the first among

the roots themselves, the sons or daughters of the deceased. As if a man hath

two sons, A and B, and A dies leaving two *sons, and then the grand- ,- *„, „ ,

father dies; now the eldest son of A shall succeed to the whole of his *• •"

grandfather's estate: and if A had left only two daughters, they should have

succeeded also to equal moieties of the whole, in exclusion of B and his issue.

But if a man hath only three daughters, C, D, and E; and C dies leaving two

sons, D leaving two daughters, and E leaving a daughter and a son who is

younger than his sister: here, when the grandfather dies, the eldest son of C :

shall succeed to one-third, in exclusion of the younger; the two daughters of D"

to another third in partnership; and the son of E to the remaining third, in

exclusion of his eldest sister. And the same right of representation, guided and

retrained by the same rules of descent, prevails downwards in infinitum. (19)

(d) Solden, tie nice. Ki,r. c. 1. (e) Sm. 110, e. H. Jnrf. 3, 1, 6.

(19) [This right, transferred by representation,- is infinite and unlimited in the degrees of

those that descend from the represented: for the son, the grandson, the great-grandson, and

so all downwards in infinitum, enjoy the same privilege of representation as those from whom

they derive their pedigree hail. Hale, C. L. c. ll. And from hence it follows, that the
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This f:&king by representati~n is <;alled succession m stfrpe~, according tu tl1e
roots; smce all the branches mhent the same share that theu root, whom they
represent, would have done. And in this manner also was the JewiBh sw.:cession directed; (d) but the Roman somewhat differed from it. In the descendingline the right of representation continued in infinitum, and the inheritance still
descended in stirpes: as if one of three daughters died, leaving ten children,
and then the father died; the two surviving daughters had eacb one-third of
his effects, and the ten grand-children had the remaining third divided between
them. And so among collaterals, if any person of equal degree with the
persons represented were still subsisting (as if the deceased left one brother, and
two nephews the sons of another brother), the succession was still guided by
the roots: but, if both of the brethren were dead, leaving issue, then (I apprehend) their representatives in e~ual degree became themselves principals,
•and shared the inheritance per capita, that is, share and share alike; [ • 218 ]
they being themselves now the next in de~ree to the ancestor, in their
own right, and not by right of representatwn. (e) So, if the next heirs of Titius
be six nieces, three by one sister, two by another, and one by a third; his inheritance by the Roman law was divided into six parts, and one given to each of the
nieces: whereas the law of England in this case would still dh·ide it only: into
three parts, and distribute it per stirpes, thus; one-third to the three children
who represent one sister, another third to the two who represent the second, and
the remaining third to the one child who is the sole representative of her
mother.
This mode of representation is a necessary consequence of the double preference given by our law, first to the male issue, and next to the first-born among
the males, to both which the Roman law is a stranger. For if all the children
of three sisters were in England to claim pe·r capita, in their own right as next
of kin to the ancestor, without any respect to the stocks from whence they
sprung, and those children were partly male and partly female; then the eldest
male among them would exclude not only his own brethren and sisters, but
all the issue of the other two daughters; or else the law in this instance
must be inconsistent with itself, and depart from the preference which it
constantly gives to the males and the first-born, among persons in equal degree.
Whereas, by dividing the inheritance according to the roots, or stirpes, the rule
of descent is kept uniform and steadY.: the issue of the eldest son excludes all
other pretenders, as the son himself (if liYing) would have done; but the issue
of two daughters divide the inheritance between them, provided their mothers
(if living) would have done the same: and among these several issues, or
representatives of the reflil>Cctive roots, the same preference to males and the
same right of primogeniture obtain as would have obtained at the first among
the roots themselves, the sons or daughters of the deceased. As if a man hath
two sons, A and B, and A dies leaving two *sons, and then the grand- •
father dies; now the eldest son of A shall succeed to the whole of his [ 219 J
grandfather's estate: and if A had left only two daughters, they should have
succeeded also to equal moieties of the whole, in exclusion of B and his issue.
But if a man hath only three daughters, C, D, and E; and C dies leaving two
eons, D leaving two daughters, and E leaving a daughter and a son who is
younger than his sis~r: ~ere, whe~ the grandfather dies, the eldest son of C ~
shall succeed to one-third, m exclusion: of the younger; the two daughters of D
to another third in partnership; and the son of E to the remaining third, in
exclusion of his eldest sister. And the same right of representation, guided and
retrained by the same rules of descent, prevails downwards in inftnUum. (19)
(d) 8elden, tk n.cc. Ebr. c. 1.
(61 NOfl. 110, c. &. Ind. a, I, 6.
(19) [This right, tranRferred hy representation,. is infinit.e and nnlimited in the degrees of
those that de8Cend from the represented: for the. son, the grand11on, the great-grandson, and
so all doyrnward.s in i1_ifiniiuin, cmjor the same pri~lege of representation a.<i those from whom
they denve thmr pe1llgree had. Halo, C. L. c. 11. And from hence it follow~. that the
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Yet this right does not appear to have been thoroughly established in the

time of Henry the Second, when Glanvil wrote: and therefore, in the title to

the crown, especially, we find frequent contests between the younger (but sur-

viving) brother and his nephew (being the son and representative of the elder

deceased) in regard to the inheritance of their common ancestor: for the uncle

is certainly nearer of kin to the common stock, by one degree, than the nephew;

though the nephew, by representing his father, has in him the right of primo-

geniture. The uncle also was usually better able to perform the services of the

fief; and besides had frequently superior interest and strength to back his pre-

tensions, and crush the right of his nephew. And even to this day, in the

lower Saxony, proximity of blood takes place of representative primogeniture;

that is, the younger surviving brother is admitted to the inheritance before the

son of an elder deceased: which occasioned the disputes between the two houses

of Mecklenburg, Schwerin and Strelitz, in 1692. (/) Yet Glanvil. with us, even

in the twelfth century, seems (a) to declare for the right of the nephew by

representation: provided the eldest son had not received a provision in lands

F *2201 ^rom k'8 fatner> or; (*? the civil law would call it) had not been *foris-

' "'"" J familiated, in his lifetime. King John, however,'who kept his nephew

Arthur from the throne, by disputing this right of representation, did all in his

Swer to abolish it throughout the realm: (h) but in time of his son King

jnry the Third, we find the rule indisputably settled in the manner we have

here laid it down, (t) and so it has continued ever since. And thus much for
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lineal descents.

V. A fifth rule is, that on failure of lineal descendants, or issue, of the person

last seised, the inheritance shall descend to his collateral relations, being of the

blood of the first purchaser; subject to the three preceding rules. (20)

Thus if Geoffrey Stiles purchases land, and it descends to John Stiles, his son,

and John dies seised thereof, without issue; whoever succeeds to this inheritance

must be of the blood of Geoffrey, the first purchaser of this family, (k) (21) The

first purchaser, perquisitor, is he who first acquired the estate to his family,

whether the same was transferred to him by sale or by gift, or by any other

method, except only that of descent

(/) Mod. Un. Hi3t. xlll, 334. Ig) 1. 7. «. 3. (A) Hole, H. C. L. 217, 229.

(i) lira..ton, 1. 2, e. 80, 4 2. (£) Co. Lltt. 12.

nearest relation is not always the heir at law; as the next cousin, jure repregentationis, is pre-

Yet this right does not appear to have been thoroughly established in the
time of Henry the Second, when Glanvil wrote: and tberefore, in the title to
the crown, especially, we find frequent contests between the younger (hut snrviving) brother and his nephew (being the son and representative of the elder
deceased) in regard to the inheritance of their common ancestor: for the nncle
is certainly nearer of kin to the common stock, by one degree, than the nephew;
though the nephew, by representing his father, lrns in him the right of primogeniture. The uncle also was usually better able to perform the services of the
fief; and besides had frequently superior interest and strength to back his pretensions, and crush the right of his nephew. And even to this day, in the
lower Saxony, proximity of blood takes place of representath-e primogeniture;
that is, the younger surviving brother is admitted t.o the inheritance before the
son of an elder deceased: which occasioned the disputes between the two bonses
of Mecklenburg, Schwerin and Strelitz, in 1692. (/) Yet Glanvil, with us, eYen
in the twelfth century, seems ( g) to declare for the right of the nephew bv
representation: provided the eldest son had not received a provision in lands
[ • 220 ] from his father, or, (as the civil law would call it) bud not been *forisfamiliated, in his lifetime. King John, however; who kept his nephew
Arthur from the throne, by disputing this right of re~resentation, did all in his
power to abolish it throughout the realm: (h) but m time of his son King
Henry the Third, we find the rule indisputably settled in the manner ·v;e have
here laid it down, (i) and so it has continued ever since. And thus much for
lineal descents.
V. A fifth rule is, that on failure of lineal descendants, or issue, of the person
last seised, the inheritance shall descend to his collateral relations, being of the
blood of the first purchaser; subject to the three preceding n1les. (20)
Thus if Geoffrey Stiles purchases land, and it descends to John Stiles, his son,
and John dies seised thereof, without issue; whoever succeeds to this inheritance
must be of the blood of Geoffrey, the first purchaser of this family. (k) (21) The
first purchaser, perquisitor, is he who first acquired the estate t-0 his family,
whether the same was transferred to him by sale or by gift, or by any other
method, except only that of descent. .

ferred to the next cousin, jure propinquitatis. Co. Litt. 10, b. Proximity of blood, therefore,

is twofoldj either positive or representative. It is positive when the parties claim in then:

If) Mod. Un. Hist. xiii, SIU.
(i)

Braeton, l. 2, c:. 80, t 2.

1111 i. 7. c. s.

(k) Co. IJti. 12.

IA) Hale, H. C. L. 917, 2111.

own individual right, as between the second and third son, or Between the uncle and grand

uncle. It is representative when either of the parties claim as being lineally descended from

another, in which case he is entitled to the degree of proximity to his ancestors. Thus, the

grandson of the elder son of any person proposed is entitled, before the second eon of such

person, though in common acceptation nearer by two degrees; and this principle of repre-

sentative proximity is by the law if England so peremptory that a female may avail herself

thereof to the total exclusion of a male claiming in his own right; for in descents in fee-simple,

the daughter of the eldest son shall, as claiming by representation of her father, succeed in

preference to the second or youngest son. See 3 Gru. Dig. 378, 379.]

(20) [The purchaser here spoken of is frequently an imaginary person, as may be gathered

from what follows in the text. Under the new law the person to succeed must be not only

of the blood of the purchaser, but also his heir. Infra, p. 240, note.]

(21) [To be of the blood of Geoffrev, is either to be immediately descended from ««, or to be

descended from the same couple, of common ancestors. Two persons are consangvinai, or

are of the blood (that is, whole blood) of each other, who are descended from the same two

ancestors.

The heir and ancestor must not only have two common ancestors with the original pur-

chaser of the estate, but must have two common ancestors with each other; and therefore if

the sou purchases lands and dies without issue, and it descends to any heir on the part of the

father, ifthe line of the father should afterwards become extinct, it cannot pass to the line of

the mother. Bale's Hist. C. L. 246; 49 E. Ill, 12. And for the same reason, if it should

descend to the line of any female, it can never afterwards, npon failure of that line, be trans-

mitted to the line of any other female, for according to the next rule, viz.: the sixth, the heir

of the person laat seised, must be a collateral kinsman of the whole blood.]
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nearel!t relation is not always the heir at Jaw; as the next cousin, jvre repruentationi8, is P!t'ferred to the next cousin, jHrc propinquitatiB. Oo. Litt. 10, b. Proximity of blood, therefofe,
is twofold1 either posith-e or representative. It is positive wh!Pl the parties ela.im in their
own indindual right, as between the second and third son, or !Jetween the uncle and grand
uncle. It is repretlentative when either of the parties claim as being lineally descended from
another, in which case he is entitled to the degree or proximity to his anoolrtors. Thus, tht1
gramliwn of the elder son of any penion proposed is entitled, before the second son or sueh
pet'l!on, though in oommon acceptation nearer by two degrees; and this principle of representative proximity is by the law if England so peremptory that a female may a;a.il herself
thereof to the total exclui!ion of a male claiming in hiR own right; for in de:10entll in fee-simple,
the daughter of the eldest son shall, as elaimmg by representation of her father, succeed in
preference to the ReOOnd or :vounge::it son. See 3 Cru. Dig. 378, 379.]
(20) [The purchaser here Rpoken of is frequently an imaginary person, as may be WJthered
from what followa in the text. Under the new low the per~on to succeed must be not only
of the blood of the purchn.~er, but also bis heir. Infra, p. 240, note. l
(21) [To be of the blood of Geoffrey, is either to be immediately aesoeuded from mm, or w be
descended from the aa!f'le C011.ple, of common a.ncestoni. 'l'wo persons are oonam1gmfMli, (lr
are of the blood (that is, whole blood) of each other, who are desoended from the same two
ancest.ors.
The heir and ancestor must not only h•we two common ancestors with the original purchBl!Cr of the estate, but ruuNt havo two oommon e.neestors with each other; and therefore if
the sou purchases lands and dies without issue, and it descends to any heir on the part of the
father, if the line of the father ~hould afterwards become extinct, it cannot pass t.o the line of
the mother. Hale's Hittt. C. r,. 246; 49 E. III, Ht And for' the same reason, if it should
de110end to the line of any female, it can ne;er afterwards, upon fa.ilure of that line, be transmitted to the line of any other female, for according to the next rule, vis. : the sixth, the heir
or the person l&l!t seised, must be a collateral kinsman or the whole blood.]
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This is a rule almost peculiar to our own laws, and those of a similar original.

For it was entirely unknown among the Jews, Greeks, and Romans: none of

whose laws looked any farther than the person himself who died seised of the

estate; but assigned him an heir, without considering by what title he gained

it, or from what ancestor he derived it. But the law of Normandy (I) agrees

with our law in this respect: nor indeed is that agreement to be wondered at,

since the law of descents in both is of feudal original; and this rule or canon

cannot otherwise be accounted for than by recurring to feudal principles.

When feuds first began to be hereditary, it was made a necessary qualifica

tion of the heir, who would succeed to a feud, that he should be of the blood of,

that is, lineally *desceuded from, the first feudatory or purchaser. In r ,,«„.. •,

consequence whereof, if a vassal died seised of a feud of his own acquir- I J

ing, or feudum novum, it oould not descend to any but his own offspring: no,

not even to his brother, because he was not descended, nor derived his mood,

from the first acquirer. But if it -was feudum antiquum, that is, one descended

to the vassal from his ancestors, then his brother, or such other collateral relation

as was descended and derived his blood from the first feudatory, might suc-

ceed to such inheritance. To this purpose speaks the following rule: "frater

frfttri, sine legitimo hmrede defuncto, in beneficio quod eorum patrisfuit suc-

cedat: sin autevi unuse fratribus a domino feudum acceperit, eo defuncto sine

legitimo hcerede, frater ejus in feudum non succedit." (m) The true feudal

reason for which rule was this; that what was given to a man, for his personal
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service and personal merit, ought not to descend to any but the heirs of his

person. And .therefore, as in estates-tail (which a proper feud very much

resembled), so in the feudal donation, " nomen haredis, in prima investitura

expresgum,, -tantum ad descendentes ex corpore primi vasalli extenditur ; et non

ad collateraks, nisi ex corpore primi vasalli sive stipitis descendant;" (») the

will of the donor, or original lord (when feuds were turned from life-estates

into inheritances), not being to make them absolutely hereditary, like the Roman

allodium, but hereditary only sub modo: not hereditary to the collateral rela-

tions, or lineal ancestors, or husband, or wife of the feudatory, but to the issue

descended from his body only.

However, in process of time, when the feudal rigour was in part abated, a

method was invented to let in the collateral relations of the grantee to the

inheritance, by granting him a feudum novum to hold ut feudum antiquum'j

that is, with all the qualities annexed of a feud derived from his ancestors, and

then the collateral relations were admitted to succeed even in infinitum, because

they might have been of the blood of, that is, descended from, the first imagin-

ary purchaser. For *since it is not ascertained in such general grants, r ^ao \

whether this feud shall be held ut feudum paternum or feudum avitum, "- '

but ut feudum antiquum merely; as a feud of indefinite antiquity; that is,

since it is not ascertained from which of the ancestors of the grantee this feud

shall be supposed to have descended; the law will not ascertain it, but will sup-

pose any of his ancestors, pro re nata, to have been the first purchaser: and

therefore it admits any of his collateral kindred (who have the other necessary

requisites) to the inheritance, because every collateral kinsman must be de-

scended from some one of his lineal ancestors.

Of this nature are all the grants of fee-simple estates of this kingdom, for

there is now in the law of England no such thing as a grant of a, feudum novum,

to be held ut novum: unless in the case of a fee-tail, and there we see that this

rule is strictly observed, and none but the lineal descendants of the first donee

(or purchaser) are admitted; but every grant of land in fee-simple is with us a

feudum novum to be held ut antiquum, asa feud whose antiquity is indefinite:(22)

(I) Or. Coustum. c. 26. (m) 1 Feud. 1, f 2. (n) Craig. I. 1, t. 9, ( 86.

(22) ['Where a man takes by purchase he must, take the estate as a feudum antiquum, and

though it oe limited to his heirs on the part of his mother, yet the heirs on the paternal aide,

shall be preferred in the descent, for no one is at liberty to create a new kind of inheritaiK

H. Chit Deso. 3, 123; 3 Cm. Dig. 359; Walk. D. 222, 223.]

This is a rule almost peculiar to our own laws, and those of a similar original.
For it was entirely unknown among the Jews, Greeks, and Romans: none of
whose laws lookecl any farther than the person himself who died seised of the
estate; but assigned him an heir, without considering by what title he gainecl
it, or from what ancestor he derived it. But the law of Normandy (l) agrees
with our law in this respect: nor indeed is that agreement to be wondered at,
since the law of descents in both is of feudal original; and this rule or canon
cannot otherwitie l~ accounted for than by recurring to feudal principles.
When feuds first bega.n to be hereditary, it was ma.de a necessary qualificn
tion of the heir, who would succeed to a feud, that he should be of the blood of,
that is, lineally *descended from, the first feudatory or purchaser. In [ ,..221 ]
consequence whereof, if' a vassal died se.ised of a feud of his own acquiring, or feudum novum, it oould not descend to any but his own offspring: no,
not even to his brother, because he was not descended, nor derived his blood,
from the first a.cquirer. But if it wa.s/eudum antiquum, that is, one descended
to the vassal from his ancestors, then his brother, or such other collateral relation
BS was descended and derive<l his blood from the first feudatory, might succeed to such inheritance. To this purpose speaks the following rule: "/rater
fr.ftri, sine legitimo liwrede de/11-ncto, in hene.ficio quod eorum patris fuit succedat : sin autem miuse f ratribus a d<>mino feudum acceperit, eo d~functo sine
lsgiti,-mo kaJrede,frater ejus in feudum non succedit." (m) The true feudal
reason for whicli rule was this; that what was given to a man, for his personal
servi~ and personal merit, ought not to descend to any but the heirs of hie
person. And ,therefore, as in estates-tail (which a proper feud Yery much
resembled), so in the feudal donation, "nomen hmredis, in prima investitura
exp.ressum,, .tantum ad descendentes ex corpore primi vasalli extenditur; et non
ad (J()llaterales, n.isi ex corpore primi · vasaUi sive stipitis descendant ;" ( n) the
will of the donor, or original lord (when feuds were turned from life-estates
into inheritances), not being to make them absolutely hereditary, like the Roman
allodium, but hereditary only sub modo: not hereditary to the collateral relations, or lineal ancestors. or husband, or wife of the feudatory, but to the issue
descended from his body only.
However~ in process of time, when the feudal rigour was in part abated, a
method was invented to let in the collateral relations of the grantee to the
inheritance, by granting him a feudum novum to hold ut feudum antiquurn;
that is, with all the qualities annexed of a feud derived from his ancestors, and
then the collateral relations were admitted to succeed e'ten in infinit1tm, because
ther might, ham been of the blood of, that is, descended from, the first imaginary purchaser. For *8incc it is not ascertained in such general grants, 111
whether this feud shall be held ut feudum paternum or feudum aviturn, [ 222 )
but ut feudum antiquum merely; as a feud of indefinite antiquity; that is,
since it is not ascertained from which of the ancestors of the grantee this feud
shall be supposed to have descended ; the law will not ascertain it, but will suppose any of his ancestors, pro re nata, to have been the first purchaser: and
therefore it admits any of his collateral kindred (who have the other necessary
requisites) to the inheritance, because every collateral kinsman must be descended from some one of his lineal ancestors.
Of this nature are all the grants of fee-simple estates of this kingdom, for
there is now in the law of England no such thing as a grant of a feudum novum,
to be held 1d noimm: unless in the case of a fee-tail, and there we see that this
rule is strictly observed, and none but the lineal descendants of the first donee
(or purchaser) are admitted; but every grant of larul in fee-simple is with us a
feudurn novum to he lteld ut antiquum, as a feU<f t1Jhose antiquity is indejinite:(22}
(l} <h'. Cowtum. c. 211.

(m) 1 Feud. J, Ii.

(n) Craig. l. I,

t. 9, f 36.

(2'i) [Wbere a man takes by purchase he must take the estate a.~ a .fe"dum antiquum, a.nd
though it 'he limited to his heirti on the pa.rt of his mother, yet the heirH on the pe.terne.l. s\d~
shall be preferred in the deRcent, for no one is at liberty to create a new kind of inherltanr ~
H. Chit. Desc. 3, 123; 3 Crn. Dig. 359; Watk. D. 222, WJ.]
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and therefore the collateral kindred of the grantee, or descendants from any of

his lineal ancestors, by whom the lands might possibly have been purchased, are

capable of being called to the inheritance.

Yet, when an estate hath really descended in a course of inheritance to the

person last seized, the strict rule of the feudal law is still observed: and none

are admitted but the heirs of those through whom the inheritance hath passed:

for all others have demonstrably none of the blood of the first purchaser in

them, and therefore shall never succeed. (23) As if lands come to John Stiles

by descent from his mother Lucy Baker, no relation of his father (as such)

shall ever be his heir of these lands; and vice versa, if they descended from

his father Geoffrey Stiles, no relation of his mother (as such) shall ever be ad-

mitted thereto, for his father's kindred have none of his mother's blood, nor

have his mother's relations any share of his father's blood. And so, if the

estate descended from his father's father, George Stiles; the relations of *hia

r *9M 1 father's mother, Cecilia Kemps, shall for the same reason never be

«• J admitted, but only those of his father's father. (24) This is also

the rule of the French law, (o) which is derived from the same feudal

fountain.

Here we may observe, that so far as the feud is really antiquum, the law

traces it back, and will not suffer any to inherit but the blood of those ancestors,

from whom the feud was conveyed to the late proprietor. But when, through

length of time, it can trace it no farther; as if it be not known whether his
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grandfather, George Stiles, inherited it from his father Walter Stiles, or his

mother Christian Smith, or if it appear that his grandfather was the first

grantee, and so took it (by the general law) as a feud of indefinite antiquity ; in

either of these cases the law admits the descendants of any ancestor of George

Stiles, either paternal or maternal to be in their due order the heirs to John

Stiles of this estate; because, in the first case it is really uncertain, and in the

second case it is supposed to be uncertain, whether the grandfather derived his

title from the part of his father or his mother.

This, then, is the great and general principle, upon which the law of collate-

ral inheritances depends; that, upon failure of issue in the last proprietor, the

estate shall descend to the blood of the first purchaser; or, that it shall result

back to the heirs of the body of that ancestor, from whom it either really has, or

is supposed by fiction of law to have, originally descended; according to the

rule laid down in the year books, (p) Fitzherbert, (q) Brook, (r) and Hale, (*)

" that he who would have been heir to the father of the deceased" (and, of

course to the mother, or any other real or supposed purchasing ancestor) " shall

also be heir to the son ;" a maxim that will hold universally, except in the case

of a brother or sister of the half blood, which exception (as we shall see hereafter)

depends upon very special grounds.

(o) Domat. part», pr. (pj X. 12 Edw. IV, M. (q) Abr. t. diacent. 2.

(r) Ibtd. 38. fl)H. C.t.243.

—, 1

(33) [It will sometimes happen that two estates or titles, the one legal and the other equitable,

will descend upon the same person, in which case they will become united, and the equitable,

shall follow the line of descent through which the legal estate descended. See Goodright d.

and therefore the collateral kindred of the grantee, or descendants from any of
his lineal ancestors, by whom the lands might possibly have been purchased: are
capable of being called to the inheritance.
Yet, when an estate hath really descended in a course of inheritance to the
person last seized, the strict rule of the feudal law is still observed: and none
are admitted but the heirs of tho8e through whom the inheritance hath passed:
for all others have demonstrably none of the blood of the first purchaser in
them, and therefore shall never succeed. (23) As if lands come to John Stiles
by descent from his mother Lucy Baker, no relation of his father (as such)
shall ever be his heir of these lands; and ttice versa, if they descended from
his father Geoffrey Stiles, no relation of his mother (as such) shall ever be admitted thereto, for his father's kindred have none of his mother's blood, nor
have his mother's relations any share of his father's blood. And so, if the
estate descended from his father's father, George Stiles; the relations of *hi.a
[ • 223 ] father's mother, Cecilia Kemps, shall for the sa.me reason never be
admitted, but only those of his father's father. (24) This is also
the rule of the French law, (o) which is derived from the sa.me feudal
fountain.
Here we may observe, that so far as the feud is really antiquum., the law
traces it back, and will not suffer any to inherit but the blood of those ancestors,
from whom the feud was conveyed to the late proprietor. But when, through
length of time, it can trace it no farther; a.a if it be not known whether· }iis
grandfather, George Stiles, inherited it from his father Walter Stiles, or his
mother Christian Smith, or if it appear that his gra.ndfathe:r was the first
grant<>...e, and so took it (by the general law) as a feud of indefinite antiquity ; in
either of these cases the law admits the descendants of any ancestor of George
Stiles, either paternal or maternal to be in their due order the heirs to John
Stiles of this estate; because in the first case it is really uncertain, and in the
second case it is supposed to be uncertain, whether the gr?ndfather derived his
title from the part of his father or his mother.
·
This, then, is the great and general principle, upon which the law of collat.eral inheritances depends; that, upon failure of issue in the last proprietor, the
estate shall descend to the blood of the first purchaser; or, that it shall result
back to the heirs of the body of that ancestor, from whom it either really has, or
is supposed by fiction of law to have, originally descended; according to the
rule laid down in the year books, (p) Fitzherbert, (q) Brook, (r) and Hale, (s}
"that he who would h'ave been heir to the father of the deceased" (and, of
course to the mother, or any other real or supposed purchasing ancestor) "shall
also be heir to the son;" a maxim that will hold universally, except in the case
of a brother or sister of the half blood, which exception (as we shall see hereafter)
depends upon very special grounds.
(o)
(r)

Domat. parU, pr.
(p) M. U Bd«I. IY, 1,.
Ibid. 38.
(1) H. C. L. W.

('I) .A.br.

t. dlacent. I.

Alston v. Wells, Dougl. 771. And in the late case of Langley ». Sneyd, 1 Simons and Stu. Rep.

45, where an infant died seised of an equitable estate, descending ex parte materna, the lepal estate

being vested in trustees, his incapacity to call fora conveyance of the legal estate (by which

the course of descent might have been broken), was held not to be a sufficient reason to indnce

a court of equity to consider the case, as if such a conveyance had actually been made, it not

being, according to the terms of the trust, any part of the express duty of the trustees to execute

Kiu'li conveyance.]

(•M) [ Hence the expression heir at lav> must always be used with a reference to a specific

estate; for if an only child has taken by descent an estate from his father, and another from his

u.other, upon his death without issue these estates will descend to two different persons: so also,

• i!' his two grandfathers and two grandmothers had each an estate, which descended to his father

nriti•<i mother, whom I suppose also to be only children, then, as before, these four estates will

of the f nd to four different heirs.]

*-478

(23) [It will sometimeil happen that two estate;i or titles, the o~e legal and the other equitable,
will descend upon the ~ame person, in which case they will become united, and the equitable,
shall folio"' the line of descent through which the legal estate descended. See Gi>odright d.
.A.Jston ti. Wells, Dougl. 771. And in the late case of Langley v. Sneyd, 1 Simone and Stn. Rep.
45, where au infant died seised of an eq_uitable estate, descending ex par~ mat.erna, the legal estate
being \·eeted in tru~tecs, hi8 incapa01ty to call fora conveyance of the le~al estate (by which
the course of descent might ham been broken), we..~ held not to be a sufficient reason to induce
a court of equity to consider the cMe, as if such a conveyance had actually been made, it not
being, according to the terms of the trust, any part of the express duty of the tntstecs to execute
such conveyance.]
(~) [Hence the exprc,;sion heir at law must always be used with a reference to a specific
e~tate; for if an only child has taken by de~ceut an estate from his father, and another from hit\
u.other, upon his death without i~suo the"6 estate!! will descend to two different penions: !IQ also•
.• if hi~ two grandfatheni and two grandmothers hiW. each an estate, which descended to his father
mit"'l mother, whom I sup{>Ose also to be only cIµldren, ~en, as before, these four estates will
of the !'nd to four different hem.]
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The rules of inheritance that remain are only rules of evidence, calculated

to investigate who the purchasing ancestor was; which *infeudus vere r *224l

antiquis has in process of time been forgotten, and is supposed so to be *• •*

in feuds that are held ut antiquis.

VI. A sixth rule or canon therefore is, that the collateral heir of the person

last seised must be his next collateral kinsman of the whole blood. (25)

First, he must be his next collateral kinsman, either personally or jure

representation^; (26) which proximity is reckoned according to the canonical

degrees of consanguinity before mentioned. Therefore, the brother being in the

first degree, he and his descendants shall exclude the uncle and his issue, who

is only in the second. And herein consists the true reason of the different

methods of computing the degrees of consanguinity, in the civil law on the one

hand, and in the canon and common laws on the other. The civil law regards

consanguinity, principally with respect to successions, and therein very natu-

rally considers only the "person deceased, to whom the relation is claimed: it

therefore counts the degrees of kindred according to the number of persons

through whom the claim must be derived from him; and makes not only his

great-nephew but also his first-cousin to be both related to him in the fourth

degree; because there are three persons between him and each of them. The

canon law regards consanguinity principally with a view to prevent incestuous

marriages, between those who have a large portion of the same blood running

in their respective veins; and therefore looks up to the author of that blood, or
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the common ancestor, reckoning the degrees from him: so that the great-

nephew is related in the third canonical degree to the person proposed, and the

first-cousin in the second; the former being distant three degrees from the com-

mon ancestor (the father of the propositus), and therefore deriving only one-

fourth of his blood from the same fountain : the latter, and also the propositus

himself, being each of them distant only two degrees from the common ancestor,

(the grandfather of each), and therefore having one-half of each of their bloods

the same. The common law regards consanguinity principally with respect to

descents; and having therein the same object in view as the civil, it may seem

as if it ought *to proceed according to the civil computation. But as it r ^ooc i

also respects the purchasing ancestor, from whom the estate was derived, L •"

it therein resembles the canon law, and therefore counts its degrees in the same

manner. Indeed the designation of person, in seeking for the next of kin, will

come to exactly the same end (though the degrees will be differently numbered),

•whichever method of computation we suppose the law of England to use;

since the right of representation of the parent by the issue is allowed to

prevail in infinitum. This allowance was absolutely necessary, else there

would have frequently been many claimants in exactly the same degree of

(25) [In order to constitute a good title, the party must be the nearest collateral heir of the

whole blood of the person last seised on the part of the ancestor through whom the estate

The rules of inheritauce that remain are only rules of evidence, calculated
t-0 inYestigate who tht! purchasing ancestor was; which *in feudus vere [ • 224 ]
antiquis has in process of time been forgotten, and is supposed so to be
in feuds that are held ut antiquis.
VI. A sixth rule or canon therefore is, that the collateral heir of the person
last seiscd must be his next collateral kinsman of the whole hl-Ood. (25)
.First, he mu8t be his next collateral kinsman, either personally or jure
representationt'.s; (i6) which proximity is reckoned according to the canonical
degrees of consanguinity before mentioned. Therefore, the brother being in the
first degree, he and his descendants shall exclude the uncle and his issue, who
is only in the second. And herein consists the true reason of the different
methods of computing the degrees of consanguinity, in the civil law on the one
hand, and in the canon and common laws on the other. The civil law regards
consanguinity, principallv with respect to successions, and therein very naturally considers only the person deceased, to whom the relation is claimed: it
therefore counts the degrees of kindred accordin~ to the number of persons
through whom the claim must be derived from him; and makes not only his
great-nephew but also his first-cousin to be both related to him in the fourth
degree; because there are three persons between him and each of them. The
canon law regards consanguinity principally with a view to prevent incestuous
marriages, between those who have a large portion of the same blood running
in their respective veins; and therefore looks up to the author of that blood, or
the common ancest-0r, reckoning the degrees from him: so th.a t the greatnephew is related in the third canonical degree to the person proposed, and the
first-cousin in the second; the former being distant three degrees from the common ancestor (the father of the propositus), and therefore deriving only onefourth of his blood from the same fountain : the latter, and also the propositus
himself, being each of them distant only two degrees from the common ancestor,
(the grandfather of each), and therefore having one-half of each of their bloods
the same. The common law regards consanguinity principally with respect to
descents; and having therein the same object in view as the civil, it may seem
as if it ought •to proceed according to the civil computation. But as it [ • 225 ]
also res_P0cts the purchasing ancestor, from whom the estate was derived,
it therem resembles the canon law, and therefore counts its degrees in the same
m1mner. Indeed the designation of person, in seeking for the next of kin, will
come to exactly the same end (though the degrees will be differently numbered),
whichever method of computation we suppose the law of En~land t-0 use;
since the right of representation of the parent by the issue is allowed to
prevail in infinitum. rrhis allowance was absolutely necessary, else there
would have frequently been many claimants in exactly the same degree of

descended. When Lord Hale speaks of the nearest collateral relation of the whole blood of

the person last seised, and of the blood of the first purchaser, he means the latter branch of

the expression, as a qualification, and not an addition to the first branch, that the collateral

heir of the whole blood mnst claim through the ancestor from whom the estate descended, and

thus be of the blood of the first purchaser. Per Leach, vice-chancellor, Hawkins v. Shewen, 1

Sim. and Stu. Rep. 257J

By statute 3 and 4 Win. IV., c. 106, the rule here stated is modified. The half blood are

to succeed to the inheritance next after any relation of the whole blood in the same degree,

and his issue, where the common ancestor is a male; and next after the common ancestor,

where such ancestor is a female. And no brother or sister, shall be considered to inherit

immediately from his or her brother or sister, but every descent from a brother or sister

shall be traced through the parent.

In many of the United States no distinction is made between the whole and the half blood

in the statutes of descent; in others the half blood is postponed or its share diminished; bnt

it is excluded in none. 4 Kent, 404.

(20) [This is only true in the paternal line ; for when the paternal and maternal lines are

both admitted to the inheritance, the most remote collateral Kinsman ex parte paterna will

inherit before the nearest ex parte materna. See p. 236, post.]
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(25) [In order to constitute a good title, the party must be the nearest collateral heir of the
whole blood of the penion le.st sei;;ed on the part of the ancestor through whom the estate
descended. When Lord Hale speaks of the nee.rest collateral relation of the whole blood of
the pen1on 181!t seised, and of the blood of the first purchaser, he means the latter branch of
the exprosi.ion, e.s a qualification, and not an addition to the first branch, that the collateral
heir of the whole blood must claim through the ancestor from whom the estate descended, and
thus be of the blood of the first purchaser. Per Lee.ch, vice-chancellor, Hawkins v. Shewen, 1
Sim. and Stu. Rep. 257.]
By Atatute 3 and 4 W'm. IV., c. 106, the rule here i;tatod is modified. The half blood are
to succeed to the inheritance next after any relation of the whole blood in tho l\Smo degree,
and his issue, where the common anceKtor i11 a male; and next after the common ancestor,
where such ancestor is a female. And no brother or sister, shall be consid~rlld to inherit
immediately from his or her brother or sister, but every descent from a brother or si8tor
shall be traced throu~h the parent.
In manv of the Umtod States no distinction is me.de between the whole and the half blood
in the statutes of de~cent; in othen1 the he.If blood is postponed or its 8ho.ro diminished; but
it i~ excluded in none. 4 Kent, 404.
(2Ci) [Thi:> iti univ true in the paternal line ; for when the paternal and maternal lines are
both e.dmitted to the inheritance, the most remote collateral kim1man ex parw paterna will
inherit before the nearest ex parte materna. See p. 236, poat.]
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kindred, as (for instance) uncles and nephews of the deceased; which multi-

plicity, though no material inconvenience in the Roman law or partible inheri-

tances, yet would have been productive of endless confusion where the right of

sole succession, as with us, is established. The issue or descendants therefore

of John Stiles's brother are all of them in the first degree of kindred with

respect to inheritances, those of his uncle in the second, and those of his great-

uncle in the third; as their respective ancestors, if living, would have been;

and are severally called to the succession in right of such their representative

proximity.

The right of representation being thus established, the former part of the

present rule amounts to this ; that on the failure of issue of the person last

seised, the inheritance shall descend to the other subsisting issue of his next

immediate ancestor. Thus, if John Stiles dies without issue, his estate shall

descend to Francis, his brother, or his representatives; he being lineally

descended from Geoffrey Stiles, John's next immediate ancestor, or father.

On failure of brethren, or sisters, and their issue, it shall descend to the uncle

of John Stiles, the lineal descendant of his grandfather George, and so on in

infinitum. Very similar to which was the law of inheritance among the

ancient Germans, our progenitors: " hceredes successoresque, sui cuique Kberi, et

nullum testamentum: si hberi, non sunt,proximus gradus in possessions, fratres,

patrui, avunculi." (t)

f *22<? 1 *Now here it must be observed, that the lineal ancestors, though
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I -I (according to the first rule) incapable themselves of succeeding to the

estate, because it is supposed to have already passed them, are yet the common

stocks from which the next successor must spring. And therefore in the Jew-

ish law, which in this respect entirely corresponds with ours, (M) the father or

other lineal ancestor is himself said to be the heir, though long since dead, as

being represented by the persons of his issue; who are held to succeed, not in

their own rights, as brethren, uncles, &c., but in right of representation, as the

offspring of the father, grandfather, &c., of the deceased, (w) But, though the

common ancestor be thus the root of the inheritance, yet with us it is not

necessary to name him in making out the pedigree of descent. For the descent

between two brothers is held to be an immediate descent; and therefore title

may be made by one brother or his representatives to or through another, with-

out mentioning their common father, (x) (27) If Geoffrey Stiles hath two sons,

John and Francis, Francis may claim as heir to John, without naming their

father Geoffrey; and so the son of Francis may claim as cousin and heir to Mat-

thew, the son of John, without naming the grandfather; viz: as son of Francis,

who was the brother of John, who was the father of Matthew. But though the

common ancestors are not named in deducing the pedigree, yet the law still

respects them as the fountains of inheritable blood ; and therefore in order to

ascertain the collateral heir of John Stiles, it is first necessary to recur to his

ancestors in the first degree ; and if they have left any other issue besides John,

(t) Tacitus rfe nor. (term. 21. (H) Nnmli. r. 17. (in] Selilun. de raoc. £br. a. 12.

<x) Sid. 196. 1 Vent. 4iJ. 1 Lev. 60. 12 Mod. 61».

(27) [The law is now different, the statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 106, s. 5, enacting that no

brother or sister shall be considered to inherit immediately from his or her brother or sister, bat

every descent from a brother or sister shall be traced through the parent.

The doctrine of immediate descent between brothers and sisters was formerly important, on

kindred, as (for instance) uncles and ne:phews of the deceased;· which multiplicity, though no materi11l inconvenience m the Roman law or partible inheritances, yet would have been productive of endless confusion where the right of
sole succession, as with us, is established. The issue or descendants therefore
of John Stiles's brother are all of them in the first degree of kindred with
respect to inheritances, those of his uncle in the second, and those of his greatuncle in the third; as their respective ancestors, if living, would have been;
and are severally called to the succession in right of such their representative
proximity.
'fhe right of representation being thus established, the former part of the
present rule a.mounts to this ; that on the failure of issue of the person last
seised, the inheritance shall descend to the other subsisting issue of his next
immediate ancestor. Thus, if John Stiles dies without issue, his estate shall
descend to Francis, his brother, or his representatives; he being lineally
descended from Geoffrey Stiles, John's next immediate ancestor, or father.
On failure of brethren, or sisters, and their issue, it shall descend t,o the uncle
of John Stiles, the lineal descendant of his grandfather George, and so on in
infinitum. Very similar ~ which was the law of inheritance among the
ancient Germans, our pro~enitors: "htsredes successoresque, sui cuique liberi, et
nullum testamentum: si ltberi, non sunt,proximus gradus in possessione,fratre.s,
patrui, avunculi." (t)
•
]
*Now here it must be observed, that the lineal ancestors, though
[ 226 (according to the first rule) incapable themselves of succeeding to the
estate, because it is supposed to have already passed them, are yet the common
stocks from which the next successor must spring. And therefore in the Jewish law, which in this respect entirely corresponds with ours, (u) the father or
other lineal ancestor is himself said to be the heir, though long since dead, as
being represented by the persons of his issue; who are held to succeed, not in
their own rights, as brethren, uncles, &c., but in right of rel!resenta.tion, as the
offspring of the father, grandfather, &c., of the deceased. (w) But, thou~h the
common ancestor be thus the root of the inheritance, yet with us it 1s not
necessary to name him in making out the pedigree of descent. For the descent
between two brothers is held to be an immediate descent; and therefore title
may be made by one brother or his representatives to or through another, without mentioning their common father. (x) (27) If Geoffrey Stiles hath two sons,
John and Francis, Francis may claim as heir to John, without naming their
father Geoffrey; and so the son of Francis may claim as cousin and heir to Matthew, the son of John, without naming the grandfather; viz: as son of Francis,
who was the brother of John, who was the father of Matthew. But though the
common ancestors are not named in deducing the pedigree, yet the law st.ill
respects them as the fountains of inheritable blood ; and therefore in order to
ascertain the collateral heir of John Stiles, it is first necessary to recur to his
ancestors in the first degree; and if they have left any other issue besides John,
11tOr. Ger111. ~l.
(If) Numb. c. r7.
Sid. 196. I Veot. '23. 1 Lev. 60. 12 Mod. 619.

(t) Tacitus tk
(~)

(te>i Selden, de lllOO• .Blw.

c. It.

account of the rule, that as an alien had no inheritable blood in him, descent could not be traced

through him; it being held in Collingwopd ». Pace, Orl. Bridgm. 410; 1 Vent. 413, that

brothers, natural born subjects, born of alien parents, might inherit from each other as not

needing to trace their descent through their parents. See Co. Litt. 8, a. This difficulty was

removed in other cases by the statutes 11 and 12 Win. Ill, c. 6, and 85 Oreo. Ill, c. 39, allow-

ing descents to be traced through alien parents, provided ttie person claiming through them

was in existence and capable of taking at the death of the person last seised; which proviso

does not prevent the devesting of an estate out of the daughter of an alien on the birth of a

brother or sister. The rule that a descent cannot bo traced through a person attainted has also

been abolished. Stat. 3 and 4 W in. IT, c. 106, a. 10.]
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(27) [The law i11 now different, the statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, ~ 5, enactin~ that no
brother or si11ter shall be considered to inherit immediately from hie or her brother or BlBter, but
every de~cent from a brother or lli;;ter shall be traced through the parent.
The doctrine of iruu1e1Iiate dcMcent between brother!! and si;;ters was Connerly important, on
account of the rule, that a.~ an alien had no inheritable blood in him, descent could not be traced
through him; it being held in Collingwood v. Pace, Ori. Bridgm. 410; 1 Vent. 413, that
brothen;, natural horn subject,;, burn of alien parents, might inherit from each other as no~
needing to trace their dc"cent through their parents. See Co. Litt. 8, a. Thi~ difficulty was
removed in other cases by the 8tatute~ 11 and 12 Wm. III. c. 6, and 25 Geo. III, c. 39, allowing descents to be traced through alien parent!!, provided tlhe person claiming through them
was in existence and capable of taking at the death of the person last sei110d; which proviso
does not prevent the devestiug of an estate out of the daughter of e.n alien on the birth of a
brother or sister. The rule that a descent cannot be traced through a person attaiuted has BlliO
been abolished. Stat. 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c.106, e. 10.]
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that issue will be his heir. On default of such, we must ascend one step higher,

to the ancestors in the second degree, and then to those in the third and fourth,

and so upwards in infintium, till some couple of ancestors be found, who have

other issue descending from them besides the deceased, in a parallel or collateral

line. From these ancestors the heir of John Stiles must derive his descent;

and in such derivation the same rules must be observed, with regard to the sex,

*primogeniture, and representation, that have before been laid down r *oor« i

with regard to lineal descents from the person of the last proprietor. *- *""' '

But, secondly, the heir need not be the nearest kinsman absolutely, but only

sub miido ; that is, he must be the nearest kinsman of the whole blood; for if

there be a much nearer kinsman of the half blood, a distant kinsman of the

whole blood shall be admitted, and the other entirely excluded; nay, the estate

shall escheat to the lord, sooner than the half blood shall inherit. (28)

A kinsman of the whole blood is he that is derived, not only from the same

ancestor, but from the same couple of ancestors. For, as every man's own

blood is compounded of the bloods of his respective ancestors, he only is prop-

erly of the whole or entire blood with another, who hath (so far as the distance

of degrees will permit) all the same ingredients in the composition of his blood

that the other had. Thus, the blood of John Stiles being composed of those

of Geoffrey Stiles his father, and Lucy Baker his mother, therefore his brother

Francis, being descended from both the same parents, hath entirely the same

blood with John Stiles; or he is his brother of the whole blood. But if, after
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the death of Geoffrey, Lucy Baker the mother marries a second husband, Lewis

Gay. and hath issue by him; the blood of this issue, being compounded of the

blood of Lucy Baker (it is true) on the one part, but that of Lewis Gay (instead

of Geoffrey Stiles), on the other part, it hath therefore only half the same

ingredients with that of John Stiles; so that he is only his brother of the half

blood, and for that reason they shall never inherit to each other. So also, if the

father has two sons, A and B, by different venters or wives; now these two

brethren are not brethren of the whole blood, and therefore shall never inherit

to each other, but the estate shall rather escheat to the lord Nay, even if the

father dies, and his lands descend to his eldest son A, who enters thereon, and

dies seized without issue; still B shall not be heir to this estate, because he is

only of the half blood to A, the person last seized: but it shall descend to a

sister (if any) of the whole blood to A: for in such cases the maxim is, that the

seisin or possessio fratis facit sororem esse hceredum. Yet, had A died without

entry, then B might have inherited; not as *heir to A, his half-brother, r *228 1

but as heir to their common father, who was the person last actually L •"

seized, (y) (29)

This total exclusion of the half blood from the inheritance, being almost

peculiar to our own law, is looked upon as a strange hardship by such as are

unacquainted with the reasons on which it is grounded. But these censures

arise from a misapprehension of the rule, which is not so much to be considered

(y) Hale, H. C. L. 238.

(23) [It may be observed, that it is always intended, or presumed, that a person is of the whole

blood, until the contrary is shown. Kitch. 225, a; Plowd. 77, a; Trin. 10 H. 8, pi. 6, p. 11. b:

•Watk. Desc. 75, n. (u).]

that issue will be his heir. On default of such, we must ascend ont> step higher,
to the ancestors in the second degree, and then to those in the third and fourth,
and so upwards i11, infinit1un, till some couple of ancestors be found, who haYti
other issue descending from them besides the deceiLsed, in a parallel or collater.i.l
line. From these ancestors the heir of John Stiles must derive his descent;
and in such derimtion the same rules must be observed, with regard to the sex,
*primogeniture, and representation, that haYe before been laid down [ ·~ 2 ..,]
with regard to lineal descents from the person of the last proprietor.
'
But, secondly, the heir need not be the ne.arest kinsman absolutely, but only
sub nwdo; that is, he must be the nearest kinsman of the wltole blood; for if
there be a much nearer kinsman of the half blood, a distant kinsman of the
whole blood shall be admitted, and the other entirely excluded; nay, the estate
shall escheat to the lord, sooner than the half blood shall inherit. (28)
A kinsman of the whole blood is he that is derived, not only from the sam.e
ancestor, but from the same couple of ancestors. For, as every man's own
blood is compounded of the bloods of his respective ancestors, he only is properly of the whole or entire blood with another, who hath (so far as the distance
of dewees will permit) all the ~me ingredients in the composition of his blood
that tne other had. 'fhus, the blood of John Stiles being composed of those
of Geoffrey Stiles his father, and Lucy Baker his mother, therefore his brother
Francis, being descended from both the same parents, hath entirely the same
blood with John Stiles; or he is his brother of the whole blood. But if, after
the death of Geoffrey, Lucy Baker the mother marries a second husband, Lewis
Gay. and hath issue hY. him; the blood of this issue, being compounded of the
blood of Lucy Baker (it is true) on the one part, but that of Lewis Gay (instead
of Geoffrey Stiles), on the other part, it hath therefore only half the same
ingredients with that of John Stiles; so that he is only his brother of the half
l>lood, and for that reason they shall never inherit to each other. So also, if the
father has two sons, A and B, by different Yenters or wives; now these two
brethren are not brethren of the whole blood, and therefore shall never inherit
to each other, but the estate shall ra.ther escheat to the lord Nay, even if the
father dies, and his lands descend to his eldest son A, who enters thereon, and
dies seized without issue; still B shall not be heir to this estate, because he is
only of the half blood to A, the person last seized: but it shall descend to a
sister (if any) of the whole blood to A: for in such cases the maxim is, that the
seisin or possessio fratis facit sororem esse lusredum. Yet, had A died without
entry, then B mignt have inherited; not as *heir to A, his half-brother, [ • 228 ]
but as heir to their common father, who was the person last actually
seized. (y) (29)
This total exclusion of the half blood from the inheritance, being almost
peculiar to our own law, is looked upon as a stmnge hardship by such as a.re
unacquainted with the reasons on which it is ~rounded. But these censures
arise from a misapprehension of the rule, which 18 not 80 much to be considered
i,l Hale, H. C. L. 238.

(29) [The meaning of the maxim is, that the possession of a brother will make his sister of

the whole blood his heir in preference to a brother of the half blood. Litt. 58.

Of some inheritances there cannot be a seisin, or a posseggio fratris ; as if the eldest brother

dies before a presentation to an advowson, it will descend to the half-brother as heir to the

person last seized, and not to the sister of the whole blood. 1 Bam EC. 11. So of reversions,

remainders, and executory devises, there can be no seisin or possessio fratris ; and if they are

reserved or granted to A and his heirs, he who is heir to A when they come into possession, is

entitled to them by descent; that is, that person who wonld have been heir to A if A had

lived so long, and had then died actually seized. 2 Wood. 256; Feame, 448; 2 Wils. 29. It

may also be observed, that if the father die without heirs male, hisdaughters by different venters

may inherit together to the father, although they cannot inherit to each other. Bro. Abr.

Descent, pi. 20; 1 KoU. Abr. 627.]
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(2.~) [It. may be observ~d, that it is ~lways1 in_!".ended, or presumed, t~at a person is or the whole
blood, until the contrary 18 shown. Kitch. 225, a; Plowd. 77, a; Tnn. 10 H. 8, pl. 6, p. 11, b;
Watk. Deec. 75, n. (u).]
(:29) [The meaning of the maxim ie, that the poRl'ession or a brother will make hie sister of
the whole blood his heir in preference to a brother of the half blood. Litt. 58.
Of some inheritances there cannot be a Rei8in. or a possessio fratris ,· IL8 if the elde~t brother
dies before a prei!6ntation to o.n advowl\On, it will deKccnd to the hair-brother a.<1 heir to the
penon last seized, o.nd not to the sister of the whole blood. 1 Bum Ee. 11. So of reversions,
remainder:1, and executory devi81ls, there can be no seisin or possessio fratris ; and if they are
reo<erved or granted to A and his heirll, he who hi heir to A when they come into possesKion, is
~ntitled to them by de:ieent; that i1.1, that person who would have been heir t-0 A if. A had
li\"ed so long, and had then died actually t«>.ized. 2 Wood. 256; Feame, 448; 2 Wils. 29. lt
may alRO be ob,ierved, that if the father die without heir!! male, hietlaughtefl! by dilferent venters
may inherit together to the father, although they cannot inherit to each other. Dro. .A.br.
Descent, pl. 20; 1 Roll • .Abr. 627.]

VoL. I.-61

Dig

481
Orig_inal from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

228 TITLE BY DESCENT. [Book. II.

228

(Book. II.

·TITLE BY DESCENT.

in the light of a rule of descent, as of a rule of evidence: an auxiliary rale, to

carry a former into execution. And here we must again remember, that the

great and most universal principle of collateral inheritances being this, that the

heir to a feudum aniiquum muat be of the blood of the first feudatory or por-

chaser, that is, derived in a lineal descent from him; it was originally requisite,

as upon gifts in tail it still is, to make out the pedigree of the heir from the

first donee or purchaser, and to show that such heir was his lineal representa-

tive. But when, by length of time and a long course of descents, it came (in

those rude and unlettered ages) to be forgotten who was really the first feudatory

or purchaser, and thereby the proof of an actual descent from him became impos-

sible ; then the law substituted what Sir Martin Wright (z) calls a reasoiMble,

in the stead of an impossible, proof: for it remits the proof of an actual descent

from the first purchaser; and only requires in lieu of it, that the claimant be

next of the whole blood to the person last in possession, (or deriYed from the

same couple of ancestors;) which will probably answer the same end as if he

could trace his pedigree in a direct line from the first purchaser. For he who is

my kinsman of the whole blood, can have no ancestors beyond or higher than

the common stock, but what are equally my ancestors also: and mine are vice

versa his: he therefore is very likely to be derived from that unknown ancestor

of mine, from whom the inheritance descended. But a kinsman of the half

blood has but one-half of his ancestors above the common stock the same as

mine; and therefore there is not the same probability of that standing requisite
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in law, that he be derived from the blood of the first purchaser,

r *OOQ i *To illustrate this by example. Let there be John Stiles, and Francis,

•• 'J -" brothers, by the same father and mother, and another son of the same

mother by Lewis Gay, a second husband. Now, if John dies seised of lands,

but it is uncertain whether they descended to him from his father or mother;

in this case his brother Francis, of the whole blood, is qualified to be his heir;

for he is sure to be in the line of descent from the first purchaser, whether it

were the line of the father or the mother. But if Francis should die before John,

without issue, the mother's son by Lewis Gay (or brother of the half blood} is

utterly incapable of being heir; for he cannot prove his descent from the hrst

purchaser, who is unknown, nor has he that fair probability which the law

admits as presumptive evidence, since he is to the full as likely not to be de-

scended from the line of the first purchaser, as to be descended; and therefore

the inheritance shall go to the nearest relation possessed of his presumptive

proof, the whole blood.

And, as this is the case in feudis antiquis, where there really did once exist a

purchasing ancestor, who is forgotten: it is also the case in feudis novis held ut

antiquis, where the purchasing ancestor is merely ideal, and never existed but

only in fiction of law. Of this nature are all grants of lands in fee-simple at

this day, which are inheritable as if they descended from some uncertain indefi-

nite ancestor, and therefore any of the collateral kindred of the real modern

purchaser (and not his own offspring only) may inherit them, provided they be

of the whole blood; for all such are, in judgment of law, likely enough to be

derived from this indefinite ancestor: but those of the half blood are excluded,

for want of the same probability. Nor should this be thought hard, that a

brother of the purchaser, though only of the half blood, must thus be disinher-

ited, and a more remote relation of the whole blood admitted, merely upon a

supposition and fiction of law; since it is only upon a like supposition and fic-

tion, that brethren of purchasers (whether of the whole or naif blood) are

entitled to inherit at all; for we have seen that in feudis stride novis neither

r *2301 brethren nor anv other collaterals were admitted. As *therefore in

[ MO \ j-eu,iis antiquis we have seen the reasonableness of excluding the half

blood, if by fiction of law afeudum novum be made descendible to collaterals

as if it -wasfeudum antiquum,i$ just and equitable that it should be subject

to the same restrictions as well as the same latitude of descent.

(:) Tenures, 186.
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in the light of a role of descent, as of a rule of evidence: an auxiliary rn1e, to
carry a former into execution. And here we must again remember, that the
great and most universal principle of collateral inheritances being this, that the
heir to a feudum antiquum must be of the blood of the fil'Bt feudatory 01' purchaser, that is, derived in a lineal descent from him; it was originally requisite,
88 upon gifts in tail it still is, to make out the pedigree of the heir from the
first donee or purch88er, and to show that such heir was his lineal representative. But when, by length of time and a long courae of descents, it came (in
those rude and unlettered ages) to be forgotten who was really the first feudatory
or purchaser, and thereby the proof of an actual descent from him became impos-sible; then the law substituted what Sir .Martin Wright (z) calls a reasonable,
in the stead of an impossihk, proof: for it remits the proof of an actual descent
from the fil'Bt purchaser; and only requires in lieu of it, that the claimant be
next of the whole blood to the person last in possession, (or derived from the
88me couple of ancestors; ) which will probably answer the same end as if he
could trace his pedigree in a direct line from the first purchaser. For be who is
my kinsman of the whole blood, can have no ancestors beyond or higher than
the common stock, but what are equally mv ancestors also: and mine are ttiCtJ
tJersa his: he therefore is very likely to be derived from that unknown ancestor
of mine, from whom the inheritance descended. But a kinsman of the half
blood has but one-half of his ancestors above the common stock the same as
mine; and therefore there is not the same probability of that standing requisite
in law, that he be derived from the blood of the first purchaser.
.._ro illustrate this by example. let there be John Stilee, and Francis,
[ • 229 ]
brothers, by the same iather and mother, and another son of the same
mother by lewis Gay, a seoond husband. Now, if John dies seised of lands,
but it is uncertain whether they descended to him from his father or mother;
in this case his brother Francis, of the whole blood, is qualified to be his heir;
for he is sure to be in the line of descent from the first purchaser, whether it
were the lineof the father or the mother. But if Francis should die before John,
without issue, the mother's son by I.iewis Gay (or brother of the half blood) is
utterly incapable of being heir; for he cannot prove his descent from the first
purchaser, who is unknown, nor has he that fair probability which the law
admits as presumptive evidence, since he is to the full as likely not to be descended from the line of the first pnrchaser, as to be descended; and therefore
the inheritance shall go to the nearest relation poBSeSSed of his presumptive
proof, the whole blood.
And, as this is the case infeudis antiquis, where there roolly did once exist a
purchasing ancestor, who is forgotten: it is also the case in feudis novis held ul
antiquis, where the purchasing ancestor is merely ideal, and never existed but
only in fiction of law. Of thie nature a.re all grants of lands in foe-simple at
thie day, which a.re inheritable RS if they descended from some nnoert.ain indefinite ancestor, and therefore any of the collateral kindred of the real modem
purchaser (and not his own offspring only) may inherit them, provided they be
of the whole blood; for all such are, in judgmeut of law, likely enough to be
derived from this indefinite ancestor: but those of the half blood are excluded.
for want of the same probability. Nor should this be thought hard, that a
brother of the purchaser, though only of the half blood, must thus be disinherited, and a more remote relation of the whole blood admitted, merely upon a
supposition and fiction of law; since it is only upon a like supposition and fiction, that brethren of purchasers (whether of the whole or half blood) alI'e
entitled to inherit at all; for we have seen that in feudis stricte nCtviB neither
•·
brethren nor any other collaterals were Sdmitted. As ,.therefore in
[ 230 ] feudis antiquis we have seen the reasonableness of excluding the half
blood, if by fiction of law a feudum novum be made descendible to collaterals ....
as if it was feudmn antiquum, is just and equitable that it should be subject
to the same restrictions a.s well as the same latitude of descent.
(aJ Tenures, 11111.
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Perhaps by this time the exclusion of the half blood does not appear altogether

so unreasonable as at first sight it is apt to do. It is certainly a very fine-spun

and subtle nicety; but considering the principles upon which our law is founded,

it is not an injustice, nor always a hardship; since even the succession of the

whole blood was originally a beneficial indulgence, rather than the strict right

of collaterals; and though that indulgence is not extended to the demi-kin-

dred, yet they are rarely abridged of any right which they could possibly have

enjoyed before. The doctrine of the whole blood was calculated to supply the

frequent impossibility of proving a descent from the first purchaser, without

some proof of which (according to our fundamental maxim) there can be no in-

heritance allowed of. And this purpose it answers, for the most part, effectually

enough. I speak with these restrictions, because it does not, neither can any

other method, answer this purpose entirely. For though all the ancestors of

John Stiles, above the common stock, are also the ancestors of his collateral

kinsmen of the whole blood; yet, unless that common stock be in the first de-

gree (that is, unless they have the same father and mother), there will be

intermediate ancestors, below the common stock, that belong to either of them

respectively, from which the other is not descended, and therefore can have none

of their blood. Thus, though John Stiles and his brother of the whole blood

can each have no other ancestors than what are in common to them both ; yet

•with regard to his uncle, where the common stock is removed one degree higher

(that is, the grandfather and grandmother), one-half of John's ancestors will
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not be the ancestors of his uncle: his patruus, or father's brother, derives not

his descent from John's maternal ancestors; nor his avunculus, or mother's

brother, *from those in the paternal line. Here then the supply of proof r *%>•! -i

is deficient, and by no means amounts to a certainty; and the higher L J

the common stock is removed, the more will even the probability decrease. But

it must be observed, that (upon the same principles of calculation) the half

blood have always a much less chance to be descended from an unknown indefi-

nite ancestor of the deceased, than the whole blood in the same degree. As, in

the first degree, the whole brother of John Stiles is sure to be descended from

that unknown ancestor; his half brother has only an even chance, for half

John's ancestors are not his. So, in the second degree, John's uncle of the

whole blood has an even chance; but the chances are three to one against his

uncle of the half blood, for three-fourths of John's ancestors are not his. In

like manner, in the third degree, the chances are only three to one against John's

great-uncle of the whole blood, but they are seven to one against his great-uncle

of the half blood, for seven-eighths of John's ancestors have no connexion in

blood with him. Therefore the much less probability of the half blood's

descent from the first purchaser, compared with that of the whole blood,

in the several degrees, has occasioned a general exclusion of the half _ blood

in all.

But, while I thus illustrate the reason of excluding the half blood in general,

I must be impartial enough to own, that, in some instances, the practice is car-

ried farther than the principle upon which it goes will warrant Particularly

when a kinsman of the whole blood in a remoter degree, as the uncle or great-

tmele, is preferred to one of the half blood in a nearer degree, as the brother;

for the half brother hath the same chance of being descended from the pur-

chasing ancestor as the uncle; and a thrice (30) better chance than the great-

uncle or kinsman in the third degree. It is also more especially overstrained,

when a man has two sons by different venters, and the estate on bis death de-

scends from him to the eldest, who enters and dies without issue; in which case

the younger son cannot inherit this estate, because he is not of the whole blood

(30) [This ought to be twice; for the half brother has one chance in two, the great-uncle

one in four; the chance of the half brother is therefore twice better than that of the great-

imcle.]
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· Perhaps by this time the exclusion of the half blood does not appeaT altogether
so unreasonable as at first sight it is apt to do. It is certainly a very fine-spun
and sobtle nicety; but considering the principles upon which our law is founded,
it is not o.n injustice, nor always a hardship; since even the succession of the
whole blood was originally a beneficial indulgence, rather than the strict right
of collaterals; and though that indulgence is not ext.ended to the demi-kindred, yet they a.re rarely abridged of any right which they could possibly have
enjoyed before. The doctrine of the whole blood was calculated to supply the
frequent impossibility of proTing a descent from the first purchaser, without
some proof of which (according to our fundamental maxim) there can be no inheritance allowed of. And this purpose it answers, for the most pa.rt, effectually
enough. I speak with these restrictions, because it does not, neither can any
other method, answer this purpose entirely. For though all the ancestors of
John Stiles, above the common stock, are also the ancestors of his collateral
kinsmen of the whole blood; yet, unless that common stock be in the first de~ (that is, unless they have the same father and mother), there will be
mt.ermediat.e ancestors, below the common stock, that belong to either of them
respectively, from which the other is not descended, and therefore can have nono
of their blood. Thus, though John Stiles and his brother of the whole blood
can each have no other ancestors tho.n what are in common to them both ; yet
with regard to his uncle, where the common stock is remo..,·ed one degree highc>r
(that is, the grandfather and grandmother), one-half of John's ancestors will
not be the ancestors of his uncle: his patrutts, or father's brother, derives not
bis descent from John's maternal ancestors; nor his avunculus, or mother's
brother, *from those in the pat.ernal line. Here then the supply of proof [ ..,231 ]
is deficient, and by no means amounts to a certainty; and the higher
the common stock is removed, the more will even the probability decrease. But
it must be observed, that (upon the same principles of calculation) the half
blood have always a much less chance to be descended from an unknown indefinite ancestor of the deceased, than the whole blood in the same degree. As, in
the first degree, the whole brother of John Stiles is sure to be descended from
that unknown ancestor; his half brother has only an even chance, for half
John's ancestors are not his. So, in the second degree, John's uncle of the
whole blood has an even chance; but the chances are three to one against his
uncle of the half blood, for three-fourths of John's ancestors a.re not his. In
like manner, in the third degree, the chances are only three to one 8¥ainst John's
great-uncle of the whole blood, but they are seyen to one against his great-uncle
of the half blood, for seven~ighths of John's ancestors have no connexion in
blood with him. Therefore the much less probability of the half blood's
descent from the first purchaser, compared with that of the whole blood,
in the several degrees, has occasioned a general exclusion of the half blood
~ill
.
But, while I thus illustrat.e the reason of excluding the half blood in geneml,
I must be impartial enough to own, that, in some instances, the practice is carried farther than the principle upon which it goes will warrant. Particularly
when a kinsman of the whole blood in a remot.er degree, as the uncle or greatnncle, is preferred to one of the half blood in a nearer degree, as the brother;
r~r the half brother hath the same chance of being descended from the purchasing anc,estor ag the uncle; and a thrice (30) better chance than the greatuncle or kinsman in the third degree. It is also more especially overstrained,
when a man has two sons bv different venters, and the estate on bis death descends from him to the eldest; who enters and dies without issue; in which case
the younger son cannot inherit this estat.e, because he is not of the whole blood
(30) [This ought to be ttcice; for the half brother ha.~ one chance in two, the great-uncle
one in four i the chanoo uf the half brother is therefore twice better than that of the greatUDCle.]
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r fog, -• to the last proprietor, (a) This, it must be *owned, carries a hardship

' •" * J with it, even upon feudal principles; for the rule was introduced only

to supply the proof of a descent from the first purchaser; but here, as this es-

tate notoriously descended from the father, and as both the brothers confessedly

sprung from him, it is demonstrable that the half brother must be of the blood

of the first purchaser, who was either the father or some of the father's ances-

tors. When, therefore, there is actual demonstration of the thing to. be proved,

it is hard to exclude a man by a rule substituted to supply that proof when de-

ficient. So far as the inheritance can be evidently traced back, there seems no

need of calling in this presumptive proof, this rule of probability, to investigate

what is already certain. Had the elder brother, indeed, been a purchaser, there

would have been no hardship at all, for the reasons already given; or had the

frater uterinus only, or brother by the mother's side, been excluded from an

inheritance which descended from the father, it had been highly reasonable.

Indeed it is this very instance, of excluding & frater consanguineus or brother

by the father's side, from an inheritance which descended apatre, that Craig (b)

has singled out on which to ground his strictures on the English law of naif

blood. And, really, it should seem as if originally the custom of excluding the

half blood in Normandy, (c) extended only to exclude a frater uterinus, when

the inheritance descended a pat re, and vice versa, and possibly in England also;

as even with us it remained a doubt, in the time of Bracton, (d) and of Fleta, (e)

whether the half blood on the father's side was excluded from the inheritance
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which originally descended from the common father, or only from such as de-

scended from the respective mothers, and from newly purchased lands. So also

F *23S 1 *^e ru^e °^ ' ^ ^a'^ *d°wn by our Fortescue, (/) extends no farther

I- J than this: frater fratri uterino non succedit in hcereditate paterna. It

is moreover worthy of observation, that by our law, as it now stands, the crown

(which is the highest inheritance in the nation) may descend to the half blood

of the preceding sovereign, (g) so that it be the blood of the first monarch pur-

chaser, or (in the feudal language) conqueror of the reigning family. Thus it

actually did descend from King Edward the Sixth to Queen Mary, and from her

to Queen Elizabeth, who were respectively of the half blood to each other. For

the royal pedigree being always a matter of sufficient notoriety, there is no oc-

casion to call in the aid of this presumptive rule of evidence, to render probable

the descent from the royal stock, which was formerly King William the Nor-

man, and is now (by act of Parliament) (h) the Princess Sophia of Hanover.

Hence also it is that in estates-tail, where the pedigree from the first donee

must be strictly proved, half blood is no impediment to the descent; (0 because

when the lineage is clearly made out, there is no need of this auxiliary proof. (31)

How far it might be desirable for the legislature to give relief, by amending the

law of .descents in one or two instances, and ordaining that the half blood

might always inherit, where the estate notoriously descended from its own pro-

per ancestor, and in cases of new-purchased lands, or uncertain descents, should

never be excluded by the whole blood in a remoter degree; or how far a private

inconvenience should be still submitted to, rather than a long established rule

should be shaken, it is not for me to determina

The rule then, together with its illustration, amounts to this: that, in order

to keep the estate of John Stiles as nearly as possible in the line of his purchas-

(a) A still harder case than this hnppeno<l, St. 10 Edtc. III. On the death of a man. who had three dangta-i

tors by n first wife, anil a fourth lijr another, Ms (amis descended equally to all four as coparceners. After-

ward:* the eldest two died without issue: and It wan held, that the third daughter alone shonld inherit their

nh.i i-r-i, ns be-in:; their hoi i of this whole blood; and thnt the youngest daughter should retain only her original

fourth part of their common tuthcr's lands. {10 .-Is*. 27.) Vml yot it was clear law In .V. 19 I'.tttr. fl. that where

lands had descended to two.sisters of the half blood, ns coparceners, each might be heir of those lauds ta

the other. Mayn. Kdw. II. «28. Fitzh. Abr. ta. giwire fmperftt. 177.

(6) I. 2, t. IS, I 14. (c) Or. Ctnutnm. c. 25. (d) J. 2, c. 30, » 3. (e) I. 6, o. 1, { 14.

(/) delauit. LL. Angl.S. (g\ Plowd. 243. Co. TJtt. IS. (A) 12 Win. III. o. *. («! Utt. M 14. IS,

(31) flu titles of honor also, half blood is no impediment to the descent; but a title can onlr

be transmitted to those who ore descended from the first person ennobled. Co. Litt. 15. 1UU"

bluod is no obstruction in the succession to personal property. Page 505, pott.]
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ing ancestor, it must descend to the issue of the nearest couple of ancestors that

have left descendants behind them; because the descendants of one ancestor only

are not so likely to be in the line of that purchasing ancestor, as those who are

descended from both.

*But here another difficulty arises. In the second, third, fourth, and r $234 1

every superior degree, every man has many couples of ancestors, increas- ^ ""'' '

ing according to the distances in a geometrical progression upwards, (£) the

descendants of all which respective couples are (representatively) related to him

in the same degree. Thus in the second degree, the issue of George and Cecilia

Stiles and of Andrew and Esther Baker, the two grandsires and grandmothers

of John Stiles, are each in the same degree of propinquity; in the third degree,

the respective issues of Walter and Christian Stiles, of Luke and Francis Kempe,

of Herbert and Hannah Baker, and of James and Emma Thorpe, are (upon the

.extinction of the two inferior degrees) all equally entitled to call themselves the

next kindred to the whole blood of John Stiles. To which therefore of these

ancestors must we first resort, in order to find out descendants to be preferably

called to the inheritance? In answer to this, and likewise to avoid all other

confusion and uncertainty that might arise between the several stocks wherein

the purchasing ancestor may be sought for, another qualification is requisite,

besides the proximity and entirety, which is that of dignity or worthiness of

blood. For,

VII. The seventh and last rule or canon is, that in collateral inheritances
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the male stocks shall be preferred to the female (that is, kindred derived from the

blood of the male ancestors, however remote, shall be admitted before those

from the blood of the female, however near),—unless where the lands have, in

fact, descended from a female. (32)

Thus the relations on the father's side are admitted in infinitum, before those

on the mother's side are admitted at all; (I) and the relations of the father's

father, before those of the father's mother; and so on. (33) And in this the

English law is not singular, but warranted by the examples of the Hebrew and

Athenian laws, as stated by Selden, (m) and Petit: (n) though among the Greeks

flj See page 304. (7jI.iu.Jl. (m} deTOCC. Ebraor. c. 12. (n) LL. Attic. 1.1, t. 0.

(32) This rule does not obtain in the United States.

iog ancesto.r, it must descend to the issue of the nearest couple of ancestors that
have left descendanta behind them; because the descendants of one ancestor only
are not so likely l;Q be in the line of that purchasing ancestor, as those who are
descended from both.
*But her~ another difficulty arise& In the second, third, fom:th, and [ • 234 ]
every supenor degree, every man has many couple.s of ancestors, mcreasing according to the distances in & geometrical progression upwards, (k) the
descendants of all which respective couples are (representatively) related to him
in the same degree. 'l'hus in the second degree, the issue of George and Cecilia
Stiles and .of Andrew a!ld Esther Baker, the two pan?sire~ and gra~dmothers
of John Stiles, are each m the same degree of propmqmty; m the third degree,
the respective issues of Walter and Christian St.Hes, of Luke and Francis Kempe,
of Herbert and Hannah Baker, and of James and Emma 'l'horpe, are (upon the
. extinction of the two inferior degrees) all equally entitled to call themselves the
next kindred to the whole blood of John Stiles. To which therefore of these
anceators must we first resort, in order to find out descendanta to be[referably
called to the inheritance? In answer to this, and likewise to avoi all other
confusion and uncertainty that might arise between the several stocks wherein
the purchasing ancestor may be sought for, another qualification is requisite,
besides the proximity and entirety, which is that of dignity or worthiness of
blood. For,
VII. The seventh and last rule or canon is, that in collateral inheritances
the male stocks shall be preferred to the female (that is, kindred derived from the
blood of the male ancestors, however remote, shall be admitted before those
from the blood of the female, however near),-nnless where the lands have, in
fact, descended from a female. (32)
Thus the relations on the father's side are admitted in infinitum, before those
on the mother's side are admitted at all; (l) and the relations of the father's
father, before those of the father's mother; and so on. (33) And in this the
English law is not singular, but warranted by the examples of the Hebrew imd
Athenian laws, as stated by Selden, (m) and Petit: (n} though among the Greeks

(33) [So Lord Hale says, " If a son purchases land in fee-simple, and dies without issue, those

(I:)

See page tot.

of the male line shall be preferred in the descent: Hale Hist. Com. L. 326, rule 7, div. 1; and

(lJ Litt. I '·

(•) de mcc. E braww.

c. 12.

(n) LL. .&Uk. l. 1,

t. 6.

the line of the part of the mother shall never inherit as long as there are any, though never so

remote, of the line of the part of the father; and, consequently, though the mother had a

brother, yet if the great great great grandfather or grandmother "has a brother or sister, or any

descended from them, they shall be preferred to and exclude the mother's brother, though he

18 much nearer. Id. ib. div. 2; Clere v. Brooke, Plowd. 442. And so pvm is the preference

shown to the male line, that if a son dies, having purchased lands which descend to his heir

on the part of his father (not being his own brother or sister, see H. Chit. Desc. 123; and the

line of the father should afterwards fail, yet the descent shall never return to the line of the

mother, though in the first instance, or first descent from the son, it might have descended to the

heir of the part of the mother; for by this descent and seisin it is lodged in the father's line, to

•n-hom the heir of the part of the mother can never derive a title as heir, but it shall rather escheat.

See Hargr. note 5, Co. Litt. 13, a.

" This preference of male stocks is continued throughout all manner of successions ; for if, on

default ol heirs of the part of the father, the lands descend to the line of the mother, the heirs of

the mother of the part of her father's side shall be preferred in the succession before her heirs of

the part of her mother's side, because they are the more worthy." Hale, C. L. 330. •

The several classes which can' comprehend every description of kindred are thus enumerated

by Mr. Cruise, Dig. vol. 3, p. 377 :

1. The male stock of the paternal line.

2. The female stock of the paternal line.

3. The male branches of the female stock of the paternal line.

4. The female branches of the female stock of the paternal line.

5. The male stock of the maternal line.

6. The female branches of the male stock of the maternal line.

7. The male branches of the female stock of the maternal line.

8. The female branches of the female stock of the maternal line.]
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(32) Thie rule does not obtain in the United Stat.eR.
(33) [So Lord Hale il8ys, "If a l!On purchaees la.nd in fee-simple, and dies without isttue, tho1.1e

of the male line shall be preforred in the de1:1cent: Hale Hi~t. Com. L. 326, rule 7, div. 1; and
the line of the part of the mother shall never inheiit as long ns there are any, though never Ro
remote, of the line of the part of the father; and, conFequentlv, though the mother hl\d a
brother, yet if the great great great grandfather or grandmother
a brother or sister, or any
descended from them, they- shall be preferred to and exclude the mother's brother, though he
is much nearer. Id. ib. div. 2; Clere v. Brooke, Plowcl. 442. .And so ~rest is the preference
shown to the male line, that if a son diet!, having purchB.Rcd lands which descend to his heir
on the part of bis father (not beinp; his own brother or sister, see H. Chit. Desc. 12:~; and the
line of the father should afterwards fe.il, yet the de11Cent !!hall never return to the line of tho
mother, though in the first im1tance, or first descent from the El<ln, it might have descended to the
heir of the part of tho mother i for by thii; descent and seh;in it it1 lodged in the father's line, to
whom the lieir of the part of tno mother can never derive a title as heir, but it shall rather escheat.
See Hargr. not.e 5, Co. Litt. 13, a.
" This preference of male stocks iR continued throughout all manner of snccelllrions ; for if, on
default ol heiI'!l of the part of the father, the lands de~end to the line of the mother, the heirs of
the mother of the part of her father's side shall be preferred in the surce11siou before her heiI'I! of
the part ofber mother'!! Kille, becuuso they are the more worthy." Hale, C. L. 33CI.
•
The several cla.~11 which cnri comprehend every description of kindred are thDB enumerated
by Mr. Cruise, Dig. vol. 3, p. 377 :
1. The male stock of the paternal line.
2. The female stock of the paternal line.
3. The male branches of the female stock of the patemo.l line.
4. The female branches of tho female stock of the paternal line.
5. The male Rtock of the maternal line.
6. The female branches of the male stock of the nrnt.ernal line.
7. The male branches of the female stock of the mat.ernal line.
8. The female branches of the female stock of the maternal line.]
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in the time of Hesiod, (o) when a man died without wife or children, all his

r *oQ5 I kindred (without any distinction) divided his estate among them. It is

• '""* -1 likewise warranted by the example of the Roman laws; wherein the

agnati, or relations by the father, were preferred to the cognati, or relations by

the mother, till the edict of the Emperor Justinian (p) abolished all distinction

between them. It is also conformable to the customary law of Normandy, (q)

which indeed in most respects agrees with our English law of inheritance. "

However, I am inclined to think, that this rule of our law does not owe its

immediate original to any view of conformity to those which I have jnst now

mentioned ; but was established in order to effectuate and carry into execution

the fifth rule, or principal canon of collateral inheritance, before laid down;

that every heir must be of the blood of the first purchaser. For, when such

first purchaser was not easily to be discovered after a long course of descents,

the lawyers not only endeavoured to investigate him by taking the next relation

of the whole blood to the person last in possession, but also, considering that a

preference had been given to males by virtue of the second canon) through the

whole course of lineal descent from the first purchaser to the present time, they

judged it more likely that the lands should have descended to the last tenant

from his male than from his female ancestors; from the father (for instance)

rather than from the mother; from the father's father rather than from the

father's mother: and therefore they hunted back the inheritance (if I may be

allowed the expression) through the male line; and gave it to the next relations
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on the side of the father, the father's father, and so upwards, imagining with

reason that this was the most probable way of continuing it in the line of the

first purchaser. A conduct much more rational than the preference of the

agnati, by the Roman laws: which, as they gave no advantage to the males in

the first instance or direct lineal succession, had no reason for preferring them

in the transverse collateral one: upon which account this preference was very

wisely abolished by Justinian.

T *236 1 *That this was the true foundation of the preference of the agnati or

L v J male stocks, in our law, will farther appear, if we consider, that when-

ever the lands have notoriously descended to a man from his mother's side, this

rule is totally reversed; and no relation of his by the father's side, as such, can

ever be admitted to them; because he cannot possibly be of the blood of the

first purchaser. And so, e converse, if the lands descended from the father's

side, no relation of the mother, as such, shall ever inherit. So also, if they in

fact descended to John Stiles from his father's mother, Cecilia Kempe; here" not

only the blood of Lucy Baker, his mother, but also of George Stiles, his father's

father, is perpetually excluded. And in like manner, if they be known to have

descended from Frances Holland, the mother of Cecilia Kempe, the line not only

of Lucy Baker, and of George Stiles, but also of Luke Kempe, the father of

Cecilia, is excluded. Whereas, when the side from which they descended ia

forgotten or never known (as in the case of an estate newly purchased to be

holden ut feudum antiquwn), here the right of inheritance first runs up all the

father's side, with a preference to the male stocks in every instance; and, if it

finds no heirs there, it then, and then only, resorts to the mother's side; leav-

ing no place untried, in order to find heirs that may by possibility be derived

from the original purchaser. The greatest probability of finding such was

among those descended from the male ancestors; but, upon failure of issue there,

they may possibly be found among those derived from the females. (34)

(o) Qeayav, 606. (p) A'oe. 118. (q) Or. Cmtturn. c. 25

(34) [If a man seised in fee ex parte materna, levy a fine sur grant it render, granting to A

and his heirs; the estate taken oy the conusor under the render will now be descendible to

his heirs ex parte paterna. 1 Prest. Conv. 210, 318; Co. Litt. 316; Dyer, 837, b ; Price v. Lang-

in the time of Hesiod, (o) when a man died without wife or children, all bis
[ • 235 ] kindred (without any *distinction) divided his estate among them. It is
likewise warranted by the exam pie of the Roman law&; wherein the
agnati, or relations by the father, were preferred to the C<Jgnati, or relations by
the mother, till the edict of the Emperor Juatinian (p) abolished all distinction
between them. It is also conformable to the customary law of Normandy, (q)
which indeed in most respects agrees with our English law of inheritance.
However, I am inclined to think, that this rule of our law does not owe its
immediate original to any view of conformity to those which I have ju.st now
mentioned; but wae established in order to effectuate and carry into execution
the fifth rule, or principal canon of collateral inheritance, before laid down·;
that every heir must be of the blood of the first purchaser. For, when such
first purchaser was not easily to be discovered after a long course of descent"'
the lawyers not only endeavoured to inveet.igate him by taking the next relation
of the whole blood to the person last in posl!e88ion, but also, considering that a
preference had been giYen to males by virtue of the second canon) through the
whole couree of lineal desoent from the first purchaser to the present time, they
judged it more likely that the lands should have descended to the last tenant
from his male than from his female ancestors; from the father (for instance)
rather than from the mother; from the father's father rather than from the
father's mother: and therefore they hunted back the inheritance (if I may be
allowed the expression) through the male line ; and gave it to the next relations
on the side of the father, the father's father, and so upwards, imagining with
reason that this was the most probable way of continuing it in the line of the
first purch&1er. A conduct much more rational than the preference of the
agnati, b,Y the Roman laws: which, as they gave no advantage to the males in
thP. first mstance or direct lineal succession, had no reason for preferring them
in the transverse collateral one : upon which account this preference wu nry
wisely abolished by Justinian.
*That this was the true foundation of the :preference of the agfl,(Jti or
[ • 236 ]
male stocks, in our law, will farther appear, if we consider, that whenever the lands have notoriously descended to a man f~m his mother's side., this
rule is totally reversed ; and no relation of his by the father's side, as such, can
ever be admitted to them ; because he cannot possibly be of the blood of the
first purchaser. And so, e converao, if the lands descended from the fathde
side, no relation of the mother, as such, shall ever inherit. So also, if thev in
fact descended to John Stiles from his father's mother, Cecilia Kempe; here· not
only the blood of Lucy Baker, hie mother, but also of George Stiles, his father's
father, is perpetually excluded. And in like manner, if they be known to have
de11cended from Frances Holland, the mother of Cecilia Kempe, the line not onlv
of Lucy Baker, and of George Stiles, but also of Luke Kempe, the father of
Cecilia, is excluded. Wherelf.B, when the side from which they descended is
forgotten or never known (ae in the case of an estate newly purchased to be
holden ut feudum antiqumn), here the right of inheritance first rune up all the
father's side, with a preference to the male stocks in every instance; and, if it
finds no heirs there, it then, and then only, resorts to the mother's side; lea\·ing no place untried, in order to find heirs that may by poesibility be derived
from the original purchaser. The greatest probability of findin~ such wa.e
among those descended from the male ancestors; but, upon failure of issue there,
they may possibly be found among those derived from the females. (34)

ford, 1 Salk. 92. And the same in the case of feoffment and re-infeoffment, or even if a man

(o)

0eoy011, 606.

<PJ 1r0t1. us.

M'isnl ex parte materna, make feoffment in fee reserving rent, the rent shall descend to the hein

ex parte paterna. Co. Litt. 12, b.]
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(34) [If a man seised in fee 11z parte matema, levy a fine 8Ur grant it f"ender, granting to.!.
aod hi11 heirs ; the estate taken by the connsor under the render will now be d811Cendible to
hi~ heil'!\ e.r parte paterna. 1 Prest. Conv. 210, 318; Co. Litt. 316; Dyer, 237, b; Price l'. Langford, 1 Salk. 9'l. A.nd the Mme in the case of feofl'ment and re·infeofl'ment, or even if a man
sei8ed ex partc materna, make feoffment in fee reserving rent, the rent shall d01JCend to the heirl
ex parte patema. Co. Litt. 12, b.]
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This I take to be the true reason of the constant preference of the agnatic

succession, or issue derived from the male ancestors, through all the stages of

collateral inheritance; as the ability for personal service was the reason for pre-

ferring the males at first in the direct lineal succession. We see clearly, that

if males had been perpetually admitted, in utter exclusion of females, the trac-

ing the inheritance back through the male line of ancestors must at last have

inevitably brought us up to the first purchaser; but as males have not been

*perpftuatty admitted but only generally preferred; as females have

not been utterly excluded, but only generally postponed to males; the

tracing the inheritance up through the male stocks will not give us absolute

demonstration, but only a strong probability, of arriving at the first purchaser;

which joined with the other probability, of the wholeness of entirety of blood,

will fall little short of a certainty.

Before we conclude this branch of our inquiries, it may not be amiss to exem-

plify these rules by a short sketch of the manner in which we must search for

the heir of a person, as John Stiles, who dies seised of land which he acquired,

and which therefore he held as a feud of indefinite antiquity, (r)

In the first place succeeds the eldest son, Matthew Stiles, or his issue: (n°l.)—

if his line be extinct, then Gilbert Stiles and the other sons, respectively, in

order of birth, or their issue: (n* 2.)—in default of these, all the daughters

together, Margaret and Charlotte Stiles, or their issue. (n° 3.)—On failure of

the descendants of John Stiks, himself, the issue of Geoffrey and Lucy Stiles, his
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parents, is called in, viz.: first, Francis Stiles, the eldest brother of the whole

blood, or his issue: (n° 4.)—then Oliver Stiles, and the other whole brothers,

respectively, in order of birth, or their issue: (n° 5.)—then the sisters of the

whole blood all together, Bridget and Alice Stiles, or their issue. (n° 6.)—In

defect of these, the issue of George and Cecelia Stiles, his father's parents;

respect being still had to their age and sex: (n* 7.)—then the issue of Walter

and Christian Stiles, the parents of his paternal grandfather: (n° 8.)—then the

issue of Richard and Anne Stiles, the parents of his paternal grandfather's

father, (n° 9.)—and so on in the paternal grandfather's paternal line, or blood

of Walter Stiles, in infinitum. In defect of these, the issue of William and Jane

Smith, the parents of his paternal grandfather's mother: (n° 10.)—and so on

in the paternal grandfather's maternal line, or blood of Christian Smith, in

infinitum: till both the "immediate bloods of George Stilea, the paternal r ^og -.

grandfather, are spent.—Then we must resort to the issue of Luke and L J

Frances Kempe, the parents of John Stiks's paternal grandmother: (n° 11.)—

then to the issue of Thomas and Sarah Kempe, the parents of his paternal

grandmother's father: (n° 12.)—and so on in the paternal grandmothers pater-

nal line, or blood of Luke Kempe, in infinitum.—In default of which we must

call in the issue of Charles and Mary Holland, the parents of his paternal grand-

mother's mother: (n° 13.)—and so on in the paternal grandmother's maternal >

line, or blood of Frances Holland, in infinitum; till both the immediate bloods of f

Cecelia Kempe, the paternal grandmother are also spent.—Whereby the paternal

blood of John Stiles entirely failing, recourse must then, and not before, be had

to his maternal relations; or the blood of the Bakers, (u° 14, 15, 16.)—Willis's, ',

(n° 17.)—Thorpe's (n° 18, 19.)—and White's, (n° 20.)—in the same regular suc-

cessive order as in the paternal line.

The student should however be informed, that class, n* 10, would be post-

poned to n° 11, in consequence of the doctrine laid down, arguendo, by Justice

Manwoode, in the case of Clere and Brooke ;(s) from whence it'is adopted by

Lord Bacon, (0 and Sir Matthew Hale: («) because, it is said, that all the

female ancestors on the part of the father are equally worthy of blood ; and in

that case proximity shall prevail. And yet, notwithstanding these respectable

authorities, the compiler of this table hath ventured {in point of theory, for the

' r > See the table of descents annexed. (») Plowd. 150.

ft) Elem. c. 1. (M) H. C. L. 310, 2U.
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This I rake to be the true reason of the coQ.st;ant preference of the agnatic
succession, or issue derived from the male ancestors, through all the stages of
collateral inherit.a.nee; as the ability for personal service was the reaBOn for preferring the males at first in the direct lineal succession. We see clearly, that
if males had been perpetually admitted, in utter exclusion of females, the tracing the inheritance back through the male line of ancestors must at lagt have
inevitably brought us up to the first purchaser; but as males have not been
*perpetually admitted but only generally preferred; as females have [ • 237 ]
not been tdkrly euludd, but only gfm6rally p<Jslponed to males; the
tracing the inheritance up through the male stocks will not give us absolute
demonstration, but only a strong probability, of arriving at the first purchaser;
which joine.d with the other probability, of the wholeness of entirety of blood,
will foH little short of a certainty.
Before we conclude this branch of our inquiries, it may not be amiss to exemplify these rules by a short sketch of the manner in which we must search for
the heir of a. person, as John Stilu, who dies seised of land which he acquired,
and which therefore he held as a feud of indefinite antiquity. (r)
In the first place succeeds the eldest son, Matthew Stiles, or his issue: (n°1.)if his line be extinct, then Gilbert Stiles and the other sons, respectively, in
order of birth, or their issue: en• 2.)-in default of these, all the daughters
together, Margaret and Charlotte Stiles, or their issue. (n° 3.)-0n failure of
the descendants of John Stif.es, himself, the issue of Geoffrey and Lucy Stiles, his
pa.rents, is called in, viz.: first, Francis Stiles, the eldest brother of the whole
blood, or his issue: (n° 4.)-then Oliver Stiles, and the other whole brothers,
respectively, in order of birth, or their issue: (n° 5.)-then the sisters of the
whole blood all together, Bridget and Alice Stiles, or their issue. (n° 6.)-In
defect of these, the issue of George and Cecelia. Stiles, his father's fa.rents;
respect being still h&d to their age and sex: (n• 7.)-then the issue o Walter
and Christian Stiles, the parents of his paternal grandfather: (n° 8.)-then the
issue of Richard and Anne Stiles, the parents of his paternal ~randfather's
father, (n° 9.)-and so on in the paternal grandfather's paternal lme, or blood
of Walter Stiles, i11 injinitu,rrt. In defect of these, the issue of Willi&m and Jane
Smith, the parents of his paternal grandfather's mother: (n° 10.)-and 80 on
in the paternal grandfather's maternal line, or blood of Christian Smith, in
inftnituni : till both the *immediate bloods of George Stiles, the paternal [ • 238 ]
grandfather, are spent.-Then we must resort to the issue of Luke and
Frances Kempe, the parents of John Stile.~'s paternal grandmother: (n° 11.)then t,o the issue of Thomas and Sarah Kempe, the parents of his paternal
grandmother's father: (n° 12.)-and so on in the paternal grandmother's paternal line, or blood of Luke Kempe, in injinitum.-In default of which we must
call in the issue of Charles and Mary Holland, the parents of his paternal grandmother's mother: (n°13.)-and 80 on in the paternal grandmother's maternal
line, or blood of Frances Holland, in infinitum; till both the immediate bloods of
Cecelia Kempe, the paternal grandmother are also spent.-Whereby the paternal
blood of Johri Stilu entirely failina, recourse must then, and not before, be had
to his maternal relations; or the biood of th~ Bakers, (n° 14, 16, 16.)-Willis's,
(n° 17.)-'fhorpe's (n° 18, 19.)-and White's, (n° 20.)-in the same regular successive order as in the paternal line.
The student should however be informed, that class, n• 10, would be postponed to n° 11, in consequence of the doctrine laid down, arguendo, by Justice
Manwoode, in the case of Clere and Brooke; (s) from whence it 'is adopted by
Lord Bacon, ( t) and Sir Matthew Hale: (u) because, it is said, that all the
female ancestors on the yart of the father are equally worthy of blood; and in
that case proximity shal prevail. And yet, nothwithstanding these respectable
authorities, the compiler of this table hath ventured (in point of theory, for the
(r) Seo the table otdoscents annexe<!,
OJ Elem. e. 1.
(u) H. c. L. 2-W, m.

(11)

Plowd. '60.
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case never yet occurred in practice) (35) to give the preference to n" 10 before

case never yet occurred in practice) (35) to give the preference to n° 10 bef'ore
n° 11; for the following reusons; 1. _&.cause this point 1rns not the principal
question in th.e case of Clerc and Brooke: bot the law concerning it is delivered
obiter onlv, and in the course of argument by justice Manwoode; though afterwards saicl to be confirmed by the three other justices in separute, extrajndicial
conferences with the reporter. 2. Because the chief justice, Sir James Dyer, in
reporting the resolution of the court in what seems to be the same case, (w) takes
no notice of this doctrine. 3. Because it appears from Plowden's report that
[ • 239 ] very many gentlemen of the law were dissatisfied •with this position of
Justice Manwoode; since the blood of n° 10 was derived to the purchaser
through a ~ter number of males than the blood of n° 11, and was therefore
in their opmion the more worthy of the two. 4. Because the position itself
destroys the otherwise entire and regular symmetry of our legal course of
descents, as is manifest by inspecting the table: wherein n•16, which is analogous in the maternal line to n° 10 in the paternal, is preferred to n° 18, which
is analogous to n" 11, upon the authority of the eighth rule laid down by Halle
himself: and it destroys also that constant preference of the male stocks in the
law of inheritance, for which an additional reason is before (x) given, besides
the mere dignity of blood. 5. Because it introduces all that uncertainty and
contradiction, which is :pointed out by that ingenious author; (y) and establishes
a collateral doctrine (viz.: the J?reference of n° 11 to nc 10) seemingly, though
perhaps not strictlv, incompatible with the principal point resoh·ed . in the
case of Clere and Brooke, viz.: the preference of n° 11 to n° 14. And, though
that learned writer proposes to rescind the principal point then resoh·ed, m
order to clear this difficulty; it is apprehended, that the difficulty may be better
cleared, by rejecting the collateral doctrine, which was never yet resolved at alt
6. Because the reason that is given for this doctrine by Lord Bacon (viz.: tha.t
in any degree, ;paramount the first, the law respecteth proximity, and not dignity
of blood) is directly contrary to many instances given by Plowden and Hale,
and every other writer on the law of descents. 7. Because this position seems
to contradict the allowed doctrine of Sir Edward Coke; (z) who lays it down
(under different names) that the blood of the Kempes (alias Sandies) shall not
inherit till the blood of the Stiles's (alia.<l Fairfields) fail. Now the blood of the
Stiles's d()('S certainlv not fail, till both n° 9 and n° 10 are extinct. Wherefore
n° 11 (being the blooC'l of the Kempes) ought not to inherit till then. 8. Because
in the case, Mich. 12 Edw. IV, 14, (a) (much relied on in that of Clere and
Brooke) it is laid down as a rule, that "ce."tuy, que doit inheriter al pere, doit
inheritor al fils." (h) And so Sir Matthew Hale (c) says, "that though the law
excludes the father from inheriting, yet it substitutes and directs the descent as
it should have been had the father inherited. (36) Now it is settled, by the reso[ • 240 ] lution of Clere •and Brooke, that n° 10 should have inherited before
n ° 11 to Geoffrey Stile1:1, the father, had he been the person last seised ;
and therefore n° 10 ought also to be preferred in inheriting to Jolin StilesJ the son.
In case John Stiles was not himself the purchaser, but the estate in fact came
to him by descent from his father, mother or any higher ancestor, there is this
difference; that the blood of that line of ancestors, from which it did not
descend, can never inherit: as was formerly fully explained. (d) And the like
rule, as there exemplified, will hold upon descents from any other ancestors.
The student should also bear in mind, that during this whole process, John
Btiles is the J?6rson supposed to ha¥e been last actually seised of the estate For

n° 11; for the following reasons; 1. Because this point was not the principal

question in the case of Clere and Brooke: but the law concerning it is delivered

obiter only, and in the course of argument by justice Manwoode; though after-

wards said to be confirmed by the three other justices in separate, extrajndicial

conferences with the reporter. 2. Because the chief justice, Sir James Dyer, in

reporting the resolution of the court in what seems to be the same case, (a>) takes

no notice of this doctrine. 3. Because it appears from Plowden's report that

r »2QQ ] very many gentlemen of the law were dissatisfied *with this position of

•1 Justice Manwoode; since the blood of n° 10 was derived to the purchaser

through a greater number of males than the blood of n° 11, and was therefore

in their opinion the more worthy of the two. 4. Because the position itself

destroys the otherwise entire and regular symmetry of our legal course of

descents, as is manifest by inspecting the table: wherein n*16, which is anal-

ogous in the maternal line to n° 10 in the paternal, is preferred to n° 18, which

is analogous to n" 11, upon the authority of the eighth rule laid down by Hale

himself: and it destroys also that constant preference of the male stocks in the

law of inheritance, for which an additional reason is before (x) given, besides

the mere dignity of blood. 5. Because it introduces all that uncertainty and

contradiction, which is pointed out by that ingenious author; (y) and establishes

a collateral doctrine (viz.: the preference of n° 11 to nc 10) seemingly, though

perhaps not strictly, incompatible with the principal point resolved in the
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case of Clere and Brooke, viz.: the preference of n° 11 to n° 14. And, though

that learned writer proposes to rescind the principal point then resolved, in

order to clear this difficulty; it is apprehended, that the difficulty may be better

cleared, by rejecting the collateral doctrine, which was never yet resolved at all.

6. Because the reason that is given for this doctrine by Lord Bacon (viz.: that

in any degree, paramount the first, the law respecteth proximity, and not dignity

of blood) is directly contrary to many instances given by Plowden and Hale,

and every other writer on the law of descents. 7. Because this position seems

to contradict the allowed doctrine of Sir Edward Coke; (z) who lays it down

(under different names) that the blood of the Kempes (alias Sandies) shall not

inherit till the blood of the Stiles's (alias Fail-fields) fail. Now the blood of the

Stiles's does certainly not fail, till both n° 9 and n" 10 are extinct Wherefore

n" 11 (being the blood of the Kempes) ought not to inherit till then. 8. Because

in the case, Mich. 12 Edw. IV, 14, (a) (much relied on in that of Clere and

Brooke) it is laid down as a rule, that " cestity, que doit inheriter al pere, doit

inheritor al fils." (b) And so Sir Matthew Hale (c) says, " that though the law

excludes the father from inheriting, yet it substitutes and directs the descent as

it should have been had the father inherited. (36) Now it is settled, by the reso-

r *24i) 1 luti°n °f Clere *and Brooke, that n° 10 should have inherited before

I J n° 11 to Geoffrey Stiles, the father, had he been the person last seised;

and therefore n° 10 ought also to be preferred in inheriting to John Stilest the son.

In case John Stiles was not himself the purchaser, but the estate in fact came

to him by descent from his father, mother or any higher ancestor, there is this

difference; that the blood of that line of ancestors, from which it did not

descend, can never inherit: as was formerly fully explained, (d) And the like

rule, as there exemplified, will hold upon descents from any other ancestors.

The student should also bear in mind, that during this whole process, John

Stiles is the person supposed to have been last actually seised of the estate For

(wl Over, 3U. (x) Pages 2SS, 6, 7. (wl Law of Inheritance. 2d edit. pages 30. 31. 61, R2, W.

(z) Co. Litt. 12. Hawk. abr. in loc. (a) i'ltzh. Al,. lit. rtitcent. 2. Bro. Abr. tit. diteent. 3.

(6) See page 223. (c) Hist. C. L. 243. (rf) See page 23(5.

(35) [The point has since arisen, and been decided in favor of the learned commentator's opin-

ion. Davies c. Lowndes, 7 Scott, 22, 56. And the legislature has adopted the same rale. Infra,

(tel Dyer1 31'.
(:r) Pages ts.~. 6, 7.
<11) J,aw orI~her!tanl'e, 'ld efllt. Jla.!Jff 30. 31. 61. ll'l, 1!S.
(z) Co. Lrtt. l'l. Hawk. ahr. in loc.
(a) fltzh. Ab. tu. ducent. 'l. Bro. Alw. tU. d'-"l. 3.
(bl See page tia.
(c) Hist. (;. J,. m.
(d) Sec page ~.

p. 240, note.]

(36) [This rale, however, does not apply in all cases; for a brother of the half blood would suc-

ceed to the father, though he could not to the son.]

i
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(35) [The point ba.8 since arisen, and been decided in favor of the learned commentator's opin·
ion. Davies ~- Lowndes, 7 Scott, 2'l, 56. And the legislature has adopted the same rnle. INjN,
p. 240, note.]
(:.16) [ThiR rule, howerer, doe11 not apply in nil CMCll; for a brother of the half blood would 8UC·
ceed to thtJ father, though he could not to the son.]
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PURCHASE DEFINED.

if ever it comes to vest in any other person, as heir to John Stiles, a new order

of succession must be observed upon the death of such heir; since he, by his

own seisin, now becomes himself an ancestor or stipes, and must be put in the

place of John Sliles. The figures therefore denote the order in which the

several classes would succeed to John Stiles, and not to each other: and before

we search for an heir in any of the higher figures (as n° 8), we must be first

assured that all the lower classes (from n° 1 to n° 1) were extinct, at John

Stiles's decease. (37)

CHAPTER XV.

if ever it comes to vest in any other person, as heir to John Stiles, a. new order
of succession must be observed upon the death of such heir; since he, by his
own seisin, now becomes himself an ancestor or stipes, and must be put in the
place of John Stiles. The figures therefore denote the order in which the
several classes would succeed to Jolm Stiles, and not to each other: and before
we see.rch for an heir in any of the higher figures (as n° 8), we must be first
- assured that all the lower classes (from n° 1 to n° 7) were extinct, at John
Stilu's decease. (37)

OF TITLE BY PURCHASE.

AND

I, BY ESCHEAT.

PURCHASE,perquisitto, taken in its largest and most extensive sense, is thus

defined by Littleton; (a) the possession of lands and tenements, which a man

CHAPTER XV.

hath by his own act or agreement, and not by descent from any of his ances-

tors or kindred. In this sense it is contradistinguished from acquisition by

right of blood, and includes every other method of coming to an estate, but

OF TITLE BY PURCHASE.

merely that by inheritance, (1) wherein the title is vested in a person, not by his

own act or agreement, but by the single operation of law. (b)

AND

Purchase, indeed, in its vulgar and confined acceptation, is applied only to

I, BY ESCHEA'r.

such acquisitions of land, as are obtained by way of bargain and sale for money,

or some other valuable consideration. But this falls far short of the legal idea
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of purchase: for, if I give land freely to another, he is in the eye of the law a

purchaser, (c) and falls within Littleton's definition, for he comes to the estate

(a) JII. (b) Co. LIB. 18. (c) Ibid.

(37) Some of the important changes made in the English law of descents by the statute 3 and

4 Vm. IV, c. 106. have been referred to in the preceding notes. Mr. Sweet gives the following

as the existing canons of descent under that statute:

1. The descent shall be traced from the last purchaser, or the last person entitled to the land

who cannot be proved to have inherited it.

2. That inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of the last purchaser.

3. That on failure of issue of the last purchaser, the inheritance shall go to his nearest lineal

ancestor, or his issue ; the ancestor taking in preference to his issue, but so that a nearer lineal

ancestor and his issue are to be preferred to a more remote lineal ancestor and his issue, other

than such nearer lineal ancestor or his issue.

PcRCHASE, 1erquisitio, taken in its largest and most extensive sense, is thus
defined by Littleton; (a) the possession of lands and tenements, which a man
bath by his own act or agreement, and not by descent from any of his ancestors or kindred. In this sense it is contra.distinguished from acqni~ition by
right of blood, and includes every other method of coming to an estate, but
merely that by inheritance, (1) wherein the title is vested in a person, not by his
own act or ~reement, but by the single operation oflaw. (h)
Purchase, mdeed, in its vulgar and confined acceptation, is applied only t-0
such acquisitions of land, as are obtained by way of bargain and sale for money,
or some other valuable consiJeration. But this falls far short of the legal idea
of purchase: for, if I give land freely to another, he is in the eye of the law a
purchMer, (c) and falls within Littleton's definition, for he comes to the estate

4. That a relation of the whole blood, and his or her issue, shall be preferred to a relation of

the same degree of the half blood, and his or her issue. Collateral relatives of the half blood may

(a)

f 12.

(6) Co. Litt. 18.

(c)

1""1

therefore inherit, but after the common ancestor, and after collateral relations of the whole

blood.

5. Each male ancestor and his ancestors, whether male or female, and his and their issue, shall

be preferred to all other female ancestors and their ancestors, whether male or female, and their

Issue.

6. That the male issue shall be admitted before the female.

7. That when there are two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit; but

the females altogether.

8. That (subject to the third rule) a parent shall be preferred to his issue ; but the issue in

infinitum of any person deceased shall represent their ancestor; that is shall stand in the same

place as he would have done had he been living.

For the rules of descent prevailing in the United States, the reader is referred to 4 Kent Coin.

Lee. 75. The differences between them and the English rules are alluded to in the preceding

notes, but there is not such uniformity in the American statutes as to make any attempt at an

analysis of them in this place desirable.

(1) See reference to statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106. in note to p. 201.
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(37) Some of the important changes made in tho En~lish law of de~ent8 by the statute 3 and
4 Wm. IV, c. 106. have been reforrecl to in the precedmg notes. Mr. Sweet gives the following
81.1 the existing canons of descent under that statute :
1. The de1<eent shall be traced from the )&St purchaser, or the 1&11t pel'l!On entitled to the land
who cannot be l?roved to have inherited it.
2. That inhe11tancet1 11hall lineally dei;cend to the iRBue of the lllilt purch811Cr.
3. That on failure of is~ue of the Jai;t purchaser, the inheritance shall go to his nearest . lineal
ancet<tor, or hi~ i~sue; the ancestor taking in preference to his i~Rue, but so that a .n~iuer lineal
ancest-0r and Jµs u;sue are to be preferred to a more remote lineal ancestor and hi.> issue, other
thau such nearer lineal ancestor or his Ui.iue.
4. That a relation of the whole blood, and his or her h•sne, shall be preferred to a reltltion of
the 81\me degree of the half blood, and hi11 or her issue. Collateral relatives of the half blood may
therefore inherit, but after the common ancestor, and after collateral relations of tho whole
blood.
,
S. Each male ancestor and his ancestors, whether male or female, and his and their issne, shall
be preferred to all other female ancestons and their ancestors, whether male or felllaio, and their
illSUe.
6. That the male issue shall be admitted before the female.
7. That when there are two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit; but
the femnleR altogether.
8. That (subject to the third rule) a parent shall be preferred to his iBBUe; but the issue in
Infinitum of anr person decel\8Cd shall represent their ancestor; that is shall stand in the same
plooe M he would have done had be been living.
For the rules of descent prevailing in tho Umted States, the reader is referred to 4 Kent Com.
Loo. 75. Tho diffcrenco:i between them and the Englh1h rules are alluded to in the prc<'eding
notes, but there i11 not such uuifonnity in the American statutes as to make any attempt at &11
analysiR of them in this place do~irablc.
(1) See reference to 8tatute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, in note top. 201.

VoL. I.-62

489

Original from

NE

YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

241 TITLE BY PURCHASE. [Book IL

24.1

[Book IL

TITLE BY PURCHASE.

by his own agreement; that is, he consents to the gift A man who has hii

father's estate settled upon him in tail, before lie was born, is also a purchaser;

for he takes quite another estate than the law of descents would have given

him. Nay, even if the ancestor devises his estate to his heir at law by wit],

vilh other limitations, or in any other shape tluin the course of descents would

direct, such heir shall take by purchase. (</) But if a man seised in fee, devises

his whole estate to his heir at law, so that the heir takes neither a greater nor a

F *242 1 'ess es*a^e ky the *devise than he would have done without it, he shall

*• -"be adjudged to take by descent, (e) (2) even though it be charged with

incumbrances; (/) this being for the benefit of creditors, and others, who have

demands on the estate of the ancestor. If a remainder be limited to the

heirs of Sempronius, here Sempronius himself takes nothing; but if he dies

during the continuance of the particular estate, his heirs shall take as purchas-

ers. (g) But if an estate be made to A for life, remainder to his right heirs in

fee, his heirs shall take by descent: for it is an ancient rule of law, that when-

ever the ancestor takes an estate for life, the heir cannot by the same convey-

ance take an estate in fee by purchase, but only by descent, (h) (3) And if A dies,

before entry, still his heirs shall take by descent, and not by purchase: for

where the heir takes any thing that might have vested in the ancestor, he takes

by way of descent, (i) The ancestor, during his life, beareth in himself all his

heirs; (k) and therefore, when once he is or might have been seised of the lauds,

the inheritance so limited to his heirs vests in the ancestor himself: and the
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word " heirs " in this case is not esteemed a word of purchase, but a word of

limitation, enuring so as to increase the estate of the ancestor from a tenancy

for life to a fee-simple. (4) And, had it been otherwise, had the heir (who is

uncertain till the death of the ancestor) been allowed to take as a purchaser

originally nominated in the deed, as must have been the case if the remainder

had been expressly limited to Matthew or Thomas by name; then, in the times

of strict feudal tenure, the lord would have been defrauded by such a limitation

of the fruits of his signiory arising from a descent to the heir.

What we call purchase, perquisitio, the feudists called conquests, conqutestus,

or conquisitio: (I) both denoting any means of acquiring an estate out of the

common course of inheritance. Ancl this is still the proper phrase in the law

F *243 1 °^ Scotland: (m) as it was among the Norman jurists, who styled *the

"• -* first purchaser (that is, he who brought the estate into the family which

at present owns it) the conqueror or conquereur. (n) Which seems to be all that

was meant by the appellation which was given to William the Norman, when

his manner of ascending the throne of England was, in his own and his suc-

cessor's charters, and by the historians of the times, entitled conquastus, and

himself conquwstor or conquisitor; (o) signifying that he was the first of his

family who acquired the crown of England, and from whom therefore all future

(rfi Lord Rayra. 728. (e) 1 Boll. Mir. 626. (/) Salic. 241. Lord Itnyni. 788.

(a) 1 Koll. MIT. C27. (») 1 Rep. 104. 2 Lev. 80. Kaym. SW. «) Shelley's Case, 1 Hep. 98.

t/Ji Co. I .ill- -Hi. 11} Craig. I. 1, /. 10, i 18. (m) Dalrymple of Fcndg, SIO.

by his own agreement; that is, he oonsents to the gift. A man who bas bit
father's estate settled upon him in tail, before he was born, is also a purchaser;
for he takes quite another estate than the law of descents would have gh·en
him. Nay, even if the ance1tor devises his estate to his heir at law bv will,
with other limitations, or in any other shape than the course of descents would
direct, such heir shall take by purchase. (d) But if a man seised in fee~ devises
his whole estate to his heir at law, so that the heir takes neither a greater nor a
[ • 242 ] less estate by the •devise than he would have done without it, he shall
be adjudged to take by descent, (e) (2) even though it be charged with
incumbrances; (/) this being for the benefit of creditors, and others, who ha\"e
demands on the estate of the ancestor. If a remainder be limited to the
heirs of Sempronius, here Sempronius himself takes nothing; but if he di~
during the continuance of the particular estatt>, bis heirs shall take as purchasers. ( g) But if an estate be made to A for life, remainder to his right heirs in
fee, his heirs shall take by descent: for it is an ancient rule of law, that whenever the ancestor takes an estate for life, the heir cannot by the same conYeyance take an estate in fee by purcliase, but only by descent. (Ii) (3) And if A dies,
before entry, still his heirs shalt take by descent, and not by purchase: for
where the heir takes any thing that might have vested in the ancestor, he takes
by way of descent. (i) The ancestor, during his life, beareth in himself all his
heirs; (k) and therefore, when once he is or might have been seised of the lands,
the inheritance so limited t.o his heirs vests in the ancestor himielf: and the
word "heirs" in this case is not esteemed a word of pu,rcha.se, but a word of
limitaUon, enaring so as to increase the estate of the ancestor from a tenancy
for life to a fee-simple. (4) And, had it been otherwise, had the heir (who is
uncertain till the death of the ancestor) been allowed to take as a purchaser
originally nominated in the deed, as must have been the case if the remainder
had been expressly limited to Matthew or Thomas by name; then, in the time.s
of strict feudal tenure, the lord would have been defrauded by such a limitation
of the fruits of his signiory arising from a descent to the heir.
What we call purchase, perquisitio, tho feudists called conquests, conqumsills,
or conquisitio: (l) both denoting any means of acquiring an estate out of the
common course of inheritance. And this is still the proper phrase in the law
[ • 243 ] of Scotland: (m) as it was among the Norman jurists, who stY.led •the
first purchaser (that is, he who brought the estate into the family which
at present owns it) the conqueror or conquereur. (n) Which seems to be all that
w~ meant by the appellation which was given to William the Norman, when
his manner of ascending the throne of England was, in his own and his suocessor's charters, and by the historians of the times, entitled conqu<Bstm, and
himself conqumstor or conquisitor; (o) signifying that he was the first of his
family who acquired the crown of England, and from whom therefore all future

(n) Or. Couitum. Glou. c. 23. page 40. (o) Spelm. Olott. 115.

(2) [This rale was abrogated by the Inheritance Act. 3 and 4 Wan. IT, c. 106, $ 3. Even

before that statute, if the devise to the heir gave him a different estate to that which he would

have taken by descent, he took under the devise. Lord Raym. 738. The origin of the old rul«

(d) Lord Ray111. 728.
(pl I Uoll. Al.or. 6!7.
(k) Co. Litt.~.

(11) 1 Roll. A.br. 626.

(f)

Salk. Ml. Lord Raym. 728.

(la) 1Rep.101. I! Lev. 80. 1'aym. SiW.
(') ~helley'1 Case,
(11 Craig. l. 1, t. 101 f 11!.
(91) D111rym1>lo ofFcncte, 110.
(ta) Gr. Cou•tv.. Glou. c. s.'i, pagoe fO.
(o) Spelm. Ulou. H6.

l Rep. 98.

of law seems to have been similar to that stated in the text as the ground of the rule in SheHcr'«

Case, viz.: the advantage of the lord. An heir who IB made devisee may now disclaim

the devise and take as heir, though such a course is never adopted, since no advantage can arise

from it.]

(3) That is, at heir he cannot take under the conveyance otherwise than by descent; but if

an estate is given to A for life, there is nothing in the rules of law hi preclude the remainder in

fee being given by the same conveyance to the person who will be heir to A, provided some other

word than the technical one of " heir" is employed to designate him.

(4) [This is the rule or maxim known among lawyers, as " the rule in Shelley's Case." 1 Co.

88; see Harg. and Bull. Co. Litt. 376, B. N. 1; Fearae Cont. Rem. 23; Preston on Estates, 1

vol. 263 to 419.]

And see a Washb. Real Prop. 268 to 276.
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(2) [Thie rnle w&11 abrogated by the Inheritance Act. 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, ~ 3. Et'ea
before that st.atute, if the denJJe to the heir gave him a l'lifferen' estate to that which he w111dd
have taken by deRCent, be took under the de\·ise. Lord RAym. 728. The origin oft.lie old rule
of law seem:; to have been similar to that stated in the text as the ground of the mle in Shellc,-'1
Cwie, viz. : the advanta15e of the lord. An heir who is made deviaee may now diiid&im
the devise and take as he1r, though snch a ooune ill never adopted, sinoe no adnntage can arise
from it. l
(3) That Is, a.a lteir he cannot take under the conveyance otherwiBe than by deacont ; but if
an estate ie given to A for life, there ie nothing in the roles of law tu preclude the remainder ii
fee bt:iug gi\"en by the ll3me conveyance to the person who will be heir t.o A, pronded ~une other
word than the technical one of" heir'' ifl employed to de1.1ignato him.
(4) [Thill is the rule or maxim known among lawyCJ'!I, 88 "the rule in Shelley's Case." 1 Co.
88{· "ee Harg. and Butl. Co. Litt. 376, B. N. 1; Fearne Cont. Rem. 2tl; Preston on &itAt&I, 1
Vo. 263 to 419.)
And see~ W811hb. Real Prop. !iMJ8 to 276.
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claims by descent must be derived: though now, from our disuse of the feudal

sense of the word, together with the reflection on his forcible method of acqui-

sition, we are apt to annex the idea of victory to this name of conquest or con-

quisition : a title which, however just with regard to the crown, the conqueror

never pretended with regard to the realm of England ; nor in fact, ever had. (p)

The difference, in effect, between the acquisition of an estate by descent and

by purchase, consists principally in these two points: 1. That by purchase the

estate acquires a new inheritable quality, and is descendible to the owner's

blood iu general, and not the blood only of some particular ancestor. For,

•when a man takes an estate by purchase, he takes it not ut feudum paternum

or maternum, which would descend only to the heirs by the father's or the

mother's side: but he takes it ut feudum antiquum, as a feud of indefinite

antiquity, whereby it becomes inheritable to his heirs general, first of the pater-

nal, and then of the maternal line. 2, An estate taken by purchase will not

make the heir answerable for the acts of the ancestor, as an estate by descent

•will. For if the ancestor, by any deed, obligation, covenant, or the like, bindeth

himself and his heirs, and dieth; this deed, obligation, or covenant, shall be

binding upon the heir, so far forth only as he (or any other in trust for him) (q)

had any estate of inheritance vested in him by descent *from, (or any r #044 n

estate per auter vie coming to him by special occupancy, as heir to) (r) *• " '

that ancestor, sufficient to answer the charge; (*) whether he remains in pos-

session, or hath alienated it before action brought; (t) which sufficient estate is
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in the law called assets: from the French word, asset, enough, (u) Therefore,

if a man covenants, for himself and his heirs, to keep my house in repair, I can

then (and then only) compel his heir to perform this covenant, when he has

an estate sufficient for this purpose, or assets, by descent from the covenantor:

for though the covenant descends to the heir, whether he inherits any estate or

no, it lies dormant, and is not compulsory, until he has assets by descent, (v)

This is the legal signification of the word perquisitio, or purchase; and in

this sense it includes the five following methods of acquiring a title to estates:

1. Escheat. 2. Occupancy. 3. Prescription. 4. Forfeiture. 5. Alienation.

Of all these in their order.

I. Escheat, we may remember, (10) was one of the fruits and consequences of

feudal tenure. The word itself is originally French or Norman, (x) in which

language it signifies chance or accident; and with us it denotes an obstruction

of the course of descent, and a consequent determination of the tenure, by

some unforeseen contingency: in which case the land naturally results back, by

a kind of reversion, to the original grantor or lord of the fee. (y)

Escheat therefore being a title frequently vested in the lord by inheritance,

as being the fruit of a signiory to which he was entitled by descent (for which

reason the lands escheated shall attend the signiory, and be inheritable by such

only of his heirs as are capable of inheriting the other), (z) it may seem in such

cases to fall more properly under the former general head of acquiring title to

estates, viz.: by descent (being vested in him by act of law, and not by his own

act *or agreement), than under the present, by purchase. But it must r ^.^ -,

be remembered that, in order to complete this title by escheat, it is *-

necessary that the lord perform an act of his own, by entering on the lands and

tenements so escheated, or suing out a writ of escheat: (a) (5) on failure of

which, or by doing any act that amounts to an implied waiver of his right, as

by accepting homage or rent of a stranger who usurps the possession, his title

by escheat is barred, (b) It is therefore in some respect a title acquired by his

(p) See Book I. ch.S. (g) Stat. SO Car. II, n. 8, HO. (r) Ibid. }W. (•) 1 P. Wras. 777.

(<) Stat. 3 and 4 W. AM. c. 14. (w) Finch. Law, 119. (r) Finch. Rep. 88. (to) Sec lingo72.
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claims by descent must be derived: though now, from our disuse of the feudal
sense of the word, together with the reflection on his forcible method of acquisition, we are apt to annex the idea of vfrtory to this name of conquest or con·
quisition : a title which, however just with regard to the crown, the conqueror
never pretended with regard to the realm of England; nor in fact, ever bud. (p)
The difference, in effect, between the acquisition of an estate by descent and
by purchase, consists principally in these two points : 1. That by purchase the
estate acquires a new inheritable quality, and is descendible to the owner's
blood in general, and not the blood only of some particular ancestor. For,
when a man takes an estate by purchase, he takes it not ut feudmn paternmn
or maternum, which would descend only to the heirs by the father's or the
mother's side: but he takes it ut feud1.tm antiquum, as a feud of indefinite
antiquity, whereby it becomes inheritable to his heirs general, first of the paternal, and then of the maternal line. 2. An estate taken by purchase will not
make the heir answerable for the acts ·of the ancestor, as an estate by descent
-will. For if the ancestor, by any deed, obligation, covenant, or the like, bindeth
himself and his heirs, and dieth; this deed, obligation, or covenant, shall be
binding upon the heir, so far forth only as he (or any other in trust for him) (q)
had any estate of inheritance vested in him by descent *from, (or anr [ *244]
estate per auter vie coming to him by special occupancy, as heir to) (r)
that ancestor, sufficient to answer the charge; (s) whether he remains in possession, or hath alienated it before action brought; (t) which sufficient estate is
in the law called assets : from the French word, assez, enough. (u) Therefore,
if a man covenants, for himself and his heirs, to koop my house in repair, I can
then (and then only) compel his heir to perform this covenant, when he has
an esLlte sufficient for this purpose, or assets, by descent from the covenant.or:
for though the covenant descends to the heir, whether he inherits any estate or
no, it lies dormant, and is not compulsory, until he has assets by descent. (v)
This is the legal signification of the word perquisitio, or purchase; and in
this sense it includes tbe five following methods of acquiring a title to estates:
1. Escheat. 2. Occupancy. 3. Prescription. 4. Forfeiture. 5. Alienation.
Of all these in their order.
I. Escheat, we may remember, {w) was one of the fruits and consequences of
feudal tenure. The word itself lS originally French or Norman, (x) in which
language it signifies chance or accident; and with us it denotes an obstruction
of the course of descent, and a consequent determination of the tenure, by
some unforeseen contingency: in which case the land naturally results back, by
a kind of reversion, to the ori~inal grantor or lord of the fee. (y)
Escheat therefore being a title frequently vested in the lord by inheritance,
as being the fruit of a signiory to which he was entit.led by descent (for which
reason the lands escheated shall uttend the signiory, and be inheritable by such
only of his heirs as are capable of inheriting the other), (z) it may seem in such
cases to fo.11 more properly under the fonner general heud of acquiring title to
estates, viz.: by descent (being vested in him by act of law, and not by his own
act •or agreement), than under'the present, by purchase. But it must [ ,..245 ]
be remembered that, in order to complete this title by escheat, it is
necessary that the lord perform an act of his own, by enterin!J on the lands and
tenements so escheated, or suing out a writ of esch8at: (a) (5) on failure of
which, or by doing any act that amounts to an implied wan-er of his right, as
by accepting homage or rent of a stronger who usurps the possession, his title
by escheat is barred. (b) It is therefore in some respect a. title acquired by his

(.'•' Eschet. or echet, formed from the verb eschoir or echoir, to happen. (y) 1 Fetid. 80. Co. I .in. 13.

(x) Co. Lilt. 13. («| Bro. Abr. lit. eicheat. 26. (6) Bro. Air. tit. acceptance. 28. Co. I.in 2BS.

(5) [The -writ of escheat is abolished, statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IT, c. 27, s. 36, and the lord's

Cp) See Book I, ch. 3.
(ql Stat. 29 Car. II, c. S, ! JO.
(r) Ibid. ! 12.
(1) l P. Wms. 777.
(I) Stat. 3 &nd 4 \V ••t M. e. H.
(u) J:o' inch. Law, 119.
(t>) Finch. Rep. 86.
(to) See pngc 72.
(zl Eaclut. or eclld, fom1cd from the verb e1c1toir 01· eclwir, to happen.
(ff) l Fetid. 86. Co. l.itt. 13.
(.s) Co. Litt. 13.
(a) Bro. Abr. fft. eacAeat. '.la.
(I>) Bro. Abr. IU. acceptance. 26. Co. Litt. 268.

remedy is by entry or ejectment, or, in the case of the crown, by a commission of escheat. l«fc

East, 96.]

491

(5) [The writ of eschcat is abolished, statute 3 aud 4 Wm. IV, c. 'Z'I, s. 36, and the lord.'11
remc,'<ly is l>y l!ntry or ejectuient, or, in the ca~e of the crown, by a commission of cschcat. l~
E8>:1t, 96.]
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own act, as well as by act of law. Indeed, this may also be said of descents

themselves, in which an entry or other seisin is required, in order to make a

complete title: and therefore this distribution of titles by our legal writers, into

those by descent and by purchase, seems in this respect rather inaccurate, and

not marked with sufficient precision : for, as escheats must follow the nature of

the signiory to which they belong, they may vest by either purchase or descent,

according as the signiory is vested. And, though Sir Edward Coke considers

the lord by escheat as in some respects the assignee of the last tenant, (c) and

therefore taking by purchase; yet, on the other hand, the lord is more fre-

quently considered as being ultimus hceres, and therefore taking by descent in

a kind of caducary succession.

The law of escheats is founded upon this single principle, that the blood of

the person last seised in fee-simple is, by some means or other, utterly extinct

and gone; and since none can inherit his estate but such as are of his blood and

consanguinity, it follows, as a regular consequence, that when such blood ia

extinct, the inheritance itself must fail: the land must become what the feudal

writers denominate feudum apertum; and must result back again to the lord of

the fee, by whom, or by those whose estate he hath, it was given.

Escheats are frequently divided into those proptcr defeclmn sanguinis, and

thosepropter delictum tenentis: the one sort, if the tenant dies without heirs;

the other, if his blood be attainted, (d) But both these species may well be

F *2461 *comPrenended under the first denomination only; for he that is at-
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*• "" •" tainted suffers an extinction of his blood, as well as lie that dies without

relations. The inheritable quality is expunged in one instance, and expires in

the other; or, as the doctrine of escheats is very fully expressed in Fieta, (e)

" dominus capitnlis feodi loco hceredis habetur, quoties per defeclum vel delictum

extinguitur sanguis tenentis."

Escheats, therefore, arising merely upon the deficiency of the blood, whereby

the descent is impeded, their doctrine will be better illustrated by considering

the several cases wherein hereditary blood may be deficient, than by any othei

method whatsoever.

1, 2, 3. The first three cases, wherein inheritable blood is wanting, may be

collected from the rules of descent laid down and explained in the preceding

chapter, and therefore will need very little illustration or comment. First, when

the tenant dies without any relations on the part of any of his ancestors:

secondly, when he dies witnout any relations on the part of those ancestors

from whom his estate descended: thirdly, when he dies without any relations

of the whole blood. In two of these cases the blood of the first purchaser is

certainly, in the other it is probably, at an end; and therefore, in all of them

the law directs, that the land shall escheat to the lord of the fee ; for the lord

would be manifestly prejudiced, if, contrary to the inherent condition tacitly

annexed to all feuds, any person should be suffered to succeed to the lands, who

is not of the blood of the first feudatory, to whom for his personal merit the

estate is supposed to have been granted. (6)

(e) 1 IH.-.1, 41S. (dl Co. Utt. 13, 93. (e) I. 6, e. 1.

(6) [The important ease of Burgess v. 'Wheate, 1 Eden, 177-261, was to the following pur-

port. A, being seized in fee expartepaterna, conveyed to the trustees, intrust for herself, her

own act, as well as by act of law. Indeed, this may also be said of descents
thl·mselves, in which an entry or other seisin is required, in order to make a
complete title: and therefore this distribution of titles by our legal writers, into
those by descent and by purchase, seems in this respect rather inaccurate, and
not marked with sufficient precision: for, as escheats must follow the nature of
the signiory to which they belong, they may vest by either purchase or deacent,
according as the signiory is vested. And, though Sir Edward Coke considers
the lord by escbeat as in some respects the assignee of the last tenant, (c) and
therefore taking by purchase ; yet., on the other hand, the lord is more frequently considered as being ultimu" hmres, and therefore taking by descent in
a kind of caducary succession.
'l'he law of escheats is founded upon this single principle, that the blood of
the person last seised in fee-simple is, by some means or other, utterlv extinc~
and gone; and since nor.e can inherit his estate but such as are of his blood and
consanguinity, it follows, as a regular consequence, that when such blo00 i~
extinct, the inheritance itself must fail: the land must become what the feudal
writers denominate .feudmn apertum; and must result back again to the lonl of
the fee, by whom, or by those whose est.at~ l1e hath, it was gi\"en.
Escheats are frequently divided into those p_ropter defeclum sanguim'.s~ and
those propter tklictum tenentis: the one sort, if the tenant dies without heirs;
the other, if his blood be attainted. (</) But both these species may well be
[ • 246 ] •comprehended under the first denomination onlv ; for he tbat is attainted suffers an extinction of his blood, as well as 11e that dies without
relations. The inheritable guality is expun~ed in one instance, and expires in
the other; or, as the doctnne of escheats is very fully expressed in Fleta, (e)
" dominus r:apitalis .feodi loco hreredis ltabetur, quoties per defectum vel deliclmn
extinguitur sanguis tenentis."
Escheats, therefore, a.rising merely upon the deficiency of the blood, wherebv
the descent is impeded, their doctrine will be better illustrated by considl·ring
the several cases wherein hereditary blood may be deficient, than by any othex
method whatsoever.
1, 2, 3. The first three cases, wherein inheritable blood is wanting, may be
collected from the rules of descent laid down and explained in the p:re<'edinll!
chapter, and therefore will need very little illustration or comment. First, when
the t(lnant dies without any relations on the part of any of his ancestors:
secondly, when he dies without any relations on the part of those anC('stors
from whom his estate descended: thirdly, when he dies without any relations
of the whole blood. In two of these cases the blood of the first purchaser is
certainly. in the other it is probably, at an end; and therefore, in all of them
the law directs, that the land shall eschcat to the lord of the fee; for the lord
would be manifestly prejudiced, if, contrary to the inherent condition tacitly
annexed to all feuds, any person should be suffered to succeed to the lands, who
is not of the blood of the first feudatory, to whom for his personal merit the
estate is supposed to have been granted. (G)

heirs and assigns, to the intent that she might dispose thereof as she should by her will or

(C)

other writing appoint. A died without making any appointment, and without heirs er parte

1 Inst. tl5.

(d) Co. J.IU. Ia, 92.

(e) l. 6,

c. 1.

paterna. It was held by Lord Keeper Henlev, (afterwards Northington), as well as hr Sir

Thomas Clarke, M. R., and by Lord Mansfield, C. J. (whose assistance the lord keeper bad

requested), that the heir ex parte matcrna was clearly not entitled. But Lord Mansfield

thought the crown was entitled by escheat; or, if that were not so under the circumstance?,

then, that, as between the maternal heir and the trustee, the former was entitled. This opin-

ion, however, was contrary to that of the lord keeper and of the master of the rolls; and it

was decided, that there being a terre tenant, Barclay t'. Russel, 3 Yes. 430 ; the crown, claim-

ing by escheat, had not a title by stipa-na to compel a conveyance from the trustee, the tru>t

being absolutely determined. Upon the right of the trustee it was not necessary for the

determination of the question before the court, to pronounce any positive judgment It
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(6) [The important cMC of Burgess "· Wbeate, 1 Eden, 177-261, was to the following pm·
port. A, being seized in fee ex part-0 paterna, <'onveyed to the trustees, in truKt for hel'!l('lf'. her
heil'I! and ft&ligm1, to the intent that she might dhipose thereof M she should by her ..Oil or
other writing appoint. .A dioo without making any appointment, and without heirs er partc
patcrt1a. It was held by Lord Kel'per Henll'y, (afterwards Northington). as v.-ell a~ hf' Sir
~hom11s Clarke, ll. R., and by Lord Mansfield, C. J. (who1<e aiisi!lta1iee tho Joni keeper bad
rcque~ted), that the heir ex/arte materna wl\ll clearly not entitled. But Lord Yansfi~IJ
thought the crown was entitle by el'Cheat ; or, if thnt were not RO under the drenm~tal1rt';:,
then, that, as between the mat~rnnl heir and the tru~tee, the former WM entitled. Thi~ opin·
ion, howe\·er, WM eontrary t-0 that of the lord keeper and of the master of t.he rull~; ~ it
w~" dedded. that there being a terre te11a11t, Barcia[ t'. RuA~el, 3 Ve~. 430; the crown, daimin~ by el!Cheat, hod not a title by s11pama to eompe a com·eyanee from the tm~tee, the trn.-t
being o.bRolutcly determined. Upon the right of the trustee it was not neces;;iuy fnr tile
determination of the question before the court, to pronounce auy pot!iti'l'c judgwC'ut. U
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4. A monster, which hath not the shape of mankind, but in part evidently

bears the resemblance of the brute creation, hath no inheritable blood, and can

not be heir to any land, albeit it be brought forth in marriage; but, although

it hath deformity in any part of its body, yet if it *hath human shape, it r #„. „ -•

may be heir, (f) This is a very ancient rule in the law of England; (g) *- •>

and its reason is'too obvious and too shocking to bear a minute discussion. The

Roman law agrees with our own in excluding such births from successions: (A)

vet accounts them, however, children in some respects, where the parents, or at

least the father, could reap any advantage thereby: (i) (as the jus trium liber-

orum, and the like) esteeming them the misfortune, rather than the fault, of

that parent. But our law will not admit a birth of this kind to be such an issue

as shall entitle the husband to be tenant by the curtesy; (k) because it is not

capable of inheriting. And therefore, if there appears no other heir than such

a prodigious birth, the land shall escheat to the lord.

5. Bastards are incapable of being heirs. Bastards, by our law, are such

children as are not born either in lawful wedlock, or within a competent time

after its determination. (I) Such are held to be nulliut filii, the sons of nobody;

for the maxim of law is, qui ex damnato coitu nascuntur, inter liberos non com-

putantur. (m) Being thus the sons of nobody, they have no blood in them, at

least no inheritable blood: consequently, none of the blood of the first pur-

chaser: and therefore, if there be no other claimant than such illegitimate

children, the land shall escheat to the lord. (») The civil law differs from ours
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in this point, and allows a bastard to succeed to an inheritance, if after its birth

the mother was married to the father: (0) and also if the father had no lawful

wife or child, then, even if the concubine was never married to the father, yet

she and her bastard son were admitted each to one-twelfth of the inheritance; (p)

and a bastard was likewise ""capable of succeeding to the whole of his i- *j>4g i

mother's estate, although she was never married; the mother being suf- L -I

ciently certain, though the father is not. (g) But our law, in favour of marriage,

is much less indulgent to bastards.

There is indeed, one instance in which our law has shown them some little

regard ; and that is usually termed the case of bastard eignt, and mulier puisne.

This happens when a man has a bastard son, and afterwards marries the mother,

and by her has a legitimate son, who, in the language of the law, is called a mulier,

or as Ulauvil(r) expresses it in his Latin,j6/tw* mulieratus; the woman before mar-

riage being concubina, and afterwards mulier. Now here the eldest son is bas-

m Co. LIW. 7, s.

(g) Qni contra formam htanani generis converso more procreantur, ut ti mulier monstroswn rel prodigi.

4. A monster, which hath not the shape of mankind, but in part evidently
bears the resemblance of the brute creation, hath no inheritable blood, and can
not be heir to any land, albeit it be brought forth in marriage; but, although
it hath deformity in anv part of its body, yet if it *hath human shape, it [ • 247 ]
may be heir.(/) This fa a ...-ery ancient rule in the law of England; (g)
and its reason is· too obvious and too shocking to bear a minute discusaion. The
Roman law agrees with our own in excluding such births from successions: (h)
yet accounts them, however, children in some respects, where the parents, or at
least the father, could reap any adnmtage thereby: (i) (as thejits trium liberorum, and the like) esteeming them the misfortune, rather than the fault, of
that parent. But our law will not admit a birth of this kind to be such an issue
as shall entitle the husband to be tenant by the curtesy; (k) because it is not
capable of inheriting. And therefore, if there appears no other heir than such
a prodigious birth, the land shall escheat to the lord.
5. Bastards are incapable of being heirs. Bastards, by our law, are such
children as are not born either in lawful wedlock, or withm a competent time
after its determination. (l) Such are held to be nulliut flUi, the sons of nobody ;
for the maxim of law is, qui ex damnato co-itu nascunt?tr, inter liberos non computantur. (m) Being thus the sons of nobody, they have no blood in them, at
lea.st no inheritible blood: consequently, none of the blood of the first pul'chaser: and therefore, if there he no other claimant than such illegitimate
children, the land shall escheat to the lord. ( n) The civil law differs from ours
in this point, and allows a bastard to succeed to an inheritance, if after its birth
the mother was married to the father: (o) nnd also if the father had no lawful
wife or child, then, even if the concubine was never married to the father, yet
she and her bastard son were admitted each to one-twelfth of the inheritance; (p)
and a bastard was likewise *capable of succeeding to the whole of his [ • 248 ]
mother's estate, although she was never married ; the mother being sufciently certain, though the fother is not. (q) But our law, in favour of marriage,
is much less indulgent to bastards.
There is indeed, one instance in which our law has shown them some little
regard ; and that is usually termed the case of bastard eigna, and mulier pu·isne.
Thh1 happens when a man has a bastard son, and afterwards marries the mother,
and by her has a legitimate son, who, in the language of the law, is called a mul-ie·r,
or as Glanvil(r) expresses it in his I..iatin,flliusmulieratus; the woman before mar·
riage being concubina, and afterwards mulier. Now here the eldest son is bas·

osvm enixa sit. inter liberos non comptttcntur. Partus tamen, rt/i natura aHguantultim addiderit vel tliminu<

frit, ut ti sex vel taittum quator diffitoa habuerit, bene ttfbet inter liberos connumerttri; et, si membra tint

itmlilia aut tortvota, non lumen eat partut monttromt. Bract. I. 1, a. 6, and 1. 5, tr. 5, c. 30.

(h) Ff. 1,5, U. (i) FT. 58. IB, 135. Paul. 4, lent. » } 83. (k) Co. UU. sa

(1) Sec Book I, ch. 16. (m) Co. L1M. 8. (n) Finch, Law. 117. (o) Km. 89, c. 8.

(p) Ibid. c. 12. (q) Cod. e, 57, 5. (r) 1. 7, c. 1.

(fJ Co. Litt. 7. 8.
( g J Qui contra /OMlllJlll humanl genma conttrao more procrMntur, vt ri mulkr motUtf'OIU"' "el prodig(.
oavm enU:a Bit. int~ llbwo• non compute11tur. l'artu• tame11, cul 1ialura aliquantulum addlderll "el cHr11inu.
mt, td ri •ex toel tantum quatot· digitos lmbtUril, b~ d~bet intft" libero• connumerori; et, ri ~ ''"'
iHt1tUlta attt tortuoaa, Mn tamei• eat partuM mon11troau1. Bract. l. I, c. 6, anti l. :I, tr. II, c. ao.
(II) Ff. I, II, H.
(i) Ff. 6-i. Jfl, JM. l'uul. o&, 1ent. II~ 63.
(k) Co. LlU. ~'9.
(l) See Book I, ch. 16.
(m) Co. Lltc. II.
(n) 1'·inch, Law. 117.
(o) Nov. 89, o. 8.
(pJ Ibid. c. 12.
(q) Cod. II, :17, II.
(r) l. 1, c. l.

should seem, however, that he would have received no assistance from equity in support of big

claims. "Williams r. Lord Lonsdale, 3 V cs. 757. And, clearly, a trustee not having the legal

estate in lands purchased with the trust moneys, cannot hold against the crown claiming by

escheat. "Walker v. Denne, 2 Ves. Jun. 170.

In the case last cited, the court is reported to have said, that " copyhold cannot escheat to

the crown;" but this dictum, in all probability, however applicable to the instance then under

consideration, was not intended to be understood aa a general proposition. Copyholds

bolden of a manor, whereof a subject is lord, will escheat to him certainly, and not to the

crown; but the 12th section of the statute of 39 and 40 Geo. Ill, e. 88, after reciting that

"divers lands, tenements and hereditaments, as well freehold as copyhold, have escheated

and may escheat" to the crown, enacts that, "it shall be lawful to direct by war-

rant under the sign manual the execution of any trusts to which the lands so escheated

were liable at the time of the escheat, or to which they would have been liable in the hands

of a subject, and to make such grants of the lands so escheated as to the sovereign shall seem

meet."]

Now by statute 13 and 14 Vic. c. 60, when any person sewed of lands in trust shall die with-

out an heir, the court of chancery may make an order vesting the land in a trustee of its own

should eeem, however, that be would have received no assistance from equity in support of his
claims. Williams v. Lord Lom1dale, 3 Voll. 757. .A.nd, clearly, u. trustee not having the legal
etltate in lands purcha..~ with the tmst moneys, cannot bold against the crown claiming hy
elieheat. Walker ti. Denne, 2 Yes. Jun. 170.
In the ca!ltl lBllt cited, the court is reported to have ll8id, that "copyhold cannot escbeat to
the crown ;" but this diotttm, in all probability. however applicable to the instance then under
con11idcmtion, w68 not intended to be undel'lltood as a general propollition. Copyholdil
holden of a m1mor, whereof a subject is lord, will escbeat to him certainly, and not to the
crown; but the 12th section of the statute of 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 88, at\er reciting that
"divers lands, tenements and bereditamente, as well freehold 88 copyhold, have eschcated
and may eschcat" to the crown, enacttl that, " it eball be lawful to direct by warrant under the sign manual the execution of any trusts to which the lands so eschcated
were liable at the time of the esobll8t, or to which they would hove been liable in the hands
of a llllbject, and to make such grant.s of the lands eo escheated Bil to the sovereign shall seem
meet.'']
Now by 11tatute l!I and 14 Vic. c. 60, when any pel'l!On ~ised of land~ in tnu1t shall~~() without a.n heir, the court of uhancery may make au order vestrng the land m a trustee of its owu
appointment, and the order shall hal'c tho effect of a con\"cyance.
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tard, or bastard eigne; and the younger is legitimate, or mutter puisne. If,

then, the father dies, and the bastard eigne enters upon his land, and enjoys it

to his death, and dies seised thereof, (7) whereby the inheritance descends to his

issue ; in this case the muher puisne, and all other heirs (though minors, feme-

coverts, or under any incapacity whatsoever), are totally barred of their rights. (#)

And this, 1. As a punishment on the mulier for his negligence in not entering

during the baMara's life, and evicting him. 2. Because the law will not suffer

a man to be bastardized after his death who entered as heir and died seised, and

so passed for legitimate in his lifetime. (8) 3. Because the canon law (following the

civil) did allow such bastard eigne to be legitimate on the subsequent marriage

of his mother; and therefore the laws of England (though they would not admit

either the civil or canon law to rule the inheritances of this kingdom, yet) paid

such a regard to a person thus peculiarly circumstanced, that, after the land had

descended to his issue, they would not unravel the matter again, and suffer his

estate to be shaken. But this indulgence was shown to no other kind of bas-

tard ; for, if the mother was never married to the father, such bastard could have

no colourable title at all. (t) (9)

F *249 1 *^s Dastards cannot be heirs themselves, so neither can they have any

I- -I heirs but those of their own bodies. For, as all collateral kindred con-

sists in being derived from the same common ancestor, and as a bastard has no

legal ancestors, he can have no collateral kindred; and, consequently, can have

no legal heirs, but such as claim by a lineal descent from himself. And there-
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fore if a bastard purchases land and dies seised thereof without issue, and intes-

tate, the land shall escheat to the lord of the fee. (u)

6. Aliens, (v) also, are incapable of taking by descent, or inheriting: (to) for

they are not allowed to have any inheritable Wood in them ; rather indeed upon

a principal of national or civil policy, than upon reasons strictly feudal. Though,

if lands had been suffered to fall into their hands who owe no allegiance to the

crown of England, the design of introducing our feuds, the defence of the king-

dom, would have been defeated. Wherefore, if a man leaves no other relations

but aliens, his land shall escheat to the lord.

As aliens cannot inherit, so far they are on a level with bastards; but as they

are also disabled to hold by purchase, (x) (10) they are under still greater dis-

(i) Lift. * 389. Co. UK. 244. (t) IML t 400. (u) Bract. 1. 2, o. 7. Co. 1 .ill. 244. frj See Book I, ch. 10.

(w) Co. Lilt. 8. (x) IMd. 2.

(7) [There must not only be a dying seized, but a descent to his issue. Co. Litt. 244, a. And

if the bastard did h seized, his wife enseint with a son, the inulier enter, the son is born, and ths

issue of the bastard is barred. Id. Broke, tit. Descent, 41; Plow. 57, a. 272, a.]

(8) [The second reason is not true generally, for, in all other cases but this, a man may be

bastardized alter his death; not indeed in the spiritual courts, which proceed only salutem aninuc,

but in the temporal, where the rights of third persons depend npon his legitimacy. See Pride t.

Earls of Bath and Montague, 1 Salk. 120.

The rule itself prevails equally as to daughters; " if a man hath issue two daughters (by the same

woman) the eldest being a bastard, and they enter and occupy peaceably as heirs; now" the law in

favor of legitimation shall not adjudge the whole possession in the mulier, who then had the only

right, but in both, so as if the bastard hath issue and dietb, her issue shall inherit." Co. Litt. 244.]

(9) Mr. Kcrr says it would seem that this privilege of the bastard eigne no longer exists, in

consequence of statute 3 and 4 "Win. IT. c. 27, having enacted that no descent cast shall defeat

any right of entry.

(10) [If the purchase be made with the king's license, it seems that it may hold. See 14 Hen.

IT, 20; Harg. Co. Litt. 2 b. n. 2.

The law as to purchases by aliens without license is shortly this, that the purchase vests the

land in the alien, but subject to be devested out of him for the benefit of the crown by the finding

of an inquisition in the exchequer. Letters of dcuizatinn, so far as t hey relate to the alien's land,

are a mere remission of this forfeiture.]

Whether in the case of escheat the title to the land vests in the state without inquest of office,

is a question upon which the A merican cases are not harmonious. The following among othen

hold that it is: Fairfax 0. 11 HURT'S Lessee, 7 Crunch. 603; Jackson i1. Adams, 7 \\Vu.l, 367;

Wilbur v. Tobey, 16 Pick. 177; Commonwealth v. Hite, 6 Leigh, 588; Taylor u. Benham, 5 How.

233; People r. Fulsom, 5 Cal. 373; Puckett v. State, 1 Sneed. 355; Bradstreet v. Supervisors,

rt <•.. 13 Wend. 546; Barbour c. Kelson, 1 Litt. 60. Other cases hold that it is not. Rnbeck t.

Gardner, 7 Watts, 455; White v. White, 2 Met Ky. 185; Den v. O'Hanlon, 20 N. J. 31: Colgan

r. McKeon, 84 N. J. 567; Farrar v. Dean, 24 Mis. 16; Crane v. Reader, 21 Mich. 24; Uolliuua

v. Peebles, 1 Texas, 673.
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abilities. And, as they can neither hold by purchase, nor by inheritance, it is

almost superfluous to say that they can have no heirs, since they can have noth-

ing for an heir to inherit; but so it is expressly holden, (y) because they have

not in them any inheritable blood.

And farther, if an alien be made a denizen by the king's letters patent, and

then purchases lands (which the law allows such a one to do), his son, born be-

fore his denization, shall not (by the common law) inherit those lands; but a

son born afterwards may, even though his elder brother be living; for the

father before denization, had no inheritable blood to communicate to his eldest

eon; but by denization it acquires *an hereditary quality, which will be r $250 i

transmitted to his subsequent posterity. Yet if he nad been naturalized "• ^

by act of parliament, such eldest son might then have inherited; for that can-

cels all defects, and is allowed to have a retrospective energy, which simple

denization has not (z) (11)

Sir Edward Coke (a) also holds, that if an alien cometh into England, and

there hath issue two sons, who are thereby natural-born subjects; and one of

them purchases laud, and dies; yet neither of these brethren can be heir to the

other. For the commune vinculum, or common stock of their consanguinity, is

the father; and as he had no inheritable blood in him, he could communicate

none to his sons; and, when the sons can by no possibility be heirs to the

father, the one of them shall not be heir to the other. And this opinion of hia

seems founded upon solid principles of the ancient law; not only from the rule
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before cited, (b) that cestuy, que doit inheriter alpere, doit inheriter alfils: but

also because we have seen that the only feudal foundation, upon which newly

purchased land can possibly descend to a brother, is the supposition and fiction

of law that it descended from some one of his ancestors; but in this case, as the

intermediate ancestor was an alien, from whom it could by no possibility de-

scend, this should destroy the supposition, and impede the descent, and the

laud should be inherited utfeudum stride novum; that is, by none but the lineal

descendants of the purchasing brother; and on failure of them should escheat

to the lord of the fee, But this opinion hath since been overruled (c) and it is

now held for law, that the sons of an alien born here may inherit to each other;

the descent from one brother to another being an immediate descent, (d) And

reasonably enough upon the whole; for, as (in common purchases) the whole

of the supposed descent from indefinite ancestors is but fictitious, the law may

as well suppose the requisite ancestor as suppose the requisite descent. (12)

*It is also enacted, by the statute 11 and 12 Win. III. c. 6, that all r ^^ -i

persons, being natural-born subjects of the king, may inherit and make •• '"' '

their titles by descent from any of their ancestors lineal or collateral; although

their father or mother, or other ancestor, by, from, through, or under whom

they derive their pedigrees, were born out of the king's allegiance. But incon-

veniences were afterwards apprehended, in case persons should thereby gain a

future capacity to inherit, who did not exist at the death of the person last

seised. As, if Francis, the elder brother of John Stiles, be an alien, and Oliver,

the younger, be a natural-born subject, upon John's death without issue his

lands will descend to Oliver, the younger brother: now, if afterwards Francis

has a child born in England, it was feared that, under the statute of King Wil-

liam, this new born child might defeat the estate of his uncle Oliver. Where-

(y) Co. Lltt. 2. 1 Lev. 49. (*) Co. LiU> 129. (a) I Inst.8. (b) See page* 223 and 239.

(c) I Vcntr. 413. 1 Lev. S9. 1 Sid. 193. (d) See pagu 226.

(11) A very simple mode of naturalization is now provided by stat. 7 and 8 Tic. c. 6(i, by

which the person naturalized acquires the rights and privileges of a British subject, except the

capacity of being a member or the privy council, or a member of the houses of parliament,

and except also such rights and capacities (if any) as shall be specially excepted in the certificate

abilities. And, as they can neither hold by purchase, nor by inheritance, it is
almost superfluous to sa)· that they can have no heirs, since they can have nothing for an heir to inherit; but so it is expressly holden, (y) because they have
not in them any inheritable blood.
Aud farther, if an alien be made a denizen by the king's letters patent, and
then purchases lands (which the law allows such a one to do), his son, born before his denization, shall not (by the common law) inherit those lands; but a
son born afterwards may, even though his elder brother be living; for the
father before denization, had no inheritable blood to communicate to his eldest
son; but by denization it acquire! •an hereditary quality, which will be [ • 250 ]
transmitted to his subsequent posterity. Yet if he bad been naturalized
by act of' parliament, such eldest son might then have inherited; for that cancels all defects, and is allowed to have a retrospective energy, which simple
denization has not. (z) (11)
Sir Edward Coke (a) also holds, that if an alien cometh into England, and
there ha.th issue two sons, who arc thereby natural-born subjects; and one of
them purchases land, and dies; yet neither of these brethren can be heir to the
other. For the commune vinculmn, or common stock of their consanguinity, is
the father; and as he had no inheritable blood in him, he could commumcate
none to his sons; and, when the sons can by no possibility be heirs to the
father, the one of them shall not be heir to the other. And this opinion of his
seems founded upon solid p1·inciplcs of the ancient law; not only from the rule
before cited, (b) that cestuy, que do it inlteriter al pere, doit inherit er al fils: but
also because we have seen that the only feudal foundation, upon which newly
purchased land can possibly descend to a brother, is the supposition and fiction
of law that it descended from some one of his ancestors; but in this case, as the
intermediate ancestor was an alien, from whom it could by no possibility descend, this should destroy the supposition, and impede the descent, and the
lund &hould be inherited ut .feudum stricte novuni; that is, by none but the lineal
descendants of the purchasing brother; and on failure of them should escheat
LO the lord of the fee, But this opinion hath since been 0Tern1led (c) and it is
now held for law, that the sons of an alien born here may inherit to each other;
the descent from one brother to another beinR an immediate descent. (d) And
reasonably enough upon the whole; for, as lin common purchases) tbe whole
of the supposed descent from indefinite ancestors is but fictitious, the law may
as well suppose the requisite ancestor as suppose the requisite descent. (12)
*It is also enu.cte.d, by the statute 11 and 12 Wm. III. c. 6, that all [ • 251 ]
persons, being natural-born subjects of the king, may inherit and make
their titles by descent from any of their ancestors lineal or collateral; although
their father or mother, or other ancestor, by, from, through, or under whom
they derive their pedigrees, were born out of the king's allegiance. But inconveniences were afterwards apprehended, in case persons should thereby gain a
future capacity to inherit, who did not exist at the death of the person last
seised. As, iC-Francis, the elder brother of John Stiles, be an alien, and Oliver,
the younger, be a natural-born subject., upon John's death without issue his
lands will descend to Oli·rnr, the younger brother: now~ if afterwards Francie
has a child born in England, it was feared that, under the statute of Kit:~ Willi.um, this new born child might defeat the estate of his uncle Oliver. where(•)Co. Utt. t . I Lev. 68.
(1:) Co. Litt. 129.
(a) I In1U.
{c) 1 Ventr. '13. 1 J.e\'. 69. 1 Sid. 193.
(d) See pagu 2'26.

(b) See paps 2Z3 and 2311.

issued to him by the secretary of state. And since this statute letters of aenization are seldom

if ever obtained.

' (12) And now by stat. 3 and 4 Vm. IV, c. 106, the person lost entitled to the land is considered

the purchaser unless the contrary is proved.
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(11) A very simple mode of na.tura.lization is now provided by stat. 7 and F! Vic. c. 66, by
which the perl!on naturaliJed o.cquired the right.~ a.nd privileges of a. British Bubjoot, except the
capiwity of being a member of the privy council, or a member of the hou8es of parliament,
and except alw such right!! and capacities (ife.uy) as shall be specially excepted in tho l'ortifi<~ato
iil>lued to him by the secretary of state. And since this statute letters or donization aro i;eldum
if' ever obtained.
' (12) Aud now by stat. 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, the person last entitled to the land is con,.idered
the purchaser unJedS the contrary is i>ro'\"ed.
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fore it is provided, by the statute 25 Geo. II, c. 39, that no right of inheritance

shall accrue by virtue of the former statute to any persons whatsoever, unless

they are in being and capable to take as heirs at the death of the person last

seised:—with an exception, however, to the case, where lauds shall descend to

the daughter of an alien ; which descent shall be divested in favour of an after-

born brother, or the inheritance shall be divided with an after-born sister or

sisters, according to the usual rule (e) of descents by the common law.

7. By attainder, also, for treason or other felony, the blood of the person

attainted is so corrupted as to be rendered no longer inheritable. (13)

Great care must be taken to distinguish between forfeiture of lands, to the

king, and this species of escheat to the lord; which, by reason of their simili-

tude in some circumstances, and because the crown is very frequently the

immediate lord of the fee, and therefore entitled to both, have been often con-

founded together. Forfeiture of lands, and of whatever else the offender

possessed, was the doctrine of the old Saxon law, (/) as a part of punishment

r *n*)2 1 ^or *ne °ffence > *and does not at all relate to the feudal system, nor is

" -"-I the consequence of any signiory or lordship paramount :(#) but, being

a prerogative vested in the crown, was neither superseded nor diminished by the

introduction of the Norman tenures; a fruit and consequence of which, escheat

must undoubtedly be reckoned. Escheat, therefore, operates in subordination to

this more ancient and superior law of forfeiture.

The doctrine of escheat upon attainder, taken singly, is this: that the blood
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of the tenant, by the commission of any felony (under which denomination all

treasons were formerly comprised), (h) is corrupted and stained, and the original

donation of the feud is thereby determined, it being always granted to the vas-

sal on the implied condition of dum bene tie gesserit. Upon the thorough dem-

onstration of which guilt, by legal attainder, the feudal covenant and mutual

bond of fealty are held to be broken, the estate instantly falls back from the of-

fender to the lord of the fee, and the inheritable quality of his blood is extin-

guished and blotted out forever. In this situation the law of feudal escheat was

Drought into England at the conquest; and in general superadded to the an-

cient law of forfeiture. In consequence of which corruption and extinction of

hereditary blood, the land of all felons would immediately revest in the lord,

but that the superior law of forfeiture intervenes, and intercepts it in its pas-

sage : in case of treason forever; in case of other felony, for only a year and a

day; after which time it goes to the lord in a regular course of escheat, (0 as

it would have done to the heir of the felon in case the feudal tenures had

never been introduced. And that this is the true operation and genuine his-

tory of escheats will most evidently appear from this incident to gavelkind lands

(which seems to be the old Saxon tenure), that they are in no case subject to

escheat for felony, though they are liable to forfeiture for treason. (/)

F *253 1 *^s a consecluence °f this doctrine of escheat, all lands of inheritance

*• J immediately revesting in the lord, the wife of the felon was liable to

lose her dower, till the statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, enacted, that albeit any person

be attainted of misprision of treason, murder, or felony, yet his wife shall enjoy

her dower. But she has not this indulgence where the ancient law of forfeiture

operates, for it is expressly provided by the statute 5, and 6 Edw. VI, all, that

the wife of one attaint of high treason shall not be endowed at all. (14)

Hitherto we have only spoken of estates vested in the offender at the time of

his offence or attainder. And here the law of forfeiture stops; but the law of

(e) See pages 80S and 114. (/) L. L. JElfrtd, c. 4. /,. L. Camt. c. M. (f) i ln>t. 64. Salt:. Si

(A/ 3 Inst. 18. Slat. 25 Edw. Ill, c. 2, j 12. «) 1 lust. 38. (}} Soraner. S3. Wright. Ten. IIS.

(13) In the United States thore is no forfeiture of estate except for treason, and an attain-

der of treason cannot work corruption of blood except during the life of the person attainted.

Const of United States, art. 3, $ 3. And see 3 Greenl. Cruise Dig. 398, note. For tbe present

law in England see note 15, p 8&4.

fore it is provided, by the statute 25 Geo. II, c. 39, that no right of inheritance
shall accrue bJ virtue of the former statute to any persons whatsoever, unless
they are in bcmg and capable to take as heirs at the death of the person last
seised :-with an exception, however, to the case, where lands shall descend to ·
the daughter of an alien; which descent shall be dh·ested in favour of au afterborn brother, or the inheritance shull be divided with an after-born sister 01
sisters, according to the usual rule (e) of descents by the common la.w.
7. By attainder, also, for treuson or other felonr, the blood of the peri!on
attainted is so corrupted as to be rendered no longer mheritable. (13)
Great care must be taken to distinguish between forfeiture ot lands, to the
king, and this species of escheat to the lord; which, by reason of their similitude in !!Orne circumstances, and because the crown is very frequentlv the
immedinte lord of the fee, and therefore entitled to both, have been often" confounded together. Forfeiture of lands, and of whatever else the offt:nder
possessed, was. the doctrine of the old Saxon law, (/) as a part of punishment
[ • 2 0~ 21 for the offence; •and does not at all relate to the feudal system, nor ia
the consequence of any signiory or lordship paramount: (g) but, being
a prerogative vested in the crown, was neither superseded nor dimmishcd by the
introduction of the Norman tenures; a fruit and consequence of which, escheat
must undoubtedly be reckoned. Escheat, therefore, operates in subordination to
this more ancient and superior law of forfcit.ure.
The doctrine of escheat upon attainder, taken singly, is this: that the blood
of the tenant, by the commission of any felony (under which denomination all
treasons were formerly comprised), (It) is corrupted and stained, and the original
donation of the feud 1s thereby determined, it being always granted to the rnssal on the implied condition of dum bene M gesserU. Ufon the thorough demonstration of which guilt, by legal attainder, the f'euda co\'enant and mutual
bond of fealty are held to be broken, the estate instantly falls back from the offender to the lord of the fee, and the inheritable quality of his blood is extinguished and blotted out forever. In this situation the law of feudal escheat was
brought into England at the conquest; and in general superadded to the ancient law of forfeiture. In consequence of which corruption and extinction of
hereditary blood, the land of all felons would immedmtely reYest in the lortl,
but that the superior law of forfeiture intervenes, and intercept.a it in its passage: in case of treason fo:rever; in cuse of other felony, for only a year and a
day; aft.er which ti'me it goes to the lord in a regular course of escheat, ( '1 as
it would have done to the heir of the felon in case the feudal tenures had
never been introduced. And that this is the t.rue operation and genuine history of escheats will most evidently appear from this rncident to gavelkind lands
(which seems to be the old Saxon tenure), that they are in no case subject to
escheat for felony, though they are liable to forfeiture for treason. ( i)
•As a consequence of this doctrine of escheat, all lands of mheritanre
[ • 253 ]
immediately revesting in the lord, the wife of the felon was liable to
lose her dower, till the statnfo 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, enacted, that albeit any person
be attainted of misprision of treason, murder, or felony, yet his wife slmll enjoy
her dower. But she has not this indulgence where the ancient law of forfeiture
operates, for it is expressly provided by the statute 5, and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11, that
the wife of one e.ttaint of high treason shall not be endowed at all. (14)
Hitherto we have only spoken of estates ,·ested in the offender at the time of
his offence or attainder. And here the law of forfeiture stops; but the law of
(e) See pages 208 and 114.
(fl L. L . ..£(.f.-.d, c. 4. L. L.
(A 1 3 Inst. 111. Slat. 23 Edw. Ill, c. 2, 112.
(I) 2 Inst, 36.

c-td. c. M.

(j) Somner.

161 ll ln8&. 6'. Salt. 8i.

5.'f. Wrigbt. Teo. llll.

(14) The statute embraced petit treason, also, but that is since, abolished. Statute 9 Geo. IV,

0.31,8.2.
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(13) In the United Statoe there le no forfeiture of e11tate except for treason, and an attainder of trea..cion cannot work corruption of blood except during the llfe of the pel'l:l<ln atta.int.t>d.
Couet. of United States, art. 3, ~ 3. And see 3 Greenl. Crui:ie Dig. 398, note. Fur the pre8ellt
law in England see note 15, p ~(14) The statute embraced petit treason, also, but that is Binoe abolillhed. Statute 9 Geo. Ii',
"· 31, 8, 2.
.
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escheat pursues the matter still farther. For the blood of the tenant being

utterly corrupted and extinguished, it follows not only that all that he now has

shall escheat from him, but also that he shall be incapable of inheriting any

thing for the future. This may farther illustrate the distinction between for-

feiture and escheat If, therefore, a father be seised in fee, and the son commits

treason and is attainted, and then the father dies: here the lands shall escheat

to the lord; because the son, by the corruption of his blood, is incapable to be

heir, and there can be no other heir during his life; but nothing shall be for-

feited to the king, for the son never had any interest in the lands to forfeit (k)

In this case the escheat operates, and not the forfeiture; but in the following

instance the forfeiture works, and not the escheat As where a new felony is

created by act of parliament, and it is provided (as is frequently the case) that

it shall not extend to corruption of blood; here the hinds of the felon shall not

escheat to the lord, but yet the profits of them shall be forfeited to the king for

a year and a day, and so long after as the offender lives. (I)

There is yet a farther consequence of the corruption and extinction of heredi-

tary blood, which is this: that the person *attainted shall not only be r*254l

incapable himself of inheriting, or transmitting his own property by heir- •- ^

ehip, but shall also obstruct the descent of lands or tenements to his posterity,

in all cases where they are obliged to derive their title through him from any

remoter ancestor. The channel which conveyed the hereditary blood from his

ancestors to him, is not only exhausted for the present, but totally dammed up
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and rendered impervious for the future. This is a refinement upon the ancient

law of feuds, which allowed that the grandson might be heir to his grandfather,

though the son in the intermediate generation was guilty of felony, (m) But,

by the law of England, a man's blood is so universally corrupted (15) by attain-

der, that his sous can neither inherit to him nor to any other ancestors, (>/) at

least on the part of their attainted father.

This corruption of blood cannot be absolutely removed but by authority of

parliament The king may excuse the public punishment of an offender; but

cannot abolish the private right, which has accrued or may accrue to individuals

as a consequence of the criminal's attainder. He may remit a forfeiture, in which

the interest of the crown is alone concerned; but he cannot wipe away the cor-

ruption of blood; for therein a third person hath an interest, the lord who

claims by escheat If, therefore, a man hath a son, and is attainted, and after-

wards pardoned by the king; this son can never inherit to his father or father's

ancestors; because his paternal blood, being once thoroughly corrupted by his

father's attainder, must continue so; but if the son has been born after the par-

don, he might inherit; because by the pardon the father is made a new man,

and may convey new inheritable blood to his after-born children, (o)

Herein there is, however, a difference between aliens and persons attainted.

Of aliens, who could never by any possibility be heirs, the law takes no notice:

and therefore we have *seen, that an alien elder brother shall not impede r *., - ~ -,

the descent to a natural-born younger brother. But in attainders it is •• J

otherwise: for if a man hath issue a son, and is attainted, and afterwards par-

doned, and then hath issue a second son, and dies; here the corruption of blood

is not removed from the eldest, and therefore he cannot be heir; neither can

the youngest be heir, for he hath an elder brother living, of whom the law takes

(it Co. Litt. IS. (I) 3 Inst. 47. (m) Van Lceuwen m J feud. SI.

(•) Co. I.ill. Ml. (o) Ibid. 39*.

(15) The statute 54 Geo. Ill, c. 155, abolished corruption of blood except in cases of treason,

petit treason or murder, and the more recent statute 3 and 4 William IV, c. 106, § 10, enacts

eecheat pursues the. matter still farther. For the blood of the tenant being
utterly corrupted and extinguished, it follows not only that all that he now has
shall esche.at from him, but also that he shall be incapable of inheriting any
thing for the future. This may farther illustrate the distinction between forft>iture and escheat. If, therefore, a father be seised in fee, and the son commits
treason and is attainted, and then the f11.ther dies: here the lands shall esche.at
to the lord; because the son, by the corruption of his blood, is incapable to be
heir, and there can be no other heir during his life; but nothing shall be forfeited to the king, for the son nev-er had any interest in the lands to forfeit. (k)
In this case the escheat operates, and not the forteiture; but in the following
instance the forfeiture works, and not the escheat. As where a new felony is
created by a.ct ofjarliament, and it is provided (as is frequently the case) that
it shall not ext.en to corruption of blood; here the lauds of the felon shall not
escheat to the lord, but yet the profits of them shall be forfeited to the king for
a year and a day, and so long after aa the offender liYes. (l)
There is yet a farther consequence of the corruption and extinction of hereditary blood, which is this: that the person *attainted shall not only be *
incapable himself of inheriting, or transmitting his own property by heir- [ 254 ]
ship, but shall also obstruct the descent of lands or tenements to his posterity,
in all ~es where they are obliged to derive their title through him from any
remoter ancestor. The channel which conYeyed the hereditary blood from his
ancestors to him, is not only exhausted for the present, but totally dammed up
and rendered impervious for the future. This is a refinement upon the ancient
la.w of feuds, which allowed that the grandson might be heir to bis grandfather,
though the son in the intermediate generation was guilty of felony. (m) But,
by the law of England, a man's blood is so universally corrupted (15) by attainder, that his sous can neither inherit to him nor to any other ancestors, (n) at
least on the part of their attainted father.
This corruption of blood cannot be absolutely removed but by authority of
parliament. The king may excuse the public punishment of an offender; but
cannot abolish the private right, which ha.s &C'-crued or may accrue to indinduals
as a consequence of the criminal's attainder. He may remit a forfeiture, in which
the interest of the crown is alone concerned; but he cannot wipe away the corruption of blood; for therein a third person hath an interest, the lord who
claims bv escheat. If, therefore, a man hath a son, and is attainted, and afterwards pardoned by the king; this son can never inherit to his father or father's
ancestors; because bis paternal blood, being once thoroughly corrupted by bis
father's attainder, must continue so; but if the son has been born after the pardon, he might inherit; because by the pardon the father is made a new man,
and may convey new inheritable blood to h_is after-born children. ( o)
Herem there is, howeYer, a difference between aliens and persons attainted.
Of aliens, who could never by any possibility be heirs, the law takes no notice:
and therefore we have *seen, that an alien elder brother shall not impede [ • 255 ]
the descent to a n11.tural-born younger brother. But in attainders it is
·
otherwise: for if a man hath issue a son, and is attainted, and afterwards pardoned, and then hath issue a second son, and dies; here the corruption of blood
is not removed from the eldest, and therefore he cannot be heir; neither can
the youngest be heir, for he hath an elder brother living, of whom the law takes

that •• when the person, from whom the descent of any land is to be traced shall have had any

relation who, having been attainted, shall have died before such descent shall have taken

(.I:)

Co. Litt. JS.

(•) Uo. Litt. :Mil.

(l)

3 Inst. '7.

(ol lWd. 119t.

(•) Van Leeuwen"' t Fewd. IL

place, then such attainder shall not prevent any person from inheriting such land who would

nave been capable of inheriting the same, by tracing his descent through such relation, if he

had not been attainted, unless such laud shall have escheated before the first day of January,

1834."
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{15) The st&tnte 54 Geo. III. c. 155, aboli~hed corruption of blood except in cases of treason,
petit trea.'IOn or murder, 8nd the more recent Rtatute 3 and 4 William IV, c. 106, ~ 10, enacts
th.at "when the peraon, from whom the descent of any land is to be traced shall ha\"e had any
relation who, ha¥ing been attainted, shall have died before such de11Cent Rhall hnvo taken
place, then such aUainder shall not prevent any periwn from inheriting such land who would
have been capable of inheriting the same, by tmeing his descent through such relation, if he
bad not been attainted, unless such land shall have eschooted before the filljt day of January,
lt:l34.''
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notice, as he once had a possibility of being heir; and therefore the younger

brother shall not inherit but tin- bind shall escheat to the lord; though had

tlie elder died without issue in the life of the father, the younger aon born after

the pardon might well have inherited, for he hath no corruption of blood. (/>)

Bo if a man hath issue two sons, and the elder in the lifetime of the father bath

issue, and then is attainted and executed, and afterwards the father die*, the

lands of the father shall not descend to the younger son: for the issue of the

elder, which had once a possibility to inherit, shall impede the descent to the

younger, and the land shall escheat to the lord. (<?) Sir Edward Coke in this

case allows, (r) that if the ancestor be attainted, his sons born before the attain-

der may be heirs to each other; and distinguishes it from the case of the sons

of an alien, because in this case the blood was inheritable when imparted to them

from the father; but he makes a doubt (upon the principles before mentioned,

which are now over-ruled) (s) whether sons, born after the attainder, can inherit

to each other, for they never had any inheritable blood in them.

Upon the whole it appears, that a person attainted is neither allowed to retain

his former estate, nor to inherit any future one, nor to transmit any inheritance

to his issue, either immediately from himself, or mediately through himself from

any remoter ancestor; for his inheritable blood, which is necessary either to

hold, to take, or to transmit any feudal property, is blotted out, corrupted, and

extinguished forever: the consequence of which is, that estates thus impeded in

their descent, result back and escheat to the lord.
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f *2561 *This corruption of blood, thus arising from feudal principles, but

*• J perhaps extended farther than even those principles will warrant, has

been long looked upon as a peculiar hardship: because the oppressive part of

the feudal tenures being now in general abolished, it seems unreasonable to

reserve one of their most inequitable consequences; namely, that the children

should not only be reduced to present poverty (which, however severe, is suffi-

ciently justified upon reasons of public policy), but also be laid under future

difficulties of inheritance, on account of the guilt of their ancestors. And there-

fore in most (if not all) of the new felonies created by parliament since the reign

of Henry the Eighth, it is declared, that they shall not extend to any corrup-

tion of blood: and by the statute 7 Ann. c. 21, (the operation of which is post-

poned by the statute 17 Geo. II, c. 39), it is enacted, that after the death of the

late pretender, and his sons, no attainder for treason shall extend to the disin-

heriting any heir, nor the prejudice of any person, other than the offender him-

self: •which provisions have indeed carried the remedy farther (16) than was

required by the hardship above complained of; which is the only future obstruc-

tion of descents, where the pedigree happens to be deduced through the blood

of an attainted ancestor.

Before I conclude this head of escheat, I must mention one singular instance

in which lands held in tee-simple are not liable to escheat to the lord, even when

their owner is no more, and hath left no heirs to inherit them. And this is the

case of a corporation; for if that comes by any accident to be dissolved, the

donor or his heirs shall have the land again in reversion, and not the lord by

escheat; which is perhaps the only instance where a reversion can be expectant

on a grant in fee-simple absolute. But the law, we are told, (/) doth tacitly

annex a condition to every such gift or grant, that if the corporation be dis-

solved, the donor or grantor shall re-enter; for the cause of the gift or grant

F *2571 "foil^h' This >8 indeed founded upon the self same principle ae the

L I law of escheat; the heirs of the donor being only substituted instead

of the chief lord of the fee: which was formerly very frequently the case in snb-

infeudatious, or alienations of lands by a vassal to be holden as of himself, till

(f) Ibid. 6. (») Dyer, V. (r) Co. LIU. 8. («) I H»l. P. C. »T. («) Co. IJtt. 11

(16) Si'.- note 15, p. 254. Ax to the effect of attainder fur treason on a title or dignity, see the

Brare Peerage Case, 8 Scott, 106.
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notice, 18 he once had a pouibility of being heir; and therefore the younger
brother shall not inherit, but the land 1hall t!SCheat to the Joni; t.bongh had
t™l elder died ~ithout issue in. the ~fe of the father, the yo1111ger BOD born after
the pardon might well have anhentild, for be hath DO corruption of blood. (p)
So it a man bath ilsue two sons, and the elder in the lifetime of the father hath
i1Sue, and then ia attainted and executed, &Dd afterwards the father We., the
Janda of the father lhall not desoond to the younger son: for the iNue of the
elder, which had onoo a pot11ibility to inherit, shall im}lede the deieent to the
younger, and the land shall escheat to the lord. (9) S'ir Edward Coke in this
case tlllowe, (r) that if the anccator be attainted, h:ui IODI born before the attainder may be heirs to each other; and distinguishe11 it from the case of the sons
of an alien, beoouae in this cue the blood wu inheritable when imparted to them
from the father; but he makes a doubt (upon the principl~ betore mention~
which are now oTer-ruled) (s) whether 11<m1, born after the attainder, can inherit
to each other, for they never had any inheritable blood in them.
Upon the whole it appears, that a pe1'80n attainted iB neither allowed to retain
his former estate, nor to inherit any future one, nor to tran11mii any inheritance
to his issue, either immedistely from him11elf, or mediately through him1elf from
any remoter anoeator; for his inheritable blood, which is 11eceaary either to
hold, to take, or to tran1mit any feuilitl froperty, i11 blotted out, oorrupW, and
extinguished forever: the consequence o which is, ihat eetate!J thu impeded in
their de1Cent, result beck and escheat to the lord.
•This corruption of blood, thus arising from feudal frinciplee, but
[ • 256 ]
perhap1 extended farther than even those principlet1 wil warrant, bas
been long looked upon as a peculiar hardship: becaue the oppreuin JNri of
the feudal tilnnre8 being now in general abolished, it seems unreaaonable to
reserve one of their most inequitable ooneequenOOil; namely, that the children
should not only be reduced to present poverty (which, however &el"ere, is imfficiently ju1tified upon reawons of public policy), but alio be laid under future
difficulties of inheritanoe, on account of the guilt of their anceliors. And therefore in most (if not all) of the new felonies created by parliament linoo the reign
of Henry the Eighth, it is declared, that they shall not extend to any corruption of. blood: and by th~ 11tatute 7 Ann. c. 21, (the operation of which ia poetponed by the st.atut.e 17 Geo. II, c. 39 ), it is enacted, that after the death of the
late pretender, and his sons, no atttlinder for treuon 11ball extend to the disinberitmg any heir, nor the prejudice of any person, other than the oft"ender himeelf: which provisions have indeed carried the remedy farther (16) than llias
required by the hardship above complained of; which is the only future ob&tru~
tion of descents, where the pedigree happens to be deduced through the blood
of an attainted anoostor.
Before I conclude this head of eecbeat, I must mention one singular instance
in which land1 held in fee-11imple are not liable to escheat to the lord, even whtn
their owner is no more, and hatJlleft no heirs to inherit them. And this is the
case of a corporation ; for if that comes by any accident to be di880lved, the
donor or his hein ahall haYe the land again in revenion, and not the lord by
escbeat; which i1 perhapa the only instance where a reversion can be expectant
on a grant in f.ee..simple abaolut.e. But the law, we are told, (I) doth tacitly
annex a condition to every 1uch gift or grant, that if the corporation be dissolved, the donor or grantor shall re-enter; for the cause of the gift or grant
[ • 257 ] •faileth. This is indeed founded upon the self.same principle as the
law of escheat; the heira of the donor being only substituted instt'ad
of the chief lord of the fee: which was formerly very frequently the case in suhinfeudations, or alienations of Janda by a va.ao.l to be holden aa of himselt.. till
(p) lWd. 8.

(t) D)'er,

41.

(r)

Co. Li't.. 8.

(II l Bal. P. C. BOT.

(I)

C.. LIU. U.

(16) Soe note 15, p. 254. .A8 to the eft'ect of attainder for treason ou a title or dignitf, aee Ule
Braye Peerage Case, 8 Scott, 108.
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that practice was restrained by the statute of qnin vmptores, 18 Edw. I, st. 1, to

which this very singular instance still in some degree remains an exception.

Tfcere is one more incapacity of taking by descent, which, not being produc-

tive of any escheat, is not strictly reducible to this head, and yet must not be

passed over in silence. It is enacted by the statute 11 and 12 Wm. Ill, c. 4, (17)

that every papist who shall not abjure the errors of his religion by taking the

oaths to the government, and making the declaration against transubstantiation,

within six months after he has attained the age of eighteen years, shall be inctt-

pable of inheriting, or taking, by descent aa well as purchase, any real estates

whatsoever; and his next of kin, being a Protestant, shall hold them to his own

pse till such time as he complies with the terms imposed by the act This

incapacity is merely personal; it affects himself only, and does not destroy the

inheritable quality of his blood, so as to impede the descent to others of his

kindred. In like manner as, even in the times of popery, one who entered into

religion, and became a monk professed, was incapable of inheriting lands, both

in our own (K) and the feudal law; eo quod desiit e*se mile* seculi qui foetus

est miles Christi: nee beneficium pertinet ad turn qui non debit gerere ejflcimn,

(w) But yet he was accounted only ciriliter mortuu-s ; he did not impede the

descent to others, but the next heir was entitled to his or his ancestor's estate.

These are the several deficiencies of hereditary blood, recognized by the law

of England; which, so often as they happen, occasion lands to escheat to the

original proprietary or lord. (18)
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OCCUPAXCT is the taking possession of those things which before belonged to

that practice wag restrained by the statute of fUift tt11pt<>ns, 18 Edw. I, st. 1, to
which this very singular instance still in. Mme degree remai11s an exoeption.
There is one more ineapaeity of taking by d~nt, which, not being productive of any eechea.t, is not strictly reducible to this head, and yet tnust not be
passed over in silence. It is enacted by the statut.e 11 and 12 Wm. III, c. 4, (17)
that every p:ipist who shall not abjure the errors of his religion by taking the
oaths to the government, and making the dedara.tio11 against transubstantiation,
within six months after he has attained the ag'(' of eighteen years, shall be incapable of inheriting, or 1;aking, by deseent as well as purchase, any real esta~
whatsoever; and his next of kin, being a Protestant, shall hold them to his own
nse till such time as h~ eomplies with the terms imposed by the act. 'fhi8
incapacity is merely personal; it 11.ft'ects himself onlv, and does n.ot destroy the
inheritable quality of his blood, so as to impede the descent to others of his
kindred. In like manner as, el---en in the times or popery, one who entered into
religion, and became a. monk professed, W&S incapable of inheriting lands, both
in our own (7t) and the feudal law; e,o qttod desiit es~ mil~ sectlli qui factu,s
est miles Christi : nee !Jenefici:um pertinet ad eum qui non d8hit ge~ ojjicitttn.
(w) But yet he was accounted only cif1ilt'.ter mortu1t8; he did not impede the
descent to others, but the next heir W&S entitled to his or his ancestor's estate.
These are the several deficiencies of hereditary blood, recognized by the law
of England; which, so often as they happen, occasion lands to escheat to the
original proprietary or lord. (18)

nobody. This, as we have seen, (a) is the true ground and foundation of all

property, or of holding those things in severally, which, by the law of nature,

unqualified by that of society, were common to all mankind. But when once it

was agreed that every thing capable of ownership should have an owner, natural

reason suggested, that he who could first declare his intention of appropriating

CHAPTER XVL

any thing to his own use, and, in consequence of such intention, actually took

it into possession, should thereby gain the absolute property of it; according to

II. OF TITLE BY OCCUPANCY.

that rule of the law of nations, recognized by the laws of Home, (b) quod nullius

est, id ratione natvrali occupcmti conceditur.

This right of occupancy, so far as it concerns real property (for of personal

chattels I am not in this"place to speak), hath been confined by the laws of

England within a very narrow compass; and was extended only to a single

instance: namely, where a man was tenant pur (inter vie, or had an estate

granted to himself only (without mentioning his heirs) for the life of another

man, and died during the life of cettny que vie, or him by whose life it was

(«) Co. Litt 112. (») 2 Fold. 21. (a) See page* 3 *od 8. (6) F/. 41. 1, S.

(17) These harsh and unreasonable restrictions were very much modified by stiitnfrs 18 Geo.

Ill, o. 60, 31 Geo. Ill, c. 32, and 43 Gco. HI, e. 30; and by statute 10 Geo. IV, c. 7, commonly

called the Roman Catholic Belief Act, Catholics are entitled to hold and enjoy real and personal

estate without being required to take any other oath than such an by law may be required to be

taken by any other subjects. See A! ny's Coust-it-uti<imil History, ch. 13, for an account of the pas-

sage of this last mentioned act

(18) Where lands escheat within one of the United States, the state, and not the general gov-

ernment, becomes entitled. But to perfect the right some courts hold that a process must be had

oiiumionl v called " inquest of office " or " office found," to determine and adjudge the facts. See

4 Kent, 424, 425, note; 2 TTashb. Heal Prop. 444; ante, p. 249, n. (10.)
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OccuPANCY is the taking possession of those things which before belonged to.
nobody. This, as we have seen, (a) is the true ground and foundation of all
property, or of holding those things in severalty, which, by the le.w of nature,
unqualified by that of society, were common to all mankind. But when once it
we.s agreed that every thing capable of ownership should ha.,·e'. fm owner, natural
reason suggest.ed, that he who could first declare his intent.to._ of appropriating
auy thing to his own use, and, in conaequenoe of such intention, actually took
it mto p088eSsion, should thereby gain the absolut.e property of it; aooordmg to
that rule of the law of nations, recognized by the laws of Rome, ( b) q?UJd nuUius
ut, id ,.atwne Mittrali occttpanii COMe(litttr.
This right of occupancy, so far as it concerns l'f'8l property (for of personal
chattels I am not in this place to speak), ha.th been confined by the laws of
England within & -very narrow compass; and was extended only to a single
instance: namely, where & man was tenant pttr auter vie, or had an est.ate
granted t.o himeelf only (without mentioning his heirs) for the life of another
man, and died during the life of cuttty q~ ~ or him by who10 life it was
(•I Co. Litt. 1'2.

(tol 2 F<!Ud. 21.

{G)

See pages Sand 8.

(bl Ff. '1, 1, 3.

(17) fteee barsh and Unre&Mnable 1'68trietions were very much modified by .-tatutes 18 Geo.
by sta.tut.e 10 Geo. IV, c. 7, oommonlv
called the Roman Catholic Relief A.ct, C11.tbolicR are entitled oo hold and enjoy real and pel'l!Onal
e!lt.Ate without being required oo take &ny other oath than Ruch u by law may be required to be
taken by any other subject~ See lla.y'11 CoruJtitutioll&l History, ch. 13, for an account of the pas·
age o( this last IJMlDtioned act.
(18) Where lands escbo&t within one of the Unit.od St.ates, the state, and not the general government, IJecomes entitled. But oo perfect the right some courts hold that o. prucesR muRt be had
commonly called '' inquei;t of office" or "office found," ro determine nnd adjudge the fQCta. See
4 K.eut, 424, 425, note; 2 W a.shh. Ren.I Prop. 444; ante, p. 249, n. (10.)

Iii, o. 60, 31 Geo. HI, c. 32, and 43 Geo. III, c. 30; e.nd
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holden; in this case he that could first enter on the land might lawfully retain

the possession, so long as cestuy que vie lived, by right of occupancy, (c)

f *2591 *This seems to have been recurring to first principles, and calling in

L -I the law of nature to ascertain the property of the land, when left with-

out a legal owner. For it did not revert to the grantor, though it formerly (d)

was supposed so to do; for he had parted with all his interest, so long as cestuy

que vie lived: it did not escheat to the lord of the fee, for all escheats must be

of the absolute entire fee, and not of any particular estate carved out of it;

much less of so minute a remnant as this: it did not belong to the grantee;

for he was dead: it did not descend to his heirs; for there were no words of

inheritance in the grant: nor could it vest in his executors; for no executors

could succeed to a freehold. Belonging therefore to nobody, like the hmreditag

jacens of the Romans, the law left it open to be seised and appropriated by the

first person that could enter upon it, during the life of cestuy que vie, under

the name of an occupant. But there was no right of occupancy allowed, where

the king had the reversion of the lands: for the reversioner hath an equal right

with any other man to enter upon the vacant possession, and where the king's

title and a subject's concur, the king's shall be always preferred: against the

king therefore there could be no prior occupant, because nullum tempus occur-

rit regi. (e) And, even in the case of a subject, had the estate pur outer vie

been granted to a man and his heirs during the life of cestuy que me, there the

heir might, and still may, enter and hold possession, and is called in law a
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special occupant: as having a special exclusive right, by the terms of the orig-

inal grant, to enter upon and occupy this hasreditas jacens, during the residue

of the estate granted: though some have thought him so called with no very

great propriety; (f) and that such estate is rather a descendible freehold. But

the title of common occupancy is now reduced almost to nothing by two statutes:

the one 29 Car. II, c. 3, which enacts (according to the ancient rule of law)(</)

that where there is no special occupant, in whom the estate may vest, the tenant

T *2601 Pur au^er v^e mav Devise it *by will, or it shall go to the executors or

*• J administrators, and be assets in their hand for payment of debts: the

other, that of 14 Geo. II, c. 20, which enacts, that the surplus of such estate

pur auter vie, after payment of debts, shall go in a course of distribution like a

chattel interest.

By these two statutes the title of common occupancy is utterly extinct and

abolished; though that of special occupancy by the heir at law continues to

this day; such heir being held to succeed to the ancestor's estate, not by descent,

for then he must take an estate of inheritance, but as an occupant specially

marked out and appointed by the original grant. But, as before the statutes

there could no common occupancy be had of incorporeal hereditaments, as of

rents, tithes, advowsons, commons, or the like, (A) (because, with respect to

them, there could be no actual entry made,or corporal seisin had; and there-

fore by the death of the grantee pur auter vie a grant of such hereditaments

was entirely determined,) so now, I apprehend, notwithstanding these statutes,

such grant would be determined likewise; and the hereditaments would not be

devisable, nor vest in the executors, nor go in a course of distribution. For

these statutes must not be construed so as to create any new estate, or keep that

alive which by the common law was determined, and thereby to defer the

grantor's reversion, but merely to dispose of an interest in being, to which by

law there was no owner, and which, therefore, was left open to the first occu-

pant. (1) When there is a residue left, the statutes give it to the executors and

(c) Co. Utt «. (d) Bract. 1. 2, c. 9, J. 4, tr. 3 c. 9, 5 4. Flot. /. S, o. 12. i ft, I. », e. 5, 3 18.

(e) Co. Litt. 41. (f) Vangh. 201. (g) Bract. Ond. Het. itid (h) Co. Litt. 41. Vaogh. 8M.

(1) The statutes here referred to were repealed by 1 Tic. c. 26, $ 1, except as to wills exe-

cuted before January 1, 1838; and by $ 3 an estate pur auter vie, of whatever tenure, mar in

holden; in this case he that could first enter on the land might lawfully retain
the possession, so long a.s cestuy que vie lived, by right of occupancy. (c)
*'l'his seems to have been recurring to first principles, and callin~ in
[ ..,259 ]
.
the law of nature to ascertain the property of the land, when left without a legal owner. For it did not revert to the grantor, though it formerly (d)
was supposed 80 to do; for he had parted with all his interest, so long as cestuy
que vie lived: it did not escheat to the lord of the fee, for all escheats must be
of the absolute entire fee, and not of any particular estate carYed out of it;
much less of so minute a remnant as this: it did not belong to the grantee;
for he was dead : it <lid not descend to his heirs; for there were no words of
inheritance in the grant: nor could it Yest in his executors; for no executors
could succeed to a freehold. Belonging therefore to nobody, like the lu:sreditas
jacens of the Romans, the law left it open to be seised and appropriated by the
first person that could enter upon it, during the life of cestuy que vie, under
the name of an occupant. But there was no right of occupancy allowed, where
the king had the reversion of the lands: for the reversioner hath an equal right
with any other man to enter upon the ,·acant possession, and where the kin~s
title and a subject's CQncur, the king's shall be always preferred: against tlie
king therefore there could be no prior occupant, because nullum tempus occurrit regi. (e) And, even in the ct1.se of a subject, had the estate pur auter vis
been granted to a man and Ms heirs during the life of cestuy que tne, there the
heir might, and still may, enter and hold possession, and is called in law a
special occupant: as having a special exclusive right, by the terms of the original grant, to enter upon and occupy this luBreditas jacens, during the residue
of the estate granted: though some have thought him 80 called "ith no very
great propriety; (() and that such est11te is rather a descendible freehold. But
the title of common occupancy is now reduced almost to nothing by two statutes:
the one 29 Car. II, c. 3, which enacts (according to the ancient rule of law)(g)
that where there is no special occupant, in whom the estate may vest, the tenant
[ • 260 ] pur auter vie mn.y devise it *by will, or it shall go to the executors or
administrators, and be assets in their hand for pavment of debt.s: the
other, that of 14 Geo. II, c. 20, which enacts, that the surplus of snob estate
pur auter vie, aft~r payment of debts, shall go in a course of distribution like •
chattel interest.
Bv these two statutes the title of common occupBncy is utterly extinct and
abolished; though that of special occupancy by the heir at law continues to
this day; such heir being held to succeed to the ancestor's estate, not by descent,
for then he must take an estate of' inheritance, but as an occupant specially
marked out and appointed by the original grant. But, l\S before the statutes
there could no common occupancy be had of incorporeal hereditaments, as of
renta, tithes, ad vowsons, commons, or the like, (h) (because, with respect to
them, there could be no actual entry made, or corporal seisin had; and therefore by the death of the grantee pur auter uie a grant of such hereditaments
was entirely det~rmined,) so now, I apprehend, notwithstanding these statutes,
such grant would be determined likeWise; and the hereditaments would not be
devisable, nor vest in the executors, nor go in a course of distribution. For
these statutes must not be construed so as to create any new estate, or keep that
alive which by the common law was determined, and thereby to defer the
grantor's reYersion, but merelv to dispose of an interest in being, to which by
law there was no owner, and which, therefore, was left open to the first occupant. (1) When there is a residue left, the statutes give it to the executors and

all cases be devised by will, and by $ 6, if not so devised, it shall be assets in the hands of the

heir, as special occupant, fur the payment of debts as in the case of freehold lauds in fee-
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(c) Co.

J.ltt.

•t.

(eJ Co. Litt. •1.

(d} Bract. l. 2, c. !I, l. •. tr. Sc. 9, O.&. Fl&t. l . S. c. 12. 111, 1. 5, ~- 11, I lll.
Vaugh. 201.
(g) Bract. ibid.
Ftet. ibid (It) Co. IJU.. ii. Vaugh. 91.

(f)

(1) The statutes here referred to were repealed by 1 Vic. c. 26, ~ l, except as to wills executed before J11nuar.v l, 1838; an<l liy ~ 3 an estate pur auter t>ic, of whatever toonre, mav in
.all case8 Im devi1md by' will, and by§ 6, if not~ dcviwd; it sbl\ll he aRsets iu the hands of tho
heir, RK 11pecial occupant, for the payment of debts WI in the case of freehold lauds in foe-
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administrators, instead of the first occupant; but they will not create a residue,

on purpose to give it to either.(t) They only meant to provide an appointed

instead of a casual, a certain instead of an uncertain, owner of lands which

before were nobody's; and thereby to supply this c«.?zw omissus, and render the

disposition of law in all respects entirely uniform; this being the only instance

wherein a title to a real estate could ever be acquired by occupancy.(2)

*This, I say, was the only instance; for I think there can be no other r $ng, -•

case devised, wherein there is not some owner of the land appointed by I -I

the law. In the case of a sole corporation, as a parson of a church, when he

dies or resigns, though there is no actual owner of the land till a successor be

appointed, yet there is a legal, potential ownership subsisting in contemplation

of law; and when the successor is appointed, his appointment shall have a

retrospect and relation backwards, so as to entitle him to all the profits from the

instant that the vacancy commenced. And, in all other instances, when the

tenant dies intestate, and no other owner of the lands is to be found in the com-

mon course of descents, there the law vests an ownership in the king, or in the

subordinate lord of the fee, by escheat.

So, also, in some cases, where the laws of other nations give a. right by occu-

pancy, as in lands newly created, by the rising of an island in the sea or in a

river, or by the alluvion or dereliction of the waters; in these instances the law

of England assigns them an immediate owner. For Bracton tells us,(/) that if

an island arise in the middle of a river, it belongs in common to those who have
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lands on each side thereof; but if it be nearer to one bank than the other, it

belongs only to him who is proprietor of the nearest shore: which is agreeable

to, and probably copied from, the civil law.(i) Yet this seems only to be

reasonable, where the soil of the river is equally divided between the owners of

the opposite shores; for if the whole soil is ttie freehold of any one man, as it

usually is whenever a several fishery is claimed,(Z) there it seems just (and so is

the constant practice) that the eyotts or little islands, arising in any part of the

river, shall be the property of him who owneth the piscary and the soil. How-

ever, in case a new island rise in the sea, though the civil law gives it to the

first occupant,(7») yet ours gives it to the king.(») *And as to lands r *062 T

gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by the washing up of sand *• J

and earth, so as in time to make terra firma ; or by dereliction, as when the

sea shrinks back below the usual watermark; in these cases the law is held

to be, that if this gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible de-

grees, it shall go to the owner of the land adjoming.(o) For de minimis non

curat lex: and, besides, these owners, being often losers by the breaking in

of the sea, or at charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a recipro-

cal consideration for such possible charge or loss. But if the alluvion or dere-

liction be sudden and considerable, in this case it belongs to the king; for, as

the king is lord of the sea, and so owner of the soil while it is covered with

water, it is but reasonable he should have the soil when the water has left it,

dry.(p) So that the quantity of ground gained, and the time during which

it is gaining, are what make it either the king's or the subject's property. (3)

(i) But see now the statute 5 Geo. ni, c. 17, which makes leases for one. two, or three lives, by ecclesiat-

tical persons or nny demotynary corporation, of tithes or other Incorporeal hereditaments, as good ami

effectual to alt intents and purposes as leases of corporeal possessions.

()) 1. 2, c. 2. (k) fntt. 2.1, 22. (I) Salk. H37. Sue page 39. (m) Inst. 2. 1, 22.

fn] Bract. J. 2, c. 2. Callis, of sewers, 22. (o) 2 Roll. Abr. 170. Dyer, 326. (p) Callis, 24, 28.

sim jiir. and if there shall be no special occupant, it goes to the executor or administrator, to be

applied and distributed in the siimc manner as the personal estate.

(i) [In the mining districts of Derbyshire and Cornwall, by the laws of the Stannaries, an

administrators, inst.eM. of the first occupant; but they will not create a residue,
on purpose to giv-e it to either.(1:) They only meant to provide an appointed
instead of a casual, a certain inst.ead of an uncertain, owner of lands which
before were nobody's; and thereby to supply this e<Mu..~ omissus, and render the
dispoaition of law m all respects entirely uniform; this being the only instance
wherein a title to a real estate could ever be acquired by occupancy.(2)
*This, I say, was the only instance; for I think there can be no other [ • 261 ]
case devised, wherein there is not some owner of the land appointed by
the law. In the case of a sole corporation, a.s a parson of a church, when he
dies or resigns, though there is no actual owner of the land till a successor be
appointed, yet there is a legal, potential. ownership subsisting in contemplation
of ·law; 0.nd when the successor is appointed, his appointment shall have a.
retrospect and relation backwards, so as to entitle him to all the profits from the
instant that the vacancy commenced. And, in all other instances, when the
tenant dies intestate, and no other owner of the lands is to be found in the common course of descents, there the law vests an ownership in the king, or in the
subordinate lord of the fee, by escheat.
So, also, in some cases, where the laws of other nations give a. right by occupancy, as in lands newly created, by the rising of an island in the sea or in a
river, or by the alluvion or dereliction of the waters; in these instances the law
of England assigns them an immediate owner. For Bracton tells us,(j) that if
an island a.rise in the middl,e of e. river, it belongs in common to those who ham
lands on each side thereof; but if it be nearer to one bank than the other, it
belongs only to him who is proprietor of the nearest shore: which is agreeable
to, and probably copied from, the civil law.(k) Yet this seems only to be
reasonable, where the soil of the river is eq,ually divided between the owners of
the opposite shores; for if the whole soil is the freehold of any one man, as it
usually is whenever a. several fishery is claimed,(l) there it seems just (and so is
the constant practice) that the eyotts or little islands, arising in any part of the
river, shall be the property of him who owneth the piscary and the soil. However, in case a. new island rise in the sea, though the civil law gives it to the
first occupant,(m) yet ours gives it to the king.(n) •And as to lands [ • 262 l
gained from the sea., either by alluvion, by the washing up of sand
u.nd earth, so 1\8 in time to make te1·ra ftrma ; or by dereliction, as when the
sea shrinks back below the usual watermark ; in these cases the law is held
to be, that if this gain be by little and little, b.y small and imperceptible degrees, it shall go to the owner of the land adjoming.(o) For de minimis non,
curat lez: and, besides, these owners, being often losers by the breaking in
of the sea, or at charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a reciprocal consideration for such rossible charge or loss. But if the alluvion or dereliction be sudden and considerable, in this case it belongs to the king; for, as
the king is lord of the sea, and so owner of the soil while it is covered with
water, it is but reasonable he should have the soil when the water has left it.
dry.(p) So that the quantity of ground gained, and the time during which
it is gaining, are what make it either the king's or the subject's property. (3)
(i) But see now the 11tat11te ll Geo. Ill, e. 17, which makes leases foT one. two1 oT three lives, by ecclttituffcal persons or n.nr ~nnrrt corporAtion, of titbef! or other Incorporeal nerodltament..1 1 as good 11nrl
ell'ootnal Co aU inteflU and purpo8U as lea11e1 of corporeal pos&e8sions.
(j) I. 2, c. 2.
(le) lrut. 2. l, 2'2.
(I) Salk. 1137. Sec pall'C 39.
(m) lnAt. 2 1, 22.
(nl Bract. l. 2, c. 2. Callls, ofllcwel"H, 22.
(o) 2 Roll. AbT. 170. DyeT, 826.
(pJ ea1Us, u, 28.

estate in mines might, and it is believed still may, be gained by occupancy. Geary v. Bareroft,

1 Sid. 347.]

(3) [See these subjects of alluvion, avulsion, and reliction, and islands arising in the sea and

rivers, fully considered, and the cases collected in the able treatise of Mr. Schultes on Aquatic

Bights, who, in pages 115 to 138, draws this conclusion : " that all islands, relicted land, and

other increase arising in tho sea and in navigable streams, except under local circiimstances

before alluded to, belong to the crown; and that all islands, relicted land, and the soil of
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!dmple, and if there shall be no special occupant, it goei: to the executor or administrator, to be
applied and di.,,tributed in the i:ame manner a.'I thedrsonal eRtat~.
(:l) [In the mining districts of Derbyshire an Cornwall, by the laws of the Stannaries, an
estate in mines might, and it is believed still may, be gained by occupancy. Geary v. Barcroft,
1 Sid. 347.]
(3) [See the11e 11nbjects of alluvion, avulRion, and reliction, and island1.1 ariRing in the sea and
rivers, fully cousiclered, and the cases collected in the able treatise of Mr. Schultes on Aquatic
Rights, who, in page11 115 to 138, draws this roncluRion: "that all islands, relicted land, an!l
other increa..;e arising in tho sea and in navigable streamR, except under local circumstances
before alluded to, belong to the crown; and that all islands, relicted land, and the soil of
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In the same manner if a river, rumi tug between two lordships, by degrees gains

upon the oae, and thereby leaves the other dry; the owner who loses his ground

thus imperceptibly has no remedy ; (4) but if the courseof the river be changed

by a sudden and violent flood, or other hasty means, and thereby a man loses

his ground, it is said that he shall have what the river has left in any other

place, as a recompense for this sudden lpss.(<jr) (5) And thLs law of allusions

and derelictions, with regard to rivers, is nearly the same in the imperial

law ; (;•) from whence indeed those our determinations seem to have been druwu

and adopted: but we ourselves, as islanders* have applied them to marina

increases; and have given our sovereign the prerogative he enjoys, as well npoa

the particular reasons before mentioned, as upon this other general ground of

prerogative, which was formerly remarked^) that whatever hath no other

owner is vested by the law in the king.

(q) Callia, 88. (r) 6ut. »,!,», M, 22, 23,2k (•»> See Book I, page S».

In the ll&ID.e manner if• river, :nmmg baween two lordshi~ by ~· ~
upon the oae, ud thereby leave& the other dry;. the owner who. lOieS li.ia gronlMI
tlrna imperceptibly has n<> remedy;(~) but if the eoureeof the riYer be c\anged
b,y a sudden and violent flood, or other hasty means, ancl the..Wy •man lo8e8
his ground, it is said that he &hall have what the river h¥ left in aay oth.ew:
place, a.s a ft'OO•pe&Se' fo.r this sudden l01&(q) (5) And thia 1Bw 0£ alhniou
and dereliction~ with regard io riVf!TI, is nearly the: iftD1e in tae im.pena.1

law; (r) from whence indeed those oar detellllinations seem to 1-'ie been dralfll

and adopted: b\lt. we oW'Belves~ aa islimders,. have applied tbeol to 1Nm'i•
increases; and have given our 80Yereign the preroga.tive he enjoys,. &Swell u~
ihe particular l'e88QD8 before mwtioned, u u~ thW other geiaeral' groll,lld of
prerogative, which wu formerly :remarked,(•) thM.i whaiever baili no ~her
owner is veeted boy the law in the :i.i.ag.

inland, tmnavigable rivers and streams nnder similar circumstances belong to the proprietor

(q) Callls, !I.

of the est ittcs to which such rivers act a*» boundaries; and hence it may In; considered as law,

(rJ Jul.

s, t, 20, n, n, 25, SL

r•J Sec Book r, JSae !118.

that ull islands, sand beds, or other parcels of agglomerated or concreted earth which newly

arise in. rivers, or congregate to their banks by afravion, reliction, or other aqueous means, as

is frequently to be observed in rivers where the current is irregular, such accumulated or

relicted property belongs to the owners of the neighbouring estates. Sehaltes on Aquatic

Rights, 138. See mrth«r, Com. Dig. Prerog, D. 61; Bac. Ab. Prerogative; 3 Bar. aad C. 91;

5 1!. and A. 268; 3 Ad. and El. 564 ; 5 N rv. and M. 234; 3 B. and Ad. S62. From the lata
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case of the King v. Lord Yarborongh. 3 Bar. and Cres. 91 (though the decision trmwd rather

upon the pleadings and evidence than the general law of alluvion and reliction), and the cases

cited, id. 102, it may be collected that if the salt water leave a great quantity of land on the

shore, the king shall have the land by his prerogative, and not the owner of the adjoining

soil; but not so when dry land ig formed gradually, and by insensible, imperceptible degrees,

by alluvions or relictions, however large it may ultimately become. 2 Bligh. W7 ; 5 I-finjr. ItW:

4 B. and Or. 505. As to oanavigable rivers, there is a case cited ia Gillis. a 1. from, the £t

lib. ass. pi. 93, which fully establishes the law. '• The case was, that a river of voter did run

between two lordships, and the soil of one side, together with the river of water, did whollv

belong to one of the said lordships, and the river, by little and little, did gather upon the soil

ol the other lord, but so slowly, that if one had h'sed his eye a whole day thereon together, it

could not be perceived. By this petty anil imperceptible increase, the imsreaiseiiusut was got

to the owner of the river, but if the river by a sudden and unusual flood,.had gained hastily a

great parcel of the other lord's ground, he should not thereby have lost the same; and so "of

petty and unperceivable increasements from the sea, the king gains no property, for' fa mini-

mis non carat lex.' " X. B. In the above text, it is supposed " he shall have what the river ha*

left in any other plaee as a recompense for his sudden loss." but the case in 22 ass. pi. till, say*

that "neither party shall lose his land." Schnltes oa Aquatic Rights, 136,137.]

Upon this subject sec the following American cases; Adams v. FrothiDgham, 3 Mass. 353;

Deerfield v. Arms, 17 Pick. 41; Trustees i\ Dickinson, 9 Cnsh, 544; Email* #. Tumi mil. 2 John*.

33-2; 11 (User B. McConuick, 18, X. T. 147 ; Girand v. Hughes, 1 Gill and J. 24»; Chapman v.

Jloskins, -2 Md. Ch. 485; Lamb v. Rickets, 11 Ohio, 311; Morgan P. Livingston, 6 Mart, La. 19;

New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet.. 6(52; St Louis Public Schools v. Kinky, 40 Ifo. 356>

Patterson ». Gelston, 23 Md. 432.

(4) [And the same rule holds good as between the crown and a subject in the ease of a gradual

encroachment of the sea. 5Mee. and W. 327.]

(5) See cases cited in TUfte 3. Also Lynch v. Allen, 4 Dev. and Bat 6B; Woodhury r.

Short, 17 Tt. 387. As to alluvion formed on the shore of a lake or natural pond, see Murray

v. Sermon, 1 Hawks, 56. Controversies frequently arise, in the case of alluvion; as to the proper

division of the increase between the adjoining proprietors oa the same side of the water, whose

water front is thus extended, but the division line between whom may not, perhaps, have inter-

sected the original shore line at right angles. In such a case the land formed by the alluvion

is to be so divided as to give to each proprietor a length on the new water line proportioned

to his length on the old water line, whether the one be longer or shorter than the other.

Trustees v. Dickinson, 9 Gush. 544; People v. Canal Appraisers, 13 'Wend. 355; O'Dounell r.

inland, unnavigable rivers and streams under si~ila.r cil:cumsMiooea ?"tkJog to the pNflrietot
oi the e.1tatN to whiea web rivers oct as boandaries;. and hew:e it m.a,y be considered 88 law,
that o.Jl illlands, ~ bedlf, or other parcel:; of agglomerated or eoncreted esrth which newly
arii>e in rivers, or congregate to their banks by alluvioo, roliction, or otller aqueeus 111e11M.• as
is frequently to be obeened in rivers where the olm'lll' ii irr~~ saclt aoowmliated or
re~cte« ~ropeny belonp M- the- .owner& of the u~uing e~ Selmltes gn ~utic
R1gh'8, J;IS. Seit furt.her, Com. Dig. Prenig. D. 61 ;. Bae. A.b. Prerogative~ 3 Bil. ae.d C. 91;
o B. and A. 268; 3 Ad. and El. 5M ; 5 Nev. and K. 234; 3 B. and Ad. 862. l"rom the late
case of the K~"· Lord Yarborouati. 3- Bsr. and Cre!l. 91 (thottgh thdeeitQon tm1u!d rather
·~ the . ple&iing. and eYidsllce dim the ~n~ law el Mtuvif1n llllll relietioa). md die CMeS
e1t.ed, id. lOi, it may be eollec\00 that if .iw. :181.t wat.er Juve a gnat qu80ti•y of land QQ tb&
shore, the king shall ba.ve the land by hi11 prerogative, and. not tbe owner of the adjoining
soil ; but not 110 when dry land is formed graduall.Y, ood by insorurible, impereeptibte de~s,
by alltrriona or relictions, b.uwever large it 1116Y mttmately become. i Bligt't, 187 ; fJ Bing. lGS;
4 B. aud Ct. 586. A~ to 1UU1AYi~abie men, Ulere ill • ease oiied. ia t:ali.ia.-1>1~ from &JM·i i
tib. 868. pL Ile, whicb &illy 88tablitihe& tb11 law. "The oase was. that. a river of water did run
between two lord11hips, and the soil of ooe side, together with the river of water, did whollv
belong to one of the Bllid lord11hips, aw! the river, by littt~ and little, did gather upon the sorl
ot the other lord, but so slowly, that if one bad tisecl lie eye a wboN
thereea 1k>goether, it
OOWd JIOt be perceived.. By this petty ami impe~eptible mC1'88881 the ~ WM ~
the owner of the river, but if the river by a swld.eu. o.nd unlk!ual flood,. had gainea hastily a
great partial gf the other lord't1 ground, he i!hould not thereby have lost the same; and w of
petty and Un perceivable increa.iements from the S~8, th& king gains no pro:rerty, for 1 ~ mmi·
mis non curat lex.'" N. B. In. the abon ten, it 1s 11upf>Ol*l ·• ~ illla&l b&v1t 1rhn4 ibe n.nr M&
left in any other phlee 88 • l\lOOmptmtoe ilr bis sudden. lilM," b1lt the- oase in. ~ us. pl. 93, •:r&
'1lat "ue1ther party sh&ll lose Ilia land." Schul.t.e8 0111 Aquatic Rights, 136, 137.]
Upon this subject see the following American cBSes; Adams v. Frothingham, 3 Mass. 352;
Deerfield v. Armll, 17 Pick. 41 ; Trui!teell v. Diclrimon, 9 Cush, 54'4; Jllmtms "· T111'!lbuff, 2 .fflhns.
322; Halsev "· McCormick, 18, N. T. 147; Giraud v. Kugbes, 1 Gill and J.2481; eJl&pman ti.
H~lrins, 2 ild. Cb. 48&; Lamb T. Rieket.I!, U Ohiet311; J&organ •, LivW.gstao, 6 lilan.. La. 19;
New Orle811& •· Ueiied States, 10 Pet..662; St. J..onis Public SchotN.s v. llisLey, 40 Yo. 35&;
l"attel'l!On "· Gelston, j;J Md. 43'4
(4) [And the same rule hold11 good as between: the cntwa and&aubject in the 8*le of a gradual
encroachment of the 11ee. 5 Kee. 111d W. 32i.]
(5) See cMeS cited in note 3. Also Lynch 11. Alleo, ~ l>n. and Bat. 61t; Woodbu.ry t1.
Short, 17 Vt. 387. All to alluvion formed on the shere flf a lake or no.turo.l pond, see Murray
"· Sermon, 1 Hawks, 56. Controversi61! frequently a.rise, in the C88e of alluvion; as to the pruper
divi11ion of the incre88e IMKweea Ute. adjoining piopdetMrs oa Ule same side of the water. wh1.1Se
water front is thas esbeaded, bu& the divisien line between whom may not. perha~ ha.1'e inter-sectcd the Q~ shore line at right angles. In suck & case the lamt funned by t.he alhnion
is to be. so divided ae ~ give to each proprietor a rength on the new water line proportiioood
to his length on the old water line, whether the one be longer or shorter than the other.
Trusteell 11. Dickiwlon, 9 Cush. MA; People v. Canal Appraisel'I!, 13 Wend. 355; O'Donnell 11.
Kclsev 4 Sandf. 202; Deerfield t7. Arms, 17 Pick. 41; Emel'80n "· Taylor, 9 Greenl. «; Newton
v. Eddy, 23 Vt. 319; Kennebeck Ferry Co. 11. Bradstreet, ~ lle. 374. These cues will illuatrate the rule and its application under different ciroumstancea. See al&o Clark er. Campen,
19 .Mich.325; 13Kent, 428; .Ang. on Watere0Ul"ll811, t§Dato 60-; Ang. on 'l'lde Waters, fU9 to 25.1.

dAr

'°

Kelsev, 4 Sondf. 202; Deerfield v. Anns, 17 Pick. 41; Emerson v. Taylor, 9Greenl. 44; Xewton

v. Eddy, 23 Yt. 319; Kennebeck Ferry Co. v. Bradstreet, 28 Me. 3?4. These cases will illus-

trate the rule and Ha application under different circumstances. See also Clark v. Carnpan,

19 Mich. 325; 13 Kent, 428; Ang. on Watercourses, $ J53 to 60; Aug. on Tide Waters, 349 to 253.
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CHAPTER XVIL

III. OF TITLE BY PRESCRIPTION.

A THIRD method of acquiring real property by purchase is that by prescrip-

tion; as when a man can show no other title to what he claims, than that he,

and those under whom h« claims, have immemorially used to enjoy it. Con-

cerning customs, or immemorial usages, in general, with the several requisites

and rules to be observed, in order to prove their existence and validity, we

inquired at large in the preceding part of these Commentaries.(ffl) At present,

therefore, I shall only, first, distinguish between custom, strictly taken, and

prescription ; and then show what sort of things may be prescribed for.

And, first, the distinction between custom and prescription is this; that cus-

tom is properly a local usage, and not annexed to any person; such as a custom

in the manor of Dale that lands shall descend to the youngest son: prescription

is merely a personal nsage; as, that Sempronius and his ancestors, or those

whose estate he hath, have used time out of mind to have snch an advantage or

privilege.(d) As for example; if there be a usage in the parish of Dale, that all

the inhabitants of that parish may dance on a certain close at all times, for

their recreation (which is held (c) to he a lawful nsage); this is strictly a custom,

for it is applied to the place in general, and not to any particular persons: but

if the *tenant, who is seised of the manor of Dale in fee, alleges that he r #064 1

and his ancestors, or all those whose estate he hath in the said manor, L •*

have used time out of mind to have common of pasture in such a close, this is
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properly called a prescription ; for this is a usage annexed to the person of the

owner of this estate. All prescription must be either in a man and his ancestors,

or in a man and those whose estate h« hath: (d) which last is called prescribing

in a que estate. And formerly a man might, by the common law, have prescribed

for a right which had been enjoyed by his ancestors or predecessors at any

distance of time, though his or their enjoyment of it had been suspended (e) for

an indefinite series of years.(l) Bat by the statute of limitations, 32 Hen. VIII,

c. 2, it is enacted, that no person shall make any prescription by the seisin or

possession of his ancestor or predecessor, unless such seisin or possession hath

been within threescore years next before such prescription made. (/) (2)

fa) See book I, page75, Ac. (*) Cn.T.ltt. 1W. («) 1 Lev. 17W. (<*) * Rep. 82. {«) Co. Litt. 11.1.

(/i This title, of prescription, was well known in the Uomiui law by the name olHtticapio (Ff. 41, U, 3), tw>

called, because a man, that gains a title by prescription, may be saiu M«II rent capere.

(1) [See 6 Mee. and W. 542; 6 JUT. 837 ; 6 Scott, 167; tl Ad. and E. 819. A right acquired

by prescription may be lost by abandonment or non-user. After twenty years of non-user the

court would generally presume that the right had been released, and abandonment may be in-

ferred from unequivocal acts within a much shorter time; as by pulling down a wall, in which

•wag an ancient light, and erecting a blank wall in its place. 3 B. and (Jr. 336; 3 Ad. and

El. 325.1

(2) [To remedy the defects in the methods of acquiring title by prescription, the act 2 and 3

"Win. IV, c. 71, commonly called Lord Tenterdcn'e net, was passed, by which the user which

should render a title to an easement indefeasible is defined.

By the first section it is declared that no claim which might lawfully be made at the com-

mon law, by custom, prescription or grant, to any right of common or other profit a nrendre,

except sucfi matters and things as are therein specially provided for (meaning right* of way or

other easements, watercourses and lights), shall, if it have been uninterruptedly enjoyed by

any person claiming right thereto for thirty years, be defeated by showing the commencement

of the enjoyment o? sueh right prior to the period of thirty years. But any other mode of

defeating the claim which was before, is to continue to be available for that purpose, except

that an uninterrupted enjoyment for sirty years (unless had by consent, expressly given by

deed or writing), is to confer an absolute and indefeasible title.

By the next section, when the right claimed is a right of way or other easement or a water

course, or the use of any water—see Webb v. Bird, 31 L. J. C. P. 335—the above periods of

thirty and sixty years are reduced to twenty and forty respectively.

By the third suction, the claim to the access and nse of light for any dwelling house, workshop

or other building, if actually enjoyed, otherwise than by consent or agreement in writing,
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Secondly, as to the several species of things which may, or may not, be

prescribed for; we may, in the first place, observe, that nothing bat incorporeal

hereditaments can be claimed by prescription; as a right of way, a common,

&c.; but that no prescription can give a title to lands, and other corporeal sub-

stances of which more certain evidence may be had..(g) For a man shall not be

said to prescribe, that he and his ancestors have mum-mo rial ly need to hold the

castle of Arundel: for this is clearly another sort of title; a title by corporal

seisin and inheritance, which is more permanent, and therefore more capable

of proof, than that of prescription. But, as to a right of way, a common, or the

like, a man may be allowed to prescribe; for of these there is no corporal seisin,

the enjoyment will be frequently by intervals, and therefore the right to enjoy

them can depend on nothing else but immemorial usage. 2. A prescription

F *2651 must alwaJ8 b6 *laid m h'm that is tenant of the fee. A tenant for

I - '"' I ]jfej for years, at will, or a copyholder, cannot prescribe, by reason of the

imbecility of their estates. (A) For, as prescription is nsage beyond time of

memory, it is absurd that they should pretend to prescribe for anything, whose

estates commenced within the remembrance of man. And therefore the copy-

holder must prescribe under cover of his lord's estate, and the tenant for life

under cover of the tenant in fee-simple. As if tenant for life of a manor would

prescribe for a right of common as appurtenant to the same, he must prescribe

under cover of the tenant in fee-simple; and must plead that John Stiles and

his ancestors had immemorially used to have this right of common, appurtenant
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to the said manor, and that John Stiles demised the said manor, with its appur-

tenances, to him the said tenant for life. 3. A prescription cannot be for a

thing which cannot be raised by grant. For the law allows prescription only

in supply of the loss of a grant, and therefore every prescription presupposes a

grant to have existed. (3) Thus the lord of a manor cannot prescribe to raise a

tax or toll upon strangers; for, as such claim could never have been good by

(ff) Dr. ft St. dial. 1, c. 8. Finch, 132. (h) 4 Rep. $2, S3.

is made indefeasible after twenty years' user, any local user or custom to the contrary notwith-

standing. In this case the necessity for proving that the easement had been nsed as of right U

dispensed with. But by other sections, provision is made to meet the cases where the

persons who are interested in contesting the right are incapacitated, or only entitled in reversion,

and an explanation is given that nothing is to be deemed an interruption unless it is submitted to

for a year.

It will be seen from the above statement of the act, that if the easement be enjoyed under a

parot license, extending over the periods of thirty or twenty years (except in the case of light),

this fact is sufficient to defeat the claim: for then the user would not be as of right, and so would

not come within the act: and a parol license was always at common law sufficient to rebut the pre-

sumption of a grant. Tickle t>. Brown, 4 A. and E. 369; S. C.. 6 If. and M. 230. And where the

nature of the right is such that it could not be claimed as of right, the act evidently does not

apply; for instance, whore the claim is to tile overflow of water from a canal, consequent upon

boats passing through the locks of the canal. Staffordshire, <fec. Canal Nuv. r. Birmingham

Canal, L. R. 1 H. L. E. and J. 254.

As to the nature of the user, and whether it is of right within the intention of the act. see 'War-

burton v. Parko, 2 H. and N. 64; Bright v. Walker, 1 Cr. M. and R. 211; Onley v. Gardiner. 4 11.

and W. 496; Beasley v. Clarke, 3 Scott, 263; England v. Wall, 10 M. and W. 699; Eaton c. Swan-

sea Water Co., 17 Q. B. 267.]

(3) [The general rule with regard to prescriptive claims is, that every such claim is good if by

possibility it might have had a legal commencement: 1 Term. R. 667, ante, pp. 31 and 35, and

notes; and from upwards of twenty years'enjoyment of an easement or profit aprcndre, grants,

or, as Lord Kenyon said, even a hundred grants, will be presumed, even against the crown, if by

possibility they "could legally have been made. 11 East, 284, 495. Thus a fair or market may be

claimed by prescription, which presumes a grant from the king, which by length of time is sup-

posed to be lost or worn out: Glib. Dist. 22; but if such a grant would be contrary to an express

act of parliament it would be otherwise. 11 East, 495. But an exception to the general rule is

the claim of toll thorough, where it is necessary to show expressly for what consideration it was

granted, though such proof is not necessary in respect of toll traverse.' 1 T. R. 667; 1 B. and

C. 223. An ancient grant without date does not necessarily destroy a prescriptive right for it may

be either prior to time of legal memory or in confirmation of such prescriptive right, which a

matter to be left to a jury. 2 Bla. R. 989. Nor will a prescriptive right be destroyed by implica-

tion merely in an act of parliament. 3 B. and A. 193.]
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any grant, it shall not be good by prescription, (f) A fourth rule is, that

what is to arise by matter of record cannot be prescribed for, but must be

claimed by grant, entered on record; such as, for instance, the royal franchises

of deodands, felon's goods, and the like. These, not being forfeited till the

matter on which they arise is found by the inquisition of a jury, and so made a

matter of record, the forfeiture itseff cannot be claimed by an inferior title.

But the franchises of treasure-trove, waifs, estrays, and the like, may be claimed

by prescription; for they arise from private contingencies, and not from any

matter of record, (k) (4) 5. Among things incorporeal, which may be claimed

by prescription, a distinction must be made with regard to the manner of

prescribing; that is, whether a man shall prescribe in a que estate, or in himself

and his ancestors. For, if a man prescribes in a que estate, (that is, in himself

and those whose estate he holds), nothing *is claimable by this prescrip- r ^gg -,

tion, but such things as are incident, appendant, or appurtenant to I- " '

lands; for it would be absurd to claim any thing as the consequence, or

appendix of an estate, with which the thing claimed has no connexion; but if

he prescribes in himself and his ancestors, he may prescribe for any thing

whatsoever that lies in grant: not only things that are appurtenant, but also

such as may be in gross. (I) Therefore a man may prescribe, that he, and those

whose estate he hath in the manor of Dale, have used to hold the advowson

of Dale, as appendant to that manqr; but if the advowson be a distinct

inheritance, and not appendant, then he can only prescribe in his ancestors.
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So also a man may prescribe in a que estate for a common appurtenant to a

manor; but, if he would prescribe for a common in gross, he must prescribe

in himself and his ancestors. 6. Lastly, we may observe, that estates gained by

prescription are not, of course, descendible to the heirs general, like other pur-

chased estates, but are an exception to the rule. For, properly speaking, the

prescription is rather to be considered as an evidence of a former acquisition,

than as an acquisition de novo: and therefore, if a man prescribes for a right of

way in himself and his ancestors, it will descend only to the blood of that line

of ancestors in whom he so prescribes; the prescription in this case being indeed

a species of descent. But, if he prescribes for it in a que estate, it will follow the

nature of that estate in which the prescription is laid, and be inheritable in the

same manner, whether that were acquired by descent or purchase; for every

accessory followeth the nature of its principal. (5)

(i) 1 Tent. 337. (k) Co. I.ill, 114. (1) LIU. t 133. Finch, L. 101.

(4) [The reason for this distinction is not very satisfactory; though the forfeiture must be

matter of record, there seems no ground why the right to receive that forfeiture might uot be

claimed by prescription : at all events there is some inconsistency, for a man may proscribe for a

court Icet, which is a court of record, as well as for a county palatine, and by reason thereof to

have the forfeitures in question. Co. Litt. 114, b.]

(5) The term " prescription" is in strictness applicable only to incorporeal hereditament*

Ferris o. Brown, 3 Barb. 105; Caldwell r. Copeland, 37 Penn. St. 431. In order to raiee tlia

presumption of a grant, the user must have been peaceable and open, and it must have been

adverse to the owner of the land. Sargent». Ballard, 9 Pick. 251; Brace v. Tale, 10 Allen,

441; "Watkinst'. Peck, 13 N. H.360; Corning v. Gould, 16 "Wend. 531; Colvin ». Burnett, 17

id. 564; Trask t>. Ford, 39 Me. 437; Pernn t>. Garfield, 37 Vt. 310. It must also have

been continuous for the whole period. Pollard ». Barnes, 2 Cush. 191; Branch r. Doane, 18

Conn. 233; Pierre p. Fernald, 26 Mo. 436; Rogers v. Suwin, 10 Gray, 376. And if the mode

of user has been changed during the time, the party can claim only to the extent that he has

continuously enjoyed the easement, or other right for the whole time. Monmouth, <tc., Co. v.

Harford, 1 C. M. <t R. 614; Dand r. Kingscote,6 M. <fc W. 174. Staekpolc v. Curtis, 32 Me. 383;

Biglow r. Battle, 15 Mass. 313; Darlington e. Painter, 7 Penn. St. 473; Belknap v. Trimble, 3

Paige, 577. But although the extent of the right is to be measured and regulated by the

enjoyment upon which the right is supported, the party is yet allowed freedom hi the manner

of exercising it. See Ang. on 'Watercourses, $ 226, and coses cited. And on the general

subject, see Bowman v. Wickliffe, 15 B. Mour. 84; Garrett v. Jaefcuon, 20 Penn. St. 331; Tyler

v. "Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397; Thomas r. Marehfield, 13 Pick. 248, Ricard v. "Williams, 7 Wheat,

109; Morrison v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 72.
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IV. OF TITLE BY FORFEITURE.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FORFEITURE is a punishment annexed by law to some illegal aet, or negligence^

in the owner of lauds, tenements or hereditaments; whereby he loses all big in-

IV. O:i TITLE BY FORFEITURE.

terest therein, and they go to the party injured, as a recompense for the wrong

which either he alone, or the public together with himself, hath sustained.

Lands, tenements, and hereditaments, may be forfeited ia various degrees and

by various means: 1. By crimes and misdemeanors. 2. By alienation contrary

to law. 3. By non-presentation to a benefice, whoa the forfeiture is denomi-

nated a lapse. 4. By simony. 5. By non-performance of conditions 6, By

waste. 7. By breach of copyhold customs. 8. By bankruptcy.

I. The foundation and justice of forfeitures for crimes and misdemeanors,

and the several degrees of those forfeitures proportioned to the several offences,

have been hinted at in the preceding book ; (a) but it will be more properly con

sidered, and more at large, in the fourth book of these Commentaries. At preseiu

I shall only observe in general, that the offences which induce a forfeiture of

lands and tenements to the crown are principally the following six: 1. Treason.

F*268l ^' Felony. (1) 3. MiapriskiH of treason. 4 Pr»mu*ire. *5. Draw-

"• •* ing a weapon on a judge, or striking any one in the presence of the

king's principal courts of justice. 6. Popish recusancy, or non-observance of

certain laws enacted in restraint of papists. (2) But at what time they severally

commence, how far they extend, and how long they endure, will with greater

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

propriety be reserved as the object of our future inquiries. (3)

II. Lands and tenements may be forfeited by alieiuitinn. or conveying them

to another, contrary to law. This is either alienation in Mortmain, alienation to

an alien, or alienation by particular tenants; in the two former of which cases

the forfeiture arises from the incapacity of the alienee to take, in the latter from

the incapacity of the alienor to grant.

1. Alienation in mortmain, in marina manu, is an alienation of lands or tene-

ments to any corporation, sole or aggregate, ecclesiastical or temporal. But

these purchases having been chiefly made by religious houses, in eoaseqaenee

whereof the lands became perpetually inherit in one dead hand, this hath

occasioned the general appellation of mortmain to be applied to such aliena-

tions, (b) and the religions houses themselves to be principally considered in

forming the statutes of mortmain ; in deducing the history of which statutes,

it will be matter of curiosity to observe the great address and subtle contrivance

of the ecclesiastics in eluding from time to time the laws in being, and the zeal

with which successive parliaments have pursued them through all their finesses:

how new remedies were still the parents of new evasions; till the legislature at

last, though with difficulty, hath obtained a decisive victory.

By the common law any man might dispose of his lands to any other private

man at his own discretion, especially when the feudal restraints of alienation

were worn away- Yet in consequence of these it was always and is still neces-

f *269 1 sarv> (^ ^or corporations to have a license in mortmain *from the crown,

' '"' •* to enable them to purchase lands; for as the king is the ultimate lord of

every fee, he ought not, unless by his own consent, to lose his privilege of

(a) Book I, page 299. (It) See Book I, pngn O». fe) V. S. B 1».

(1) Now by statute 3 and 4 William FT, c. 106, the forfeiture, where it exists at all, is only for

the Bfe of the person attainted. See note, p. 254.

(2) These laws are since repealed. See note, p, 257.

(3) [Until the facts of the seisin and of the forfeiture are found by an inquisition on behalf o*

the crown, or as it is phrased, until " office found," the land remains in the offender, ana

may be conveyed by him, subject to being divested upon the recording of the inquisition. Se«

6 B. and Ad. 765.1
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(a) Book!,

page tlPJ.

(l>J See Book I, page

,'JI.

(eJ P. N. B . m.

(1) Now by statute 3 and 4 William IV, c. 106, the forfeiture, where it exilt.s at all, i11 on1y for
the life of the person attainted. See note, p. i54.
(2) These laws are Bince repealed. See note, p, 257.
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may be con\'eycd by him, subject to being dh'ested upon the recording of the inquisition. See
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escheats, and other feudal profits, by the vesting of lands in tenants that can

never be attainted or die. And such licenses of mortmain seem to have been

necessary among; the Saxons, about sixty years before the Norman conquest, (d)

But, besides this general license from the king, as lord paramount of the

kingdom, it was also requisite, whenever there was a mesne or intermediate

lord between the king and the alienor, to obtain his license also (upon the same

feudal principles), for the alienation of the specific land. And if no such

license was obtained, the king or other lord might respectively enter on the

land so aliened in mortmain as a forfeiture. The necessity of this license from

the crown was acknowledged by the constitutions of Clarendon, (e) in respect

of advowsons, which the monks- always greatly coveted, as being the ground-

work of subsequent appropriations. (/) Yet such were the influence and

ingenuity of the clergy, that (notwithstanding this fundamental principle) we

find that the largest and most considerable dotations of religious houses hap-

pened within less than two centuries after the conquesi And (when a license

could not be obtained) their contrivance seems to have been this: that, as the

forfeiture for such alienations accrued in the first place to the immediate lord

of the fee, the tenant who meant to alienate first conveyed his lands to the reli-

gious house, and instantly took them back again to hold as tenant to the

monastery; which kind of instantaneous seisin was probably held not to occa-

sion any forfeiture: and then, by pretext of some other forfeiture, snrrender OF

escheat, the society entered into those lands in right of such their newly-
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acquired signiory, as immediate lords of the fee. But when these dotations

began to grow numerous, it was observed that the feudal services, ordained for

the defense of the kingdom, were every day visibly withdrawn; that the circula-

tion of landed property from man to man began to *stagnate; and that r *,-„ -.

the lorda were curtailed of the fruits of their sigHiories, their escheats, I -I

wardships, reliefs, and the like; and therefore, in order to prevent this, it was

ordered by the second of King Henry III.'s great charters, (g) and afterwards

by that printed in our common statute books, that all such attempts should be

void, and the land forfeited to the lord of the fee. (k)

But, as this prohibition extended only to religious houses, bishops and other

sole corporations were not included therein; and the aggregate ecclesiastical

bodies (who Sir Edward Coke observes, (t) in this were to be commended, that

they ever had of their counsel the best learned men that they could get), found

many means to creep out of this statute, by buying in lands that were bonajidt

holden of themselves as lords of the fee, and thereby evading the forfeiture;

or by taking long leases for years, which first introduced those extensive terms,

for a thousand or more years, which are now so frequent in conveyaircea. This

produced the statute de reltgiosis, 7 Edw. I; which provided, that no person,

religious or other whatsoever, should buy, or sell, or receive under a pretence of

a gift, or term of vears, or any other title whatsoever, nor should by any art or

ingenuity appropriate to himself any lands or tenements in mortmain: upon

pain that the immediate lord of the fee, or, on his default for one year, the lords

paramount, and, in default of all of them, the king, might enter thereon as a

forfeiture.

This seemed to be a sufficient security against all alienations in mortmain:

but as these statutes extended only to gifts and conveyances between the parties,

the religious houses now began to set up a fictitious title to the land, which it

was intended they should have, and to bring an *action to recover it r ^^71 i

against the tenant; who by fraud and collusion, made no defence, and >- •"

thereby judgment was given for the religion* house, which then recovered the

(d) SeWen, Jan. Angl. /. 2. (45.

(t) Ecdaia de/etula ,/amini nyit non potnwi in perpetuum dari, nlnqtn: attensv et covsmiioKe iptita. c. 3,

(.() Sec Ixvnk I, page 384. (g) A. D. 1217. cap. 43. e>Kt. Oxon.

tn) .Von licet altcvi tie fatten* dare terram itwtm alicui domui religiosce, ita quod ilhiin rentmat tenendam rfa

tadttn donto ; n«c, liccut ativui itnmn't religwaat terrain aliciyut fie ttccipere^qvod tradat ilium ei n quo if>*'nn

recepit tenendam t ai tfuis avtem tie efftero terrnmimam dnmni rfjiffinttat tic d$e deret. et super Hoc conrincatur^

«"»"'» nnim iifnitim canetur, ut terra ilia domino mo Ulitufeodt in curratur. Mag. Cart. 9 Hen. Ill, c. 38.
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land by sentence of law upon a supposed prior title. And thus they had the

honour of inventing those fictitious adjudications of right, which are since

become the great assurance of the kingdom, under the name of common recov-

eries. But upon this the statute of Westminster the second, 13 Edw. I, c. 32,

enacted, that in such cases a jury shall try the true right of the demandants or

plaintiffs to the land, and if the religious house or corporation be found to have

it, they shall still recover seisin; otherwise it shall be forfeited to the immediate

lord of the fee, or else to the next lord, and finally to the king, upon the

immediate or other lord's default. And the like provision was made by the

succeeding chapter, (k) in case the tenants set up crosses upon their lands

(the badges of knights templars and hospitallers), in order to protect them from

the feudal demands of their lords, by virtue of the privileges of those religious

and military orders. So careful indeed was this provident prince to prevent

any future evasion, that when the statute of quia emptores, 18 Edw. I, abolished

all subinfeudations, and gave liberty for all men to alienate their lands to be

holden of their next immediate lord, (I) a proviso was inserted (m) that this

should not extend to authorize any kind of alienation in mortmain. And when

afterwards the method of obtaining the king's license by writ of ad quod

damnum was marked out by the statute 27 Edw. I, st 2, it was further provided

by statute 34 Edw. I, st. 3, that no such license should be effectual, without the

consent of the mense or intermediate lords.

Yet still it was found difficult to set bounds to ecclesiastical ingenuity; for
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when they were driven out of all their former holds, they devised a new method

of conveyance, for which the lands were granted, not to themselves directly,

but to nominal feoffees to the use of the religious houses; thus distinguish-

r tg,™ 1 in& between the possesxwn and the use, and receiving *the actual profits,

' '" J while the seisin of the lands remained in the nominal feoffee; who was

held by the courts of equity (then under the direction of the clergy) to be

bound in conscience to account to his cestuy que use for the rents and emolu-

ments of the estate. And it is to these inventions that our practisers are

indebted for the introduction of uses and trusts, the foundation of modern con-

veyancing. But, unfortunately for the inventors themselves, they did not long

enjoy the advantage of their new device; for the statute 15 Ric. II, c. 5, enacts,

that the lands which had been so purchased to uses should be amortised by

license from the crown, or else be sold to private persons; and that, for the

future, uses shall be subject to the statutes of moitmain, and forfeitable like the

lands themselves. And whereas the statutes had been eluded by purchasing

large tracts of land, adjoining to churches, and consecrating them by the name

of church-yards, such subtle imagination is also declared to be within the com-

pass of the statutes of mortmain. And civil or lay corporations, as well as

ecclesiastical, are also declared to be within the mischief, and of course within

the remedy provided by those salutary laws. And lastly, as during the times

of popery, lands were frequently given'to superstitious uses, though not to any

corporate bodies; or were made liable in the hands of heirs and devisees to the

charge of obits, chaunteries, and the like, which were equally pernicious in a

well governed state as actual alienations in mortmain; therefore, at the dawn

of the reformation, the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 10, declares that all future

grants of lands for any of the purposes aforesaid, if granted for any longer term

than twenty years, shall be void.

But during all this time, it was in the power of the crown, by granting a

license of mortmain, to remit the forfeiture, so far as related to its own rights;

and to enable any spiritual or other corporation to purchase and hold any lands

or tenements in perpetuity; which prerogative is declared and confirmed by the

statute 18 Edw. Ill, st. 3, c. 3. But, as doubts were conceived at the time of

the revolution how far such license was valid, (•») since the kings had no

I *27S 1 *Power t° dispense with the statutes of mortmain by a clause of nan,

I J obstante, (o) which was the usual course, though it seems to have been

(k) Cap. .13. (I) 2 Inet. 801. (m) Cap. 8. (n) t Hawk. P. C. 391. (o) Stat. 1 W. & M. st. 8, c. 1
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damnum was marked out by the statute 27 Edw. I, st. 2, it was further pro,·ided
by statute 34 Edw. I, st. 3, that no such license should be effectual, without the
consent of the mense or intermediate lo1·ds.
Yet still it was found difficult to set bounds to ecclesia.stica.l ingenuit.y ; for
when they were driven out of all their former holds, they devised a new method
of conveyance, for which the lands were granted, not to themsch-es directly,
but to nominal feoffees to the use of the religious houses; thus distinguish[ • 272 ] ing between the possesl'ion and the use, and receh·ing *the actual profits,
while the seisin of the lands remained in the nominal feoffee; who was
held by the courta of equity (then under the direction of the clergy) to be
bound in conscience to account t-0 his cestu.'I que use for the rents and emoluments of the estate. And it is to these inventions that our practisers are
indebted for the introduction of uses and tmsts, the foundation of modern conveyancing. But, unfortunately for the inventors themseh·es, they did not long
enjoy the advantage of their new device; for the st.atute 15 Ric. II, c. 5, enacts,
that the lands which had been so purchased to uses should be amortised by
license from the crown, or else be sold to private persons ; and that, for the
future, uses shall be subject to the statutes of mo1tmain, and forfeitable like the
lands themseh-es. And whereas the statutes had been eluded by purchasing
large tracts of land, adjoinin~ to churches, and consecrating them by the name
of church-yards, such subtle imagination is also declared to be within t.he compass of the statutes of mortmain; And civil or lay corporations~ as well a.s
ecclesia.sticul, are also declared to be within the mischief, and of course within
the remedy provided by those salutary laws. And lastly, a.a during the times
of popery, lands were frequently given to superstitious uses, though not to any
corporate bodies; or were made liable in the hands of heirs and devisces to the
charge of obits, chaunteries, and the like, which were equally pemicious in a
well governed state as actual alienations in mortmain ; therefore, at the dawn
of the reformation, the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 10, declares that all future
grants of lands for any of the purposes aforesaid, if granted. for any longer term
than twenty years, shall be void.
But during all this time, it was in the power of the crown, by granting a
license of mortmain, to remit the forfeiture, so far as related to its own rights;
and to enable any spiritual or other corporation to purchase and hold any 111.nds
or tenements in perpetuity; which prerogative is declared and confirmed by the
statute 18 Edw. III, st. 3, c. 3. But, as doubts were conoeiYed at the time of
the revolution how far such license was valicl, (n) since the kings had no
to dispense with the statutes of mortmain by a clause of t1on
l •273 ] •power
obstante, (o) which was the usual course, though it seems to hu,-e ~n
(le) Cap.

as.

(l)

2 Insl l!Ol.

(m) Cap. S. . (n) 2 Hawk. P. C. 391.
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(o) Stat. 1 W . .t .M. It.~ c. t.
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unnecessary: (p) and as, by the gradual declension of mesne sign iories through

the long operation of the statute of quia emptores, the rights of intermediate

lords were reduced to a very small compass; it was therefore provided by the

statute 7 and 8 Win. Ill, c. 37, that the crown for the future at its own discre-

tion may grant licenses to aliene or take in mortmain, of whomsoever the tene-

ments may be holden.

After the dissolution of monasteries under Henry VIII, though the policy of

the next popish successor affected to grant a security to the possessors of abbey

lands, yet, in order to regain so much of them as either the zeal or timidity of

their owners might induce them to part with, the statutes of mortmain were

suspended for twenty years by the statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 8, and during

that time, any lands or tenements were allowed to be granted to any spiritual

corporation without any license whatsoever. And, long afterwards, for a much

better purpose, the augmentation of poor livings, it was enacted by the statute

17 Car. II, c. 3, that appropriators may annex the great tithes to the vicarages;

and that all benefices under 1001. per annum may be augmented by the pur-

chase of lands, without license of mortmain in either case; and the like pro-

vision hath been since made, in favour of the governors of Queen Anne's

bounty, (a) It hath also been held, (r) that the statute 23 Hen. VIII, before

mentioned, did not extend to any thing but superstitious uses; and that there-

fore a man may give lands for the maintenance of a school, an hospital, or any

other charitable uses. But as it was apprehended from recent experience, that
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persona on their death-beds might make large and improvident dispositions even

for these good purposes, and defeat the political ends of the statutes of mort-

main ; it is therefore enacted by the statute 9 Geo. II, c. 36, that no lands or

tenements, or money to be laid out thereon, shall *be given for or

charged with any charitable uses whatsoever, unless by deed indented, *

executed in the presence of two witnesses twelve calendar months before the

death of the donor, and enrolled in the court of chancery within six months

after its execution (except stocks in the public funds, which may be transferred

within six months previous to the donors death), and unless such gift be made

to take effect immediately, and be without power of revocation: and that all

other gifts shall be void. (4) The two universities, their colleges, and the schol-

ars upon the foundation of the colleges of Eton, Winchester, and Westminster,

are excepted out of this act: but such exemption was granted with this pro-

viso, that no college shall be at liberty to purchase more advowsons, than are

equal in number to one moiety of the fellows or students, upon the respective

foundations. (5)

2. Secondly, alienation to an alien (6) is also a cause of forfeiture to the crown

of the land so alienated; not only on account of his incapacity to hold them,

(1>) Co. LIU. 99. (q) suit. S and 3 Anne, o. 11. (r) 1 Rep. «.

(4) The statutes of mortmain are in force in Pennsylvania BO far as they prohibit the dedi-

cation of property to superstitions uses, or granU to corporations without statutory license.

unnecessary: (p) and as, by the gradual declension of mesne signiories through
the long operation of the statute of quia emptores, the ri~hts of intermediate
lords were reduced to a very small compass; it was therefore provided by the
statute 7 and 8 Wm. III, c. 37, that the crown for the future at its own discretion may grant licenses to aliene or· take in mortmain, of whomsoever the tenements may be holden.
After the dissolution of monasteries under Henry VIII, though the policy of
the next popish successor affected to grant a security to the possessors of abbey
lands, yet, in order to regain so much of them as e1thPr the zeal or timidity of
their owners might induce them to part with, the stututes of mortmain were
suspended for twenty years by the statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 8, and during
that time, any lands or tenements were allowed to be granted to any spiritual
corporation without any license whatsoever. And, long afterwards, for a much
better purpose, the augmentation of poor livings, it was enacted by the statute
17 Car. II, c. 3, that appropriators may annex the great tithes to the vicarages;
and that all benefices under 1001. per annum may be augmented by the purchase of lands, without license of mortmain in either case; and the like provision hath been since made, in favour of the governors of Queen Anne's
bounty. (q) It hath also been held, (r) that the statute 23 Hen. VIII, before
mentioned, did not extend to any thing but superstitious uses; and that therefore a man may give lands for the maintenance of a school, an hospital, or any
other cliaritable uses. But as it was apprehended from recent experience, that
persons on their death-beds might make large and improvident dispositions eyen
for these good purposes, and defeat the political ends of the statutes of mortmain; it is therefore enacted by the statute 9 Geo. II, c. 36, that no lands or
tenements, or money to be laid out thereon, shall •be given for or [ • 2...4 ]
charged with any cltarittible uses whatsoever, unless by deed indented,
'
executed in the presence of two witnesses twelve calendar months before the
death of the donor, and enrolled in the court of chancery within six months
after its execution (except stocks in the public funds, which may be transferred
within six months preYious to the donor's death), and unless such gift be made
to take effect immediately, and be without power of revocation: and that all
other gifts shall be void. (4) The two universities, their colleges, and the scholars upon the foundation of the colleges of Eton, Winchester, and Westminster,
are exc~pted out of this act: but such exemption was granted with this proviso, that no college shall be at liberty to purchase more advowsons, than are
equal in number to one moiety of the fellows or students, upon the respective
foundations. (5)
2. Secondly, alienation to an alien (6) is also a cause of forfeiture to the crown
of the land so alienated; not only on account of his incapacity to hold them,

3Binn. App. 626; Methodist Church v. Remington, 1 Watts, 218; 2 Kent, 288. They have

(p) Co.

r.ltt. 99.

(q)

Stat. i and 3 Anne, c. 11.

(r) 1 Rep. M.

not been adopted in the law of the other states, and corporation* may hold property so far as not

restricted by their charters, or as it may not be foreign to the purposes of their creation. And

even in Pennsylvania a corporation created in another state, with capacity to take propertv for

its corporate purposes, may hold lands subject only to forfeiture to the state. Runyan v. Coster's

Lessee, 14 Pet. 122. See further as to conveyances in mortmain, Ann. and A. on Coro 4 149 •

Grant on Corp. 98, et seq. "

(5) The statute 45 Geo. Ill, c. 101, repealed the restriction imposed by this act on colleges,

as to the number of their advowsons, so that now they may hold them without restriction.

Mr. Justice Coleridge says he believes It to be understood, however, that neither the statute 9

Geo. II, nor 45 Geo. Ill, at all affected the restraints of the mortmain laws, and that a license

from the crown is still necessary when a college purchases an advowson. Many colleges are

provided with a prospective license to purchase in mortmain to a certain extent • and such a

license boa in practice been considered, sufficient.

(6) [An alien may be grantee in a deed, though he cannot hold it; for on "office found" the

kuig shall have it by his prerogative. Co. Litt. 2 b.; 5 Co. 52; 1 Leon. 47; 1 Chittv'a Com.lj.

162. As to copyhold, see 1 Mod. 17; All. 14.] VWHS

(~) The stat11tes of mortm~ii;i are in force in Pennsylvania~ far ~ they prohibit the dedication of proptrty to superstitions nseR, or ~tlnt.1 to corporations without titatntorv licemui.
3 Binn. App. b"26; Methodist Church v. Remmgt~>n, 1 Watts, 218; 2 Kent, 28'.l. Tbey have
not 1?een adopts<! in the law of th.a other states, and .corporation~ may hold property so far as not
re11tncted by their charters, or as 1t may not be formgn to the purposes of thmr creation. And
t;ven in Penn11ylvania a corporation created. in annthor titate, with capacity t.o take property for
Its r.orporate purposes, may hold lauds snbJect only to forfeiture to the state. Runyan v. Coster's
Le11.<1ee, 14 Pet. 1~2. See further as to conveyances iu mortmain, Ang. and A.. on Corp. 9 149;
Grant on Corp. 98, et seq.
(5) The statute 45 Ge~. III, c. 101, repealed the restriction imposed by this act on colle~s,
as t.o the number of their advowsons, so that now they may hold them without restriction.
Yr. Justice Coleridge says he believes lt to be understood, however, that neither the statute 9
Geo. II, nor 4."> Geo. Ill, at all affected the ro;;traintll of the mortmain laws and that a license
from the crown iii still necessary when a college purohases an advow;mu. Many colleges are
provided with .. pro8pective license to pnrohase in mortmain to a certain extent · nnd ~uch a
licellJle has in practice been con11idered. sufficieut.
'
. (6) [An alien may be grantee in a dee1J, though he cannot hold It; for on "otlke found" the
king 11hall have it by his prerogative. Co. Litt. :l b. ; 5 Co. 52; 1 Leon. 47; 1 (.;h\tty's Oum. L.
162. .As to copyhold, see 1 Mod. 17; All. 14.]
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which occasions him to be passed by in descents of land, (#) but likewise on

whieh -OCCMions him t.o be pa.aed by in deecenbt of Ian~ (s) but likewise on
account of his presumption in attempting, bv an act of his own, ro acquire any
~property; as was obeerved in the preceding book. (t)
3. Lastly, alienations /Jy particttlu tenant&, when they are greater than the
law entitles them ro make, and devest the remainder or reversion, ( u) are also
forfeitures to him whose right is attacked thereby. As, if tenant for hie own
life aliens by foof'ment or fine for the life of another, or in tail, or in fee; (:)
theee being eat.ates, which either must or may last longer than his own, the
creatin~ them is not only beyond his power, and inoonsist.ent with the nature
of his mterest, bat it also a forfeiture of his own particulBJ" estate to him in
remainder <>l' reversi.(}n. (") For which there seem ro be two reuons. First,
beoa.use such alienation amounts to a renunciation of the feudal connexion and
dependence; it implies • refll881 to perfonn the due renders and sernoe& to the
[ • 275 J lord of •the fee, of which f~alty is constantly one; and it tends in its
conaequence to defeat and devest the remainde.r or reversion expectant:
as therefore that is put in jeopardy, by snch act of the particular tenant, it ia
but just that, upon discovery, the ~rticular estat:e should be forfeited and taken
from him, who has shown so manifest an inclination to m&ke an improper me
of it. The other reason is, because the particular tenant, by granting a larier
estate than his on, has by his own act det:ermined and put an entire end to liia
own original interest; and on such determination the next taker is entitled to
ent:er regularly, as in his remainder or reversion. The same law, which iB thus
l&id down with repnl to tenants for life, holds also with respect to all tenant.a
of the mere freehold or of chattel int:ereets; but if tenant in tail alienes in fee,
this is no immediate forfeiture to the remainder-man, but a mere durontinuatta
(as it is called) (tt!) of the estate-tail, which the issue may afterwards avoid by
due coarse of law: (x) for he in remainder or reversion hath only & very remote
and barely pouible iuierett therein, until the wue in tail is extinct. But, in
case of such forfeitures by particular t:enant.s, all legal est.at.es by them before
created, as if tena.nt for twenty years grants a lease for fifteen, and all charges
by him lawfully made on the lands, shall be good and available in law. (J) For
the law will not hurt an innocent le88ee for the fault of hie lessor; nor permit
the lessor, after be bu granted a good and lawful estate, by hie own act to a\·oid
it, and defeat the interest which he himself has creat.ed.
Eqaivalent, both in its nature and its consequences, to an illegal alienation
by the particular tenant., is the. ci"fil crime of disclaimM"; as where a t:enant,
who hold1 of any lord, neglect.a to render him the due services, and upon an
action brought to recover them, disclaims to hold of his lord. Which dieclaimer
of tenure in any court of record is a forfeiture of the lands to the lonl (z), upon
reuons most apparently feudal. And eo, likewise, if in any court of record
[ • 276 ] the *particuwr tenant doeB any act which amounts to a virtual disclaimer; if he claims any greater estate than was granted him at the first
infeodation, or takes upon himself those rights which belong only to tenant of
a superior cl&88; (a) if he affirms the reversion to be in a stranger, by accepting
his fine, attorning as his tenant, collusive pleading, and the like ; (b) aurh
behaviour amounts to a forfeiture of hie particular estate. (8)

account of his presumption in attempting, by an act of his own, to acquire any

leal property; as was observed in the preceding book. (0

3, Lastly, alienations by particular tenant*, when they are greater than the

law entitles them to make, and devest the remainder or reversion, (w) are aim

forfeitures to him whose right is attacked thereby. As, if tenant for his own

life aliens by feoffment or fine for the life of another, or in tail, or in fee; (?)

these being estates, which either must or may last longer than his own, the

creating them is not only beyond his power, and inconsistent with the nature

of his interest, but is also a forfeiture of his own particular estate to him in

remainder or reversion. (») For which there seem to be two reasons. First,

because such alienation amounts to a renunciation of the feudal connexion and

dependence; it implies a refusal to perform the due renders and services to the

r #075 1 'Or<^ °f **"e f66' °f which fealty is constantly one; and it tends in its

*• J consequence to defeat and devest the remainder or reversion expectant:

as therefore that is put in jeopardy, by such act of the particular tenant, it is

but just that, upon discovery, the particular estate should be forfeited and taken

from him, who has shown so manifest an inclination to make an improper use

of it. The other reason is, because the particular tenant, by granting a larger

estate than hie own, has by his own act determined and put an entire end to his

own original interest; and on such determination the next taker is entitled to

enter regularly, as in his remainder or reversion. The same law, which is thus

laid down with regard to tenants for life, holds also with respect to all tenants
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of the mere freehold or of chattel interests ; but if tenant in tail alienee in fee,

this is no immediate forfeiture to the remainder-man, but a mere disctmtinvmut

(as it is called) (w) of the estate-tail, which the issue may afterwards avoid by

due course of law : («) for he in remainder or reversion hath only a very remote

and barely possible interest therein, until the issue in tail is extinct. But, in

case of such forfeitures by particular tenants, all legal estates by them before

created, as if tenant for twenty years grants a lease for fifteen, and all charges

by him lawfully made on the lands, shall be good and available in law. (t/) For

the law will not hurt an innocent lessee for the fault of his lessor; nor permit

the lessor, after he has granted a good and lawful estate, by his own act to avoid

it, and defeat the interest which he himself has created.

Equivalent, both in its nature and its consequences, to an illegal alienation

by the particular tenant, is the civil crime of disclaimer; as where a tenant,

who holds of any lord, neglects to render him the due services, and upon an

action brought to recover them, disclaims to hold of his lord. Which disclaimer

of tenure in any court of record is a forfeiture of the lands to the lord («), upon

reasons most apparently feudal. And so, likewise, if in any court of record

F *2761 tne *Par*;jcuk*r tenant does any act which amounts to a virtual dis-

L -" claimer; if he claims any greater estate than was granted him at the first

infeodation, or takes upon himself those rights which belong only to tenant of

a superior class; (a) if he affirms the reversion to be in a stranger, by accepting

his fine, attorning as his tenant, collusive pleading, and the like ; (£) surfi

behaviour amounts to a forfeiture of his particular estate. (8)

(«) See pages 219. 290. (t) Book I, para)372. ("I Co. Lilt. 251. (*) Lin. >, 415.

(») See Book lit, ch. 10. (z) t.ilt. H SM.VM17. (y) Co. l.itt. 233. (z) Finch, 270. 271.

(a) Co. Lilt. «9B. (ft) I6U. 253.

(7) But now by statute 8 and 9 Vie. p. 106, it is enacted that no feoffment shall bars a tor-

l•l See pagea St&. W.
{to) See~t Ill, cb. 19.

tious operation, and fines and recoveries in England are abolished. Forfeiture for this cftUM,

ta}

therefore, cannot now take place, as the doctrine never applied to conveyances under the Slat-

eo. uct. •.

<61

(IJ Book I, pap1371.
(.z) Litt. ff llQ'>.llO'l.

nu. •·

{11)

Co. LIU. 151.

(f) Ca. Lltt. 233.

(•) IJtl f 4~.
l•l 11Deh, t79, m.

nte of Uuses. 1 Cruise Dig. 109 ; 1 "Washb. Real Prop. 9i. In the United States it is declared

by statute in many of the states that a deed purporting to convey a greater interest than th«

grantor has shall not work a forfeiture, but shall be effectual to transfer his actual interest And

this is perhaps the law in the other states also. See 1 Washb. Real Prop. 92, and cases cited.

As to forfeiture by disclaimer of tenure, see Doe v. Flynn, 1 C. M. and R. 137; Doe c. Wells,

10 A. and E. 427.

(8) [If a servant sets np a title hostile to his landlord, it is a forfeiture of his term ; and it il

the same if he assists another person to set up such a claim; 1 C., M. and R. 141. See

510

(7) But now by statute 8 &nd 9 Vic. c. 106, it i11 enacted that no feoft'ment sbalJ. haTe a 1Dr·
1ious operation, and fines 1&Dd reooTeriet1 in England are abolished. Forfeiture for this oawie,
therefore, cannot now take place, &11 thE! doctrine never applied t.o oonveyance8 under the Sta&ute of Uul!e8. 1 Cmi88 Dig. 109; l Wlll!hb. Real Prop. 9-l. In the United Stat.es It 111 decWM
by l!t.atute in many of the st.&008 that a deed purporting t.o convey a greatar interet1t than the
~nt.or ball Ah&l.l not work a forfeiture, but llhall b6 eft'ootual t.o traDst'er bis aotual lntm!!IL AD4
this ii perb&ps the law in the other etate9 also. See l Wasbb. Real Prop. W, and cuee eit.ed.
As to forfeiture by disclaimer of tenure, see Doe"· Flynn, l C. )(,and R. 131; Doe c. Wells,
10 A... and E. 427.
(@) [If a eervant 8et.8 up a tAtle holltlle t.o hit1 landlord, it Is a fhrfelture
hie t.errn; and It fl
the BllDle if he !lllsists another person to set up sach a olllim ; 1 C., M:. and R. 141. See 1 Pc.

or

•
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III. Lapse is a species of forfeiture, whereby the right of presentation to a

church accrues to the ordinary by neglect of the patron to present, to the

metropolitan by neglect of the ordinary, and to the king by neglect of the

metropolitan. For it being for the interest of religion, and the good of the

public, that the church should be provided with an officiating minister, the law

has therefore given this right of lapse, in order to quicken the patron; who

might otherwise, by suffering the church to remain vacant, avoid paying his

ecclesiastical dues, and frustrate the pious intentions of his ancestors. This

right of lapse was first established about the time (though not by the authority)

(c) of the council of Lateran, (d) which was in the reign of onr Henry the Sec-

ond, when the bishops first began to exercise universally the right of institution

to churches, (e) And, therefore, where there is no right of institution there is

no right of lapse: so that no donative can lapse to the ordinary, (/) unless it

hath been augmented by the queen's bounty, (g) But no right of lapse can accrue

when the original presentation is in the crown. (A)

The term, in which the title to present by lapse accrues from the one to the

other successively, is six calendar months (£) (following in this case the compu-

tation of the church, and not the usual one of the common law. and this

*exclusive of the day of the avoidance, (k) But, if the bishop be both r ^y i

patron and ordinary, he shall not have a double time allowed him to col- L •*

late in; (I) for the forfeiture accrues by law, whenever the negligence has continued

six months in the same person. And also if the bishop doth not collate his own
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clerk immediately to the living, and the natron presents, though after the six

months are elapsed, yet his presentation is good, and the bishop is bound to

institute the patron's clerk, (m) For as the law only gives the bishop this title

by lapse, to punish the patron's negligence, there is no reason that, if the bishop

himself be guilty of equal or greater negligence, the patron should be deprived

of his turn. If the bishop suffer the presentation to lapse to the metropolitan,

the patron also has the same advantage if he presents before the archbishop has

fillea up the benefice; and that for the same reason. Yet the ordinary cannot,

after lapse to the metropolitan, collate his own clerk to the prejudice of the

archbishop, (n) For he had no permanent right and interest in the advowson,

as the patron hath, but merely a temporary one; which having neglected to

make use of during the time, he cannot afterwards retrieve it. But ir the pre-

sentation lapses to the king, prerogative here intervenes and makes a difference;

and the patron shall never recover his right till the king has satisfied his turn

by presentation: for nullum tempus occurrit regi. (o) And therefore it may seem

as if the church might continue void for ever, unless the king shall be pleased

to present; and a patron thereby be absolutely defeated of his advowson. But

to prevent this inconvenience, the law has lodged a power in the patron's hands,

of, as it were, compelling the king to present. For if, during the delay of the

crown, the patron himself presents, and his clerk is instituted, the king indeed

by presenting another may turn out the patron's clerk; or, after induction, may

remove him by guare impedit: but if he does not, and the patron's clerk dies

incumbent, or is canonically deprived, the king hath lost his right, which was

only to the next or first presentation, (p)

*In case the benefice becomes void by death, or cession through plurality r*27a i

of benefices, there the patron is bound to take notice of the vacancy at *• •*

fc)tTUU. Abr. SX. pi. 10. (d} Braoton, 1.4. tr. J, e. 8. (e) See page 23.

<f) Bro. Abr. tU. Quar. Imped. 3 Cro. Jac. »W. (g) St. 1 Geo. I, »t. t, c. 10.

(•'/•; st«i. 17 K«lw. II, c. 8. 2 Insi 271. (1) R Bop. 63. Begiit. «. (k) » last. 3«J.

(I) Gilw. Cod. 769. (m) I Inst. OT. (A) 1 Boll. Abr. 388.

(a) Dr. & St. d. •-', c. JS. Cro. Car. 358. (f) 7 Bap. W. Cro. Kltz. 44.

»nd D. 688. A parol disclaimer by tenant for year* Is no forfeiture. 2 Per. and D. 396. If a

tenant Bet his landlord at defiance, and do any act disclaiming to hold of him as tenant, us,

fur instance, if he attorn to gome other person, no notice to quit will be necessary : for in such

III. Lapse is a species of forfeiture, whereby the right of presentation to a
ch arch accrues to the ordinary by neglect ()f the patron to present, to the
metropolitan by neglect of the ordinn.ry, a.nd to the king by neglect of the
metropolitan. For it being for the interest of relilrion, and the good of the
public, that the church should be provided with an officiating minister, the law
he.s therefore given this right of lapse, in order to quicken the patron; who
might otherwise, by suffering the church to remain vacant, avoid paying his
ecclesia.stical dues, and frustrate the pious intentions of his ancestors. This
ri~ht of lapse was first established about the time (though not by the authority)
( c j of the council of Lateran, (d) which was in the reiun of our Henry the second, when the bishoJlS first began to exercise universally the right of institution
to churches. (e) And, therefore., where there is no right of institution there ie ·
no right of lapse: so that no donative can lapse to the ordinary,(/) nnless it
hath been augmented by the queen's bounty. (g) But no right of lapee can accrue
when the ori~inal \lresentation is in the crown. (h)
The term, m which the title to present bY, lapse accmes from the one to the
other successively, is six calendar months (i) (following in this case the computation of the church, and not the usual one of the common law, and this
•exclusive of the day of the avoidance. (k) But, if the bishoJ? be both [ • 277 ]
patron and ordinary, he shall not have a double time allowed him to collate in; (l) for the forfeiture accrues by law, whenever the negligence has continued
six months in the same person. And also if the bishop doth not collate his own
clerk immediately to the living, and the l?atron present.s, though after the six
months are elapsed~ yet his presentation is good, and the bishop is bound to
institute the patron's clerk. (m) For as the law only gives the bishop this title
by lapse, to punish the patron's negligence, there is no reason that, if the bishop
him.Belf be guilty of equal or greater negligence, the patron should be deprived
of his turn. If the bishop suffer the presentation to lapse to the metropolitan,
the patron also has the same advantage if he presents before the archbishop ha.a
filled up the benefice; and that for the srune reason. Yet the ordinarv cannot,
after lapse to the metropolitan, collate his own clerk to the prejudtce of the
archbishop. (n) For he had no permanent right and interest in the advowson,
as the patron h~tb, but .merely a temporary one; wh~ch ~aving n~glected to
make use of dunng the time, he cannot afterwards retneve 1t.. But 1f the presentation lapses to the king, prerogative here intervenes and makes a difference;
and the patron shall never recover his right till the king has satisfied his turn
by J!resentation: for nullum tempus occurrit regi. (o) And therefore it may seem
as 1C the church might continue Yoid for ever, unless the king shall be pleased
to present; and a patron thereby be absolutely defeated of hts adl"oweon. But
to prevent this inconvenience, the law has lodged a J?OWer in the patron's hands,
of, as it were, compelling the king to present. For 1f, during the delay of the
crown, the patron himself presents, and his clerk is instituted, the kin~ indeed
by presenting anothE'\r may turn out the patron's clerk; or, after induction, may
remove him by quare impedit: but if he does not, and the patron's clerk dies
incumbent, or is canonically deprived, the king he.th lost his right, which wae
only to the next or first presentation. ( p)
•}n case the benefice becomes void by cleath, or cession throngh plurality {*278 ]
of beneficeg, there the patron is bound to take notice of the vacancy at
(d) Braot.on, I.'· Ir. i, c. 3.
(e) See page 23.
3 Cro. Jae. 1118.
(g) St. 1 Geo. I, •t. t, c. 10.
(C) 8 Rep.«!. lk!glat. ff.
(k) I lut.. 16L
(m) S lnat. !78.
(n) 2 Roll. Ahr. 3611.
S6. Cro. Car. W.
(p) 7 Rep. Ill. Cro. Eliz."·

{c) 2 Ron. Abr. 336. pl. JO.
(/)Bro. A!Jr. IU. Quar. l'IApttl.
(la) Rtat. 17 Edw. fi,
(l) Gilts. Cod. 700.
(o) Dr. & St. d. t, c.

c. 8. 9 lnat. t7S.

f.i-i1. although the wrongful operation of an attornmont has been taken away, 11 Geo. II, c. 19,

«. 11, the landlord may treat him as a trespasser. Boll. N. P. 96; Cowp. 622; 2 Sen. and Left*.

73,434.
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&nd D. ~. A parol disclaimer by tenant ror yean ls RO ftlrfeiture. 2 Per. and D. 396. If 8
tenant !let hl~ landlord at defiance, and do any act dill61aiming to hold ot him as tenant, M,
fur instance, it' be attorn to some other person, no notice to quit will be necet111ary ; for in such
ca.~, although the wrongful operaUou of an attornmcnt bu been taken away, 11 Geo. II, c. 19,
fl. 11, the IAndlord may treat him as a trespasser, Bull. N. P. 96; Cowp. Wl; 2 Sch. and Le~.
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his own peril; for these are matters of equal notoriety to the patron and ordi-

nary; but in case of a vacancy by resignation, or canonical deprivation, or if a

clerk presented be refused for insufficiency, these being matters of which the

bishop alone is presumed to be cognizant, here the law requires him to give

notice thereof to the patron, otherwise he can take no advantage by way of

lapse, (a) Neither shall any lapse thereby accrue to the metropolitan or to the

king; for it is universally true, that neither the archbishop nor the king shall

ever present by lapse, but where the immediate ordinary might have collated by

lapse, within the six months, and hath exceeded his time: for the first step or

beginning faileth, et quod non habet principium, non kabet finem. (r) If the

bishop refuse or neglect to examine and admit the patron's clerk, without good

reason assigned or notice given, he is styled a disturber by the law, and shall not

have any title to present by lapse; for no man shall take advantage of his own

wrong, (s) Also if the right of presentation be litigious or contested, and an

action be brought against the bisnop to try the title, no lapse shall incur till the

question of right be decided. (/)

IV. By simony, the right of presentation to a living is forfeited, and vested

pro hoc vice in the crown. Simony is the corrupt presentation of any one to an

ecclesiastical benefice for money, gift, or reward. It is so called from the resem-

blance it is said to bear to the sin of Simon Magus, though the purchasing of

holy orders seems to approach nearer to his offence. It was by the canon law a

very grievous crime: and is so much the more odious, because as Sir Edward
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Coke observes, («) it is ever accompanied with perjury; for the presentee is sworn

to have committed no simony. However, it was not an offence punishable in a

criminal way at the common law; (to) it being thought sufficient to leave the

F *279 1 c'erk t° ecclesiastical censures. But as these did not affect *the simo-

L J niacal patron, nor were efficacious enough to repel the notorious prac-

tice of the thing, divers acts of parliament have been made to restrain it by

means of civil forfeitures; which the modern prevailing usage, with regard to

spiritual preferments, calls aloud to be put in execution. I shall briefly con-

sider them in this place, because they devest the corrupt patron of the right of

presentation, and vest a new right in the crown.

By the statute 31 Eliz. c. 6, it is for avoiding of simony enacted, that if any

patron for any corrupt consideration, by gift or promise, directly or indirectly,

shall present or collate any person to an ecclesiastical benefice or dignity; such

presentation shall be void, and the presentee be rendered incapable of ever enjoy-

ing the same benefice: and the crown shall present to it for that turn only. (~x)

But if the presentee dies, without being convicted of such simony in his life-

time, it is enacted ,by statute 1 W. and M. c. 16, that the simoniacal contract

shall not prejudice any other innocent patron, on pretence of lapse to the crown

or otherwise. Also by the statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 12, if any person for money

or profit shall procure, in his own name or the name of any other, the next presen-

tation to any living ecclesiastical, and shall be presented thereupon, this is de-

clared to be a simoniacal contract; and the party is subjected to all the ecclesi-

astical penalties of simony, is disabled from holding the benefice, and the pre-

sentation devolves to the crown.

Upon these statutes many questions have arisen, with regard to what is, and

what is not simony. And, among others, these points seem to be clearly settled:

1. That to purchase a presentation, the living being actually vacant, is open and

notorious simony: (y) this being expressly in the face of the statute. 2. That

for a clerk to bargain for the next presentation, the incumbent being sick and

about to die, was simony, even before the statute of Queen Anne: (z) (9) and

(q) 4 Rep. 75. a lost. 638. (r) Co. I.iit 344, 349. (•) S Roll. Abr. 3G9. (I) Co. I.iit. 344.

(a > 3 1 list. 196. (ti-,i Moor. 864. (x) For other penalties inflicted by this statute, see Book IV, ch. 4.

(y) Cro. Ellz. 788. Moor. 914. (x) Hob. 1*5.

(9) [Mr. Christian, in his note upon tho passage in the text, reminds us, that "it has been

determined, that the purchase of an advowson in fee, when the incumbent was upon his death-

ted, without any privity of the olerk who was afterwards presented, was not simoniacal, and
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his own peril; for these are matters of equal notoriety to the patron and ordinary; but in case of a vacancy by resignation, or canonical deprivation, or if a
clerk presented be refused for insufficiency, these being matters of which the
bishop alone is presumed to be cognizant, here the law requires him to give
notice thereof to the patron, otherwise he can take no advantage by way of
lapse. (q) Neither shall any lapse thereby accrue to the metropolitan or to the
king; for it is universally true, that neither the arch bishop nor the king shall
ever present by lapse, but where the immediate ordinary might have collat~d by
lapse, within the six months, and hath exceed1.,>d his time: for the first step or
beginnin~ faileth, et quod non ltabet princiJ.>imn, non habet ftnem. (r) If the
bishop reruse or neglect to examine and admit the patron's clerk, without good
reason assi~ned or notice given, he is styled a disturber by the law, and shall not
have any title to {>resent by lapse; for no man shall take adranta.ge of bis own
wrong. (s) Also if the right of presentation be litigious or contested, and an
action be brought against the bishop to try the title, no lapse shall incur till the
question of right be decided. (I)
IV. By simony, the right of presentation to a living is forfeited, and vested
pro hac vice in the crown. Simony is the corrupt presentation of any one to an
ecclesiastical benefice for money, gift, or reward. It is so called from the re.semblance it is said to bear to the sin of Simon Magus, though the purchasing of
holy orders seems to approach nearer to his offence. It was by the canon law a
very grievous crime: and is so much the more odious, because as Sir Ed ward
Coke observes, (u) it is ever accompanied with perjury; for the presentee is sworn
to have committed no simony. However, it was not u.n offence punishable in a
criminal way at the common law; (w) it being thought sufficient to leave the
[ • 279 ] clerk to ecclesiastical censures. But as these did not affect *the simoniacal patron, nor were efficacious enough to repel the notorious practice of the thing, divers acts of parliament have been made to restrain 1t by
means of civil forfeitures; which the modern prevailing usage, with regard to
spiritual preferments, calls aloud to be put in execution. I shall briefly consider them in this place, because they dewst the corrupt patron of the right of
presentation, and vest a new right in the crown.
By the statute 31 Eliz. c. 6, it is for avoiding of simony enacted, that if any
patron for any corrupt consideration, by gift or promise, directly or indirectly,
shall present or collate any person to an ecclesi~tical benefice or dignity ; such
presentation shall be void, and the presentee be rendered incapable of ever enjoymg the same benefice: and the crown shall present to it for that turn only. (x)
But if the presentce dies, without being convicted of such simony in bis lifetime, it is enacted .,by statute 1 W. and M. c. 16, that the simoniacal contract
shall not prejudice any other innocent patron, on pretence of lapse to the crown
or otherwise. Also by the statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 12, if any person for money
or profit shall l>rocure, in his own name or the name of any other~ the next presentat10n to any living ecclesiastical, and shall be presented thereupon, this is declared to be a simoniacal contract; and the party is subjected to all the ecclesiastical penalties of simony, is disabled from holding the benefice, and the presentation devolves to the crown.
Upon these statutes many questions have arisen, with regard to what is, and
what is not simony. And, among others, these points seem to be clearly settled:
1. That to purchase a presentation, the living being actually vacant, is open and
notorious simony: (Y) this being expressly in the face of the statute. 2. That
for a clerk to bargam for the next presentation, the incumbent being sick and
about to die, was simony, even before the statute of Queen Anne: (z) (9) and
(qJ' Rep. 711. !llnat. 83'J.

(u) 3 Ioat. 156.
(to) Mool'.11&.
(1/) (,'J'o. Ellz. 7M. Mool'. 9i•.

(r) Co. J,ltt 3", 846.
{I) i Roll. Ahr. 3G9.
{t) Co. Ute. it«.
(z) For othel' penaltlea lnftlcted bf thia ata.tuic, aee Book IV, eh. i.
(z) Hob. iM.

(9) (Mr. Christian, in his note upon tho passage m the text, remind11 us, that "it hM befn
det9rrnlned, that the ~urchai;o of 811 advowson in fee, when t.he incumbent was npnn ~is deathbed, without any priv1ty of the clerk who wu afterwards presented, was not 81Dlowa.cw, 111d
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now, by that statute, to purchase, either in his own name or another's, the next

presentation, and be thereupon presented *at any future time to the , tgg0 -,

living, is direct and palpable simony. But, 3. It is held that for a father L ' I

to purchase such a presentation, in order to provide for his son, is not simony:

for the son is not concerned in the bargain, and the father is by nature bound

to make a provision for him. (a) 4. That if a simouiacal contract be made with

the patron, the clerk not being privy thereto, the presentation for that turn

shall indeed devolve to the crown, as a punishment of the guilty patron; but

the clerk, who is innocent, does not incur any disability or forfeiture, (b) 5. That

bonds given to pay money to charitable uses, on receiving a presentation to a

living are not simoniacal, (c) provided the patron or his relations be not bene-

fitted thereby; (d) for this is no corrupt consideration, moving to the patron.

6. That bonds of resignation, in case of non-residence or taking any other

living, are not simoniacal; (e) there being no corrupt consideration herein, but

euch only as is for the good of the public. So also bonds to resign, when the

patron's son comes to canonical age, are legal; upon the reason before given, that

the father is bound to provide for his son. (f) 7. Lastly, general bonds to resign

at the patron's request are held to be legal: (g) for they may possibly be given

for one of the legal considerations before mentioned, and where there is a pos-

sibility that a transaction may be fair, the law will not suppose it iniquitous

.without proof. (10) But, if the party can prove the contract to have been a cor-

rupt one, such proof will be admitted, in order to show the bond simoniacal,
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and therefore void. Neither will the patron be suffered to make an ill use of

such a general bond of resignation; as, by extorting a composition for tithes,

procuring an annuity for his relation, or by demanding a resignation wantonly

or without good cause, such as is approved by the law ; as, for the benefit of his

fa) Cro. Kill. 688. Moor. 918. (b) 3 Inst 154. Cro. J»o. 885. (c) Noy, HJ. (d) Str». 534.

(e) Cro. C»r. 180. (f) Cro. Jao. 248, 274. (g) Cro. Car. 180. Stnt. 227.

now, by that statute, to purchase, either in his own name or another's, the no:xt
presentation, and be thereupon presented *at any future time to the l ,..280 ]
living, is direct and palpable simony. But, 3. It is held that for a father
t.o purchase such a presentation, in order to provide for his son, is not simony:
for the son is not concerned in the bargain, and the father is by nature bound
to make a provision for him. (a) 4:. That if a simoniacal contract be made with
the patron, the clerk not being privy thereto, the presentation for that turn
shall indeed devolve to the crown, as a punishment of the guilty patron; but
the clerk, who is innocent, does not incur a.ny disability or forfeiture. ( b) 5. That
bonds given to pay money to charitable uses, on receiving a presentation to a
living are not simoniacal, (c) provided the patron or his relations be not bencfittcd thereby; (d) for this is no corrupt consideration, moving to the patron.
6. That bonds of resignation, in case of non-residence or taking any other
living, are not simoniacal; (e) there being no corrupt consideration herein, but
such only as is for the good ot' the public. So also bonds to resign, when the
patron's son comes to canonical age, are le~al; upon the reason before given, tha.t
the father is bound to provide for his son .. ~f) 7. Lastly, general bonus to resign
at the patron's request are held to be legal: (g) for they may possibly be given
for one of the legal considerations before mentioned, and where there is a possibility that a transaction may be fair, the law will not suppose it iniquitous
.without proof. (10) But, if the party can prove the con tr.wt to have been a corrupt one, such proof will be admitted, in order to show the bond simoniacal,
and therefore void. Neither will the patron be suffered to make an ill use of
such a general bond of resignation; as, by extorting a composition for tithes,
procuring an annuity for his relation, or by demanding a resign:J.tion wantonly
or without good cause, such as is approved by the law; as, for the benefit of hie

•would not vacate the next presentation. 2 Bl. Rep. 1052." And though in the later case of

Fox r. the Bishop of Chester: 2 Bam. and Cress. 658; S. C., 4 Dowl. and Ryl. Ill; the case of

Barrett r. Glubb (the case referred to by Mr. Christian), was repudiated by the court of king's

(n)
(e)

Cro. Ells. Ml. Moor. 918.
(b) :I Insl IM. Cro. Jae. 385.
(c) Noy, lUI.
Cro. Car. ll!O.
(/) Cro. Jae. 2'8, :m.
(fl) Cro. Car. ltl). Stra. 'l:l1.

(d) Stra. GM.

bench, the principle of that case has since been re-established. In Fox r. The Bishop of

Chester, where a contract wag made for the sale of the next presentation of a living, the con-

tracting parties at the time knowing the incumbent to be at the point of death, it was held by

the conrt of king's bench, that the contract was simoniacal, and the presentation made in pur-

suance thereof by the purchaser void; although the clerk presented was not privy to the trans-

action, and the contract was not. entered into with a view to the presentation of any particular

person. But this judgment was reversed, on appeal, by the house of lords. See 2 It. and Cr.

635; SBligh, N. S. 123.]

(10) [In the great case of The Bishop of London c. Ffytche, it was determined by the bouse

of lords, that a general bond of resignation is simoniacal and ilfegal. The circumstances of

that case were briefly these: If r. Ffytche, the patron, presented Mr. Eyre, his clerk, to the

bishop of London, for institution. The bishop refused to admit the presentation, because Mr.

Eyre had given a general bond of resignation; upon this, Mr. Ffytche brought a qttare impedit

against the bishop, to which the bishop pleaded that the presentation was simoniacal and void

by reason of the Imml of resignation; and to this plea Mr. Ffytche demurred. From a series

of judicial decisions, the court of common pleas thought themselves bound to determine in his

favour; and Mint judgment was affirmed by the court of king's bench; but these judgments were

afterwards reversed by the house of lords. The principal question was this, viz.: whether such

•'! bond was a n-irnnl, gift, profit, or benefit, to the patron under the 31 Eliz. c. 6: if it were so,

the statute had declared the presentation to be simouiacal and void. Such a bond is so man-

ifestly intended by the parties to be a benefit to the patron, that it is surprising that it should

ever have been argued ami decided that it was not a hum-jit within the meaning of the statute.

Yet many learned men are dissatisfied with this determination of the lords, and are of opinion

that their judgment would be different, if the question were brought before them a second time.

But it is generally understood that the lords, from a regard to their dignity, and to preserve a

consistency in their judgments, will never permit a question which they have once decided, to

be again debated in their house. See 1 Bro. 386. The case of The Bishop of London r. Ffytche,

is reported at length in Cunningham's Law of Simony, p. 52.] Upon the same subject, see the

later cases of Rowlatt v. Rowlatt. 1 Jac. and Wai. 283; Doshwood e. Peyton, 18 Ves. 37;

Fletcher o. Lord Sondes, 3 Bing. 502, S. C., 5 B. and A. 835; and also the statute 9 Geo. IV, c.

94. And gee Bagghaw v. BossTey, 4 T. K. 78; Partridge v. Whiston, id. 359; Newman v. Sow

would not Vl\C&te the next preAent.ation. 2 Bl. Rep. 1052." .And though in the later case of
Fox ti. the Bishop of ChetJter: 2 Barn. sud {,'ress. 658; S. C.. 4 Dow I. and Ryl. 111; the co.se of
Barrett v. Glubb (the case referred to by Mr. Christian), was repudiated by the court of king's
bench, the principle of that cal!e has since been re-etlt.ablisheil. In Fux ti. The BiHhop of
Chester, where & contmct waa made for the sale of the next present.ation of & living, the contracting parties &t the time kno\\·ing the incumbent to be at the point of death, it was held by
the court. of king's bench, that the contract W&il simonil\Cul, sud the presentation made in pur·
suance thereof liy the purchaser void ; although the clerk presented was not privy to the trans·
&ctfon, and the contract w~ not entered into with & view to the presentation of any particular
person. ~ut thi11 jud.gment was reversed, on appeal, by the honl!e of lord11. See 2 .U. and Cr.
635; 3 Bligh, N. S. 1~]
( 10) [In -the great 0&88 of The Jlishop of London ti. Ffytche, it was determined by the house
of lortlR, that a ,.;eneml bond of rc3ignstion is simoniacll.l and Hregal. The circum,;tances of
thnt ca.~ were briefly thell6: Mr. Ffytche, the patron, presented Mr. Eyre, his clerk, to the
bishop of London, for institution. The biahop refut!6d to admit the presentation, because Mr.
Eyre had given a general bond of resignation; upon this, Mr. Ffytche brou~ht a q1tare impedtt
against the bishop, to which the bishop pleaded that the present.ation was s1monia<1al and void
by re&l!On of the bond of resignation; and to this plea Mr. Ffytche demurred. From a series
of judicial decisions, the court of common plea.~ thought themselves bound to determine in his
favour; and that judgment was affirmed by the court of king's bench; but these judgments were
111\erwa.nls reverHed by the house of lord..._ 'rhe principal question Wad this, vii.: whuther such
a bond wag a re"'ard, gift. profit, or bCJU:fit, to the patron under the 31 Elis. c. 6: if it were so,
the statute had declared the pre1.1en1a.tion to be 1:1imoniacsl and void. Such a bond it1 so mun·
ife-11tly intended by thl'I p11.rtie~ w be a ben'1.fit w the patron, that it is surprising that it ~honld
ever have been argued and decided that it wa~ not a benefit within the meaning of the 11tatute.
Yet many learned men are di11Mthllled with this determination of the lord1.1, and are of opinion
that th.eir judgment would be different, if the question were brought beforti them a second time.
But it is generally nnderr1tood that the lords, from a reganl to their dignity, and to pre8crve a
consitltency in their jud~ments, will never permit a queKtion which they have once decided, to
be again debated in their hourl0. See 1 Ilro. 286. The C&Re of The Bishop of London 11. Pfyt-Ohe,
is reported at length in Cunningharu'i; Law of Simony, p. 52.] Upon the dame subject, i;ee the
later e&.'168 of Rowlatt 11. Rowlatt. 1 Jae. and Wal. :483; Dat1hwood 11. Peywn, 18 Vos. 37;
Flewher v. Lord Sondei!, 3 Bing. OO'J, S. C., fl B. and A. 83&; and also the statute 9 Geo. IV, o.
94. .And tiee Bagshaw v. Bossley, 4 T. R. 78; Partridge 11. Whiston, id. 359; Newman v. New
lll&O, 4 ll. and S. 71.
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own son, or on account of non-residence, plurality of livings, or gross immorality

in the incumbent. (A)

F *2811 *^' l^'ne nex^ fcind °f forfeitures are those by breach or non-perform-

*• •• ance of a condition annexed to the estate, either expressly by deed at its

original creation, or impliedly by law from a principle of natural reason. Both

which we considered at large in a former chapter, (t)

VI. I therefore now proceed to another species of forfeiture, viz.: by waste*

Waste, vastum, is a spoil or destruction in houses, gardens, trees, or other cor-

poreal hereditaments, to the dishersion of him that hath the remainder or rever-

sion in fee-simple or fee-tail. (&) (11)

Waste is either voluntary, which is a crime of commission, as by pulling down

a house; or it is permissive, (12) which is a matter of omission only, as by suf-

fering it to fall for want of necessary reparations. Whatever does a lasting

damage to the freehold or inheritance is waste. (I) Therefore removing wain-

scot, floors, or other things once fixed to the freehold of a house, is waste, (m) (13)

fh) 1 Vern. 411. 1 Eqn. Cas. Abr. 86, 87. Stra. Mi. (i) See ch. 10, page 152.

(kj Co. IJtt. 6S. WHell. ». (m) 4 Kep. W.

own son, or on account of non-residence, plurality of livings, or gross immorality
in the incumbent. (Ji)
[ • 281 ]
*V. The next kind of forfeitures are those by breach or non-performance of a condition annexe<l to the estate, either expressly by deed at its
ori~inal creation, or impliedly by law from a. principle of natural reason. Both
which we considered a.t large in a former chapter. (1)
VI. I therefore now P.roceed to another species of forfeiture, viz.: by tcaJJft.
Waste, vastum, is a sp01l or destruction in houses, gardens, trees, or other corporeal hereditaments, to the dishersion of him that hath the remainder or reversion in fee-simple or fee-tail. (k) (11)
Waste is either voluntary, which is a crime of commission, as by polling down
a. house; or it is permissive, (12) which is a matter of omission only, as by suffering it to fall for want of necessary repa.rations. Whatever does a lasting
damaO'e to the freehold or inheritunce 1s waste. (l) Therefore removin~ wainscot, Roors, or other things once fixed to the freehold of a house, is waste. l m) ( 13)

(11) [A tenant for life has no property in timber or underwood till his estate comes into

possession, and therefore cannot have an account in equity, or maintain an action of trover at

(la) 1 Vern. 411. J Eqn. Cas. Abr. 86, 87.
(k) Co. Liti. 113.
(l) He&I. M.

Stra. fl.1'.
(•)•Hep.

6&.

(f) See ch. 10, page l~t.

law, for what has been cut wrongfully by a preceding tenant, notwithstanding his own estate,

being without impeachment of waste, would have entitled him to cut such timber or under-

wood, and put the produce into his own pocket: the owner of the first estate of inheritance,
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at the time when the timber was cut, is the party entitled to redress in such ease. Pieot

v. Bullock, 1 Ves. Jnn. 484; Whitfield v. Bewit, 2 P. Wins. 242. However, a tenant for hfe'in

remainder, though he cannot establish any property in timber actually severed during a prior

estate, may bring a bill to restrain waste ; and he may sustain snch a suit, although he has not

the immediate remainder, and notwithstanding his estate, whenever it comes into possession,

will be subject to impeachment for waste; for, though he will have no right to the timber, he

will have an interest in the most and shade of the trees. So, trustees to preserve contingent

remainders may maintain a suit for a similar injunction, even though the contingent re-

mainder-men have not come into csse. Perrot v. Perrot, 3 Atk. 95 ; StunsfiVId r. Habcrghain,

10 Vcs. 281; Garth v. Cotton, 3 Atk. 754. It is true, that, in coses of legal waste, if there

be no person capable of maintaining an action, before the party who committed the waste

dies, the wrong is then without a remedy »t common law; but, where the question is brought

without the cognizance of equity, those courts say, unauthorized waste shall not be com-

mitted with impunity; and the produce of the tortious act shall be laid up for the benefit

of the contingent remainder-men. Marquis of Lansdowne r. Marchioness Dowager of

Lansdowne, 1 Mad. 140; Bishop of Winchester v. Knight, 1 P. Wms. 407; Anonym. 1 Ves.

Jun. 93.]

(12) [Where an estate is given for life, without impeachment of waste other Out* ml hi! trtute,

this will excuse permissive waste: Lansdowne, v. Lansdowne, 1 Jac. and Walk. 523; if the

tenant for life, under snch a limitation, cut timber, Sir Wm. Grant, M. R., seems to have felt it

questionable whether the tenant could appropriate to himself the principal money produced by

the sale of snch timber, though he held it clear he was entitled to the interest thereof for hi's

life: Wickham v. Wickham, 19 Ves. 423; 8. C., Cooper, 290; but, from the case of Williams r.

Williams, 12 East, 220, it should appear that the tenant for life would have the entire property

in timber so cut down.]

(13) [Between the heir and executor there has not been any relaxation of the ancient law

with regard to fixtures, for there is no reason why the one should be more favored than the

other, or the courts would be disposed to assist the heir, and to prevent the inheritance front

being dismembered and disfigured. If the inheritance cannot be enjoyed, without the things

in dispute, the owner could never mean to give them to the executor, as in the cose of salt-

pans fixed with mortar to a brick floor, and without which the salt works produce no profit;

but if removed are of very little value to the executor, as old materials only. 1 Hen. Bl. 25U,

n. a. But the courts are more favorable to an executor of a tenant for life against a perw>n

in remainder, and therefore thev have held that his executor shall have the benefit of a fire

engine erected by a tenant for life, because the colliery might be worked without it, though not

so conveniently. 3 Atk. 13. With regard to a tenant for years, it is fully established he may

take down useful and necessary erections for the benefit of his trade or manufacture, and

which enable him to carry it on with more advantage. BBC. Ab. Executor, H. 3; 3 Esp, 11;

2 East, 88. It has been so held in the case of cider mills. A tenant for years may also carry

away ornamental marble chimney pieces, wainscot fixed only by screws, and roch like.

(11) [A tenant for life has no property in timber or underwood till his csmte comes into
possession, ond therefore cannot hll\'c on account in equity, or maintain an action of m1ver at
low, for whot has been cut wrongfully by a preceding tenant, notwithi;tanding his own tl>'ta~,
being without impeachment of waste, would have untitled him to cut such timber or under·
wood, oud put the produce into hi~ own pocket: t.he owner of the first estate of inheritimce,
at the time when the timber was cut, i>1 the party entitled to redreRS in such C88C. Pi~t
t'. Bnllock, 1 Ves. Jun. 484; Whitfield v. Bewit, 2 P. Wms. 242. HoweT"er, a tenant for life in
remainder, though he cannot cstahli11h any property in timber octually severed during a prior
c1:1tate, may bring a hill to re11train woi;te ; and he moy sustain such o 11uit, although he ha.-; not
the immediate remoindcr, and notwith11tanding his ciitate, whenever it comes into po."'i>e~"'ion.
will be subject t.o impea.chment for wa.~te; for, though be will hove no . right to the timber. be
will ha'"c an interest in the most and bhade of the trees. So, t.nu1tees t.o prescrro conun~nt.
remainders may maintain a suit for a similar injunction, even though the contingent remainder-men hal"e not come into csse. Perrot v. Perrot, 3 Atk. 95 ; Stalll!field v. Habcrgham,
10 Vos. 281; Garth v. Cotton, 3 Atk. 754. It is true. that, in coses of le~ waste, if tht>ra
be no per!Wm capahlc of maintaining an action, before the party who committed the wa:•t.6
dicR, the wrong is then without u. nm1edy at common Jaw; bnt, where the quest.ion is brought
without the cA1gnizance of equity, those courts say, unauthorized waste shall not be com·
mith!d with impunity ; and the produce of tho tortious net shall be laid up for the benefit
of the contingent remainder-men. Marqui9 of J,unsdowne r. lfarohion01!8 Dow~r uf
Lansdowne, 1 Mad. 140; Bishop of Wineh08ter 11. Knight, 1 P. Wms. 407; Anonym. 1 \'M.
Jun. 9:3.)
(12) [Where an estate is gi'"en for life, without impelM.'hment of waste otAer tha• trilf•l tra#e,
this will excuse per111islrirt: wa.<ite: Lan~owne, 11. l..nn~owne, 1 Joe. and Walk. 523; if the
tenant for life, under such a limitation, cut timber, Sir Wm. Grant, M. R., seems to have felt it
que8tionoble wbc~er the te11ant could appnipriate to himself the princi~ money produced by
the sale of such timber, though he held 1t clear he WM entitled te the mterest. th~reof for hi:t
life: Wickham 1'. Wickham, HI Ves. 4:l3; S. C., Cooper, ~; bnt, from the CMe of Williams r..
William!!, 12 East, 220, it should appear that the tenant for life would have the entire property
in timber so cut down.]
(13) [Between the heir and executor there has not been any relaxation of the ancient law
with regard to fixtures, for there is nu res..;iun why the one should he more favored than th11
other, or the courts would be dispo~ed to 118>-;st the heir, and to prevent the inheritance from
being di>nnemhered and di~figured. If the inheritance cannot he cn~yed, wit.bout the things
in dispnt-0, the owner could ncrnr mean to give them to the executor, as in the CBl!e of salt.
pans fixed with mortar to a brick floor, oud without which the salt works produce no profit;
but if removed are of very little mlue to the executor, a.'! old materials only. 1 Beu. Ill.~.
n. a. But the court.! are moro fan1rahlc to an executor of a tenant for life llgaio><t a perMlD
in remainder, and therefore thev ham held that his executor shall hne the benefit of a fire
engine erected by a tenant for life, booam~e the colliery might be worked without i~.• though not
so conveniently. 3 .Atk. 13. With rci;ard to a tenant for r.oani, it is fully established be may
take down u11eful and necesf<Bry erections for the benefit of his trode or manufmeturn, and
which cnublo him to co.rry it on with more advantage. Bae. Ab. Executor, H. 3; 3 E11p. 11;
2 East, 88. It has been so held in the case of cider mills. .A. tenant for years may also nny
away oruo.mental marble chimney pieces, wninllcot fixed only by 11crews, and 81lch like.
Where the tenant h1111 covenanted to leal"e all buildiug::1, &c., he cannot remo'"e even erections
for trade. 1 Taunt. 19. Where a tenant for yeo.1"11 hM a right to romove croouous 8Dd fix·
ture>1 during hi11 lease, and omit.II doing it, he iR a trcspast;()r af\orward>1 for going upon the laud.
but not a tre8pB11Ser de bonis asportatis. 2 Ea:>t, 81:!. .A. farmer who rai;ics young fruit trees on the

Where the tenant has covenanted to leave all buildings, <tc., he cannot remove even erections

514:

for trade. 1 Taunt. 19. Where a tenant for years has a right to remove erections and fix-

tures during his lease, and omits doing it, he is a trespasser afterwards for going upon the loud,

but not a trespasser de bonis oetjtortatis. 2 East, 88. A fanner who raises young fruit trees on th»

514
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If a house be destroyed by tempest, lightning, or the like, which is the act of

Providence, it is no waste: but otherwise, if the house be burnt by the careless-

ness or negligence of the lessee: though now by the statute 6 Ann. c. 31, no

action will lie against a tenant for an accident of this kind. (14) Waste may

also be committed in ponds, dove-houses, warrens, and the like; by so reducing

the number of the creatures therein, that there will not be sufficient for the

reversioner when he conies to the inheritance, (n) Timber,also, is apart of the

inheritance, (o) Such are oak, ash, and elm in all places; and in some particu-

lar countries by local custom, where other trees are generally used for building,

they are for that reason considered as timber; and to cut down such trees, or

top them, or do any other act whereby the timber may decay, is waste, (p) But

underwood the tenant may cut down at any seasonable time *that he r ^go i

pleases; (q) and may take sufficient estovers of common right for house- "- "~'~ ~ >

bote and cart-bote; unless restrained (which is usual) by particular covenants or

exceptions, (r) The conversion of land from one species to another is waste. To

convert wood, meadow, or pasture, into arable; to turn arable, meadow, or pasture

into woodland; or to turn arable or woodland into meadow or pasture, are all of

them waste. (<) For, as Sir Edward Coke observes, (t) it not only changes the

course of husbandry, but the evidence of the estate; when such a close, which is

conveyed and described as pasture, is found to be arable, and e converso. And

the same rule is observed, for the same reason, with regard to converting one

species of edifice into another, even though it is improved in its value. («) To
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open the land to search for mines of metal, coal, &c., is waste: for that is a

detriment to the inheritance: (v) (15) but if the pits or mines were open before,

(n) Co. LitL 53. (o) 4 Rep. (B. (p) Co. Litt. 58. (q) 2 Roll. Abr. 817.

(r) Co. Utt. 41. (•) Hob. 296. ft) 1 Inst. 63. (u) 1 Lev. 309. (v) 6 Rep. 12.

If a house be destroyed by tempest, li&'htning, or the like, which is the act of
Providence, it is no waste: but otherwise, if the house be burnt by the carelessnesl! or negligence of the 1tssee: though now by the statute 6 Ann. c. 31, no
action will lie against a tenant for an accident of this kind. (14) Waste may
also be committed in ponds, dove-houses, warrens, and the like; by so reducing
the number of the creatures therein, that there will not be sufficient for the
reversioner when he comes to the inheritance. (fl) 'l'im her, a]so, is a part of the
inheritance. (o) Such are oak, ash, and elm in ail places; and in some particular countries by local custom, where other trees are generally used for building,
they are for that reason considered as timber; and to cut down such trees, or
t.op them, or do any other act whereby the timber may decay, is waste. (p) But
underwood the tenant may cut down at any seasonable time •that he [ • 282 ]
pleases; (q) and may take sufficient estovers of common right for housebote and cart-bote; unless restrained (which is usuaJ) by particular covenants or
exceptions. (r) The conversion of land from one species to another is waste. 'fo
convert wood, meadow, or pasture, int-0 arable; to turn arable, meadow, or pasture
in to woodland ; or to turn arable or woodland into me.adow or paBture, are all of
them waste. (s) For, as Sir Edward Coke observes, (t) it not only changes the
course of husbandry, but the evidence of the estate; when such a close, which is
ronveyed and described as pasture, is found to be arable, and e converso. And
the same rule is observed, for the same reason, with regard to converting one
species of edifice into another, even though it is improved in its value. (u) To
open the land to search for mines of metal, coal, &c., is waste; for that is a.
detiiment to the inheritance: ( v) (15) but if the pits or mines were open before,

demised land for filling np bis lessor's orchards, is not entitled to sell them, unless he is a nursery-

man by trade. 4Tauut. 316.]

(tt)
( r)

Co. Litt. 53.
Co. Litt. fl.

(o) 4 Rep. 112.

(I) Hob. 296,

(p)
(t)

Co. Litt. 118.
l Inst. 63.

(q) t Roll. Abr. 817.
(•) l Lev. 309.
(o) 6 Rep. 12..

Upon the general subject of fixture* see Amos and Ferrard on Fixtures ; Elwes ». Mawe, and

the notes thereto, in 2 Smith's Leading Cases 99; Washb. Real Prop. c. 1; "Williams on Pers.

Prop. 13 notes to 3d American ed.; Willard on Real Estate, 83-90.

(14) [With a proviso, however, that the act shall not defeat any agreement between land-

lord and tenant See the statute. Bnt if a lessee covenants to pay rent; and to repair with

an express exception of casualties by fire; he may be obliged to pay rent during the whole

term, though the premises are burnt down by accident and never rebuilt by the lessor. 1 T.

R. 310. Nor can ne be relieved by a court of equity; Anst. 687; unless perhaps the landlord

has received the value of his premises by insuring. Amb. 681. And if he covenants to repair

generally without any express exceptions, and the premises are burned down, he is bound to re-

build them. 6T. R. 650.

But though the tenant is not liable for the unroofing of his house by a tempest, he may be

liable for waste if he suffer it to remain uncovered. Pollard v. Shaaffer, 1 Daft. 210. And he

is liable for waste committed upon the premises by a trespasser, because it is his duty to pro-

tect them. Fay v. Brewer, 3 Pick. 203. The statute of Aline referred to in the text ig

adopted into the common law of this country; Wainscott «. Silvers, 13 Ind. 497; but the acci-

dental destruction of a buildiug leased with the land on which it stood, would not excuse

the tenant from the payment of rent; though if the lease was of a part of a building only, aud

the building was destroyed, so that the subject matter of the lease no longer existed, the right to

rents would be extinguished. Winton r. Cornish, 5 Ohio, 477; Graves c. Berdan, 29 Barb. 100.

Sec post, book 3, p. 228, n.

(15) [It is in order to prevent irremediable injury to the inheritance that the court of chan-

cery win grant injunctions against waste, and allow affidavits to be read in support of such

injunctions: the defendant might possibly be able to pay for the mischief done, if it could

ultimately be proved that his act was tortious; but, if any thing is about to be abstracted which

cannot be restored in specie, no man oug^ht to be liable to have that taken away which cannot

be replaced, merely because he may possibly recover (what others may deem) an equivalent in

money. Berkeley v. Brymer, 9 Ves. 356.

In general cases, for the purpose of dissolving an injunction granted ex pat te, the established

practice te to give credit to the answer when it comes in, if it denies all the circumstances

upon which the equity of the plaintiff's application rests, and not to allow affidavits to be

read in contradiction to such answer: Clapnam ». White, 8 Ves. 36; but an exception to this

rule is made in cases of alleged irremediable waste: Potter v. Chapman, Aiubl. 99; and in

cases analogous to waste : Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Tcs. 51; Gibba v. Cole, 3 P. Wins. 254; yet

demised land for filling up bis let1sor's orchards, is not entitled to sell them, unless he is a nursery4 Taunt. a16. J
Upon the general subject of fixturc11 sec Amos and Ferre.rd on Fixtures; Elwes "· Mawe, and
t.be notes thereto, in 2 8mitb'8 Lea.ding Ca.-1es 99; Wasbb. Real Prop. c. 1; Williams on Pers.
Prop. 13 notes to 3d American ed.; Willard on Real Estate, 83-90.
(14) (With a pro'\"iso, however, that the o.ct shall not defeat a.ny agreement between landlord and tenant. See the statute. But if a lessee covenant.'! to pay rent; and to repair with
an expresR exception of casualties· by fire; he mav he obliged to pay rent during the whole
tem1, though the premise8 are burnt down by accident and never rebuilt by the lessor.. 1 T.
R. 310. Wor can be be relieved by a court of equity; Anst. 687; unless perhaps the landlord
bas received the value of bi:! premises by immring. Amb. 621. And if he covenants to repair
genemlly without. any express exceptiou11, o.nd the premises are burned down, he is bound to rellui11l them. 6 T. R. 650.
Dut though the tenant is not liable for the unroofing of his house by a tempest, he may be
liable for waste if he suff'or it to remain uncovered. Pollard"· Sbn.aff'er, 1 Dafi. 210. And he
is liable for wa.'!te committed upon the premises by a trespa.;;ser, bec1mse it is his duty to protect them. Fay "· .Brewer, 3 Pick. 203. The i;tatute of Anne referred to in the text is
adopted into the common law of thiR country; Wainscott "· Sih•er11, 13 Ind. 497; but the accidental destruction of a building lClLSed with the land on which it t<tood, would not excuse
the tenant from the payment of rent; though if the lease was of a part of a building only, and
th1i building was destroyed, so that the subject matter of the lea..'16 no longer exi11tcd, tbe right to
rents would be extinguished. Winton r. Cornish, 5 Ohio, 477; Graves "· Berdan, 29 Barb. 100.
See post, book 3, p. m, n.
(15) [It is in order to prevent irremediable injury to the Inheritance that the court of chancery wifi grant injunctions against WMte, and allow aflidavitl:! to be read in 1mpport of such
injunctions: the defendant might pos~ibly be able to pay for the mischief done, if it could
ultimately be proved that his act was tortious; but, if any tbingi11 about t.<1 be abstro.ctl'<l which
cannot be rm1tored in specie, no man ou~bt to be liable to have that taken away which cannot
be replaced, merely becau~e be may po11s1bly recover (what others may deem) an eq11ivalent in
money. Berkeley v. Brymer, 9 Ves. 356.
Jn ~enera.l cases, for the purpoRe of dis11olving an injunction wanted ex pat te, the eRtablished
practice i8 to give credit to the answer when it comeri in, if it denies all tho eircumstanceH
npon which the equity of the plaintiff's application rests, and not to allow affidavit.It to be
read in contradictior. to such answer: Clapham v. White, 8 VeB. 36; but an exception to this
rule is made in co.sc11 of alleged irremediable wa.'!tc: Potter"· Chapman, Ambl. 99; and in
cues Blllllogous to w&11te: Peacock 11. Peacock, 16 Vcs. 51; Gibbs t•. Cole, 3 P. Wm~. 254; yet
e"r•·n in >nC'b ca'1tls, the pln.intifl"s affidavit.-> m1111t not go to the question of title, bnt be confi.ued to the quedtion of fact as to tctuJle done or threatened. Morphett v. Jones, 19 Ves. 351.

man by trade.
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even in suc-h cases, the plaintiff's affidavits must not go to the question of title, but be con-

fined to the question of fact as to waste done or threatened. Horphett v. Jones, 19 Ves. 351.
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it is no waste for the tenant to continue digging them for his own nse; (w) for

it is now become the mere annual profit of the land. These three are the gen-

eral heads of waste, vi/,,: in houses, in timber, and in land. Though, as was

before said, whatever else tends to the destruction, or depreciating the value, of

the inheritance is considered by the law as waste.

Let us next see, who are liable to be punished for committing waste. And

by the feudal law, feuds being originally granted for life only, we find that the

rule was general for all vassals or feudatories; "si vaaallus feudum dittsipa-

verit, aut imigni detrimento deterius fecerit, privabitur," (x) But in our ancient

common law the rule was by no means so large; for not only be that was seised

of an estate of inheritance might do as he pleased with it, but also waste was

not punishable in any tenant, save only in three persons; guardian in chivalry,

I *2831 '''"'''"' '" dower, and tenant by the Courtesy; (//) and not in tenant for

•• J life or years, (z) And the reason of the diversity was, that the estate of

the three former was created by the act of the law itself, which therefore gave a

remedy against them; but tenant for life, or for years, came in by the demise

and lease of the owner of the fee, and therefore he might have provided against

the committing of waste by his lessee; and if he did not, it was his own default

(w) Hob. 395. (ar) Wright. 44.

(y) It was however a doubt whether \vsate was punishable at the common law in tenant by the onrtesy.

it is no waste for the tenant t.i> continue digging them for b~ own use; (w) for
it is now become the mere imuual profit of the land. 'fhese tbr(.ie are the ~D·
eral he.ads of waste, viz.: in houses, in timber, and in land. Though, as "Wal.ii
before said, whatenr else tt-nd1t to the destruction, or depreciating the vulue, of
the inheritance is considered by the law as waste.
Let us next see, who are liable to be punished for committing waste. And
by the feudal law, feuds being originully granted for life only, we find that the
rule was ~eneral for all vassals or feuclutories; "si vasallus f evdum dis1ipaverit, aut imigni dt1trimento deterius fecerit, privabitur." (x) But in our ancient
eommon law the rule was by no means so large ; for not only be that waa 11eised
of an estate of inheritance might do as he pleased with it, but also waste was
not punishable in any tenant, save only in three persons; guardian in chivalry,
[ • 283 ] tenant in dower, and tenant by the •curtesy; (y) and not in tenH.nt for
life or years. (z) And the retM1on of the diversity was, that the estate of
the three former was created by the act of the law itself, which therefore ~ye a
remedy against them; but tenant for life, or for years, came in by the domise
and leu.se of the owner of the fee, and therefore he might have provided against
the committing of waste by his lessee; and if he did not, it was his own default.

Bcgist. 72. Bro. Al.r. tit. waste, 88. 2 lust. 301.

(Z) 2 Iiut. 'Mi.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Norway v. Rowe, id. 153; Countess of Strathmoro r. Bowes, 1 Cox, 264. And as to matters

which the plaintiff was acquainted with when he filed his bill, he ought at that timo to hare

(ID) Hob. illll.
(z) Wright. 44.
llfl It wu howe,·er a •l1>11bt whether w11ate ,,."" pnnllbable ai &Jae oomlllOll law la &eD&Q& by &be oruwf'/.
Beglst.
JJ1·0. Abr. tU. l!>Q4IU, &i. 2 I1111t. :'!01.
{~I 2 luat. M.

n.

stated them upon affidavit, in order to give the defendant an opportunity of explaining or

denying them by his answer: Lawson v. Morgan, 1 Price, 306; though, of course, acts of

waste uone subsequently to the filing of the bill would be entitled to a distinct consideration:

Suiythe «. Smythe, 1 Swanst. 253; and where allegations in an injunction bill hare been

neither admitted nor denied in the answer, there can be no surprise on the defendant; and it

should seem that affidavits in support of those allegations may be read, though they were not

filed till after the answer was pnt m. Morgan v. Goode, 3 Meriv. 11; Jefi'eries r. Smith, 1 Jac.

»nd "Walk. 300; Barrett i'. Tickell, Jacob's Hep, 155; Taggart v. Hewlett, 1 Meriv. 499.

Neither vague apprehension of an intention to commit waste, nor information given of

snob, intention by a third person, who merely states his belief, but not the grounds of his

belief, will sustain an application for an injunction. The affidavits should go (not necessarily,

indeed, to positive acts, but, at least) to explicit threats, A court of equity never grants an

injunction on the notion that it will do no harm to the defendant, if he does not intend to commit

the act in question ; an injunction will not issue unless some positive reasons are shown to call

for it. Haunay v. M'Entirc, 11 Ves. 54 ; Coffin v. Cofliu, Jacob's Rep. 72.

It was formerly held, that an injunction ought not to go against a person who was a mere

stranger, and who consequently might, by summary legal process, bo turned out of possession

of premises which he was injuring. Such a person, it was said, was a trespasser; but, there

not being any privity of estate, waste, strictly speaking, could not be alleged against him.

Mortimer ». Cottrcll, 2 Cox, 205. But this technical rule is overturned; it is now established

by numerous precedents, that wherever a defendant is taking the substance of a plaintiff's in-

heritance or commitrag or throating irremediable mischief, equity ought to grant an injunction;

although the acts are such as, in correct technical denomination, ought rather to be termed tres-

passes than waste. Mitchell ». Dors, h' Ves. 147 ; Hanson v. Gardiner, 7 id. 309; Twort r. Twort,

1C id. 130 ; Earl Cowper v. Baker, 17 id. 128; Thomas v. Oakley, 18 id. 186.

Any collusion, by which the legal remedies against waste may be evaded, irill give to

courts of equity a jurisdiction over such cases, often beyond, and even contrary to, the rule*

of law; Garth ti. Cotton, 3Atk. 755; thus, trustees to preserve contingent remainders will be

prohibited from joining with the tenant for life in the destruction of that estate, for Uie pur-

pose of bringing forward a remainder, and thereby enabling him to gain a property in timber,

so as to defeat contingent remainder-men; and wherever there i« an executory devise over,

after an estate for life subject to impeachment of waste, equity will not permit timber to be

cut. Stansfield v. Uabcrgham, 10 Ves. 278; Oxpnden v. Lord Compton, 2 Yes. Jnn. 71. So,

though the property of timber severed during the estate of a strict tenant for life vests in the

first owner of the inheritance; yet, where a party having the reversion m fee is, by settle-

ment, made tenant for life, if he, in fraud of that settlement, cuts timber, equity will take

care that the property shall be restored to, and carried throughout all the usage of, the set-

tlement. Powlett v. Duchess of Bolton, 3 Ves. 377 ; Williams v. Duke of Bolton, 1 Cox, 73.]

Norway 11. Rowe, id. 15.'J; Countess of Strathmoro t'. Bowes, 1 Cox, 264. .And &.'! to matteni
which the pl&intiff wa.~ acquainted with when he filed hb bill, he ought at that time to have
stated them upon affidavit, in order to give the defendant an opportunity of explaining or
denying them by his answer: Law~on v. ¥organ, 1 Price, :JOI); though, of course, act.-4 of
waste done i.lnbsequently to the filing of the bill would be entitled to a distinct eonsiderntion:
Smythe 11. Smythe, 1 Swanst. 253 ; and where allegations in an injun<ition bill haTe btlen
neither admitted nor denied in the answer, there can be no snrprise on the defcn1lant; and i~
should l:'eem that affidavits in 1mpJ?Ort of those allcgation11 may be read, thongh thel were not
tJled till after the answer was pnt m. Mor~an "· Goode, 3 Meriv. 11; Jefferies"· Smith, l J8'C.
o.nd Walk. 300; Barrett t•. Tickell, Jacob's Re,P, loo; Toggart ·v. Hewlett, 1 Meriv. 499.
Neither Tague apprehension of an intention to commit WIL..te, nor information given of
11nch intention by a third pel'l'On, who merely stateil hill belief, but not the grounds of hi$
belief, will snt1tain an application for an injunction. The affidont.s t;honld go (not nec~"IU'i.ly,
indeed, to poriitive acts, but, at lt'ast) to cxplidt threat:;, .A court of equity ne\"'er grant.ii an
injunction on the notion that it will do no harm to the defendant, if ho docs not intond to commit
t.he act in question ; an injunction will not illilue unlc118 ;;ome po~it.i\"'o relk!oM are shown to es.II
for it. Hannay 11. M' Entire, 11 Veri. 54 : Coffin t'. Collin, J a.cob's Rep. 72.
It was formerly held, that an injunction ought not to go again11t a pel"80n who WM a mmi
stranger, and v.·ho consequently nught, by 11ummary le~ process, be turned out of pos:ies:<ion
of premi868 which he Wat' injurin". Such a pe?'llon, it was suid, was a tro~~r ; but, there
not being any pril'ity of estate, wa.~te. strictly lllJl:'Bk.ing, could not be alleged agaim;t him.
Mortimer 11. Cottrell, 2 Col:, ~5. But this t<•chuical role is overtnn1ed; it is now cstablii1hfod
by numerous precedents, that wherever a defendant ill taki11g the subHtanoo or a plaintiff's in·
heritance or commitmg or threating i.mlmedial.Jlli mischief, oqnity ought to grnnt an injunction;
although the acts are such as, in corroot technical dtlnomination, ought rather to be termed in_.,..
p8riscs than WBl!te. Mitchdl v. Dora, 6 Vet.1. 147; Hanson v. Gardiner, 7 id. 309; Twort. r. Twort.,
l6 id. 130 · Earl Cowper 11. Buker, 17 i<l. 128; Thoml\i! v. Oakley, 18 id. 186.
Any cohu11ion, by which the legal rou11Jdie;i again~t waiite may be eTaded, will give to
court.I! of equity a jurisdiction over ~uch ca.-res, often beyond, and evlln contrary to, the ru.lei
of Jaw; Garth 11. Cotton, 3 Atk. 75.'l; thus, trustees to pre~erre oontingf'nt remnindel"ll will be
prohibited from joiuing with the tenunt for lifo in the destruction of that estate, for the pur·
J>Ol!e of bringing forward a reu1aindcr, and thereby tmabling him to gain a pn1perty in limber,
ao as to defeat oontingent remainder-men ; and wherever there Li an exocntory deTilie oTer,
after an estote for life subject t.<1 impc~hmout of wlll!te, equity will not permit timber lo be
eut. Stausfield v. IIabcrgbam, 10 Ves. 278; Oxenden t'. Lord Cornpt-0n, 2 Yes. Jun. 71. So.
though the property of timl.Jer ,;evcred during the estate of a t1trict tenant for life v0&ts in the
fifllt owner of the inheritlUIOe; yet, where a ruty having the reYCflliOD fn fee is, by Rttl~
ment, made tenant for life, if he, in fraud o that settlement, cut..q timber, equity will take
care that the property shall be restored to, and carried throudlont all tho U881U or. the 11ettlemeut. Powlett "· Duchetl8 of Bolton, 3 Ves. 377; Williams fl. l>uke of Bolton, 1 Cox, 73.]
A.11 to injunctiom~ to rtllltrain wGSte, 11ee }';den on Injnuctioutl, 179, et acq; KerT on Injuootiooi:.
235 et ~q ,·Story 1'~q. Jnr. ~~ 9hl·9".l0; Adams Eq. (5th Am. ed.) 208 not.c; Willitml F.q. :Nl.
And as to wa'IW gcutlrally and tho remedies thllrefor, eoo 1 W ashl>. Reill Prop. 107, et ~!l.; pUlll,
book III, o. 14.

616

As to injunctions to restrain waste, see Kdenon Injunctions, 179, et seq ; Kerr on Injunctions

235 et seq; Story Eq. Jur. $$ 912-920; Adams Eq. (5th Am, ed.) 208 note ; Milliard Eq. 3«».

And as to waste generally and the remedies therefor, see 1 Washb. Keul Prop. 107, et scq ;

book III, c. 14.
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But in favour of the owners of the inheritance, the statutes of Marlbridge, 52

Hen. Ill, c. 23, and of Gloucester, 6 Edw, I, c, 6, provided that the writ of

waste (15) shall not only lie against tenants by the law of England (or curtesy),

and those in dower, but against any farmer ot other that holds in any manner

for life or years. So that, for above five hundred years past, all tenants merely

for life, or for any less estate, have been punishable or liable to be impeached

For waste, both voluntary and permissive; unless their leases be made, as some-

times they are, without impeachment of waste, dbsque impetitione vasti; that

Is, with a provision or protection that no man shall impetere, or sue him for

waste, committed. But tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct is not

impeachable for waste; because his estate was at its creation an estate of inheri-

itance, and so not within the statutes, (a) Neither does an action of waste lie

for the debtor against tenant by statute, recognizance, or elegit; because against

them the debtor may set off the damages in account: (V) but it seems reasonable

that it should lie for the reeersioner, expectant on the determination of the

debtor's own estate, or of these estates derived from the debtor, (c)

The punishment for waste committed was, by common law and the statute

of Marlbridge, only single damages; (d) except in the case of a guardian, who

also forfeited his wardship (e) by the provisions of the great charter; (/) but

the statute of Gloucester directs, that the other four species of tenants shall

lose and forfeit the place wherein the waste is committed, and also treble dama-

ges to him that hath the inheritance. The expression of the statute is, " he
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shall forfeit the thing which he hath wasted ;" and it hath been determined that

under these words the place is also included, (g) And if waste be done sparsim,

or here and there, all over a wood, the whole wood shall be recovered; or if in

several rooms of a *house, the whole house shall be forfeited; (h) be- ,- $0041

cause it is impracticable for the reversioner to enjoy only the identical *• -•

places wasted, when lying interspersed with the other. But if waste be done

only in one end of a wood (or perhaps in one room of & house, if that can be

Conveniently separated from the rest), that part only is the locus vastatus, or

the thing wasted, and that only shall be forfeited to the reversioner. (»')

VII. A seventh species of forfeiture is that of copyhold estates, by breach of

the customs of the manor. Copyhold estates are not only liable to the same

forfeitures as those which are held in socage, for treason, felony, alienation, and

waste: whereupon the lord may seise them without any presentment by the

homage; (k) bnt also to peculiar forfeitures annexed to this species of tenure,

which are incurred by the breach of either the general customs of all copyholds,

or the peculiar local customs of certain particular manors. And we may observe

that, as these tenements were originally holden by the lowest and most abject

vassals, the marks of feudal dominion continue much the strongest upon this

mode of property. Most of the offences, which occasioned a resumption of the

fief by the feudal law, and were denominated felonies, per quas vassallws amitterct

feudum, (1) still continue to be causes of forfeiture in many of our modern copy-

holds. As, by subtraction of suit and service (m) si dominum deservire noluerit: (ii\

by disclaiming to hold of the lord, or swearing himself not his Copyholder; (0)

sidominnm ejuravit, i. e. negavit se a domino feudum habere: (p) by neglect

to be admitted tenant within a year and a day; (q) si per annumet diem, ces-

saverit in petenda invcstitura: (r) by contumacy in not appearing in court

after three proclamations; (s) si a domino ter citatus non comparuerit: (t) or _

by refusing, when sworn of the homage, to present the truth according to his"

oath: («) *si pares veritatem noverint, et dicant se nescire, cum sciant. (w) r *ggg -•

In these and a variety of other cases, which it is impossible here to *-

(«) Co. Lilt. 27. 2 Roll. Abr. 82S. 828. (») Co. LIU SI. (e) F. N. B. 88. (d\ t Inst. 146.

(«i/ft«. 800. (/) 9 Hen. III. c. 4. (a) * Inst. SIB. (A) Co. Litt. 54. (t)-2 Inst. 304.

(t) 2 Ventr. 38. Cro. Eliz. 489. (I) Feud. 1. S, *. 2B, in calc. (m) :i Leon. 108. Dyer, ill.

(n) Paid. I. 1. t. 21. (o) Co. Copyh. I 57. (PI Feud. I. 2, t. 34, and t. 26, 5 3.

Chap. 18.]
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But in favour of the owners of tlie . inheritance, the statutes of Yarlhridge, 52

Hen. III, c. 23, and of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 5, provided that the writ of

waste (15J.shall not only lie.against tenarita by the law of Engla~d (or curtesy),
aml those. in dower, but a.ga.met any farmer ot other that holds m any manner
for life or years. So that, for above five hundred yea.rs pa.st, all tenants merely
tor life, or for any less estate, have been punishable or liable to be impeached
for w1LSte, both voluntary and permissive; unless their leases be made, as sometimes they are, without impeachment of waste, alJsv.ue impetiUone v~t1:; that
ls, with a provision or protection that no man shall impetere, or sne him for
waste, committed. But tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct is not
fmpe.achable for waste; because his estate was at ite creation an estate of inheriitance, and so not within the statutes. (a) Neither does an action of waste lie
for tll.6 debtor agu.inst tenant by st.atute, recognizance, or' e/.egit; because against
them the debtor msy set off the damages in 8.C<:!oant: (b) but it seems reasonablo
that it should lie for tll.6 retJersioner, expectant on the determination of the
debtor's own estate, or o( these estates den,·ed from the debtor. (c)
The punishment for waste committed was, by common law and the statute
of Marlbridae, only single damages; (d) except in the cue of a guardian, who
also forfeitea his wardship (e) by the provisions of the great charter; (f) but
the statute ot Gloucester directs, that the other four species of tenants shall
lose and forfeit the place wherein the waste is committed, and a.lso treble damages to him that hath the inheritance. The expression of the statute is, "he
shall forfeit the thing which he hath wasted ;" and it hath been determined that
under these words the plact is also included. (g) And if wa.ste be done sparst"ln,
or here and there, all over a wood, the whole wood shall be recovered; or if in
several rooms of a *house, the whole house shall be forfeited; (k) be· •·
cam~e it is impracticable for the reversioner to enjoy only the identical [ 284 J
places wasted, when lying interspersed with the other. But if waste be done
only in one end of a wood (or perhaps in one room of g house, if that can be
com·eniently separated from the rest), that po.rt only is the locus vastatu,s, or
the thing wasted, and that only shall be forfeited to the reversioner. (1'.)
VII. A se>enth species of forfeiture is that of eopyhold estates, by breach of
the customs of the manor. Copyhold estates are not only liable to the same
forfeitures as those which are hefd in socage, for treason, felony, alienation, and
waste: whereupon the lord may seise them without any presentment by the
homage; (k) but also to peculiar forfeitures annexed to this species of tenure,
which are incurred by the breach of either the general customs of all copy holds,
or the peculiar local customs of certain particular manors. And we may observe
that, as these tenements were originally holden by the lowest and most abject
vassals, the marks of feudal dominion continue much the strongest upon this
mode of property. Most of the offence.a, which occasioned a resumption of the
fief by the feoda.l law, and were denominated .feloni<B. per quas vassallu8 amitterct
feudmn, (l) still continue to be causes of forfeiture in many of our modern copyliolds. As, by subtraction of suit and service (m) si dominum deservire noluerit: (n)
by disclaiming to hold of the lord, or swearing himself not his copyholder; (o)
n dmninnm ejttravit, i. e. negavit s~ a domino f eudum kabere : ( p) by neglect
to be admitted tenant within a year and a day; (q) si per ann.mn et dfrm ce.s·
8averit i1i petenda investitura: (r) by contumacy in not appearing in court
after three proclamations; (s) si a dornino ter c'l-iatus nori comparuerif: (t) or.
by refusing, when sworn of the homage, to present the truth according to his
oath : (it) •sipare.'J vert'tatem noverint, et dicant se nescire, cum. sciant. ( w) [ • 28 • ]
In these and a variety of other cases, which it is impossible here to
<>

(o) Plowd. 374. (r) Fetid. 1. 2. (. 24. (»)8Kep. !I9. Co. Copyh » 57.

(ft Feud. 1. 2, t. 22. («) Co. Copyh. } 57. (V) Feud. I 2, *. W.

(16) The writ of waste is now abolished by stat. 3 and 4 "Win. IV, o. 27, 4 36.
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(11\ Ol. LltL '!1. t Roll. A br. 8211. 828.
(f>) Co. Litt. M.
(el F. N. B. li8.
(dl 2 Inst. 1'8.
(el Ibid. Im.
(f) 9 Hen. Ill. c. '·
lg) lB Inst. 308.
(A) Co. Litt. M.
(l) ~ ln~t. 30I..
(k) 2 Ventl'. 38.
Cro. l!:li&. 499.
(I) Jt'etJ.4, l. 2, t. 26, in calc.
(in) :I Leon. lOll. Dyer, 211.
(flJ Fead. l. l. t. 21.
(o) Uo. Copyh. J 57.
!Pl Feud. I. !, t. 34, and t. 26, t 3.
(qJ Plowd. 37:!.
(r) Feud. l. 2. t. 2'.
(•)8 Rep. 119. Uo. Co1lyh t 67.
(I) Feud. I. 2, t. 2'J.
(VJ Co. Copyh. f S7.
!W) Fettd. l. t, t. 211.

(16) The writ of waste is now abolished by stat. 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. Z'l,

~
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enumerate, the forfeiture does not accrue to the lord till after the offences are

presented by the homage, or jury of the lord's court baron: (a:) per laudamen-

turn parium suorum; (y) or, as it is more fully expressed in another place, (z)

nemo miles adimatur de possessions sui beneficii, nisi convicta culpa, yute sit

laudanda (a) per judicium parium suorum. (17)

VIII. The eighth and last method whereby lands and tenements may become

forfeited, is that of bankruptcy, or the act of becoming a bankrupt; which un-

fortunate person may, from the several descriptions given of him in our statute

law, be thus defined, a trader who secretes himself, or does certain other acts,

tending to defraud his creditors.

Who shall be such a trader, or what acts are sufficient to denominate him a

bankrupt, with the several connected consequences resulting from that unhappy

situation, will be better considered in a subsequent chapter; when we shall en-

deavour more fully to explain its nature, as it most immediately relates to per-

sonal goods and chattels. I shall only here observe the manner in which the

property of lands and tenements is transferred, upon the supposition that the

owner of them is clearly and indisputably a bankrupt, and that a commission

of bankrupt is awarded and issued against him.

By statute 13 Eliz. c. 7, the commissioners for that purpose, when a man is

declared a bankrupt, shall have full power to dispose of all his lauds and tene-

ments, which he had in his own right at the time when he became a bankrupt,

or which shall descend or come to him at any time afterwards, before his debts
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are satisfied or agreed for; and all lands and tenements which were purchased

by him jointly with his wife or children to his own use (or such interest therein

F *2861 ^ * may Awfully Part with), or purchased with any other person upon

L " -I secret trust for his own use; and to cause them to be appraised to their

full value, and to sell the same by deed indented and inrolled, or divide them

proportionably among the creditors. This statute expressly included not only

free, but customary and copyhold, lands; but did not extend to estate-tail,

farther than for the bankrupt's life; nor to equities of redemption on a mort-

gaged estate, wherein the bankrupt has no legal interest, but only an equitable

reversion. Whereupon the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 19, enacts, that the commission-

ers shall be empowered to sell or convey, by deed indented and inrolled, any

lands or tenements of the bankrupt, wherein he shall be seised of an estate-tail

in possession, remainder, or reversion, unless the remainder or reversion thereof

shall be in the crown; and that such sale shall be good against all such issues

in tail, remainder-men, and reversioners, whom the bankrupt himself might

fzjCo. Copyh. (38 (y) Feud. 1. «, t. 21 (zJIHd.t.W.

(a) i. e. arbUranda, defniemhi. Da Fresne, IV, 79.

(17) [It is rather singular that in every instance in which Lord Coke on Copyholds is cited

enumerate, the forfeiture does not accrue to the lord till after the offences are
presented by the homage, or jury of the lord's court baron: (x) per laudamentum parium auorum; (y) or, as it is more fully expressed in another place, (z)
nemo miles adimatur de posaessione sui benejicii, 1iisi ronvicta culpa, fJU'B sit
laudanda (a) per judicium parium suorum. (17)
VIII. The eighth and last method whereby lands and tenements may become
forfeited, is that of bmikruptcy, or the act of becoming a bankrupt; which unfortunate person may, from the several descriptions given of him in our statute
law, be thus defined, a trnder who secretes himself, or does certain other acts,
·tending to defraud his creditors.
Who shall be such a trader, or what acts are sufficient to denominate him a
bankrupt, with the several connected consequences resulting from that unhappy
situation, will be better considered in a subsequent chapter; when we shall endeavour more fully to explain its nature, as it most immediately relak>s to personal goods and chattels. I shall only here observe the manner in which the
property of lands and tenements is transferred, upon the supposition that the
owner of them is cle.arly and indisputably a bankrupt, and that a commission
of bankrupt is awarded and issued ~ainst him.
By statute 13 Eliz. c. 7, the commissioners for that purpose, when a man is
declared a bankrupt, shall have full power to dispose of all his lauds and tenements, which be bad in his own right at the time when he became a bankrupt,
or which shall descend or come to him at any time afterwards, before his debts
are satisfied or agreed for; and all lands and tenements which were pnrchas<'d
by him jointly with his wife or children to bis own use (or such interest therein
[ • 286 ] as *he may lawfully part with), or purchased with any other person upon
secret trust for his own use; and to cause them to be appraised to their
full value, and to sell the same by deed indented and inrolled, or divide them
proportionably among the creditors. This statute l'xpressly included not only
free, but customary and copyhold, lands; but did not extend to estate-tail,
farther than for the bankrupt's life; nor to equities of redemption on a mortgaged estate, wherein the bankrupt has no legal interest, but only an equitable
reversion. Whereupon the stature 21 Jae. I, c. 19, enacts, that the commissioners shall be empowered to sell or convey, by deed indented and inrolled~ anv
lands or tenements of the bankrupt, wherein he shall be seised of an estate-tu.fl
in possession, remainder, or reversion, unless the remainder or reversion thert'of
shall be in the crown; and that such sale shall be good against all such issues
in tail, remainder-men, and reversioners, whom the bankrupt himself might

in this paragraph, his authority is directly contradictory of the text. In his fifty-seventh

chapter he divides forfeitures into those which operate eo instante, and those which must be

presented; and then enumerates those of the former class. Under this he ranges among

fzJ Co. Copyh. J ll8
. fr) Feud. l. 2, e. it
f•J Ibid. 1. n.
e. arbUNncla, ·df/lfnfMda. Du Fresne, IV, 79.

(a)'·

many others, disclaimer, not appearing after three proclamations, and refusing when sworn,

to present the truth. In his fifty-eighth chapter he enumerates the second class, and under it

places treason, felony, and alienation. It is observable also, that the references to Dyer 211

and 8 Rep. 99, are not in point.

"With respect to the subject of the paragraph, if presentment is necessary in any case, it

should seem in reason that the necessity would exist rather in case of treason and felony,

where the conviction and attainder might take place far from the residence of the lord, than

in case of disclaimer, Ac., which must take place either in the lord's court, or in a suit to which

he was a party. Of the first he might reasonably be supposed to remain ignorant until his

homage by presentment informed him; of the latter he could hardly avoid taking instant

notice. But, in fact, the better opinion seems to be, that in no case is presentment legally nec-

essary. In 'every instance the forfeiture is referable bock to a supposed determination of the

will which the act, being inconsistent with the tenancy, demonstrates. If the lord is not aware

of the act. it is the duty of the homagera to inform him; but the forfeiture exist' in that case

before the information given. As .a matter of prudence, however, the lord will of course pro-

cure a presentment. See Scriven on Copyholds, 311, in which the opinions of Ch. Baron Gil-

bert and Watkins are stated.")
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(17) [It i!i rather singular that in every instance in which Lord Coke on CoJ?yhollls i11 cited
in this p~ph, his anthority is directly contradict;ory of the text. In hill fifty-seventh
chapter he divides forfeitnres into tho11e which operate w inatante, and those which must be
presented; and then enumerates those of the former cl888. Under this be ranges among
many othen1, disclaimer, not appearing after three proclamation!!, and refmiing when tlwom,
to pre11ent the trut.h. In his fifty-eighth chapter be enumerates the second cla.'<11, and nnder it
places treason, felony, and alienation. It id observable also, that the references to Dyer 211
and 8 Rep. 99, are not in point.
With respect to the subject of "the paragraph, if presentment is necessary in any ca.~. it
should seem in re880n that the necc8sity would exist rather in ca.'ie of treHSon and felon"\",
where the conviction and attainder might take place far from the rei!idence of the lord, than
in ca..~ of disclaimer, &c., which must take .place either in the lord's eonrt, or in a ;;nit t;o which
he was a party. Of the first he might reasonably be supposed to remain ignorant until hi"
homage by presentment informed him; of the latt~r he could hardly avoid taking illlltnnt
notice. But, in fact, the better opinion seems to be, that in no case is presentment Je.gally neooi;sary. In ·every instance tho forfeiture Ji; referable back to a 11upposed determination of the
will which the act, being incontriirtcnt wiCh the tenancy, demonstmte11. If the lord is not aware
of the act. it is the duty of the homagers to inform him; but the forfeiture exist.<t in that ea.ie
before the information given. As .a umttor of prudence, however, the lord 11,11 of course procure a prei;entment. Sec Scriven on COJ>yhelds, 311, in which the opinions of Ch. Baron Gil·
bert and Watkins are lltated.1

618

Original from

NE YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

Chap. 19.] TITLE BY ALIENATION. 286

Cha.p. 19.]

286

TITLE BY ALIENATION.

have barred by a common recovery, or other means; and that all equities of re-

demption upon mortgaged estates shall be at the disposal of the commissioners;

for they shall have power to redeem the same as the bankrupt himself might

have done, and after redemption to sell them. And also by this and a former

act, (b) all fraudulent conveyances to defeat the intent of these statutes are de-

clared void ; but that no purchaser bonafide, for a good or valuable considera-

tion, shall be affected by the bankrupt laws, unless the commission be sued forth

within five years after the act of bankruptcy committed.

By virtue of these statutes a bankrupt may lose all his real estates; which

may at once be transferred by his commissioners to their assignees without his

participation or consent (18.)

CHAPTER XIX.

have barre.d by a common recovery, or other means; and that all equities of redemption upon mortgaged estates shall be at the disposal of the commissioners;
for th~y shall have power to redeem the same i&S the bankrupt himself might
have done, and after redemption to sell them. And also by this and a former
act, (h) all fraudulent conveyancwa to defeat the intent of these statutes are declared void ; but that no purchaser bona fide, for a good or valuable consideration, shall be affected by the bankrupt laws, unless the commission be sued forth
within five years after the act of bankruptcy committed.
By virtue of these statutes a bankrupt may lose all his real estates; which
may at once be transferred by his commissioners to their assignooa without his
participation or consent. (18.)

OF TITLE BY ALIENATION.

THE most usual and universal method of acquiring a title to real estates is

that of alienation, conveyance, or purchase in its limited gense; under which

may be comprised any method wherein estates are voluntarily resigned by one

man, and accepted by another; whether that be effected by sale, gift, marriage,

settlement, devise, or other transmission of property by the mutual consent of the

CHAPTER XIX.

parties.

This means of taking estates by alienation, is not of equal antiquity in the

OF TITLE BY ALIENATION.

law of England with that of taking them by descent. For we may remember

that, by the feudal law, (a) a pure and genuine feud could not be transferred

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

from one feudatory to another without the consent of the lord; lest thereby a

feeble or suspicious tenant might have been substituted and imposed upon him

to perform the feudal services, instead of one on whose abilities and fidelity he

could depend. Neither could the feudatory then subject the land to his debts;

for if he might, the feudal restraint of alienation would have been easily frus-

trated and evaded, (b) And as he could not aliene it in his lifetime, so neither

could he by will defeat the succession, by devising his feud to another family;

nor even alter the course of it, by imposing particular limitations, or prescribing

an unusual path of descent Nor, in short, could he aliene the estate, even

•with the consent of the lord, unless he had also obtained the consent of his own

next apparent or presumptive heir, (c) And therefore it was very usual in

ancient feoffmeuts to express that *the alienation was made by consent •- *ogg i

of the heirs of the feoffor; or sometimes for the heir apparent himself *• *"'" *

to join with the feoffor in the grant ^d) And, on the other hand, as the feudal

obligation was looked upon to be reciprocal, the lord could not aliene or transfer

(b) 1 Jac. I. c. 15. C<U See page 57. fb) Feud. 1.1, t. 27.

(<•') Co. Litt. 94. Wright, 1«8. (d) Maddox, Fornml. Angl. No 316, 319, 427.

(18) The English Bankrupt Acts were revised and consolidated by stat. 12 and 13 Vic. c. 106,

Tinder which the estate of the bankrupt becomes vested in the assignees appointed on behalf

of creditors, in the manner directed by law, by virtue of such appointment alone, and without

any deed or conveyance. These acts were again revised and consolidated by a new act, taking

effect in 1870.

The several states in the United States have insolvent laws, which are in the nature of bank-

rupt laws, and under which, when an assignee is appointed, the estate of the insolvent is trans-

ferred to such assignee, cither by force of the appointment, or by a conveyance which the

THE moet usual and universal method of acquirin~ a title to real estates 1s
that of alienation, conveyance, or purchase in its limited oense; under which
may be comprised any method wherein estates are voluntarily resigned by one
man, and accepted by another; whether that be effected by sale, gift, marria~e,
settlement, devise, or other transmission of property by the mutual consent of tne
parties.
This means of taking estates by alienation, is not of equal antiquity in the
law of England with that of taking them by descent. For we may remember
that, by the feudal law, (a) a pure and genuine feud could not be transferred
from one feudatory to another without the consent of the lord; lest thereby a
feeble or suspicious tenant might have been substituted and imposed upon him
to perform the feudal services, instead of one on whose abilities and fidelity he
coulJ. depend. Neither could the feudatory then subject the land to his debts;
for if he might, the feudal restraint of alienation would have been easily frustrated and evaded. (b) And as he could not aliene it in his lifetime, so neither
could he by will defeat the succession, by devising his feud to another family;
nor even alter the course of it, by imposing particular limitations, or prescribing
an unusual path of descent. Nor, in short, could he aliene the estate, eYen
with the consent of the lord, unless he had also obtained the consent of his own
next apparent or presumptive heir. (c) And therefore it was very usual in
ancient feoffments to express that •the alienation was made by consent [ • 288 ]
of the heirs of the feoffor; or sometimes for the heir apparent himself
to join with the feoffor in the grant. (d) And, on the other hand, as the feudal
obligation was looked upon to be reciprocal, the lord could not aliene or transfer

insolvent is required to execute. Congress, however, is empowered by the constitution of the

United States to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, and this power was exercised in 1867.

(b) I Jae. I. c. Iii.
(a) See page 57.
(b) Ft:t1d. l. 1, t. 27.
(c) Co. Litt. 9'. Wright, llltl.
(dJ Madotox, Forand. .A.ngl. No a16, 319, 4%7.

The state laws are in consequence superseded, inasmuch as the system established by Congress

cannot be " uniform " throughout the country so long as such state laws remain in force. Stur-

gese. Crowninshield, 4 "Wheat. 132. The bankrupt's estate, under the act of 1867, is vested in

the assignee by the appointment.

(18) The English Bankrupt Acts were revised and consolidated by ;;tat. 12 and t:l Vic. c. 106,
under which tlie e11tate of the bankrupt become!\ vested in tht1 asilignee11 appointed on behalf
of creditor.1, in the manner directed by law, by virtue of such appointment alone, and without
any deed or conveyance. These acts were again revised and consolidated by a new e.ct, taking
effect in 1870.
The ~veral states in the United States have insolvent laws, which are in the nature of bankrupt laws, and nnder which, when an assignee is appointed, the ei;tate of the insolvent is transferred to such aasignee, either by force of the appointment. or by a conveyance which the
in,.olvent is required to execute. CongresR, however, iR empowered by the con~titntion of the
Gnited State>! to ei;tablish a uniform syswm of bankruptcy, and thi8 power wwi excrcii>cd in 1867.
The 1.1tate laws arc in consequence isupen;edcd, inasmuch as the syt1wm cRtahlishe1l by Con,rress
eannot be "uniform" throughout the country so long as such ~tate laws remain in force. Stnrges1'. <:rowninrihield, 4 Wheat. 132. The lJankrupt's er;tate, under the act of ltl67, is vested in
the assignee by tho appointment.
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his signiory without the consent of his vassal: for it wag esteemed unreason-

able to subject a feudatory to a new superior, with whom he might have a

deadly enmity, without his own approbation; or even to transfer his fealty,

without his being thoroughly apprised of it, that he might know with certainty

to whom his renders and services were dne, and be able to distinguish a lawful

distress for rent from a hostile seizing of his cattle by the lord of a neighbor-

ing clan, (c) This consent of the vassal was expressed by what was called

attorning, (/) or professing to become the tenant of the new lord; which

doctrine of attornment was afterwards extended to all lessees for life or years.

For if one bought an estate with any lease for life or years standing out

thereon, and the lessee or tenant refused to attorn to the purchaser, and to

become his tenant, the grant or contract was in most cases void, or at least

incomplete: (g) which was also an additional clog upon alienations.

But by degrees this feudal severity is worn off; and experience hath shown

that property best answers the purposes of civil life, especially in commercial

countries, when its transfer and circulation are totally free and unrestrained.

The road was cleared in the first place by a law of King Henry the First,

which allowed a man to sell and dispose of lauds which he himself had pur-

chased; for over these he was thought, to have a more extensive power than

over what had been transmitted to him in a course of descent from his

r *289 1 ances*;or8 5 W *a doctrine which is countenanced by the feudal con-

«• J stitntions.themselves;(i) but he was not allowed to sell the whole of
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his own acquirements, so as totally to disinherit his children, any more than he

was at liberty to aliene his paternal estate, (k) Afterwards a man seems to have

been at liberty to part with all his own acquisitions, if he had previously pur-

chased to him and his assigns by name; but, if his assigns were not specified

in the purchase deed, he was not empowered to aliene; (/) and also he might

part with one-fourth of the inheritance of his ancestors without the consent

of his heir, (m) By the great charter of Henry III, (n) no subinfendation was

permitted of part of the land, unless sufficient was left to answer the services

due to the superior lord, which sufficiency was probably interpreted to be one

half or moiety of the land, (o) But these restrictions were in general removed,

by the statute of quia emptores, (p) whereby all persons, except the king's

tenants in capite, were left at liberty to aliene all or any part of their lands at

their own discretion, (q) And even these tenants in capite were by the statute

1 Edw. Ill, c. 12, permitted to aliene, on paying a fine to the king, (r) By the

temporary statutes 7 Hen. VII, c. 3, and 3 Hen. VIII, c. 4, all persons attending

the king in his wars were allowed to aliene their lands without license, and were

relieved from other feudal burdens. And lastly, these very fines for alienations

were, in all cases of freehold tenure, entirely abolished by the statute 12 Car. II, c.

24. As to the power of charging lands with the debts of the owner, this was intro-

duced so early as statute Westm. 2, which (*) subjected a moiety of the tenant's

lands to executions, for debts recovered bylaw; as thett'Aofoof them was like-

wise subjected to be pawned in a statute merchant by the statute de mercatoribut

made £he same year, and in a statute staple by statute 27 Edw. Ill, c. 9, and in

F *29fl 1 otner sin"lar recognizances by statute *23 Hen. VIII, c. 6. And now,

L ^9U J the whole of them is not only subject to be pawned for the debts of the

owner, but likewise to be absolutely sold for the benefit of trade and commerce bv

the several statutes of bankruptcy. The restraint of devising lands by will,

(t) Gilb. Ten. 75.

(f) The same doctrine and the same denomination prevailed In Bretafrne—potKtsionet in j*rit<1i<iiai>a}i-

liti'.t nan alittr apprehsiidi pout, ijuam per attournnncei et iimrancft. «< liu/ui solent : <•«» ratal/us, ejnrato

privris domini ooscquio etfide, novo sc tacramcnto novo item domino acquirtnti obstrinyebat, idque jusn tntc-

torii. D'ArjriMitre Aniiq. Consult. Brit, apud Dufrcsiie, i. 819, 820.

CffjMtt. f Ml.

fh) Kmptione* vel acquimfione* nun tlet mi magit velit. Terrain antrm qvam eiparenta dsdcnni*, noil

miitni t'j-trn cogntitwHem suani. LL. Sen. I, c. 70.

(i) Fnul. I. 'I, t. :».

(k) Si i/uentum tantum haburrit ii. qul partfm terrtt sna donare rolneHt, tnne yuidem hoe et licet; nd iws

t tin,a ijnesium, quia non potixtjiltum laum hmredf.ni exhceredare. Glanvil. I. 7, c. 1.

(I) MiiT. c. 1. i S. Tills is also borrowed from the trndal law. Feud. I. 2, t. 48,

(m) Mirr. ibid. (n) 9 Hen. Ill, c. 32. (o) D.-ilrympleof Feuds, 88. (a) 18 Edw. I, c. 1.

(q) Sec pnjtiM 72,91. (r) 2 lust. 07. (t) 13 Edw. I, c. 18.
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except in some places by particular custom, lasted longer; that not being totally

removed till the abolition of the military tenure. The doctrine of attornment-s

continued still later than any of the rest, and became extremely troublesome,

though many methods were invented to evade them; till at last they were made

no longer necessary to complete the grant or conveyance, by statute 4 and 5

Ann. c. 16 ; nor shall, by statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, the attornment of any tenant

affect the possession of any lands, unless made with consent of the landlord,

or to a mortgagee after the mortgage is forfeited, or by direction of a court of

justice. (1)

In examining the nature of alienation, let us first inquire, briefly, who may

aliene, and to whom; and then, more largely, how a man may aliene, or the

several modes of conveyance,

I. Who may aliene, and to whom: or, in other words, who is capable of con-

veying and who of purchasing. And herein we must consider rather the

incapacity, than capacity, of the several parties: for all persons in possession

are prima facie capable both of conveying and purchasing, unless the law has laid

them under any particular disabilities. But, if a man has only in him the right

of either possession or property, he cannot convey it to any other, lest pretended

titles might be granted to great men, whereby justice might be trodden down, and

the weak oppressed, (t) (2) Yet reversions and vested remainders may be granted;

ft) Co. Litt ill.

(1) [An attornment at the common law was an agreement of the tenant to the grant of the

except in some pluces by particular custom, la.stoo longer ; that not being totally
removed till the abolition of the military tenure. The doctrine of attornment~
continued still later than any of the rest, and became extremely troublesome,
though many methods were invented to evade them; till at last they were made
no longer necessary t-0 complete the grant or conveyance, by statute 4 1~nd I>
Ann. c. 16; nor shall, by st:atute 11 Geo. 11, c. 19, the attomment of any tenant
affect the possession of any lands, unless made with consent of the landlord,
· or to a mortgagee after the mortgage is forfeited, or by direction of a court of
justice. (1)
In examining the nature of alienation, let ns first inquire, briefly, wlto may
aliene, and to whom.; and then, more largely, hO'W a man may ahene, or the
several modes of conveyance.
I. Who may aliene, and to whom: or, in other words, who is capable of con·
veying and who of purchasing. And herein we most consider rather the
incapacity, than capacity, of the several parties: for all persons in potlS6ssion
are prt'.ma fact'.e capable both of conveying a.nd purchasing, nnless the law bas laid
them under any particular disabilities. But, if' a mnn has only in him the ri,qht
of either possession or property, he cannot conl'ey it to any other, lest pretended
titles might be granted to great men, whereby justice might be trodden down, and
the weak oppressed. (t) (2) Yet reversions and vested remainders may be granted;
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signiory, or of a rent, or of the donee in tail, or tenant for life or years, to a grant of reversion,

(I) (;o. Litt. lta.

or remainder made to another. Co. Litt. 309 a. And the attornment was necessary to the

perfection of the grant. However, the necessity of allurements w u< in some measure

avoided by the statute of uses, as by that statute the possession was immediately executed to

the use, 1 Term R. 384, 386, and by the statute of wills, by which the legal estate is imme-

diately vested in the devisee. Yet attornment continued after this to be necessary in many cases:

but both the necessity and efficacy, of attoraments have been almost totally taken away by the

statutes referred to. An attormnent, nevertheless, is not altogether useless, for after an attoni-

menl, in an action by the landlord against the tenant, it is unnecessary to adduce evidence of the

plaintiiFs title; unless indeed the tenant shows that he has attorned by mistake. 6 Tauut. 202;

Doe v. Thompson, 6 A. and E. 721.]

(2) [It is a very ancient role of law that rights not reduced into possession should not be

assignable to a stranger, on the ground that such alienation tended to increase maintenance

and litigation, and afforded means to powerful men to purchase rights of action, and oppress

others. Co. Litt 214, 265, a. n. 1, 232, b. n. 1. Our ancestors were so anxious to prevent

alienation of chafes, or rights in action, that we find it enacted by the 32 Hen. Till, c. 9,

(which it is said'wag in affirmance of the common law, Plowd. 88), that no person should buy

or sell, or by any means obtain any right or title to any manors, lands, tenements, or heredita-

ments, unless the person contracting to sell or his ancestor, or they by whom he or they claim

the same, had been in possessioti of the name, or of the reversion or remainder thereof, for the

space of one year before the contract: and this statute wag adjudged to extend to the assign-

ment of a copyhold estate, 4 Co. 26, a., and of a chattel interest, or a lease for years, of land

•whereof the grantor was not in possession. Plowd. 88. At what time this doctrine, which, it

is said, had relation originally only to landed estates, 2 Woodd. 388, was first adjudged to be

equally applicable to the assignment of a mere personal chattel not in possession, it is not easy

to decide: it seems, however, to have been so settled at a very early period of our history, as the

works of our oldest text writers, and the reports, contain numberless observations and cases on

the subject. Lord Coke says, Co. Litt. 214, a.; see also, 2 Bos. and Pul. 541, that it is one of the

maxims of the common law, that no right of action can be transferred, " because under color

thereof, pretended titles mitt ht be granted to great men, whereby right might be trodden down,

and the weak oppressed, which the common law forbiddeth."]

Chancellor Kent has well remarked that the ancient policy, which prohibited the sale of pre-

tended titles, and adjudged the conveyance to a third person of lands held adversely at the time

to be an act of maintenance, was founded upon a state of society which does not exist in the

United States. 2 Kent, 447. Accordingly, many of the states have abolinhed by statute the rule

stated in the text But where not abolished, it docs not apply to judicial sales. Friz^e «.

Teach, 1 Dana, 216; Jarrett v. Tomliuson, 3. W. and S. 114; Tuttle t'. Jackson, 6 Wend. 213.

And a deed of lands adversely possessed is void only as to the person in possession, and those

claiming in privity with him; as to the grantor and his heirs it is good, by way of estoppel, and

the grantee may sue for and recover possession in the name of the grantor, and then protect him-

(1) [An attomment at the common law was an agreement of the tenant to the grant of the
signiory, or of a rent, or of the donee in tail, or tenant for life or yell.I'll, to a gmnt of reversion,
or remainder made to another. Co. Litt. 309 &. And the attomment wu necessary to the
perfection of the grant. However, the ne~l!sity of attornwents WM in 1:10me mea..~ure
avoided by the statute of uses, as by that statute the \>_<!8iression was immediately executed to
the use, 1 Tenn R. 384, 386, and by the statute of w1ll:1. by which the legal estate is immediately vested in the de\'"isee. Yet attornment continued after this to be neces:>ary in many c&:Jes:
but both the nece8t!ity ood effieooy. of attomments have been almost totally taken away by the
statutes referred to. .An attorwnent, neverthelos11, is not altogether U8tll81!1!, for after an attornment, in an action by the landlord against the tenant, it is unnecessary to adduce evidence of the
plaintiff'll title; unle1:!8 indeed the tenant shows that he has attorued by mistake. 6 Taunt. 20"2;
Doe ti. Thompson, 6 A. and E. 721. l
(2) [It is a very ancient rulo oi law that rights not reduced into posseesion Rhould not be
Uzlignal.Jle to a l!tranger. on tbe ground that such alienation tended to incree.se maintenan.ce
and litigation, and afforded means to powerful men to purch&ile rights of action, a11d oppre88
others. Cu. Litt. 214, 265, a. n. 1, 2!rl, b. n. 1. Our ancestors were so anxious to prevent
alienation of choBCs, or rights in action, that we find it enact.ad by the 3'.l Hen. VIII, c. 9,
(which it ie Mid w88 in aftinnaneeoftbe common law, Plowd. 88), that no person should bny
or sell, or by any meanr; obtain any right or title to any manom, lands, tenements, or hereditamcnts, unless the person contracting to sell or hit> ancestm, or they by whom he or they claim
the same, bad been in posse.~simi of the. ~nme, or of the revemion orrcmaimler thereof, for the
sp&ee of one year before the contract: and this 1¢8.tut.e was adjudged to ext.end to the a.«irlgn·
munt of a copybold est.ate, 4 Co. 26, a., and of a chattel intere11t, or a lea.<1e for :ye~, of land
whereof the grantor wa.'! not in po11session. Plowd. 88. .At what time this doctnne, which, it
is said, had relation vriginally only tc1 lande<h~states, 2 W oodd. 388, was fint adjudged to be
equally applicable tO the Msignment of a mere per~nal chattel not in possession, it i~ not easy
to decide: it seems, however, to have been so settled at a very early penod of our history, wi the
works of our oldest text writers, and the reporbl, cont.a.in numberless observations and caimf! on
the subject. Lord Coke i;ay!!, Co. Litt. 214, a.; see also, 2 Bos. and Pu!. 541, that it is one of tho
maximi; of the common law, that no right of action can be transferred, "because under color
thereof, pretended title;i might be granted to great men, whereby right might be trodden down,
and the weak oppresi;ed, whioh the common law forbiddetb."]
Chancellor Kent hM well remarked that the ancient policy, which prohibited the sale of \Ire·
tended titles, and adjudged the conveyance to a third penion oflands held achersely at the time
to be an act of maintenance, was fouudcd npon a state of BOCiety which does not exist in the
U nit~d States. 2 Kent, 447. .Accordingly, many of the Btates have aboli11hed by statute the rule
stated in the text But where not e.boli11hed, it docs not apply to judicial. sa.l.tiS. Friz:tJe ti,
Veach, 1 Dana, 216; Jarrett ti. Tomlinl!On, 3. W. and S. 114; Tuttle ti. Jacki!On, 6 Wend. 213.
.And a deed of lands ad\'ersely po1!8e88ed i11 void only as to the penion in pos11e!!Rion, and those
claiming in privity with him ; as to the grantor and his heirs it is good, by way of et<tnppel, and
the ~antec may sue for and recover po&;el!lliun in the name of the grant.or, and then protect him·
t1elf 111 his title under snch deed. Williams"· Jackson, 6 Johns. 489; Brinley"· Whiting, 5 Pick.
348; Livingston v. ProMcu,1.1, 2 Hill, 526.
0

self in his title under such deed. "Williams «, Jackson, 5 Johns. 489; Brinley ». Whiting, 5 Pick.
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348; Livingston v. Proscus, 2 Hill, 526.
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because the possession of the particular tenant is the possession of him in

reversion or remainder; but contingencies, and merepossibilities, though they

may be released, or devised by will, (3) or may pass to the heir or executor, yet can-

not (it hath been said) be assigned to a stranger, unless coupled with some present

interest, (u)

Persons attainted of treason, felony, and prcemunire, are incapable of con-

veying, from the time of the offence committed, provided attainder follows: (v)

for such conveyance by them may tend to defeat the king of his forfeitures, or

r »qg, -i the *lord of his escheat But they may purchase for the benefit of the

' J crown, or the lord of the fee, though they are disabled to hold; the landa

so purchased, if after attainder, being subject to immediate forfeiture; if before,

to escheat as well as forfeiture, according to the nature of the crime, (w) (4) So

also corporations, religious or others, may purchase lands; vet, unless they have

a license to hold in mortmain, they cannot retain such purchase; but it shall be

forfeited to the lord of the fee.

Idiots and persons of non-sane memory, infants and persons under duress, are

not totally disabled either to convey or purchase, but sub modo only. For their

conveyances and purchases are voidable, but not actually void. The king, in-

deed, on behalf of an idiot, may avoid his grants or other acts. (./:) But it hath

been said, that a non compos himself, though he be afterwards brought to a right

mind, shall not be permitted to allege his own insanity in order to avoid such

grant: for that no man shall be allowed to stultify himself, or plead his own dis-
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ability. The progress of this notion is somewhat curious. In the time of

Edward I, non compos was a sufficient plea to avoid a man's own bond: (y) and

there is a writ in the register (z) for the alienor himself to recover lands aliened

by him during his insanity; dum fuit non compos mentis suce, ut dicit, t&c,

But under Edward III a scruple began to arise, whether a man should be per-

mitted to blemish himself, by pleading his own insanity: (a) and, afterwards, a

defendant in assise having pleaded a release by the plaintiff since the last con-

tinuance, to which the plaintiff replied (ore tenus, as the manner was) that he

was out of his mind when he gave it, the court adjourned the assise; doubting,

whether as the plaintiff was sane both then and at the commencement of the

suit, he should be permitted to plead an intermediate deprivation of reason; and

the question was asked, how he came to remember the release, if out of his

f *2921 8enses wnen he gave it. (b) Under Henry VI this way of 'reasoning

*• '" •* (that a man shall not be allowed to disable himself, by pleading his own

incapacity, because he cannot know what he did under such a situation) was

seriously adopted by the judges in argument;(c) upon a question, whether the

heir was barred of his right of entry by the feoffment of his insane ancestor.

And from these loose authorities, which Fitzherbert does not scruple to reject

as being contrary to reason, (d) the maxim that a man shall not stultify himself

hath been handed down as settled law: (e) though later opinions, feeling the

(u) Shenpard's Touchstone, 238. 239, 322. 11 Mod. 152. 1 P. Wms. 574. Stru. 132.

(v) Co. Litt. 42. (v>) Ibid. 2. (xj Ibid. 247. (y) Britton. c. W./bt. 06.

(~) Fol. 228. See also Memorand. Scacch. 22 Edm. I (prefixed to Maynnni's year-book. K.I w. Ti^,f-.il. 23.

(a) 5 Edm. Ill, 70. (b) 36 Atiit. pi. 10. fcj 39 Hen. VI, 42. (d) F. N. B. 202.

(<•) Litt. ;> 40S. Cro. Eliz. 383. 4 Rep. 123. Junk. 40.

(3) [It is now well established, as a general rule, that possibilities (not meaningthcrebv mere

Jiopes of succession, Curl I on v. Leighton, 3 Meriv. (571; Jones v. Roe, 3 T. R. 93, 96,) are devisa-

ble : for a disposition of equitable interests in land, though not good at law, may be sustained in

equity. Perry v. Phelips, 1 Ves. Jnn. 251; Scawen v. Blunt, 7 Ves. 300; Moor v. Hawkins, 2

Eden, 343.]

(4) [.After attainder a man is civUitcr mortvus; all feudal relation between himself aud his

lord is at an end, and therefore there can be no escheat. Neither, strictly speaking, can there be

forfeiture, which is a kind of punishment, and operates on the relation of king and subject.

Indeed, by mere forfeiture in felons, the king's title would only be for a year and a day. Lord

Coke expresses himself therefore cautiously, calling it neither escheat nor forfeiture; he says,

" the king shall have it by his prerogative, and not the lord of the fee; for a man attainted hath

no capacities to purchase (being a man tiviliter mortitus), but only fur the benefit of thv king. DO

more than an alien hath."]
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inconvenience of the rule, have in many points endeavoured to restrain it. (/) (5)

And, clearly, the next heir, or other person interested, may, after the death of

the idiot or non compos, take advantage of his incapacity and avoid the grant, (g)

And so, too, if he purchases under this disability, and does not afterwards upon

recovering his senses agree to the purchase, his heir may either waive or accept

the estate at his option. (A) In like manner, an infant may waive such purchase

or conveyance, when he comes to full age; or if he does not then actually agree

to it, his heirs may waive it after him. (t) Persons also, who purchase or convey

under duress, may affirm or avoid such transaction, whenever the duress is

ceased. (/) (6) For all these are under the protection of the law; which will not

suffer them to be imposed upon, through the imbecility of their present condi-

tion ; so that their acts are only binding, in case they be afterwards agreed to,

when such imbecility ceases. Yet the guardians or committees of a lunatic, by

the statute of 11 Geo. Ill, c. 20, are empowered to renew in his right, under the

directions of the court of chancery, any lease for lives or years, and apply the

profits of such renewal for the benefit of such lunatic, his heirs or executors. (7)

The case of a feme-covert is somewhat different She may purchase an estate

without the consent of her husband, and the conveyance is good during the

coverture, till he avoids *it by some act declaring his dissent, (k) And, r ,„„„ -,

though he does nothing to avoid it, or even if he actually consents, the *- ' -"

feme-covert herself may, after the death of her husband, waive or disagree to

the same: nay, even her heirs may waive it after her, if she dies before her hus-
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band, or if in her widowhood she does nothing to express her consent or

agreement^ I) But the conveyance or other contract of a feme-covert (except

(f) Comb. 489. 3 Mod. 310, 311. 1 Eqn. cas. abr. 279. (g) Perkins, f 81 (hj Co. Litt. i.

ft} IMA. (j) i Inst. 483. 6 Rep. 119. (k) Co. Litt. 2. ft} Ibid.

inconvenience of the rule, have in many points endeavoured to restmin it.(/) (5)
And, clearly, the next heir, or other person interested, may, after the death of
the idiot or non compos, take advantage of his incapacity and avoid the grant. ( g)
And so, too, if he purchases under this disability, and does not afterwu.rds upon
recovering his senses agree to the purchase, his heir may either waive or accept
the estate at his option. (It) In like manner, an infu.nt may waive such pnrcha8e
or conveyanr,e, when he comes to full age; or if he does not then actually agree
to it, his heirs may waive it after him. ('i) Persons also, who purchase or conYcy
under duress~ may affirm or avoid such transaction, when~ver the duress is
ceased. <.f) (6) For all these are under the protection of the law; which will not
suffer them to be imposed upon, through the imbecility of their present condition; so that their acts are onlv binding, in case they be afterwards agreed to,
when such imbecility ceases. Yet the guardians or committees of a lunatic, by
the statute of 11 Geo. III, c. 20, are empowered to renew in his right, under the
directions of the court of chancery, any lease for lives or years, and apply the
profits of such renewal for the benefit of such lunlltic, his heirs or executors. (7)
The case of a feme-covert is somewhat different. She muy purclmse an estate
without the consent of her husband, and the conveyance is good during the
coyerture, till he avoids *it by some oot declaring his dissent. (k) And, [ • 293 ]
though he does nothing to avoid it, or even if he actually consents, the
·
feme-covert herself mu.y, after the death of her husband, waive or disagree to
the same: nay, even her heirs may waive it after her, if she dies before her husband, or if in her widowhood she does nothing to express her consent or
agreement.( l) But the conveyance or other contract of a feme-covert (except

(5) The old doctrine that a man shall not be allowed to stultify himself by alleging his men-

tal ineompenteney in avoidance of his contract, is no longer accepted in the lawj either in

(f) Comb. 489.
(i) I bid.

3 Mod. 310, Sil. I Eqn. cu. abr. 279.
(g} Perkins, f !1
(j) I Inst. ,113, 5 Ro11. Ult,
(k) Co. IJtc. I.
(l) I bid.

(It) Co. Litt.

I.

England or in this country. As Mr. Parsons has well said, those who have no mind cannot

agree in mind with another; and as this is the essence of a contract, they cannot enter into a

contract. 1 Pars, on Cont. 383. And if one has not made a contract, it ih difficult to dis-

cover any sound reason which should preclude his saying so when he is charged with having

become a party to one. The modem authorities allow want of mental capacity to be made a

defense at law as well as a ground for affirmative relief in equity, not only by the party him-

self while living, but by his representatives afterwards. Lang v. WTiidden, 2 N. H., 435;

Mitchell e. Kingman, 5 Pick. 431: Grant ». Thompson, 4 Conn. 203; Horner v. Marshall, 5

Munf. 466; Rice ». Pect, 15 Johns. 503. And if a man is so intoxicated at the time of entering

into a contract as to be incapable of comprehending its meaning, nature or effect, and the

other party is aware of that fata, this is sufficient answer to an action upon it. Gore v. Gibson,

13 M. and W. 623. And see Foot ». Tewksbury, 2 Vt. 97 ; Duncan e. McCuIlough, 4 S. and R.

484; Harrison v. Lemon, 3 Blackf. 54; Prentice v. Achom, 2 Paige, 30; Reimckor v. Smith,

2 Har. and J. 421.

(6) [Where a deed has been prepared in pursuance of personal instructions of the convey-

ing party, yet, if it be proved that such party, though appearing to act voluntarily, was in

fact not a free agent, but so subdued by harshness and cruelty that the deed spoke the mind,

not of the party executing, but of another, such deed cannot, in equity, stand: though it may

be difficult to make out a case of legal duress. Peel «. , 16 Ves. 159, citing Lady Strath-

more v. Bowes, 1 Ves. Jun. 22. When an execution of a deed is prevented, or compelled, by

force or artifice, equity will give relief, Middleton v. Middleton, 1 Jac. and Walk. 96; in

favor of a volunteer, aud even, in some cases, as against innocent parties: Meostaer v. Gillespie,

11 Ves. 639; for, it would be almost impossible ever to reach a case of fraud, if third persons were

allowed to retain gratuitous benefits, which they have derived from the fraud, imposition, or

undue influence practiced by others. Hngueuin ?. Baseley, 14 Ves. 289; Stilwell v. Wilkius,

Jacob's Rep. 282. Still, it would be pushing this principle too far to extend it to innocent

purchasers: Lloyd v. PaBsingham, Coop. 155; it is only when an estate has been obtained by

a third person without payment, or with notice of fraud, that a court of equity will take it from him,

to restore it to the party who has been defrauded of it: Mackreth v, Syuiinons, 1 Ves. 340; a

Iniiin fide purchaser, for valuable consideration and without notice, will not be deprived of the

advantage which his legal title gives him. Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ves. Jun. 457.]

A contract made under duress is void, inasmuch as in such case the essential element of consent

is wanting. As to what is duress, see note to book 1, p. 131.

(5) The old doctrine that fl man shall not be allowed to stultify himself by alleging hi~ mental incompentency in a>oidance of his contract, is no lon~r accepted in the law, either in
England or in this country. As Mr. Panmns has well said, those who ha>e no mind cannot
agree in mind with another ; and 88 thit1 is the eRrlence of a contra.ct, they cannot enter into a
contract. 1 Pal'l!. on Cont. 383. .And if one hss not wf\de a contract, it it- difficult to disco>er any sound rcn.-<0n which should preclude his saying t10 when he is char~ with hn¥ing
become a party to one. The modem authorities allow want of mental capacity to be made a
defense at law 8.1! well as a ground for affinn1\tive relief in equity, not only by the party himself while living, but by his representatives afterwards. Lang "· Whidden, 2 N: H., 435;
Mitchell v. Kingman, 5 Pick. 4:n: Grant "· Thompson, 4 Conn. 203; Homer 11. Manihwl, 5
Munf. 466; Rice ti. Peet, 15 Johns. 503. And if a man it1 so intoxicated at the time of entering
into a contract as to be incapable of cnml?rehending it.II meaning, nature or effect, and the
other party is aware of that f11ct, this is suftlment answer to an action upon it. Gore fl. Gib1mn,
13 lil. and W. 623. .And see Foot ti. Tewk!lbary, 2 Vt. 97; Duncan ti. MeCullou~h, 4 S. and R.
484 ; Harrif!On fl. Lemon, 3 Blackf. 54 ; Prentice "· Achorn, 2 Po.ige, 30 ; Rein1ckcr ti. Smith,
2 Har. and J. 421.
(6) [Where a deed ha.;i been prepared in pursnance of personal instructions of the cnnver·
ing party, yet, if it be pmved that such party, though appearing to act voluntarily, wa.-1 1n
fact not a free agent, but i:o subdued by hal'llhness and enmity that the deed spoke the mind,
not of the party executing, but of another, such deed cannot, in equity, stand: though it may
be difficult to make out 11 c11~e of legal dnrei:is. Peel v. - - , 16 Ves. 159, c.i ting Lady Strathmore ti. Bowes, 1 Ve11. Jun. 2'..!. When au exl'cution of a deed is pre>cnted, or compelled, by
force or artifice, equity will gfre relief, Middleton ti. Middleton, 1 Jac. and Walk. 96; in
favor of a volunteer, aud c>en, in some case~, 88 againilt innocent partie~ : lileostaer fl. Gillespie,
11 Ves. 639; for, it would be almost impoN>ible 1.wer to rcuch a case ot' fmnd, if third pel'llons were
allowed to retain gratuit01'8 benefits, which t.hey ha>e derived from the fraud, imposition, or
undue influence practicP.d by others. Huguenin v. Ba.<tiley, 14 Ves. 289; Stilwell ti. Wilkimi,
.Jacob's Rep. 28'..!. Still, it would be pushing thi,i principle too far to extend it to innocent
pvrchasers : Lloyd fl. Pa.qsingham, Coop. 155; it is only when an estate ha.~ been obtained by
a third person without payment, or with notice of fraud, that a court of ecp1ity will take it f'rom him,
to ret1tore it t-0 the p11.rtv who has been defrauded of it: lila.ckreth "· Symmons, 1 Ves. 340; a
bmaa fide purchMer,
>runable conRideration and without not.ice, will not be deprived of the
advantage which his leg11l title gives him. Jcrrard ti. Saunders. 2 Ves. Jun. 457.)
.A contra.ct mnd€' under dureRS is >oid, inasmuch as in such case the essential element of conl!ent
is wanting. .As to what is duress, 11ee note to book 1, p. 1:n.
(7) There are 11everal subsequent statutes pre!lcribing aud regulating the powers and duties
of these committees. The same subject iJ! also regulated by Btatute in the United States.
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by some matter of record) is absolutely void, and not merely voidable; (m) and,

therefore, cannot be affirmed or made good by any subsequent agreement. (8)

(m) Perking. •; 15t. 1 Sid. ISO.

(8) [The rule laid flown in the text must bo understood with some obvious qualifications.

The possession by a married woman of property settled to her separate use. may, as a neeps-

sary incident, carry with it the right of disposition over such property. Rich p. Cockell 9

Yes. 375; Fettiplace «. Gorges, 1 Ves. Jun. 49 ; Tappenden 0. Walsh, 1 Puilliin. 352 ; Grigby r.

Cox. 1 Ves. Sen. 518; Bell v. Hyde, Proc. in Cha. MO. A. court of equity has no power to set

aside, but is bound to give effect to a disposition made by a feme covert of property settled to

her separate use, though such disposition be made in favor of her husband, or even of her

own trustee; notwithstanding it may be plain, that the whole object of the settlement in the

wife's favor may be counteracted by this exercise of her power. Pylms v. Smith, 1 Ves. Jun. 194;

Parker «. White, 11 Ves. 221, 2-2-2; Jackson v. Hobhou.se, 2 Men v. 487 ; Xantes r. Corrock. 9 Ves.

189; Sperlingt). Roehfort, 8 id. 175; Sturjris e. Corp, 13 id. 190; Ulyn «. Baxter, 1 Tonnge and

Jerv. 332; Acton ». White, 1 Sim. and Stn. 432. And the assent of tnwteos to whom property

is given for the separate use of a married woman, is not necessary to enable her to bind that

property as she thinks fit; unless such assent is required by the instrument under which she

is beneficially entitled to that property. Essex v. Atkins, 14 Ves. 547 ; Browne r. Like, 14 id.

302; Pybus c. Smith, 1 Ves. Jnn. 194.

So, us Mr. Sugden, in the 3d chapter of his Treatise on Powers adduces numerous authorities

to prove, it hag long been settled, that a married woman may exercise a power over land,

or, in other words, direct a conveyance of that land, whether the power be appendaut, in
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gross, or simply collateral; and as well whether the estate be copyhold or freehold. Doe r.

Staple, 2T. R. 695; Tomlinson p. Dighton, 1 P. Wms. 149; Hearle'c. Greenbank. 3 Atk. 711;

Peacock r. Monk. 2 Ves. Sen. 191; Wright v. Englefield, Ambl. 473; Driver r. Thompson. 4

Taunt. 297. And it would operate palpable injustice, if, where a married woman held property

in trust as executrix, or en autre droit, she could not convey and dispose of the same, as

the duties of her trust required. Scammell v. Wilkinson, 2 Kast, 557; Perkins, ch. 1, J 7.

No doubt, the separate estate of a/erne covert uuuuot be reached as if she were a feme tole

without some charge on her part, either express or to be implied ; it seems, herwever, to be set-

tled, notwithstanding the dislike of the principle, which has been often expressed: Jones r.

Harris, 9 Ves, 497; Sautes v. Corrock, 9 id. 189; Heatlcy r. Thomas, 15 id. 604 ; that when a

•wife joins with her husband in a security, this is an implied execution of her power to charge

her separate property. Greatley ». Noble, 3 Mad. 94 ; Stuart v. Kirkwall, 3 id. 389 ; Hulme P.

Tenant, 1 Brown, 20; Sperling t). Roukford, 8 Ves. 175. Aud by joining m a sale wifh

her husband by fine, a married woman may clearly come under obligations affecting her

separate trust estate. Parker ». White, 11 id.'221, 224. A court of equity will certainly not

interfere without great reluctance, for the purpose of giving effect to the improvident engage-

ment of a married woman, for the accommodation of her husband; but where it appear* in

evidence that she was a free agent, and understood what she did when she engaged her sep-

arate property, a court of equity, it has been held, is bound to give eifect to her contract.

Essex «. Atkins, 14 id. 547. Or rather, perhaps, it may be more correctly put, to say, that, at

though a, feme covert cannot, by the equitable possession of separate property acquire a power

of personal contract, yet she has a power of disposition as incident to property, and her actual

disposition will bind her. Aguilar «. Aguilar, 5 Mad. 418. The distinction between the mere

contract, or general engagement of a married woman, and an appropriation of her separate es-

tate, has been frequently recognized: Power r. Bailey, 1 Ball, and Beat. 52; she can enter into

no contract affecting her person; the remedy must bo against her property. Sockett r. VTray,

4 Brown, 485; Francis t). Widville, 1 Mad. 263.

Where her husband is banished for life: Countess of Portland v. Prodgers, 2 Tern. 104; or

as it seems, is transported beyond the seas: Newsome v. Bowyer, 3 P. Wms. 38; Lena r.

Schutz, 2 W. Bla. 1198; or is an*alien enemy: Derby c. Dutehess of Mazariue, 1 Salk. 116 ; and

fcoe Co. Litt. 132 !>.. 133 a.; in all these cases it has been hold that it is necessary the wife should

be considered a* a feme gale.]

Since this note was first published the statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 75, has been passed, -which

allows a married woman to dispose of her land by deed, with the concurrence of ner husband,

but the deed must be acknowleged before a judge of the superior or county courts, or before

a commissioner appointed for the purpose of taking such acknowledgments, by whom she is

examined apart from her husband to ascertain if her consent to the deed is voluntary. This

statute establishes a mode of conveyance by married women in England, which has long been

employed in the United States. In some of the states the statutes go farther, and allow mar-

ried women to convey their lands without the concurrence of their husbands, and in the

same manner as if they were unmarried. See Watson v. Thurber, 11 Mich. 457. Bruminet c.

Weaver, 2 Oregon 168.

As regards the property settled to the separate use of the married woman, and colled her

separate estate, the married woman has substantially the same control over it that she would

have if under no disability, and this whether it is vested in her directly, or in trustees. Slid

may make contracts which have the effect to charge it, and she may make sale of it without

the intervention or consent of the husband. The contract!!, however, are not enforceable at

Chap. 19.] CAPACITY TO ALIEN AND PURCHASE. 293

The case of an alien born is also peculiar. For he may purchase any thing;

but after purchase he can hold nothing (9) except a lease for years of

law, but only in the courts of equity, and they do not bind her personally, but are to be en-

forced against the specific property only. See Gardner v. Gardner, 7 Paige, 112; Jaqucs v.

Methodist Church, 17 Johns. 548. The circumstance that the wife has a separate estate for

her support, does not, at the common law, relieve the husband from the obligation he would

otherwise be under to answer for her contracts, and, in many cases, it becomes a matter of uo

little difficulty to determine whether, under the particular circumstances, a debt is to be re-

garded as contracted on behalf of the husband, or, on the other hand, as a charge on her sep-

arate estate. The following are believed to be correct rules on this subject.

1. Where a married woman contracts a debt, apparently for the benefit of the family, though

really for the benefit of her separate estate, but this factis not known to the creditor, and the

circumstances are sueh as fairly to authorize him to infer the authority and consent of the

husband, the creditor has a right to treat the wife as the agent of the husbaud for the purpose

of contracting the debt, and to hold him liable for the payment of the same. And the hus-

band, if he would protect himself against any such liability, must take care that those dealing

•with the wife have no reason to suppose from his acts, or the manner which she transacts

business, that she is acting as his agent, and not on her own behalf.

2. Bnt where the debt is contracted expressly on the faith of the separate estate, the credi-

tor cannot look to the husband for payment, inasmuch as he has not trusted to his responsi-

bility, and had no reason to rely upon it. Bentley v. Griffin, 6 Taunt. 356; Petty v. Anderson,

3 Biiig. 170; Lillia e. Airey, 1 Ves. 277; Dyatt ». N. A. Coal Co., 20 Wend. 570. And whether

fact.
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the husband or the wife's separate estate 'was credited in any particular case is a question of

3. Where a married woman contracts a debt for the benefit of her separate estate, it is pre-

sumed that she intended to charge that estate; the like presumption is a reasonable one in

any case where the debt is contracted for her own benefit, and uo other or different intent in

manifested at the time. Story Eq. Juris. $ 1400; Owens v. Dickinson, 1 Craig, and Phil. 48;

Yaudt'rheydeu v. Mallory, 1 X. T. 452. But it seems that no such presumption can be enter-

tained where she signs a note merely as surety for her husband; and in such ease her

estate is not liable. Yale n. Dederer, 18 S. Y. 267.. See Wolf v. Van Metre, 2S Iowa, 397.

i:') [If, says Lord Coke: Co. Lilt, 2, a. b.; Com. Dig. Alieus, C. 2; see the reasons, line. Ab.

Aliens, C.; "an alien purchase houses, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, to him and his

heirs, albeit he can have uo heirs, yet he is of capacity to take a fee-simple, but not to

hoM: for upon office found, that is, upon the inquest of a proper jury, the king shall have it

by his prerogative of whomsoever the land is holden; and so it is it the alien doth purchase

land aud die, the law doth east the freehold and inheritance upon the king." Aud if au

alien purchase to him and the heirs of his body, he is tenant in trtil; and if he suffer a recov-

ery, and afterwards an office is found, the recovery is good to bar the remainder; 9 Co. 141;

2 Koll. 321; 4 Leon. 84; Com. Dig. Aliens, C. 2; but the estate purchased by an alien does

not vest in the king till office found, until which the alien is seised; and may sustain actions

for injuries to the property. 5 Co, 52 b.; 1 Leonard, 47; 4 Leon, 82; Com. Dig. Aliens, C. 4.

But though an alien may lake real property by purchase, yet he cannot take by descent, by

dower, or by the curtesy of England, which are the acts of the law, for the act of law, says

Sir Edward Coke, 7 Co. 25 a; Com. Dig. Aliens, C.I; Bao. Ab. Aliens, o.; 2 Bla. Com. 249,

giveth the alien nothing. Therefore, by the common law, Co. Lilt. 8, a, an alien could not

inherit to his father, though the father were a natural born subject, and the statutes have

made no alteration in this respect in favor of persons who do not obtain denization or

naturalization. So that an alien is at this day excluded not only from holding what he has

taken by purchase, after office found, but from even taking by descent at all; and the reason

of this distinction between the act of the alien himself, by which he may take but cauuot

hold, and the act of the law by which he cannot even take, is marked by Lord Hale in hi3

judgment in the cose of Collingwood v. Pace, 1 Tent. 417. where he says, though an alien

may take by purchase by his own contract that which he cannot retain against the king, yet

the law will not euable him by act of his own to transfer or bv hereditary descent to take by

tin act in law; for the law, qute nihil frustra (which does nothing in vain) will not give an

Inheritance or freehold by act in law, for ho cannot keep it.

The general rule of the law therefore appears to be, that an alien by purchase, which Is his

own act, may take real property but cannot hold it; by descent, dower, or onrtesy, or any other

conceivable act of the law, he cannot even take any lands, tenements, or hereditaments what-

soever, much less hold them, The reason of the law's general exclusion of aliens, we have

seen, ante, book 1, 371, 2.]

By statutes 7 and 8 Vic. c. 66, alien friends are now permitted to take and hold lands, for

residence or business, for twenty-one years; and a person born out of the reaim, whose

mother is a natural born subject, may take any estate, by devise, purchase, inheritance or suc-

cession.

The law regarding the holding of property by aliens in the United States is not uniform in

the different states, but the disability is removed, wholly or in part, in most of them. See 1

Vashb. Real Prop. 51. "
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a house for convenience of merchandise, in case he be an alien friend; (10)

all other purchases (when found by an inquest of office) being immediately

forfeited to the king, (w) (11)

Papists, lastly, and persons professing the popish religion, and neglecting to

take the oath prescribed by statute 18 Geo. Ill, c. 60, within the time limited

for that purpose, are by statute 11 and 12 Win. Ill, c. 4, disabled to purchase

any lands, rents, or hereditaments; and all estates made to their use, or in trust

for them, are void, (o) (12)

II. We are next, but principally, to inquire, how a man may aliene or convey;

which will lead us to consider the several modes of conveyance.

In consequence of the admission of property, or the giving a separate right

by the law of society to those things which by the law of nature were' in com-

mon, there was necessarily some means to be devised, whereby that separate

F*294l r'£n* or exclusive property should be originally acquired: *which we

"• J have more than once observed, was that of occupancy or first possession.

But this possession, when once gained, was also necessarily to be continued; or

else, upon one man's dereliction of the thing he had seised, it would again

become common, and all those mischiefs and contentions would ensue, which

property was introduced to prevent. For this purpose therefore of continuing

the possession, the municipal law has established descents and alienations: the

former to continue the possession in the heirs of the proprietor, after his invol-

untary dereliction of it by his death; the latter to continue it in those persons
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to whom the proprietor, by his own voluntary act, shall choose to relinquish

it in his lifetime. A translation, or transfer, of property being thus admitted

by law, it became necessary that this transfer should be properly evidenced: in

order to prevent disputes, either about the fact, as whether there was any

transfer at all; or concerning the persons, by whom and to whom it was trans-

ferred; or with regard to the subject-matter, as to what the thing transferred

consisted of; or, lastly, with relation to the mode and quality of the transfer, as

for what period of time (or, in other words, for what estate and interest) the

conveyance was made. The legal evidences of this translation of property are

called the common assurances of the kingdom; whereby every man's estate is

assured to him, and all controversies, doubts, and difficulties are either pre-

vented or removed.

These common assurances are of four kinds: 1. By matter in pais, or deed;

which is an assurance transacted between two or more private persons in putt,

in the country; that is (according to the old common law), upon the very spot

to be transferred. 2. By matter of record, or an assurance transacted only in

the king's public courts of record. 3. By special custom, obtaining in some

particular places, and relating only to some particular species of property.

Which three are such as take effect during the life of the party conveying

or assuring. 4. The fourth takes no effect till after his death; and that is by

devise, contained in his last will and testament. We shall treat of each in its

order.

(n) Co. Lltt 2. (o) 1 P. Wins. 354.

(10) [In former times no alien was permitted even to occupy a house for his habitation, and

the alteration in that law was merely in favor of commerce and merchants. See 1 Kapin

a house for convenience of merchandise, in case he he an alien friend; (IO)
all other purchases (when found by an inquest of office) being immediately
forfeited to the king. (n) (11)
Papists, lastly, and persons professing the popish religion, and neglectin~ to
take the oath prescribed by statute 18 Geo. 111, c. GO, within the time limited
for that purpose, are by statute 11 and 12 Wm. III, c. 4, disabled to purchaEe
any lands, rents, or heredita.ments; and all estates made to their use, or in trust
for them, are void. (o) (12)
II. We are next, but principally, to inquire, how a man may aliene or convey;
which will lead us to consider the several modes of conveyance.
In consequence of the admission of property, or the giving a separate right
by the law of society to those things which by the law of nature were· in common, there was necessarily some means to be devised, whereby that separate
[ • 294 ] right or exclusive property should be originally acquired: •which we
have more than once observed, was that of occupancy or first posS{'ssion.
But this possession, when once gained, was also necessarily to be continued; or
else, upon one man's dereliction of the thing ht: had seised, it would again
become common, and all those mischiefs and contentions would ensue, which
property was introduced to prevent. For this purpose therefore of continuing
the possession, the municipal law has established descents and alienations: the
former t-0 continue the possession in the heirs of the propiietor, after his im:oluntary dereliction of it by his death; the latter to continue it in those persons
to whom the proprietor, by his own voluntary act, shall choose to relinquish
it in his lifetime. A translation, or transfer, of property being thus admitt<!d
by law, it became necessary that this transfer should be properly evidenced: in
order to prevent disputes, either about the fact, as whether there was any
transfer at all; or concerning the persons, by whom and to whom it was transferred; or with regard to the subject-matter, as to what the thing transferred
consisted of; or, lastly, with relation to the mode and quality of the transfer, as
for what period of time (or, in other words, for what estate and interest) the
conveyance was made. 'l'he legal evidences of this translation of property are
called the common assurances of the kingdom; whereby every man's estate is
assured to him, and all controversies, doubts, and difficulties are either prevented or removed.
'fhese common assurances a.re of four kinds: 1. By matter in pais, or dero;
which is an assurance transacted between two or more private persons t'.n pm~~,
in the country; that is (according to the old common lu.w), upon the wry sP?t
to be transferred. 2. By matter of record, or an assurance transacted only m
the king's public courts of record. 3. By special custom, obtaining in some
particular places, and relating only to some particular species of propt>rty.
Which three are such as take effect during the life of the party conveying
or assuring. 4. The fourth takes no effect till after his death; and that fs b~·
devise, contained in his last will and testament. We shall treat of each in its
order.

Hist. Eng. 361, n. 9; Bac. Ab. Aliens, C.I

(•l Co. Litt. 2.

(O)

l P. Wms. SM.

(11) [But not before the inquest: 5 Co. 52, b; and if the purchase be made -with the king's

license, there can be no forfeiture. 14 Hen. IV, 20 Harg. Co. Litt. 2, b. n. 2.]

(12) These disabilities are now entirely removed. See the statutes 10 Geo. IV, c. 7, and 2

and 3 "Wm. IV, o. 115; 23 and 24 Vic. o. 134; 32 and 33 Vic. o. 109.
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(10) [In funner times no a.lien was permitted even to occupy o. house for his habitation. and
al:erat.ion in ~at Jaw was !llerely in favor of commerce and merchant.a. See 1 Rapin
H1;it. En~. 361, n. 9, Bae. Ab . .A.hens, C.]
·
(11) [But not before the inquest: 5 Co. 52, b; and if the purchase be made with the king"s
licenBe, there can be no forfeiture. 14 Hen. IV, 20 Harg. Co. Litt. 2, b. n. 2.]
(12) These disabilities are now entirely removed. See the statures 10 Goo. IV, c. 7, and 2
and 3 Wm. IV, o. 115; 23 and 24 Vic. c. 134; 3'.l and 33 Vic. o. 109.
th~
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OF ALIENATION BY DEED.

CHAPTER XX.

IH treating of deeds I shall consider, first, their general nature; and, next,

the several sorts or kinds of deeds, with their respective incidents. And in

OF ALIENATION BY DEED.

explaining the former, I shall examine, first, what a deed is; secondly, its requi-

sites ; and, thirdly, how it may be avoided.

I. First, then, a deed is a writing sealed and delivered hy the parties, (a) It ig

sometimes called a charter, carta, from its materials; but most usually when

applied to the transactions of private subjects, it is called a deed, in Latin

factum, nar1 efo^j/v, because it is the most solemn and authentic act that a man

can possibly perform, with relation to the disposal of his property; and therefore

a man shall always be estopped by his own deed, or not permitted to aver or prove

any thing in contradiction to what he has once so solemnly and deliberately

avowed, (b) If a deed be made by more parties than one, there ought to be

regularly as many copies of it as there are parties, and each should be cut or

indented (formerly in acute angles instar dentium, like the teeth of a saw, but

at present in a waving line) on the top or side, to tally or correspond with the

other; which deed, so made, is called an indenture. Formerly, when deeds were

more concise than at present, it was usual to write both parts on the same piece

of parchment, with some word or letters of the alphabet written between them;

through which the parchment was cut, either in a straight or indented line, in

such manner as to leave half the w,ord on *one part and half on the r ^qg ]
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other. Deeds thus made were denominated syngrapha by the canon- •- *

ists; (e) and with us chirographa, or hand-writings; (d) the word cirographum

or cyrographum being usually that which is divided in making the indenture:

and this custom is still preserved in making out the indentures of a fine,

•whereof hereafter. But at length indenting only has come into use, without

cutting through any letters at all; and it seems at present to serve for little

other purpose than to give name to the species of the deed. When the several

parts of an indenture are interchangeably executed by the several parties, that

part or copy which is executed by the grantor is usually called the original, and

the rest are counterparts: though of late it is most frequent for all the parties

to execute every part; which renders them all originals. A deed made by one

party only is not indented, put polled or shaved quite even; and therefore called

a deed-poll, or a single deed, (e) (1)

II. We are in the next place to consider the requisites of a deed. Tine first

of which is, that there be persons able to contract and be contracted with for

the purposes intended by the deed: and also a thing, or subject-matter to be

contracted for; all which must be expressed by sufficient names. (/) So as in

every grant there must be a grantor, a grantee, and a thing granted; in every

lease a lessor, a lessee, and a thing demised.

Secondly, the deed must be founded upon good and sufficient consideration,

Not upon an usurious contract; (g) nor upon fraud or collusion, either to

deceive purchasers bonafide, (h) or just and lawful creditors; (i) any of which

bad considerations will vacate the deed, and subject such persons as put the

same in use, to forfeitures, and often to imprisonment. (2) A deed also, or other

fa) Co. Lltt. 171. (b) Plowd. 434. fe) Lyndow. 1. 1. *. 10, c. 1.

(d) Mirror, «. 2. t 27. (e) -Mirror, c. 2. ! 27. Lltt. ti 371. 372. (f) Co. Lltt. 35.

(g) Slut. 13 Eliz. e. 8. (h> Stat 27 Ellz. c. 4. (i) Stat. 13 Elizi c. 5.

("1) Generally, at the present time, deeds for the conveyance of lands simply, though colled

indentures, are executed only by the grantors, and counterparts are not made and not

necdfuL

l:N treating of deeds I shall consider, first, their general nature; and, next,
the several sorts or kinds of deeds, with their respective incidents. And in
explaining the former, I shall examine, first, what a deed is; secondly, its requisites; and, thirdly, how it may be avoided.
I. First, then, a deed is a writing sealed and delivered by the parties. (a) It is
sometimes called a charter, carta, from its materials; but most usually when
applied to the transactions of private subjects. it is called a deed, in Latin
factttm, 1eaT' eEox11v, because it is the most solemn and authentic act that a man
can possibly perform, with relation to the disposal of his property; and therefore
a man shall always be estopped by his own deed, or not permitted to aver or prove
any thing in contradiction to what he has once so solemnly and deliberately
avowed. (b) If a deed be made by more parties than one, there ought to be
regularly as many copies of it as there are parties, and each should be cut or
indented (formerly in acute angles instar dentium, like the teeth of a saw, but
at present in a waving line) on the top or side, to tally or correspond with the
other; which deed, so made, is called an indenture. :f'ormerly, when deeds were
more concise than at present, it was usual to write both parts on the same piece
of parchment, with some word or letters of the alphabet written between them;
through which the parchment was cut, either in a straight or indented line, in
such manner as to leave half the ltOrd on "'one part and half on the [ ...296 ]
other. Deeds thus made were denominated syngrapha by the canonists; (c) and with us chirograplia, or hand-writings; (d) the word cirographum
or cyrographum being usually that which is divided in making the indenture:
and this custom is still preserved in making out the indentures of a fine,
whereof hereafter. But at length indenting only has come into use, without
cutting through any letters at all ; and it seems at present to serve for little
other purpose than to give name to the species of the deed. When the severul
parts of an indenture are interchangeably executed by the several parties, that
part or copy which is executed by the grantor is usually called the original, and
the rest are counterparts: though of late it is most frequent for all the parties
to execute every part; which renders them all originals. A deed made by one
party only is not indented, put polled or shaved quite even; and therefore called
a deed-poll, or a single deed. (e) (1)
II. We are in the next place to consider the requisites of a deed. The first
of which is, that there be persons able to contract and be contracted with for
the purposes intended by the deed: and also a thin~, or subject-matter to be
contracted for; all which must be expressed by sufficient names.(/) So as in
every grant there must be a gmntor, a grantee, and a thing granted; in every
lease a lessor, a lessee, and a thing demised.
Secondly, the deed must be founded upon good and sufficient consideration.
Not upon an usurious contract; ( g) nor upon fraud or collusion, either to
deceive purchasers bona fale, (Ji) or just and lawful creditors; (i) any of which
bad considerations will vacate the deed, and subject such persons as put the
same in use, to forfeitures, and often to imprisonment. (2) A deed also, or other

(2) But a deed in fraud of purchasers or creditors Is not void as between the parties thereto,

nor even as to third persona who are not concerned in the fraud. Only the parties who would be

defrauded lir it can allege its invalidity, and as to them it is avoided only so far as is needful for

(n) Co. Utt. 171.
(d) Mirror, c. 2. t 'J7.
(g) Stat. 13 Eliz. e. 8.

(b) Plowd. "-"'·
(c) J.ymlcw. l. 1. t. 10, c. 1.
(e) .1:Lrror. c . !, J 'n. Litt. 11371. 372.
(/)Co. Lltt. M.
(h) StaL

'ET Eliz. c. (.

(I) Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 6.

their protection.
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(1) Generally, at the present time, deeds for the conveyance of landti simply, though called
indent11re.i, are executed only by the grsntors, and counterparts are not made and not
necdfuL
(~) But a deed in fmud of purchaser11 or creditor11 Is not void &.~ between the partic~ thernto,
nor even as to third pe!'NnRR who arc not concerned in the fraud. Onlv the parties who would be
c'fo(rauded by it can allege its invalidity. and as to them it i11 avoided ·only so far a.13 is needful for
their protection.
·
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grant, made without any consideration, is, as it were, of no effect : for it is con-

strued to enure, or to be effectual, only to the use of the grantor himself, (k) (3)

F *297 1 ^ne consideration may be either *a good or a valuable one. A good

*- J consideration is such as that of blood, or of natural love and affection,

when a man grants an estate to a near relation ; being founded on motives of

generosity, prudence and natural duty ; a valuable consideration is such as

money, marriage, or the like, which the law esteems an equivalent given for the

grant: (I) and is therefore founded in motives of justice. Deeds made upon

good consideration only, are considered as merely voluntary, and are frequently

set aside in favour of creditors, and botuifide purchasers. (4)

Thirdly; the deed must be written, or I presume printed, (5) for it may be in

any character or any language ; but it must be upon paper or parchment For

if it be written on stone, board, linen, leather, or the like, it is no deed, (wi)

Wood or stone may be more durable, and linen less liable to erasures ; but writ-

ing on paper or parchment unites in itself, more perfectly than any other way,

botli these desirable qualities : for there is nothing else so durable, and at the

same time so little liable to alteration : nothing so secure from alteration, that is

at the same time so durable. It must also have the regular stamps imposed on

it by the several statutes for the increase of the public revenue : else it cannot

be given in evidence. Formerly many conveyances were made by parol, or word

of mouth only, without writing; but this giving a handle to a variety of frauds,

the statute 29 Car. II, c. 3, enacts, that no lease-estate or interest in lands, tene-
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ments, or hereditaments, made by livery of seisin, or by parol only (except

leases, not exceeding three years from the making, and whereon the reserved

rent is at least two-thirds of the real value), shall be looked upon as of greater

force than a lease or estate at will; nor slmlniny assignment, grant, or surrender

of any interest in any freehold hereditaments be valid ; unless in both cases the

same be put in writing, and signed by the party granting, or his agent lawfully

authorized in writing. (6)

(t) Park. J 533. (I) S Ucp. 83. (ml Co. Utt. 229. F. N. B. J2S.

(3) [This sentence is not quite accurately worded: from the expression "deed or other

grant," it might be inferred that a deed was a species of grant, whereas a grant is onlv one

mode of conveyance by deed : next, it is not true that all deeds, or all grants made without

consideration, are of no effect, for 1st, as to all deeds which operate at common law, or by

transmutation of possession, that they will be valid at law to pass the estates they profess to

n, as against the grantor, though made without any consideration ; and secondly an to

s which operate under the statute of uses, they create a use which results to the grantor.

To all appearance, indeed, no change is made in the grantor's title or right* by such a deed,

yet that it is without effect in law cannot be Raid, because it works such an alteration in the

grantor's estate from that which he had before, that any devise of the lands made before the

date of the deed, will have no effect, unless the will bo republished, that is, in fact, now

made.]

(4) This rule does not obtain in the United States. A deed purely voluntary is perfectly valid

as against any subsequent purchaser from the gantor, who buys with notice, whether the notice

be actual, or such as the law implies from the recording of the prior deed. 4 Kent, 463 ; Jackson

v. Town, 4 Cow. 603 ; Salmon v. Bennett. 1 Conn. 525 ; Bennett <•. Bedford Bank, 11 Mas*. 441 :

Bicker v, Ham. 14 id. 137 ; Cathcart v. Eobiusou, 5 Pet. 280 ; Atkinson v. Phillips, 1 Md. Ch.

Dec. 507; Beal v. Warren, 2 Gray, 447; Douglas v. Dunlap, 10 Ohio. 162.

(5) [Com.Dig. Fait, A ; 3 Chilly's Com. L. 6. There seems no doubt that it may be printed,

and that if signatures be requisite the name of a party in print at the foot of the instrument would

suffice. 2 M. and S. 288 ; 2 Bos. and P. 238.]

(6) Nevertheless courts of equity have long boon in the practice of enforcing the specific per-

formance of parol contracts for the sale of lands, where there have been such acts or part per-

formance as preclude the parties being placed in utatu quo, and where, undor the circumstances,

it is equitable that such performance should be decreed. See Fry on Specific Performance;

Story Eq. Juris. $$ 712—799.

[It is settled, also, that trusts of lands arising by implication, or operation of law, are not with-

in the statute of frauds ; if they were, it has been said, that statute would tend to promote frauds

rather than prevent them. To'ung v. Peachy, 2 Atk. 250, 257 ; "Willis ». "Willis, id. 71 ; Anonym.

2 Tentr. 361.

The statute of frauds enacts, that no agreement respecting lands shall be of force, nnleas it

be signed by the party to be charged; but the statute does not say that every agreement ao
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Fourthly ; the matter written must be legally and orderly set forth : that is,

there must be words sufficient to specify the agreement and bind the parties ;

•which *sufflciency must be left to the courts of law to determine.(») (7) r *OQQ i

"- '" "

For it is not absolutely necessary in la* to have all the formal parts that

are usually drawn but in deeds, so as there be sufficient words to declare clearly

and legally the party's meaning. But, as these formal and orderly parts are

calculated "to convey that meaning in the clearest, distinctest, and most effectual

manner, and have been well considered and settled by the wisdom of successive

ages, it is prudent not to depart from them without good reason or urgent ne-

cessity; and therefore I will here mention them in their usual (o) order.

1. The premises may be used to set forth the number and names of the parties,

with their additions or titles. They also contain the recital, if any, of such

deeds, agreements, or matters of fact, as are necessary to explain the reasons

upon which the present transaction is founded ; and herein also is set down the

consideration upon which the deed is made. And then follows the certainty of

the grantor, grantee, and thing granted, (p)

2, 3. Next come the habendum and tenendum. (q) The office of the habendum

is properly to determine what estate or interest is granted by the deed : though

this may be performed, and sometimes is performed, in the premises. In which

case the habendum may lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify, but not totally con-

tradict or be repugnant to the estate granted in the premises. As if a grant be
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" to A and the heirs of his body," in the premises ; habendum " to him and his

heirs forever," or vice versa ; here A has an estate-tail, and a fee-simple expect-

ant thereon, (f) But, had it been in the premises " to him and his heirs, "

habendum " to him for life," the habendum would be utterly void ; («) for an

estate of inheritance is vested in him before the habendum comes, and shall not

afterwards be taken away or devested by it. The tenendum, " and to hold," is

now of very little use, and is only kept in by custom. It was sometimes formerly

*used to signify the tenure by which the estate granted was to be r *299 1

nj Co. Lltt. W5. (a) Ibid. 8. fpj See Appendix, No. n, fl, page T. (q)Ibid.

(r} Co. Lttt. »r. 2 Boll. Itep. 19, 23. Pro. Jae. 476 r«>2Bep. i». Bid. 86. _

signed shall be enforced. To adopt that construction would \w, to enable any person who had

procured another to sign an agreement to make it depend on hig own will and pleasure whether

it should be an agreement or not Lord Redesdale, indeed, has intimated a donbt, whether In

any case (not turning npon the fact of part performance) an agreement ought to be enforced.

•which has not been signed by, or on behalf of, both parties. Lawrenson v. Butler, 1 Sch. and

Let 20 ; O'Rourke v. Percival, 2 Ball and Beat. 62. Lord Hardwicke and Sir Wm. Grant held a

different doctrine. Backhouse ». Mohnn, 3 Swanst. 435 ; Powle v. Freeman, 9 Ves. 351 ; West-

ern e. Russel, 3 Ves. and Bea. 193. Lord Eldou, without expressly deciding the point, seems to

have leaned to Lord Redesdale's view of the question : Huddlestone «. Biscoe, 11 Ves. 592 ; and

Sir Thomas Plnmer wished it to be considered whether, when one party has not bound himself,

the other is not at liberty to enter into a new agreement with a third person. Martin t>. Mitchell.

2. Jac. and Walk. 428.

Bv statute 8 and 9 Vic. c. IOC, g. 4, a feofFment made after the first of October, 1845, other than a

feoffment made under a custom by an infant, shall be void at law, unless evidenced by deed ; and

it is also enacted thnt a partition and an exchange of any hereditaments, not being copyhold, and

a lease required by law to be in writing,of any hereditaments, and an assignment of a chattel in-

terest not being copyhold in any hereditaments, and a surrender in writing of any interest therein

not being a copyhold interest, and not being an interest which might by lawnave been created with-

out writing, made after the first day of October, 1845, shall also be void at law, unless made by deed.]

Permission from the owner of land to another, to erect and occupy a building upon his premises,

though not given in writing, will make the building, when erected, the propertv of the builder.

But uiis permission, properly called a license, is revocable at any time : but when revoked, the

licensee is entitled to the building, and may remove it. Dnboia «. Kelley, 10 Barb. 496. If,

however, the owner of the land sell to a third person who has no knowledge of the license, such

third person, it seems, takes the land with whatever is so attached as to pass as a part of the realty

if belonging to the grantor ; and in such a case, the licensee, if he had not previously removed

the building, would lose it. Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 383. That a license is always revocable,

see Burton e. Schnff, 1 Allen, 13; Owen v. Field, 12 Allen, 257; Pittman «. Poor, 38 Me. 23;

Rhodes ». Otis, 33 Ala. 600 ; Pratt v. Ogden, 34 N. Y. 22 ; Huff v. McAulev, 53 Penn. St. 206 ;

Houston v. Laffer, 46 N . H. 505. A strong disposition has been manifested of late to hold that

where expenditures have been made upon lauds in reliance upon a license before revocation, the

licensor shall be estopped from revoking afterwards unless the licensee can be placed in stntu quo.

Kerick v. Kern, 14 S. and R. 267; Dark v. Johnston. 55 Penn. St 164; Snowden*. "Wilas, 19

Ind. 10; Lane p. Miller, 27 Ind. 534.

(7) For rules for the construction of deeds, see post, 379.
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holden, viz.: " ienendum per servitium militare, in bwrgagio, in libero soc-

ayw," &c. But, all these being now reduced to free and common socage, the

tenure is never specified. Before the statute of quia etnptoreg, 18 Edw. I, it was

also sometimes used to denote the lord of whom the land should be holden ; but

that statute directing all future purchasers to hold, not of the immediate grantor,

but of the chief lord of the fee, this use of the ienendum hath been also anti-

quated; though for a long, time after we find it mentioned in ancient charters,

that the tenements shall be holden de capitalibus dmninis feodi; (t) bat as this

expressed nothing more than the statute had already provided for, it gradually

grew out of use. (8)

4. Next follow the terms of stipulation, if any, upon which the grant is

made; the first of which is the reddendum or reservation, whereby the grantor

doth create or reserve some new thing to himself out of what he had before

granted, as " rendering therefor yearly the sum of ten shillings, or a pepper-

corn, or two days' ploughing, or the like." («) Under the pure feudal system,

this render, reditus, return or rent, consisted in chivalry principally of mili-

tary services; in villeinage, of the most slavish offices; and m socage/it usually

consists of money, though it may still consist of services, or of any other

certain profit, (w) To make a reddendum good, if it be of any thing newly

created by the deed, the reservation must be to the grantors, or some, or one of

them, and not to any stranger to the deed, (x) But if it be of ancient services

or the like, annexed to the land, then the reservation may be to the lord of the
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fee.(y)

5. Another of the terms upon which a grant may be made is a condition ;

which is a clause of contingency, on the happening of which the estate granted

may be defeated: as " provided always, that if the mortgagor shall pav the

r *Qnn i mortgagee *500Z. upon such a day, the whole estate granted shall deter-

L dUUJ mine;" and the like,(z)

6. Next may follow the clause of warranty; whereby the grantor doth, for

himself and his heirs, warrant and secure to the grantee the estate so granted, (a)

By the feudal constitution, if the vassal's title to enjoy the fend was disputed,

he might vouch, or call the lord or donor to warrant or insure his gift; which

if he failed to do, and the vassal was evicted, the lord was bound to give him

another feud of equal value in recompense, (b) And so, by our ancient law, if

before the statute of quia emptores a man enfeoffed another in fee, by the feudal

verb dedi, to hold of himself_and his heirs by certain services; the law annexed

a warranty to this grant, which bound the feoffer and his heirs, to whom the

services (which were the consideration and equivalent for the gift) were origin-

ally stipulated to be rendered, (c) Or if a man and his ancestors had imme-

morially holden land of another and his ancestors by the service of homage

(which was called Iwmage aunceatral), this also bound the lord to warranty ; (</)

the homage being an evidence of such a feudal grant. And, upon a similar

principle, in case, after a partition or exchange of lands of inheritance, either

party or his heirs be evicted of his share, the other and his heirs are bound to

warranty, (e) because they enjoy the equivalent. And so, even at this day, upon

a gift in tail or lease for life, rendering rent, the donor or lessor and his heirs

(to whom the rent is payable) are bound to warrant the title. (/) But in a

feoffment in fee, by the verb dedi, since the statute of quia emptores, the feoffer

only is bound to the implied warranty, and not his heirs ; (g) because it is a

mere personal contract on the part of the feoffer, the tenure (and of course the

ancient services) resulting back to the superior lord of the fee. And in other

(t) Appendix, No. I. Madox. Formal, pnuim. («) Appendix, No. II, > 1, page ill.

(w) Sec paife 41. \x) Plowd. 13. 8 Uep. 71. (», Appendix, No. I, page 1.

(z) Ibid. No. II, } 2, page viil. (a) I bid. No. I, pnge I. (») fewl. 1.1, t. 8 and ».

(c) Co. Litt. 364. <rf) LIU.} 143. («) Co. lilt. 174. (/) I bid. 884. (g) Ibid.

holden, viz.: "tenendum per servitium militare, in b11rgagio, in libero 6flc-

agt0," &c. But, all these being now reduced to free and common socage, the
tenure is never specified. Before the statute of quia emptores, 18 Edw. I, it 1\.a3
ulso sometimes used to denote the lord of whom the land should be holden ; but
that statute directing all futnre purchasers to hold, not of the immediate grantor,
but of the chief lord of the fee, this use of the tene1idum ha.th been also antiquated; though for a long . time after we find it mentioned in ancient chartere,
that the tenements shall be holden de ca.pitcililnts dmninis feodi; (t) but as this
expressed nothing more than the statute had already pro\·ided. for, it gr-ddually
grew out of use. (8)
4. Next follow the terms of stipulation, if any, u:pon which the grant is
made; the first of which is the redtlemlwn or reservation, whereby the grantor
doth create or reserve some new thing to himself out of what he had before
granted, as "rendering therefor yearly the sum of ten shillings, or a peppercorn, or two days' ploughing, or the like." (u) Under the pure fen<lal system,
this render, reditus, return or rent, consisted in chivalry principally of military services; in villeinage, of the most slavish offices; and m socage,~it nsnallv
consists of money, though it may still consist of services. or of any otbe"r
certain profit. (w) To make a reddendum good, if it be of any thing newlv
created by the deed, the reservation must be to the grantors, or some, or one of
them, and not to any stranger to the deed. (x) But if it be of ancient serviees
or the like, annexed to the land, then the reservation may be to the lord of the
fee. (y)
5. Another of the terms upon which a grant may be made is a condifi<m;
which is a clause of contingency, on the happening of which the estate granted
may be defeated: as "provided always, that if the mortgagor shall pav the
[ • 300 ] mortgagee *500l. upon such a day, the whole estate granted shall iletermine ;" and the like. (z)
6. Next ma,r follow the clause of warranty; whereby the grantor doth, for
himself and his heirs, warrant and secure to the grantee the estate so granted..(a)
By the feudal constitution, if the vassal's title to enjoy the fend was dispnt~,
he might vouch, or call the lord or donor to warrant or insure his gift; which
if he failed to do, and the vassal was evicted, the lord was bound to ghe him
another feud of equal ·rnlue in recompense. (l>) And so, by our ancient law, if
before the statute of quia emptores a man enfeoffed another in fee, by the feudal
verb dedi, to hold of himse\[.and his heirs by certain services; the law annex~
a warranty to this grant, which bound the feoffer and his heirs, to whom the
services (which were the consideration and equivalent for the gift) were originally stipulated to be rendered. (c) Or if a man and his ancestors had immemorially hol<len land of another a.nd his ancestors by the service of homage
(which was called lwmage auncestral), this also bound the lord to warranty; (J)
the homage being an evidence of such a feudal grant. And, upon a similar
principle, in case, after a partition or exchange of lands of inheritance, eitber
party or his heirs be evicted of his share, the other and his heirs are bound to
warranty, (e) because they enjoy the equivalent. And so, even at this day, upon
a gift in tail or lease for life, rendering rent, the donor or lessor and his heirs
(to whom the rent is payable) are bound to warrant the title. (f) But in a
feoffment in fee, by the verb dedi, since the statute of quia emptores, the feotft>r
only is bound to the implied warranty, and not his heirs ; (g) because it is a
mere personal contract on the part of the feotfer, the tenure (and of course the
ancient serrices) resulting back to the superior lord of the fee. And in other

(8) [The habcndum, though a proper and formal part of a conveyance at common law, w not

absolutely essential; and in a conveyance merely by way of declaration of use, as a bargain

and i>ale, covenant to stand seised, or appointment, it is obviously unnecessary, and (unless m a

bargain and pale) improper. Seo 5 B. and Ad. 733.]
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Ma<lox. FONlltll. pauim.
(ti) A1>pendlx, So. II, ~I. J>Rirt' Ill.
!:r) Plowd. la. t! Rep. 71.
!N1 Ap)>eudlx, No. l, pAge I.
(z) I Md. So. II, 12, page ,.ill.
(o) 1 Mil. No. I, p11ge I.
(l>J Feu4. l. 2, t. 8 and 95.
(C) Co. Litt. 364.
(dJ LIU. I US.
(IJ Co. Utt. 17'.
(/)Ibid. W.
(.fl Ilrid.

(t) Appcn<lix, No. I.
(tc) Sl'e (Ill.ICC

'1.

(8) [The htwcndum, though a proper nnd thrmnl pnrt. of a conveynnoo at common law, i11 n?t
abi;olutely el!11entinl; and in a com·eyance merely hy way of declaration of u11e, as a b~
and flale, covenant t-0 stand seit'tld, or appointment, it is obviollllly unnecetiSa.ry, and (unle&1 m •
bargnin andflale) improper. Soo 6 B. and Ad. 7d3.]
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forms of alienation, gradually introduced since that statute, *no war- r *»Q-I •>

ranty whatsoever is implied; (h) they bearing no sort of analogy to the *- *

original feudal donation. And therefore in such cases it became necessary to

add an express clause of warranty to bind the grantor and his heirs; which

is a kind of covenant real, and can only be created by the verb warrantizo or

warrant, (t)

These express warranties were introduced, even prior to the statute of quia

emptores, in order to evade the strictness of the feudal doctrine of non-aliena-

tion without the consent of the heir. For, though he, at the death of his

ancestor, might have entered on any tenements that were aliened without his

concurrence, yet if a clause of warranty was added to the ancestor's grant, this

covenant descending upon the heir insured the grantee; not so much by con-

firming his title, as by obliging such heir to yield him a recompense in lands of

equal value: the law in favor of alienations, supposing that no ancestor would

wantonly disinherit his next of blood; (k) and therefore presuming that he

had received a valuable consideration, either in land or in money, which had

purchased land, and that this equivalent descended to the heir together with

the ancestor's warranty. So that when either an ancestor, being the rightful

tenant of the freehold, conveyed the land to a stranger and his heirs, or released

the right in fee simple to one who was already in possession, and superadded a

warranty to his deed, it was held that such warranty not only bound the

•warrantor himself to protect and assure the title of the warrantee, but it also
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bound his heir: and this, whether that warranty was lineal or collateral to the

title of the land. Lineal warranty was, where the heir derived, or might by

possibility have derived, his title to the land warranted, either from or through

the ancestor who made the warranty: as where a father, or an elder son in the

life of the father, released to the disseisor of either themselves or the grand-

father, with warranty, this was lineal to the younger sou. (I) Collateral war-

ranty was where the heir's title to the land neither was, nor could have been,

derived from the *warranting ancestor; as where a younger brother re- r ,302 -,

leased to his father's disseisor, with warranty, this was collateral to the "- J

elder brother, (m) But where the very conveyance to which the warranty was

annexed immediately followed a disseisin, or operated itself as such, (as where a

father tenant for years, with remainder to his son in fee, aliened in fee-simple

with warranty), this being in its original manifestly founded on the tort or

wrong of the "warrantor himself, was culled a warranty commencing by disseisin;

and being too palpably injurious to be supported, was not binding upon any

heir of such tortious warrantor, (n)

In both lineal and collateral warranty, the obligation of the heir (in case the

warrantee was evicted, to yield him other lands in their stead) was only on con-

dition that he had other sufficient lands by descent from the warranting ances-

tor, (o) But though without assets, he was not bound to insure the title of

another, yet in case of lineal warranty, whether assets descended or not, the

heir was perpetually barred from claiming the land himself; for if he could suc-

ceed in such claim, he would then gain assets by descent (if he had them not

before^, and must fulfil the warranty of his ancestor: and the same rule(/j)

was with less justice adopted also in respect of collateral warranties, which like-

wise (though no assets descended) barred the heir of the warrantor from claim-

ing the land by any collateral title ; upon the presumption of law that he might

hereafter have assets by descent either from or through the same ancestor. The

inconvenience of this latter branch of the rule was felt very early, when tenants

by the curtesy took upon them to aliene their lands with warranty; which col-

lateral warranty of the father descended upon the son (who was the heir of

both his parents) barred him from claiming his maternal inheritance; to remedy

which the statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 3, declared, that such warranty

should be no bar to the son, unless assets descended from the father. It was

(A) Ibid. 102. (i) Litt. } 733. (ft) Co. Lttt. 373. (Jl Litt. K 703. 70T., 707.

{«») Ibid, if 703, 707. (»! Ibid, tt 098, 702. (0) Co. Litt. 102. (p) Litt. 711, 712.
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forms of alienation, gradually introduced since that statute, *no war- [ • 301 ]
ranty whatsoever is implied; (h) they bearing no sort of analogy to the
origmal feudal donation. And therefore in such cases it became necessary to
add an express clause of warranty to bind the grantor and his heirs; which
is a. kind of covenant real, and can only be created by the verb warrantizo or
warrant. (i)
These express warranties were introduced, even prior to the st.atute of quia
~mptores, in order to evade the strictness of the fendal doctrine of non-alienation without the consent of the heir. For, though he, at the death of his
ancestor, might have entered on any tenements that were aliened without his
concurrence, yet if a clause of warmnty was added to the ancestor's grant, this
covenant descending upon the heir insured the grantee; not so much by confirming his title, as by obliging such heir to yield him a recompense in lands of
£qual value: the law in favor of alienations, supposing that no ancestor would
wantonly disinherit his next of blood; (k) and therefore presuming that he
had received a valuable consideration, either in land or in money, which had
purchased land, and that this equivalent descended to the heir together with
the ancestor's warranty. So that when either an ancestor, being the rightful
tenant of the freehold, conveyed the land to a stranger and his heirs, or releaseµ
the right in fee simple to one who was already in possession, and superadded a
warranty to his deed, it was held that such warranty not only bound the
warrantor himself to protect and assnre the title of the warrantee, but it also
bound his heir: and this, whether that warranty was lineal or collateral to the
title of the land. Lineal warrant.y was, where the heir derived, or might by
possibility ha•;e derived, his title to the land warranted, either from or through
the ancestor who made the walTanty: as where a father, or an elder son in the
life of the father, released to the d1sseisor of either themselves or the grandfather, with warranty, this was lineal to the younger son. (l) Collateral warranty was where the heir's title to the land neither was, nor could have been,
derived from the •warranting ancestor; ru3 where a younger brother re- [ • 302 ]
leased to his father's disseisor, with warranty, this was collateral to the
elder brother. (m) But where the very conveyance to which the warranty was
annexed immediately followed a disseisin, or operated itself as such, (as where a
father tenant for years, with remainder to his son in fee, aliened in fee-simple
with warranty), this bein~ in its original manifestly founded on the tort or
wrong of the warrantor himself, was culled a warranty commenct1!f! by disseisin~·
and being too palpably injurious to be supported, was not bindmg upon any
heir of such tortious wammtor. (n)
In both lineal and collateral warranty, the obligation of the heir (in case the
warrantee was evicted, to yield him other lands in their stead) was only on condition that he had other sufficient lands by descent from the warranting ancestor. (o) But though without. asset.s, he was not bound to insure the title of
another, yet ·in case of lineal warranty, whether assets descended or not, the
heir was perpt'tually barred from claiming the land hi'.mse?f; for if he could succeed in such claim, he would then gain assets by descent (if he had them not
before), and must fulfil the warranty of his ancestor: and the same rule ( p)
was with less justice adopted also in respect of collaterctl warranties, which likewise (though no sssets descended) barred the heir of the warrantor from claiming the land by any collateral titl~; upon the presumption of law that he might
hereafter have assets by descent either from or throu~h the same ancestor. 'l'he
inconvenience of this latter branch of the ru]e was felt very early, when tenants
by the curtesy took upon them to aliene their lands with warranty; which collateral warranty of the father descended upon the son (who was the heir of
both his po.rents) oon·ed him from clniming his maternal inheritance; to remedy
which the statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 3, declared, that such warranty
should be no bar to the son, unless assets descended from the father. It was
(Al JIM. 102.
(ii Litt. I 7::3.
Ckl Co. Litt. 373.
Cl\ Litt. fl i0.1. 700, 707.
(•l Ibid. H i03, i07.
(•! Jl>id. H 69S 1 i02.
(ol Co. LIU. i02.
(Pl Litt. 711, 712.
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' J versa!, by enacting, that no collateral warranty should be a bar, unless

where assets descended from the same ancestor ; (q) but it then proceeded not to

effect. However, by the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 20, notwithstanding any alien-

ation with warranty by tenant in dower, the heir of the husband is not barred,

though he be also heir to the wife. And by statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16> all war-

ranties by any tenant for life shall be void against those in remainder or rever-

sion ; and all collateral warranties by any ancestor who has no estate of inher-

itance in possession, shall be void against his heir. By the wording of which

last statute it should seem that the legislature meant to allow, that the collateral

warranty of tenant in tail in possession, descending (though without assets)

upon a remainder-man or reversioner, should still bar the remainder or rever-

sion. For though the judges, in expounding the statute de donis, held that by

analogy to the statute of Gloucester, a lineal warranty by the tenant in tail with-

out assets should not bar the issue in tail, yet they held such warranty with

assets to be a sufficient bar : (r) which was therefore formerly mentioned («) as

one of the ways whereby an estate-tail might be destroyed ; it being indeed noth-

ing more in effect than exchanging the lands entailed for others of equal value.

They also held, that collateral warranty was not within the statute de donis; as

that act was principally intended to prevent the tenant in tail from disinherit-

ing his own issue ; and therefore collateral warranty (though without assets)

was allowed to be, as at common law, a sufficient bar of the estate-tail and all
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remainders and reversions expectant thereon, (t) And so it still continues to

be, notwithstanding the statute of Queen Anne, if made by tenant in tail in pos-

session : who therefore may now, without the forms of a fine or recovery, in some

cases make a good conveyance in fee-simple, by snperadding a warranty to hia

grant ; which, if accompanied with assets, bars his own issue, and without them

bars such of his heirs as may be in remainder or reversion. (9)

f *304 1 *^' ^^ter warranty usually follow covenants, (10) or conventions, which

1 "" -I are clauses of agreement contained in a deed, whereby either party may

(<!) Co. Utt. 3T3. frj Lltt i 712. 2 [list. 293. (») Page 116. (t) Co. l.iu. ::74. 2 Inst. 3.Y..

(9) [Estates-tail and estates expectant thereon are not now barrable by warranty, but by sim-

pler means. Sec statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 74, s. 14. And since statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, and

[ • 303 ] afterwards attempted in 50 Edw. III, •to make the same proviSion nni•
versal, by enacting, that no collateral warranty should be a bar, unless
where assets descended from the same ancestor; (q) but it then proceeded not to
effect. However, by the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 20, notwithstanding any alienation with warranty by tenant in dower, the heir of the husband is not barred,
though he be also heir to the wife. And by statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, all warranties by any tenant for life shall be void against those in remainder or reversion; and all collateral warranties by n.ny ancestor who has no estate of inheritance in possession, shall be void against his heir. By the wording of which
last statute it should seem that the legislature meant to allow, that the oollat.eral
warranty of. tenant in tail in .Possession, desc~nding (though !ithont aseets)
upon a remamder-man or re..-ers1oner, should still bar the remainder or reversion. For though the judges, in expounding the statute de d<mis, held that by
analogy to the statute of Gloucester, a lineal iVarranty by the tenant in tail without assets should not bar the issue in tail, yet they held such warrantv with
assets to be a sufficient bar: (r) which was therefore formerly mentioned (s) 88
one of the ways whereby an estate-tail might be destroyed; it being indeed nothing more in effect than exchanging the lands entailed for others of equal value.
1.'hey also held, that collateral wanimty was not within the statute de d<mis; 88
that act was principally intended to prevent the tenant in tail from disinheriting his own issue; and therefore collate1'8l warranty (though without assets)
was allowed to be, as at common law, a sufficient bar of the estate-tail and all
remainders and reversions expectant thereon. (t) And so it .still continues t.o
be, notwithstanding the statute of Queen Anne, if made by tenant in tail in possession: who therefore may now, without the forms of a fine or reco"°ery, in some
cases make a good conveyance in fee-simple, by supersdding a warranty to his
grant; which, if accompanied with assets, bars his own issue, and without them
bars such of his heirs as may be in remainder or reversion. (9)
"'7. After wammty usually follow c~venants, (10) or conventions, which
[ ,..304 ]
are clauses of agreement contained in a deed, whereby either party may

the statute above mentioned, warranties of real estate have ceased to have practical operation.]

(10) [The word "covenant" is not essentially necessary to the Validity of a covenant, for t

(q) Co. LIU. 378.

(f"J IJtt. t

na

t Ina&. 283.

( 1) Page 118.

(I)

Co.

LI~

374. i In9'. 131.

proviso to pay is a covenant, and may be so declared upon. Clapham v. Moylo, Lev. 165. And

it may be inferred from the exception in another covenant. 16 East, 352.

Covenants which affect, or are intimately attached to, the thine granted, as to repair, pay rent,

<tc., are said to run with the land, and bind not only the lessee, out his assignee also: 5 Co. 16

b. ; and enure to the heir and assignee of the lessor, even although not named in the covenant.

See 2 Lev. 92. As are also those which the grantor makes that he is seised in fee, has a right to

convey, for quiet enjoyment, for further assurance, and the like, which enure not only fc> the

grantee, but also to his assignee : 1 Marsh. 107; S. C., 5 Taunt. 418; 4 M. and.S. 183; M. 53;

and to executors, <tc., according to the nature of the estate. 2 Lev. 26 ; Spencer's Case, 5 Co.

17, b. ; 3 T. R. 13. And these are covenants real, as they either pass a realty, or confirm an

obligation, so connected with realty, that he who has the realty is either entitled to the benefit

of, or is liable to perform, the obligation. Fitt N. B., 145 ; Shop. Touch, c. 7, 161. See, as to

right and liability of suing and being sued on these covenants, in case of heirs, assignees, 4«., 1

Chitty on PI. 10, 11, 13, 38. 3D, 42.]

The most common covenants in American conveyances are : 1. That the grantor is well seized

of the premises described ; 2. That he has good right and lawful authority to sell and convey

the same; 3. That the premises are free from any incumbrance; 4. That the grantor will pro-

tect the grantee in the quiet enjoyment of the same as against all persons lawfully i-laimin™. and,

5. The covenant of general warranty. The first three of these covenants are broken *t onee, if

at all, and a right of action immediately accrues in favor of the grantee. Bingham r. \\>ui. r-

wax, 1 N. T. 509; Parker f. Brown, 15 N. H. 176; Hamilton v. Cutts, 4 Mass. 349; Baker F.

Bunt, 40 111. 264. As to what will constitute a breach of the covenant of seisin, see Porter r.

Perkins, 5 Moss. 233 ; Sedgwiok v. Hollenbeck, 7 Johns. 376 ; Mott v. Palmer, 1 N. T. 574. The

covenant against incnmbrances extends to easements: Preseott v. Trueman, 4 ICass. 629;

Butler ». Gale, 27 Vt. 739; Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Ponn. St. 232 ; as well as to liens of every

description ; and the grantor is liable upon it if an incumbrance exists, notwithstanding the

grantee was aware of it when he received the conveyance. Townsend c. "Weld, 8 Mass. 146;

Harlow v. Thomas, 15 Pick. 66. The fourth and fifth covenants are designed in wtiw-* "' -
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(9) [Estates-tail and eirtates expectant thereon are not now ban-able by "·arranty, but by sim·
pler means. Sec statute 3and 4 Wm. IV, c. i4. ~- 14. .And since statute 3 aud 4 Wm. JY, c. 2i, and
th!i statute above mentioned, w&Tanties of real estate have ceased to have practical operation.]
(10) [The word "CQt't:nant" is not es~entislly nece1111ary to the \'alidity of a covenant, ror a
proi•i.ao to ,P&Y is a covenant, and may be so declared upon. Clapham"· Moyle, Lev. 155. And
it may be mferred from the exception in another covenant. 16 Ea..~t, 352.
CovonanttJ which affect, or aro intimately attached t-0, the thing granted, 811 to repair, pay rent,
&c., are said to rnn with the land, and bind not only the lessee, bnt his assignee also: 5 Co. 16
b.; and enuro to the heir and Msignoe of the le>lt'or, even although not named in the covenani..
See 2 Lev. 92. .As are also those 'vbich the gmntor makes that he is seised in f~ bM a ri81>t te
convey, for quiet enjoyment, for further a;;surance, and the Jike, which enure not only to the
grantee, but al"° to his a.~signee : 1 Man;h. 107; S. C., 5 Taunt. 418; 4 M. and .S. 188; id. 53;
and to execnto?'l!I, &c., R.CCording to the natnre of the estate. 2 Lev. 26; Spencer'il 08.«e, 5 Cu.
17, b.; 3 T. R. 13. .And these are covenants real, 81! they either p&.'!s a realty or COllfum n
obligati011, so connected with realty, that he who ha.'! the realty is eithel' entitl~ to the benefit
of, or is liable to perform, the obligation. Fit1. N. B., 145; Shep. Touch. c. 7, 161. Soo, mt> to
right and liability of suing and being 11ued on these covenants, in case of heirs, assignees, ct~., l
Chitty on Pl. 10, 11, 13, 38, 39, 42.]
The most common covenants in .American conveyanoes are: 1. That the grantw i8 well 9flised
of the premises described; 2. That be has good right and lawful authority to sell and oonTey
the same; 3. That the premises are free from any incumbrance · 4. That the gnmtor Till protect the grantee in the quiet enjoyment of the l'Bme as against ali pcrson11 lawfully claimm~, and,
5. The c0venant of general warranty. The first three of tbe1:1e coveuauts are broken at onee, if
at all, and a right of action immediately accrues in favor of the grantee. Bingham "· Wftder-wax, 1 N. Y. 509; Parker "· Brown, 15 N. H. 176; Hamilton v. Cutts. 4 llass. 3'9; Baler"·
Bunt, 40 Ill. 264. .As to what will oonstitute a breach of the co'\'"enant of seisin, Ree PorU.·r "·
Perkins, 5 Mn.'!~. 233; Sedgwick v. Hollenbeck, 7 Johns. 376; Mott ii. Palmer, l N. Y. 574. Tho
covenant aitnin!!t incnmbrances extends t-0 easements: Pre!!oott v. Tmeman, 4 lla..'lll. trlS;
Butler "· Gale, Z'I Vt. 739; Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Penn. St. 232; as woll &11 to lions of el"MY
description; aud the grantor is liable upon it if an incumbrance e:siRbl, notwithstanding the
~ntce was aware of it when he rec11ived the uonveyance. Townsend"· Weld, 8 M81t11. 146;
Harlow v. ThomBB, 15 Pick. 66. The fourth and fi.ft.h covenants are dosi1rt10d t.o .......t ..,.• •• •
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stipulate for the truth of certain facts, or may bind himself to perform, or give,

something to the other. Thus the grantor may covenant that he hath a right,

to convey; or for the grantee's quiet enjoyment; or the like; the grantee may

covenant to pay his rent, or keep the premises in repair, &c. (w) If the covenan-

tor covenants for himself and his heirs, it is then a covenant real, and descends

upon the heirs; who are bound to perform it, provided they have assets by de-

scent, but not otherwise; if he covenants also for his executors and administra-

tors, his personal assets, as well as his real, are likewise pledged for the

performance of the covenant; which makes such covenant a better security

than any warranty. (11) It is also in some respects a less security, and therefore

more beneficial to the grantor; who usually covenants only for the acts of him-

self and his ancestors, whereas a general warranty extends to all mankind. For

which reasons the covenant has in modern practice totally superseded the other.

8. Lastly, comes the conclusion, which mentions the execution and date of

deed, or the time of its being given or executed, either expressly, or by refer-

ence to some day and year oefore mentioned, (wi) Not but a deed is good,

although it mention no date; or hath a false date; or even if it hath an impos-

sible date, as the thirtieth of February: provided the real day of its being dated

or given, that is delivered, can be proved, (x) (12)

Iproceed now to the fifth requisite for making a good deed; the reading (13)

of it This is necessary, wherever any of the parties desire it; and, if it be not

done on his request, the deed is void as to him. If he can, he should read it
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himself; if he be blind or illiterate, another must read it to him. If it be read

falsely, it will be void: at least for so much as is misrecited; unless it be agreed

by collusion that the deed shall be read false, on purpose to make it void; for in

such case it shall bind the fraudulent party, (y)

*Sixthly, it is requisite that the party, whose deed it is, should seal, (14) r „„„£ -,

and now in most cases, I apprehend, should sign it also. (15) The use *- *

(it) Appendix No. II. i 2, page viii. (to) Ibid, pago xil. («) Co. LItt. 10. Dyer, 28.

(y) 2 ttep. 3, :>. 11 Rep. 27.

title in the future, and they pass to the heirs and assignees of the grantee until a breach occurs,

and an action then accrues in favor of the person then entitled as heir or assignee. All these

stipulate for the truth of certain facts, or may bind himself to perform, or ~fre,
something to the other. Thus the grantor may covenant that he hath a rigl1t.
to convey; or for the grantee's quiet enjoyment; or the like; the grantee may
covenant to p~y his rent, or keep the premis(•s in repair, &c. ( u) If the covenantor covenants for himself and his lteirs, it is then a covenant real, and descends
upon the heirs; who &re bound to perform it, provided they have asset.a by descent, but not otherwise; if he coYenants also for his e:r;ecutors and administrators, his personal assets, as well as his real, are likewise pledged for the
performance of the covenant; which makes such covenant a better security
lhan a.n,y warranty. (11) It is also in. some respects a le'5s security, and therefore
more beneficial to the grantor; who usually covenants only for the acts of himself and his ancestors, whereas a general warranty extends to all mankind. For
which reasons the covenant has in modern practice totally superseded the other.
8. Lastly, comes the conclusion, which mentions the execution and date of
deed, or the time of its being given or executed, either expressly, or by reference to some day and year before mentioned. (w) Not but a. deed is good,
alt.hough it ment10n no date; or hath a false da.te; or even if it hath an impossible date, as the thirtieth of February : provided the real day of its being dated
or _given, that is delivered, can be proved. (x) (12)
I proceed now to the fifth requisite for ma.kmg a good deed; the reading (13)
of it. This is necessary, wherever any of the parties desire it; and, if it be not
done on his request, the deed is void as to. him. If he can, he should read it
himself; if he be blind or illiterate, another must read it to him. If it be read
falsely, it will be void: at least for so much as is misrecited; unless it be agreed
by collusion that the deed shall be read false, on purpose to make it void; for in
such case it shall bind the fraudulent party. (y)
•Sixthly, it is requisite that the party, whose deed it is, should seal, (14) [ •aoo]
and now in most cases, I apprehend, should sign it also. (15) The use
(•)Appendix No. ll, J 2, page vW.
(I) 2 Jtep. 3, 9. 11 Rep. 'Zl.

(•) I lli4. P8«8 xll.

(a:)

Co. Utt. t6. Dyer, 28.

covenants mav be, and frequently are, qualified by exceptions. See Rawle on Covenants; 2

"Washb. Real Prop. 642.

(11) [The executors and administrators are bound by every covenant without being named,

unless it is such a covenant as is to be performed personally by the covenantor, and there has

been no breach before his death. Cro. Eliz. 553.]

(12) [The date of a deed is not essential. Com. Dig. Fait, B. 3. In ancient times the date

of the deed was generally omitted, and the reason was this, viz.: that the time of prescription

frequently changed, and a deed dated before the time of prescription was not pleaoable, but a

deed without date might be alleged to be made within the time of prescription. Dates begau

to be added in the reigns of Edw. II and Edw. III.

Where a deed purported to bear date on the 20th of November, and was executed by one

of two defendants on the 16th of that month, and by the other on a previous day, it was held

to be immaterial, it not appearing that a blank was left for the date at the time of the execu-

tion. 6 Moore, 483. And where there is no date to a deed, and it directs something to be done

•within a certain time after its supposed date, the time will be calculated from the delivery, 2 Ld.

Rayrn. 1076.]

(13) [But this is not necessary even in the case of an illiterate person, unless he desires it to

be done. 1 Nov. and M. 578 ; 4 B. and Ad. 647; See 8 Car. and P. 124.]

(14) [Sealing must be averred in pleading. 1 Saund. 290, n. 1. It A execute a deed for

himself and hia partner by the autlutrity of nispartner and in his presence, it has been held a

good execution, though only sealed once ; 4 T. R. 313; 3 Ves. 578; though it is an established

rule, that one partner cannot bind the other partners by deed. 7 T. R. 207. A person execut-

ing a deed for his principal should sign in the name of the principal: 6 T. R. 176; or thus, " for

A B (the principal), E F his attorney." 2 East, 142.]

In some of the United States a seal is not necessary to a deed. See Shelton ». Armor 13 Ala.

647; Simpson v. Mundee, 3 Kansas, 172; Pierson v. Armstrong, 1 Iowa, 282; McKinney v. Mil-

ler, 19 Mich.142. In othersascroll or any other device employed by the parties as a substitute for a

seal is sufficient. As to seals generally, see 1 Am. Law. Rev. 638.

(15) [Signing seems unnecessary, unless in cases under the statute of frauds and deeds exe-

title in the future, and they pass to the heirs and assignees of the grantee until a breach occurs,
and an action then accrues in favor of the pen;on then entitled as heir or assignee. All these
co\'enants mav be, and frequently are, qualified by exceptiol1!1. See Rawle on Covenants; 2
WB!!hb. Real Prop. 642.
(11) iThe executors and administratonr are bound by every covenant without being named,
nnl6Ss it is such a covenant as is to be performed personally by the covenantor, and there ha~
been no breach before hit< death. Cro. Eliz. 5r>3.]
(12) [The date of a deed i8 not essential. Com. Dig. Fait, B. 3. In ancient times the date
of the deed WBll generallv omitted, and the reason was this, viz.: that the time of preRCription
frequently changed, and deed dated before the time of prescription was not plead.able, but a
deed wit.bout date might be a.Ileged to be made within the time of prescription. Dates bego.u
to be added in the reigns of Eclw. 11 and Edw. III.
Where a deed purported to bear date on the 20th of November, and WM executed by one
of two defendants on the 16th of that month, and by the other on a previouR day, it was held
to be immaterial, it not appearing that a blank was left. for the date at the time of the execution. 61rloore, 483. And where there is no date to a deed, and it directs something to be clone
within a certain time after its supposed date, the time will be calculated from the delivery, 2 Ld.

a

Rarni. 1076.)
·
(13) (But this is not necer1Mry even in the ease of an illiterate person, unless he de!dres it to
be clone. 1 Nev. and ll. 578; 4 B. and Ad. 647; See 8 Car. a,nd P. 124.]
(14) [Sealing mu~t be averred in pleading. 1 Saund. 290, n. 1. It A execute a deed for
him11elf and hia partner by the a1,tlwrit!t of his partner and in hi.a presence, it has been held a
good execution, though only sealud 011-0C; 4 T. R. 313; 3 Ves. 5713; though it is an esta.bli;hed
rule, that one partner ce.nnot bind the other partners by deed. 7 T. R. 007. A pen;on executin.g a deed for his principal should sign in the name of the principal : 6 T. R. 176; or thus, "for
AB (the principal), E F his attorney." 2 East) 142.]

In JWme of the United States a see.I is not necessary to a deed. See Shelton v. Armor. 13 Ala.
647; Simpson v. Mundee, 3 Karn~as, 172; Pierson v. Armstrong, 1 Iowa, 28'.l; llcKinney v. Miller, 19 ltich.142. In others a scroll or any other de,·ice employed by the parties as a substitute for a
seal is 8Ufficient. As to seals generally, see 1 Am. La\V. Rev. 638.
(15) [Signing RCOID!'l unncc~s11ary1 unless in caseil under the statute offmuds and deeds executed under power!!, Com. Dig. Fait, B. 1; 17 Ve~. 459.]
Signing i:! probably necetisa.ry iu all the United Sta.te11. 2 We.shh. Real Prop. 569.
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Signing is probably necessary in all the United States. 2 Washb. Real Prop. 569.
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of seals, as a mark of authenticity to letters and other instruments in writ-

ing, is extremely ancient. We read of it among the Jews and Persians in

the earliest and most sacred records of history, (z) And in the book of

Jeremiah there is a very remarkable instance, not only of an attestation,

by seal, but also of the other usual formalities attending a Jewish pur-

chase, (a) In the civil law, also, (b) seals were the evidence of truth ; and

were required, on the part of the witnesses, at least, at the attestation of

every testament But in the times of our Saxon ancestors, they were not

much in use in England. For though Sir Edward Coke (c) relies on an

instance of King Edwin's making use of a seal about an hundred years before

the conquest, yet it does not follow that this was the usage among the whole

nation: and perhaps the charter he mentions may be of doubtful authority,

from this very circumstance, of being sealed; since we are assured by all our an-

cient historians, that sealing was not then in common use. The method of the

Saxons was for such as could write to subscribe their names, and whether they

could write or not, to affix the sign of the cross ; which custom our illiterate vul-

gar do, for the most part, to this day keep up; by signing across for their mark,

when unable to write their names. And indeed this inability to write, and there-

fore making a cross in its stead, is honestly avowed by Csedwalla, a Saxon king,

at the end of one of his charters, (d) In like manner, and for the same nnsnr-

F *306 1 moun';able reason, the Normans, a brave but illiterate nation, at their

L -I first settlement in France, used the practice of sealing only, without
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writing their names: which custom continued when learning made its way

among them,though the reason fordoing it had ceased; and hence the charter

of Edward the Confessor to Westminster-abbey, himself being brought up in

Normandy, was witnessed only by his seal, and is generally thought to be the

oldest sealed charter of any authenticity in England, (e) At the conquest, the

Norman lords brought over into this kingdom their own fashions; and intro-

duced waxen seals only, instead of the English method of writing their names,

and signing with the sign of the cros8.(/) And in the reign of Edward I, every

freeman, and even such of the more substantial villeins as were fit to be put

upon juries, had their distinct particular seals, (g) The impiessions of these

seals were sometimes a knight on horseback, sometimes other devices: but coats

of arms was not introduced into seals, nor indeed into any other use, till about

the reign of Richard the First, who brought them from the croisade in the holy

land; where they were first invented and painted on the shields 01 the knights to

distinguish the variety of persons of every Christian nation wno resorted thither,

and who could not, when clad in complete steel, be otherwise known or ascertained.

This neglect of signing, and resting only upon the authenticity of seals,

remained very long among us; for it was held in all our books that sealing

alone was sufficient to authenticate a deed: and so the common form of attest-

ing deeds,—"sealed and delivered," continues to this day; nothwithstanding the

statute 29 Car. II, c. 3, before mentioned, revives the Saxon custom, and expressly

directs the signing, in all grants of lauds, and many other species of deeds: in

which therefore signing seems to be now as necessary as sealing, though it hath

been sometimes held that the one includes the other, (h)

A seventh requisite to a good deed is, that it be delivered (16) by the party

(z) 1 Kings, c. 21. Daniel, c. 6. Esther, c. 8.

(a) "Ana I bought the field of Haiuuneol, nnil weighed him the money, even seventeen shekels of silver.

And I subscribed the evidence, and sealed it, and took witnesses, nnd weighed him the money in the bal-

ances. And I took the evidence of the purchase, both that which was sealed according to the law and •• u--

tom, and also that which was open." C. S3.

(6) fnat. 2, 10, 2 and 3. (c)l Inst. 7.

(.d) " 1'ropria manu pro Ignorantia literarum lignum lanctte cruci» expretti et aibieripti." Seld. Jan.

jtnnl, I 1, s 42. And this (according to ProcoplnsJ, the Emperor Justin in the East, and Theodoric king

of the Uoths in Italy, had before authorized by their <

r example, on account of their Inability to write.

(c) Lamb. Archeion. 51.

Jfrmti'

(g) Stat,

of seals, as a mark of authenticity to letters and other instruments in writing, is extremely ancient. We read of it among the Jews and PersiBilS in
the earliest and most sacred records of history. (z) And in the book of
Jeremiah there is a very remarkable instance, not only of an attest.atio~
by seal, but also of the other usual formalities attending a Jewish purchase. (a) In the civil law, also, (b) seals were the evidence of truth; and
were required, on the :part of the witnesses, at least, at the attestation of
every testament. But m the times of our Saxon ancestors, they were not
much in use in England. For though Sir Edward Coke (c) relies on an
instance of King Edwin's making use of a seal about an hundred years before
the conquest, yet it does not follow that this was the usa~ among the whole
nation: and perhaps the charter he mentions may be of doubtful authority,
from this very circumstance, of being sealed; since we are assured by all our ancient historians, that sealing was not then in common use. The method of the
Saxons was for such as coufd write to subscribe their names, and whether they
could write or not, to affix the sign of the cross; which custom our illiterate vulgar do, for the most part, to this day keep up ; by si$'ning a cross for their mark,
when unable to write their names. And mdeed this mability to write, and therefore making a cross in its stead, is honestly avowed by Credwalla, a Saxon king,
at the end of one of bis charters. (d) In like manner, and for the same nnsnr[ • 306 ] mountable reason, the Normans, a brave but *illitemt.e nation, at their
first settlement in France, used the practice of sealing only, without
writing their names: which custom continued when learning made its way
among them, though the reason for doing it had ceased; and hence the charter
of Edward the Confessor to Westminster-abbey, himself being brought np in
Normandy, was witnessed only by his seal, and is generally thought to be the
oldest sealed charter of any authenticity in England. (e) At the conquest, the
Norman lords brought over into this kingdom their own fashions; and introduced waxen seals only, instead of the English method of writing their names,
and signing with the sign of the cross.(!) And in the reign of Edward I, every
freeman, and even such of the more substantial villeins as were fit to be imt
upon juries, had their distinct particular sea.ls. (g) The impressions of these
seals were sometimes a knight on horseback, sometimes other device1:1: but coats
of arms was not introduced into seals, nor indeed into any otber use, till about
the reign of Richard the First, who brought them from the croi.swle in the holv
land; where they were first invented and painted on the shields 01 the kniuhts to
distinguish the variety of persons of every Christian nation wbo rE>sorted t'.ftither,
and who could not, when clad in complete steel, be otherwise known or ascertained.
This neglect of signing, and resting only upon the authenticity of seals,
remained very long among us; for it was held in all our books that sealing
alone was sufficient to authenticate a deed: and so the common form of attesting deecls,-"sealed and delivered," continues to this day; nothwithstanding the
statute 29 Car. II, c. 3, before mentioned, revives the Saxon custom, and expressly
directs the signin~, in all grants of lands, and many other species of deeds: in
which therefore signing seems to be now as necessary as sealing, though it hath
been sometimes held that the one includes the other. (/1.)
A seventh requisite to a good deed is, that it be delivered (16) by the party
(.;) 1 Kings, c. 21. Daniel, c. 6. Esther{ c. 8.
(aJ "AJl(l 1 bought th!' Held ot'Hanamec, 1mrl welghc<l him the money. even sel"cnt~n shekels ot'~iJ,.er.
And I subscribed the ovi<lence, and aealed It, and took wltne8809, 1rnd -weighed him the mone5 In the bal·
ances. Anrt I took tho evidence of the pnrchMe, both that which waa sealed according to the law aud Cl1$o
tom, mul also that which was open." C. 8'J.
(b) Inst. 2, 10, 2und3.
(c)l !Mt. 7.
~dJ ·' Propria trtanu pro ignoranlia lUerarvm n!Jftfltn •anctl!l cnicU upreari ~. 81'blcril>ri." Seid. Jmt•
.Anol. l. I, j 42. And this (according to Proeoplu~), the Emperor Justin In the East, 1rnd Theodoric :ting
ot the Goths In Italy, had before authorized by their example, on account of their inability to wri&e.
(e) Lamb. Arcllelon. 61.

(fl "Normnnni clllrographnru,,. con/ectiontm, cum cn&Cibtu aurti•, aliuq1'e ~ laef'U, IJ&.J."lllia
Jfrmarl 8olit<1m, in caram '"'pru•a,,. mutant. modumrr.ui •cribtndl Anvlicum r<jicttmt." Ingulph.
(g) :;cut. Exon. H Ed. 1.

(h} 3 I.ev. 1.

Stra. 16'.

(16) No title passes by a deed, though it bo executed with all due formalities, so long as the

grantor retains it in his own possession. Overman p. Kerr, 17 Iowa, 490. It is from the

"Iformanni cMrographorum eonfectionem, cum cntcibut aureii, alii»que lignaculi* Merit, inAnglia

(16) No title pAASes hy a deed, though it be executed with all due fomialities, so long Ill! the

grautor retains it iu his own possession. O•erman "· Kerr, 17 Iowa, 490. It is from the

534:

i sotitam, in cteram impresaam mutant, modumfrtie acribendi Anylicum rqiciunt." Ingiilph.

tat. Exon. UEd. 1. (A; 3 Lev. 1. Stra.Wt.
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himself or his certain attorney, which therefore is *also expressed in r *»„„ -i

the attestation; " sealed and delivered.' A deed takes effect only from L ' ' I

this tradition or delivery; for if the date be false or impossible, the delivery

ascertains the time of it. And if another person seals the deed, yet if the party

delivers it himself, he thereby adopts the sealing, (i) and by a parity of reason

the signing also, and makes them both his own. A delivery may be either

absolute, that is, to the party or grantee himself; or to a third person, to hold

till some conditions be performed on the part of the grantee: in which last

case it is not delivered us & deed, but as an escrow ; thatis,as a scrowl or writing,

which is not to take effect as a deed till the conditions be performed; and then

it is a deed to all intents and purposes. (j)

The last requisite to the validity of a deed is the attestation, or execution of

it in the presence of witnesses: (17) though this is necessary, rather for pre-

(0 Perk. f130. fj) Co. Litt. 88.

delivery that a deed takes effect; but this will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the

contrary, to have been made on the day the deed bears date. Jackson r. Bard, 4 Johns. 230 ;

Cults v. Turk Co., 18 Me. 190: Geiss v. Odenheimer, 4 Yeates, 278. If, however, the acknowl-

edgment of the deed bears date after the date of the deed itself, the delivery will be presumed

to have been made subsequent to the acknowledgment, that being the usual course. Blanch-

ard v. Tyler, 12 Mich. 339; contra, Ford c. Gregory, 10 B. Monr. 175. Possession of the deed

by the grantee is evidence of due delivery, but it is not conclusive, and it may nevertheless be

shown that after execution the grantee had taken it without the grantor's assent. Mills »•.
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Gore, 20 Pick. 36; Hadlock v. Hadlock, 22 111. 388. If, however, the grantee, in the presence

of the grantor, takes possession of the deed without objection, the assent of the latter will be

presumed. "Williams ». Sullivan, 10 Rich. Eq. 217. Delivery to a stranger for the grantee is

sufficient, even though the latter be not aware of it at the time, if he subsequently assents,

Buffuin t>. Green, 5 N. H. 71; Cooper r. Jackson, 4 Wis. 553; Hatch «. Hatch, 9 Mass. 307;

"Wesson v. Stevens, 2 Ired. Eq. 557; Hatch v. Bates, 54 Me. 136; Stephens v. HUBS, 54 Penn.

St. 20: Revard v. "Walker, 39 111. 413. And the recording of a deed by the grantor may be

regarded as a delivery of it to the recorder for the grantee. Jackson «. Leek, 12 Wend. 107;

Denton v. Perry, 5 Vt. 382. But if, in such a case, tne deed does not come to the knowledge

of the grantee until after the grantor's death, the delivery is not effectual. Mavnard t). May-

nard, 10 Mass. 456. But see Mitchell ». Ryan, 3 Ohio, N. S. 377. Where a deed is recorded,

and there is no evidence who caused it to be done, delivery is presumed; and it has been held

that the like presumption arises where the grantor himself placed it on record. Mitchell r.

Ryan, 3 Ohio, N. S. 377; Folk ». Tarn, 9 Rich. Eq. 303. But see Maynard v. Maynard, 10

Mass. 456; Samson v. Thornton, 3 Met. 275. A deed may be delivered upon condition to be

performed before it shall take effect,; in which case it is called an escrow ; but in such a case

the delivery must be to some third person, to hold until the condition is performed. If deliv-

ered to the grantee himself upon condition, the condition is void, and the deed takes effect at

once. Brown p. Reynolds, 5 Sneed, 639; Dawson v. Hall, a Mich. 390; Graves v. Tucker, 10

S. and M. 9. See Rcsor v. Railroad Co., 17 Ohio St. 139. Where a deed is placed in escrow, it

takes effect from the delivery made after the condition is performed; Jackson ». Rowland, 6

Wend. 666; and if the custodian of the deed shall deliver it without performance of the condi-

tion, such second delivery is ineffectual: Stiles ». Brown, 16 Vt. 563; and it seems that even

an innocent purchaser from the grantee cannot hold in such a case. See People v. Bostwick, 32

N. Y. 450 ; Smith v. South Royalton Bank, 32 Vt. 341. But see Blight v. Schenck, 10 Peun. St.

285; Berry t>. Anderson, 22 Ind. 40.

(17) [It is not essential to the validity of a deed, in general, that it should be executed in the

presence of a witness. Com. Dig. Fait, B. 4. And where the names of two fictitious persons

had been subscribed by way of attestation, the judge permitted the plaintiff, who had received

the deed from the defendant in that deceitful i-hape, to give evidence of the handwriting of

the defendant himself; and where the subscribing witness denied any recollection of the execu-

tion, proof of his handwriting was deemed sufficient. Peake Rep. 23, 146; 2 Camp. 635.]

The statutes of some of the United States make the presence and attestation of witnesses

essential to the validity of the deed. See 2 Washb. Real Prop. 572. Generally, however, they

arc required only for the purpose of authenticating the deed, in order that it may be recorded,

and the deed will be valid as against the grantor and all others acquiring rights, with knowl-

edge of it, without either witnesses or record. Long v. Ramsey, 1 S. and R. 73 ; Dole v. Thur-

low, 18 Met. 157; Dougherty c. Randall, 3 Mich. 581; Wiswall v. Ross, 4 Port. 321. What

has been said as to witnesses is true also as to acknowledgment; in some states this is essential

to give the deed validity, while in others it is only a ceremony preliminary to the record. The

statutes regarding the record of deeds are not uniform; in most of the states the record is

required for the purpose of notice, and to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers; and an

unrecorded deed is effectual against the grantor and his heirs, as well as against subsequent

purchasers and mortgagees under him, who have received their conveyances and liens with

knowledge of such unrecorded deed. Upon this subject, see 4 Kent, 456, et seq.; 2 Washb.

Real Prop. 590, et seq. The record of a deed not executed with all the statutory formalities,
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serving the evidence, than for constituting the essence of the deed. Our modern

deeds are in reality nothing more than an improvement or amplification of the

brevia teztata mentioned by the feudal writers, (k) which were written memoran-

dums, introduced to perpetuate the tenor of the conveyance and investiture, when

f rants by parol only became the foundation of frequent dispute and uncertainty.

'o this end they registered in the deed the persons who attended as witnesses,

which was formerly done without their signing their names (that not beiag

always in their power),but they only heard the deed read; and then the clerk

or scribe added their names, In a sort of memorandum, thus: "hijs tesiibva

Johanne Moore, Jacobo Smith, et aliis, ad hanc rein convocatis." (ty This, like

all other solemn transactions, was originally done only coram panbvs, (MI) and

frequently when assembled in the court-baron, hundred, or county-court; which

was then expressed in the attestation, teste comitatu hundredo, <&c. (n) After-

r *3Qg -I wards the attestation of other witnesses was allowed, the trial in *case of

L ' J a dispute being still reserved to the pares; with whom the witnesses (if

more than one) were associated and joined in the verdict; (o) till that also was

abrogated by the statute of York, 12 Edw. II, st. 1, c. 2. And in this manner,

with some such clause of hijs testibu8,sm all old deeds and charters, particularly

magna carta, witnessed. And in the time of Sir Edward Coke, creations of

nobility were still witnessed in the same manner. (») But in the king's common

charters, writs or letters patent, the style is now altered: for at present the king

is his own witness, and attests his letters patent thus: " Teste meipso, witness
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ourself at Westminster," &c., a form which was introduced by Richard the

First, (q) but not commonly used till about the beginning of the fifteenth

century; nor the clause of hijs tesiibus entirely discontinued till the reign of

Henry the Eighth: (r) which was also the aera of discontinuing it in the deeds

of subjects, learning being then revived, and the faculty of writing more general:

and, therefore, ever since that time the witnesses have usually subscribed their

attestations, either at the bottom, or on the back of the deed. (*)

III. We are next to consider, how a deed may be avoided, or rendered of no

effect. And from what has been before laid down, it will follow, that if a deed

wants any of the essential requisites before mentioned; either, 1. Proper

parties, and a proper subject-matter: 2. A good and sufficient consideration:

3. Writing on paper or parchment, duly stamped: 4. Sufficient and legal words,

properly disposed: 5. Reading, if desired, before the execution: C. Sealing, and,

by the statute, in most cases signing also: or, 7. Delivery; it is a void deed ab

initio. It may also be avoided by matter ex post facto: as 1. By rasure, interlining

or other alteration in any material part: unless a memorandum be made

thereof at the time of the execution and attestation. (£) (18) 2. By break-

fk) Feud. M.I. 4. (1) Co. LIB. 7. (m) Feud I. 2, (. 32.

(n) Spelm. Olatt. '.*>. Madox. forum I. No. 221, :a->, 660. (a) Co. Lltt. 0.

fpj ZInst. 77. (q) Madox. Formvl. No. 515. (r) Ibid. Dissert fol. 32.

serving the evidence, than for constitµtiug tht- essence of the deed. Our modern
doods are in reality nothing more than an hnprm·ement or amplification of the
brevia testata mentioned by the feudal writers, (k) which were written memonmdums, introduced to perpetn~te the ~nor of the conveyance and investi~ure, when
grunts by parol only became the foundation of frequent dispute and uncertaintv.
'l'o this end they registered in the deed the persons who attended as '"itn~
which was formerly done without their signing their names (that not being
always in their power), but thev only be~<l the deed read; and then the clerk
or scribe added their nrunes, in a sort of memorandum, thu&: "hijs teslifnt-8
Jolumne Moore, Jacobo Smith, et aliis, ad /1mic rem convocatis." (l) This, like
all other solemn transactions, was originally done only coram parilms, (m) and
frequently when assembled in the court-bw-ou, hundred, or county-court; which
was then expressed in the attestation, teste crmiitatu hundredo, &c. ( n) After[ • 308 ] wards the attestation of other witnesses was allowed, the trial in •case of
a dispute being still reserwd to the pares; with whom the witnesses (if
more than on-e) were associated and joined in the verdict; (o) till that also was
abrogated by the statute of York, 12 Edw. II, st. 1, c. 2. Ancl in this manner,
with some such clause of !tijs testibus, are all old deeds and charters, particularly
magna carta, witnessed. And in the time of Sir Edward Coke, creations of
nobility were still witnessed in the same manner. (p) But in the king's common
charters, writs or letters patent, the style is now altered: for at present the king
is his own witness, and attests his letters patent thus: " Teste me·ipso, witness
ourself at Westminster," &c., a form which was introduced by Richard the
First, (q) but not commonly used till about the beginning of the fifteenth
century; nor the clause of ltijs testibus entire}; disoontinued till the reign of
Henry the Eighth: (r) wnich was also the rera. o discontinuing it in the deeds
of subjects, learning being then revived, and the faculty of writing more general :
and, therefore, ever since that time the witnesses have usually subscribed their
attestations, either at the bottom, or on the back of the deed. (s)
III. We arc next to consider, how a deed may be avoided, or rendered of no
effect. And from what has been before laid down, it will follow, that if a deed
wants any of the essential requisites before mentioned; either, 1. Pro~r
parties, and a proper subject-matter: ~. A good and sufficient consideration:
3. Writing on paper or parchment, duly stamped: 4. Sufficient and leglll words,
properly disposed: 5. Reading, if desired, before the execution: G. Sealing, and,
by the statute, in most cases signing also: or, 7. Delivery; it is a void deed ah
initio. It may also be avoided by matter ex post facto: as 1. By rasnre, interlining
or other alteration in any material part: unless a memorandum be made
thereof at the time of the execution and attesta.tion. (t) (18) 2. By break-

(i) 2 lost. 73. See page 378. (I) 11 Bop. 27.

is notice to no one. Galpin v. Abbott, 6 Mich. 17; Blood v. Blood, 23 Pick. 80; Kerns r. Swopc,

2 Watts, 75; Bossard v. White, 9 Rich. Eg. 483; Peck v. Mallams, 10 N. T. 518; Herndon r.

Kimball, 7 Geo. 432; Choteau v. Jones, 11 111. 300.

(l:J Aud. l. I. I . 4.
(l) Co. Litt. 7.
Spelm. OWi. 118. H"dox. Fonwl. No.

(ft)
(p)

(•) Fl'.lld l. 2, I . St.

m, lm, GOO.

2 Inst. 77.
· (q) Madox. FOrMul. ·No. 1'>15.
(•) 2 lnat. 78. See page 378.
(t) 11 Rep. i7.

(o) Co. Litt. G.
(r) Ibid. Dleeert. fol•.

(18) The effect which an erasure, interlineation or other alteration in a deed may hare upon

it does not depend upon whether or not a memorandum thereof is made at the 'time of the

execution of the deed, but whether in fact it appears to have been made at a proper time and

with proper authority. "Where such alteration is actually made before the deed is executed,

it is always a proper precaution to have a memorandum thereof made at the foot of the deed

and attested by the witnesses; and the deed will then bear upon its face the most satisfactory

evidence that "the alteration has not been improperly made. But where an alteration appears

which is not thus noted, it does not follow, even though it be in a material part, that the deed

is thereby avoided. If the alteration corrects an evident mistake of description, which with-

out it tne court would have corrected by construction, it will be treated as immaterial by

whomsoever made. Jordan v. Stevens, 61 Me. 78; Gordan v. Si»er, 39 Miss. 818. Bnt if the

alteration appear to be material, it will often happen that the question upon whom rests the bur-

den of explanation is of the last importance, especially as these questious often arise after snob

lapse of time that complete explanation is difficult or impossible.
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Galpin ti. Abbott, 6 llich. 17; Blood"· Blood, 23 Pick. 80; Kerns l'. Swope.
2 _Watts, 75; ~rd v. White, 9 Rich. Eq. 483; Peck t1. llallarns, 10 N. Y. 518; Herndon ~.
Ktmball. 7 Geo. 432; Choteau v. Jones, 11 Ill. 300.
(18) The effect which an er88uro, interlineation or other alteration in a deed may ha'\"e upon
it docs not dtJpend upon whether or not a memorandum thereof is made at the time of t.he
execution of the deed, but whether in fact it appears to have been made at a propt"r time &nd
with proper authority. Where such alt.erst.ion lil actually made before the deed is execuk.-d,
it is always n proper precaution to have a memorandum thereof made at the foot of the deed
and attested by the witnesses; and the deed will then bear upon its face the mo8t eati.'lfactory
evidence that the alteration hllll not been improperly mnde. But where an alteration app<'lll'll
which is not thus noted, it doe11 not follow, even though it be in a material vart, that the deed
is thereby a\·oi<led. If the alteration corrects o.n evident mi11take of de!!Cnption, which vit.hout it the court would have corrected by construction, it will be treated as immaterial by
~homsoc>cr wnde. Jordan v. St.e,·ens, 51 lile. 78; Gordan ti. Siler, 39 lliss. 818. Bnt if the
alteration appear to be material, it will of\en happen that the question upon whom rest." the burden of explanation is of the last importance, especiall7 as these questions often arise after 11uab
lapse of time that complete explanation ie difficult or llllpot18ible.
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ing off, or defacing the seal, (w) (19) 3. By delivering it up to be cancelled;

"that is, to have lines drawn over it in the form of lattice-work or r ^^ -,

cancelli; though the phrase is now used figuratively for any manner of •• l> :

obliteration or defacing it. 4. By the disagreement of such, whose concur-

rence is necessary, in order for the deed to stand: as the husband, where a feme-

covert is concerned; an infant, or person under duress, when those disabilities

are removed; and the like. 5. By the judgment or decree of a court of judica-

ture. This was anciently the proVince of the court of star-chamber, and now of

the chancery: (20) when it appears that the deed was obtained by fraud, force,

or other foul practice; or is proved to be an absolute forgery, (w) In any of

these cases the deed may be voided, either in part or totally, according as the

cause of avoidance is more or less extensive.

And, having thus explained the general nature of deeds, we are next to con-

sider their several species, together with their respective incidents. And herein,

(H) 8 Rep. 23. (w) Tuth. nnmn. -U. 1 Vt-ru. IUS.

ing oft', or defacin~ the seal. (u) (19) 3. By delh·ering it np to be cancelled;
•that is, to hin-e Imes drawn over it in the form of lattice-work or [ • 309 ]
ca1icelli; though the J!hrase is now used figuratively for any m1mner of
obliteration or defacmg it. 4. By the disagreement of such, whose concurrence is necessary, in order for the deed to stand: as the husband, where a femecovert is concerned; an infant, or person under duress, when those disabilities
are removed; and the like. 5. By the judgment or decree of a court of judicature. This was anciently the pro\·ince of the court of' star-chamber, and now of
the chancery: (20) when it appears that the deed was obtained by fraud, force,
pr other foul practice; or is proved to be an absolute forgery. (w) In any of
these cases the deed may be voided, either in part or totally, according as the
cause of avoidance is more or less extensive.
And, having thus explained the general rniture of deeds, we are next to consider their se\·eral species, together with their respective incidents. And herein

There is certainly considerable diversity in the judicial decisions noon this subject, but the

("1)

tendency of the later adjudications seems to be to establish the doctrine that there id no pre-

Totb. '*lllP·

*·

J Vern. M8.

sumption of law that an alteration was made subsequent to the execution of the deed, but

that, on the contrary, the question when and with what intent an alteration was made is one

of fact for the jury, who, in the absence of any suspicious circumstance, ought to presume

against its having been wrongfully and improperly made. There is much good sense in

what is said by Mr. Justice Hall, of the supreme court of Vermont, that " an alteration of a
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written instrument, if nothing appear to the contrary, should be presumed to have been made

at the time of its execution. I think this rule is demanded by the actual condition of the busi-

ness transactions of this country, and especially of this state, where a great portion of the

contracts made are drawn by the parties to them, and without great care in regard to inter-

lineations and alterations. To establish an invariable rule, that the party producing the paper

should in all cases be bound to explain any alteration by extrinsic evidence, would, I appre-

hend, do injustice in a very great majority of the instances in which it should be applied. *

~ * It is not*often that an alteration can ba accounted for by extraneous evidence; and

to hold that in all cases such evidence must be given, without regard to any suspicious

appearance of the alteration, would, I think, in many instances, be doing such manifest injus

face as to shook the common sense of most men." Deaman's Admrs. ». Kussell, -Ji i Tt. a I :t;

Bee also Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. 531; Pullen v. Hutchenson, 12 Shep. 254; McCormick ».

Fritzmorris, 39 Mo. 34; Simpson t. Stackhouse, 9 Peuu. St. 106. The cases upon this subject

are collected in 1 Greenl. Ev. $ 564; 1 Smith Lead. Cos. 5th Am. ed. 961; 2 Washb. Real. Prop.

557. If the alteration is suspicious upon its face—as if it be in a different handwriting or dif-

ferent ink from the body of the deed, and be favorable to the interest of the grantee—it is reas-

onable that he be required to account for it. Jackson v. Jacoby, 9 Cow. 125; Wilde ». Armsby,

6 Cush. 314.

Where, by the making and delivery of a deed, the title passes, no subsequent alteration in the

deed, or even its destruction, can of itself have the effect to defeat or divest the title which has

once passed. JUiller t>. Gilleland, 19 I VIOL St. 119 ; 2 Washb. Real Prop. 557. But if a deed is

destroyed or altered by the grantee himself for any fraudulent purpose, or uuder such cir-

cumstances that it wo'uld be inequitable for him afterwards to rely upon title under it,

it may be that the rules of evidence will preclude his showing the title which he actually pos-

sesses. It has been held in one case, that the fraudulent destruction or alteration of a deed

would preclude the party from introducing secondary evidence of its contents: Wallace v.

Hamistad, 44 Penn. St. 492; and in another that, where, by consent of the parties thereto,

a deed was destroyed, with the intent to revest the title in the grantor, the grantee was

estopped in a suit at law from producing the like secondary evidence. Ougins v. Van Gorder, 10

Mich. 523.

(19) [Sec in general, Com. Dig. Fait, F. 2. It must be an intentional breaking off or defac-

ing by the party to whom the other is bound, for if the person bound break off or deface the

seal, it will not avoid the deed. Touchstone, c. 4, s. 6, 2. And if it appear that the seal has

been affixed and afterwards broken off or defaced by accident, the deed will still be valid.

Palm. 403. And the defacing or canceling a deed will not in any case divest property which

has once vested by transmutation of possession. 2 Hen. Bla. 263 ; and see 4 B. and A. "675. If

several join in a deed and be separately bound thereby, the breaking off the seal of one, with

intent to discharge him from future liability, will not alter the liability of the others. 1 B. and

There is certainly comddemble dh·er.dty in the Judicial deciRions UJ!on this subject, bnt the
tendency of the later adjudicatiou11 eeem11 to be to establish the doctrine that there is no presumption of law that an a.lteratfon wu made subsequent to the execution of the deed, but
that, on the contrary, the question when &nd with what intent an alteration WM made is one
of toot for the jury, who, in the ab11euce of any RU8piciou:1 circumst,ance, ought to pre~ume
against it.l having been wrondhllr and improperly made. There is much good sense in
wbat is said by Yr. Ju~ice Ha11, of the 1mpreme court of Vermont, that" an alteration of a
written instrument, if nothing appear to the .contrary, should be presumed to have been made
at the time of its execution. I think this mlo is domwided by the actual con11ition of tho bu1:1iness transactions of this country, and e8pecially of this 11tate, where a great portion of the
contract~ made are drawn by the partic11 to them, &nd without great care in re~ard to iutcrlineations and alterations. To establish an invariable role, that the party producmg the paper
should in all ca110s be bouud to explain any alteration by extrin~ic evidonoe, would, I apprehend, do injustice in a very great majority of the instances in which it should be applied. •
• • It i8 not' often that an alteration can be accounted for by extraneous evidence ; and
to bold that in all c&l'el! such evidence mnst be ~iYen, without regard to any fiUi!picioua
appearance of the alteration, would, I think, in many instances, be doing ench manife~t injus
tice as to shook the oommon i<e.DBe of m1»1t men." Jleawan'B .Admrs. v. Ru~sell, 20 Vt.. 213;
see also Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. 531; Pullen v. Hutchcnwn, 12 Shep. 254; McCormick v.
Frit.zmorri11, 39 Mo. 34; Simp~on ii. Stackhou11e, 9 Penn. St. 106. The ca.-;es upon this subject
are collected in 1 Greenl. Ev. ~ 564; 1 Smith Lead. Co.s. 5th Am. ed. 961; 2 WMhb. Rew. Pro.P.·
657. If the alteration is su11piciou1 upon its fooe-aii if it be in a difforent handwriting or d1ffe.rent ink from the body of the l\eed, and be fuvorable to the interest of the grantee-it is reasonable that he be required to acoount for it. Jackl!on v. Jacoby, 9 Cow. l~; Wilde v . .Arm11by,
6 Cu11b. 314.
Where, by the making and delivery of a deed, the title pasRes, no subsequent alt.eration in the
deed, or even it~ dostruction, can of itself have the effect to defeat or divest the title which has
once pat1Sed. .M:iller v. Gilleland, 1IJ Penn. St. 119; 2 Wa.~hb. .Real Prop. 557. But if a deed is
destroyed or altered by the gra.ntee himself for any fraudulent purpose, or under l!Ucb circumstances that it would be inequitable for him afterwords to rely UJ!on title under it.,
it may be that tho roles of evidence will preclude his Rhowing the title which he 8C'tually possesseH. It has been held in one case, that the fraudulent destruction or &Iteration of a deed
would preclude the party from introducing aecondary evidence of its content.d: Wallace v.
Hanmtatl, 44 Penn. St. 49'.2; and in a.nother that, where, by consent of the partie~ thereto,
a deed was de8troyed, with the intent to revest the title In the grantor, the grantee w1111
eRtopped in a 8Uit at law from producing the like secondary evidence. Gugins "· Van Gorder, 10
M.icb. 523.
(19) [Sec in general, Com. Dig. Fait, F. 2. It mnst be an intentional breaking o.11' or defacing bf the party to whom the other il! bound, for if the person bound \>rcak off or deface the
seul, 1t will not avoid tho deed. Touchstone, c. 4, A. 6, ll. And if it appear that tho 8Cal has
been affixed and atl.erwardg broken oft' or defaced by accident, the deed will still be valid.
Palm. 403. And the defl\Cing or canceling a deed will not in any C886 divest property which
ha.'! once vested by tmni1mntntion of possession. 2 Hen. Bia. 263; and see 4 B. and A. 675. If
ecveml join in a deed aml be Aeparate[y bound thereby, the breaking off the seal of one, with
intent to discharge him from future liability, will not alter the liability of the others. 1 B. and

c. 68'.l.]

(20) [The court.a of common law are equally competent to nullify the deed in mch c11.11e npon
the principle that. the mind not aaKenting, it is not the deed of the party sought to be charged
by it; and there is no occasion to resort to a court of equity for relief, when evidence at law can
bo adduced. 2 T. R. 765.]

C. 682.]

(20) [The courts of common law are equally competent to nullify the deed in such case upon

the principle that, the mind not assenting, it is not the deed of the party sought to be charged
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by it; and there is no occasion to resort to a court of equity for relief, when evidence at law can

bo adduced. 2 T. K. 765.]
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I shall only examine the particulars of those which, from practice and experi-

ence of their efficacy, are generally used in the alienation of real estates, for it

would be tedious, nay infinite, to descant upon all the several instruments made

use of in personal concerns, but which fall under our general definition of a

deed ; that is, a writing sealed and delivered. The former being principally such

as serve to convey the property of lands and tenements from man to man, are

commonly denominated conveyances; which are either conveyances at common

law, or such as receive their force and efficacy by virtue of the statute of uses.

I. Of conveyances by the common law, some may be called original or pri-

mary conveyances; which are those by means whereof the benefit or estate is

created or first arises ; others are derivative^ or secondary; whereby the benefit or

estate originally created, is enlarged, restrained, transferred, or extinguished.

C*310I * Original conveyances are the following: 1. Feoffment; 2. Gift; 3.

1 ' J Grant; 4. Lease; 5. Exchange; 6. Partition: derivative are, 7. Release;

8. Confirmation ; 9. Surrender; 10. Assignment; 11. Defeazance.

1. A feoSment, feoff amentum, is a substantive derived from the verb, to enfeoff,

feoffare or infeudare, to give one a feud ; and therefore feoffment is properly

donatio feudi. (x) It is the most ancient method of conveyance, the most solem n

and public, and therefore the most easily remembered and proved. And it may

properly be defined, the gift of any corporeal hereditament to another. He that

so gives, or enfeoffs, is called the feoffor; and the person enfeoffed is denomi-

nated the feoffee. (21)
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This is plainly derived from, or is indeed itself the very mode of, the ancient

feudal donation ; for though it may be performed by the word " enfeoff" or

"grant," yet the aptest word of feoffment is, " do or dedi." (y) And it is still

directed and governed by the same feudal rules ; insomuch that the principal

rule relating to the extent and effect of the feudal grant, " tenor est gui legem

datfeudo" is in other words become the maxim of our law with relation to

feoffments, •' modus legem dat donationi." (z) And therefore, as in pure feudal

donations, the lord, from whom the feud moved, must expressly limit and.

declare the continuance or quantity of estate which he meant to confer, "ne

quis plus donasse pr<esumatur quam in donations expresserit;" (a) so, if one

grants by feoffment lands or tenements to another, and limits or expresses uo

estate, the grantee (due ceremonies of law being performed) hath barely an estate

for life, (b) For as the personal abilities of the feoffee were originally presumed.

to be the immediate or principal inducements to the feoffment, the feoffee's

estate ought to be confined to his person, and subsist only for his life; unless

F *311 1 ^ne fe°ffer» by express provision in the creation *and constitution of the

L J estate, hath given it a longer continuance. These express provisions

are indeed generally made ; for this was for ages the only conveyance, whereby

our ancestors were wont to create an estate in fee-simple, (c) by giving the land

to the feoffee, to hold to him and his heirs forever; though it serves equally well

to convey any other estate or freehold, (d)

But by the mere words of the deed the feoffment is by no means perfected ;

there remains a very material ceremony to be performed, called livery of seisin;

without which the feoffee has but a mere estate at will, (e) This livery of seisin

is no other than the pure feudal investiture, or delivery of corporeal possession

of the land or tenement ; which was held absolutely necessary to complete the

donation. " Nam feudum sine investitura nullo modo constitm potuit .•" (f)

and an estate was then only perfect, when, as the author of Fleta expresses it in

our law, "fit juris et setsinas conjunctio." ( g)

(x) Co. IJtt. 9. (y)IMa. (*) Wright, 21. (a) Page 108.

(\>) Co. Lite. 42. fe) Sec Appendix, No. 1. (d) Co. LiU. 9.

(e) LIU. i 66. (f) Wright, rf. (g) I. 3, e. 15, ( 5.

I shall only examine the particulars of those which, from practice and experi~
ence of their efficacy, are genel'll.lly used in the alienation of real estates, for it
would be tedious, nay infinite, to descant uron all the several instruments mad.e
use of in personal concerns, but which fal under our general definition of a
deed; that is, a writing sealed and delivered. The former being principaJly such
as sen-e to convey the property of lands and tenements from man to man, are
commonly denominated conveyances; which are either conveyances at common
lqw, or such as receive their force and efficacy by virtue of the atatttle of use~.
I. Of conveyances by the common law, some may be called origfoal or primary conveyances; which are those by means whereof the benefit or estate is
created or first arises; others are derivative or seconifflry; whereby the benefit or
estate originally created, is enlarged, restrained, transferred, or extinguished.
[ • 310 J *Original con ve1ances are the follo\\·~~g: 1. ~eoff~ent; 2. Gift; 3.
Grant; 4. Le.ase; a. Exchange; 6. Partition: derwative are, 7. Release;
8. Confirmation; 9. Surrender; 10. Assignment; 11. Defeazance.
1. A feoffment,feojfamentum, is a substantive derived from the verb, to enfeofrp
feoffare or infeudare, to give one a feud; and therefore feoffment is properly
donatio feudi. (x) It is the most ancient method of conveyance, the most solemn
and public, and therefore the most easily remembered and proved. And it may
properly be defined, the gift of any corporeal hereditament to another. He that
so gives, or enfeoffs, is called the .feojfor; and the person enfeoffed is denominated the feo.ffee. (21)
.
This is plamly derived from, or is indeed itself the very mode of, tbe ancient
feudal donation ; for though it may be performed by the word "tm.feoff" or
"grant," yet the aptest word of feoffment is, "do or dedi." (!/) And it is still
directed and governed by the same feudal rules; insomuch that the principal
ntle relating to the extent and effect of the feudal grant, "tenor est qui legem
dat feudo," IS in other words become the maxim of our law with relation to
feoffments, "modu.<J legem dat donationi." (z) And therefore, as in pure foudul
donations, the lord, from whom the feud moved, must expressly limit and
declare the continuance or quantity of estate which he meant to confer, "~
quis plus donasse pr<P-sumatur quam in donatione expresserit;" (a) so, if one
grants by feoffment lands or tenements to another, and limits or expresses no
estate, the grantee (due ceremonies oflaw being performed) hath barely an estate
for life. (b) For as the personal abilities of the feoffee were originally presumed
to be the immediate or principal inducements to the feotrment, the feoff'ee~s
estate ought to be confined to his person, and subsist only for his life; unless
[ • 311 ] the feoffer, by express provision in the creation *and constitution of the
estate, hath given it a longer continuance. These express provisions
are indeed generally made; for this was for. ages t~e onl~ con\"'eya_nce, whereby
our ancestors were wont to create an estate m fee~s1mple, c) by ginng the land
to the feoffee, to hold to him anu bis heirs forever; thong it serves equally well
to convey any other estate or freehold. (d)
But by the mere words of the deed the. feoffment is by no means perfected ;
there remains a verv material ceremony to be performed, called livery of seisin.;
without which the feoffee has but a mere estate at will. (e) This livery of seisin
is no other than the pnre feudal investiture, or delivery of corporeal pos::ession
of the land or tenement; which was held absolutely necessary to complete the
donation. "Nam feudmn sine investUura nullo modo constitui potuit :" (.f)
and an estate was tnen only perfect, when, as the author of Fleta expre8$08 it in
our law, "fit jteris et seisin.aJ con,ittnctio." ( g)

(21) [Mr. Saunders' description of a feoffment at common law ia more perfect than that given

in the text : he calls it a conveyance of corporeal hereditaments from one person to another by

delivery of the possession, npon or within view of the hereditaments so conveyed.]
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(:z) Co. J.ltt. !I.
(b) Co. Litt.
(c) Litt. I 00.

a.

(,,)Ibid.
(6) Wright, il.
(a) Page 108.
(c) See Appendix, No. I.
(d) Co. Litt. 9.
(/)Wright, !fl.
(fl) l. 8, c. Ill, 111.

(21) [Mr. Saunders' description of 11 feofl'ment at common law is more perfect thnn that gi,.-en
in the te::'l:t: he calls it a. conveyance of corporea.l liercditamcnt;i from one pen;on to llllother by
delivery of the possession, upon or within view of the hereditaments l!O conveyed.]
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Investitures, in their original rise, were probably intended to demonstrate in

conquered countries the actual possession of the lord; and that he did not grant

a bare litigious right, which the soldier was ill qualified to prosecute, but a

peaceable aud firm possession. And at a time when writing was seldom practiced,

a mere oral gift, at a distance from the spot that was given, was not likely to be

either long or accurately retained in the memory of by-standers, who were very

little interested in the grant Afterwards they were retained as a public and no-

torious act, that the country might take notice of and testify the transfer of the

estate; and that such as claimed title by other means, might know against whom

to bring their actions.

In all well-governed nations some notoriety of this kind has been ever held

requisite, in order to acquire and ascertain *the property of lands. In r*oioi

the Roman law plenum dominium was not said to subsist, unless where *• *

a man had both the right and the corporal possession; which possession could

not be acquired without both an actual intention to possess, and an actual

seisin, or entry into the premises, or part of them in the name of the whole, (h)

And even in ecclesiastical promotions, where the freehold passes to the person

promoted, corporal possession is required at this day, to vest the property com-

pletely in the new proprietor; who, according to the distinction of the canonists,

(V) acquires tine jits ad rein, or inchoate and imperfect right, by nomination and

institution ; but not the jus in re, or complete and full right, unless by corporal

possession. Therefore in dignities possession is given by instalment; in rectories
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and vicarages by induction, without which no temporal rights accrue to the

minister, though every ecclesiastical power is vested in him by institution. So,

also, even in descents of lands by our law, which are cast on the heir by act of

the law itself, the heir has not plenum dominium, or full and complete owner-

ship, till he has made an actual corporal entry into the lands: for if he dies be-

fore entry made, his heir shall not be entitled to take the possession, but the heir

of the person who was last actually seised, (k) It is not, therefore, only a mere

right to enter, but the actual entry, that makes a man complete owner; so as to

transmit the inheritance to his own heirs: non\ jus, sed seisina,facit stipitem. (I)

Yet the corporal tradition of lands being sometimes inconvenient, a symbolical

delivery of possession was in many cases anciently allowed; by transferring

something near at hand, in the presence of credible witnesses, which by agree-

ment should serve to represent the very thing designed to be conveyed ; aud an

occupancy of this sign or symbol was 'permitted as equivalent to occu- r ^n-, o -i

pancy of the land itself. Among the Jews we find the evidence of a *• -I

purchase thus defined in the book of Ruth: (/«) " now this was the manner in

former time in Israel, concerning redeeming and concerning changing, for to

confirm all things: a man plucked off his shoe and gave it to his neighbor; and

this was a testimony in Israel." Among the ancient Goths and Swedes, contracts

for the sale of lands were made in the presence of witnesses who extended

the cloak of the buyer, while the seller cast a clod of the land into it, in order to

give possession ; and a staffer wand was also delivered from the vendor to the

vendee, which passed through the hands of the witnesses.(w) With our Saxon

ancestors the delivery of a turf was a necessary solemnity, to establish the convey-

ance of lands.(o) And to this day, the conveyance of our copyhold estates is

usually made from the seller to the lord or his steward by delivery of a rod or

verge, and then from the lord to the purchaser by re-delivery of the same, in the

presence of a jury of tenants.

Conveyances in writing were the last and most refined improvement. The

mere delivery of possession, either actual or symbolical, depending on the ocular

testimony and remembrance of the witnesses, was liable to be forgotten or

(It) ATom apitdmur po»e»»ionem carport et nnimo ; neqne per te corpore, ntqite per te nnimo. Km autcm ita

occtpicnrfvm at. nt gvi fundum possulere veltt, omnes. glebra cirmmambtilet; .<,./ mitflcit quamlibet partem

ljutfnndi introire. (Ff. 41, 2, '•',.) Ami aguiu : tra<litionibua dominia rerum, non wwitpactis, transfemtn-

tur. (Cod. 2. 3. 20J

(i) Decretal, I. 3. t, 4, c. 40. flcl See pages 200, 227, 228. (I) Flpt. I. G. c. 2. » 2.

Cm) Cb. 4, v. 7. (n) Stiernbook, dejureSueon. 1. 2. c. 4. (<>) Uickea, Ditiert. Epistolar. 85.
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misrepresented, and became frequently incapable of proof. Besides, the new

occasions and necessities introduced by the advancement of commerce, required

means to be devised of charging and encumbering estates, and of making them

liable to a multitude of conditions and minute designations for the purpose of

raising money, without an absolute sale of the land; and sometimes the like

proceedings were found useful in order to make a decent and competent pro-

vision for the numerous branches of a family, and for other domestic views.

None of which could be effected by a mere, simple, corporal transfer of the soil

from one man to another, which was principally calculated for conveying an

I" *314 1 aDSO'u** unlimited dominion. 'Written deeds were therefore introduced,

L -I in order to specify and perpetuate the peculiar purposes of the party who

conveyed; yet still, for a very long series of years, they were never made use of, hut

in company with the more ancient and notorious method of transfer, by delivery

of corporal possession.

Livery of seisin, by the common law, is necessary to be made upon every grant

of an estate of freehold in hereditaments corporeal]! whether of inheritance or for

life only. In hereditaments incorporeal it is impossible to be made; for they are

not the objects of the senses; and in leases for years, or other chattel

interests, it is not necessary. In leases for years indeed an actual entry is

necessary, to vest the estate in the lessee: for the bare lease gives him only a

right to enter, which is called his interest in the term, or interesse termini: and

when he enters in pursuance of that right, he is then, and not before, in posses-
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sion of his term, and complete tenant for years, (p) This entry by the tenant

himself serves the purpose of notoriety, as well as livery of seisin from the

grantor could have done; which it would have been improper to have given in

this case, because that solemnity is appropriated to the conveyance of a freehold.

And this is one reason why freeholds cannot be made to commence in future,

because they cannot (at the common law) be made but by livery of seisin ; which

livery, being; an actual manual tradition of the land, must take effect in prmsenti,

or not at ail.(y) (22)

On the creation of & freehold remainder, at one and the same time with a

particular estate for years, we have before seen, that at the common law livery

must be made to the particular tenant(r) But if such a remainder be created

afterwards, expectant on a lease for years now in being, the livery must not be

made to the lessee for years, for then it operates nothing; "nam quod

seinel meurn est, amplius meum esse non potest;" (s) but it must be made to

r "SI'S 1 ^e remainder-man *himself by consent of the lessee for years; for

I- -I without his consent no livery of the possession can be given ; (t) partly

because such forcible livery would be an ejectment of the tenant from his term,

and partly for the reasons before given (v) for introducing the doctrine of at-

tornments.

Livery of seisin is either in deed or in law. Livery in deed is thus performed.

The feoffer, lessor, or his attorney, together with the feoffee, lessee, or his attor-

ney (for this may as effectually be done by deputy or attorney, as by the princi-

pals themselves in person), (23) come to the laud, or to the house; and

(p) Co. l.ill, 46. (?) See Page 109. (r) Page 187. (*) Co. Litt. 48. (() IMd, 48. (v) Page 2S&

(22) Livery of seisin is now abolished in England. See statute 8 and 9 Vic. c. 106. It was

never necessary except in conveyances at common law : those under the statute of uses were

effectual without it. In the United States, though a few very early cases are mentioned, in

which fcoffinent with livery was employed, it can hardly be doubted that from the first other

misrepresented, and bec&llle frequently incapable of proof. Besides, the new
occasions and necessities introduced by the advancement of commerce, required
means to be devised of charging and encumbering estates, and of making them
liable to a multitude of conditions and minute designations for the purpose of
raising money, without an absolute sale of the land ; and sometimes the like
proceedings were found useful in order to make a decent and competent provision for the numerous branches of a family, and for other domestic views.
None of which could be effocted by a mere, simple, corporal transfer of the soil
from one man to another, which W~S rrincipally calculated for conveying an
[ • 314 ] absolute unlimited dominion. Written deeds were therefore introduced,
in order to specify and perpetuate the peculiar purposes of the party who
conveyed; yet still, for a very long series of years, they were never made use of, but
in company with the more ancient and notorious method of transfer, by delivery
of corporal possession.
Livery of seisin, by the common law, is necessary to be made upon every grant
of an estate of freehold in hcrcditament.s corporeal, whether of inheritance or for
life only. In hereditaments incorporeal it is impossible to be made; for they are
not the objects of the senses; and in lea.sea for years, or other chattel
interests, it is not necessary. In leases for years indeed an actual entry is
necessary, to vest the estate in the lessee: for the bare lease gives him only a
right to enter, which is called his interest iu the term, or interesse termini: and
when he en tors in pursuance of that right, he is then, and not before, in pos...~
sion of his term, a.ud complete tenant for yea.rs. (p) This entry bv the tenant
himself serves the purpose of notoriety, as well as livery of seisfn from the
grantor could have done; which it would have been improper to have given in
this ca.se, because that solemnity is appropriated to the conveyance of a fn't'hold.
And this is one reason why freeholds cannot be made to commence in. futuro,
because they ca.nn,ot (at the common law) be macle but by lh--ery of seisin ; which
livery, being an actual manual tradition of the land, must take effect in pr<BSenli,
or not at all.(q) (22)
On the creation of a.freehold remainder, at one and the same time with a
particular estate for years, we ham before S<,-en, that a.t the common law Ii very
must be made to the particular tenant.(r) But if such a remainder be creakd
_afterwards, expectant on a lease for years now in being, the livery must not be
made to the lessee for years, for then it operates nothing;· "1lam quod
aeinel meum est, amplius meum esse non potest ;" (s) but it must be made ro
[ • 315 ] the remainder-man •himself by consent of the lessee for years; for
without his consent no livery of the possession can be given; Ct) partly
because such forcible livery would be an ejectment of the tenant from his term,
and partly for the reasons before given (v} for introducing the doctrine of attornments.
Livery of seisin is either in deed or in law. Livery in deed is thus performed.
The feoffer, lessor, or his attorney, together with the feoffee, lessee, or his attorney (for this may as effectually be done by deputy or attorney, as by the principals themselves in person), (23) oomc to the la.nd, or to the house; and
(p)

Co. LIU. 48.

(f)

See Page Im.

(r) Page 167.

(I) Co. LIU. 48.

C'l IWd. '8.

(0)

Pap 18a.

forms of conveyance were commonly used, and they are now universal. See 4 Kent, 84; 1

TVashb. Real Prop. :B.

(23) [But the authority given to an attorney, <tc., for this purpose should be by deed. And

the authority so given, whether by the feoffer or fooffee, must be completely exe'cuted or per-

formed in the lifetime of both the principals; for if either of them die before "the livery of seisin

is completed, his attorney cannot proceed because bis authority is then at an end. SeelJRoll.

Ab. 8 R. pi. 4, 5; Co. Litt. 52, b.]

As to the cases in which an attorney's acts for his principal may be good, notwithstanding the

death of the principal, see the well-reasoned.cose of Ish v. Crane,"8 Ohio, N. S., 545.
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(22) Livery of seisin is now abolished in England. See statute 8 and 9 Vic. c. 106. It 1n111
never neces.'<ary except in conveyances at common law : those under the statute of u~ were
effectual without it. In the United States, though a few very early cases are mentioned. ill
which feoffment with livery W8!1 employed, it can hardly be doubted that from thl' fif"t otlier
forms of conveyance were commonly used, and they are now universal. See 4 Kent, 84; 1
W o.shb. Real Prop. :J:J.
(23) [But the authority given to an attorney, &c., for this purpose ithonld be by deed. ~-\nd
the authority so given, whether by the feoffer or fooffee, mui;t be com pl etch· executed or {>!'.I·
formed in the lifetime of both the principals; for if e~thcr of .t.he!ll die before ·the li\·crr of i>e1~in
is completed, his o.ttorner. cannot proceed because his "uthonty is then at an end. -See 2 Roll
.Ab. 8 R. pl. 4, 5; Co. Litt. 52, b.]
.As to the co.ses in which o.u attorney's aots for hie principal may be ~ood, notwith!ltanding tJJe
death of the principal, see the well·rcW!Oned case of Ish 11. Cre.nc, 8 Ohio, .N. S., 545.
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there, in the presence of witnesses, declare the contents of the feoffmeht or lease,

on. which livery is to be made. And then the feoffor, if it be of land, doth

deliver to the feoffee, all other persons being out of the ground,* clod or turf,

or a twig or bough there growing, with words to this effect: "I deliver these to

you in the name of seisin of all the lands and tenements contained in this deed."

IJut if it be of a house, the feoifer must take the ring or latch of the door, the

house being quite empty, and deliver it to the feoffee in the same form; and

then the feoffee must enter alone, and shut to the door, and then open it, and

let in the others, (w) If the conveyance or feoffment be of divers lands, lying

scattered in one and the same county, then in the feoffer's possession, livery of

seisin of any parcel, in the name of the rest, sufficeth for all; (x) (24) but if they

be in several counties, there must be as many liveries as there are counties.

For if the title in these lands comes to be disputed, there must be as many trials

as there are counties, and the jury of one county are no judges of the notoriety

of a fact in another. Besides anciently this seisin was obliged to be delivered

coram paribus de virineto, before the peers or freeholders of the neighbourhood,

who attested such delivery in the body or on the back of the deed; according

to the rule of the feudal law (y)pares debent inter esse investiture feudi, et non

alii: for which this reason is expressly given: because *the peers or r*qig-i

vassals of the lord being bound by their oath of fealty, will take care *- -I

that no fraud be committed to his prejudice, which strangers might be apt to

tonnive at. And though afterwards the occular attestation of the pares was held
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unnecessary, and livery might be made before any credible witnesses, yet the

trial, in case it was disputed (like that of all other attestations), (z) was still

reserved to thej?am or jury of the county, (a) Also, if the lands be out on

lease, though all lie in the same county, there must be as many liveries as there

are tenants; because no livery can be made in this case but by the consent of

the particular tenant; and the consent of one will not bind tne rest, (b) And

in all these cases it is prudent, and usual, to endorse the livery of seisin on the

back of the deed, specifying the manner, place, and time of making it; together

with the names of the witnesses, (c) And thus much for livery in deed.

Livery in law is where the same is not made on the land, but in sight of it

only; the feoffor saying to the feoffee, " I give yon yonder land; enter and take

possession." Here, if the feoffee enters during the life of the feoffor, it is a

good livery, but not otherwise; unless he dares not enter, through fear of his

life or bodily harm; and then his continual claim, made yearly, in due form of

law, as near as possible to the lands, (d) will suffice without an entry, (e) This

livery in law cannot, however, be given or received by attorney, but only by the

parties themselves. (/)

2. The conveyance by gift, donatio, is properly applied to the creation of an

estate-tail, as feoffment is to that of an estate in fee. and lease to that of an

estate for life or years. It differs in nothing from a feoffment, but in the nature

of the estate passing by it; for the operative words of conveyance in this case

are do or dedi; (</) and gifts in tail are equally imperfect without livery of

seisin; as feoffments in fee-simple. (A) *And this is the only distinction r „„,- -,

that Littleton seems to take, when he says (i) " it is to be understood L J

that there is feoffor and feoffee, donor and donee, lessor and lessee;" viz.: feoffor

is applied to a feoffment in fee-simple, donor to a gift in tail, and lessor to a

lease for life, or for years, or at will. In common acceptation gifts are frequently

confounded with the next species of deeds: which are,

(v>) Co. Lltt. 48. West. Sytnb 161. (*) IJtt. ^ 41*. (y) Fend. I. 2, t. 58. (*) See page 307.

(a) Glib. 10, 3S. (1>) Dyer, 18. (c) See Appendix, No. 1. (d) Lltt. f 421, &c.

(e) Co. Lltt. 4». (f) Ibid. 88. (g) West. Symbol.256. (\) Lltt. J W. <i) <i 87.

(24) [So in rectories and vicarages, induction, which is made usually by giving possession

there, in the presence of witnesses, declare the contents of the feoffmeht or lease,
on which livery is to be made. And then the feoffor, if it be of land, doth
deliver to the feoffee, all other persons being out of the ground, a clod or turf,
or a twig or bough there growing, with words to this effect: "I deliver these to
you in the name of seisin of all the lands and tenements contained in this deed."
But if it be of a house, the feoffer must take the ring or latch of the door, the
house being quite empty, and deliver it to the feoffee in .the eame form; and
then the feoft'ee must enter alone, and shut to the door, and then open it, and
let in the others. (w) If the conveyance or feoft'ment be of divers lands, lying
scatk>rcd in one and the same county, then in the feoft'er's possession, livery of
seisin of any parcel, in the name of the rest, sufficeth for all; (x) (24) but if they
be in several counties, there must be as many liveries as there are counties.
For if the title in these lands comes to be disputed, there must be as many trials
as there are co1mties, and the jury of one county are no judges of the notoriety
of a fact in another. Besides anciently this seisin was obliged to be delivered
coram parihus de vicineto, before the peers or freeholders of the neighbourhood,
who attested such delivery in the body or on the back of the dood; according
to.~he rule of _the fe~dsl law ('!/)pares deben~ interesse inv88titurm fetzdi, et non
alu: for which thu~ i:eason is exprl.'~l~ given: becanse ~the peer& or [ ,..316 ]
vassals of the lord. being bound ~y the!r <?ath of .fealty~ will tak~ care
that no fraud be committed to his prejudice, whteh strangel'8 might be apt t.o
~nnive at. And though afterwards the occnlat attestation of the pares was held
unnecessary, and livery might be made before any credible witnesses, yet the
trial, in case it was disputed (like that of all other attestations), (z) was still
reserved to the 6ares or jury of the county. (a) Also, if the lands be out on
lease, though all lie in the same county, there must be as many liveries as there
are tenants; because no livery can be made in this caee but by the consent of
the particular tenant; and the consent of one will not bind the rest. (b) And
in all these cases it is prudent, and usual, to endorse the livery of seisin on the
back of the deed, specifying the manner, place, and time of making it ; together
with the names of the witnesses. (c) And thus much for livery in deed.
Livery in lmo is where the same is not made on the land, but in sight of it
only; the feoffor saying to the feoffee, "I give you yonder land; enter and take
possession." Here, if the feoft'ee enters during the life of the feoffor, it is a
good livery, but not otherwise; unless he dares not enter, through fear of his
life or bodily harm; and then his continual claim, made yearly, in due form of
law, as near as possible to the lands, (d) will suffice without an entry. (e) Thia
livery in law cannot, however, be given or received by attorney, but only by the
parties themselves. (f)
2. The conveyance by gift, donatio, is properly applied to the creation of an
estate-tail, as feoft'ment is to that of an estate in f~ and lease to that of an
estate for life or years. It differs in nothing from a feoffment, but in the nature
of the estate .Passing by it; for the operative words of conveyance in this case
are do or dedi; ( g) and gifts in tail are equally imperfect without livery of
seisin; as feoft'ments in fee-simple. (It) •And this is the only distinction [ • 317 ]
that Littleton seems to take, when he says (i) "it is to be understood
that there is feoft'or and fcoffee, donor a.nd donee, lessor and lessee;" viz. : feoft'or
is applied to a feoffment in fee-simple, donor to a gift in tail, and lessor to a
lease for life, or for years, or at will. In common acceptation gi~ are frequently
oonfounded with the next species of deeds: which are,

of the church, puts the parson into complete and actual possession of the whole elebe and

tomnoralties, BO that he may maintain trespass or ejectment. Bulwer v. Bulwer, 2 B. and A.

541

(ttJ)

Co. Litt. '8. West. S7111b llH.

(a) Ollb. 10, 311.
(e) Co. Litt. ''·

(b) Dyer, 18.
(f) Ibid. 1111.

(:i:) IJtt. J41'.
(IJ') Felld. l. I, 1.118.
(~) Soe pnge 807,
(c) Sec Appen•tlx, No. 1.
(dJ Litt. f '21, &c.
(g) Weet. Sym'hoUM..
(A) Litt. t 119.
(4) t 117.

{24) [So in rectories and vicarages, induction, whtch 111 made u~nally by giving po81\l'98ion
tho church, pats the parson into oomplete and actual po811888ion of the whole debe and
tcm(>oralties, so that he D1af maintain trespass or ejoottnont. Bulwer ti. Bulwer, 2'B. and A..
.&70.1
o(
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3. Grants, concessiona,· the regular method by the common law of transferring the property of incorporeal hereditaments, or such things whereof no
livery can be had. (k) For which reason all corporeal hereditaments, as lands
11.nd houses, are said to lie in livery; and the others, as advowsons, commons,
rents, reversions, &c., to lie in grant. (l) And the reason is given by Bracton: (m)
"traditio, or livery, nihil aliud est quam rei, corpora/is de persona in person.am,
de manu fo manum, translatio aut in possessionem inductio : sed res incorporales, qu<» sunt ipsum jus rei vel corpori inhmrens, traditionem non paliunter."
These, therefore, pass merely by the delivery of the deed. And in signiorics, or
reversions of lands, such grant, together with the attornment of the tenant
(while attornments were requisite), were held to be of equal notoriety with, and
therefore equivalent to, a. feoffment and livery of lands in immediate possession. It therefore differs but little from a feoffment, except in its subject-matter; for the operative words therein commonly used are dedi et concessi'., "have
given and granted."
4. A lease is properly a con>eyance of any lands or tenements (usually in
consideration of rent or other annual recompense), made for life, for years, or
at will, but al wars for a kss time than the ]essor hath in the premises; for if it
be for the who'le mterest, it is more properly an assignment than a lease. The
usual words of operation in it are, "demise, irant, and to farm let ; dimisi, con[ • 318 ] cessi, et ad.firm.am •tradidi. Farm, or feorme, is an old Saxon word
signifying provisions; ( n) and it came to be used instead of rent or render;
because anciently the greater part of rents were reserved in provisions ; in corn,
in poultry, and the like; till the use of money became more frequent. So that
a farmer, .ftrmarius, was one who held his lands upon paym.ent of a rent or
feorrne: though at present, by a gradual departure from the original sense, the
word farm is brought to signify the very estate or lands so held upon farm or
rent. By this conveyance an estate for hfe. for years, or at will, mny be created,
either in corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments: though livery of seisin is
indee.d incident and necessary to one species of leases, Yiz. : leases for life of
corporeal hereditaments ; but to no other.
Whatever restriction, by the severity of the feudal law, might in times of very
high antiquity be observed with regard to leases; yet by the common law, as it
bas stood for many centuries, all persons seized of any estate might let leases to
endure so long as their own interest lasted, but no lonuer. Therefore tenant. in
fee-simple mif.ht let leases of any duration; for he hath the whole interest:., but
tenant in tai , or tenant for life, could make no leases which should bind the
issue in tail or reversioner; nor could a husband, seized ju re ttxoris, make a
firm or valid lease for any longer term than the joint lives of himself and his
wife, for then his interest expired. Yet some tenants for life, where the fee.
simple was in abeyance, might (with the concurrence of such as have the guardianship of the fee) make leases of e~ual duration with those granted by knants
in fee-sm1ple, such as parsons and ·nears, with consent of the patron and ordinary. (o) So also bishops and deans, and such other sole ecclesiastical corporations as are seized of the fee-simple of lands in their corporate right, might,
with the concurrence and confirmation of such persons as the law reqnire8, have
made leases for vears, or for life, estates in tail, or in fee, without any limitation
[ • 319 ] or control And corporations aggre~ate *might have made what estates
they pleased, without the confirmation of any other person whatSQ('"'er.
Whereas now, by several statutes, this power, where it was unreasonable, and
might be made an ill use of, is restrained; and, where in the other cases the
restraint by the common law seemed too hard, it is in some me.a.sure remoYed.
The former statutes a.re called the restraining, the latter the enabling statute.
We will take o. view of them all, in order of time.
And, first, the enabling statute, 32 IIen. VIII, c. 28, empowers three manner
of persons to make }CH.Bes, to endure for three live,s or one-and-twenty years;
which could not do so before. As first, tenant in tail may by such leases bind .
(le) Co. Litt. 9.
(l) IWd ml.
(•) l. i, e. JR. (rt) Spelm. Glou. i'J&. (o) Co. LIU. «..

3. Grants, concessionet; the regular method by the common law of trans-

ferring the property of incorporeal hereditaments, or such things whereof no

livery can be had. («) For which reason all corporeal hereditaments, as lands

and houses, are said to lie in livery; and the others, as advowsons, commons,

rents, reversions, &c., to lie in grant. (1) And the reason is given by Bracton: (in)

" traditio, or livery, nihil aliud est quam rei corporalis de persona in person-am,

de manu in manum, translatio aut in possessionem inductio: sed res incorpo-

rates, quas sunt ipsum jus rei vel corpori inhwrens, traditionem non paliunler."

These, therefore, pass merely by the delivery of the deed. And in signiories, or

reversions of lands, such grant, together with the attornment of the tenant

(while attornments were requisite), were held to be of equal notoriety with, and

therefore equivalent to, a feoffmeut and livery of lands in immediate posses-

sion. It therefore differs but little from a feofftnent, except in its subject-mat-

ter; for the operative words therein commonly used are dedi et concessi, "have

given and granted."

4 A lease is properly a conveyance of any lands or tenements (usually in

consideration of rent or other annual recompense), made for life, for years, or

at will, but always for a less time than the lessor hath in the premises; for if it

be for the whole interest, it is more properly an assignment than a lease. The

usual words of operation in it are, "demise, grant, and to farm let; dimisi, con-

F *318 1 cessi> 6t adfirmam *tradidi. Farm, orfeorme, is an old Saxon word

•• -1 signifying provisions; (n) and it came to be used instead of rent or render?
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because anciently the greater part of rents were reserved in provisions; in corn,

in poultry, and the like; till the use of money became more frequent. So that

a farmer, firmarius, was one who held his lands upon payment of a rent or

feorme: though at present, by a gradual departure from the original sense, the

word farm is brought to signify the very estate or lands so held upon farm or

rent By this conveyance an estate for life, for years, or at will, may be created,

either in corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments: though livery of seisin is

indeed incident and necessary to one species of leases, viz.: leases for life of

corporeal hereditaments ; but to no other.

Whatever restriction, by the severity of the feudal law, might in times of very

high antiquity be observed with regard to leases; yet by the common law, as it

has stood for many centuries, all persons seized of any estate might let leases to

endure so long as their own interest lasted, but no longer. Therefore tenant in

fee-simple might let leases of any duration; for he hath the whole interest, but

tenant in tail, or tenant for life, could make no leases which should bind the

issue in tail or reversioner; nor could a husband, seized jure uxoris, make a

firm or valid lease for any longer term than the joint lives of himself and his

wife, for then his interest expired. Yet some tenants for life, where the fee-

simple was in abeyance, might (with the concurrence of such as have the guar-

dianship of the fee) make leases of equal duration with those granted by tenants

in fee-simple, such as parsons and vicars, with consent of the patron and ordi-

nary, (o) So also bishops and deans, and such other sole ecclesiastical corpo-

rations as are seized of the fee-simple of lands in their corporate right, might,

with the concurrence and confirmation of such persons as the law requires, have

made leases for years, or for life, estates in tail, or in fee, without any limitation

r *3191 or contr°l- And corporations aggregate *might have made what estates

L -1 they pleased, without the confinnation of any other person whatsoever.

Whereas now, by several statutes, this power, where it was unreasonable, and

might be made an ill use of, is restrained; and, where in the other cases the

restraint by the common law seemed too hard, it is in some measure removed.

The former statutes are called the restraining, the latter the enabling statute.

We will take a view of them all, in order of time.

And, first, the enabling statute, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28, empowers three manner

of persons to make leases, to endure for three lives or one-and-twenty years;

which could not do so before. As first, tenant in tail may by such leases bind

ftj Co. Lltt. 9. (I) Ibid 173. (m) I. 8, o. IS. (nj Spclra. Glow. 229. (o) Co. LiU. 44.
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his issue in tail, but not those in remainder or reversion. Secondly, a husband

seised in right of his wife, in fee-simple or fee-tail, provided the wife joins in

euch lease, may bind her and her heirs thereby. Lastly, all persons seised of

an estate of fee-simple in right of their churches, which extends not to parsons

and vicars, may (without the concurrence of any other person) bind their suc-

cessors. But then there must many requisites be observed, which the statute

specifies, otherwise such leases are not binding. (») 1. The lease must be by

indenture; and not by deed poll, or by parol. 2. It must begin from the mak-

ing, or day of the making, and not at any greater distance of time. 3. If there

be any old lease in being, it must be first absolutely surrendered, or be within a

year of expiring. 4. It must be either for twenty-one years, or three lives, and

not for both. 5. It must not exceed the term of three lives, or twenty-one

years, but may be for a shorter term. 6. It must be of corporeal hereditaments,

and not of such things as lie merely in grant; for no rent can be reserved

thereout by the common law, as the lessor cannot resort to them to distrein. (q)

7. It must be of *lands and tenements most commonly letten for twenty

years past; so that if they had been let for above half the time (or eleven

years out of the twenty) either for life, for years, at will, or by copy of court

roll, it is sufficient. 8. The most usual and customary feorm or rent, for twenty

years past, must be reserved yearly on such lease. 9. Such leases must not be

made without impeachment of waste. These are the guards, imposed by the

statute (which was avowedly made for the security of farmers and the conse-
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quent improvement of tillage) to prevent unreasonable abuses, in prejudice of

the issue, the wife, or the successor, of the reasonable indulgence here given.

Next follows, in order of time, the disabling or restraining statute, 1 Eliz. c.

19, (made entirely for the benefit of the successor), which enacts, that all grants by

archbishops and bishops (which include even those confirmed by the dean and

chapter; the which, however long or unreasonable, were good at common law),

other than for the term of one and twenty years, or three lives from the making, or

the dean and chapter, are held to be within the exception of this statute, and there-

fore valid; provided they do not exceed (together with the lease in being) the

term permitted by the act. (r) But by a saving expressly made, this statute of

1 Eliz. did not extend to grants made by any bishop to the crown; by which

means Queen Elizabeth procured many fair possessions to be made over to her

by the prelates, either for her own use, or with intent to be granted out again to

her favorites, whom she thus gratified without any expense to herself. To pre-

vent which (s) for the future, the statute 1 Jac. I, c. 3, extends the prohibition

to grants and leases made to the king, as well as to any of his subjects.

Next comes the statute 13 Eliz. c. 10, explained and enforced by the statutes

14 Eliz. c. 11 and 14, 18 Eliz. c. 11, and 43 Eliz. c. 29 ; which extend the restric-

tions laid by * the last-mentioned statute on bishops, to certain other r*ooii

inferior coporations, both sole and aggregate. From laying all which *• -I

together we may collect, that all colleges, cathedrals, and other ecclesiastical or

eleemosynary corporations, and all parsons and vicars, are restrained from mak-

ing any leases of their lands, unless under the following regulations: 1. They

must not exceed twenty-one years, or three lives, from the making. 2. The

accustomed rent, or more, must be yearly reserved thereon. 3. Houses in cor-

porations, or market towns, may be let for forty years, provided they be not the

mansion-houses of the lessors, nor have above ten acres of ground belonging to

them; and provided the lessee be bound to keep them in repair; and they may

also be aliened in fee-simple for lands of equal value in recompense. 4. Where

there is an old lease in being, no concurrent lease shall be made, unless where

the old one will expire within three years. 5. No lease (by the equity of the

(}>) Co. I.itt. 44.

(<l) But now by (he statute A Geo. Ill. c. 17, a lease of tlthoi or other Incorporeal hereditaments, alone,

max lio granted fiy any blehop or any such ecclesiastical or eleemosynary corporation, anil the successor

shall be entitled In recover the rent by an action of debt; which (in case of a freehold lease) he could not

his issue in tail, but not those in remainder or reversion. Secondly, a husband
eeised in right of his wife, in fee-simple or fee-tail, provided the wife joins in
such lease, may bind her and her heirs thereby. Lastly, all persons seised of
an estate of fee-simple in right of their churches, which extends not to parsons
and vicars, may (without the concurrence of any other person) bind their successors. But then there must many requisites be observed, which the statute
specifies, otherwise such leases are not binding. (p) 1.. The lease must be by
indenture; and not by deed poll, or by parol. 2. It must begin from the making, or day of the making, and not at any greater distance of time. 3. If there
be any old lease in being, it must be first absolutely surrendered, or be within a
year of expiring. 4. It must be eitlter for twenty-one years, or three liYes, and
not for both. 5. It must not exceed the term of three lives, or twenty-one
years, but may be for a shorter term. 6. It must be of corporeal hereditaments,
and not of such things as lie merely in grant ; for no rent can be reserved
thereout by the common law, as the lessor cannot n>sort to them to distrein. ( q)
7. It must be of *lands and tenements most commonly letten for twenty [ • 320 ]
years past ; so that if they had been let for above half the time (or eleven
years out of the twenty) either for life, for years, at will, or by copy of court
roll, it is sufficient. 8. The most usual and customary feQl"Dl or rent, for twenty
years past, must be reserved yearly on such lease. 9. Such leases must not be
made without impeachment of waste. These are the guards, imposed by the
statute (which was avowedly made for the security of formers and the consequent improvement of tillage) to prevent unreasonable abases, in prejudice of
the issue, the wife, or the successor, of the reasonable indul~ence here giwn.
Next follows, in order of time, the disabling or rest.raining statute, 1 Eliz. o.
19, (made entirely for the benefit of the successor), which enacts, that all grants by
arch bishops and bishops (which include even those confirmed by the dean and
chapter; the which, however loner or unreasonable, were good at common law),
other than for the term of one an8 twenty years, or three lives from the making, or
the dean and chapter, are held to be within the exception of this statute, and therefore valid; provuled they do not exceed (together with the lease in being) the
term permitted by the act. (r) But by a saving expressly made, this statute of
1 Eliz. did not extend to grants made by any bishop to the crown; by which
means Queen Elizabeth procured many fair possessions to be made over to her
by the prelates, either for her own use, or with intent to be granted out again to
her favorites, whom she thus gratified without any expense to herself. 110 prevent which (s) for the future, the statute 1 Jae. I, c. 3, extends the prohibition
to grants and leases made to the king, as well as to any of his subjects.
Next comes the statute 13 Eliz. c. 10, explained and enforced by the statutes
14 Eliz. c. 11 and 14, 18 Eliz. c. 11, and 43 Eliz. c. 29; which extend the restrictions laid by *the last-mentioned statute on bishops, to certain other [ • 321 ]
inferior coporations, both sole and aggregate. From laying all which
'
together we may collect, that all colleges, cathedrals, and other ecclesiastical or
eleemosynary corporations, and all parsons and vicars, are restrained from making any leases of their lands, unless under the following regulations: 1. They
must not exceed twenty-one vears, or three lives, from the making. 2. 'l'he
accustomed rent, or more, mus·t he yearly reserYed thereon. 3. Houses in corporations, or market towns, may be let for forty years, provided they be not the
mansion-houses of the lessors, nor have above ten acres of ground belonging to
them ; and provided the lessee be bound to keep them in repair ; and they may
also be aliened in fee-simple for lands of equal value in rfcompens-3. 4. Where
there is an old lease in being, no concurrent lease shall be made, unless where
the old one will expire within thrf:e years. 5. No lease (by the equity of the

have brought Ht the common Ian-.

(r) O Lilt. ti. (I) 11 Bcp. 71.

543

(p)

Co. f.ltt. "·

(r)

<.:"

. (q) .IJut now hy the etatute II Geo. III. c. 17, a leRee or tltho1 or other lnoorporeRl he redl!Aments, alone,
1111\y he g"111e<I f1y 11111 hldho p or any such oeclef i1UJtil:al or eleemosynary col"poration1 and the sncoo11Sor
lbllll be onlitle<I In reco,·er the rent by an aciloo of debt; which \in Cll8C of a freeho)Q lease) he could no&
bani broutcht 11t the common lnw.
Litt.~-

fl)
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statute) shall be made without impeachment of waste, (t) 6. All bonds and

covenants tending to frustrate the provisions of the statutes of 13 and 18 Elia.

shall be void.

Concerning these restrictive statutes there are two observations to be made;

first that they do not by any construction enable any persons to make such

leases as they weie by common law disabled to make. Therefore a parson, or

ricar, though he is restrained from making longer leases than for twenty-one

years or three lives, even with the consent of patron and ordinary, yet is not

enabled to make uny lease at all, so as to bind his successor, without obtaining

such consent (w) Secondly, that though leases contrary to these acts are

declared void, yet they are good against the lessor during his life, if he be a sole

corporation ; and are also good against an aggregate corporation so long as the

head of it lives, who is presumed to be the most concerned in interest For the

act was intended for the benefit of the successor only; and no man shall make

an advantage of his own wrong, (w)

[ *32°. 1 *There is yet another restriction with regard to college leases, by stat-

1 ' '" •• ute 18 Eliz, c. 6, which directs, that one-third of the old rent, then paid,

should for the future be reserved in wheat or malt, reserving a quarter of Wheat

for each 6*. Sd., or a quarter of malt for every 5«.; or that the lessees should

pay for the same according to the price that wheat and malt should be sold for,

in the market next adjoining to the respective colleges on the market day before

the rent becomes due. This is said (x) to have been an invention of Lord Treas-
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urer Burleigh, and Sir Thomas Smith, then principal secretary of state; who,

observing how greatly the value of money had sunk, and the price of all provis-

ions risen, by the quantity of bullion imported from the new-found Indies

(which effects were likely to increase to a greater degree), devised this method

for upholding the revenues of colleges. Their foresight and penetration has in

this respect been very apparent: for, though the rent so reserved in -corn was at

first but one-third of the old rent, or half what was still reserved in money, yet

now the proportion is nearly inverted: and the money arising from corn rents

w,communibus annis, almost double to the rente reserved in money.

The leases of beneficed clergymen are farther restrained, in case of their non-

residence, by statutes 13 Eliz. c. 20, 14 Eliz. c. 11,18 Eliz. c. 11, and 43 Eliz.

c. 9, which direct, that if any beneficed clergyman be absent from his cure

above fourscore days in any one year, he shall not only forfeit one year's profit

of his benefice, to oe distributed among the poor of the parish; but that all

leases made by him, of the profits of such benefice, and all covenants and agree-

ments of like nature, shall cease and be void : except in the case of licensed plu-

ralists, who are allowed to demise the living, on which they are non-resident, to

, their curates only; provided such curates do not absent themselves above

f *323 1 "fortv da78 ln anv one Jrear> An(* ^nus muc^ f°r leases, with their

«- -1 several enlargements ancf restrictions, (y) (25)

5. An exchange is a mutual grant of equal interests, the one in consideration

of the other. The word " exchange," is so individually requisite and appropri-

ated by law to this case, that it cannot be supplied by any other word, or expressed

by any circumlocution, (z) The estates exchanged must be equal in quantity; (a)

not of value, for that is immaterial, but of interest; as fee-simple for fee-

simple, a lease for twenty years for a lease for twenty years, and the like. And

the exchange may be of things thut lie either in grant or in livery. (V) But no

livery of seisin, even in exchanges of freehold, is necessary to perfect the convey-

(t) Co. Litt. 45. fu) Co. Utt. 44. (-a) 7Mrf. 4ft. (x) Strype's Ann Bis ofKHi.

(y) For the other learning relating to leases, which ia very eurlous and ilimisiro, I must refer the .-iinlriit

to 3 Bac. abrldg. 206 (title, lease* and turns for year*), where the subject Is treated In a perspicuous fcnd

&ta.tnte) shall be made without impeachment of waste. (t) 6. All bonds and
covenants tending to frustrat.e the provisions of the statutes of 13 and 18 Elu.
shall be void.
Concerning these restrictive statutes there are two observations to be made;
first that they do not by any construction enable any persons to make such
leases as they were by common law disabled to make. 'fherefore a parson, or
vicar, thongh he is restrained from making longer leases than for twenty-one .
years or three lives, even witli the consent of patron and ordinary, yet is not
enabled to make any lease st all, 80 as to bind his successor, without obtaining
11uch consent. (u) Secondly, that though leases contrary to these acts are
declared void, yet they are good against the ks8or during his life, if he be a sole
corporation ; and are also good sgainst an aggregate corporation so long a.s the
~ of it lives, who is presumed to be the most concerned in interest. For the
act was intended for the benefit of the successor only; and no man shall make
an advantage of his own wrong. (w)
[ • 322 ]
•There is yet another restriction with regard to college leases, by stat.
ute 18 Eliz. c. 6, which directs, that one-third of the old rent, then paid,
should for the future be reserved in wheat or malt, reserving & quarter of wheat
for each 6s. 8d., or a quarter of malt for e\•ery 5s.; or that the lessees should
pay for the same acoordin~ to the price that wheat and malt should be sold for,
m the market next adjoining to the respective colleges on the market day before
the rent becomes due. This is said (x) to have been an invention of Lord Treasurer Burleigh, and Sir Thomas Smith, then principal secretary of state; who,
observing how greatly the value of money had sunk, and the price of all proYisions risen, by the 9.uantity of bullion imported from the new-fonnd Indies
(which effects were hkely to increase to a greater degree), devised this method
tor upholding the revenues of colleges. 'rheir foresight and penetration l1as in
this respect been very apparent: for, though the rent so reserved in .com was at
first but one-third of the old rent, or half what was still reserved in money, yet
now the proportion is nearly inverted: and the money arising from corn rents
ia,communihus annis, almost double to the renta reserved in money.
The leaseg of beneficed clergymen are farther restrained, in case of their nonresidence, by statutes 13 Eliz. c. 20, 14: Eliz. c. 11, 18 Eliz. c. 11, and 43 Eliz.
c. 9, which direct, that if any beneficed clergyman be abse.nt from his cure
above fourscore days in any one year, he shall not only forfeit one year's profit
of his benefice, to be distributed among the poor of the lmrish; but that all
leases made by him, of the profits of such benefice, and all cove;nants and agreements of like nature, shall cease and be void: except in the case of licensed pluralists, who are allowed to demise the living, on which they are non-resident, to
, their curates only; :provided such curates do not absent themselves above
[ • 323 ] •forty days m any one year.. A;11d thus much for leases, with their
several enlargements and restnct10ns. (y) (25)
5. An exchange is a mutual grant of equal interests, the one in considerat.ion
of the other. 'l'he word "exchange/' is so individually requisite and appropriated by law to this case, that it cannot be supplied by any other word, or expressed
by any circumlocution. (z) The estates exchanged must be equal in quantity; (a)
not of value, for that is immaterial, but of interest; as fee-simple for fcesimple, a lease for twenty yea.rs for a lease for twenty years, and the like. And
the exchan~e may be of things thut lie either in grant or in liYery. (h) But no
livery of seisin, even in exchanges of freehold, is necessary to perfect the convey-

masterly manner; being supposed to be extracted from a manuscript or Sir Ueoffrey Gilbert.

(*) Co. Lltt. SO, 51. (a) Litt. H 64, 65. (b) Co. Litt. Bl.

(25) Since these Commentaries were written, preat changes have been made In the statute law

of England concerning the several subjects here referred to, but the changes art not important, to

the American student.

644

Co. Llti. 45.
(u) Co. Litt. 44.
(ttJ) IMd. 45.
(:.) Birype•• An11.i. ofEtl:a.
For the other learning notating to leue1, which 11 vl'ry f'.Urlou11 and dUl'uslve. I ma1t relbr the 11tuden&
&o 8 Bae. abrldg. ~ ct.ltle, letUea mid tenna fOf" rear•), where the subject le treated In a perspicuoui; .ud
masterly manner; belug auppoRCd to be ex&mc&e<t from a man1111Crlpt of Sir Ueotl'reJ Gllbers.
(•) CO. Litt. 50, Ill.
(a) Litt. ff 64, 66.
(b) Co. Utt. Ill.
(tJ
(f)

(25) Since these Commentaries We?I' written, great changes have been mad~ in the RtBtuto l11w
of England concerning the several mb,tects here referred to, but the cbangtia art> Dot impune.nt "9
the American student.
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ance: (c) for each party stands in the place of the other and occupies his right,

and each of them hath already had corporal possession of his own land. But

entry must be made on both sides; for, if either party die before entry, the

exchange is void, for want of sufficient notoriety, (d) (26) And so also, if two

parsons, by consent of patron and ordinary, exchange their preferments; and the

one is presented, instituted, and inducted, and the other is presented, and insti-

tuted, but dies before induction; the former shall not keep his new benefice,

because the exchange was not completed, and therefore he shall return back to

his own. (e) For if, after an exchange of lands or other hereditaments, either

party be evicted of those which were taken by him in exchange, through defect

of the other's title; he shall return back to the possession of his own, oy virtue

of the implied warranty contained in all exchanges. (/) (27)

6. A partition is when two or more joint-tenants, coparceners, or tenants in

common, agree to divide the *lands so held among them in severalty, r *OQA 1

each taking a distinct part. Here, as in some instances there is a unity L "' '

of interest, and in all a unity of possession, it is necessary that they all mutually

convey and assure to each other the several estates which they are to take and

enjoy separately. By the common law, coparceners, being compellable to make

partition, might have made it by parol only; but joint-tenants and tenants in

common must have done it by deed: and in both cases the conveyance must

have been perfected by livery in seisin, (g) And the statutes of 31 Hen. VIII,

c. 1, and 32 Hen. VIII, c. 32, made no alteration in this point. But the statute
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of frauds, 20 Car. II, c. 2, hath now abolished this distinction, and made a deed

in all cases necessary. (28)

These are the several species of primary or original conveyances. Those

•which remain are of the secondary or derivative sort; which presuppose some

other conveyance precedent, and only serve to enlarge, confirm, alter, restrain,

restore, or transfer the interest granted by such original conveyance. As

7. Releases; which are a discharge or a conveyance of a man's right in lands

or tenements, to another that hath some former estate in possession. The words

generally used therein are " remised, released, and forever c[uit-claimed." (h)

And these releases may enure either, 1. By way of enlarging an estate, or

enlarger restate: as if there be tenant for life or years, remainder to another in

fee, and he in remainder releases all his right to the particular tenant and his

heirs, this gives him the estate in fee. (i) But in this case the relessee must be in

possession (29) of some estate, for the release to work upon; for if there be les-

see for years, and before he enters and is in possession, the lessor releases to him

let Litt. ? «*. (<i) Co. Litt. SO. («) Perk. 5 288. (/) Page 300.

(./I Litt. 4 250. Co. Litt 189. (») Liu i US. (<) Ibid.'', 465.

(26) But this would not be so if exchange were made by lease and release, in which case

the statute would exeute the possession instantly upon the execution of the deeds. Neither

would entry be essential if deeds of bargain and sale were employed.

ance: (c) for each party stan<ls in the place of the other and occupies bis right,
and each of them hath already had corporal possession of his own land. But
entry must be made on both sides; for, if either varty die before entrv, the
exchange is void, for want of sufficient notoriety. (d) (26) And so also, ff two
parsons, by consent of patron and ordinary, exchange their preferments; and the
one is presented, instituted, and inducted, and the other is presented, and instituted, but dies before induction; the former shall not keep his new benefice,
because the exchange was not completed, and therefore he shall return hack to
his own. (e) For if, after an exchange of lands or other hereditaments, either
party be eYicted of those which were taken by him in exchange, through defect
of the other's title; he shall return back to the possession of his own, by virtue
of the implied warranty contained in all exchanges.(/) (27)
6. A partition is when two or more joint-tenants, coparceners, or tenants in
common, agree to divide the *lands so held among them in severalty, [ ,..234 ]
each taking a distinct part. Here, as in some instances there is a unity
of interest, and in all a unity of possession, it is necessar,Y that they all mutually
convey and assure to each other the several estates which they are to take and
enjoY. separately. By the common law, coparceners, being compellable to make
partition, might have mo.de it by parol only; but joint-tenants and tenants in
common must have done it by deed: and in both cases the conveyance must
have been perfected by livery in seisin. ( g) And the statutes of 31 Hen. VIII,
c. I, and 32 Hen. VIII, c. 32, made no alteration in this point. But the statute
of frauds, 20 Car. II, c. 2, hath now abolished this distinction, and made a deed
in all cases necessary. (28)
These u.re the sewral species of primary or original conveyances. Those
which remain are of the secondary or derivative sort; which presuppose some
other conveyance precedent, and only serve to enlarge, confirm, alter, restrain,
restore, or transfer the interest granted by such original conveyance. As
7. Releases; which are a discliarge or a conveyance of a man's right in lands
or tenements, to another that hath some former estate in possession. The words
generally used therein are "rem.ised, released, and forever 9. nit-claimed." (Ii)
.And these releases may enure either, 1. By way of enla·rfftng an estate, or
enlarger l'estate: as if there be tenant for life or years, remamder to another in
fee, and he in remainder releases all his right to the particular tenant and his
heirs, this 9.ives him the estate in fee. (i) But in this case the relessee must be in
possession \29) of some estate, for the release to work upon; for if there be lessee for years, and before he enters and is in possession, the lessor releases to him
(c} Litt, f t".
(d) Co. Utt. tlO.
(t) Perk. f 288.
l(l Page 300,
(g) Litt. f 250.

Co. Litt. 169.

(Al Litt. f ft6.

l'I Ibid. 466.

(27) By statute 8 and 9 Vic. c. 106, an exchange of any hereditaments, made by deed execu-

ted after the first day of October, 1845, shall not imply anr condition in law.

The general enclosure act of 8 and 9 Vic. c. 118, contains provisions under which exchanges

of lands may be effected under the order of the enclosure commissioners, on the application

in writing of the persons interested, and the land on each side taken in exchange remains and

enures to the same uses, trusts, intents and purposes, and is subject to the same charges as the

land j_'ivrn in exchange. And the order of exchange is not to be impeached by reason of any

infirmity of estate of the persons on whose application it shall be made.

(28) See also, statute 8 and 9 Vic. 106. Partition may also be made under the general en-

closure act of 8 and 9 Vic. 118, in the same manner as exchanges. In the United States it is

commonly made by mntual deed of quit-claim and release.

(29) [A virtual possession will suffice, if the releasee has an estate actually vested in him at

the time of the release, which would be capable of enlargement by such release if he had the

actual possession. Thus, if a tenant for twenty years makes a lease to another for five years,

who enters, a release to the first lessee is g<H>d, for the possession of hi» lessee was his posses-

sion. So, if a man makes a lease for years, remainder for years, and the first lessee enters,

a release to the person in remainder for years is good, to enlarge his estate. Mr. Har-

grave's note (3) to Co. Litt 270, a]
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(26) But this would not be so if exchange were made by lease and release, in which case
the statute would exrute the possession im•tantlv upon the execution of the deeds. Neither
would entry be e88ential if deeds of bargain and sale were employed.
(27} By statute 8 and 9 Vic. c. 106, an exchange of any hcreditaments.• made by deed executed after the firat dny or October, 1845, shall not imply any condition in Jaw.
The general enclosure act of 8 and 9 Vic. c. 118, contains provisions under which excban~es
of landi mar be effected under the order or the enclo11ure commistlioners, on the application
in writing o the pel'l!ons intereMted, and the laud on each side taken in exchange remains and
enure11 to the Mme uses, trusts, intents and purposeR, and is subject to the lil8me charges 68 the
land ,pven iu exchange. Aud the order of exchange is not to be impeached by reason of any
infinmty or estate of the persons on whose application it shall be made.
(28} See also, statute 8 and 9 Vic. 106. Partition may also be made under the general enclosure act or 8 and 9 Vic. 118, in the i<Ume manner as exchanges. In the United States it i.s
commonly made by mutual deed or quit-claim and release.
(29) [.A. viYl1ial possest1ion will suffice, if the releases has an estate actually vested in him at
the time of the relea.~e, which would be capahle of enlargement by such rele886 if he had the
actual pos~ssion. Thus, if a tenant for twenty yea.rs makes a lease to another for five years,
who enter1', a release to the fir11t lessee iR good, for the ~se88ion of hi11 lessee was his possession. So, if a man makes a lewe for years, remainder for ye&rB, and the first lessee euters,
a releMe to the per>Km in remainder for years is good, to enlarge his est!Ate. Mr. Hargrave's note (:l) to Co. Litt. 270, a]
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all his right in the reversion, such release is void for want of possession in the

relessee. (K) 2. By way of pasting an estate, or mitler I'estate: (30) as when one

T ^g^s i °f t^0 coparceners releaseth all her *right to the other,, this passeth the

*• '^ -• fee-simple of the whole, (I) And in both these eases there muet be a prh'ity

of estate between the relessor and relessee; (m) that is, one of their estates mast

be so related to the other, as to make but our of the same estate in law.. 3. By

way of passing a right (31) or mitter le droit: as if a man be. disseised^, and

releaseth to his disseisor all his right, hereby the diseeisor acquires a new right,

which changes the quality of his estate, and renders that lawful which before

was tortious or wrongful. (») (32) 4. By way of exting*iakmmt:. as if my ten-

ant for life makes a lease to A for life, remainder to- £ and his heirs, ami I

release to A; this extinguishes my right to the reversion, and shall enure to the

advantage of B's remainder as well as of A's particular estate, (o) 5. By way of

entry and feoffment: as if there be two joint disseisors, and the disseisee

releases to one of them, he shall be sole seised, and shall keep oat Ms former

companion; which is the saine in effect as if the disseisee had entered, and

thereby put an end to the disseisin, and afterwards had enfeoffed one of the dis-

seisors in fee. (p) And hereupon we may observe, that when a man has in him-

self the possession of lands, he must at the common law convey the freehold by

feoffment and livery; which makes a notoriety in the country: but if a man

has only a right or a future interest, he may convey that right or interest by a

mere release to him that is in possession of the hind: ior the occupancy of the
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relessee is a matter of sufficient notoriety already.

8. A confirmation is of a nature nearly allied to a release. Sir Edward Coke

defines it (q) to be a conveyance of an estate or right in esse, whereby a void-

able (33) estate is made sure and unavoidable, or whereby a particular estate is

increased: and the words of making it are these, " have given, granted, ratified,

approved and confirmed." (r) An instance of the first branch of the definition is, if

tenant for life leaseth for forty years, and dieth during that term: here the lease for

r *oog I years is voidable by him in reversion; yet, if he *hath confirmed the

' ""'" -I estate of the lessee for years, before the death of tenant for life, it is no

longer voidable bnt sure. (*) The latter branch, or that which tends to the

increase of a particular estate, is the same in all respects with that species of

release, which operates by way of enlargement

9. A surrender, tttrsuniredditio, or rendering up, is of a nature directly

opposite to a release; for, as that operates by the greater estate descending

upon the less, a surrender is the falling of a less estate into a greater. It is

defined, (t) & yielding up of an estate for life or years to him that hath the imme-

diate reversion or remainder, wherein the particular estate may merge or drown,

by mutual agreement between them. It is done by these words, " hath surren-

(IclTIM.iM.i. (I) Co. T,ftt. 878. (m) Ibirl. 27*, 873. (•) Litl. «4G6. <o> IHd. t 470.

(l>\ Co. Liu. 278. (9) 1 lust. 495. (r) l.iu. W51ft, 531. («) /bill. Sl(i. (t) Co. Lit! S3I.

(30) [If one joint-tenant assign to the other, it operates as a release, and must lie BO pleaded.

2 Cruise, 527.]

(31) [There must be a privity of estate between the relessor and the relessee in the first

species of release mentioned, see ante; but In this release per initter lo droit, there is not or

all his right in the reversion, such release is void for want of poBEes&ion in the
relessee. (k) 2. By way of pas:4ing an estate, or 111itter l'estate: (30) ~when on.e
[ • 325 ] of two copa.rceners releaseth all her *right t4> the other,, this pw:>.11eth the
fee-simple of the whole. (l) And in both. these C88e8 there mut h.: a prhi ty
ot estate between the relessor and relessee; (m) that is,. one of thefr estates mo8t
be so related to. the other, as to make but one of th.e sam~ estate in litiw. 3. By
way of ptissing a rif!kt (31) 01 mitter le droit: aa if a man be. clisseised. and
releaseth to his disse1so.r uU his right, hereby the- diBseis.or 8t'quires a new tight,
which changes the quality of his estate, and renders thu.t ltnv.ful w. hich before
·was tortious or wrongful. (n) (32) 4. By way of sxtinguiakmMlt: as if my tenant fur life makes a ~ase to A for life, :remainder· to. .B and his heirs, a.ad I
release to A; this extingnisllea my right to the reversion, and shall enul't' to t0e
adv1rntag~ of .B's remainder as well a.s of A's particular estate. (o) 5. .By 1raj' or
entry and feoffm.ent : as if Lbere be two Joint dissei.sors, &nd the diiiSt>i~
releases to one of them, he shall be sole seised, and shu.ll keep out his former
companion; which is the same in effect as if the diiiseisee had entert-d, 'nd
thereby put an end to the di88eisin, and afterwards bad enfeoft'ed one of the dis11eisors in fee. (p) And hE!reupon we m!\y observe, that when a man has in himself the possession of lands, he must at the common law conwy the freehold by
feoffment and livery; which makes a notoriety i11 the country: but if a man
has only a right or a future inrerest, he may convey that right or interest by a
mere release to him that is in possession of the land: for the occupa~oy of the
relessee is a matter of sufficient notoriety already.
·
8. A confirmation is of a nature nearly allied to a release. Sir Edward Cok~
defines it (q) to be a conveyance of an estate or l'ight in 111e, wherejly a Toida.ble (33) estate is made sure and unavoidable, or wheroby a particular estate is
incroased: and the words of making it are these, "ha•;e given, granted, ratitiro,
approved and confirmed." (r) An instance of the first branch of the definition is, i~~
tenant for life le.aseth for forty years, and dieth during that term: here the le~e for
[ • 326 ] years is voidable by him in reversion; yet, if he *hatl1 confirmed th~
estate of the lessee for years, before the death of tenant for life, it is no
longer voidable bnt sure. (s) 'l'he latter branch, or that which tends to th~
increase of a particular estate, is the ea.me in all respects with that species of
release, which operates by \\·ay of enlargement.
· 9. A surrender, 1ur1mmredtliUo, or rendering up, is of a nat~re directly
opposite to a release; for, as that opera.tes by the grt~ter estate <lesoondiug
upon the less, a surrender is the falling of a less estate into a. gl'eater. It iii
defined, (t) a yielding up of an estate for life or years to hitn th11t huth the i~me
diate reversion or remainder, wherein the partieular estate may merge or drown,
by mutual agreement between them. It is done by these wordsJ '' h11.th surl'('n(kl IMd. f 469.
(•) Ilri<I. m, 17a..
101 Hid. t •~o.
(ll Co. J.ltt. 273.
l•l LICl.t-MI.
lP) Co. LlLt. lm.

lql l lu11l. iOO.

(r) Lin. H :m1, 6al.

l•l Ibid. Cilll.

m Co• .µu. S;li.

cannot be any snch privity: Co. Litt. 274, a, n. 1; nor is there any occasion f«r words pf

inheritance. Litt. 4TO, and'Co. Litt. 273.]

(S-.2) [No privity is necessary when a release of a right ia made to one who hath an estate of

freehold, in deed or in law; but a release cannot enure by way of passing a right, unless it is

made to one having a fee-simple; for the person to whom a right is passed must have the

whole right; to a person not having the fee, therefore, a release of right operates, us it were,

by extinguishment in respect of him that made the release: which extinguishment shall enure

to him in remainder, though the right is not extinct in deed. 1 Instil. 275, a, 379, b. If a

release of all actions be made to a tenant fur life, the person in remainder, alter the death of

the tenant for life, shall have no benefit from this release. 1 Instil. 275, b, 285,1); Edward

Altham's Case, 8 Rep. 3to; Lampet's Case, 10 id. 51.]

(:f.;) [The distinction between voidable and void must not be lost sight of here, fur it haa

no operation whatever upon a void estate. Gilb. Ten. 75.]

546

(30) [If one joint.tenant &Mign to the other, it operates 11!11 a fe}eRSe, and must be ilO {)leaded.
2 Cnuiro, fl2i.]
(31) [There must be a privity of 61!t.ato between the rolesaor and the relessee in tJie fin>t
spocie11 of relna11e mentioned, Sl•e ant~; but in this release per mitt.er le dniit, there is nvt or
cannot be anr irnch pril"ity: Co. Litt. 274, a, n. 1; nor it1 there any ocea.iun for words of
inheritance. Litt. 470, and Co. Litt. 273.]
(3-.t) [No privity ii! necel!al&rJ when a re~ of a right is made to one who hath IUI estate of
freehold, in det,'<l or in law; but a relo&de cannot euure by way of passing a right, unles;; it is
mftde w one having a fee-simple; for the peI'liOn to whom a right is paued must have tho
u:lwlc right; to a P.crson not bav!ng the fee, tbernfore, a rel~ of ri~ht '!perotcs, ~ it "·ere,
by extingul11hment in respect of him thlit made the release i which ext.iu~ll!bnuint s)lall cnurn
to him ill romaindor, though the riJ(ht i111 not extinct in Cleoo. 1 In><tit. 275, a, 279, b. If ~
rele&>c of all acti-Ottl be mo.de to a tenant for life, the per.,;on in romaiudtir, afwr the dl'&th of
the tonnnt for life, shall h11ve no benefit from this releQ.SO, 1 Jm;tit. 275, b, 285, b; Edward
.Alth1m1't1 Case, 8 Rep. :iO'l; Lampet's CBl!e, 10 id. 51.]
(:t~) [The dit1tinotion between voidable and void must not be lost sight of here, fw it hill
no operation whatever upon a void ti11tate. Gilb. Ten. 7o.]
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dered, granted, and yielded up." (34) The surrenderor must be in possession ; (u)

and the surrenderee must have a higher estate, in which the estate surrendered

may merge; therefore tenant for life cannot surrender to him in remainder for

years, (w) In a surrender there is no occasion for livery of seisin; (x) for there

is a privity of estate between the surrenderor and the surrenderee; the one's

particular estate and the other's remainder are one and the same estate: and liv-

ery having been once made at the creation of it, there is no necessity for hav-

ing it afterwards. And, for the same reason, no livery is required on a release

or confirmation in tee to tenant for years or at will, though a freehold thereby

passes: since the reversion of the relessor, or confirmor, and the particular estate

of the relessee, or confirmee, are one and the same estate : and where there is

already a possession, derived from such a privity of estate, any farther delivery

of possession would be vain and nugatory, (y)

10. An assignment is properly a transfer, or making over to another, of the

right one has in any estate; out it is usually applied to an estate for life or years.

And it differs from a lease only in this: that by a lease one grants an inter-

est less *than his own, reserving to himself a reversion; in assignments r »qo~ i

he parts with the whole property, and the assignee stands to all intents *• *

and purposes in the place of the assignor. (35)

11. A defeazance is a collateral deed, made at the same time with a feoffment

or other conveyance, containing certain conditions, upon the performance of

which the estate then created may be defeated (z) or totally undone. And in
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(«) riii.l. m (in Perk. « 589. (x) Co. Litt. 90.

(e) From thf French verb defaire, infectum raldere.

dered, glflnted, and yielded up." (34) The surrenderor must be in possession; ( n)
and the surrenderee must have a higher estate, in which the estate surrenderecl
may merge; therefore tenant forlife cannot surrender to him in' remainder for
years. (w) In a surrender there is no occasion for livery of seisin; (x) for there
is a privity of estate between the imrrenderor and tlie snrrenderee; the one's
particuliu est.ate and t~e other's remainder are one and the same estate: and livery having been once made at the creation of it; there is no necessity for having it afterwards.· And, for the same reason, no livery is required on a release
or contir1m~tion in fee to tenant for years or at will, thouO'h a freehold thereby
passes: since the reversion of the relessor, or confirmor, ·and the particular esta~e
of the relessee, or confirmee, are one and the same estate: and where there is
already a possession, derived from such a privity of estate, any farther delivery
of possession would be vain and nugatory. (y)
10. An assipnment is properlv a transfer, or making over to another, of the
right one has in any estat.e; hut 'it is usually applied to an estate for life or years.
And it differs from a lease only in this: that by a lease one grants an interest less *th.an his own, reserving to himself a .reversion; in assi~~ments [ • 321 ]
he parts with .the whole property, a~d the assignee stands to all mte~ts
and purposes m the place of the assignor. (35)
·
ll. A defeazance is a collateral deed, made at the same time with a feoffment
or other con,·eyance, containing certain conditions, upon the performance ?f
which the estate then created may be d~feated (z) or totally undone. A-nd m

(g) Litt. i 460.

(34) [But these words are not essential to a surrender. 1 Wils. 127; Cro. Jac. 169; 2 Wils. 26;

(•I Ibid. :l-18.

(tt>l Perk.

~

1189.

(•I l''rOn'I the French verb defaire, infect""'

(zl Co. Litt. llO.

~re.

(N)

Lltt. f

~.

5 Moo. and P. 800.

A surrender must be of the whole estate or it will not operate as such. Tonchst. 308; Hard.

417. It cannot be mode to take effect in futuro. 1 Mee. and W. 50; 3 id. 328. But it may be

made upon a condition precedent, 12 East, 134; 1 Mee. and W. 676; Perk. e. 624.]

The surrender here described is one by deed, but there may be a surrender in law without

any deed. As where the lessee, before the expiration of his term, delivered up possession to

the lessor who leased the premises to another. Randall v. Rich, 11 Mass. 494; Hesaeltime t>.

Seavey, 16 Me. 212; Dodd v. Acklom, 6 M. and G. 673. So if without a reletting the land-

lord accepts possession of the premises. Elliott v. Aiken, 45 JT. H. 36: Matthew c. Tabenor,

39 Mo. 115. So where the lessee gave to the lessor a lease of the same psemises, in terms like

his own, it was held a surrender, and that the term was merged. Shepard v. Spalding, 4 Met.

416. And the same has been held where the tenant left the premises on a notice from the

landlord to quit for non-payment of rent, and the latter went into possession. Patchin v.

Dickerman, 31 Vt. 666; and sec 1 Washb. Real. Prop. 350, et seq. Surrenders in England,

when in writing, are now by statute 8 and 9 Vie. 106 required to be by deed. And by statute 8

and 9 Vic. c. 112, when the purpose for which a term for years has been created is satisfied, the

term itself ceases to exist.

(35) [This is not universally true; for there is a variety of distinctions when the assignee is

bound by the covenauts of the assignor, and when he is not. The general rule is, that he is

bound by all covenants which run With the laud; but not bv collateral covenants which do

not run with the land. As if a lessee covenants for himself, executors, and administrators,

concerning a thing not in existence, as to build a wall upon the promises, the assignee will

not be bound; but the assignee will be bound, if the lessee has covenanted for himself and

assigns. Where the lessee covenants for himself, his executors and administrators, to reside

upon the premises, this covenant binds his assignee, for it runs with, or is appurtenant to, the

thing demised. 2 Hen. Bl. 133. The assignee in no case is bound by the covenant of the

lessee, to build a house for the lessor any where off the premises, or to pay money to a stranger.

5 Co. 16. The assignee is not bound by a covenant broken before assignment. 3 Burr. 1271;

eee Com. Dig. Covenant. But if an underlease is made, even for a day less than the whole

term, the under-lessee is not liable for rent or covenants to the original lessee, like an assignee

of the whole term. DougL 183, 56. An assignee is liable for rent only whilst he continues

in possession under the assignment. And he is held not to be guilty of a fraud, if he assigns

even to a beggar, or to a person leaving the kingdom, urovlded the assignment be executed

before his departure. 1 B. and P. 21. The same principle prevails in equity. See 2 Bridg.

Eq. Dig. 138; 1 Vern. 87; 2 id. 103; 8 Ves. 95; 1 Sch. and Lefroy, 310. But the assignee's

liability commences upon acceptance of the lease, though he never enter. 1 B. and P. 238.]

(34) [But these words are not essential to o. snrrender. 1 Wile. 127; Cro. J ac. 169; 2 Wils. 26;
5 Yoo. and P. 000. ·
A surrender must be of the whole estate or it will not operate as ~uch. Touchst. 308 ; Hard.
417: It cannot be ma.de to take effect in futuro. 1 Mee. and W. 50; :J id. 328. But it may be
mo.de npon a condition precedent. 12 Eust, 1::W; 1 Mee. and W. 676; Perk. s. 6'24.]
The surrender here described is one by deed, but there may be a surrender in law without
any deed. As where the lessee, before the expiration of his term, deli;erod up possession to
the lessor who lea"ed the premises to another. Randall ti. Rieb, 11 M11.~s. 494; Hesa.eltime t•.
Sea\"ey, 16 Ye. 212; Dodd v. Acklom, 6 M. and G. 673. So if without a reletting the landlord accepts prn1se~!1ion of the premi~es. Elliott v. Aiken, 45 N. H. :J6: Matthew "· Tabencr,
39 Ho. 115. So where the le~r1ee gave to the lessor a leMe of the same psemise~. in term8 like
hi8 own, it was beld a 11nrrencler, and that the tenn was merged. Shepard "· Spalding, 4 Met.
416. And the same has been held where the tenant lot\ the premir1es on a notice from the
landlord to quit for non-payment of rent, and the latter 'vent into po8seAAion. Pat~hin t'.
Dickerman, 31 Vt: 666; and see 1 Wo.~bb. Ree.I. Prop. 350, et seq. SurrendenJ in England,
when in writing, are now by statute 8 and 9 Vic. 106 required to be by deed. And by statute 8
and 9 Vic: c. llj, when the purpose for which a term for yeal"li has been created is satisfied, the
tem1 it>iolf cea.-ies to exii;t.
(35} [This is no~ uni\"enially true; for there is a varietv of distinctions when the a.~8ignee is
bound by the' CO\"en1llltl! or the aS8ignor, and when he ir1 not; The g(•neral rule iA, that he is
bound by all covenants which run with the land; but not bv collateral covenants which do
not run With the land. As if a lessee covenants fur himimlf, exeeutonJ, and administrators,
concerning a thing not in existence, as to build a wall upon the llTllllJise>J, the 11.11Aigneu will
not be bound; but the o.:1signee will be hound, if the leggee ha.~ covenanted for himself and
auigns. Where the lesi,ice covenantg for him,;elf. his executoni e.n d administrators, to resirlo
upon the premises, thi11 covemmt binds his as:<ignee, for it runs with, or is appurtenant to, the
thing demised.· 2 Hen. Bl. 13:J. The as~ignee · in . no e&.'le is bound by the coveni~nt of the
let!14ee, to build a h~u"e f~1r the le8sor any where off tltc premises, or to ].JllY money to a straurvr.
6 Co. 16. The a.-is1gnee JS not bound by a covenant broken before &'l"tgnmeut. 3 Burr. li:!71 ;
@ee Com. Dig. Covenant. Brtt lfan underlea.~e ls ma.de, even for a day le~s than the whole
term, the under-lessee is not liable for rent or core11ant11 to the original les.~ee. like an as11ignee
of the wMli! term. DougL 1-S:J, 66. ' An &KSignee is liable for rent only whil,,ct he continue11
in pos<18811ion nnder ~he a.~11ignment. .Aud he ls held not to be guilty of a fraud, if he as«igns
even to a beggar, or to a person leaving the kingdom, l?ro'l"lded the a!!signmcnt be exe<'nted
f,efore hill departure. l B. and P. 21. The 11ame principle prevails in equity. See 2 Brid~.
Eq. Dig. 138; 1 Vern. 87; 2 ld. 103; 8 Ves. 95; 1 Sch. and Lefroy, 310. But tho o.11;iignce'R
liability commences upon IM'-Ceptauce of the lea;1e. though he never enter. 1 B. and P. 2:J8.]
As to the· ditference between an &.~igmnent and a sul>-letting, see in general, 1 W a.~hb. R eal
Prop. 333, et seq. A covenant 11.~ain'st an assignment is not broken by a sub-letting, o.nd
e toltl)t:rso. Parker ri. Copland, 4 Mich. 660; Lynde v. Hough, Z'l Barb. 415.

As to the1 difference between an assignment and a sub-letting, see in general, 1 "Washb. Real

Prop. 333, et seq. A covenant against an assignment is not broken by a sub-lettiug. and

e eoitttno. Parker /•- Copland, 4 Mich. 660; Lyndee. Hough, 27 Barb. 415.
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this manner mortgages were in former times usually made ; the mortgagor

(Book II.

ALIENATION BY DEED.

eiifeoffing the mortgagee, and he at the same time executing a deed of defea-

this manner mortgages were in fonner times usua1ly made ; the mortgagor
enfeoffing the mortgagee, and he at the same time executing a deed of defeazance, whereby the feoffment was rendered void on repayment of the money borrowed at a. certain day. And this, when executed at the same time with the
original feoffment, was considered as part of it by the ancient law; (a) and
therefore only indulged: no subsequent secret revocation of u solemn com·eyance, executed by livery 9f seisin, being allowed in those days of simplicity and
truth; though, when uses were afterwards introduced, a revocation of such uses
was permitted by the courts of equity. Bnt things that were merely executory,
or to be completed by matter subsequent, (as rents, of which no seisin could be
had till the time of payment;) and so also annuities, conditions, warranties,
and the like, were always liable to be recalled by defeazances made subsequent
to the time of their creation. (h)
II. There yet remain to be spoken of some few conveyances, which have their
force and operation by virtue of the statute of uses.
Uses and trusts are in their original of a nature very similar, or rather
exactly the same: answering more to the _fidei-commissurn than the usus.fractus
of the civil law; which latter was the temporary right of using a thing, without
having the ultimate property, or full dominion of the substance. (r.)-But the
ftdei-commis.<Jum, which usually was created by will, was the disposal of au
[ • 328 ] inherit1mce to one, in confidence that he *should convey it or dispose
of the profits at the will of another. And it was the business of a particular magistrate, the prmtor fidei co1mnissarius, instituted by Augustus, to
enforce the observance of this confidence. (d) So that the right thereby girnn
was looked upon as a. vest<.,'<! right, and entitled to a remedy from a court of
justice: which occasioned that known division of rights by the Roman law into
jus legitimum, a legal i;ght, which was remedied by the ordinary course of law;
jus fidm:iarium, a right in trust, for which there was a remedy in conscience;
and jus precarium, a right in courtesy, for which the remedy was only by
entreaty or request. (e) In our 11:1.w, a use might be ranked under the rights of
the second kind; being a confidence reposed in another who was tenant of the
land, or terre-tenant, that he should dispose of the land according to the intentions of cestuy que use, or him to whose use it was granted, and suffer him to
take the profits. (.f) As, if a fooffment was made to A and his heirs, to the u~
of (or in trust for) B and his heirs; here at the com1Uon law A, the terretenant, had the legal property and possession of the land, but B, the cestuy que
use, was in conscience and equity to ham the profits and·disposal of' it.
This notion was tnmsplanted into England from the civil law, about the
close of the reign of Edward III, (g) by means of the foreign ecclesiastics; who
introduced it to evade the statutes ofmortmain, by obtaining grants of lands, not
to their religious houses directly, but to the use of tho reli~ious houses: (Tt) which
the clerical chancellors of those times held to be fldte-c(}mmissa, and binding: in conscience; and therefore assumed the junsdiction whioh Au~ustus
luut vested in his prf13tor, of compelling the execution of such trusts m the
court of chanoory. And, as it was most easy to obtain such grants from dying
persons, a maxim was established, that though by law the lands themseh·es
were not devisable, yet if a testator had enfeoffed another to his own use, and so
,. .
wa.s *possessed of the use only, such use was devisable by will. But
[ 329 ] we haYe seen (i) how this evasion was crushed in its infancy, by statute
15 Ric. II, c. 5, with respect to religions houses.
Yet, the idea being onoo introduced, however frandulently, it afterwards con·
tinued to be often innocently, and sometimes very laudably, applied to a number
of civil purposes: particularly as it removed the restraint of alienations by ml1,.
and permitted the owner of lands in his lifetime to make various de-signations
of their profits, as ;erudence, or justice, or family convenience, might from time
to time require. 'Iill at length, during our long wars in Fmnce, and the sub-

zance, whereby the feoffment was rendered void on repayment of the money bor-

rowed at a certain day. And this, when executed at the same time with the

original feoffment, was considered as part of it by the ancient law; (a) and

therefore only indulged: no subsequent secret revocation of a solemn convey-

ance, executed by livery of seisin, being allowed in those days of simplicity and

truth; though, when uses were afterwards introduced, a revocation of such uses

was permitted by the courts of equity. But things that were merely executory,

or to be completed by matter subsequent, (as rents, of which no seisin could be

had till the time of payment;) and so also annuities, conditions, warranties,

and the like, were always liable to be recalled by defeazances made subsequent

to the time of their creation, (b)

II. There yet remain to be spoken of some few conveyances, which have their

force and operation by virtue of the statute of uses.

Uses and (rusts are in their original of* a nature very similar, or rather

exactly the same: answering more to thefidei-commissum than the umsfractus

of the civil law; which latter was the temporary right of nsing a thing, without

having the ultimate property, or full dominion of the substance, (c)—But. the

fidei-commissum, which usually was created by will, was the disposal of an

r *qog I inheritance to one, in confidence that he *should convey it or dispose

*• '**' -" of the profits at the will of another. And it was the business of a partic-
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ular magistrate, the prcetor fidei coinmissarius, instituted by Augustus, to

enforce the observance of this confidence, (d) So that the right thereby given

was looked upon as a vested right, and entitled to a remedy from a court of

justice: which occasioned that known division of rights by the Roman law into

jus Itgitimum, a legal right, which was remedied by the ordinary course of law;

jusfiduciarium, a right in trust, for which there was a remedy in conscience;

and jus precarium, a right in courtesy, for which the remedy was only by

entreaty or request, (e) In our law, a use might be ranked under the rights of

the second kind; being a confidence reposed in another who was tenant of the

land, or terre-tenant, that he should dispose of the land according to the inten-

tions of cestuy que use, or him to whose use it was granted, and suffer him to

take the profits. (/) As, if a feoffment was made to A and his heirs, to the use

of (or in trust for) B and his heirs; here at the common law A, the terre-

tenant, had the legal property and possession of the land, but B, the cestuy que

use, was in conscience and equity to have the profits and disposal of it.

This notion was transplanted into England from the civil law, about the

close of the reign of Edward III, (g) by means of the foreign ecclesiastics; who

introduced it to evade the statutes of mortmain, by obtaining grants of lands, not

to their religions houses directly, but to the use of the religious houses: (/«) which

the clerical chancellors of those times held to be fidie-cammissa, and bind-

ing in conscience; and therefore assumed the jurisdiction which Augustus

had vested in his praetor, of compelling the execution of such trusts in the

court of chancery. And, as it was most easy to obtain such grants from dying;

persons, a maxim was established, that though by law the lands themselves

were not devisable, yet if a testator had enfeoffed another to his own use, and so

F *3291 was *Posse3Sed °f the use only, such use was devisable by will. But

L 64y J we have seen (f) how tins evasion was crushed in its infancy, by statute

15 Ric. II, c. 5, with respect to religious houses.

Yet, the idea being once introduced, however fraudulently, it afterwards con-

tinued to be often innocently, and sometimes very laudably, applied to a number

of civil purposes: particularly as it removed the restraint of alienations by will,

and permitted the owner of lands in his lifetime to make various designations

of their profits, as prudence, or justice, or family convenience, might from time

to time require. Till at length, during our long wars in France, and the snb-

(a) Co. T<itt. «6. (b) Ibid. 237. (c) Ff. 7, 1, 1. fdj Intt. 8 tit. 23.

(e) Ff. 43, 28, I. Bncon on Uses, 8vo. 300. '(f) Plowd. 352.

(gj Stat. 60 Kdw. Ill, c. 6. 1 Kic. II, o. 9. 1 Rep. IS). fAJ Sec page 271. (ij Pago ST2.
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faJ Co. J.itt. ~.
(b) 1 bid. 237.
(e) Ff. 43, 26, l. Bacon on Use~, !Im. 300.
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(c)

J?.f. 7, 1, 1.

(.fJ Plowd. 8.'12.

(gJ Stut. llO E•lw i~~ o. 6. l llic.11, o. 9. 1 Rep.

iaa.

(d) Jul. ll HI. 23.
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sequent civil commotions between the houses of York and Lancaster, uses grew

almost universal; through the desire that men had (when their lives were con-

tinually in hazard) of providing for their children by will, and securing their

estates from forfeitures; when each of the contending parties, as they became

uppermost, alternately attainted the other. Wherefore, about the reign of Edw.

IV, (before whose time, Lord Bacon remarks, (k) there are not six cases to be

found relating to the doctrine of uses), the courts of equity began to reduce

them to something of a regular system.

Originally it was held that the chancery could give no relief, but against the

very person himself intrusted for cestuy que use, and not against his heir or

alienee. This was altered in the reign of Henry VI, with respect to the heir; (I)

and afterwards the same rule, by a parity of reason, was extended to such alienees

as had purchased either without a valuable consideration, or with an express

notice of the use. (m) But a purchaser for a valuable consideration without

notice, might hold the land discharged of any trust or confidence. And also it

was held, that neither the king nor queen, on account of their dignity royal, (»)

nor any corporation *aggregate, on account of its limited capacity, (p) r *OOA -i

could be seised to any use but their own; that is, they might hold the L <* J

lands, but were not compellable to execute the trust. And, if the feoffee to uses

died without heir, or committed a forfeiture, or married, neither the lord who

entered for his escheat or forfeiture, nor the husband who retained the possession

as tenant by the curtesy, nor the wife to whom dower was assigned, were liable
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to perform the use: (p) because they were not parties to the trust, but came in

by act of law; though doubtless their title in reason was no better than that of

the heir.

On the other hand, the use itself, or interest of cestuy que use, was learnedly

refined upon with many elaborate distinctions. And, 1. It was held that nothing

could be granted to a use, whereof the use is inseparable from the possession ;

as annuities, ways, commons, and authorities, puce ipso usu consumuntur: (q)

or whereof the seisin could not be instantly given, (r) 2. A use could not be

raised without a sufficient consideration. For where a man makes a feoffmeut

to another, without any consideration, equity presumes that he meant it to the

use of himself, (s) unless he expressly declares it to be to the use of another,

and then nothing shall be presumed contrary to his own expressions, (t) (36)

But if either a good or valuable consideration appears, equity will immediately

raise a use correspondent to such consideration, (u) 3. Uses were descendible

according to the rules of the common law, in the case of inheritances in pos-

session ; (w) for in this and many other respects (equitas sequitur legem, and

cannot establish a different rule of property from that which the law has estab-

lished. 4. Uses might be assigned by secret deeds between the parties, (x) or be

devised by last will and testament; (y) for, as the legal estate in the soil was not

transferred by these transactions, no livery of seisin was necessary; *and, r $„„•• -•

as the intention of the parties was the leading principle in this species L *

(£) On Uses, 813. (1] Keilw. 42. Year-book, 22 Ed\v. IV. 6.

(m) Ibid. 46. Bacon on Uses. 312. (n) Bro. Abr. tit. Feaffm. at usa, 31. Bacon of nses, 346, 317.

(o) Bro. Abr. tit. Feoffm. at ti»e», 40. Bacon, 347. (p) 1 Hep. 122. (q) Uon. 127.

(r) Cro. Jiliz. 401. («) See page 2%. (*) 1 And. 37. («) Moor. 684.

(w)« Roll. Abr. 760. (x) Bacon on Uses, 312. (») Ibid. SOS.

(36) [In the second section of the third chapter of Gilbert on Uses, p. 222, the law is in sub-

stance thus laid down. If a feoffment be made, or a fine be levied, or recovery bo suffered,

without consideration, and no uses be expressed, the ,use results to the feofior and his heirs.

But if any uses be expressed, it shall be to those uses, though no consideration be had ; and

herein is the difference between raising uses by fine, feoffment, or other conveyance operating

by transmutation of possession, and uses raised by covenant: for, upon the first, if no xiscs

were expressed, it is equity that assigns the feoffor to have the resulting use; by the law. the

feoffor has parted with all his interest: see Cave P. Holford, 3 Ves. 667; but where he expresses

uses, there can be no equity in giving him the use against his own will. On the other hand,

in case of a covenant there can be no use without a consideration; for the covcnantee in such

case can have no right by law, and there is no reason why equity should give him the use. And

8ee Calthrop's Case, Moor, 101; Stephen's Case, 1 Leon. 138; Mildriay's Case, 1 Rep. 176;

2 Roll's Ab. 790.]
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of property, any instrument declaring that intention was allowed to be bindirig

in equity. But cestuy queuse could not at common law aliene the legal interest

of the lands, without the concurrence of his feoffee ; (z) to whom he was

accounted by law to be only tenant at sufferance, (a) 5. Uses were not liable to

any of the feudal burthens; and particularly did not escheat for felony or other

defect of blood; for escheats, &c., are the consequence of tenure, and uses are

held of nobody : but the land itself was liable to escheat, whenever the blood of

the feoffee to uses was extinguished by crime or by defect ; and the lord (as was

before observed) might hold it discharged of the use. (b) 6. No wife could be

endowed, or husband have his curtesy, of a use: (e) for no trust was declared.

for their benefit, at the original grant of the estate. Arid therefore it became

customary, when most estates were put in use, to settle before marriage some

joint estate to the use of the husband and wife for their lives; which was the

original of modern jointures. (r7) 7. A use could not be extended b'v writ of

eleyit, or other legal process, for the debts ol cesfuu que use.(e) for, being

merely a creature of equity, the common law, which looked no farther than to

the person actually seised of the land, could award no process against it.

It is impracticable, upon our present plan, to pursue the doctrine of uses

through all the refinements and niceties which the ingenuity of the times

(abounding in subtile disquisitions) deduced from this child of the imagination;

when once a departure was permitted from the plain, simple rules of property

established by the ancient law. These principal outlines will be fully sufficient
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to show the ground of Lord Bacon's complaint, (/) that this course of proceed-

ing " was turned to deceive many of their just and reasonable rights. — A man,

*'11% 1 ^a* ^^ cause to sue for land, knew not against whom to "bring his

•* action or who was the owner of it. The wife was defrauded of her

thirds ; the husband of his curtesy ; the lord of his wardship, relief, heriot, arid

escheat; the creditor of his extent for debt; and the poor tenant of his lease."

To remedy these inconveniences abundance of statutes were provided, which

made the lands liable to be extended by the creditors of ce stuy que use, (g)

allowed actions for the freehold to be brought against him if in tne actual per-

nancy or enjoyment of the profits ; (k) made him liable to actions of waste :(/)

established his conveyances and leases made without the concurrence of his

feoffees; (k) and gave the lord the wardship of his heir, with certain other

feudal perquisites. (/)

These provisions all tended to consider cestuy que -use as the real owner of the

estate; and at length that idea was carried into full effect by the statute 27

Hen. VIII, c. 10, which is usually called the statute of uses, or, in conveyances

and pleadings, the statute for transferring uses info possession. The hint

seems to have been derived from what was done at the accession of King Rich-

ard III; who, having, when duke of Gloucester, been frequently made a feoffee

to uses, would upon the assumption of the crown (as the law was then under-

stood) have been entitled to hold the lands discharged of the use. But to obviate

so notorious an injustice, an act of parliament was immediately passed, (m) which

ordained, that where he had been so enfeoffed jointly with other persons, the land

should vest in the other feoffees, as if he had never been named ; and that, where

he stood solely enfeoffed, the estate should itself vest in cestuy queuse in like

manner as he had the use. And so the statute of Henry VIII, after reciting the

various inconveniences before-mentioned, and many others, enacts, that "when

any person shall be seised of lands, &c., to the use, confidence, or trust of any other

r *oqq-i person or body *politic, the person or corporation entitled to the use in

' ''" -I fee-simple, fee-tail, for life, or years, or otherwise, shall from thenceforth

stand and be seised or possessed of the land, &c., of and in the like estates as they

have in the use, trust, or confidence; and that the estate of the person so seised

(z) Stat. 1 Ric. in, o. 1. (a) Bro. Abr. ffiid. 23. (b) Jcnk. 190. fcJiRep.l. 4 And. 75.

fdj Sue page 137 . (e) Bro. Abr, til atfcutima. 90. (f) Use of the law, 15S.

(a) Stat. 50. E«Uv. HI, o. 8. 2 Klc. II, sees. 2, c. 3. 19 Hen. VII, c. IS.

(It) Stat. 1 Kic. II, o. ». 4 Hen. IV, c. 7, c. 13. 11 lien. VI, c. 3. 1 Hen. VII, c. 1.

(i) Hint. 11 Hen. VI, c. 5. (k) Stat. 1 Ric. Ill, c. 1.

(1) Stttt. t Hen. VII, c. 17. 19 Hen. VII, c. 15. (m) 1 Kic. IH, o. 5.
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of property, any instrument declaring tbat intention was allowed to be bindin'g
in equity. But c;stuy queuse could ~ot at com~on law aliene the legal interest
of the lands, without the concurrence of his feo:ffee; (z) t9 whom he lfas
accounted by law to be only tenant at' sufferance. (a) 5. Uses were not liable to
un v of the feudal burthens; and particularly did not escheat for felony or other
Clefect of blood; for escheats, &c., are the consequence of tenure, and ·uses are
held of nobody: but the land itself was liable to escheat, whenever the blood of
the feoffee to uses was extingQished by crime or by defect; and the lord (as was
before obsen-ed) miaht hold. it discharged of the use. (b) . 6. No wife could be
endowed, or hnsbanct have his cur~sy, of a use: ·(c) for no trust was declared
for their benefit, at the original grant of the estate. Arid therefore it beC'.uile
cust-0mary, when most estates were put in u8e, to settle before mtmiage some
joint estate to the use of the husband and wife for their lives; which was the
original of modern jointnres. (d) 7. A use could not be extended bv writ o'f
elegit, or other legal pr?cess, for the debts of c~sfuy que use. (e) for, being
merely a creatnre of eqmty, the common law, wluch looked no farther than to
the p~rsou actually seised of the land, could award no proct'St:l against it.
It is impraGticable, upon our present plan, .to pursue the dochfoe
uses
through all the refinements and niceties. which the ingenuity of the timf's
(abounding in sttbtile disquisitions) deduced from this child of the imagination;
when once a departure wns permitted from the plain, simple rules of property
established by the ancient law. These principal outlines will be . frilly sufficient
to show the grouncl of Lord Bacon's complaint, (f) that this co1irse of proceeding" was turned to deceive many of their just and reasonable rights.-A man,
[ ,..332 ] that had cause to sue for land, knew not agairn~t whom to *bring his
action or who was the owner of it. 'l'he wife
'defrauded of her
thirds; the husband of his cnrtesy; the lord of his wardship, relief, heriot, a1id
escheat; the creditor of his extent for debt; and the poor tenant of his lease."
To r(•medy these inconveniences abundance of sfotutes were prodded, which
made the lands liable to be extended by the creditors of cestuy que use, (g)
allowed actions for the freehold to be brought against him if in the actual Jlernancy or enjoyment of the profits; (h) made him liable to actions of waste; (f)
established Ins convevances and leases nrnde without the concurrence of his
feoffees; (k) an.d ~ve the lord the wardship of his heir, with certain other
feudal perquisites. ti)
These provisions all tended to consider cestup que ut~e as the real owner of the
estate; and at length that idea was carried rnto full effect by the statute 27
Hen. VIII, c. 10, which is usually called the statute of uses, or, in conveyances
and pleadings, the statute for transferrfog u..1es in(o ponession. 'fhe hint
seems to have been derived from what was done at the accession of King Richard III; .who, ha,·ing, when duke of Gloucester, been frequently made a feoffee
to uses, would upon the assumption of the crown (as the law was then understood) have been entitled to hold the lands discharged of the use~ But to obviate
so noto1ious an injustice, an act of parliament was immediately passed, (111) which
ordained, that where he had been so enfeoffed jointly with other persons, the land
should vest in the other feoffees, as if he had never been named; and that, where
he stood solely enfeoffed, the estate should itself vest in cestuy que Uile in like
manner as he had the use. Aud so the statute of Henry VIII, after reciting the
various inconveniences before-mentioned, and many others, enacts, that "when
any person shall be set'.sed of lands, &c., to the use, confidence, or trust of any other
[ • 333 ] person or body *politic, the person qr corporation entitled to the use in
· fee-simple, fee-tail, for life, or vears, or otherwise, shall from thencefort.11
shtnd and be seised or possessed of the land, &c., of and in the like estates as they
hM·e in the use, trust, or confidence; and that the estate of the person so seised

of

was

(z) Stat. 1 Ric. Ill, o. l.

(a) Bro . ..4br. ibid. 23.

(b) Je11k. 190.

(c)• Rep. I.

(cl) See page 137.
(e) Bro. Abr. tit l'.r~culi0111. llO.
( f) Use of the law, 16S.
StRt. Ml. .Edw. m, o. 6. '.!Ric. II, 11<.'88. 2, c. S. 19 Hen. Vil, c. 15.
(Ji} ~tat. 1 Ric. II, c. II. • lien. IV,"· 7. c . l!i. 11 Hen. VI, c. S. l llen. VII, c. 1.
(i) Stat. 11 Hen. VI, c. 11.
(k) Stitt. I Ric. Ill, c. I.
(l) Stat. f lien. VII, c. 17. 19 Hen. VII, c. 16.
(m) l lUc. ill, o. 11.

2 .And. 73.

(ff)
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·fo uses shall be aeemed to bt. in him or them that have the use, in such quality,

'to uses shall be deemed to be in him or them that have the use, in such quality,

manuer, form, and condition, as they had before in the use." The statute thus

fxetvtt* the use, as our lawyers term it; that is, it conveys the possession to the

use, and transfers the use into possession; thereby making cestuy que use com-

plete owner of the lands and tenements, as well at law as in equity.

The statute having thus not abolished the conveyance to uses, but only anni-

'hilated the intervening estate of the feoffee, and turned the interest of ceatuy

que use into a legal instead of an equitable ownership; the courts of common

law began to take cognizance of uses, instead of sending the party to seek his

relief in chancery. And, considering them now as merely a mode of convey-

ance, very many of the rules before established in equity were adopted with im-

provements by the judges of the common law. The same persons only were

held capable of being seised to a use, the same considerations were necessary fox

raising it, and it could only be raised of the same hereditaments as formerly.

But as the statute, the instant it was raised, converted it into an actual pos-

session of the land, a great number of the incidents, that formerly attended it

in its fiduciary state, were now at an end. The land could not escheat or be

forfeited by the act or defect of the feoffee, nor be aliened to any purchaser dis-

charged of the use, nor be liable to dower or curtesy on account of the seisin of

such feoffee; because the legal estate never rests in him for a moment, but is

instantaneously transferred to cestuy que use as soon as the use is declared.

And, as the use and the land were now convertible terms, they became liable to
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dower, curtesy, and escheat, in consequence of the seisin of cestuy que use, who

•was now become the terre-tenant also; and they likewise were no longer devisa-

ble bv will.

*T"he various necessities of mankind induced also the judges very soon r *ooi -i

to depart from the rigour and simplicity of the rules of the common "- -I

law, and to allow a more minute and complex construction upon conveyances to

uses than upon others. Hence it was adjudged that the use need .not always be

executed the instant the conveyance is made: but, if it cannot take effect at

'that time, the operation of the statute may wait till the use shall arise upon

some future contingency, to happen within a reasonable period of time; and in

the meanwhile the ancient use shall remain in the original grantor: as, when

lands are conveyed to the use of A and B, after a marriage shall be had between

them, (n) or to the use of A and his heirs till B shall pay him a sum of money,

and then to the use of B and his heirs, (o) Which doctrine, when devises by

will were again introduced, and considered as equivalent in point of construc-

tion to declarations of uses, was also adopted in favour of executory devises, (p)

But herein these, which are called contingent or springing uses, (3?) differ from

(»J2 Roll. Abr. 781. Cro. Eliz. 4K. (o) Bro. Abr.tU. Feoffn. aluta, 80. (pj See page 173.

(37) [Mr. Sugden says, shifting, secondary, and springing uses, are frequently confounded

manner, form, e.nd condition, as they had before in the use." The statute thus
exe~t!'.~ the use, as our lawyers term it; that is, it conveys the possession to the
use, and transfers the use into possession; thereby me.king cestuy que use com·ptete owner of the lands and tenements, as well at law as in equity.
The statute having thus not abolished the conveyance to uses, bnt only anni'bilated the intervening estate of the feoffee, and turned the interest of cestuy
que use into a legal instead of an equitable ownership; the courts of common
luw began to take cognizance of uses, instead of sending the party to seek his
relier in chancery. And, considering them now as merely a mode of conveyance, very many of the rules before established in equity were adopted with improvements by the judges of the common law. 'rhe same persons only were
held capable of beh1g seised to a use, the same considerations were necessary for
raising it, and it could only be raised of the same hereditaments as formerly.
But as the statute, the instant it was raised, converted it into an actual pos·
session of the land, a great number of the incidents, that formerly attended it
in its fiduciary state, were now at an end. 'rhe land could not cscheat or be
forfeited by the act or defect of the feoffce, nor be aliened to any purchaser discharged of the use, nor be liable to dower or curtesy on account of the seisin of
such feoffee; because the legal estate never rests in him for a moment, but is
instantaneouslytmnsferred to cestuy que ·use as soon as the use is declared.
And, as the use and the land were now convertible terms, they became Hable to
dower, curtesy, and escheat, in consequence of the seisin of cestuy qtte use, who
~ni.s now become the terre-tmant also; and they likewise were no ·longer devisa-ble bv will
*'the various necessities of mankind induced also the judges very soon [ • 334 ]
to depart from the rigour and simplicity of the rules of the common ·
law, and to allow a more minute and complex construction upon conveyances to
uses than upon others. Hence it was adjnd!red that the use need .not always be
executed the instant the conveyance is made: but, if it cannot take effect at
·that time, the operation of the statute may wait till the use shall arise upon
some future contingency, to happen within a reasonable period of time; and in
the meanwhile the ancient use shall remain in the origmal grantor: as, when
lands are conveyed to the use of A and B, after a marriage shall be had between
them, (n) or to the use of A and his heirs till B shall pay him a·sum of money,
and then to the nse of Baud his heirs. (o) Which doctrine, when devises by
will were a15ain introduced, and considered as equivalent in point of construction to declarations of uses, was also adopted in favour -of ~ucutor!/ devises. (p)
But herein these, which are· called· contingent or springing uses, (37) differ from

with each other, and with future or contingent uses. They may perhaps be thus classed : 1st,

(•) i Roll. Abr. '191. Oro. illill. 481.

Shifting or secondary uses, which take effect in derogation of Rome other estate, and are either

(o)

Bro. .ifbr. HI. Fei>J'n. a4 - . , 30.

(p)

See page 173.

limited expressly by the deed, or are authorized to be created by some person named in the

deed. ~< i I v, Springing uses, confining this class to uses limited to arise on a future event, where

(37) (Mr. Sugden says, 11hifl.ing, eooondary, and springing uses, are frequently oonfounded
wit.h each other, and with future or oontingent uses. 'fhey may perhaps be thus olast!ed: ht,
Shifting or BteOlntdary tHle.'J, which take effect in derogation of some other estate, and are either
limited cxpre1V1ly by the deed, or are authorized to be created by some pen!On named in the
deed. 2<tly; 8pri'llfl''llfl tuJeB, confinin~ this cl81.<8 to Utlll!l limited to arise on & future event, where
no preceding UAe ill limited, and which du not take effect in d0l'Ogation · of ·any other interest
than that which Tesnlts to the ~ntl>r, or remains in hlm, in the mean time. 3dly, Ff4tlff'e or
rontingent 1'868, are prupcrly usct1 to take eft'ect M remainders; for instance, a 0110 to the fiNt
unborn ~on of A, afler a previous limitation to him fur lifo, or for years, determinable OU hie
life. is a future or contingent use: but yet does not aml\ver the notion of either a shifting or a
l'J?riuginf! UllC. Oontingent uses naturally arose, aft.er the statute of <,n Hen. VIII, in imitation
ot coutingont remainder:!.
The fll'llt c)Mij, that iM, shifting or 86COndar11 mes, are at this day· so ·oommon that they pass
without oblle"ation. In e>ery marriage settlement, the firt1t use is to the owner in fee until
msrriRge, and after the marriage to other UA6ll. Here, the owner, in the .fil'llt instance, takeR the
fee. which upon the man·iage cAB.'4eti, and the new U118 arises. But a shifting n8e cannot be limited on a 11hifl;iug Uflle: and ithfft.ing u~11 mu!ft be confined within 1mch limits aa aro not to tend
to a purpetnity. See mtte, ehnp. 11. But a shift.in!£ Ul!e may be created after nn e11tatc-tail, to
take effect at any period, however remote; becan:;e the tenant in tail for tho time being may, by
a recovery, defoat the shifting use.

no preceding use is limited, and which do not take effect in derogation of any other interest

than that which results to the grantor, or remains in him, in the mean time. 3dly, Future or

contingent uses, are properly uses to take effect as remainders; for instance, a use to the first

unborn son of A, after a previous limitation to him for lifo, or for years, determinate on his

life, is a future or contingent use: but yet does not answer the notion of either a shirting or a

springing use. Contingent rises naturally arose, after the statute of 27 Hen. VIII, in imitation

ol contingent remainders.

The first class, that is, shifting or secondary uses, are at this day so common that they pass

without observation. In every marriage settlement, the first use is to the owner in fee until

marrmge, and after the marriage to other uses. Here, the owner, in the first instance, takes the

fee, which upon the marriage ceases, and the new use arises. But a shifting use cannot bo lim-

ited on a shifting use : and shifting uses must be confined within such limits as are not to tend

to a perpetuity. See ante, chnp. 11. But a shifting use may be created after on estate-tail, to

take effect at any period, however remote; because the tenant in tail for the time being may, by

a recovery, defeat the shifting use.
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an executory devise; in that there must be a person seised to such uses at the

time when the contingency happens, else they can never be executed by the

statute; and therefore if the estate of the feoffee to such use be destroyed by

alienation or otherwise, before the contingency arises, the use is destroyed for-

ever ; (q) (38) whereas by an executory devise the freehold itself is transferred to

the future devisee. And, in both these cases, a fee may be limited to take effect

after a fee; (r) because, though that was forbidden by the common law in favour

of the lord's escheat, yet when the legal estate was not extended beyond one fee-

simple, such subsequent uses (after a use in fee) were before the statute per-

mitted to be limited in equity; and then the statute executed the legal estate

in the same manner as the use before subsisted. It was also held, that a use,

though executed, may change from one to another by circumstances ex post

r *aof. -i facto; («) as, if A makes a feoffment *to the use of his intended wife

"• ' -1 and her eldest son for their lives, upon the marriage the wife takes the

whole use in severally; and upon the birth of a son, the use is executed jointly

in them both, (t) This is sometimes called a secondary, sometimes a shifting

use. And, whenever the use limited by the deed expires, or cannot vest, it

returns back to him who raised it, after such expiration, or during such impos-

sibility, and is styled a resulting use. As, if a man makes a feoffment to the

use of his intended wife for life, with remainder to the use of her first-born son

in tail; here, till he marries, the use results back to himself; after marriage, it

is executed in the wife for life: and, if she dies without issue, the whole results
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back to him in fee. (M) It was likewise held, that the uses originally declared

may be revoked at any future time, and new uses be declared of the land, pro-

vided the grantor reserved to himself such a power at the creation of the estate;

whereas the utmost that the common law would allow, was a deed of defeazance

coeval with the grant itself, and therefore esteemed a part of it, upon events

specially mentioned, (w) And, in case of such a revocation, the old uses were

held instantly to cease, and the new ones to become executed in their stead, (x)

And this was permitted, partly to indulge the convenience, and partly the

caprice of mankind; who (as Lord Bacon observes) (y~) have always affected to

have the disposition of their property revocable in their own time, and irrevoca-

ble ever afterwards.

(?) 1 Rep. 134. 138 Cro. Eli/.. 439. (r) Pollexf. 78. 10 Mod. 428.

(») Bvo. Mir. tit. Feoff*, al via, 30. ((i Bacon on Uses, :c,l. («)Ibid. 260. 1 Rep. 120.

(to) See page 327. (x, Co. Liu. 237. l.vi On Usca, 316.

As to the second class, or gpringing uses, before the statute of Hen. Till, there was no mis-

chief in an independent original springing use. to commence at a distant period, because the

legal estate remained in the trustee. After the statute, too, the use was held to result to, or

an executory devise; in tha.t there must be a person seised to snch uees at the
time when the contingency happens, else they can never be executro by the
statute; and therefore if the estate of the feoffee to such use be destroyed by
alienation or otherwise, before the contingency arises, the use is destroyed forever; (q) (38) whereas by an executory devise the freehold iteelf is transferred to
the future devisee. And, in both these cases, a fee ma.y be limited to take eft'ect
after a fee; (r) because, though that was forbidden by the common law in favour
of the lord's escheat, yet when the legal estate was not extended beyond one feesimple, such subsequent uses (after a use in fee) were before the statute permitted to oo limited in equity; and then the statute executed the legal estate
in the same manner as the use before subsisted. It was also held, that a use,
though executed, may change from one to another by circumstances ex post
[ • 335 ] facto; (s) BB, if A makes a feoffment •to the use of his intended wife
and her eldest son for their lives, upon the marria~e the wife takes the
·
whole use in severalty; and upon the birth of a son, the use is executed jointly
in them both. (t) This is sometimes called a secondary, sometimes a sltifting
use. And, whenever the use limited by the deed expires, or cannot vest, it
returns back to him who raised it, after snch expiration, or during such impossibility, and is styled a resulting use. As, if a man makes a feoffment to the
use of his intended wife for life, with remainder to the use of her first-born son
in tail; here, till he marries, the use results back to himself; after marriage, it
is executed in the wife for life: and, if she dies without issue, the whole results
back to him in fee. (u) It was likewise held, that the uses originally declared
may be revoked at any future time, and new uses be declared of the land, provided the grantor reserved to himself such a power at the creation of the estate;
whereas the utmost that the common law would allow, was a deed of defeazance
coeval with the grant itself, and therefore esteemed a part of it, upon events
specially mentioned. (w) And, in case of such a revocation, the old uses were
held instantly to cease, and the new ones to become executed in their stead. (x)
And this wus permitted, partly to indulge the convenience, and partly the
caprice of mankind; who (as Lord Bacon observes) (y) have always affected to
have the disposition of their property revocable in their own time, and irrevocable ever afterwards.
(q) 1 Rep. lM. 138 Cro. Elb:. •39.
(r) Pollexr. 78. 10 Mod. '23.
l•l Bro. ..4.br. tit. Feol'tlf.. al wau, SO.
(t) Bacon on Uses, 361.
(to) See page s•n.
1:1:1 t.;o. Litt. 23i.
(¥)On Uaca, BIB.

(u) Ibid. 260. 1 Rep. JiO.

remain in, the person creating the future use, according to the mode of conveyance adopted,

till the springing use arose. This resulting use the statute executed, so that the estate remained

in the settler till the period when the use was to rise : which might be at any time within the

limits allowed by law, in case of an executory devise. When springing uses are raised by con

veyances not operating by transmutation of possession, as sneh conveyances have only an equi-

table effect until the statute and use meet, a springing use may be limited by them at once: but

where the conveyance is one which does operate by transmutation of possession (as a feoffmeut,

fine, recovery, or lease and release), two objects must be attended to : first, to convoy the estate

according to the rules of common law ; secondly, to raise the use ont of the seisin created by

the conveyance. Now, the common law does not admit of a freehold being limited to com-

mence in futuro. See ante, p. 143.

As to the third class, m future or contingent uses, where an estate is limited previously to a

future use, and the future use is limited by way of remainder, it will be subject to the rules of

common law, and, if the previous estate is not sufficient to support it, will be void. See ante,

p. 168.

Future uses have been countenanced, and springing uses restrained, by what is now a firm

rule of law, namely, that if such a construction can be put upon a limitation in use, as that it

may take effect by way of remainder, it shall never take effect as a springing use. Southcot r.

Stowel, 1 Mod. 226, 237 ; 2 Mod. 207 ; Goodtitle v. Billington, Dougl. 758.]

(38) By statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 38, s. 7, it is provided that a future contingent or executory

use shall take effect, without any continued existence of a seisin to uses.

552

As to the second class, or springing uses, before the statute of Hen. VIII, there was no mi3·
chief in an independent origmal springing use, to commence at a di11tant period, because the
legal estate remained in the trustee. After the statute, too, the use wa.'I held to re1mlt to, or
remain in, the person creating the future use, according to the mode of conveyance adopted.
till the springfog use arose. This re~ulting use t.he i;te.tute exeeuted, so that the e11tate remained
in the settler till the period when the use was t~ rise: which might be at any time within the
limits allowed by law, in case of an executory deV'iRe. When springing uses are rnit1ed by con ·
VCV"ances not OJ.ler&ting by transmutation of po81!e8Sion, 81! sueh conveyances haV'e only an equitable effect unt.il the statute and use meet, a springing ui<e may be limited by them at once: but
when.1 the conveyance is one which doe1:1 operate by transmutation of pollSession (IM'l a feoff'meut,
fine, recovery, or lease and releaim), two objects must be attended to: finit, to convey the estate
o.ccordiug to the roles of common law ; secondly, to raise the u11e out of the seisin created by
the conveyance. Now, the common law does not admit of a freehold being limited to com·
mence in futuro. See ante, p. 143.
A11 to the third class, or fut11re or contingent uses, where an estate is limited pre¥iously to a
future use, and the future use is limited by way of remainder, it will he subject to the roles of
common law, and, if the previous estato iR not sufficient to support it, will be -roid. See ante,
p. Hk3.
Future uses have been countenaneed, and ttpringing usett restrained, by what is now a firm
role of law, namely, that if such a construction can be put upon e. limitation in use, a11 that it
may take effect by wa.v of remainder. it shall never take effect as a springing use. Southcot t1.
Stowe!, 1 Mod. 2'.!6, 237; 2 Mod. 207; Goodtitle fl. Billington, Dougl. 758.)
(38) By statute 2.1 and 24 Vic. c. 38, s. 7, it is provided that a future C<>ntingent or executory
use shall take effect, without any continued existence of a seisin to uses.
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By this equitable train of decisions in the courts of law, the power of the court

of chancery over landed property was greatly curtailed and diminished. (39)

Bnt one or two technical scruples, which the judges found it hard to get over,

restored it with tenfold increase. They held, in the first place, that " no use

could be limited on a use;" (z) and that when a man bargains and sells his land

for money, which raises a use by implication to the bargainee, the limitation of

a farther use to another person is repugnant, and therefore *void. (a) ,- #ova -i

And therefore on a feoffment to A and his heirs, to the use of B and *• -I

his heirs, in trust for C and his heirs, they held that the statute executed only

(*) Dyer l.Vi. (a) 1 And. 37,1W.

By this equitable train of decisions in the courts of law, the power of the court
of chancery over landed property was greatly curtailed and diminished. (39)
Bnt one or two technical scruples, which the ju<lges found it hard to get over,
n>stored it with tenfold increase. 'l'hey held, in the first ;place, that "no use
could be limited on a use;" (z) and that when a man bargams and sells his land
for money, which raises a use by implication to the bargainee, the limitation of
a further use to another person is repugnant, and therefore •void. (a) [ • 336 ]
And therefore on a feoffrnent to A and his heirs, to the use of Band
bis heirs, in trust for C and his heirs, they held that the statute executed only

(39) [With respect to what shall be said to be an use executed by the statute of 37 Hen. Till,

(II)

c. 10, or a trust estate now not executed, it is held, that where an use is limited upon an use, it is

DyerlM.

(al I And.

r., lllli.

not executed, out the legal estate is vested in him to whom the first use is limited. Dy. 155. As

•where an estate is conveyed to another in these words, " to W and his heirs, to the use of him and

his heirs, in trust for, or to the use of R and his heirs," the use is not executed in R but in W;

and the legal estate is vested in him as trustee. Cas. T. Talb. 164; id. 138, 139; 2 P. Wins.

146. So where E made a settlement to the use of himself and his heirs until his then intended

marriage, and afterwards to the use of his wife for life, and after her death to the use of trustees

and their heirs during the life of E, upon trust to permit him to take- the profits, remainder to

the first and other sons of the marriage, <tc., remainder to the use of the heirs of the body

of E ; it was adjudged that E took only a trust estate for life, for the use to him could not exe-

cute upon the use which was limited to the trustees for his life, and consequently the legal estate
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for his life was executed in them by the statute of uses, and the limitation to the heirs of the

body of E operated as words of purchase, and created a contingent remainder. Oarth. 272; S. C.,

Comb. 312, 313; 1 Ld. Raym. 33 ; 4 Mod. 380. See also 7 T. R. 342; id. 438, S. C.; id. 433; 12

Yea. 89.

So where something is to be done by the trustees which makes it necessary for them to have

the legal estate, such as payment of the rents and profits to another's separate use, or of the

debts of the testator, or to pay rates and taxes and keep the premises in repair, or the like, the

legal estate is vested in them, and the grantee or devisee has only a trust estate. 3 Bos. and Pol.

178, 179; 2 T. R. 444; 6 id. 213; 8 East, 248 ; 12 id. 455; 4 Tauut. 772. As where lands

were devised to trustees and their heirs in trust for A, a married woman, and her heirs, and

that the trustees should from time to time pay the rents and profits to A or to such person as

she, by any writing under her hand, as well during coverture as being sole, should appoint

without the intermeddling of her husband, who he willed should have no benefit or disposal

thereof; and as to the inheritance of the premises in trust for such person and for such estates

as A by her will, or other writing under her hand, should appoint, and, for want of such

appointment, in trust for her and her heirs; the question was, whether this was an use exe-

cuted by the statute, or a bare trust tor the wife; and the court held it to be a trust only, and

not an use executed by the statute. 1 Veru. 415. And again, in a late case where a devise

was to trustees and their heirs upon trust, to permit a married woman to receive the rents and

profits during her life for her own sole and separate use, notwithstanding her coverture, and with-

out being in any wise subject to the debts or control of her then or after taken husband, and

her receipt alone to be a sufficient discharge, with remainder over, it was held that the legal

estate was vested in the trustees; for it being the intention of the testator to secure to the wife

a separate allowance, free from the control of her husband, it was essentially necessary that

the trustees should take the estate with the use executed, in order to effectuate that intention;

otherwise the husband should be entitled to receive the profits, and defeat the very object

which the testator had in view. 7 Term. Rep. 652. See also 5 East, 162; 9 id". 1. So

where lands were devised to trustees and their heirs iu trust to pay out of the rents and prof-

its several legacies and annuities, and to pay all the residue of the rents and profits to C, a

married woman, during her life, for her separate use, or as she should direct, and after her

death the trustees to stand seised to the use of the heirs of her body with remainders over, it

was held by Lord King, that the use was executed in the trustees during the life of C, who had

only a trust estate in the surplus of the rents and profits for life, with a contingent remainder to

the heirs of her body, and that her eldest son would take as a purchaser ; for by the subse-

quent words, viz.: " that the trustees should stand seised to the use of the heirs of the body

of C." the use was executed in the persons entitled to take by virtue thereof; and therefore,

there being only a trust estate in C, and an use executed in the heirs of her body, these

different interests could not unite and incorporate together, so as to create an estate-tail by

operation of law in C. And he took a difference between the principal case and that of

Broughton v. Langloy, 1 Lutw. 814 ; 1 Ld. Raym. 873; for there it was to permit A to receive

(39) [With respect to what shall be said to be 11.n use executed by the statute of 'S'l Hen. VIII,
c. 10, or a trust est.ate now not executed, it is held, that 1chere an use is limited upon a.n ''-'e, it is
not crecnted, but tlic legal estate is vested fa him to icliom the first use is limited. Dy. 155. .A.e
°"'·here au estate is conveyed to another in thet1e words, "to W and his heirs, to the use of him and
his heinJ, in trust for, or to the Ut!e of R and his heirs," the ut>e is not executed in R but in W ;
awl the legal estate is vested in him e.s trustee. Cas. T. Talb. 164; id. 138, 139; 2 P. Wms.
146. So where E mode a settlement to the use of himRelf and hi~ heil"8 until his then intended
marriage, e.nd afterwards to the ni!e of his wife for life, 11.Ild after her death to the use of trnt>tees
and their heirs during the life of E, UtJ<>n tnuit to permit him to take the profit.'!, remainder to
the first and other sons of the mamage, &c., remainder to the use of the heirs of the body
of E ; it was adjudged that E t"ok only a tru~t estate for life, for the use to him could not execute upon the use which was liwited to the trn~tees for hiK life, and coni;equently the legal e!ltate
for his life was executecl in them by the statute of nRes, aud the limitntion to the heirs of the
body of E operated Bil words of purchMe, and created a <'ontingeut rem11inder. Carth. 272; S. C.,
Comb. 312, 313; 1 Ld. Raym. 33; 4 .Mod. :m. See also 7 T. R. 342; id. 438, S. C.; id. 433; 12
Yes. 89.
So whr.re something is to be done by the trustees ll'hieh makes it necessary for them to have
the 1.egal estate, 1mcb as pnyment of the rents and profits to another's separate use, or of the
debt,i of the te1:1tator, or to pay rates and taxes and keep the t>remii;es in repair, or the like.. t.he
lej?al estat.e ie vested in them, and the grantee or devisee has only a tru~t estate. 3 Bo8. and Pul.
l7t!, 179; 2 T. R. 444; 6 id. 213; 8 East, 248 ; 12 id. 45.5; 4 Tn.uut. 772. .As where lands
were devh>ed to trustees o.nd their heirs in trnst for A, a married woman, o.nd her heirs, and
that the trustees 11hould from time to time pay the rents and profits to .A or to such person as
ahe, by any writing under her hand, 11.8 well during coverture as being sole, shoulll appoint
without the intermeddling of her husband, who he willed should have no beni-fit or disposal
thereof; and e.s to the inheritance of the premises in trust for such person and for such estates
as .A. by her will, or other writing under hor band, i:hould appoint. and, for want of such
appointment, in trust for her and her heirs; the question was, ''hether this was an use exe·
cuted by the statute, or I\ bare trust for the wife; and the court held it to be a trust only, and
not an use executed by the statute. 1 Vern. 415. .Aud ago.in, in a late C81!C where a devise
wa.'l to trustees and their heirs upon trust, to pennit a married woman to receive t.he rents and
profit;1 during hor life /01· her own sole and scparnt.e use, notwit.hi:;tanding her C{1verture, and witli011t beinQ in any wise subject to the debts or control of lier tlic-n or aft.er tal.:~m lutNba11d, aud
her receipt alone to be a sufficient discharge, with remainder over, it was held that the leiral
estate W81l veFited in the trustees ; for it being the intention of the testator to i-ecure to the wifb
a separate allowance, free from the control of her huRhand, it WW! essentially necessn.rv that
the trustees should take the e8tate with the uso executed, iu order to effectuate that intention;
otherwise the husband should be entitled to receiYe the profits, and defeat the very object
which the testator hod in view. 7 Term. Rep. 652. See also 5 East, 16'.l; 9 id. 1. So
where lands were devised to trustees and their heirs in trust to pay out of the rents and profits several legacies 11nd annuities, and to po.y all the residue of the rent.\& and profit!! to C, a
married woman, during her life, for her separate use, or as she 11hould direct, and after her
death the trustees to 11tand seised to the nse of the heirs of her body with remainders over, it
'\Va.'! hold by Lord King, that the use was executed in the tn1+<tees during the life of C, who hod
only a trust estate in the surplus of the rents and profits for lifo, with a c·ontingent remainder to
the heirs of her body, and that her eldest son would take as a purchaser ; for by the subsequent words, viz. : "that the trustees 11hould stand seised to the u8e of the heirs of the body
of C." the use was executed in the persons entitled to take by virtue thereof; e.nd therefore,
there being only a trust estate in G, and an use executed in the heirs of her body, these
different intere~ts could not unite aud incoryorate together, so as to create an estate-tail by
operation of law in C. .And he took a chfference between the principal case and that of
Broughton c. Langley, 1 Lutw. 814; 1 Ld. Raym. 873; for there it WBl.I to permit .A to receive
the reut.~ ancl profi~ for life, but in the principal cn.sc it was a trust to pay over the rents and
profits to another, and therefore the eiltate must remain in the trustce:1 to perform the will : 8
Vin. 26~, pl. 19; 1 Eq. VIL!!• .A.hr. 3R3, 304 ; and this decree wu.s affirmed in the hom1e of lords. 3
Bm. C. P. 458. See a Bos. and Pul. li9. So where lantl11 were devised to trustee's and their
heinl in trnllt to pay out of the rents and profits, after deducting rates, taxes, and repairs, the

profits to another, and therefore the estate must remain in the trustees to perform the will: 8

Tin. 262, pi. 19; 1 Eq. (Jas. Abr. 383, 384 ; and this decree was affirmed in the house of lords. 3

Bro. C. P. 458. Sco 3 Bos. and Pul. 179. So where lands were devised to trustees and their

heirs in trust to pay out of the rents and profits, after deducting rates, taxes, and repairs, the
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the first use, and that the Second was a mere nullity: not adverting, that the

instant the first use was executed in B, he became seised to the use of C, which

second use the statute might as well be permitted to execute as it did the first;

and so the legal estate might be instantaneously transmitted down through a

hundred uses upon uses, till finally executed in the last cestuy que use. Again;

as the statute mentions only such persons as were seised to the use of others,

this was held not to extend to terms of years, or other chattel interests, whereof

the termor is not seised, but only possessed; (b) and therefore, if a terra of

one thousand years be limited to A, to the use of (or in trust for) B, the statute

does uot execute this use, but leaves it as at common law. (c) And lastly (by

more modern resolutions), where lands are given to one and his heirs, in trust

(I) Bacon, Law of uses. 335. Jcnk. 244. (e) Poph. 78. Dyer, 309.

residue to C 8 for 'life, and after his decease to the use of the heirs male of the body of C 9,

the flrst use, ·and that the second was a mere nullity: not adverting, that the
instant the first use was executed in B, he became seised to the use of C, which
second use the statut.e might as well be permitted to execute as it did the first;
and so the legal estate might be instantaneously transmitted down through a
hundred uses upon uses, till finally executt-d in the last cestuy que use. Again;
as the statute mentions only sucl1 persons as were seised to the use of others,
this was held not to extend to terms of years, or other chattel interests, whereof
the terrnor is not seised, but only possessed; (b) aud therefore, if a tenn of
one thousand vears be limited to A, to the use of' (or in trust for) B, the statute
does not execute this use, but leaves it as at common law. (c) And lastly (by
more modern resolutions), where lands are given to one and his heirs, in trust
(Ill Bacon, Law or uses. 335. Jenk. Ul.

with remainder over; it was held by Lord Thurlow, that the nse was executed in the trustees

IC) Poph. 76. Dyer, 3G9.

daring the life of C S, who had only a trust estate for life, and the remainder in tail was tt

legal estate, which could not unite and incorporate together, and C S could not suffer b valid

recovery; for in order to make a good tenant to the prtecipe, there must either be a legal

estate for life, aud a legal remainder in tail, or an equitable estate for life, with an equitable

remainder in tail; 1 Bro. C. C. 75. And also, where lands were devised to trustees and their

heirs in trust, that they should, out of the rents and profits, or by sale or mortgage of the

whole or so much of the estate as should be necessary, raise a sum sufficient to pay the testa-

tor's debts and legacies, and afterwards in trust, and to the nse of T B for life, with^several
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remainders over, the question was, whether the legal estate vested in the trustees? Lord

Hardwicke was of opinion that the devise to the trustees and their heirs carried the whole fee

to them, and therefore the estate for life, as well as the estates in remainder, were merely

trust estates in equity; that part of the trust was to sell the whole, or a sufficient part of the

estate, for the payment of debts and legacies, which would carry a fee by construction, though,

the word "heirs" were omitted in the devise, as in 1 Bq. Cas. Abr. 184, for the trustees must

have a fee in the whole estate to enable them to sell, because, it being uncertain what they

may sell, no purchaser could otherwise be safe; that the only doubt he had was on the case

of Lord Say and Seal c. Lady Jones, before Lord King, and affirmed in the house of lords, as

to that point : but, on examination, that case differed in a material part; and, taking together

all the clauses of that will, it only amounted to a devise to trustees and their heirs during

another's life, upon which a legal remainder might be properly limited. 1 Tes. 143; S. C., 2

Atk. 246, 570. And it was taken for granted in 2 Ves. 646, that a devise to trustees, and their

heirs in trust, to pay the rents and profits to another, vested the legal estate in the trustees.

For in general the distinction is, that where the limitation to trustees and their heirs is i» trust

to receive the rents and profit* and pay them over to A, for life, Ac., this use to A is not executed

by the statute, but the legal estate is vested in the trustees to enable them to perform the will;

but where the limitation is to trustees and their heirs in trust, to permit arid suffer A to receive

the rents and profits for bis life, Ac., the nse is executed in A, unless it be necessary the nse

should be executed in the trustees, to enable them to perform the trust, as in the case of Harton

». Harton, above mentioned. So in '2 Taunt. 109, the devise being to trustees and their heirs in

trust, to pay unto, or permit and suffer, the testator's niece to have, receive, and Lake, the rents

and profits for her life, it was held that the use was executed in the niece, because the words to

permit, <fc., came last, and in a will the last words shall prevail. See 1 Eq. Oa. Abr. 383. An

where lands were devised to trustees and their heirs to the intent and purpose to permit A to

receive the rents aud profits for his life, and after that the trustees should stand siesed to the nse

of the heirs of the body of A( with a proviso, that A, with the consent of the trustees, might

make a jointure on his Wife, it was held that this was au use executed in A, and not a trust

estate, for it would have been a plain trust at common law, and what was a trust of a freehold of

inheritance at common law is executed by the statute which mentions the word " trust "as well as

" use;" and the case in 2 Vent. 312, adjudged to the contrary upon this point, was denied to be

law. 1 Lutw. 814, 823, 8. C.; 2 Ld. Rayni. 873; 2 Salk. 679.

The statute of uses is not held to extend to copyhold estates, for it is against the nature of

their tenure that any person should be introduced into the estate without the consent of the lord :

Gilb. Ten. 170; nor to leases for years which arc actually in existence at the time of their being

assigned to the use; as where A, possessed of a lease for years, assigns it to B, to the nse of 0,

all the estate is in B; and C takes only a trust or equitable estate. But if A, seised in fee,

makes a feoffment to the use of B for a term of years, the term is served out of the seisin of the

feoffee, and is executed by the statute. It is the same if he bargains and sells the estate of

roRidue to C S for life, and after his derf)a;;e to the uqe of the beim male of the body of C S,
with remainder onir; it wa.~ held by Lord Thurlow, that the n~e wns cxecnt~d in the tm~te"8
during tho life of C S, who had only a trngt estnte for life, nnd th!' remainder in tail was a
lAital e>1tate, which eould not unite and incorporate together, and C S could not 1mffcr n valid
recornn· ; for in order to make a p;oocl tenant to the pnecipe, there must either be s leg<il
est.ate f<1r life, and a legal remainder in tail, or an equitable estate for life, with an t>etnitable
remainder in tail ; 1 Bro. C.. C. 75. . .And alw, where land~ wore devl$cd to tru»tet>ll nnd thdr
heir" iu tru8t, that they Fhould, out of the rentll and profits, or by sale or mortirttp:e of the
whole or ~o much of the e~tate a.~ should be nece~sary, raii;e a sum ~ufficient to pay the tei!t&tor's dchts aud legRCies, and afterwards in tmRt, and t-0 the U8e of T B for life, with'several
remainders oYer, the question wa8, whether the legal o~tate vested in the trust<>es f Lord
Hardwieke was of opinion that the deYfoe to the tnrntees and their heirs earried the trhole fte
to them, and tbui"Pfore the e!'tnte for life, a.~ well a~ the e~tates in remalndt>r, were mHrely
trust e>1tntes in equity; that part of tho tru~t ww to sell the whole, or a t<uffieitmt part of the
e:;tate, for the payment of dcht.;1 nnd legacies, which would <'arry a fee by construction, though
the wort! "heirs" were omitted in the dense, as in 1 Eq. CM . .A.hr. 184, for the trustees mn11t
have a foe in the whole e~tate to enable them to Rell, becau~o, it being uncertain whnt tbey
mar ~ell, no purcha~er could otherwise be Rafe; that the only doubt he bad was on the ea.~
of Lord ~av and Se.al v. Lady Jones, before Lord King, and affirmed in the hou~e of lord,,, as
to that point : but, on examination, that ca.'!e differed in a material part; and, takin~ together
all the clau~el:! of that will, it only amounted to a dense to tru8te.m1 and thf'ir heirs during
another's life, upon which a le.gal remainder tnight be properly limited. 1 VeR, 143; S. C., 2
Atk. 246, &70, And it wai; taken for gnmtl'd in 2 Ves. 646, that a devi~e to trnHtee,,, and their
bei~ in tnuit, to pav the rent~ and pro.fits to another, TeRted tho leg11.l e!(tt\te in the troRte<'s.
For in general the drstinction is, that where the limitation to trnHtees and their heirs i11 in trust
to 1·ccefrc tire rents and profits and pay tltem m•ei· to A, for lifn, cfo., thi:i tllle to A ii> not execut.ed
by the Htatute, but the legal estate 1s wsted in the tru>1tee~ to enable them t~> perfnm1 the '\\ill;
but where tho limitation jg to trn~tMs and their heim in trn~t. to permit and 811ffer A to t<eceire
the rents and profit:; for bis life, &c., tho nRe is executed in A, · nnles,. it be nec1»tsnrr the u~
should be exeeuted in the tniRhm~, to enable them to perform the trust, e.s in the cMe c1f Harton
v. Harton, above mentioned. So in 2 Taunt. 109, the devi!;ll being to truiit~ and their beiri; in
tru~t. to pay 1111to, tFr permit and .mffer, the te11tatrJr's nice.e to hnve, receive, ni1d take, tho rcntR
and profits for her life, it wa.~ held that the n,.e WM executed in the niece, because the word!:! tn
permit, ,f·e., came Jni;t1 and in a will the ll\."t '!ord<1. Ahall prev~iL See 1 Eq. Os. .Abr. :J8'J. ..iR
where landR were devi~r.d to tru,.tee11 and their be1r8 to the mtent and purpoSt' to permit A to
roeeive the rent>; and profits for hhi life, and after that the tnu!tees should stand siescd to the u~
of the hcir8 of the body of .A.1 with a provi~o, thnt A, with the consent of the trt1stool!, mi.rht
make n jointure on hi8 "·ife, 1t WBll htild that thiR WIUI an n~e executed in A, and not a t~,.t
e~tate, for it would have been a plain tnt$t at common law, nnd wllllt wa11 a tn1~t of a f'reehold of
inheritance at common law i11 cxocnted by the !ttatnte which m ention~ the word "trn11t" as well as
"ll>!e ;'' 1md the ca~e in :l Yent. :n;.i, adjudged tn the contrary upon this point, WM denied to be
lnw. 1 Lutw. 814, 8'2:l, S. C.; 2 Ld. Rnym. 873; 2 Salk. 679.
The Htntute of Uilcs is not held to extend to copyl101d e.yfates, for it is again~t tbe nature of
their tenure that any person 1<hould be introdured into the e~tat-0 without the con,,;ent of the lord :
Gilb. Ten. 170; · t1Qr to leases for years which are actnaHy in exi~tence at the time of their b<>iug
as~igned to the use ; Ri! whore A, po~se>1t1ed of a lea.~e for yca?'ll, assigmi it to B, to the u~e of c,
all tho estute is in B; and C tnkcs only B trn>it or equitable eRtate. But if ~\, sei~cd in foe,
make~ a feoffment to the n~e of B for 8 term nt' yen.n<, the term i;i served out of the seiRin of tho
feoffel', and is exerntell by the Rt~tute . It iR the RBme if he bargains and ~lls th11 e.itate of
which he is ;iei~ed in fee for a t erm of year11. Dy. :Jfi9, a., and in the margin, 2 Jn~t. b'71.
!'or doe~ the st~tute of nses extend to C&.'ieS whrre the party sei~ed to thH n~o and the
ustuy que u.~c is the same pers1111, e:t;cept there be a direct impo~sibilitv for tho n;ie to tl\kc effoct
at common law. Bae. Lnw Tracts, 352, 2d. ed.; 4 M. and S. 178. In that rn.~e, a rrlcs;;e WM
made to A and C and their heir:i, habendum to thorn and their heirll nnd n.~'iih'118 as tt>nwit.< in

which he is seised in fee for a term of years. Dy. 369, a., and in the margin, 2 Inst. 671.

Kor does the statute of uses extend to cases where the party seised to the use and the
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cestuy que IMC is the same person, except there be a direct impossibility for the nse to take effect

at common law. Bac. Law Tracts, 352, 2d. eel.; 4 M. and S. 178. in that case, a release was

made to A and C and then: heirs, habendurn to them and their heirs and assigns as tenants in
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'Chap. 20.] USES AtfD TRUSTS.

to receive and pay over the profits to another, this use is not executed by the

statute; for the land must remain in the trustee to enable him to perform the

trust, (d) (40)

Of the two more ancient distinctions the courts of equity qnickly availed

themselves. In the first case it was evident, that B was never intended by the

parties to have any beneficial interest; and, in the second, the cestuy yue use of

the term was expressly driven into the court of chancery to seek his remedy:

and therefore the court determined, that though these were not uses which the

statute could execute, yet still they were trusts in equity, which in conscience

ought to be performed. («) To this the reason of mankind assented, and the

.doctrine of uses was revived, under the denomination of trusts; and thus, by

this strict construction of the courts of law, a statute made upon great deliberation,

'Chap. 20.]

uBES AND TRUSTS.

to receive and pay over the profi~s ~ another, this use is no~ execnted by the
statute; for the fand must remam m the trustee to enable him to perform the
trust. (d} (40)
. Of the two more ancient distinctions the courts of equity quickly avniled
themselves. In the first case it was evident, that B was never inWnded by the
parties to have any beneficial interest; and, in the second, the cesfuy 9ue use of
the term was expressly driven into the court of chancery to seek his remedy:
and therefoi:e the court. determined, that though these were not uses which the
statute could execute, yet still they were trusts in equity, which in conscience
ought to be performed. (e) •ro this the reason of mankind assented, and the
.doctrine of uses was revived, under the denomination of trusts and thus, by
this strict construction of the courts of la\v, a statute made upon great deliberation,
.and introduced in the most solemn manner, has had little either effect than to
make a slight alteration in the formal words of a conveyance.(/) (41)
•However, the courts of equity, in the exercise of this new Jurisdic- [ • 33 ,.,·]
tion, have wisely avoided in a great degree tho8e mischiefs which made
'
uses intolerable. The statute of frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, hM·ing required that
eYery declaration, assignment, or gnmt of any trust in lands or bereditamcnts
(except such as arise from implicat10n or constrnction of luw), shall be made in
writing signed by the party, or by his written will: the courts now consider a
trust-estate (either when expressly declared or resulting by such implicntion) ns
equivalent to the legal ownership, $'overned by the same rules of property, and
liable to every charge in equity, winch the other is subject to in luw: and by a
long series of uniform determrnations, for now near a century past, with some
assistance from the legislature, they have raised a. new system of rational jurisprudence, by which trusts are made to answer in general all the beneficial ends
of uses, without their inconvenience or frauds. 'rhe trustee is con'sidcred as
merely the instrument of conveyance, and can in no shape affect the estate,
unless by alienation for a Ya1uable consideration to a purchaser without
notice; ( g) which, as cestlty que use is genernlly in possession of the land, is ·a
thing thnt can rarely happen. :rhe trust will descend, may be aliened, is liable
to debts, to executions on judgments, statutes and recognizances (by the express
pro,·ision of the statute. of frauds), to forfeiture, to leases, and other incnmbnmccs, nay, e\·en to the curtcsy of the husband, as if it was nn estate at law.
It has not yet indeed been subjected to dower, more from a cautious adherence
to some hasty precedents, (It) th au from any well-grounded principle. (42) It hath
J.

and introduced in the most solemn manner, has had little other effect than to

make a slight alteration in the formal words of a conveyance, (f) (41)

*However, the courts of equity, in the exercise of this new jnrisdic- r *cio*>'-i

tion, have wisely avoided in a great degree those mischiefs which made "- ' J

uses intolerable. The statute of frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, having required that

every declaration, assignment, or grant of any trust in lands or hereditaments

(except such as arise from implication or construction of law), shall be made in

•writing signed by the party, or by his written will: the courts now consider a

trust-estate (either when expressly declared or resulting by such implication) as

equivalent to the legal ownership, governed by the same rules of property, and
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liable to every charge in equity, which the other is subject to in law: and by a

long series of uniform determinations, for now near a century past, with some

assistance from the legislature, they have raised a new system of rational juris-

prudence, by which trusts are made to answer in general all the beneficial ends

of uses, without their inconvenience or frauds. The trustee is considered as

merely the instrument of convevance, and can in no shape affect the estate,

unless by alienation for a valuable consideration to a purchaser without

notice; (g) which, as cestuy que use is generally in possession of the land, is a

thing that can rarely happen. The trust will descend, may be aliened, is liable

to debts, to executions on judgments, statutes and recognizances (by the express

provision of the statute of frauds), to forfeiture, to leases, and other incum-

brances, nay, even to the curtesy of the husband, as if it was an estate at law.

It has not yet indeed been subjected to dower, more from a cautious adherence

to some hasty precedents, (h) than from any well-grounded principle. (42) It hath

(d) 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 383. 384. (t) 1 Hal. P. C. 448. f/J Vaugh. 50. Atk. 591.

(g) 2 Freem. 43. (h) 1 Chanc.Uep. 254. 2 1'. \V ms. 640.

common, and not as joint-tenants, to the use of them, their heirs, and assigns ; held that A and

C took an tenants in common. Oro. Car. 230; Jenkins v. Young, id. 244. And see Cruise's

Dig. title, Use, S. 31, ct scq.

(d)
(g)

l Eq. Ca.s. Abr. 383. 3.'W.
(~) l HAI. P . C. Z46.
(f) Vaugh. liO. .Atk. 591.
2 1''reem. 43.
(11) J Chanc.liep. l!M. 2 l'. Wms. IWO.

But where the purposes of a trust may bo answered, by giving the trustees a loss estate than

a fee. no greater estate shall arise to them by implication, but the uses in remainder limited

on Mich lesser estate, so given to them, shall be executed by the statute. Doe d. 'White «'.

Simpson, 5 East, 162; 1 Smith, 383. And a devise in foe to trustees, without any specific

limitation to cestvij que trust, the latter takes a beneficial interest in fee. 8 T. R. 5!)7. And

an express devise in fee to trustees may bo cut down to an estate for life, upon an implication

of intent. 7 T. R. 433. So where the trustees are to receive and pay routs to a married

•woman, upon her death the legal estate is executed in the person who was to take in remainder

7 id. 654.

(40) [It is the practice to introduce only the names of the trustee and the cestuy que trust;

the estate being conveyed to A and his heirs, to the tine of A and liis heirs, in trust for B and

his heirs; and thus this important statute has been effect-natty repealed by the repetition of half

a dozen words.]

(41) In several of the United States the statute of uses has been adopted as a part of the

common law, while in others its main features have been re-enacted, but with such modifications

as effectuallv abolish merely passive trusts, in whatever words they may have been created.

See 2 Washb. Real Prop. 142, et seq.

(42) [It has been decided, that when the legal and equitable estates meet in the same person,

the trust or equitable estate is merged in the legal estate; as if a wife should have the legal

estate and the husbaud the equitable; and if they have an only child, to whom these estates

555

a,q joint-tenan~, to the use of them, their heir~. ·and a.~"if.s; hold thnt A. aud
C took o..~ tenants in common. Cro. Car. 230; Jenkins v. Young, id. :.?4 • And seo Cruise's
Dig. title, U8e, S. 31, ct seq.
But where the purposes of a trust may be arn1wered, by trh-ing the truRtees a lo..~~ e~tate than
a. fee, no greater e~tate shall ari~e to them by implic!\tion. but the uses in remainder limited
on ;;ueh lePi>er estate, 110 git'en to them, ~ball be executed by the statute. Dno d. White v.
Simpson, 5 Ea.~t, 162; 1 Smith, 383. ..And a devi~e in foe to tru8tce~, without anv 8peeific
limitation t-0 ce.'!tU!f q11e trust, the latter takes a beneficial intere~t in fee. 8 T. R. ;;97, And
an express devise m foe to trustees mny bo cut down to au e:>tate for life, upon an implication
of intent. 7 T. R. 4:J3. So where the tm~t1mt1 are to receive and pay mutt< to a marrii•d
woman, upon her death the legal estate is executed in the pcn1on who was to take in remainder
7id. 654.
(40) [It i~ the practice to introduce only the names of the trustee and the rcst11y quc trust;
the e:<tate being conrnyed to A n.nd his hcin:, to the UHe of A nml J1i.~ lleir.~. in tm~t for Il and
his heirs; and thm1 thi8 important statute has been effectually repealed by the repetition of half
a dozen words.]
(41) In se\·eral of the United StateR the statute of Ufles ha.~ been adopted att n. part of the
common law, while in others its main features he.n~ been re-enncteil. bnt with imch modific-ations
as effectuallv aboliHh merely pa.<1sive tru:its, in whatever words they may buve been created.
See 2 WD.Mhb. Real Pro!?. 142, et seq.
( 42) [It ha.'1 been dec1de<l, th!\t when the legal and equitable estates meet iu the Rl\me per~on,
the trust or equitable e11tate is merged in the le1zal estnte; as if a wife should hnt'c the legal
estate and the husband the equitable; and if they have an only child, to whom these e~tatee

common, and not
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also been held not liable to escheat to the lord, in consequence of attainder or

want of heirs: (i) because the trust could never be intended for his benefit. But

let us now return to the statute of uses.

The only service, as was before observed, to which this statute is now con-

signed, is in giving efficacy to certain new and secret species of conveyances;

introduced in order to render transactions of this sort as private as possible, and

to save the trouble of making livery of seisin, the only ancient conveyance of

corporeal freeholds; the security and notoriety of which public investiture

abundantly overpaid the labour of going to the land, or of sending an attorney

in one's stead. But this now has given way to

F *3381 *^° "^ twelfth species of conveyance, called a covenant to stand

" "''" ' seised to uses:(43) by which a man, seised of lands, covenants in con-

sideration of blood or marriage that he will stand seised of the same to the use

of his child, wife, or kinsman; for life, in tail, or in fee. Here the statute exe-

cutes at once the estate; for the party intended to be benefited, having thus

acquired the use, is thereby put at once into corporal possession of the land, (/fc)

without ever seeing it, by a kind of parliamentary magic. But this conveyance

can only operate when made upon such weighty and interesting considerations

as those of blood or marriage.

13. A thirteenth species of conveyance, introduced by this staute, is that of

a bargain and sale of lands; which is a kind of real contract, whereby the bar-

gainer for some pecuniary consideration bargains and sells, that is, contracts to
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convey, the land to the bargainee, and becomes by such a bargain a trustee for,

or seised to the use of, the bargainee: and then the statute of uses completes

the purchase; (I) or, as it hath been well expressed, (m) the bargain first vests

the use, and then the statute vests the possession. But as it was foreseen that

conveyances, thus made, would want all those benefits of notoriety, which the

old common law assurances were calculated to give; to prevent therefore clan-

destine conveyances of freeholds, it was enacted in the same session of parlia-

ment, by statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 16, that such bargains and sales should not

enure to pass a freehold, unless the same be made by indenture, and enrolled

within six months in one of the courts of Westminster hall, or with the ciistos

rotulorum of the county. Clandestine bargains and sales of chattel interests, or

leases for years, were thought not worth regarding, as such interests were

very precarious, till about six years before ; (M) which also occasioned them to

be overlooked in framing the statute of uses: and therefore such bargains and

f *339 1 sa'es are not Directed to be enrolled. But how impossible it is to *fore-

L «'•'» J gefij and provide against, all the consequences of innovations! This

omission has given rise to

(0 Hani. 494. Surges and Wheat, Hill. 32 Geo. IT. In Cnnc.

(*| Bacon, Use of the Law, 181. (f) Ibid. 150. (m) Cro. Jac. 696. (n) See page 141.

descend, and who dies intestate without issue, the two estates having united, the descent will

follow the legal estate, and the estate will go to an heir on the part of the mother: and thug,

which appears strange, the beneficial interest will pass out of one family into another, between

also been held not liable to eschea.t to the lord, in consequence of attainder or
want of heirs: (i) because the trust could never be intended for his benefit. But
let us now return to the statute of uses.
The only service, a.s was before observed, to which this statute is now consigned, is in giving efficacy to certain nc\V and secret species of conveyance.g;
introduced in 01·der to render transactions of this sort a.s private as possible, and
to save the trouble of making livery of seisin, the only ancient comevance of
corporeal freeholds; the security and notoriety of which public iii'vestiture
abundantly overpaid the labour of going to the land, or of sending an attorney
in one's stead. But this now has given way to
*12. A twelfth species of conveyance, called a covenant to stand
[ • 338 ]
seised to uses: (43) by wl~ich a man, seised of lands, covenants in consideration of blood or marriage that he will stand seised of the same to the use
of his child, wife, or kinsman; for life, iµ taili or in fee. Here the statute exbcutes at once the estate; for the party intended to be benefited, haYing thus
acquired the use, is thereby put at once into corporal possession of the land, (k)
without eYer seeing it, by a kind of parliamentary magfo. But this conveyance
can only operate when made upon such weighty and mteresting considerations
as those of blood or marriage.
13. A thirt~enth species of conveyance, introduced by this staute, is that of
a bargain and sale of lands; which is a kind of real contract, whereby the bnrgainor for some pecuniary consideration bargains and sells, that is, contracts to
convey, the land to the bargainee, and becomes by such a bargain a trustee for,
or seised to the use of, the bargainee: and then the statute of uses completea
the purchase; (l) or, as it hath been well expressecl, (rn) the bargain first vests
the use, and then the statute vests the possession. But as it was foreseen that
conveyances, thus made, would want all those benefits of notorietv, which the
old common law assurances were calculated to give; to prevent therefore clandestine conveyances of freeholds, it was enacted in the same session of' parliament, by statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 16, that such bargains and sales should not
enure to pass a freehold, unless the same be made by indenture, and enrolled
within six months in one of the courts of Westminster hall, or with t.he custos
rotulorum of the county. Clandestine bargains and sales of chattelinterests,or
leases for years, were thought not worth regarding, as snch interests were
very precar10us, till about six years before; (n) which also occasioned them to
be overlooked in framing the statute of uses: and therefore such bargains and
[ • 339 ] sales are not directed to be enrolled. But how impossible it is to •foresee, and provide against, all the consequences of innovations! This
omission has given rise to
(fl Har•I. •iu. Bnrges and Wheat, Hill. 32 Getl. U. In CAne.
\k)Uacoo, Use of the Law, llil.
(1) Ibid. 150.
(tn) Cro. Jae. 696.

(nl See page Ht.

whom there is no connexion bv blood. Goodright ». Wells, Doug. 771.

Before the statute of uses tfcere was neither dower nor tenancy by the curtesy of an use, but

since the statute, the husband has curtesy of a trust estate, though it seems strange that the

wife should, out of a similar estate, be deprived of dower.]

Dower is now given the widow in these cases by statute 3 and 4 'William IV, c. 105.

(43) [This and the next species of conveyance, vix.: bargain and sale, are to be distinguished

by the nature of the instrument, and not by the words merely; for the words " covenant to

stand seised to uses" are not essential in the one, nor "bargain and sell" in the other. For if

a man, for natural love and affection, bargain and sell his lands to the use of his wife or child,

it is a covenant to stand seised to uses, and without enrollment vests the estate in the wife or

child : so if for a pecuniary consideration he corenants to stand seised to the use of a stranger,

if this deed be enrolled within six months, it is a good and valid bargain and sale under the

statute, and the estate vests in the purchaser. 7 Co. 40, by; 2 Inst. 672; 1 Leon. 25; 1 Mod.

175; 2 Lev. 10 ; 2 M. and W. 503 ; 2 Nev. and M. 602 ; 10 Mee. and W. 608; 1 Keen, 795. A

bargain and sale without enrollment may be construed and act as a grant or surrender, which

shows that the words " bargain and sell'' have no precise legal import. 1 Prest. Coiiv. 38.]
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descend, and who dies intefltate without fa!llle, the two estates ha;ing united, the de~cent will
follow the legal e8tate, and the e1<tate will go to an heir on the part of the mother: and tbut1,
which appean; strange, the beneficial intere~t will pass out of one family into another, betwetn
whom there is no connexion bv blood. G<l(ldright ti. Wells, Doug. 771.
Before the 11tatute of U!'Cll tf1ere we.~ neither dower nor tenancy by the curtesy of an Ui'IEI, but
since the statute, the hu~band has curtesy of a trnst estate, though it seemA strange that t.he
wife ;;hould, out of a >limilar est~te, be deprived of dower.]
Dower is now given the widow in these cases hy statute 3 and 4 William IV, c. 105.
(4:l) [This and the next species of con\·eyancc, viz. : bargain and so.le, are to be di~tinguished
bv the nature of the instrument, and not by the words merely; for the words " covenant to
stand seised t-0 uses" are not cs~cntial in the one, nor "bargain and sell'' in the other. For if
a man, fur natural love and affection, bargain 1md t<ell hi11 lands to the use of his wife or child,
it is a cov1.mant t.-0 staml sci11ccl t-0 uses, and without enrollment ;e11ts the estat{l in the wife or
child : so if for a pecuniary con~idera.tion be corenant.s to stand llei~ed to the n~ of a stranv;er.
if this deed be enrolled within six montbe, it is a. good nod ni.lid bargain and sale under the
stntute, and the e~tate veictR in the pun:ba.qer. 7 Co. 40, by; 2 Inst. 6i:4; 1 I..eon. 2."1; 1 Mod.
175; 2 Lev. 10; 2 M. and W. 503; 2 Ne'i'. and M. 602; 10 Mee. and W. 608; 1 Kf.'.en, 795. A.
bargain and sale wit.bout enrollment mar be construed and act as a grant or sum•nder, which
shows that t.he word!! " bargain &nd sell 1' have no precise legal import. 1 Prest. Con\. 38.]

656

Di

I

u

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

Chap. 20.] MISCELLANEOUS CONVEYANCES. 339

Chap. 20.]

MISCELLANEOUS CONVEYANCES.

339

14. A fourteenth species of conveyance, viz: by lease and release; first in-

Tented by Serjeant Moore, soon after the statute of uses, and now the most com-

mon of any, and therefore not to be shaken; though very great lawyers (as,

particularly, Mr. Noy, attorney-general to Charles I), have formerly doubted its

validity, (o) It is thus contrived. A lease, or rather bargain and sale, upon

some pecuniary consideration, for one year, made by the tenant of the freehold

to the lessee or bargainee. Now this, without any enrolment, makes the bar-

gainer stand seised to the use of the bargainee, and vests in the bargainee the

ttse of the term for a year; and then the statute immediately annexes the jwos-

session. He therefore, being thus in possession, (44) is capable of receiving a

release of the freehold and reversion; which, we have seen before, (p) must be

made to a tenant in possession: and, accordingly, the next day, a release is

granted to him. (q) This is held to supply the place of livery of seisin: and so

a conveyance by lease and release is said to amount to a feoffment. (r) (45)

15. To these may be added deeds to lead or declare the uses of other more

direct conveyances, as feoffments, fines, and recoveries; of which we shall speak

in the next chapter: and

16. Deeds of revocation of uses, hinted at in a former page, (s) and founded

in a previous power, reserved at the raising of the uses, (t) to revoke such as

were then declared; and to appoint others in their stead, which is incident to

the power of revocation, (u) And this may suffice for a specimen of convey-

ances founded upon the statute of uses, and will finish our observations upon
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such deeds as serve to transfer real property.

*Before we conclude, it will not be improper to subjoin a few remarks r *<>,£« -i

upon such deeds as are used not to convey, but to charge or incumber, >• '' '

lands and to discharge them again: of which nature are, obligations or bonds,

recognizances, and defeazances upon them both.

1. An obligation or bond, is a deed (v) whereby the obligor obliges himself,

his heirs, executors, and administrators, to pay a certain sum of money to another

at a day appointed. If this be all, the bond is called a single one, simplex obli-

gato: but there is generally a condition added, that if the obligor does some

particular act, the obligation shall be void, or else shall remain in full force : as

payment of rent; performance of covenants in a deed; or repayment of a princi-

pal sum of money borrowed of the obligee, with interest, which principal sum is

usually one-half of the penal sum specified in the bond. In case this condition

is not performed, the bond becomes forfeited, or absolute at law, and charges

the obligor, while living; and after his death the obligation descends upon his

(o) 2 Mod. 252. (p) PiiRe 324. (q) See Appendix, No. II, I! 1, S.

(r) Co. Litt. 270. Cro. Jnc. IW4. (i) Page 835. (t) See Appendix, No. H, page zl.

(u) Co. Litt. 287. (v) See Appendix, No. Ill, page xill.

14. A fourteenth species of conveyance, viz: bv lease and release; first invented by Serjeant Moore, soon after the statute of uses, and now the most common of any, and therefore not to be shaken; though very great lawyers (us,
par.ti?ularly, Mr. Noy, attorney-general to Charles I), have formerly doubted its
Yah<l1ty. (o) It is thus contrived. A lease, or ratf1er bargain and sale, upon
some pecuniary consideration, for one year, made bv the tenant of the freehold
to the lessee or bargainee. Now this, without any enrolment, makes the bargainor stand seised to the use of the bargainee, and vests in the bargainee the
?l!te of the term for a year; and then the statute immediately annexes the possession. He therefore, being th us in possession, ( 44) is capable of receiving a
relerum of the freehold and reversion; which, we have seen before, (p) must be
made to a tenant .in r,ossession: and, accordingly, the next day, a release is
granted to him. (q) 'I his is held to supply the place of livery of seisin: and so
a conveyance by lease and release is snid to amount to a feoffment. (r) (45)
15. 'fo these may be added deeds to lead or declare tlie uses of other more
direct conveyances, as feoffments, fines, and recoveries; of which we shall speak
in the next chapter: and
16. Deeds of revocation ~fuses, hinted at in a former page, (s) and founded
in a previous power, reserved at the raisin~ of t.he uses, (t) to revoke snch as
were then declared; and to appoint others m their stead, which is incident to
the power of revocation. (u) And this may suffice for a specimen of conveyances founded upon the statute of uses, and will finish our observations upon
such deeds as serve to transfer real property.
*Before we conclude. it will not be improper to subjoin a few remarks [ • 340 ]
upon such deeds as are used not to con?Jey, but to charge or incumber,
]ands and to discharge them again: of which nature are, obligations or bonds,
recognizances, and defeazances upon them both.
I. An obUgation or bond, is a deed (v) whereby the obligor obliges himself,
bis heirs, executors, and administrators, to pay a certain sum of money to another
at a day appointed. If this be all, the bond is called a single one, simplex obligato: but there is generally a condition added, that if the obligor does some
particular act, the obligation shall be void, or else shall remain in full force: as
payment of rent; performance of covenants in a deed; or repayment of a principal sum of monev borrowed of the obligee, with interest, which principal sum is
usually one-half of the penal sum specified in the bond. In case this condition
is not performed, the bond becomes forfeited, or absolute at lllw, and charges
the obligor, while living; and after his death the obligation descends upon his

(44) [It mast be borne in mind that in this and former instances, where it is said the statute

annexes the possession, upon the vesting of the use, an actual occupancy of possession of the

land is not meant.

2 Mod. 259.
(p) Poge 32'.
(q) See Appendix, No. II, I§ 1, 2.
Co. Litt. 2i0. Cro. Jnc. ti01.
(•) Pago :tl:I.
{t) See Appendix, No. U, page xi.
(u) Co. Litt. ~7.
(f!) See Appendix, No. III, page xlll.
(o)
(r)

The effect of the statute is to complete the title of the bargainee, or to give him a vested in-

terest by which his ownership in the estate is as fully confirmed, as it would have been, accord-

ing to the common law, by livery and seisin. Mr. Preston in his Conveyancing, vol. 2, page 211,

has discussed and explained this subject with his usual ability. See also Cruise Dig. index,

Lease and Release; see also the opinion of Mr. Booth in Cases and Opinions, 2d vol. 143 to 149,

tit. Reversions, edit. 1791. As to the effect of a conveyance by lease and release of a reversion

expectant on a term, and the mode of pleading such a conveyance, see Co. Litt. 270, a. n. 3; 4

Cruise, 199, and 2 Chitty on Pleading, 4th edit. 578, note e.]

(45) [Prior to the statute uses of this form of conveyance was in existence; the person wish-

ing to transfer a freehold to another granted him an actual lease for two or three years, the lessee

actually entered, and then was capable of accepting a release of the freehold. As, however, an

actual entry was necessary, this mode of conveyance was nearly as inconvenient as a feoffment,

and, when completed, was not in all respects so powerful; it was therefore seldom resorted to.

The statute of uses has dispensed with actual entry, but, though the releaseeis thus made capa-

ble of taking the release by the statute, yet the estate which he takes is one at common law,

exactly as if he had actually entered under his lease. And if the release be not to his own use,

hot to the use of another, that is not a use upon a use which the statute will not execute, but

the centuy que use will take the legal estate. See 2 Sauud. 61, 63.]
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( 44) [It must be borne in mind that in this and former instances, where it is said the statute
annexes the posaesaio1i, upou tho vesting of tho uae, an actual occupancy of possession of the
land is not meant.
The effect of the statute is to complete the title of the b&rgainee, or to give him a vested interest by which hii1 ownershi.P in the estate is a.-i fully confirmed, as it would have been, according to the common law, by livery and seisin. Mr. Preston in his Conveyancing, vol. 2, .Page 211,
ha.'! diilcus.~ed and explained th1~ subject with his u~nal ability. See also Cruise Dig. ind!'x,
Le~e and Release; see also tho opinion of Mr. Booth in Ca.se11 and Opinions, 2d vol. 143 to 149,
tit. Rerorsions, edit. 1791. As to the effect of a conveyance by lease and release of a reversion
expectant on a term, and the mode of pleading l!uoh a conveyance, ~e Co. Litt. 270, a. n. 3; 4
Crui11e, 199, and 2 Chitty on Pleading, 4th edit. 578, note e.)
( 45) [Prior to the statute uses of this form of conveyane.a was in existence; the person wishing to transfer a freehold to another granted him an actual lease for two or throe years, the leAAee
actually entered, and then was capable of accepting a relea.'16 of the freehold. As, however, an
actual entry was nooossary, this mode of oouve,rauoe was nearly as inoom·enient as a feoff'ment,
and, when completed, was not in all respects w powerful ; it was therefore seldom re~ortod to.
The statute of uat!s hM dispensed with actual entry, but, though the reloasee is thus made capable of taking the release by the .statute, yet the estate which he takes ii one at common law,
exactly a11 if he had actually entered under his lease. .And if the release be not to his own utie,
bot to the use of another, that i~ not a use upon a u~e which the statute will uot execute, but
the ceatug quc 1186 will take the legal estate. See 2 Sauud. 61, 63.]
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heir, who (on defect of personal assets) is bound to discharge it, provided he has

real assets by descent as a recompense. So that it may be called, though not a

direct, yet a collateral charge upon the lands. (46) How it affects the personal

property of the obligor will be more properly considered hereafter.

If the condition of a bond be impossible at the time of making it, or be to do

a thing contrary to some rule of law that is merely positive, or be uncertain, or

insensible, the condition alone is void, and the bond shall stand single, and un-

conditional ; for it is the folly of the obligor to enter into such an obligation,

from which he can never be released. If it be to do a thing that is malum in se,

the obligation itself is void: for the whole is an unlawful contract, and the

obligee shall take no advantage from such a transactiou. And if the condition

F *3411 ke Poss'°le at tne tin16 °f making it, and afterwards ""becomes impossi-

I- J ble by the act of God, the act of law, or the act of the obligee himself,

there the penalty of the obligation is saved ; for no prudence or foresight of the

obligor could guard against such a contingency, (w) On the forfeiture of a

bond, or its becoming single, the whole penalty was formerly recoverable at law:

but here the courts of equity interposed, and would not permit a man to take

more than in conscience he ought, viz.: his principal, interest, and expenses, in

case the forfeiture accrued by non-payment of money borrowed, the damages

sustained, upon non-performance of covenants; and the like. And the luce

practice having gained some footing in the courts of law, (x) the statute 4 and 5

Ann., c. 16, at length enacted, in the same spirit of equity, that, in case of a
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bond conditioned for the payment of money, the payment or tender of the prin-

cipal sum due, with interest and costs, even though the bond be forfeited and a

suit commenced thereon, shall be a full satisfaction and discharge. (47)

2. A recognizance is an obligation of record, which a man enters into before

some court of record or magistrate duly authorized, (y) with condition to do

some particular act; as to appear at the assizes, to keep the peace, to pay a debt,

or the like. It is in most respects like another bond: the difference being

chiefly this: that the bond is the creation of a fresh debt or obligation de novo,

the recognizance is an acknowledgment of a former debt upon record; the

form whereof is, " that A. B. doth acknowledge to owe to our lord the king, to

the plaintiff, to C P or the Uke, the sum of ten pounds," which condition to be

void on performance of the thing stipulated: in which case the king, the plain-

tiff, C D, &c., is called the cognizee, " is cui cognoscitur;" as he that enters

into the recognizance is called the cognizor, " is qui cognoscit." This, being

either certified to or taken by the officer of some court, is witnessed only by the

record of that court, and not by the party's seal: so that it is not in strict pro-

F *3421 Pr'ety a deed, though the effects of it are greater than a *common obli-

' '' -I gation, being allowed a priority in point of payment, and binding the

lands of the cognizor, from the time of enrollment on record, (z) (48) There are

|u>) Co. I ,ir . 206. (z) 2 Keb. 5.W, BW. Salk. 890, 597. « Mini. 11, fiO, 101.

(y) llin. Mr. tit. reooyntamce, 24. (;) Stat. 29 Oar. II, c. :i. See page 161.

(46) [If in a bond the obligor binds himself, without adding his heirs, executors, and n<l mhi.it-

trators, the executory and administrators are bound, but not the heir: Shop. Touch. 369; for

the law will not imply the obligation upon the heir. Co. Litt. 209, a. A bond does not seem

properly to be called an iucuinbrauce upon land; for it does not follow the land like a recogni-

zance and judgment: and even if the heir at law aliens the land, the obligee in the bond, by

which thelieir is bound, can have his remedy only against the person of the heir to the ainonnt

of the value of the laud; and he cannot follow it when it is in the possession of a bona fitic pur-

chaser. Bull. N. P. 175. By statutes 11 Geo. IV, and 1 William IV, c. 47, the creditors are

enabled to maintain actions of debt or covenant against heirs and devisees upon the covenants

and specialty debts of their ancestors or devisors, to the eitent of the value of the lands which

have come to them by descent or devise.]

(47) [As to the difference between a penalty and a stipulation for liquidated damages, see 3

MOO. and P. 425; 7 Scott, 364; 3 Mee. and W. 545.] See also Komble F. Farren. 6 Bing. 141;

Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223; Dories v. Penton, 6 B. and Cr. 222; Niver v. Rossman, 18 Barb.

63; Sajntert). Fergason, 7 M., G. and 8. 716, Jaqnith ». Hudson, 5 Mich. 123; Wallis v. Car-

penter, 13 Allen, 19; Powell v. Burroughs, 53 Penn. St. 329; Colwoll v. Lawrence, 3d N. Y. 71.

(43) [A recognizance not enrolled will be considered as an obligation, or bond, onlv; but

being sealed and acknowledged, must be paid as a debt by specialty. Bothoinly v. Lord Fail-
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also other recognizances, of a private kind, in nature of a statute staple, by virtue

of the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 6, which have already been explained, (a) and

shown to be a charge upon real property.

3. A defeazance, on a bond, or recognizance, or judgment recovered, is a con-

dition which, when performed, defeats or undoes it, in the same manner as a

defeazance of an estate before mentioned. It differs only from the common

condition of a bond, in that the one is always inserted in the deed or bond itself,

the other is made between the same parties by a separate, and frequently a sub-

sequent deed, (b) This, like the condition of a bond, when performed, dis-

charges and disincu inhere the estate of the obligor.

These are the principal species of deeds or matter in pais, by which estates

may be either conveyed, or at least affected. Among which the conveyances to

uses are by much the most- frequent of any: though in these there is certainly

one palpable defect, the want of sufficient notoriety; so that purchasers or

creditors cannot know, with any absolute certainty, what the estate, and the

title to it, in reality are, upon which they are to lay out or to lend their money.

In the ancient feudal method of conveyance (by giving corporal seisin of the

lands), this notoriety was in some measure answered; but all the advantages,

resulting from thence are now totally defeated by the introduction of death-bed

devises and secret conveyances: and there has never been yet any sufficient

guard provided against fraudulent charges and inoumbrances; since the disuse

of the old Saxon custom of transacting all conveyances at the county court,
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and entering a memorial of them in the chartnlary or ledger-book of some adja-

cent monastery; (c) and the failure of the general register established by King

Richard the First, for the starrs or mortgages made to *Jews in the r+o^o-i

capitula de Judceis, of which Hoveden has preserved a copy. How far >• '"'•'

the establishment of a like general register, for deeds, and wills, and other acts

affecting real property, would remedy this inconvenience, deserves to be well

considered. In Scotland every act and event, regarding the transmission of

property, is regularly entered on record, (d) And some of our own provincial

divisions, particularly the extended county of York, and the populous county

of Middlesex, have prevailed with the legislature (e) to erect such register in

their several districts. But, however plausible these provisions may appear in

theory, it hath been doubted by very competent judges, whether more disputes

have not arisen in those counties by the inattention and omissions of parties

than prevented by the use of registers. (49)

fa) See page 160. (b) Co. i.itt. 337. 2 Suund. «. (e) Bickes liisstrtut. epittolar. 9.

(d) Dalrymple on Feudal Property, 91*2. Ao.

(e) Stat. 2 audit Ami. c. 4. 6 Ann. c. 35. 7 Ann. c. 20. 8 Geo. II, c. 6.

fox, 1 P. 'Wma. 340; S. C. 2 Vern. 751. If enrollment is allowed by special order, after the

proper time has elapsed, this, for most purposes, makes the recognizance effectual from the time

of its date; but, should the coguizor, between the date and the enrollment of the recognizance,

also other recognizances, of a pri..-ate kind, in nahtre of a Btatute staple, by virtue
of the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 6, which have already been explained, (a) and
shown to be a charge u,pon real property._
3. A defeazance, on a bond, or r~cognizanoo, or judgment recovered, is a condition which, when performed, defeats or undoes it, m the same manner as a
defeazance of an estate before mentioned. It differs only from the common
condition of a bond, in that the one is always inserted in the deed or bond itself,
the other is made between the same parties by a separate, and frequently a subsequent deed. (h) 'fhis, like the condition of a bond, when performed, discharges and disincumbeni. the estate of the obligor.
These are the principal species of deeds or ma.tt.er in pais, by which estates
may be either conveyed, or at lea.st aff~cted. Among which the conveyances to
uses are by much t~e most-frequent of any: though in thelil6 there is certainly
one paJpable defect, the want of sufficient notoriety; so that purchasers or
creditors cannot know, with any absolute certainty, what the estate, and the
title to it, in reality are, upon which they are to lay out or to lend their money.
In the ancient feudal method of conveyance (by giving corporal seisin of the
lands), this ~otoriety was in some measure answered; but all the advantages.
resulting from thence are now totally defeated by the introduction of death-bed
devises and secret conveyances: and there has never been yet any sufficient
guard provided against fraudulent charges and inoumbrances; since the disuse
of the old Saxon custom of t]"{\nsacting all conveyances at the county court,
and entering a memorial of them in the chartnlar.y or ledger.-book of some adjacent lJlOnastery; ( c) and the failure of the general register established by King
Richard the First, for the starrs or mortgages made to •Jews in the [*343]
capitula de Judmis, of which Hoveden has preserved a copy. How far
.
the establishment of a like general register, for deeds, and wills, and other acts
affecting real property, would remedy this inconvenience, deserves to be well
considered. In Scotland every act and event, regarding the transmission of
pro~rty, is re~ularly entered on record. (d) And some of our own proYincia.l
divisions, particularly the extended county of York, and the populous county
of Middlesex, have prevailed with the legislature (e) W. erect such register in
their several distl'icts. But, however plausible these proYisions may appear in
theory, it ltath been doqbted by very competent judges, whether more disputes
have not arisen in those counties by the inattention and omissions of partie~
than prevented by the use of registers. (49)
(a)
(ti)
(e)

See page 160.
(b) Co. Litt. 237. i Saund. •1.
(C) Bickes D~tai. epldolar.11.
Dalrymple on Fendal l'n1perLy, 26'l, ~.
Stat. 2 ll.Ddll 4nu. c. •· 6 Ann. c. :15. 1 Ann. c. 20. 8 Geo. II, c. I.

have borrowed money on a judgment, the judgment creditor will be allowed a preference.

Fothergill F. Kendrick, 2 Vern. 234.]

(49) tBy the register-acts, a registered deed shall be preferred to a prior unregistered deed;

yet it has been decreed by Lord Hardwicko, if the subsequent purchaser by the registered

deed had previous notice of the unregistered one, he shall not avail himself of his deed, but

the first purchaser shall be preferred. 1 Ves. Sen. 64. The legislature has been understood

by onr courts, not to have meant that (the form of registration being unobserved) actual

notice of au incumbrance on an estate should not bind a purchaser. Davis v. Earl of Strath-

more, 16 Yes. 430; Le Neve P. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 650; Bnvhell r. Bushell, 1 Sch. and Lef.

100; Doc P. AJlgop, 5 Barn, and Aid. 147. The French courts adhered much more rigidly to

the letter of their old code respecting registration, and held, that a creditor or purchaser

might plead want of registration, in bar of a prior incumbrance, though such creditor or pur-

chaser ami full notice of the prior incumbrance, before ho made his own contract or purchase.

•They thought that to admit a contrary doctrine would leave it always open to argument

whether sufficient notice bad or had not been received ; and that this would lead to endless.

uncertainty, confusion, and perjury; therefore, that it was much better the right of the sub-

ject fthonld depend upon certain and fixed principles of law, than upon rules and construc-

tions of equity. They decided, consequently, that nothing, not even the most actual and

notice, "should countervail the want of registration. See Mr. Hargravo's note to Co.
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fux, 1 P. Wm11. 340; S. C. 2 Vern. 751. If enrollment is allowed by 11pecial orcier, aft.er the
proper time ha.~ elapsed, this, for .mo~t purposes, makes the recognise.nee effectual from th_e time
of 1ts date; but, should the cogu1zor, between the date and the enrollment of the reco,inuzanre,
have borrowed money on o. judgment, the judgment crediwr will be allowed a preforence.
Fothert·u v. Kendrick, 2 Vern. :.!34.)
( -19) By the re~it;ter:acts, a n•giHtered deed shall be profeITed to a P.rior unregistered deed;
yet it as been aecreed by Lord lfardwicko, if the subMqnent purchaser by the registered
deed bwl previou" notice of tho unregistered one, he ~ho.II not avail himself of his deed, but
~e first ·p urchaser shall be preferred. 1 Ves. Sen. 64. The le~slature has been understood
by our court.'!, not to ha\'"e meant that (the form of registrat10n beiDK unobserved) actuu.l
notice or an ineumbrance on a!l estate i!hould not bind a pnrohoaer. Davis Cl. Earl of Strathmore, l6 Ves.. 430; J,e Neve ·r.. Le Neve, 3 .Atk. 650; Bu8hell "· Bushell, 1 Sch. and Lef.
:oo; Doe 11. A.ll~ip, 5 Barn. and .Aid. 147. The French courts adhered much more rigidly t.Q
•.be letter or their old code respecting registration, and he.Id, that a creditor or puroba.ser
might plead want of r¥i~tmtion, in bar of a prior incumbrance, though snch creditor or purchaser had full notice o"F the prior incumhmnco, before he mado his own contract or purehase.
1'hev thoa~ht that to ISAmit a contmry doctrine would Teave it always open to al"gument
t.heiber snfficicnt notice had or bad not been received ; and that thiR wonld lead to endleH&
.. ue~irtainty, confui<ion, and perjury ; therefore, thllt it was much better the right of' the i;ubjoct KhoQ.ld depend upon certll.in and fixed priuc·iples of law, than upon rµ.le~ aud co118truc';io11J1 of (l(1oity. 'rhey decided, consequently, that nothing, not even the mot1t actual and
d:.":'!t notice, Rhould countervail the want of rcgitJtrution. See Mr. Hargravo's note to Co.
65!)
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CHAPTER XXI.

OF ALIENATION BY MATTER OF RECORD.

ASSURANCES by matter of record are such as do not entirely depend on the

act or consent of the parties themselves: but the sanction of a court of record

is called in to substantiate, preserve, and be a perpetual testimony of the trans-

fer of property from one man to another; or of its establishment, when already

transferred. Of this nature are, 1. Private acts of parliament. 2. The king's

grants. 3. Fines. 4. Common recoveries.

I. Private acts of parliament are, especially of late years, become a very com-

mon mode of assurance. For it may sometimes happen, that by the ingenuity

of some, and the. blunders of other practitioners, an estate is most grievously

entangled by a multitude of contingent remainders, resulting trusts, springing

uses, executory devises, and the like artificial contrivances (a confusion

unknown to the simple conveyances of the common law); so that it is out of

the power of either the courts of law or equity to relieve the owner. Or it may

sometimes happen, that by the strictness or omissions of family settlements, the

tenant of the estate is abridged of some reasonable power (as letting leases,

making a jointure for a wife, or the like), which power cannot be given him by

the ordinary judges either in common law or equity. Or it may be necessary,

in settling an estate, to secure it against the claims of infants or other persons

under legal disabilities; who are not bound by any judgments or decrees of the

F*3451 ordinary courts of justice. In these, or other cases of *the like kind,
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L J the transcendent power of parliament is called in, to cut the Gordian

knot; and by a particular law, enacted for this very purpose, to unfetter an

estate; to give its tenant reasonable powers; or to assure it to a purchaser,

against the remote or latent claims of infants or disabled persons, by settling a

proper equivalent in proportion to the interest so barred. (1) This practice was

Litt. 290, b. "With us, it has been much doubted whether our courts ought ever to have suffered

the question of notice to be agitated, as against a party who has duly registered his conveyance.

Wyatt t'. Barwell, 19 Vos. 439.

Registration of an equitable mortgage, or other incumbrance upon lands situated in a regis-

ter county, is clearly not, of itself, presumptive notice to a subsequent legal mortgagee, so as to

take from him his legal advantage, Morecoek v. Dickens, Auibt. K80; Bedford v. Bacchus, 2

Eq. Ca. Ab. 615; Hodgson ». Dean, 2 Sim. and Stu. 224. Nor will registration of a mortgage

of the equity of redemption preclude a third mortgagee from tacking that incumbrance, if lie

has bought in the first mortgage; provided ho had not notice of the second mortgage when

he lent his money. Cater «. Cooley, 1 Cox, 182. And an equitable mortgagee will not be

compelled to deliver up the title deeds deposited with him, bnt will be entitled to the benefit

thereof, as against a prior legal mortgagee, whose mortgage has been duly registered, but

notice of which registration is not brought home to the equitable mortgagee. Wiseman v.

"Westland, 1 Toung^e and Jerv. 121. For it is settled, (though the soundness of the doctrine,

as we have seen, is questionable.) that the registry of a deed does not, of itself, amount to

constructive notice. Cater v. Cooley, 1 Cox, 182;" Jolland v. Stainbridge, 3 Yes. 435; Peut-

land v. Stokes, 2 Ball and Peat. 75; Bushell v. Bushell, 1 Sch. and Lef. 97, 103; Latouche

v. Dunsany, 1 id. 157; Underwood e. Courtown, 2 id. 64; Hodgson v. Dean, 2 Sim. and Stu.

225.]

The system of recording conveyances of lands for the purposes of notice is general through-

out the United States; the statutes of each state prescribing what shall be the formalities of

execution to entitle the instrument to record, and also what shall be the effect of the record,

both as to notice and evidence. In general the record is notice only to those who claim title or

liens through or under the grantor, acquired subsequently. Elv v. Wiloox, 20 Wis. 530; George

v. Wood, 9 Allen, 80; Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. 231; Crockett v. Maguire, 10 Mo. 34. But

though the deed be not on record, any one who has actual notice of its existence is bound by that

notice to the same extent as if the record had been made. Murphy v. "S atftaus, 46 Ponn. St" 512;

Blanohard v. Tyler, 12 Mich. 339; Wells ». Morrow, 38 Ala. 125; Dixon v. Doe, 1 S. and M. 70;

Kogers v, Jones. 8 N. H. 264; Irvin v. Smith, 17 Ohio, 226; Lillard v. Rucker, 9 Terg. 63; Cos-

gray v. Cove, 2 W. Va. 353. And notice to one of several grantees is notice to all. Stanley p.

Green, 12 Cal. 148; Myers v. Boss, 3 Head. 59.

(1) [Tenants for life sometimes obtain private acts of parliament to enable them to charge

the inheritance for the amount of necessary repairs and improvements, which must enure to

560
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carried to a great length in the year succeeding the restoration; by setting aside

many conveyances alleged to have been made by constraint, or in order to screen

the estates from being forfeited during the usurpation. And at last it proceeded

so far, I hai, as the noble historian expresses it, (a) every man had raised an

equity in his own imagination, that he thought was entitled to prevail against

any descent, testament, or act of law, and to find relief in parliament: which

occasioned the king at the close of the session to remark, (//) that the good old

rules of law are the best security; and to wish, that men might not have too

much cause to fear, that the settlements which they make of their estate, shall

be too easily unsettled when they are dead, by the power of parliament.

Acts of this kind are however at present carried on, in both houses, with great

deliberation and caution; particularly in the house of lords they are usually

referred to two judges to examine and report the facts alleged, and to settle all

technical forms. Nothing also is done without the consent, expressly given, of

all parties in being, and capable of consent, that have the remotest interest in

the matter : unless such consent shall appear to be perversely and without any

reason withheld. And, as was before hinted, an equivalent in money or other

estate is usually settled upon infants, or persons not in esse, or not of capacity

to act for themselves, who are to be concluded by this act. And a general sav-

ing is constantly added, at the close of the bill, of the right and interest of all

persons whatsoever; except those whose consent is so given or purchased, and

who are therein particularly named: though it hath been holden, that even if
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such saving be omitted, the act shall bind none but the parties. (<;)

*A law thus made, though it binds all parties to the bill, is yet looked r MAC -i

upon rather as a private conveyance, than as the solemn act of the legis- L ° J

lature. It is not, therefore, allowed to be a public, but a mere private statute:

it is not printed or published among the other laws of the session; it hath been

relieved against, when obtained upon fraudulent suggestions: (d) it hath been

holden to be void, if contrary to law and reason; (e) and no judge or jury is

bound to take notice of it, unless the same be specially set forth and pleaded to

them. It remains, however, enrolled among the public records of the nation to

be forever preserved as a perpetual testimony of the conveyance or assurance so

made or established. (2)

(a) Lord. Clar. Contin. 162. fb) Ibid. 163. CcJCo. 138. Godb. 171.

(d) Kichardson v. Hamilton. Cane. 8 Jan. 1773. McKenzic v. Stuart. Dom. Proc. IS Mar. 175*.

fe.J 4 Bep. 12.

the benefit of the remainderman and reversioner. But parliament of course is the judge whether

the proposed repairs and improvements are adequately beneficial to the amount to be charged

upon the estate. As to the forms to be observed in the passing of private statutes see ante,

book 1, 181, et sea.]

(2) The power in the legislature to transfer the title to private estates is very much restricted

in the several states of the American Union, not only by the universal constitutional principle

that no man shall be deprived of property except by due process of law, and by express provisions

in some of the constitutions inhibiting private acts for such purposes, but also by the recognized

maxim that to transfer one man's property to another, except in pursuance of general laws,

and in accordance with the recognized principles which protect private rights, is not the

exercise of legislative power, and therefore not within the general grant of that power which

the state constitutions make to the state legislative bodies. Newland v. Marsh, 19 111. 382;

Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, 282; "Wilkinson «. Leland, 2 Pet 657, per Story J. But there

are many cases where private statutes similar to those, referred to in the text, are allowable,

unless prohibited in express terms. In the case of infants, lunatics, and other persons under

disability, the legislature possesses general authority to prescribe the mode in which their

property shall be disposed of for their benefit; and though this is usually done by general

Laws which give supervision of the proceedings to some proper court, it is well settled that

the legislature, if not expressly prohibited, may interfere m special cases, and, by private act,

authorize a transfer to be made by the guardian or trustee, without regard to the general laws.

Rice >•. T'arkman, 16 Mass. 326; Cochfan v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 373; Holman's Heirs «.

Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wai. 210. And it is believed to be

equally competent for the legislature to authorize a person under legal disability—for example,

an infant—to convey his estate, as to authorize it to be conveyed oy guardian. HcComb. v.

(iilkuy, 39 Miss. 146. Private statutes of this description are always supposed to be made in

the interest of the persona concerned: Men-ill v. Sherbnme, 1 N. E. 204; and are enacted
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II. The king's grants are also matter of public record. For as St. Germyn

says, (/) the king's excellency is so high in the law, that no freehold may be

given to the king, nor derived"^ from him but by matter of record. And to this

end a variety of offices are erected, communicating in a regular subordination

one with another, through which all the king's grants must pass, and be tran-

scribed, and enrolled; that the same may be narrowly inspected by his officers,

who will inform him if any thin°; contained therein is improper, or unlawful to

be granted. These grants, whether of lands, honours, liberties, franchises, or

aught besides, are contained in charter?, or letters patent, that is, open letters,

literce patentes: so called because they are not sealed up, but exposed to open

view, with the great seal pendant at the bottom; and are usually directed or

addressed by the king to all his subjects at large. And therein they differ from

certain other letters of the king, sealed also with his great seal, but directed to

particular persons, and for particular purposes: which, therefore, not being

proper for public inspection, are closed up and sealed on the outside, and are

thereupon called writs, close,lUerce dausce, and are recorded in the close-rolls, in

the same manner as the others are in the patent'-rolls.

Grants or letters patent must first pass by bill which is prepared by the attorney

r*"U71 and solicitor general, in consequence *of a warrant from the crown;

L J and is then signed, that is, subscribed at the top, with the king's own

sign manual, and sealed with his privy signet, which is always in the custody of

the principal secretary of state; and then sometimes it immediately passes
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under the great seal, in which case the patent is subscribed in these words,

" per if sum regem, by the king himself." (g) Otherwise the course is to carry

an extract of the bill to the keeper of the privy seal, who makes out a writ or

warrant thereupon to the chancery ; so that the sign manual is the warrant to

the privy seal, and the privy seal is the warrant to the great seal: and in this

last case the patent is subscribed, "per breve de privato sigillo, by writ of privy

seal." (A) (3) But there are some grants which only pass through certain offi-

ces, as the admiralty or treasury, in consequence of a sign manual, without the

confirmation of either the signet, the great, or the privy seal.

(/) Dr. & Stnd. b. 1, d. 8. (g) 9 Kcp. 18. (h) Ibid 2. Inst. 655.

under such circumstances only as would render it reasonable to imply their assent if they

were capable of giving it. Cooley Const. Lim. 103. And there is uo general principle of

constitutional law which would preclude a private act for the purpose of converting n-al

property into personal, or an equitable estate into a legal, where no other change of rights was

mode, and the parties in interest, or the proper guardians of their interest, desired the change.

Upon thin point the reader will consult with profit, Carroll v. Lessee of Olmsted, 16 Ohio, 251 ;

Davison v. Johonnot, 7 Met. 386; Leggett». Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445; Dorsey v. Gilbert. 11 Gill

and J. 87; Estep ». Hutchman, 14 S. and R. 435; Shehan's Heirs r. Barnet's Heirs, 6 T. B.

Monr. 594; Moore ». Maxwell, 16 Ark. 469, in which the doctrine here stated has been applied

in a great variety of circumstances. And see further cases cited in Cooley Const. Lim. 101-103.

But the legislature cannot assume to declare that claims which are asserted against the prop-

erty of individuals are valid, and to order the property sold to satisfy them; for this would be

the' exercise not of legislative, but of judicial power. Lane v. Donnan, 3 Scam. 242. And see

for a similar principle, Cash, appellant, 6 Mich. 193; Ervino's Appeal, 16 Perm. St. 268; State p.

Noyes. 47 Me. 189; Edwards v. Pope, 3 Scam. 465.

Interests which are only in expectancy, like the expectation of succeeding to an estate as

heir at law on the death of the owner, or of becoming tenant by the curtesy or in dower in

the lands of a wife or husband now living, may bo modified or altogether abolished by the

legislature at any time before they actually become vested. Tone v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60;

Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 57;

Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 208; Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Clark v. McCreary, 12 S.

ami M. 347. But when this is done, it is by general laws, and it would be difficult to defend an

attempt to do it by special statute operative only in a particular case.

(3) [But now under the statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 82, which abolished the offices of the clerk

of the signet and privy seal, a warrant under the sign manual may be addressed to the lord

chancellor, commanding him to cause letters patent to be passed under the great seal. This

warrant must be prepared by the attorney or solicitor general, setting forth the proposed let-

ters patent, and must be countersigned by one of the principal secretaries of state, and sealed

with the privy seal.]
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The manner of granting by the king does not more differ from that by a

subject, than the construction of his grants, when made. 1. A grant made by

the king, at the suit of the grantee, shall be taken most beneficially for the

king, and against the party: whereas the grant of a subject is construed most

strongly against the grantor. Wherefore it is usual to insert in the king's

grants, that they are made, not at the suit of the grantee, but " ex speciali gratia,

certa scientia, et mero motu regis ;" and then they have a more liberal con-

struction. (»') 2. A subject's grant shall be construed to include many things,

besides what are expressed, if necessary for the operation of the grant. There-

fore, in a private grant of the profits of land for one year, free ingress, egress,

and regress, to cut and carry away those profits, are also inclusively granted: (j)

and if a feoffment of land was made by a lord to his villein, this operated as a

manumission; (k) for he was otherwise unable to hold it. But the king's grant

shall not enure to any other intent, than that which is precisely expressed in the

grant. As, if he grants land to an alien, it operates nothing; for *such •- 41340 i

grant shall not also enure to make him a denizen, that so he may be I- '

capable of taking by grant. (I) 3. When it appears from the face of the grant,

that the king is mistaken, or deceived, either in matter of fact or matter of law,

as in case of false suggestion, misinformation, or misrecital of former grants; or

if his own title to the thing granted be different from what he supposes; or if

the grant be informal; or if he grants an estate contrary to the rules of law; in

any of these cases the grant is absolutely void, (m) For instance; if the king
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grants lands to one and his heirs male, this is merely void: for it shall not be an

estate-tail, because there want words of procreation, to ascertain the body out

of which the heirs shall issue: neither is it a fee-simple, as in common grant it

would be; because it may reasonably be supposed, that the king meant to g_ive

no more than an estate-tail: (n) the grantee is therefore (if any thing) nothing

more than tenant at will, (o) And to prevent deceits of the king, with regard to

the value of the estate granted, it is particularly provided by the statute 1 Hen.

IV, c. 6, that no grant of his shall be good, unless, in the grantee's petition for

them, express mention be made of the real value of the lands.

III. We are next to consider a very usual species of assurance, which is also

of record; viz.: a, fine of lands and tenements. In which it will be necessary to

explain, 1. The nature of a fine; 2. Its several kinds ; and, 3. Its force and

effect. (4)

1. A.fine is sometimes said to be a feoffment of record: (p) though it might

with more accuracy be called an acknowledgment of a feoffment on record. By

which is to be understood, that it has at least the same force and effect with a

feoffment, in the conveying and assuring of lands: though it is one of those

methods of transferring estates of freehold bj the common law, in which livery

of seisin is not necessary *to be actually given; the supposition and r $3491

aknowledgment thereof in a court of record, however fictitious, indue- <- -"

ing an equal notoriety. But, more particularly, a fine may be described to be an

amicable composition or agreement of a suit, either actual or factitious, by leave

of the king or his justices: whereby the lands in question become, or are

acknowledged to be, the right of one of the parties, (q) In its original it was

founded on an actual suit, commenced at law for recovery of the possession of

land or other hereditaments; and the possession thus gained by such composi-

tion was found to be so sure and effectual, that fictitious actions were, and

continue to be, every day commenced, for the sake of obtaining the same

security.

(il Finch, L. 100. 10 Rep. 112. (}) Co. Litt. 56. (kJUtt. » 206.

(I) Bro. Abr. tU. Patent, 62. Finch, L. 110. fm) Frecm. ITS. (n) Finch, 101,102.

(o) Bro. Abr. tU. Estates. 34 tit. Patrols, 104. Dyer, 270. Day. 45.

(p) Co. Litt. 80. (q) IMd. 120.

The manner of granting by the king does not more differ from that by a
subject, than the construction of his grants, when made. 1. A ~rant made by
the king, at the suit of the grantee, shall be taken most beneficially for the
king, and against the party: whereas the s:rn:nt of a subject is construed most
strongly against tlie grantor. Wherefore 1t is usual to insert in the kin~s
grants, that they are made, not at the suit of the grantee, but "ex tpeC'iali gratia,
certa &cientitt, et mero nwtu regis ;" and then they have a more liberal construction. (i) 2. A subject's grant shall be construed to include many things,
besides what are expressed, if necessary for the operation of the grant. Therefore, in a private grant of the profits of hmd for one year, free ingress, egress,
and regress, to cut and carry away those profits, are also inclusively granted: U)
and if a feoffment of land was made by a lord to his villein, this operated as a
manumission; (k) for he was otherwise unable to hold it. But the king's grant
shall not enure to any other intent, than that which is precisely expressed in the
grant. As, if he grants land to an alien, it operates nothing; for •such [ • 348 ]
grant shall not also enure to make him a denizen, that so he may be
capable of taking by grant. (l) 3. When it appears from the face of the grant,
that the king is mistaken, or deceived, either in matter of fact or matter of law,
as in case of false suggestion, misinformation, or misrecital of former grants; or
if his own title to the thin~ granted be different from what he supposes; or if
the grant be informal; or if he grants an estate contrary to the rules of law; in
any of these cases the grant is absolutely void. (m) For instance; if the king
grants lands to one and his heirs male, this is merely void: for it shall not be an
estate-tail, because there want words of procreation, to ascertain the body out
of which the heirs shall issue: neither is it a fee-simple, as in common grant it
would be; because it may reasonably be sup_posed, that the king meant to give
no more than an estate-tail: (n) the grantee is therefore (if any thing) nothing
more than tenant at will. (o) And to prevent deceits of the king, with regard to
the value of the estate granted, it is particularly provided by the statute 1 Hen.
IV, c. 6, that no grant of his shall be good, unless, in the grantee's petition for
them, express mention be made of the real value of the lands.
III. We are next to consider a very usual species of assurance, which is also
of record; viz.: a fine oflands and tenements. In which it will be necessary to
e~lain, 1. The nature of a fine; 2. Its several kinds ; and, 3. Its force and
ejfect. (4)
·
1. A fine is sometimes said to be a feoffment of record: (p) though it might
with more accuracy be called an acknowledgment of a feoffment on record. By
which is to be understood, that it has at lea.st the same force and effect with a.
feoffment, in the conveying and assuring of lands: though it is one of those
methods of transferring estates of freehold by the common law, in which livery
of seisin is not necessary •to be actually given ; the supposition and [ • 349 ]
aknowledgment thereof m a court of record, however fictitious, inducing an equal notoriety. But, more particularly, a fine may be described to be an
amicable composition or agreement of a suit, either actual or f\ctitious, by leave
of the king or his justices: whereby the lands in question become, or are
acknowledged to be, the right of one of the parties. (q) In its original it was
founded on an actual suit, commenced at law for recovery of the possession of
land or other hereditaments; and the possession thus gamed by such composition was found to be so sure and effectual, that fictitious actions were, and
continue to be, every day commenced, for the sake of obtaining the same
security.

(4) This species of assurance is now abolished in England by statute 3 and 4 'William IT, c.

74. It wag never much employed in the United States, and. is abolished by express statutes in

several of the states.
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(l) Finch, L. 100. io Rep. lll!.
( j J Co. Litt. 116.
(kJ Lltt.
{IJ Rro. A.br. iu. Pahnt, 82. 1''lnch, J,. 110.
(m) Freem. l~.

f 208.

(n} Finch, 101, 102.

(o) Bro. .A&r. '"· Illtatu, IU HI. PaknU, lCM. Dyer, 270. D&T. '6.
(p)

Co. LIU. llO.

(g)

IW<I. 120.

(4) This species of a.'!l!urance is now abolished in England by statute 3 and 4 William IV, c.

74, H WQIJ never much employed in the Ullited St&tes, aq(\ is abolished by express statutes in
aeveral of the states.
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A fine is so called because it puts an end, not only to the suit thus com-

A fine is so called because it puts an end, not only to the snit thus commenced, but also to all other suits and controversies concerning the same matter. Or, as it is expressed in an ancient record of parliament, (r) 18 Edw. I,
"Non in regno .Angli(JJ provitletu.r, vel est, aliqua securitcis major vel solennior,
per quam aliqu·is statum certiorem ltabere posst'.t, neque ad stalmn suum Z'erificandum aHquod solennius testimonium producere, quam finem in curia d-0-min,i
regis levatum: qu·i quidem finis sic vocatur, eo quoil finis et ronsttmm.a tio
omnium placitorum esse debet, et liac de cau.'fa proilidebatu.r." ~,ines indeecl
are of equal antiquity with the first rudiments of the law itself; a.re spoken of
by Glanvil (s) and Bra.cton (t) in the reigns of Hen. II, and Hen. III, as things
then well known and long established ; and instances have been produced of
them even prior to the Norman invasion. (u) So that the statute 18 Edw. I,
called modus levandi fines, did not give them ori~inal, but only declared and
regulated the manner in which they should be levied or carried on. And that
is as follows :
.
1. The party to whom the land is to be conveyed or assured, commences an
[ • 350 ] action or suit at law against the other, •generally an action of covenant( v)
by suing out a writ of prmcipe, called a writ of covenant, (w) the
foundation of which is a supposed agreement or covenant, that the one shall
convey the lands to the other; on the breach of which agreement the action is
brought. On this writ there is due to the king, by ancient prerogative, a pr1'.m.cr
fine, or a noble for every five marks of land sued for; that is, one-tenth of the
annual value. (x) The suit being thus commenced, then follows,
2. The licentia concordandi, or leave to agree the suit. (y) For, as soon as
the action is brought, the defendant knowing himself to be in the wrong, is
supposed to make overtures of peace and accommodation to the plaintiff.
Who, accepting them, but having, upon suing out the writ, given pledges to
prosecute his suit, which he endangers if he now deserts it without license, he
therefore applies to the court for leave to make the matter up. This leave is
readily granted, but for it there is also another fine due to the king by his prerogative, which is an ancient revenue of the crown, and is called the king's s·ilver,
or sometimes the po.'lt fine, with respect to the printer fine before mentioned.
And it is as much u.s the primer fine, and half as much more, or ten shillings
for every five marks of land; that is, three-twentieths of the supposed annual
value. (z)
3. Next comes the concord, or agreement itself, (a) after leave obtained from
the court: which is usually an acknowledgment from the deforciants (or those
who keep the other out of possession) that the lands in question are the right
of the complainant. And from this acknowledgment, or recognition of right,
• 351 ] the party levying the fine is called the •cogniwr, and he to whom it
[
is levied the cognizee. This acknowledgment must be ma.de either openly
in the court of common pleas, or before the lord chief justice of that court; or
else before one of the judges of that court, or two or more commissioners in
the country, emllowered by a special authority called a writ of dedimus potestate-m, which judges and commissioners are bound by statute 18 Edw. I, st. 4, to
take care that the cognizors be of full age, sound memory, and out of prison.
If there be any feme-covert among the cognizors, she is priYately examined
whether she does it willingly and freely, or by compulsion of her husband.
By these acts all the essential parts of a fine are completed: and, if the cognizor dies the next moment after the fine is acknowledged, frovided it be subsequent to the day on which the writ is ma.de returnable, (b still the fine shall
be carried on in all its remaining parts: of which the next is,

menced, but also to all other suits and controversies concerning the same mut-

ter. Or, as it is expressed in an ancient record of parliament, (r) 18 Edw. I,

" Non in regno AngliiB providetur, vel mst, aliqua securitas major vel golennior,

per quam aliquis statum certiorem habere possit, neque ad statum mum verifi-

candum aliquod solennius testimonium producere, quamfinem in curia domini

regis levatum: qui quidem finis sic vocatur, eo quod finis et consummatio

omnium placitorum esse debet, et hac de causa providebatur." Fines indeed

are of equal antiquity with the first rudiments of the law itself; are spoken of

by Glanvil («) and Bracton (t) in the reigns of Hen. II, and Hen. Ill, as things

then well known and long established; and instances have been produced of

them even prior to the Norman invasion, (u) So that the statute 18 Edw. I,

called modus levandi fines, did not give them original, but only declared and

regulated the manner in which they should be levied or carried on. And that

is as follows:

1. The party to whom the land is to be conveyed or assured, commences an

r *QKQ i action or suit at law against the other, *generally an action of covenant^)

' '"" J by suing out a writ of prcecipe, called a writ of covenant, (w) the

foundation of which is a supposed agreement or covenant, that the one shall

convey the lands to the other; on the breach of which agreement the action is

brought. On this writ there is due to the king, by ancient prerogative, a primer

fine, or a noble for every five marks of land sued for; that is, one-tenth of the
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annual value, (x) The suit being thus commenced, then follows,

2. The licentia concordandi, or leave to agree the suit (y) For, as soon as

the action is brought, the defendant knowing himself to be in the wrong, is

supposed to make overtures of peace and accommodation to the plaintiff.

Who, accepting them, but having, upon suing out the writ, given pledges to

prosecute nis suit, which he endangers if he now deserts it without license, he

therefore applies to the court for leave to make the matter up. This leave is

readily granted, but for it there is also another fine due to the King by his pre-

rogative, which is an ancient revenue of the crown, and is called the Icing's silver,

or sometimes the post fine, with respect to the primer fine before mentioned.

And it is as much as the primer fine, and half as much more, or ten shillings

for every five marks of land; that is, three-twentieths of the supposed annual

value, (^z)

3. Next comes the concord, or agreement itself, (a) after leave obtained from

the court: which is usually an acknowledgment from the deforciants (or those

who keep the other out of possession) that the lands in question are the right

of the complainant. And from this acknowledgment, or recognition of right,

r *QKI i the party levying the fine is called the *cognizor, and he to whom it

"- J is levied the cognizee. This acknowledgment must be made either openly

in the court of common pleas, or before the lord chief justice of that court; or

else before one of the judges of that court, or two or more commissioners in

the country, empowered by a special authority called a writ of dedimuspotesta-

tem, which judges and commissioners are bound by statute 18 Edw. I, st 4, to

take care that the cognizors be of full age, sound memory, and out of prison.

If there be any feme-covert among the cognizors, she is privately examined

whether she does it willingly and freely, or by compulsion of her husband.

By these acts all the essential parts of a fine are completed: and, if the cog-

nizor dies the next moment after the fine is acknowledged, provided it be sub-

sequent to the day on which the writ is made returnable, (b) still the fine shall

be carried on in all its remaining parts: of which the next is,

(r) 2 Koll. Abr. IS. ftJl.S.c.l. ft) 1. S, t. 6, c.28. (V.) Plowd. 369.

(v) A fine may also be levied on a Trrit of menu, ottoarrantia chartce, or de contuttudintbtu et serrUits.

(Finch. L. 27S.)

(vi) See Appendix, No. IV, f 1. (x) 2 Inst. 611.

fy) Appendix, No. IV. t 2. In the times of strict feudal Jurisdiction, if a vassal had commenced a snit in

(r) 2 Roll. Ahr. l!.
(I} l. 8, c. I.
(t} l. 111 t. 11, c. 28.
(u} Plowd. B.
(v) A dne may l\lso be levied on a writ of mune, ortoOrl"dflffa cTiorla!, or~~ d Hn.iti...
(!!'Inch, L . 27ll.)
(w) See Appendix, No. IV, f I.
( :C) II Inst. Im.
'II) A~pendi.x, No. IV. t 2. In the times ofstrict feudal Jnrledlctlon, If a vassal bad commenced a suit In
th'e lord·s court, he could not abandon it wiLbout leave; lest the lord should be deprived of hia perqniaitea
for <tecldlng the cause. (Robertson Cha. V, i. 31.)
(11) 6 ltep. 39. 2 Inst. 611. Stat.~ Geo. II, c. H.
(a) Appendix, No. IV, f 3.
( 1') Comb. 71.

the lord's court, he could not abandon it without leave; lest the lord should be deprived of hia perquisites

for deciding the cause. (Robertson, Cha. V, i, 31.)

p. 39. 2 Inst. 511. Slat. 32 Geo. H, c. 14. fa) Appendix, No. IV, i 8. ( b) Comb. 71.
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4, The note of the fine; (c) which is only an abstract of the writ of covenant,

and the concord; naming the parties, the parcels of land, and the agreement.

This must be enrolled of record in the proper office, by direction of the statute

5 Hen. IV, c. 14.

5. The fifth part is the/oo< of the fine, or conclusion of it; which includes

the whole matter, reciting the parties, day, year, and place, and before whom it

was acknowledged or levied, (d) Of this there are indentures made, or engrossed

at the chirographer s office, and delivered to the cognizor and the cognizee ; usually

beginning thus, "htsc estfinalis concordia, this is the final agreement," and then

reciting the whole proceeding at length. And thus the fine is completely levied

at common law.

By several statutes still more solemnities are superadded, in order to render

the fine more universally public, and less liable to be levied by fraud or covin.

And first by 27 Edw. I, *c 1, the note of the fine shall be openly read r *QKO i

in the court of common pleas, at two several days in one week, and L '"' '

during such reading all pleas shall cease. By 5 Hen. IV, c. 14, and 23 Eliz. c.

3, all the proceedings on fines, either at the time of acknowledgment, or previous

or subsequent thereto, shall be enrolled of record in the court of common pleas.

By 1 Eic. Ill, c. 7, confirmed and enforced by 4 Hen. VII, c. 24, the fine, after

engrossment, shall be openly read and proclaimed in court, (during which all

pleas shall cease) sixteen times, viz.: four times in the term in which it is made,

and four times in each of the three succeeding terms, which is reduced to once
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in each term by 31 Eliz. c. 2, and these proclamations are indorsed on the

back of the record, (e) It is also enacted by 23 Eliz. c. 3, that the chirographer of

fines shall every term write out a table of the fines levied in each county in that

term, and shall affix them in some open part of the court of common pleas all

the next term: and shall also deliver the contents of such table to the sheriff

of every county, who shall at the next assizes fix the same in some open place

in the court, for the more public notoriety of the fine.

2. Fines, thus levied, are of four kinds. 1. What in our law French is called

a fine "sur cognizance de droit, come ceo que il ad de son done;"or, a fine upon

acknowledgment of the right of the cognizee, as that which he hath of the gift

of the cognizor. (/) This is the best and surest kind of fine; for thereby the

deforciant, in order to keep his covenant with the plaintiff, of conveying to him

the lands in question, and at the same time to avoid the formality of an actual

feoffment and livery, acknowledges in court a former feoffment, or gift in pos-

session, to have been made by him to the plaintiff. This fine is therefore said

to be a feoffment of record; the livery, thus acknowledged in court, being

equivalent to an actual livery: so that this assurance is rather a confession of a

former conveyance, than a conveyance now originally made; for the deforciant

or cognizor acknowledges, *cognoscit, the right to be in the plaintiff, or r *„.,, i

cognizee, as that which he hath de son done, of the proper gift of himself "- '"'"'I

the cognizor. 2. A fine " sur cognizance de droit tantum," or upon acknowl-

edgment of the right merely; not with the circumstances of a preceding gift

from the cognizor. This is commonly used to pass a reversionary interest,

which is in the cognizor. For of such reversions there can be no feoffment, or

donation with livery, supposed; as the possession during the particular estate

belongs to a third person.f g) It is worded in this manner; " that the cognizor

acknowledges the rig^ht to be in the cognizee; and grants for himself and his

heirs, that the reversion, after the particular estate determines, shall go to the

cognizee." (h) 3. A fine " sur concessit " is where the cognizor, in order to make

an end of disputes, though he acknowledges no precedent right, yet grants to

the cognizee an estate de novo, usually for life or years, by way of supposed com-

position. And this may be done reserving a rent, or the like ; for it operates

as a new grant, (i) 4. A fine " sur done, grant, et render," is a double fine, com-

prehending the fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo, &c., and the fine sur con-

(e) Appendix, No. IV, j 4. (d) IMd. I 5. (e) Appendix, No. IV, i 6.

(f) Tills is that sort, of which an example is given in the Appendix, No. IV.

(g) Moor. 829. (h) West. Symb. p. 2,( 95. (i) West. p. 2, }66.
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4. The note of the fine; (c) which is only an abstract of the writ of covenant!
and the concord; naming the parties, the parcels of land, and the agreement.
•.rhis must be enrolled of record in the proper office, by direction of the statute
5 Hen. IV, c. 14.
5. The fifth pa.rt is the foot of the fine, or conclusion of it; which includes
the whole matter, reciting the parHcs, day, year, and place, and before whom it
was acknowledged or levied. (d) Of this there are indentures made, or engrossed
at the chirogrnpher's office, and deliYcred to the cognizor and the cognizee ; usually
beginning thus, "h<Bc est jinalis concordia, this is the final agreement," and then
reciting the whole proceeding at length. And thus the fine is completely levied
at common law.
By several statutes still more solemnities are superadded, in order to render
thl'< fine more universally public, and less liable to be levied by fraud or covin.
And first by 27 Edw. I, *c 1, the note of the fine shall be openly read [ ,..352 ]
in the court of common pleas, at two several days in one week, and
during such reading all pleas shall cease. By 5 Hen. IV, c. 14, and 23 Eliz. c.
3, all the proceedings on fines, either at the time of acknowledgment, or previous
or subsequent thereto, shall be enrolled of record in the court of common pleas.
By 1 Ric. III, c. 7, confirmed and enforced by 4 Hen. VII, c. 24, the fine, after
engrossment, shall be openly read and proclaimed in court, (during which all
pleas shall cease) sixteen times, viz.: four times in the term in which it is made,
and four times in each of the three succeeding terms, which is reduced to once
in each term by 31 Eliz. c. 2, and these proclamations are indorsed on the
back of the record. (e) It is also enacted by 23 Eliz. c. 3, that the chirographer of
fines shall every term write out a table of the fines levied in each county in that
t.erm, and shall affix them in some open part of the court of common pleas all
the next term: and shall also deliver the contents of such table to the sheriff
of every county, who shall at the next assizes fix the same in some open place
in the court, for the more public notoriety of the fine.
2. Fines, thus levied, are of four kinds. 1. What in our law French is called
a fine " sur cognizance de drfFit, come ceo que il ad de son done/' or, a fine upon
acknowledgment of the right of the cognizee, as that which he hath of the gift
of the cognizor. {/) This is the best and surest kind of fine; for thereby the
deforciant, in order to keep his covenant with the plaintiff, of conveying to him
the lands in question, and at the same time to avoid the formality of an actual
feoffment and livery, acknowledges in court a former feoffment, or gift in possession, to have been made by him to the plaintiff. This fine is therefore said
to be a feoffment of record; the livery, thus acknowledged in court, being
equivalent to an actual livery: so that this assurance is rather a confession of a
former conveyance, than a conveyance now originally made; for the deforciant
or cognizor acknowledges, *cognosdt, the right to be m the plaintiff, or [ • 353 ]
cognize.e, !M! that which he hath de son done, of the proper gift of himself
the cognizor. 2. A fine "sur cognizance de droit tantum.," or upon acknowledgment of the right merely; not with the circumstances of a preceding gift
from the cognizor. This 1s commonly used to pass a reverswnary interest,
which is in the cognizor. For of such reversions there can be no feoffment, or
donation with livery, supposed; as the possession during the particular estate
belongs to a third person.( g) It is worded in this manner; "that the cognizor
acknowledges the ri~ht to be in the cognizee; and grants for himself and his
heirs, that the revers10n, after the particular estate determines, shall go to the
cognizee." (h) 3. A fine "sur concessit" is where the cognizor, in order to make
an end of disputes, though he acknowlecl~es no precedent right, yet grants to
the cognizee an estate de novo, usually for life or years, by wax of supposed composition. And this may be done reserving a rent, or the like; for it operates
as a new grJ.nt. U) 4. A fine ".mr done, grant, et render," is a double fine, comprehending the fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo, &c., and the fine su.r con(cJ

Appendix, No. IV, I'·

(d) Ibid. I IS.

(e)

Appendix, No. IV, I 6.

( f) Thill is that Sc>rt, orwhlr.h nn exnmple Is given In the Apµenrlfx, No. IV.
Moor. 829.
(h) West. Symb. p. 2,196.
OJ Wesl. p. I!, f66.

(g)
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cessit; and may be used to create particular limitations of estate; whereas the

fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo, &c., conveys nothing but an absolute

estate, either of inheritance or at least of freehold. (/) In this last species of

fine, the cognizee, after the right is acknowledged to be in him, grants back

again, or renders to the cognizor, or perhaps to a stranger, some other estate in

the premises. But, in general, the first species of fine, sur cognizance de droit

come ceo, &c., is the most used, as it conveys a clean and absolute freehold, and

gives the cognizee a seisin in law, without any actual livery; and is therefore

called a fine executed, whereas the others are but executory.

3. We are next to consider the force and effect of a fine. These principally

depend, at this day, on the common law, and the two statutes, 4 Hen. VII, c.

24, and 32 Hen. VIII, c. 36. The ancient common law, with respect to this

r #05^ -I point, *is very forcibly declared by the statute 18 Edw. I, in these words:

*• ' •" " And the reason why such solemnity is required in the passing of a fine,

is this; because the fine is so nigh a bar, and of so great force, and of a nature

so powerful in itself, that it precludes not only those which are parties and

privies to the fine, and their heirs, but all other persons in the world, who are

of full age, out of prison, of sound memory, and within the four seas, the day

of the fine levied; unless they put in their claim on the foot (k) of the fine

within a year and a day." But this doctrine, of barring the right by non-claim,

was abolished for a time by the statute made in 34 Edw. Ill, c. 16, which admitted

persons to claim, and falsify a fine, at any indefinite distance; (I) whereby, as
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Sir Edward Coke observes, (m) great contention arose, and few men were sure

of their possessions, till the parliament, held 4 Hen. VII, reformed that mischief

and excellently moderated between the latitude given by the statute and the

rigour of the common law. For the statute, then made, («) restored the doc-

trine of non-claim; but extended the time of claim. So that now, by that

statute, the right of all strangers whatsoever is bound, unless they make claim,

by way of action, or lawful entry, not within one year and a day, as by the com-

mon law, but within five years after proclamations made: execept feme-coverts,

infants, prisoners, persons beyond the seas, and such as are not of whole mind;

who have five years allowed to them and their heirs, after the death of their

husbands, their attaining full age, recovering their liberty, returning into Eng-

land, or being restored to their right mind. (5)

It seems to have been the intention of that politic prince, King Henry VII,

to have covertly by this statute extended fines to have been a bar of estates-tail,

in order to unfetter the more easily the estates of his powerful nobility, and lay

F *3551 **nem more open to alienations: being well aware that power will

L rf°° J alwayi accompany property. But doubts having arisen whether they

could, by mere implication, be adjudged a sufficient bar (which they were

expressly declared not to be by the statute de donis), the statute 32 Hen. VIII,

c. 36, was thereupon made; which removes all difficulties, by declaring that a

fine levied by any person of full age, to whom or to whose ancestors lands have

(K) Sur la pie, as It Is in the Cotton MS. and not pur lepais, as printed by Berthelet, and In 2 Inst. Ell.

There were thru four methods of claiming, so as to avoid being concluded by a fine. 1. By action. 8.

By entering such claim on the record at the foot of the fine. 3. By entry on the lands. 4. By continual

claim. 2Inst.A18. The second Ig not now in force under the statute of Henrv VII.

rOUt. i 441. fmj 2 Inet 818. (*) 4 Hen. VII, c. 24. See page 118.

(5) By the statute 3 and 4 "William IT, c. 74, $ 15, every tenant in tail is empowered to dis-

pose, either absolutely in fee-simple or for a less estate, of the lands entailed, as against all

persona who might nave claimed the lands by force of the estate tail if it had not been BO

defeated. By the 40th section it is enacted, thftt every disposition of lands under this statute,

by a tenant in tail, may be effected by any deed (but not by will) by which he could hare dis-

posed of the same if he had been seised in fee; provided that no disposition resting only in

contract shall be of any force under this act, although such contract shall be evidenced by

deed; and if the tenant in tail making the disposition be a married woman, the concurrence of

her husband is necessary to (rive effect to the same. Bv the 41st section it is enacted, that every

assurance made under this act (except leases not exceeding 21 years) shall be inoperative unless

it ia enrolled within six months. The 54th section makes a further exception as to copyholds, as

to which enrollment is not required, otherwise than on the court rolls,
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been entailed, shall be a perpetual bar to them and their heirs claiming by force

of such entail ; unless the fine be levied by a woman after the death of her hus-

band, of lands which were, by the gift of him or his ancestors, assigned to her

in tail for her jointure ; (p) or unless it be of lands entailed by act of parlia-

ment or letters patent, and whereof the reversion belongs to the crown

From this view of the common law, regulated by these statutes, *c appears

that a fine is a solemn conveyance on record from the cognizor to the cognizee,

and that the persons bound by a fine are parties, privies and strangers.

The parties are either the cognizor or cognizees, and these are immediately

concluded by the fine, and barred of any latent right they might have, even

though under the legal impediment of coverture. (6) And indeed, as this is

almost the only act that a feme-covert, or married woman, is permitted by law

to do (and that because she is privately examined as to her voluntary consent,

which removes the general suspicion of compulsion by her husband), it is there-

fore the usual and almost the only safe method, whereby she can join in the

sale, settlement, or incumbrance, of any estate.

Privies to a fine are such as are any way related to the parties who levy the

fine, and claim under them by any right of blood or other right of representa-

tion. Such as are the heirs general of the cognizor, tlie issue in tail since the

statute of Henry the Eighth, the vendee, devisee, and all others who must make

title by the persons who levied the fine. For the act of the ancestor shall bind

the heir, and the act *of the principal, his substitute, or such as claim
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under any conveyance made by him subsequent to the fine so levied, (p) \ '*'' ' '

Strangers to a fine are all other persons in ths world, except only parties and

privies. And these are also bound by a fine, unless, within five years after proc-

lamations made, they interpose their claim; provided they are under no legal

impediments, and have then a present interest in the estate. The impediments,

84 hath before been said, are coverture, infancy, imprisonment, insanity, and

posence beyond sea; and persons, who are thus incapacitated to prosecute their

rights, have five years allowed them to put in their claims after such impedi-

ments are removed. Persons also that have not a present, but a future interest

only, as those in remainder or reversion, have five years allowed them to claim

m, from the time that such right accrues, (q) And if within that time they

neglect to claim, or (by the statute 4 Ann. c. 16,) if they do not bring an action

to try the right within one year after making such claim, and prosecute the

mme with effect, all persons whatsoever are barred of whatever right they may

have, by force of the statute of non-claim.

But, in order to make a fine of any avail at all, it is necessary that the parties

should have some interest or estate in the lands to be affected by it. Else it were

possible that two strangers by a mere confederacy, might without any risk

defraud the owners by levying fines of their lands ; for if the attempt be discov-

ered, they can be no sufferers, but must only remain in statu quo; whereas if a

tenant for life levies a fine, it is an absolute forfeiture of his estate to the remain-

der-man or reversiouer, (r) if claimed in proper time. It is not therefore to be

supposed that such tenants will frequently run so great a hazard; but if they

do, and claim is not duly made within five years after their respective terms

expire, (s) the estate is forever barred by it. Yet where a stranger, whose pre-

sumption cannot be thus punished, officiously interferes in an estate which in

nowise belongs to him, *his fine is of no effect ; and may at any time be r *->KIV -i

set aside (unless by such as are parties or privies thereunto) (t) by plead- L -I

ing that "paries finis nihil habuerunt." And, even if a tenant for years, who

hath only a chattel interest, and no freehold in the land, levies a fine, it operates

nothing, but is liable to be defeated by the same plea. (M) Wherefore when a

(o) See statute 11 Hen. VII, e. 20. (p) 8 Rep. 87. (q) Co. Litt. 372. fr/Co. latt. 251.

(t) 2 Lev. 52. ( t) Hob. S4S.' fu) 6 Hep. 123. Hardr. 401.

(6) [A fine levied by a lunatic was valid in law, though in equity relief might have been had.

2 Tern. 678 ; 4 Hep. 124 ; 12 id. 124 ; 1 Per and D. 126.]
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been entailed, shall be a perpetual bar to them anu their heirs claiming by force
of such entail; unless the fine be levied by a. woman after the death of her husband, of lands which were, by the gift of him or his ancestors, assigned to her
in tail for her jointure; (o) or unless it be of lands entailed by act of parliament or letters patent, and whereof the reversion belongs to the crown
From this view of the common law, regulated by these statutes, .t appears
that a fine is a solemn conveyance on record from the cognizor t-0 the cognizee,
and that the persons bound by a fine are parties, privies and strangers.
The parties are either the cognizor or cognizees, and these are immediately
concluded by the fine, and barred of any latent right they might have, even
though under the legal impediment of coverture. (6) And indeed, as this is
almost the only act that a feme-covert, or married woman, is permitted by law
to do (and that because she is privately examined as to her voluntary consent,
which removes the general suspicion of compulsion by her husband), it is therefore the usual and almost the only safe method, whereby she can join in the
sale, settlement, or incnmbrance, of any estate.
Privies to a fine are such as are any way related to the parties who levy the
fine, and claim under them by any right of blood or other right of represen~
tion. Such as are the heirs general of the cognizor, the issue in tail since the
statute of Henry the Eighth, the vendee, devisee, and all others who must make
title by the persons who levied the fine. For the act of the ancestor shall bind
the heir, and the act *of the principal, his substitute, or such as claim ( • 356 J
under any conveyance made by him subsequent to the fine so levied. (p)
Strangers to a fine are all other persons in ths world, except only parties and
privies. And these are also bound by a fine, unless, within five years after proclamations made, they interpose their claim; provided they are under no Jegal
impediments, and have then a present interest in the estate. '.fhe impediments,
a~ hath before been said, are coverture, infancy, imprisonment, insanity, and
11 osence beyond sea; and persons, who are thus incapacitated to prosecute their
nghts, have five years allowed them to put in then· claims after such impediments are removed. Persons also that have not a present, but a future interest
1mly, as those in remainder or reversion, have five lears allowed them to claim
m, from the time that such right accrues. (q)
nd if within that time they
neglect to claim, or (by the statute 4 Ann c. 16,) if they do not bring an action
to try the right within one year after making such claim, and prosecute the
:.iame with effect, all persons whatsoever are barred of whatever right they may
l:la\'e, by force of the statute of non-claim.
But,, in order to make a fine of any avail at all, it is necessary that the parties
3hould have some interest or estate in the lands to be affected by it. Else it were
~ossible that two strangers by a mere confederacy, might without any risk
'lef'raud the owners by levying fines of their lands; for if the attempt be discovered, they can be no suiferers, but must only remain in statu quo; whereas if a.
tenant for life levies a fine, it is an absolute forfeiture of his estate to the remaindP-r-man or reversioner, (r) if claimed in proper time. It is not therefore to be
supposed that such tenants will frequently run so great a hazard; but if they
do, and claim is not duly made within five years after their respective terms
expire, (s) the estate is forever barred by it. Yet where a stranger, whose presumption cannot be thus punished, officiously interferes in an estate which in
nowise belongs to him, "'his fine is of no effect; and may at any time be [ *35 ]
set aside (unless by such as are parties or privies thereunto) (t) by plead'7
ing that "partes finis nikil habuemnt." And, even if a tenant for years, who
hath only a chattel interest, and no freehold in the ]and, levies a fine, 1t operates
nothing, but is liable to be defeated by the same plea. (u) Wherefore when a
(o;° See statute 11 Hen. VII, o. to.
(pJ8Rep. ~.
(q) Co. Utt. sn.
(r) 'Co, Litt. ?.Ill.
(1) i Lev. M.

(t) Hob. MS;

(U)

5 Rep. 123, Hardr.

«)l.

(6) [A fine levied by a lunatic was valid in law, though in equity relief might have been had.
2 Vern. 678; 4 Rep. 1~; 12 id. 1~ ; 1 Per and D. 126.)
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lessee for years is disposed to levy a fine, it is usual for him to make a feoffment

first, to displace the estate of the reversioner, (v) and create a new freehold bj

disseisin. And thus much for the conveyance or assurance by fine: which not

only, like other conveyances, binds the grantor himself, and his heirs; but also

all mankind, whether concerned in the transfer or no, if they fail to put in their

claims within the time allotted by law.

IV. The fourth species of assurance, by matter of record, is acommon recovery. (7)

Concerning the original of which it was formerly observed, (w) that common

recoveries were invented by the ecclesiastics to elude the statutes of mort-

main ; and afterwards encouraged by the finesse of the courts of law in 12 Edw.

IV, in order to put an end to all fettered inheritances, and bar not only estates-

tail, but also all remainders and reversions expectant thereon. I am now, there-

fore, only to consider first, the nature of a common recovery; and, secondly, its

force and effect.

And, first, the nature of it: or what a common recovery is. A common

recovery is so far like a fine, that it is a suit or action, either actual or fictitious;

and in it the lands are recovered against the tenant of the freehold; which

recovery, being a supposed adjudication of the right, binds all persons, and vesta

a free and absolute fee-simple in the recoveror. A recovery, therefore, being in

the nature of an action at law, not immediately compromised like a fine, but

carried on through every regular stage of proceeding, I am greatly apprehensive

that its form and method will not DC easily understood by the student who is
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F *358 1 no* y6* acclnainte<l *with the course of judicial proceedings; which can-

*• J not be thoroughly explained, till treated of at large in the third book of

these Commentaries. However, I shall endeavor to state its nature and progress,

as clearly and concisely as I can; avoiding, as far as possible, all technical terms

and phrases not hitherto interpreted.

Let us, in the first place, suppose David Edwards (a;) to be tenant of the free-

hold, and desirous to suffer a common recovery, in order to bar all entails,

remainders, and reversions, and to convey the same in fee-simple to Francis

Golding. To effect this, Golding is to bring an action against him for the

lands; and he accordingly sues out a writ, called a prcecipe quod reddat, because

those were its initial or most operative words, when the law proceedings were in

Latin. In this writ the demandant Golding alleges that the defendant Edwards

(here called the tenant) has no legal title to the land; but that he came into

possession of it after one Hugh Hunt had turned the demandant out of it. (y)

The subsequent proceedings are made up into a record or recovery roll (z) in

which the writ and complaint of the demandant are first recited: whereupon

the tenant appears, and calls upon one Jacob Morland, who is supposed, at the

original purchase, to have warranted the title to the tenant; and thereupon he

prays that the said Jacob Morland may be called in to defend the title which

he so warranted. This is called the voucher, vocatio, or calling of Jacob Mor-

land to warranty; and Morland is called the vouchee. Upon this, Jacob Mor-

land, the vouchee, appears, is impleaded, and defends the title. Whereupon

Golding, the demandant, desires leave of the court to imparl, or confer with the

vouchee in private; which is (as usual) allowed him. And soon afterwards the

demandant Golding returns to court, but Morland the vouchee disappears, or

makes default. Whereupon judgment is given for the demandant Golding,

now called the recoveror, to recover the lands in question against the tenant,

r *o5Q 1 Edwards, who is now the recoveree; *and Edwards has judgment to

1- J recover of Jacob Morland lands of equal value, in recompense for the

lands so warranted by him, and now lost by his default; which is agreeable to

the doctrine of warranty mentioned in the preceding chapter, (a) This is called

(v) Hardr. 402. 2 Lev. 52. (v>) Pages 117, 271. (x) See Appendix, No. Y.

fy) 11. (z) i 2. (a) Page 301.

(7) Common recoveries are now abolished in England by statute 3 and 4 William IV, c. 74.

They are also abolished by express statute in some of the United States, bnt were never much

employed in any of them,
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lessee for years is disposed to levy a fine, it is usual for him to make a feoffment;
first, to displace the estate of the reversioner, (v) and create a new freehold by
disseisin. And thus much for the conveyance or assurance by fine: which not
only, like other conveyances, binds the grantor himself, and his heirs; but also
all mankind, whether concerned in the transfer or no, if they fail to put in their
claims within the time allotted by law.
IV. The fourth species of assurance, by matter of record, is a common reCQ'Very. (7)
Concerning the original of which it was formerly observed, (w) that common
recoveries were invented by the ecclesiastics to elude the statutes of moJ"t..
main ; and afterwards encouraged by the finesse of the courts of law in 12 Edw.
IV, in order to put an end to all fettered inheritances, and bar not only estatestail, but also all remainders and reversions expectant thereon. I am now, therefore, only to consider first, the nature of a common recovery; and, secondly, its
force and effect.
And, first, the nature of it: or what a common recovery is. A common
recovery is so far like a fine, that it is a suit or action, either actual or fictitious;
and in it the lands are recovered against the tenant of the freehold; which
recovery, being a supposed adjudication of the right, binds a.II persons, and vests
a free and absolute fee-simple in the recoveror. A recovery, therefore, being in
the nature of an action at law, not immediately compromised like a fine, but
carried on through every regular s~e of _eroceedmg, I am greatly apprehensive
that its form and method will not "be easily understood by the student who is
[ • 358 ] not yet acquainted "'with the course of judicial proceedings; which cannot be thoroughly explained, till treated of at large in the third book of
these Commentaries. However, I shall endeavor to state its nature and progress,
as clearly and concisely as I can; avoiding, a.a far a.a poBBible, all technical terms
and phrases not hitherto interpreted.
Let us, in the first place, suppose David Edwards (x) to be tenant of the freehold, and desirous to suffer a common recovery, in order to bar all ent.ails,
remainders, and reversions, and to convey the same in fee-simple to Francis
Golding. To effect this, Golding is to bring an action against him for the
lands; and he accordingly sues out a writ, called a prC8cipe quod reddat, because
those were its initial or most operative words, when the law proceedings were in
Latin. In this writ the demandant Golding alleges that the defendant Edwards
(here called the tenant) ha.a no legal title to the land; but that he came into
possession of it after one Hugh Hunt had turned the demandant out of it. (y)
The subsequent proceedings are made up into a record or recovery roll (z) m
which the writ and complaint of the demandant are first recited: whereupon
the tenant appears, and calla upon one J acoh Morland, who is supposed, at the
original purchase, to have warranted the title to the tenant; and thereupon he
prays that the said Jacob Morland may be called in to defend the title which
he so warranted. This is called the voucher, vocatio, or calling of Jacob Morland to warranty; and Morland is called the vouchee. Upon this, Jacob Morland, the vouchee, appears, is impleaded, and defends the title. Whereupon
Golding, the demandant, desires leave of the court to imparl, or confer with the
vouchee in private; which is (as usual) allowed him. And soon afterwards the
demandant Golding returns to court~ but Morland the vouchee disappears, or
makes default. Whereupon judgment is given for the demandant Golding,
now called the recoveror, to recover the lands in question against the tenant,
[ ,..359 ] Edwards, who is now the recoveree; "'and Edwards has judgment to
recover of Jacob Morland lands of e<J.ual value, in recompense for the
lands so warranted by him, and now lost by his default; which is agreeable to
the doctrine of warranty mentioned in the preceding chapter. (a) This is called
(z) See Appendix, No. v.
('1) Hardr. 40'J. 2 Lev. 62.
(TD) Pages 117, ll7i.
(IJJ ii.

(111J i
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(a)

Pare 801.

(7) Common recoveries are now abolished in England bv statute 3 and 4 William IV, c. 74.
They are also abolished by express statute in some of the United States, but were never much
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the recompense, or recovery in value. But Jacob Morland having no lands of

Ms own, being usually the cryer of the court (who, from being frequently thus

vouched, is called the common vouchee), it is plain that Edwards has only a

nominal recompense for the land so recovered against him by Golding; which

lands are now absolutely vested in the said recoveror by judgment of law, and

seisin thereof is delivered by the sheriff of the county. So that this collusive

recovery operates merely in the nature of a conveyance in fee-simple, from

Edwards the tenant in tail, to Golding the purchaser.

The recovery, here described, is with a single voucher only; but sometimes it

is with a double, treble, or farther voucher, as the exigency of the case may

require. And indeed it is now usual always to have a recovery with double

voucher at the least: by first conveying an estate of freehold to any indifferent

person, against whom the pracipe is brought; and then he vouches the tenant

in tail, who vouches over the common vouchee, (b) For, if a recovery be had

immediately against tenant in tail, it bars only such estate in the premises of

which he is then actually seised; whereas if the recovery be had against another

person, and the tenant in tail be vouched, it bars every latent right and interest

which he may have in the lands recovered, (c) If Edwards therefore be tenant

of the freehold in possession, and John Barker be tenant in tail in remainder,

here Edwards doth first vouch Barker, and then Barker vouches Jacob Morland,

the common vouchee; who is always the last person vouched, and always makes

default: whereby the demandant Golding recovers the land against the tenant
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Edwards, and Eawards recovers a recompense of equal value against Barker,

the first vouchee; who recovers the like against Morland, the common vouchee,

against whom such ideal recovery in value is always ultimately awarded.

*This supposed recompense in value is the reason why the issue in tail

is held to be barred by a common recovery. For if the recoveree should

obtain a recompense in lands from the common vouchee (which there is a possi-

bility in contemplation of law, though a very improbable one, of his doing),

these lands would supply the place of those so recovered from him by collusion,

and would descend to the issue in tail, (d) This reason will also hold with equal

force, as to most remainder-men and reversioners; to whom the possibility will

remain and revert, as a full recompense for the reality, which they were other-

wise entitled to: but it will not always hold: and therefore, as Pigot says, (e)

the judges have been even astuti, in inventing other reasons to maintain the

authority of recoveries. And, in particular, it hath been said, that, though

the estate-tail is gone from the recoveree, yet it is not destroyed, but only trans-

ferred j and still subsists, and will ever continue to subsist (by construction of

law) in the recoveror, his heirs and assigns: and, as the estate-tail so continues

to subsist forever, the remainders or reversions expectant on the determination

of such an estate-tail can never take place. (8)

To such awkward shifts, such subtile refinements, and such strange reasoning,

were our ancestors obliged to have recourse, in order to get the better of that

stubborn statute de donis. The design for which these contrivances were set on

foot, were certainly laudable; the unriveting the fetters of estates-tail, which were

attended with a legion of mischiefs to the commonwealth: but, while we ap-

plaud the end, we cannot but admire the means. Our modern courts of justice

have indeed adopted a more manly way of treating the subject; by considering

common recoveries in no other light than as the formal mode of conveyance, by

which tenant in tail is enabled to aliene his lands. But, since the all conse-

(M See Appendix, page xvili. (c) Bro. Abr. tit. Tatte, 82. Plowd. 8.

{d} Dr. & St. b. 1, dial. ». («) Of com. recov. IS, 14.

($) [Chief Justice Willes has declared that, "Mr. Pigot has confounded himself and every

body else who reads bin book, by endeavoring to give reasons for and explain common recov-

eries. I only say this," he adds, "to show that when men attempt to give reasons for common

the recompense, or recovery in value. But Jacob Morland having no lan<ls of
his own, being usually the cryer of the court (who, from being frequently thus
vouched, is called the common vouchee), it is plain that Edwards has only a
nominal recompense for the land so recovered against him by Golding; which
lands are now absolutely vested in the said recoveror by judgment of law, and
seisin thereof is delivered by the sheriff of the county. So tbat this collusive
recovery operates merely in the nature of a conveyance in fee-simple, from
Edwards the tenant in tail, to Golding the purchaser.
The recovery, here described, is with a single voucher only; but sometimes it
is with a double, treble, or farther voucher, as the exigency of the case may
require. And indeed it is now usual always to have a recovery with double
voucher at the least: by first conveying an estate of freehold to any indifferent
person, against whom the prmcipe is brought; and then he vouches the tenant
m tail, who vouches over the common vouchee. (b) For, if a recovery be had
immediately against tenant in tail, it bars only such estate in the premises of
which he is then actually seised; whereas if the recovery be had against another
person, and the tenant in tail he vouched, it bars every latent right and interest
which he may have in the lands recovered. (c) If Edwards therefore be tenant
of the freehold in possession, and John Barker he tenant in tail in remainder,
here Edwards doth first vouch Barker, and then Barker vouches Jacob Morland,
the common vouchee; who is always the last person vouched, and always makes
default: whereby the demandant Golding recovers the land against the tenant
Edwards, and Edwards recovers a recompense of equal value against Barker,
the first vouchee; who recovers the like against Morland, the common vonchee,
against whom such ideal recovery in value is always ultimately awarded.
•This supposed recompense in value is the reason why the issue in tail .[ • 360 ]
is held to he barred by a common recovery. For if the recoveree should
obtain a recompense in lands from the common vouchee (which there is a possibility in contemplation of law, though a very improbable one, of his doing),
these lands would supply the place of those so recovered from him by collusion,
and would descend to the issue in tail. (d) This reason will also hold with equal
force, as to most remainder-men and reversioners; to whom the possibility will
remain and revert, as a full recompense for the reality, which they were otherwise entitled to: but it will not always hold: and therefore, as Pigot says, (e)
the judges have been even astuti, in inventin~ other reasons to maintain the
authority of recoveries. And, in particular, it hath been said, that, though
the estate-tail is gone from the recoveree, yet it is not destroyed, but only transferred; and still subsists, and will ever continue to subsist (by construction of
law) in the recoveror, his heirs and assigns: and, as the estate-tail so continues
to subsist forever, the remainders or reversions expectant on the determination
of such an estate-tail can never take P.lace. (8)
To such awkward shifts, such subble refinements, and such strange reasoning,
were our ancestors obli~ed to have recourse, in order to get the better of that
stubborn statute de dams. The design for which these contrivances were set on
foot, were certainly laudable; the unriveting the fetters of estates-tail, which were
attended with a legion of mischiefs to the commonwealth: but, while we applaud the end, we cannot but admire the means. Our modern courts of justice
have indeed adopted a more manly way of treating the subject; by considering
common recoveries in no other light than as the formal mode of convexance, by
which tenant in tail is enabled to aliene his lands. But, since the 111 conse(bl See Ap_pendix. page xvill.
(dl Dr. & St. b. I,' dial. !16.

(el

(cl Bro. .A.br. tU. Taile, 82. Plowd. 8.
H.

or com. recov.13,

recoveries, they run into absurdities, and the whole of what they say is unintelligible jargon

and learned nonsense. They havu been in use some hundreds of years, have gained ground

by time, and wo roust now take them, as they really are, as common assurance*. 1 Wits. 73.]

VOL. I.—72 56'J

(13) [Chief Justice Willes ha.~ deele.rod that, "Yr. Pigot ha..~ confounded himself and every
body e1rie who reads hi11 book, by endea.rnring to give roMOns for and explain common recoverieA. I only say thi11," he adds, "to show tha.t when men attempt to give reasons for common
recoverieR, they run into ah~urditic~, aud the wholo of what they say is unintelligible jargon
and leurnecl non><eu,.;e. Ther h1wu liecn iu use some hundredM of yesrll, hRve ~aiuecl ground
hy time, und wo mnr<t now tnkc them, a.~ they really are, as common assurance,.;.' 1 Wil11. 73.)
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f *3611 1uence8 °f fettered inheritances are now generally seen *and allowed,

"- •* and of course the utility and expedience of setting them at liberty are

apparent; it hath often been wished, that the process of this conveyance was

shortened, and rendered less subject to niceties, by either totally repealing the

statute de donis; which, perhaps, by reviving the old doctrine of conditional

fees, might give birth to many litigations: or oy vesting in every tenant in tail,

of full age, the same absolute fee-simple at once, which now he may obtain

whenever he pleases, by the collusive fiction of a common recovery; though this

might possibly bear hard upon those in remainder or reversion by abridging the

chances they would otherwise frequently have, as no recovery can be suffered in

the intervals between term and term, which sometimes continue for near five

months together: or, lastly, by empowering the tenant in tail to bar the estate-

tail by a solemn deed, to be made in term time, and enrolled in some court of

record: which is liable to neither of the other objections, and is warranted not

only by the usage of our American colonies, and the decisions of our own

courts of justice, which allow a tenant in tail (without fine or recovery) to ap-

point his estate to any charitable use, (/) but also by the precedent of the

statute (g) 21 Jac. I, c. 19, which, in case of the bankrupt tenant in tail, em-

powers his commissioners to sell the estate at any time, by deed indented and

enrolled. And if, in so national a concern, the emoluments of the officers con-

cerned in passing recoveries are thought to be worthy attention, those might be

provided for in the fees to be paid upon each enrollment.
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2. The force and effect of common recoveries may appear, from what has been

said, to be an absolute bar not only of all estates-tail, but of remainders and

reversions expectant on the determination of such estates. So that a tenant in

tail may, by this method of assurance, convey the lands held in tail to the recov-

eror, his heirs and assigns, absolutely free and discharged of all conditions and

limitations in tail, and of all remainders and reversions. But by statute 34 and

35 Hen. VIII, c. 20, no recovery had against tenant in tail, of the king's gift,

whereof the remainder or reversion is in the king, shall bar such estate-tail, or

the remainder or reversion of the crown. And by the statute 11 Hen. VII, c.

F *3621 ^'no *woman> after her husband's death, shall suffer a recovery of lands

L -I settled on her by her husband, or settled on her husband and her by any

of his ancestors. And by statute 14 Eliz. c. 8, no tenant for life, of any sort,

can suffer a recovery, so as to bind them in remainder or reversion. For which

reason, if there be tenant for life, with remainder in tail, and other remainders

over, and the tenant for life is desirous to suffer a valid recovery; either he, or

the tenant to the prcecipe by him made, must, vouch the remainier-man in tail,

otherwise the recovery is void; but if he does vouch such remainder-man, and

he appears and vouches the common vouchee, it is then good; for if a man be

vouched and appears, and suffers the recovery to be had against the tenant to

the pracipe, it is as effectual to bar the estate-tail as if he himself were the

recoveree. (/*)

In all recoveries it is necessary that the recoreree, or tenant to the prte-

cipe, as he is usually called, be actually seised of the freehold, else the recovery

is void, (t) For all actions, to recover the seisin of lands, must be brought

against the actual tenant of the freehold, else the suit will lose its effect; since

the freehold cannot be recovered of him who has it not. And though these

recoveries are in themselves fabulous and fictitious, yet it is necessary that there

be actores fabulce, properly qualified. But the nicety thought by some modern

practitioners to be requisite in conveying the legal freehold, in order to make a

good tenant to the prcecipe, is removed by the provisions of the statute 14

Geo. II, c. 20, which enacts, with a retrospect and conformity to the ancient rule

of law, (/) that, though the legal freehold be vested in lessees, yet those, who are

entitled to the next freehold estate in remainder or reversion may make a good

tenant to the prcecipe ;—that though the deed or fine which creates such tenant

'. 876: (a) See page 288. ift) SaUc. 571.

tjl

Jl Pigot, fl, Ac. 4 Burr. 1,115.

[ ..,3 ] quences of fettered inheritances are now generally seen •and allowed,
61 and of course the utilit,Y and expedience of setting them at liberty are
apparent; it hath often been wished, that the process of this conveyance WWJ
shortened, and rendered less subject to niceties, by either totally repealing the
statute de doni.~; which, perhaps, by reviving the old doctrine of conditional
fees, might give birth to many litigations: or by vestin~ in ernry tenant in tail,
of full age, the same absolute fee-simple at once, which now he may obtain
whenever he pleases, by the collusive fiction of a common recovery; though this
might possibly be.ar hard upon those in remainder or reversion by abridging the
chances they would otherwise frequently have, as no recovery can be suffered in
the intervals between term and term, which sometimes continue for near five
months together: or, lastly, by empowering the tenant in tail to bar the estatetail by a solemn deed, to be made in term time, and enrolled in some court of
record: which is liable to neither of the other objections, and is warranted not
only by the usage of our American colonies, and the decisions of our own
courts of justice, which allow a tenant in tail (without fine or recovery) to appoint his estate to any charitable use,(/) but also by the precedent of the
statute ( g) 21 Jae. I, c. 19, which, in case of the bankrupt tenant in tail, empowers his commissioners to sell the estate at any time, by deed indented and
enrolled. And if, in so national a concern, the emoluments of the officers concerned in passing recoveries are thought to be worthy attention, those might be
provided for in the fees to be paid upon each enrollment.
2. The force and effect of common recoveries may appear, from what has been
said, to be an absolute bar not only of all estates-tail, but of remainders and
reversions expectant on the determination of such estates. So that a tenant in
tail may, by this method of assurance, convey the lands held in tail to the recoveror, his heirs and assigns, absolutely free and discharged of all conditions and
limitations in tail, and of all remainders and reversions. But by statute 34 and
35 Hen. VIII, c. 20, no recovery had against tenant in tail, of the king's gift,
whereof the remainder or reversion is in the king, shall bar such estate-tail, or
the remainder or reversion of the crown. And by the statute 11 Hen. VII, c.
[ • 362 ] 20, no •woman, after her husband's death, shall suffer a recovery of lands
settled on her by her husband, or settled on her husband and her by any
of his ancestors. And by statute 14 Eliz. c. 8, no tenant for life, of any sort,
. can suffer a recovery, so as to bind them in remainder or reversion. For which
reason, if there be tenant for life, with remainder in tail, and other remainders
over, and the tenant for life is desirous to suffer a valid recoverv; either he, or
the tenant to the pr<Bcipe by him made, must. vouch the remainder-man in tail,
otherwise the recovery is void; but if he does vouch such remainder-man, and
he appears and vouches the common vouchee, it is then good; for if a man be
vouched and appears, and suflers the recovery to be had against the tenant to
the prmcipe, it is as effectual to bar the estat.e-tail as if he himself were the
recoveree. (h)
In all recoveries it is necessary that the recoTeree, or tenant to the pr<I!cipe, as he is usually called, be actually seised of t,h e freehold, else the recovery
is void. (i) For all actions, to recover the seisin of lands, must be brought
against the actual tenant of the freehold, else the suit will lose its effect; since
the freehold cannot be recovered of him who bas it not. And though these
recoveries are in themselves fabulous and fictitious, yet it is necessary that there
be adores fabulm, properly qualified. But the nicety thought by some modern
practitioners to be requisite m conveying the legal freehold, in order to make a
good tenant to the prmdpe, is removed by the provisions of the statute 14
Geo. II, c. 20, which enacts, with a retrospect and conformity to the ancient rule
of law, (j) that, though the legal freehold be vested in lessees, yet those, who are
entitled to the next freehold est.ate in remainder or reversion may make a good
tenant to the pr<Bcipe ; - that though the deed or fine which creates such tenant
(/) See page 876;
(I} Plgot, 28.

(g) Sec p11ge 286.
1jl Plgot, 41, .te.

II\) Salk. 671.

' Burr. 1, 115.
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be subsequent to the judgment of recovery, yet, if it be in the same term, the

recovery shall be valid in law;—and that, though the recovery itself do not

appear to be entered, or be not regularly entered, on record, yet the deed to make

a tenant to the pracipe, and declare the uses of the recovery, shall *after r ^^ -i

a possession of twenty years, be sufficient evidence, on behalf of a L l>'" 1

purchaser for valuable consideration, that such recovery was duly suffered. And

this may suffice to give the student a general idea of common recoveries, the

last species of assurance by matter of record.

Before I conclude this nead, I must add a word concerning deeds to lead, or

to declare, the uses of fines, and of recoveries. For if they be levied or suffered

without any good consideration, and without any uses declared, they, like other

conveyances, enure only to the use of him who levies or suffers them, (k) And

if a consideration appears, yet as the most usual fine, " sitr cognizance de droit

come ceo, &c., conveys an absolute estate, without any limitations, to the cog-

nizee; and as common recoveries do the same to the recoveror; these assurances

could not be made to answer the purpose of family settlements (wherein a vari-

ety of uses and designations is very often expedient), unless their force and

effect were subjected to the direction of other more complicated deeds, wherein

particular uses can be more particularly expressed. The fine or recovery itself,

like a power once gained in mechanics, may be applied and directed to give effi-

cacy to an infinite variety of movements in the vast and intricate machine of a

voluminous family settlement. And if these deeds are made previous to the
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fine or recovery, they are called deeds to lead the uses; if subsequent, deeds to

declare them. As if A, tenant in tail, with reversion to himself in fee, would

settle his estate on B for life, remainder to C in tail, remainder to D in fee; that

is what by law he has no power of doing effectually, while his own estate-tail is

in being. He therefore usually, after making the settlement proposed, covenants

to levy a fine (or if there be any intermediate remainders, to suffer a recovery)

to E, and directs that the same shall enure to the uses in such settlement men-

tioned. This is now a deed to lead the uses of the fine or recovery; and the fine

when levied, or recovery when suffered, shall enure to the uses so specified, and

no other. For though E, the cognizee or recoveror, hath a fee-simple vested in

himself by the fine or recovery; yet, by the operation of this deed, he

*becomes a mere instrument or conduit-pipe, seised only to the use of B, r „„,,, -,

C, and D, in successive order: which use is executed immediately, by L -I

force of the statute of uses. (I) Or, if a fine or recovery be had without any

previous settlement, and a deed be afterwards made between the parties, declar-

ing the uses to which the same shall be applied, this will be equally good, as if

it had been expressly levied or suffered in consequence of a deed directing its

operation to those particular uses. For by statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, indent-

ures to declare the uses of fines and recoveries, made after the fines and

recoveries had and suffered, shall be good and effectual in law, and the fine and

recovery shall enure to such uses, and be esteemed to be only in trust, notwith-

standing any doubts that had arisen on the statute of frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, to

the contrary.

(t) Dyer, 18.

(1) This doctrine may perhaps be more clearly illustrated by example. In the deed or marriage settle-

ment in the Appendix, No. n, i 2. we may suppose the lands to have been originally settled on Abraham

and Cecilia Barker for life, remainder to John Barker in tail, with divers otherremainders over, reversion .

to Cecilia Barker in fee; and now intended to be settled to the several uses therein expressed viz.: to

Abraham anil Cecilia Barker till the marriage of John Barker with Kathcrine Edwards, and then to John

Barker for life ; remainder to trustees to preserve the contingent remainders: remainder to bis wife Kath-

erine for life, for her jointure; remainder to other trustees, fora term of five hundred years; remainder to

the first and other sons of the marriage In tail; remainder to the daughters in tail: remainder to John

Barker in tail; remainder to Cecilia Barker in fee. Now. it Is necessary, in order to bar the estate-tail of

John Barker, and the remiiiudera expectant thereon, that a recover)- be suffered of the premises; and it is

thonght proper (for though usual it is by 110 means necessary; see Forrester, 167) that, in order to make a

good tenant of the freehold or tenant to the pracipe, during the coverture, a fine should be levied by

Abraham. Cecilia and John Barker; and that the recovery itself be suffered against this tenant to the

nrrtcipe. who shall vouch John Barker, and thereby bar his estate-tall, andbecome tenant to the fne-simple

by virtue of su<-'h recovery; thu uses of which estate so acquired are lobe those expressed in this deed.

Accordingly the parties covenant to do these several acts (see page vliil; and in consequence thereof the

line and recovery are had and suffered (No. IV mi* No. V), of which this conveyance is a deed to lead the

u&es.

'-
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CHAPTER XXII.

WE are next to consider assurances by special custom, obtaining only in

particular places, and relative only to a particular species of real property.

OF ALIENATION BY SPECIAL CUSTOM.

This, therefore, is a very narrow title; being confined to copyhold lands, and

such customary estates as are holden in ancient demesne or in manors of

a similar nature; which, being of a very peculiar kind, and originally no more

than tenancies in pure or privileged villenage, were never alienable by deed;

for, as that might tend to defeat the lord of his seigniory, it is therefore a

forfeiture of a copyhold, (a) Nor are they transferable oy matter of record,

even in the king's courts, but only in the court baron of the lord. (1) The

method of doing this is generally by surrender; though in some manors, by

special custom, recoveries may be suffered of copyholds: (J) but these differing

in nothing material from recoveries of free land, save only that they are not

suffered in the king's courts, but in the court baron of the manor, I shall con-

fine myself to conveyances by surrender, and their consequences.

Surrender, sursumredditio, is the yielding up of the estate by the tenant into

the hands of the lord, for such purposes as in the surrender are expressed. As,

it may be, to the use and behoof of A and his heirs; to the use of his own

F *3661 W1^' an^ *ne ^^e' ^^e Pro.ce88> *n most manors, is that "the tenant

"• * ' J comes to the steward, either in court (or if the custom permits, out of

court), or else to two customary tenants of the same manor, provided there
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be also a custom to warrant it; and there, by delivering up a rod, a glove, or

other symbol, as the custom directs, resigns into the hands of the lord, by the

hands and acceptance of his said steward, or of the said two tenants, all his

interest and title to the estate; in trust to be again granted out by the lord, to

such persons and for such uses as are named in the surrender, and the custom

of the manor will warrant. If the surrender be made out of court, then at the

next or some subsequent court, the jury or homage must present and find it

upon their oaths; which presentment is an information to the lord or his

steward of what has been transacted out of court Immediately upon snch

surrender, in court, or upon presentment of a surrender made out of court, the

lord by his steward grants the same land again to cestui que use (who is some-

times, though rather improperly, called the surrenderee), to hold by the ancient

rents and customary services; and thereupon admits him tenant to the copy-

hold, according to the form and effect of the surrender, which must be exactly

pursued. And this is done by delivering up to the new tenant the rod or glove,

or the like, in the name, and as the symbol, of corporal seisin of the lands and

tenements. Upon which admission he pays a fine to the lord, according to the

custom of the manor, and takes the oath of fealty. (2)

In this brief abstract of the manner of transferring copyhold estates we may

plainly trace the visible footsteps of the feudal institutions. The fief, being of

a base nature and tenure, is unalienable without the knowledge and consent of

the lord. For this purpose it is resigned up, or surrendered into his hands.

Custom, and the indulgence of the law, which favours liberty, has now given

(a) Litt. I n. (\>) Moor. 637.

(1) [This is true, because real actions, which alone were conclusive as to the title, could (inly

be brought to recover copyholds in the lord's court. But ejectment is commonly brought in the

superior courts to recover the possession of copyholds. See 1 Jac. and Wai. 549. ]

(•-!) [Femes-covert and infants may be admitted by their attorney or guardian, and in default

of their appearance, the lord may appoint a guardian or attorney for that purpose. If the

fines are not paid, the lord may enter and receive the profits till he is satisfied, accounting

WE are next to consider assurances by special custom, obtaining only in
particular places, and relative only to a particular species of real propertv.
This, therefore, is a very narrow title; being confined to copyhold lands, and
such customary estates as are holden in ancient demesne or in manors of
a similar nature; which, being of a ve17. peculiar kind, and originally no more
than tenancies in pure or privileged villenage, were never alienable by deed;
for, as that might tend to defeat the lord of his seigniorv, it is therefore a
forfeiture of a copyhold. (a) Nor are they transferal)le by matter of record,
even in the king's courts, but only in the court baron of the lord. (1) The
method of doing this is generally by surrender; though in some manors, by
special custom, recoveries may be suffered of copyholds: (b) but these differing
in nothing material from recoveries of free land, save only that they are not
suffered in the king's courts, but in the court baron of the manor, I shall confine myself to conveyances by surrender, and their consequences.
Surrender, sursumrcdditio, is the yieldin&' up of the estate by the tenant into
the hands of the lord, for such purposes as m the surrender are expressed. As,
it may be, to the use and behoof of A and his heirs; to the use of his own
[ .,366 ] will; and the like. The process, in most manors, is that *the tenant
comes to the steward, either in court (or if the custom permits, out of
court), or else to two customary tenants of the same manor, provided there
be also a custom to warrant it; and there, h,Y delivering up a rod, a glove, or
other symbol, as the custom directs, resigns mto the hands of the lord, by the
hands and acceptance of his said steward, or of the said two tenants, all his
interest and title to the estate; in trust to be again granted out by the lord, to
such persons and for such uses as are named in the surrender, and the custom
of the manor will warrant. If the surrender be made out of court, then at the
next or some subsequent court, the jury or homage must present and find it
upon their oaths; which presentment is an information to the lord or his
steward of what has been transacted out of court. Immediately upon such
surrender, in court, or upon presentment of a surrender made out of court, the
lord by his steward grants the same land again to cestiti que use (who is sometimes, though rather improperly, called the surrenderee), to hold by the ancient
rents and customary services; and thereupon admits him tenant to the copybold, according to the form and effect of the surrender, which must be exactly
pursued. And this is done by delivering up to the new tenant the rod or glm·e,
or the like, in the name, and as the symbol, of corporal seisin of the lands and
tenements. Upon which admission he pays a fine to the lord, according to the
custom of the manor, and takes the oath of fealty. (2)
In this brief abstract of the manner of transferring copyhold estates we may
plainly trace the visible footsteps of the feudal institutions. The fief, being of
a base nature and tenure, is unalienable without the knowledge and consent of
the lord. For this purpose it is resigned up, or surrendered into his bands.
Custom, and the indulgence of the law, which favours liberty, has now given

yearly for the same upon demand of the person or persons entitled to the surplus, but no for-

(a) Litt.

J 7'.

(b) Moor. 637.

feiture shall be incurred by infants or femes-covert for not appearing, or refusing to pay fines

9 Geo. I, c. 29.]
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(1) [This is true, becauRe rt111l actiom~, which alone were conclusive as to the title, could only
be brought to recovor copyhold11 in the lord's court. But ejectment is commonly brought in th~
superior courts to recover t.bu po11iie~,;ion of copyholds. See 1 Jae. and Wal. 549.]
(~) [Femes-covert and infants may be admitted by their attorney or guardian, and in default
of their appearance, the lord may appoint a guardian or attomev for that purpose. If tho
fines are not paid, the lord may enter and receive the profits till he is satillfi.ed, accounting
yearly for the SQllle upon demand of tho pen;on or persons entitled to the e~lus, but no for·
feiture shall be incurred by in1iu1ts or fome11·covert for not appearing, or refusmg to pay fines
9 Geo. I, c. 29.]
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the tenant a right to name his successor; but formerly it was far otherwise.

And I am apt to suspect that this right is of much the same antiquity with the

introduction of uses with respect to freehold lands; for the alienee of a copy-

hold had merely jus fiduciarium, for which *there was no remedy at r **BH -i

law, but only by subpoena in chancery, (c) When, therefore, the lord had *• •"

accepted a surrender of his tenant's interest, upon confidence to re-grant the

estate to another person, either then expressly named or to be afterwards

named in the tenant's will, the chancery enforced this trust as a matter of con-

science ; which jurisdiction, though seemingly new in the time of Edward IV, (of)

was generally acquiesced in, as it opened the way for the alienation of copy-

holds, as well as of freehold estates, and as it rendered the use of them both equally

devisable by testament. Yet, even to this day, the new tenant cannot be admit-

ted but by composition with the lord, and paying him a fine by way of acknowl-

edgment for the license of alienation. Add to this the plain feudal investiture,

by delivering the symbol of seisin in presence of the other tenants in open

court; " quando Jiasta vel aliud corporeum quidlibet porriyitur a domino se

investituram facere dicente; quo) saltern coram duobus vasallis solemniter

fieri debet:" (e) and, to crown the whole, the oath of fealty is annexed, the very

bond of feudal subjection. From all which we may fairly conclude, that

had there been no other evidence of the fact in the rest of our tenures and

estates, the very existence of copyholds, and the manner in which they are

transferred, would inconteatibly prove the very universal reception which this

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

northern system of property for a long time obtained in this island; and which

communicated itself, or at least its similitude, even to our very villeins and

bondmen.

This method of conveyance is so essential to the nature of a copyhold estate,

that it cannot properly be transferred by any other assurance. No feoffment or

grant has any operation thereupon. If I would exchange a copyhold estate

with another, I cannot do it by an ordinary deed of exchange at the common

law, but we must surrender to each other's use, and the lord will admit us ac-

cordingly. If I would devise a copyhold, I must surrender *it to the r *ogo i

use of my last will and testament: (3) and in my will I must declare my L J

intentions, and name a devisee, who will then be entitled to admission. (/) A fine

or recovery had of copyhold lands in the king's court may, indeed, if not duly

reversed, alter the tenure of the lands, and convert them into frank fee, (g)

which is defined in the old book of tenures (h) to be "land pleadable at the com-

mon law;" but upon an action on the case, in the nature of a writ of deceit,

brought by the lord in the king's court, such fine or recovery will be reversed,

(e) Cro. Jac. 668. fd) Bro. Abr. Ut. Tenant per come,, 10. (e) Feud. 1. 2,1.1.

(f) Co. Copyh. i 86. fa) Old Nat. Brev. t. briefe de recto claum. F. N. B. IS.

(h) t. temr mfrante fee.

the tenant a right to name his successor; but formerly it was far otherwise.
And I am apt to suspect thn.t this right is of much the same antiquity with the
introduction of uses with respect to freehold lands; for the alience of a copybold had merely .fus .fiduc-iarium, for which *there was no remedy at [ • 367 ]
law, but only by subpama in chancery. (c) When, therefore, the lord had
accepted a surrender of his tenant's interest, upon confidence to re-grant the
est.ate to another person, either then expressly named or to be afterwards
named in the tenant's will, the chancery enforced this trust as a matter of conscience; which jurisdiction, thou~h seemingly new in the time of Edward IV, (ti)
was generally acquiesced in, 1'B 1t opened the way for the alienation of copyholds, as well as of freehold estates, and as it rendered the use of them both equally
devisable by test.ament. Yet, even to this day, the new tenant cannot be admitted but by composition with the lord, and paying him a fine by way of acknowledgment for the license of alienation. Add to this the plain feudal investiture,
by delivering the symbol of seisin in presence of the other tenants in open
court ; " quando hasta vel aliud corporeum quidlibet porrigitur a domino se
investituram f acere dicente ; qum saltem coram duobus vasallis solemniter
fieri debet :" (e) and, to crown the whole, the oath of fealty is annexed, the very
bond of feudal subjection. From all which we may fairly conclude, that
had there been no other evidence of the fact in the rest of our tenures and
estates, the very existence of copyholds, and the manner in which they are
transferred, would incontestibly prove the very universal reception which this
northern system of property for a long time obtained in this island; and which
communicated itself, or at least its similitude, even to our very villeins and
bondmen.
This method of conveyance is so essential to the nature of a copyhold estate,
that it cannot properly be transferred by any other assurance. No feoffment or
grant bas any operation thereupon. If I would exchange a copyhold estate
with another, I cannot do it by an ordinal'y deed of exchange at the common
law, but we must surrender to each other's use, and the lord will admit us accordingly. If I would devise a copyhold, I must surrender *it to the [ • 368 J
use of my last will and testament: (3) and in my will I must declare my
intentions, and name a devisee, who will then be entitled to admission.(/) A fine
or recovery had of copyhold lands in the king's court may, indeed, if not duly
reversed, alter the tenure of the lands, and convert them into frank fee, (g)
which is defined in the old book of tenures (h) to be "land plea.dable at the common law;" but upon an action on the case, in the nature of a writ of deceit,
brought by the lord in the king's court, such fine or recovery will be reversed,

(3) [To prevent the recurrence of the evils which frequently resulted from the devisors of copy-

(c) Cro. Jae. 1168.

f{J Co. Copyh. t 36.

hold lands omitting, either from negligence or ignorance, to surrender them to the uses of their

( J t.

wills, it was enacted by 55 Geo. Ill, c. 192, that where, by the custom of any manor in England

or Ireland, any copyhold tenant thereof may by will dispose of or appoint his copyhold tenement,

the same having been surrendered to such uses as shall be by such will declared, every disposi-

tion or charge of anv such copyholds, or of any right or title to the same, made by any such will

by any person who shall die after passing this act (viz., 12 July 1815), shall be as effectual,

although no surrender is made to the use of fitch will, as it would have been had such surrender

been made. But the claimants under the devise must pay the stamp duties, fees, <fcc., incident

to a surrender, as well as those upon admission Before the passing of this act, equity would re-

lieve in favor of a wife or younger children (but not of a brother, grandchildren, or natural

children); or where copyholds were devised for the pavment of debts. See 1 Atk. 387; 3 Bro.

229; 1 P. Wins. 60; 2 Ves. 582; 6 id. 544; 5 id. 557. Bnt where a surrender by a married

woman to the use of her will is required by the particular custom of the manor, the want of a

surrender is not aided; for the 55 Geo. Ill, c. 192, only aids the want of a formal sur-

render, and the surrender in this case is matter of substance, and requires to be accompanied

by the separate examination of the wife. 5 Bar. and Aid. 492; I Dowl. and R. 81. 8. C. Where

copyhold premises have been surrendered to such uses as the owner shall appoint, the anointment

may be made by will, and a surrender to the uses of such will was not necessary even before this

statute. 3 M. and S. 158.]

,
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(d) Bro . .Abr. tit. Ten4nl pt:r OOl1ie, 10.
(e) Feud. l. i, I. i.
(gl Old NIU. Breti. I. brlq"e ck recto clatuo. F. N. B. IS.

-

- - - - - -(3) [To prevent the recurrence of thti e1ilt1 which frequently resulted from the devisors of copyhold lands omitting, either from negligence or ignorance, to surrender them to the uses of their
wilh1, it was enacted by 55 Geo. III, o. 19'..?, that where, by the custom of any manor in England
or Ireland, anr copyhold tenant thereof may by will dispose of or appoint his copyhold tenement,
the same havmg been surrendered to such useH as shall be by such will declared, every dispmtition or charge of a.nv such copyholds, or of any right or title to the same, made by any such will
by any person who shall die after pa..,.~ing thi~ act (vi:o:., 12 July 1815), shall be as effectual,
although no surremler is matk t,o the use of 8'11ch will, as it would have been had such surrender
been made. But t.be claimants under the devil-le must pay tte stamp duties, fees, &c., incident
to a i<urrender, as well as those upon admission Before the passing of this !\Ct, equity would relieve in favor of a wife or younger children (but not of a brother, grandchildren, or natural
children); or where copyholds were devif1ed for the payment of clebtR. See 1 .A.tk. :387; 3 Bro.
229; 1 P. Wm!!. 60; 2 Vfl~. 58'2; 6 id. 544; 5 id. 557. But where a surrender by a married
woman to the use of her will is required by the particular custom of the manor, the want of a
surrender is not aided; for the 55 Geo. III, c. 1~2, only a.ids the want of a formal surrender, and the surrender in thif! ca.~e is mattor of 1mb11tance, and requires to be accompanied
bv the t1eparate examination of the wife. 5 Bar. and .Ald. 492; I Dow!. and H. 81. S. C. Where
ci1pvhold premh;es ba1e been surrendered to such uses as the owner Rhall appoint, the apointment
may be made by will, and a surrender to the uses of such will wa11 not necessary even before this
statute. 3 M:. and S. 158.]
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the lord will recover his jurisdiction; and the lands will be restored to their

former state of copyhold, (r) (4)

In order the more clearly to apprehend the nature of this peculiar assurance,

let us take a separate view of its several parts; the surrender, the presentment,

and the admittance.

1. A surrender by an admittance subsequent whereto the conveyance is to re-

ceive its perfection and confirmation, is rather'a manifestation of the alienor's

intention, than a transfer of any interest in possession. For, till admittance of

cestuy que use, the lord taketh notice of the surrenderor as his tenant; and he

shall receive the profits of the land to his own use, and shall discharge all ser-

vices due to the lord. Yet the interest remains in him not absolutely, but sub

modo ; for he cannot pass away the land to any other, or make it subject to any

other incumbrance than it was subject to at the time of the surrender. But no

manner of legal interest is vested in the nominee before admittance. If he enters,

he is a trespasser, and punishable in an action of trespass: (5) and if he sur-

renders to the use of another, such surrender is merely void, and by no matter

ex post facto can be confirmed. For though he be admitted in pursuance of the

original surrender, and thereby acquires afterwards a sufficient and plenary in-

terest as absolute owner, yet "his second surrender previous to his own admit-

tance is absolutely void ab initio ; because at the time of such surrender he had

but a possibility of an interest, and could therefore transfer nothing; and no

subsequent admittance can make an act good, which was ab initio void. Yet,
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though upon the original surrender the nominee hath but a possibility, it is

however such a possibility as may, whenever he pleases, be reduced to a certainty;

for he cannot either by force or fraud be deprived or deluded of the effects and

fruits of the surrender; but if the lord refuse to admit him, he is compellable

f *3691 t° do it by a bill in chancery, or a mandamus: (k) *and the surrenderor

«• J can in no wise defeat his grant; his hands being forever bound from

disposing of the land in any other way, and his mouth forever stopped from re-

voking or countermanding "his own deliberate act. (I)

2. As to the presentment; that, by the general custom of manors, is to be

made at the next court baron immediately after the surrender; but by special

custom in some places it will be good, though made at the second or other sub-

sequent court. And it is to be brought into court by the same persons that

took the surrender, and then to be presented by the homage; and in all points

material must correspond with the true tenor of the surrender itself. And

therefore, if the surrender be conditional, and the presentment be absolute, both

the surrender, presentment, and admittance thereupon, are wholly void: (m) the

surrender, as being never truly presented; the presentment, as being false; and

the admittance, as being founded on such untrue presentment. If a man sur-

renders out of court, and dies before presentment, and presentment be made

after his death, according to the custom, that is sufficient. (») So, too, if cestuy

que use dies before presentment, yet, upon presentment made after his death, his

heir according to the custom shall be admitted. The same law is, if those, into

whose hands the surrender is made, die bofore presentment; for, upon suffi-

cient proof in court, that such a surrender was made, the lord shall be com-

pelled to admit accordingly. And if the steward, the tenants, or others into

(fl See Book in, page 166. (1) 1 Boll. Eep. 107. (I) Co. Copyh. ( 88.

(m) It/id, i 40. I«] Co. I .ill. 62.

(4) [Now a person vrho has a legal estate in copyhold lands may dispose thereof, and bar the

entail, by surrender; if his estate be only an equitable one, he may effect the same purposes by

deed. See the statute of:! and 4 Win. IV, c. 74, ss. 50 to 54.]

(5) [The surrenderee would not now be considered a trespasser; for it has been determined

the lord will recover his jurisdiction; and the lands will be restored to their
former state of copyhold. (i) (4)
In order the more clearly to apprehend the nature of this peculiar assurance,
let us take a. separate view of its several parts; the surrender, the presentment,
and the admittance.
1. A surrender by an admittance subsequent whereto the conveyance is to receive its perfection and confirmation, iB rather·a manifestation of the alienor's
intention, than a transfer of any interest in possession. For, till admittance of
cestuy que wee, the lord taketh notice of the surrenderor as his tenant; and he
shall receive the proftts of the land to his own use, and shall discharge all services due to the lord. Yet the interest remains in him not absolutelv, but sub
mod-0; for he cannot pass away the land to any other, or make it subfect to any
other incumbrance than it was subject to at the time of the surrender. But no
manner of legal int.erest is vested in the nominee before admittance. If he enters,
he is a trespasser, and punishable in an action of trespass: ( 5) and if he surrenders to the use of another, such surrender is merel:y void, and by no matter
ex post facto can be confirmed. For though he be admitted in pursuance of the
originaf surrender, and thereby acquires afterwards a sufficient and plenary interest as absolut.e owner, yet his second surrender previous to his own ad.mitt.a.nee is absolutely void ah initio; because at the time of such surrender he had
but a possibility of an interest, and could therefore transfer nothing; and no
subsequent admittance can make an act good, which was ab initw void. Yet,
though upon the original surrender the nominee hath but a possibility, it is
however such a possibility as may, whenever he pleases, be reduced to a certainty;
for he cannot either by force or fraud be depnved or deluded of the effects and
fruits of the surrender; but if the lord refuse to admit him, he is compellable
[ • 369 ] to do it by o. bill in chancery, or a mandamus: (k) *and the surrenderor
can in no wise defeat his grant; his hands being forever bound from
disposing of the land in anv other way, and his mouth forever st.opped from revoking or countermanding his own deliberat.e act. (l)
2. As to the presentment ; that, by the general custom of manors, is to be
made at the next court baron immediately after the surrender; but by special
custom in some places it will be good, though made at the second or other subsequent court. And it is to be brought into court by the same :persons that
took the surrender, and then to be presented by the homage; and m all points
material must correspond with the true tenor of the surrender itself. And
therefore, if the surrender be conditional, and the presentment be absolut.e, both
the surrender, presentment, and admittance thereupon, are wholly void: (m) the
surrender, as being never truly present.ed; the presentment, as being false; and
the admittance, as being founded on such untrue presentment. If a man surrenders out of court, and dies before presentment, and l'resentment be made
after his death, according to the custom, that is sufficient. (n) So, too, if ccstuy
que use dies before presentment, yet~ upon presentment ma.de after his death, his
heir according to the custom shall be admitted. The same law is, if those, into
whose hands the surrender is made, die bofore presentment; for, upon sufficient proof in court, that such a surrender was made, the lord shall be compelled to admit accordingly. And if the steward, the t.ena.nts, or others into
(I) See Book III, page 166.
(k) 2 Boll. Rep. 107.
(rn) Ibid. 140.
(n) Co. Litt. 6'l.

{l) Co. Copyb. f 89.

that he may recover in an ejoctmeut against the surrenderor, upon a demise laid after the sur-

render, where there was an admittance of such party before trial: but as the surrenderor after

the surrender is considered merely a trustee for the nominee, it should seem that the decision

would have been the same even if the subsequent admittance had not been proved. 1 T. R. 600;

5 Burr. 2764; 16 East, 208.]
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(4), (Now a per11on who hB>l a legal estate in copyhold lands maydispot1e thereof, and bar the
entail, by surrender ; it' hill e,,itate be only an equitable one, he may effect the same purposes by
deed. Sec the statute of :l and 4 Wm. IV, c. 74, ss. 50 to 54.]
(5) [The 11urrenderee would not now be considered a trespasser; for it has been determined
thut be mny recover in an ejeetmeut again~t the surrenderor, u_pon a demise laid aft.er the surrender, where tbtire wa11 an admittancP of ~uch party before tru1l: but as the surrenderor after
tho surrender is con>1idered merely a trusl.ee for the nominee, it should Reem that the decision
would have been the same even if the subseque11t tldmittance had not bee11 \lfl>Ved. 1 T. R. 600;
6 Burr. 2764; 16 East, 208.]
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whose hands such surrender is made, refuse or neglect to bring it in to be pre-

sented, upon a petition preferred to the lord in his court baron, the party grieved

shall find remedy. But if the lord will not do him right and justice, he may

sue both the lord, and them that took the surrender, in chancery, and shall there

find relief.(o) (6)

*3. Admittance is the last stage, or perfection, of copyhold assurances. po^Q -i

And this is of three sorts : first, an admittance upon a voluntary grant L ' J

from the lord ; secondly, an admittance upon surrender by the former tenant ;

and, thirdly, an admittance upon a descent from the ancestor.

In admittances, even upon a voluntary grant from the lord, when copyhold

lands have escheated or reverted to him, the lord is considered as an instrument.

For though it is in his power to keep the lands in his own hands ; or to dispose

of them at his pleasure, by granting an absolute fee-simple, a freehold, or a

chattel interest therein ; and quite to change their nature from copyhold to socage

tenure, so that he may well be reputed their absolute owner and lord ; yet if he

will still continue to dispose of them as copyhold, he is bound to observe the

ancient custom precisely in every point, and can neither in tenure nor estate

introduce any kind of alteration ; for that were to create a new copyhold ; where-

fore in this respect the law accounts him custom's instrument. For if a copyhold

for life falls into the lord's hands, by the tenant's death, though the lord may

destroy the tenure and enfranchise the land, yet if he grants it out again by

copy, he can neither add to nor diminish the ancient rent, nor make any, the
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minutest, variation in other respects: (p) nor is the tenant's estate, so granted,

subject to any charges or incumbrances by the lord.(ff)

In admittances upon surrender of another, the lord is to no intent reputed as

owner, but wholly as an instrument : and the tenant admitted shall likewise be

subject to no charges or incumbrances of the lord ; for his claim to the estate is

solely under him that made the surrender.(r)

And, as in admittances upon surrenders, so in admittances upon descents, by

the death of the ancestor, the lord *is used as a mere instrument ; and r*qiyi -i

as no manner of interest passes into him by the surrender or the death L ' J

of his tenant, so no interest passes out of him by the act of admittance. And

therefore neither in the one case nor the other, is any respect had to the quantity

or quality of the lord's estate in the manor. For whether he be tenant in fee or

for years, whether he be in possession by right or by wrong, it is not material ;

since the admittances made by him shall not be impeached on account of his

title, because they are judicial, or rather ministerial acts, which every lord in

possession is bound to perform.(s)

Admittances, however, upon surrender, differ from admittances upon descent

in this, that by surrender nothing is vested in cestuy que use before admittance,

no more than in voluntary admittances ; but upon descent the heir is tenant

by copy immediately upon the death of his ancestor ; not indeed to all intents

and purposes, for he cannot be sworn on the homage, nor maintain an

action in the lord's court as tenant; but to most intents the law taketh

notice of him as of a perfect tenant of the land instantly upon the death of

his ancestor, especially where he is concerned with any stranger. He may enter

(o) Co. Copyb. « 40 d>) Ibid. (• 41. (q) 8 Rep. 63.

in 4 Rep. 27. Co. Lilt. 89. («) 4Bep. 37 I Rep. 140.

(6) [But now by the statute 4 and 5 Tic. c. 35, every surrender and deed of surrender which

the lord shall be compollable to accept or shall accept, and every will and codicil, a copy of

which shall be delivered to the lord, his steward or deputy steward, out of court, or at a

court in the absence of a homage, shall be entered in the court rolls by such lord, steward or

whose hands such surrender is made, refuse or neglect to bring it in to be present(!d, npon a petition preferred to the lord in his court baron, the party grieved
shall find remedy. But if the lord will not do him right and justice, he may
sue both the lord, and them that took the surrender, in chancery, and shall there
find relief.(o) (6)
*3. Admittance is the last stage, or perfection, of copyhold assurances. [*370 ]
And this is of three sort&: first, an admittance upon a voluntary grant
from the lord; secondly, an admittance upon surrender by the former tenant;
and, thirdly, an admittance upon a descent from the ancestor.
In admittances, even upon a voluntary grant from the lord, when copyhold
lands have escheat:ed or reverted to him, the lord is considered as an instrument.
For though it is in his power to keep the lands in his own hands; or to dispose
of them at his pleasure, by granting an absolut;e fee-simple, a. freehold, or a.
chatt:el interest therein; and quit.e to change their nature from copyhold to socage
tenure, so that he may well be reputed their absolute owner and lord; yet if he
will still continue to dispose of them as copyhold, he is bound to observe the
ancient custom precisely in every point, and can neither in t:enure nor estate
introduce any kind of alteration; for that were to creat;e a new copyhold; wherefore in this respect the law accounts him custom's instrument. For if a copyhold
for life falls into the lord's hands, by the tenant's death, though the lord may
destroy the tenure and enfranchise the land, yet if he grants it out again by
copy, he can neither add to nor diminish the ancient rent, nor make any, the
mmutest, variation in other respects: (p) nor is the tenant's estate, so granted,
subject to any charges or incumbrances by the lord.(q)
In admittances upon surrender of another, the lord is to no intent reput:ed as
owner, but wholly as u.n instrument: and the tenant admitted shall likewise be
subject to no charges or incumbrances of the lord; for his claim to the estat.e is
solely under him that made the surrender.(r)
And, as in admittances upon surrenders, so in admittances upon descents, by
the death of the ancestor, the lord *is used as a mere instrument; and [*371 ]
as no manner of interest passes into him by the surrender or the death
of his tenant, so no interest passes out of him by the act of admittance. And
therefore neither in the one case nor the other, is any respect had to the quantity
or quality of the lord's estat;e in the manor. For whether he be t:enant m fee or
for years, whether he be in possession by right or by wrong, it is not material;
since the admittances made by him shall not be impeached on account of his
title, because they are judicial, or rather ministerial acts, which every lord in
possession is bound t-0 perform.(.~)
Admittances, however, upon surrender, differ from admittances upon descent
in this, that by surrender nothing is vested in cestuy que use before admittance,
no more than in voluntary admittances; but upon descent the heir is tenant
by copy immediately upon the death of his ancestor; not indeed to all intents
and purposes, for he cannot be sworn on the homage, nor maintain an
action in the lord's court as tenant; but to most intents the law taketh
notice of him as of a perfect tenant of the land instantly upon the death of
his ancestor, especially where he is concerned with any stranger. He may enter
(o) Co. Copyh. f 40
(Pl Ibid. t 41.
(q) 8 Rep. 63.
tr) 4 Rep. '17. Co. Litt. 69.
(f) 4.Rep. 'll. l Rep. HO.

deputy, and such entry shall be of equal effect with an entry made in pursuance of a present-

ment : and presentment of the surrender, will, or other matter on which an admittance is

founded, shall not be essential to the validity of the admittance. The statute also declares

the ceremony of presentment to be not essential to the validity of an admittance, and further

«nacts that admittance may be made at any time or place without holding any court for the

purpose.]

There

ere are a number of subsequent acts amending and extending the one here referred to.

.•
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(6) [But now by the statute 4 e.nd 5 Vic. c. 35, every surrender e.nd deed of surrender which
the lord she.ll be compclle.blc to a.ccept or shall a.ccept, e.nd every will e.nd codicil, e. copy of
which shall be delivered to the lord, his steward or deputy steward, out of court, or at a
court in the e.b:;ence of a homage, Ahall be entered in the court rolls by such lord, steward or
deputy, e.nd such entry shall be of equal effect with an entry made in pursuance of a presentment: and presentment of the surrender, will, or other matter on which an admittance is
founded, l'lhl\ll not be essential to the validity of the admittance. The statute also declares
the ceremony uf presentment to be not essential to the validity of au admittance, and further
,.niwts that admittance may be made at any time or place without holding any court for the
purpoRe.]
There are a number of subsequent a.eta amending e.nd extending the one here referred t-<>·
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into the land before admittance; may take the profits; may punish any trespass.
done upon the ground; (t) na.Y, upon satisfying the lord for his fine due upon
the descent, may surrender 10to the hands of the lord to whatever use he
pleases. (7) For which reasons we may conclude, that the admittance of an heir
lS principally for the benefit of the lord, to entitle him to his fine, and not 80
much necessary for the strengthening and completing the heir's title. Hence
indeed an observation might arise, that if the benefit, which the heir is to
receive by the admittance, is not equal to the charges of the fine, he will never
come in and be admitted to his copyhold in court ; and 80 the lord may be
[•372 ] defrauded of his fine. But to this we may reJ.>lY in •the words of Sir
Edward Coke, (u) "I assure myself, if it were m the election of the heir
to be admitted or not to be admitted, he would be best contented. without admittance ; but the custom of every ma.nor is in this .point compulsory. For, either
upon pa.in of forfeiture of their copyhold, or of mcurring some great penalty,
the heirs of copyholders are enforced, in every manor, to come into court and
be admitted according to the custom, within a short time after notice given of
their ancestor's decease."

into the land before admittance; may take the profits ; may punish any trespass

done upon the ground ; (t) nay, upon satisfying the lord for his fine due upon

the descent, may surrender into the hands of the lord to whatever use he

pleases. (7) For which reasons we may conclude, that the admittance of an heir

is principally for the benefit of the lora, to entitle him to his fine, and not so

much necessary for the strengthening and completing the heir's title. Hence

indeed an observation might arise, that if the benefit, which the heir is to

receive by the admittance, is not equal to the charges of the fine, he will never

come in and be admitted to his copyhold in court ; and so the lord may be

l~*372 1 Defrauded °f l"s fine. But to this we may reply in *the words of Sir

' J Edward Coke, (u) " I assure myself, if it were in the election of the heir

to be admitted or not to be admitted, he would be best contented without admit-

tance ; but the custom of every manor is in this point compulsory. For, either

upon pain of forfeiture of their copyhold, or of incurring some great penalty,

the heirs of copyholders are enforced, in every manor, to come into court and

be admitted according to the custom, within a short time after notice given of

their ancestor's decease."

OHAPTEK XXIII.

OF ALIENATIONS BY DEVISE.

THE last method of conveying real property is, by devise, or disposition con-

tained in a man's last will and testament. And, in considering this subject, 1

shall not at present inquire into the nature of wills and testaments, which are
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more properly the instruments to convey personal estates; but only into the

CHAPTER XXIII.

original and antiquity of devising real estates by will, and the construction of

the several statutes upon which that power is now founded.

OF ALIENATIONS BY DEVISE.

It seems sufficiently clear, that, before the conquest, lands were devisable by

will, (a) But upon the introduction of the military tenures, the restraint or

THE last method of conveying real property is, by dmtise, or disposition contained in a man's last will and testament. And, in considering this subject, I
shall not at present inquire into the nature of wills and testaments, which are
more properly the instruments to convey personal estates; but only into the
original and antiquity of devising real estates by will, and the construction of
the several statutes upon which that power is now founded.
It seems sufficiently clear, that, before the conquest, lands were devisable by
will. (a) But upon the introduction of the military tenures, the restraint of
devising lands naturally took place, as a branch of the feudal doctrine of nonalienation without the consent of the lord. (b) And some have questioned
whether this restraint (which we may trace even from the ancient Germans) (c)
was not founded upon truer principles of policy, than the power of wantonly
disinheriting the heir by will, and transferring the estate, through the dotage or
ca-erice of the ancestor, from those of his blood to utter strangers. For this,
it ls alleged, maintained the balance of property, and prevented one man from
growing too big or powerful for his neighbours; since it rarely happens,
[•a *that the same man is heir to many others, though by art and manage74] mcnt he may frequently become their devisee. Thus the ancient law of
the Athenians directed that the estate of the deceased should always descend to
his children; or, on failure of lineal descendants, should go to the collateral
relations: which had an admirable effect in keeping up equality, and preventing
the accumulation of estates. But when Solon (d) made a slight alteration, by
permitting them (though only 011 failure of issue) to dispose of their lands by
testament, and devise away estates from the collateral heir, this soo11 produced
an excess of wealth in some. and of poYerty in others : which by a natural pro·
gression, first produced popular tumults and dissensions; and these at length
ended in tyranny, and the utter extinction of liberty: which was quickly followed by a total subversion of their state and nation. On the other hand, it

devising lands naturally took place, as a branch of the feudal doctrine of non-

alienation without the consent of the lord, (b) And some have questioned

whether this restraint (which we may trace even from the ancient Germans) (c)

was not founded upon truer principles of policy, than the power of wantonly

disinheriting the heir by will, and transferring the estate, through the dotage or

caprice of the ancestor, from those of his blood to utter strangers. For this,

it is alleged, maintained the balance of property, and prevented one man from

growing too big or powerful for his neighbours; since it rarely happens,

T*!174.1 ^at the 8ame man i8 heir to many others, though by art and manage-

L -I ment he may frequently become their devisee. Thus the ancient law of

the Athenians directed that the estate of the deceased should always descend to

his children; or, on failure of lineal descendants, should go to the collateral

relations: which had an admirable eifect in keeping up equality, and preventing

the accumulation of estates. But when Solon (d~) made a slight alteration, by

permitting them (though only on failure of issue) to dispose of their lands by

testament, and devise away estates from the collateral heir, this soon produced

an excess of wealth in some, and of poverty in others: which by a natural pro-

gression, first produced popular tumults and dissensions; and these at length

ended in tyranny, and the utter extinction of liberty: which was quickly fol-

lowed by a total subversion of their state and nation. On the other hand, it

ft) 4 Rep. 23. (u) Co. Copyh.} 41. (a) Wright of Tenures, 172. (b) See page 57.

(a) TaM. de mor. Germ. e. 21. " (d) Plutarch, in vita Solon.

(7) If the lord refuse in a proper case to admit the tenant, he may be compelled to do so bj

mandamus. Keg. «. Bendy, 1 B. and B. 829; Reg. v. Wellealey, 2 id. 924.
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page r.1.

(7) If the lord refuse in a proper case to o.dmit the tenant, he mar. be compelled to do eo b1
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would now seem hard, on account of some abuses, (which are the natural con-

sequence of free agency, when coupled with human infirmity), to debar the

owner of lands from distributing them after his death as the exigence of his

family affairs, or the justice due to his creditors, may perhaps require. And

this power, if prudently managed, has with us a peculiar propriety; by prevent-

ing the very evil which resulted from Solon's institution, the too great accumu-

lation of property; which is the natural consequence of our doctrine of suc-

cession, by primogeniture, to which the Athenians were strangers. Of this

accumulating the ill effects were severely felt even in the feudal times: but it

should always be strongly discouraged in a commercial country, whose welfare

depends on the number of moderate fortunes engaged in the extension of trade.

However this be, we find that, by the common law of England since the con-

quest, no estate, greater than for term of years, could be disposed of by testa-

ment; (e) except only in Kent, and in some ancient burghs, and a few particular

manors, where their Saxon immunities by special indulgence subsisted. (/)

And though the feudal restraint on alienations *by deed vanished very p ,,„-,. -,

early, yet this on wills continued for some centuries after: from an appre- >• J

hension of infirmity and imposition on the testator in extremis, which made

such devises suspicious, (g) Besides, in devises there was wanting that general

notoriety, and public designation of the successor, which in descents is apparent

to the neighbourhood, and which the simplicity of the common law always

required in every transfer and new acquisition of property.
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But when ecclesiastical ingenuity had invented the doctrine of uses as a thing

distinct from the land, uses began to be devised very frequently, (A) and the

devisee of the use could in chancery compel its execution. For it is observed

by Gilbert, (t) that, as the popish clergy then generally sat in the court of chan-

cery, they considered that men are most liberal when they can enjoy their pos-

sessions no longer: and therefore at their death would choose to dispose of them

to those who, according to the superstitions of the times, could intercede for

their happiness in another world. But, when the statute of uses (/) had

annexed the possession to the use, these uses, being now the very land itself,

became no longer devisable : which might have occasioned a great revolution in

the law of devises, had not the statute of wills been made about five years after,

viz: 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, explained by 34 Hen. VIII, c, 5, which enacted, that

all persons being seised in feersimple (except feme-coverts, (1) infants, idiots,

and persons of non-sane memory) might by will and testament m writing devise

to any other person, except to bodies corporate, two-thirds of their lands, tene-

ments, and hereditaments, held in chivalry, and the whole of those held in

socage: which now, through the alteration of tenures by the statute of Charles

the Second, amounts to the whole of their landed property, except their copy-

hold tenements.

(e)tlnst. 7. (SJUtt-n«I. 1 Instill. (g) Glan». 17, «. 1. fh) Plowd. 414.

fij On DevUes, 7. fJJ 27 Hen. VIII, o. 10. See Dyer, 143.

(1) [Where lands are conveyed to trustees, a married woman may have the power of ap-

would now seem hard, on account of some abuses, (which are the natural coni;equence of free agency, when coupled with human infirmity), to debar the
owner of lands from distributing them after his death as the exigence of his
family affairs, or the justice due to his creditors, may perhaps require. And
t.his power, if prudently managed, hll.'! with us a. peculiar propriety; by preventing the very evil which resulted from Solon's institution, the too great accumulation of property; which is the natural consequence of our doctrine of succession by primogeniture, to which the Athenians were strangers. Of this
accumulating the ill effects were severely felt even in the feudal times: but it
should always be strongly discouraged in a commercial country, whose welfare
depends on the number of moderate fortunes engaged in the extension of trade.
However this be, we find that, by the common law of Eng}and since the conquest, no estate, greater than for term of years, could be disposed of by testament; (e) except onlv in Kent, and in some ancient burghs, and a few particular
manors, where their Saxon immunities by special indulgence subsisted.(/)
And though the feudal restraint on alienations *by deed vanished very [ • 375 ]
early, yet this on wills continued for some centuries after: from an apprehension of infirmity and imposition on the testator in extremis, which made
such devises suspicious. (g) Besides, in devises there was wanting that general
notoriety, and public designation of the successor, which in descents is apparent
to the neighbourhood, and which the simplicity of the common law always
required in every transfer and new acquisition of property.
But when ecclesiastical ingenuity had invented the doctrine of uses asa thing
distinct from the land, uses began to be devised very frequently, (Ii) and the
devisee of the use could in chancery compel its execution. For it is observed
by Gilbert, (i) that, as the popish clergy then generally sat in the court of chancery, they considered that men are most liberal when they can enjoy their possegsions no longer: and therefore at their death would choose to dispose of them
to those who, according to the superstitions of the times, could intercede for
their happiness in another world. But, when the statute of uses (.j) had
annexed the possession to the use, these uses, being now the very land itself,
became no lon~er devisable: which might have occasioned a great revolution in
the law of devises, had not the statute of wills been made about five years n.fter,
viz : 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, explained by 34 Hen. VIII, c, 5, which enacted, that
all persons being seised in fee-simple (except feme-coverts, (1) infants, idiots,
and persons of non-sane memory) might by will and testament m writing devise
to any other person, except to bodies corporate, two-thirds of their lands, tenements, and hercditaments, held in chivalry, and the whole of those held in
socage: which now, through the alteration of tenures by the statute of Charles
the Second, amounts to the whole of their landed property, except their copyhold tenements.

pointing the disposition of lands held in trust for her after her death, which appointment must

be executed like the will of &ferne-sole. 8 Ves<. 610; 1 Bro. 99. And it has been determined

(e)'I. Inst. 7.
(f) LIU. I J67. 1Inat.111.
(g) GlanY. l. 7, c. 1.
OJ On Devi.ea, 7.
(j) 'n Hen. VIII, o. 10. See Dyer, 143.

(A) Plowd. '1l.

by the house of lords, that the appointment of a married woman is effectual against the heir at

law; though it depends only upon an agreement of her husband before marriage without any

conveyances of the estate to trustees. 6 Bro. P. C. 156.]

Married women are now in some of the United States given full authority to make wills,

the same as if unmarried. In others the power is more or less restricted. See I fed f. on Wills, 27.

Under the English law the wife might execute a will of personalty with the consent of the

husband, but he might nevertheless withdraw his assent, eren after her death. Tucker r. Inman,

4 M. and G. 1049. where the statute did not expressly exclude married women, it was held in

Ohio they might dispose of their property by will: Allen v. Little, 5 Ohio, 65; but in Penn-

sylvania a different ruling was made. West c. West, 10 8. and. B. 446.

In England a married woman may dispose by will of property settled to her separate use,

without going through the machinery of a power of appointment. Taylor ti. Heads, 34 L. J.

t'h. 803.
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(l) [Where le.nds o.re conveyed to trustees, e. married woman may have the power of ap·
pointing the dil'.\posit.ion of lands held in trust for her after her death, which appointment must
be c:s:ecured like the will of ajeTM-sole. 2 Ves. 610; 1 Bro. 99. And it has been determined
by the house of lord~, that the appointment of a married woman is effectual against the heir at
Jaw; though it depend!! only upon an agreement of her hnsbaud before marriage without any
eonveyances of the estaw to trustees. 6 Ilro. P. C. 156.]
Married women are now in some of the U niwd States given full authority to make wills,
the ~me as if unmarried. In others the power is more or leRs restriewd. See Redf. on Wills, 27.
Under the English law the wife mi~ht execuw a will of personalty with the consent of the
bn~be.nd, but he might nevertheless withdraw his Msent, e'l"en after her deat.h. Tncker v. Inman,
4 M. &nd G. 1049. Where the stature did not expressly exclude married women, it we..~ held in
Ohio they might dispose of their property by will: .Allen v. Little, 5 Ohio, 65; but in Penn..ylve.nia a ditrerent ruling WM made. West v. We11t, 10 S. and. R. 446.
In England a married womau may di~pose by will of property settled to her sepe.rate use,
without going through the machinery of a pow11r of appointment. Taylor "· Meads, 34 L. J.
Ch. 203.
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Corporations were excepted in these statutes, to prevent the extension of gifts

F *376 1 *n mortmain; but now, by construction *of the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4, it

*• * is held, that a devise to a corporation for a charitable use is valid, as ope-

rating in the nature of an appointment, rather than of a bequest. And indeed

the piety of the judges hath formerly carried them great lengths in supporting

such charitable uses; (k) it being held that the statute of Elizabeth, which

favours appointments to charities, supersedes and repeals all former statntes, (7)

and supplies all defects of assurances: (»») and therefore not only a devise to a

corporation, but a devise by a copyhold tenant without surrendering to the use

of his will, (») and a devise (nay even a settlement) by tenant in tail without

either fine orrecovery, if made to a charitable use, are good by way of appoint-

ment, (o)

With regard to devises in general, experience soon showed how difficult and

hazardous a thing it is, even in matters of public utility, to depart from the

rules of the common law; which are so nicely constructed and so artificially

connected together, that the least breach in any one of them disorders for a

time the texture of the whole. Innumerable frauds and perjuries were quickly

introduced by this parliamentary method of inheritance; for so loose was the

construction made upon this act by the courts of law, that bare notes in the

hand-writing of another person were allowed to be good wills within the

statute, (p) To remedy which, the statute of frauds and perjuries, 29 Car. II, c.

3, directs, that all devises of lands and tenements shall not only be in writing,
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but signed by the testator, or some other person in his presence, and by hia

express direction; and be subscribed, in his presence, by three or four credible

witnesses. (2) And a solemnity nearly similar is requisite for revoking a devise

by writing; though the same may be also revoked by burning, cancelling, tear-

ing, or obliterating thereof by the devisor, or in his presence and with his

consent: (3) as likewise imphedty, by such a great and entire alteration in the

circumstances and situation of the devisor, as arises from marriage and the birth

of a child, (q) (4)

(k) Ch. Prcc. 272. (I) Gilb. Rep. 45. 1 P. Wms. 348. (m) Duke's Chnrit. Uses, 84.

(n) Moor. 890. (o) « Vern. 4!W. Ch. Free 16. (p) Dyer, 7*. Cro. Eliz. 100.

(n) Christopher c. Christopher. S&uxh. 6 July, 1771. Spragge v. atone, at the Cockpit, 27 Mar. 1773, by

Wilmot, de Grey and Parker. See page 503.

(2) The wills act, 1 Vic. c. 26, reduces the number to two. And by section 14, the inoompe-

tency of a witness to be admitted to prove the execution will not invalidate the will. See 1

Jann. on Wills, 102. And by that act the execution of all wills, codicils and revoking instru-

ments requires the same formalities. The testator must sign at the foot or end of the will; aa

to which, see statute 15 and 16 Vic. e. 24.

(3) [With respect to revocation in general, see 1 Saund. 277 to 279, d. Where a testator

being angry witfi one of his devisees, tore his will into four pieces, but was prevented from

further tearing it, partly by force and partly by entreaty, and afterwards, becoming calm,

expressed his satisfaction that no material part was injured, and that the will was no worse,

the court held that it has been properly left to the jury to say whether the testator had per-

fected his intention of cancelling the will, or whether he was stopped in medio ; and the jury

having found the latter, the court refused to disturb the verdict. 3 B. and A. 489. But where

the testator threw his will into the tiro, out of which it was snatched by a by-stander, and

preserved without the testator's knowledge, the will was held to be cancelled. 2 Bla. K. 1043.]

To make any act of destruction or cancellation of a will operate as a revocation, the act

must be done aniwo revocandi: Burtenshaw v. Gilbert, 1 Cowp. 49 ; and when done with that

intent, a very slight injury to the instrument may be sufficient; such as drawing a lino thronffh

the testator's name : Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73; Baptist Church v. Robbarts, 2 Penn. St.

110; or even tearing off the seal, though the seal itself was not an essential formality. Avery

v. Pixlcy, 4 Mass. 460; Price v. Powel, 3 H. and N. 341. Alterations made in a will after

execution, by interlineation or erasure, ought to be duly attested by witnesses; and if this be

not done, the interlineations cannot take effect, and words erased evidently with a view to

the changes which the interlineations would make, will still, if legible, be treated as part of

the will. 1 .! iirni. on Wills, 133 ; Redf. on Wills, 315. But where erasures are made in a will

without addition, the will is revoked pro tanto. 1 Jarm. on Wills, 132; Redf. on Wills, 313.

(4) [Marriage and the birth of a posthumous child amount to a revocation. 5 T. R. 4l>.

But the subsequent birth of a child, where the will is made after marriage, is not of itself suf-

ficient. 5 T. R. 51, n.; 4 M. and S. 10 ; 5 Ves. Jr. 656. In a case where a testator had devised

lii.H real estate to a woman with whom he cohabited, and to her children, and he afterwards

578
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In the construction of this last statute, (5) it has been adjudged that r *oryw -i

the testator's name, written with his own hand, at the beginning of *his L J

married her and had children by her, it was held these circumstances, did not amount to a revo-

cation of the will. Lord Ellenborough in his judgment says : " The doctrine of implied or pre-

sumptive revocation seems to stand upon a better foundation of reason, as it is put by Lord

Kenyon, in Doe v. Lancashire, 5 T. R. 58, namely, as being ' a tacit condition annexed to the

Trill when made, that it should not take effect, if there should be a total change in the situation

of the testator's family,' than on the ground of any presumed alteration of intention; which

alteration of intention should seem in legal reasoning not very material, unless it be considered

as sufficient to found a presumption in fact, that an actual revocation has followed thereupon.

But, upon whatever grounds this rule of revocation may be supposed to stand, it is on all hands

allowed to apply only in cases where the wife and children, the new objects of duty, are wholly

unprovided fur, and where there is an entire disposition of the whole estate to their exclusion

and prejudice. This, however, cannot be said to be the case, where the same persons, who,

alter the making of the will, stand in the legal relation of wife and children, were before specifi-

cally contemplated and provided for by the testator, though under a different character and

denomination." 2 East, 530. See 5 Ves. Jun. 656. Where two wills are found in the posses-

sion of the testator, to invalidate the first the second should expressly revoke, or be clearly in-

compatible with, the first devise, for no subsequent devise will revoke a prior one, unless it apply

to the wuiie subject-matter. 1 P. Wins. 345.; 7 Bro. P. C. 344; Cowper, 87. A devise of real

property is not revoked by the bankruptcy of the devisor. The master of the rolls said, " from

the moment the debts are paid, the assignees arc mere trustees for the bankrupt, and can be
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called upon to convey to him." In this case all the debts were paid, and the bankrupt had been

dead some time. 14 Yes. 580. See also, as to implied or constructive revocations, 3 Mod. 218;

Salk. 592: 3 Mod. 203; 2 East, 488; Carth. 81; 4 Burr, 2512; 7 Vcs. Jun. 348; Cowp. 812; 4

East, 419; 2 N. R. 491, and post, " Title by Testament," 489, et seq.]

It has been repeatedly held in the United States that the subsequent marriage and birth of a

child are an implied revocation of a will, but that either marriage or birth of a child will not

alone have that effect. And it is also held that the presumed revocation may be rebutted by

circumstances evidencing a different intent. Brush ». Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 506; "Warner v.

Beach, 4 Gray, 162; Coates v. Hughes, 3 Binn. 498; Walker v. Hall, 34 Penn. St. 483; Bloomer

t?. Bloomer, 2 Bradf. Sur. R. 339. Some changes have been made in this rule, for which the

reader must be referred to the statutes of the several states. The marriage of a woman revokes

a will previously made. Hodxdeu v. Lloyd, 2 Br. C. C. 534. But whether this would be so in

those states where, alter marriage, a woman has the same power to make a will as before, may

well be doubted.

The English statute of wills, 1 Vic. c. 26, provides that no will shall be revoked by any pre-

sumption of intention on the ground of an alteration in circumstances, but it also makes mar-

riage an absolute revocation.

(5) [As to what shall be deemed a sufficient compliance with this act, see 1 Fonblanque on

Equitv, 193; Phil, on Evid. chap. 8, sec. 8. It is observable, that the statute requires that the

will snail be in writing, but it should seem it would suffice if in print, and signed by the testa-

tor. Semble, 2 M. and S. 286.

It next requires, that the will shall be sigiied 'by the testator, or some other person in his

presence and by his express direction. The first case in which this question was raised was

Leinayne e. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 403, in which case it was determined, that if the

testator write the whole of the will with his own hand, though he does not subscribe his name,

but seals and publishes it, and three witnesses subscribe their names in his presence, it is a

good will; for Ills name being written in the will it is a sufficient signing, and the statute does

not direct whether it shall be at the top, bottom, <fec. But from the case of Right, lessee of

Cater, o. Price, Dougl. 241, it may be interred that the above decision will apply only to those

cases where the testator appears to have considered such sufficient signing to .support his will;

and not to those where the testator appears to have intended to sign the instrument in form:

and Mr. Christian, in his edition of Blackstone, 2 vol. 377, n. 5, properly observes, that writing

the name at the beginning would never be considered a signing according to the statute,

unless the whole will was written by the testator himself; for whatever is written by a

stranger after the name of the testator affords no evidence of the testator's assent to it, if the

Bttbscription of his name in his own hand is not subjoined; and see Powell on Devises, 63.

In the case of Right v. Price, the will was prepared in five sheets, and a seal affixed to the

last, and the form of attestation written upon it, and the will was read over to the testator,

•who act his mark to the two first sheets, and attempted to set it to the third, but being unable,

from the weakness of his hand, he said he could not do it, but that it was his will; and on

tie following day, being asked if he would sign his will, he said be would, and attempted

to sign the two remaining sheets, bnt was not able. Lord Mansfield observed, that " the

testator, when be signed the two first sheets, had an intention of signing the others, but was

not able; he therefore did not mean the signature of the two first as the signature of the whole

will; there never was a signature of the whole. See also 4 Ves. Jun. 197; 9 Ves. 249. And if

it appear upon a will of personal estate that something more was intended to be done, and

the party was not prevented by sickness or death from signing, this declaration at the begin-
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will, as, " I, John Mills, do make this my last will and testament;" is a

sufficient signing, without any name at the bottom; (r) though the other ia

(T) 3 Lev. 1.

ning is not sufficient. 4 Tes. 197, n.; 9 id. 249. But where a Trill, written on three sides of a

will, as, "I, John Mills, do make this my last will and testament;" is a
sufficient signing, without any name at the bottom; (r) though the other iB
(r) 3 Lev. l.

sheet of paper, and duly attested, concluded by stating " that the testator had signed bin name

to the two first sides thereof, and his hand and seal to the last," and it appeared he had pat

his hand and seal to the last only, omitting to sign the two first sides, it was held that the will

was well executed, as his first intention was abandoned by the final signature made by him at

the time of executing the will. 5 Moore, 484; 2 Bro. and Biiig. 650, S. C. So where the testa-

tor had executed such a will, but some years afterwards made various interlineations and oblit-

erations therein, but which was neither re-signed, re-published, nor re-attested, but a fair copy

was afterwards made, in which he added one interlineation not afl'ecting his freehold estate, but

the copy was never signed, attested or published, and the will and nopy were found locked up

in a drawer together; it was held that there was no revocation of the will as it originally stood ;

the alterations, Ac., being merely demonstrative of an intention to execute another, neVer car-

ried into effect. Id. The testator's making a mark at the foot of his will, if intended as a signa-

ture, is sufficient. Freeman Rep. 538.

The next doubt that occurred upon this point was, whether the testator sealing his will was

not a signing within the statute, and in 2 Stra. 764, Lord Raymond is reported to have held

that it was; and of the same opinion three of the judges appear to have been, in 3 Lev. 1, on

the ground that signum is no more than a mark, and sealing ia a sufficient mark that this is

his will; but in 1 Wils. 313, such opinion was said to be very strange doctrine; for that if it
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were so, it would be easy for one person to forge any man's will by only forging the names of

any two obscure persons dead, for he would have no occasion to forge the testator's hand. And

they said, " if the same thing should come in question again, they should not hold that sealing

a will was a sufficient signing within the statute." But in 2 Atk. 176, Lord Hardwicke seems

to have thought, that sealing without signing in the presence of a third witness, the will having

been duly signed in the presence of two, would have been sufficient to make it a good will.

It was held in a case where the testator was blind, that it is not necessary to read over the will

previous to the execution, in the presence of the attesting witnesses. 2 New R. 415. The sign-

ing of the testator need not be in the presence of the witnesses; it suffices if he acknowledge

his signature to each of them. 3 P. Wms. 253; 2 Vos. 451; 1 Tes. 3. 11; 8 Tes. 504 ; 1 Tes.

and B. 362.

Upon the attestation of a will, many questions have also arisen. The first seems to have

been whether the witnesses must attest the signing by the testator, and upon this point, the

statute not requiring the testator to sign his will in the presence of the witaesses, it DOS been

held sufficient, if the testator acknowledge to the witnesses that the name is his. 3 P. Wms.

253; 2 Ves. 254. See also 2 P Wms. 510; Comyn's Rep. 197; 1 Tes. Jun. 11. The next ques-

tion respecting the attestation was, What shall be construed a signing in the presence of the

testator f and npon this point, which first came into consideration in 1 P. Wms. 740, Lord Mac-

clesfield held, that " the bare subscribing of a will, by the witnesses in the same room, did

not necessarily iinoly it to be in the testator's presence; for it might be in a corner of the

room, in a clandestine, fraudulent way, and then it would not be a subscribing by the witness

in the testator's presence, merely because in th6 same room ; but that here, it being sworn by

the wituess, that he subscribed the will at the request of the testatrix and in the same room,

this could not be fraudulent, and was therefore well enough." So in the case in 2 Salk. 688,

the testator having desired the witnesses to go into another room seven yards distant, to attest

it, in which room there was a window broken, through which the testator might have seen,

the attestation was held good ; for that it was enough that the testator might see the witnesses

signing, and that it was not necessary that ho should actually see them. See also 3 Salk. 395.

And Lord Thnrlow, in 1 Bro. C. C. 99, relying npon the authority in 2 Salk. 688, inclined to

think a will well attested whore the testatrix could see the witnesses through the window of

her carriage, and of the attorney's office. Bnt the above canes turned upon the circumstance

of the testator being in a situation which allowed of his seeing the witnesses sign; if, therefore,

he be in a position m which he cannot see the signing, it seems such attestation wonld not be

a compliance with the statute. Carth. 79; Holf s Rep. 222; 1 P. Wms. 239; 2 Show. 288. And

in the case in Comyn's R. 531, it was determined that the question, whether present or not,

was a fact for the consideration of the jury, upon all the circumstances of the case. See also,

Stra. 1109. And if the jury find that the testator was in a situation where he could not see the

witnesses, the will is not duly attested: 1 M. and S. 294; and if the testator were at the time

of attestation insensible, though the witnesses signed in his presence, it is not a good attestation.

ning is not sufficient. 4 Ves. 197, n.; 9 id. 249. Bnt where a will, written on three sides or a.
sheet of paper, and duly attested, concluded by stating " that the test.at.or had ltigned hi11 name
to the two first sides thereof, and bis hand and seal to the l&<t," and it appeared he had put
his hand and 11enl to the Ja;;t only, omitting to sign the two fir:;t sides, it was held that the will
WM well executed, M bis first intention was abandoned by the final signature made by him at
tho time of executing the will. 5 Moore, 484; 2 Bro. and Bing. 650, S. C. So where the ~ta
tor had executed such a will, but some yeani afterwards made various interlineations and obliteratiollfl therein, but which was neither re-signed, re-published, nor re-atteilted, but a fair copy
\'1"611 afterward!! made, in which he added one mterlineati•m not affecting his freehold estate, hut
the copy Wll.S ne\·er signed, atte~ted or publi~bed, and the will and r.opy were found locked up
in a drawer together ; it wM held that there wos no revocation of the ";n as it originally stood ;
t.he alterations, &c., being merely demonstrative of an intention to execute another, never carried int-0 effect. Id. The tol!tator's making a murk at the foot of his will, if intended BB a signature, is sufficient. Freeman Rep. 533.
The next doubt that occurred upon this point was, whether the testator Bealing his will was
not a signing within the statute, and in 2 Stra. 764, Lord Raymond is roported to have held
that it wa.~; and of thll same opinion throe of tho judges appear to have been, in 3 Lev. 1, on
the ground that sig11um is no more than a mark, and i;ealing i11 a sufficient mark that thit' is
his will; but in 1 Wils. 313, such opinion wa.<1 ~aid to be very strange doctrine; for that if it
were so, it would be ea.~y for one peraon to fori:re any man's will by only forging the names ot
any two ob~ure persons dead, for he would have no occasion to forge the te:.<tat.or's hand. And
they said, "if the same thing should come in question again, they should not hold that sealing
a will waa a sufficient signing within the sttltute." But in 2 Atk. 176, Lord Hardwicke seems
to have thought, that sealing without signing in the pre~ence of a third witne!ls, the will having
been dulv signed in the presence of two, would have been sufficient to make it a good wilL
It was held in a case where the testator was blind, that it is not necessarv to read over the will
previous to the execution, in the prel!euce of the attesting witnet!8e11. 2 New R. 415. The .,;gnmg of the testator need not be in the presence of the witnesse~; it snffic•es if he acknowledge
bis signature to each of them. 3 P. Wms. 253; 2 Ves. 451; 1 Ve~. J. 11; 8 Ves. 504; 1 Ve11.
and B. 362.
Upon the attestati<m of a will, many questions have al~o ari81m. The first 80flms to bare
been whether the witnesses must atte~t the 11i1'11ing by the testator, and npon this· point, the
statute not requiring the teHtator to l!ign his will in the presenee of the witnOSl!el!, it hall been
held sufficient, if the teRtntor acknowledge t-0 the witneRses that the name is his. 3 P. Wms.
253; 2 Ves. 254. See ahm 2 P Wms. 510; Comyn's Rep. 197; 1 Vefl. Jun. 11. The next qneRtion re~pecting the attestation was, What shall be construed a si~ing in the pl'8ffonoo of the
testator 1 and upon this point, which fi?'llt came into oon.-iideration m 1 P. Wms. 740, Lonl llacclcsfield held, that "the bare subl:lCribing of a will, by the ";tnesstlB in the 88Ille room, did
not neces.~arily imJ?IY it to be in the tet>tator's 11ro11ence; for it might l>e in a comer of the
room, in a clande,;tme, framlnlent way, and then it would not be a subscribing by the witn°""
iu the testator's presence, merely because in th6 same room; but that. here, it being sworn by
tlie wituet1s, that he sub8cribed the will at the request of the testatrix and in the same l'OOUl,
thi:i could not be fraudulent, and wa.'l therefore well enough." So in the case in 2 Salk. 688,
the testator having de~ired the witneAAes to go int.o another room seven yards dil'tant, to attest
it, in which room there wos a winclow broken, through which the testator mi~t have seen,
the attestation was held good ; for that it wa.<J enough that the testator migltt see the witn8tJilee
signing, aud that it wa.i not necessary that he should aot11ally 8C8 them. See also 3 Salk. :l96.
Aud Lord Thurlow, in 1 Bro. C. C. 99, relying npou the authority in 2 Salk. 688, inclined to
think a will well attested where the testatrix could see the witneeses through the window of
her carriage, sud of the attorney's office. But the aboT"e C8ile!I turned upon the circumstance
of the testat01· 1?8in~ in a. situation which allow~ of his. 11eeing the witne!!l!et'I ~ign; if, therefore,
he be in a position m whmh he c.snm1t 8t'0 the Sl(nUng, it seems t>U<Jh atte.;tation would not be
a compliance with the ~tatnte. Carth. 79; Holt's Rep. 222; I P. Wms. 239; 2 Show.~. And
in the CB8e in Comyn·~ R. 531, it was detennined that the qn011tion, wht1ther present or not,
wn~ a fMt for the con:>ideration of the jury, upon all the cireumsiances of the eatte. See al.RO,
Stra. ll09. And if the jury find that the testator was in a situation where be oould not Ree the
witnes.~es the will is not duly atte11tod: 1 .M. and S. 294; and if the testator were at the time
of attost.atlon insensible, though the witnes~es signed in his presence, it is noh good attestation.
Dong!. 241.
It Heems also to have been a question, whether the witnesses should not attest Ule will in
the presence of each other. But it wa.~ determined, very 800D after the statute, that lhou""
the witnesses mu11t all see the testator sign, or 8Clknuwl_edg\) the i;igning, yet t.hM they may uo
it at different times: Anon. 2 Ch. Ca. 100; Freem. 486; Cook 11. P~on, Pre. Ch. 185; Jones
"·Lake cited 2 Atk. li7; Bondi•. Seawell, 3 Burr, R. 177:J; and the acknowledgment by the
testato; to ono of the witneSl!es, who did not see him sign, ii; good. See Addy v. Grix, 8 Y-.

Dougl. 241.

It seems also to have been a question, whether the witnesses should not attest the will in

the presence of each other. But it was determined, very soon after the statute, that though

the witnesses must all see the testator sign, or acknowledge the signing, yet that they may do

it at different times: Anon. 2 Ch. Ca. 109; Freem. 486; Cook v. Parson, Pre. Ch. 185; Jonea

v. Lake, cited 2 Atk. 177 ; Bond «.'. Seawell, 3 Burr, R. 1773; and the acknowledgment by the

testator to one of the witnesses, who did not see him sign, is good. See Addy v. Grix, 8 Tea.
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the safer way. (6) It has also been determined, that though the witnesses must

all see the testator sign, or at least acknowledge the signing, yet they may do it

at different times, (s) But they must all subscribe their names as witnesses in

his presence, lest by any possibility they should mistake the instrument, (t) (7)

And, in one case determined by the court of king's bench, (u) the judges were

extremely strict in regard to the credibility, or rather the competency, of the

witnesses: for they would not allow any legatee, nor by consequence a creditor,

where the legacies and debts were charged on the real estate, to be a competent

Witness to the devise, as being too deeply concerned in interest not to wish the

establishment of the will; for, if it were established, he gained a security for his

legacy or debt from the real estate, Whereas otherwise he had no claim but on

the personal assets. This determination, however, alarmed many purchasers

and creditors, and threatened to shake most of the titles in the kingdom, that

depended on devises by will. For, if the will was attested by a servant to whom

wages were due, by the apothecary or attorney, whose very attendance made

them creditors, or by the minister of the parish, who had any demand for tithes

or ecclesiastical dues (and these are the persons most likely to be present in the

testator's last illness), and if in such case the testator had charged his real estate

with the payment of his debts, the whole will, and every disposition therein, so

far as related to real property, were held to be utterly void. This occasioned

the statute 35 Geo. II, c. 6, which restored both the competency and the credit

of such legatees, by declaring void all legacies (8) given to witnesses, and thereby
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removing all possibility of their interest affecting their testimony. The same

statute likewise established the competency of creditors, by directing the testi-

mony of all such creditors to be admitted, but leaving their credit (like that of

all other witnesses) to be considered, on a view of all the circumstances, by the

(•) Freem. 488. 2 Ch. Gas. 109. Pr. Ch. 185. (t) 1 P. Wms. 740. fit) Stra. 1253.

504; Ellis t>. Smith, 1 id. 11. As to the attestation by a marksman, see Harrison v. Harrison, 8

the safer way. (6) It has also been determined, that though the witnesses mmit
all see the testator sign, or at least acknowledge the signing, yet they may do it
at different times. (s) But they must all subscribe their names as witnesses -in
his pre-sence, lest by any possibility they should mistake the instrument. (t) (7)
And, in one case determined by the court of king's bench, (u) the judges were
extremely strict in regard t-0 ·the credibilitv, or rather the competency, of the
witnesses: for they would not allow any legatee, nor by consequence a creditor,
where the legacies and debts were charged on the real estate, to be a competent
witness to the devise, as being too deeply concerned in interest not to wish the
establishment of the will; for, if it were established, he gained a security for his
legacy or debt from the real estate, whereas otherwise he had no claim but on
the personal agsets. This determination, however, alarmed many purchasers
and creditors, and threatened to shake most of the titles in the kingdom, that
depended on devises by will. For, if the will was attested by a servant to whom
wages were due, by the apothecary or attorney, whose very attendance made
them creditors, or by the minister of the parish, who had any demand for tithes
or ecclesiastical dues (and these a.re the persons most likely to be present in the
testator's last illness), and if in such case the testator had charged his real estate
with the payment of his debts, the whole will, and every disposition therein, so
faT as related to real property, were held to be utterly void. This occasioned
the statute 25 Geo. II, c. 6, which restored both the competency and the credit
of such "legatees, bY. declaring void all legacies (8) given to witnesses, and thereby
removing all possibility of their interest affecting their testimony. The same
statute likewise established the competency of creditors, by directmg the testimony of all such creditors to be admitted, but leaving their credit (like that of
all other witnesses) to be considered, on a view of all the circumstances, by the

id. 185. It is not necessary that the witnesses should in their attestation express that they sub-

scribed their names iu the presence of the testator, but whether they did or not so subscribe is a

(•) Freem. 41!6. 2 Cb. Cae. 109. Pr. Cb. 18.'!,

(t) l P. Wms. 74.0.

(•) Stra. 12M.

question for the jury. 4 Taunt. 217; Willes Rep. 1.

Where there is a power to charge lands for the payment of debts, or for a provision for a wife

or younger children, a court of equity will decree a will, though not executed according to the

statute, a good execution of the power: Sch. and Lef. 60; 1 link. 165; and the defective execu-

tion of wills, in exercise of a power, is remedied by the 54 Geo. Ill, c. 68.]

(6) The statute of wills, 1 Vic. 26, requires a will to be signed at the end of the instrument,

and this is very generally required also by the statutes of wills in the United States. In the

absence of such statutory provision, the writing of the testator's name in any part of the instru-

ment by the testator himself, would be sufficient, if it satisfactorily appeared to have been done

to give the instrument effect as a will, but not otherwise. Waller v. Waller, 1 Grat. 454. The

signing of a will may be by the testator in person, or by some other person by his direction ; but

wnen by another, such person should attest the will as a witness, and iu his attestation recite

the mode of affixing the testator's name. McGee «. Porter, 14 Mo. 61. Signing by a mark

is sufficient if the testator cannot write: Butler v. Benson, 1 Barb. 586; Upchurch v. Up-

church, 16 B. Monr. 102; Smith v. Dolby, 4 Harr. 350; and in some states it has been held suf-

ficient whether he could write or not. St. Louis Hospital v. Williauis's Administrator, 19 Mo.

609. See Kay v. Hill. 3 Strobh. 297. And in England it has been held that signing by initials

—De Savory, 15 Jur. 1042—or by a fictitious name—Re Redding, 2 Rob. 339—was a sufficient

signing.

(7) The attestation should not only be in the bodily presence of the testator, but he should be

in a conscious state, and able to observe what is being done, if disposed to do so. It is not

absolutely necessary, however, that he bo in the same room with the witnesses, if within sight. ,

Dewey r. Dewey, 1 Met. 349; Watson v. Pipes, 32 Miss. 451; Wright ». Lewis, 5 Rich. 212.

But if the testator was where he could not see the witnesses in the act of attestation, it is insuffi-

cient. Brooks ». Duffell, 23 Geo. 441; Boldry v. Parris, 2 Cush. 433.

An attestation clause to a will is not essential, but it may nevertheless become very impor-

tant in the event of the witnesses not recollecting the facts recited therein, as in that case the

duo execution of the will mar be inferred from the recitals. See Hitch v. Wells, 10 Beav. 84 ;

Lawyer v. Smith, 8 Mich. 411; Kirk e. Carr, 54 Penn. St. 285.

(8) [This extends to devises of lands, and every interest given to the witnesses. But it has

been held that a witness may be rendered competent to prove a will by a release, or the receipt

604; Ellie"· Smith, 1 id. 11. .As to the atte~ta.tion by a marksman, see Harrison "· Harri1mn, 8
id. 185. It is not nece&111ory that the witnesses should in their attestation express that they subscribed their uames iu the presence of the testator, but whether they did or not so subscribe is a
question for the jury. 4 Taunt. 217; Willes Rep. 1.
Where there is a power to charge lamls for the payment of debts, or for a provision for a wife
or younger children, a court of equity will decrae a will, though not executed accilrding to the
statute, a good execution of the power: Sch. and ~f. 60; 1 Duk. 165; and the defective execution of wills, in exercise.of a power, is remedied hr. the 54 Geo. III, c. &!. ]
(6) The statute of wills, 1 Vic. 26, requires a will to be signed at the end of the instrument,
and this is very generally required also by the statutes of wills in the United States. In the
absence of such statutory provision, the writing of the t&!ta.tor's name in any part of the instrument by the testator himiw.lf, would be sufficient, if it satistil.ctorily appeared to have been done
to give the instrument effect as a will, but not otherwise. Walfor ti. Waller, 1 Gre.t. 454. 'fhc
signing of a will mBy be by the testator in person, or by some other per110n bl his direction ; but
when by another, such person i!hould attest the will as a witncs,., and in his. at~station recite
the mode of affixing the testator's name. McGee "· Porter, 14 Mo. 61. S1gnmg by a mark
ie 1t11fficient if the testator cannot write: Butler "· Benson, 1 Barb. 526; Upchul'ch v. Upchurch, 16 B. llonr. 10:.!; Smith"· Dolby, 4 Harr. 350; and in Roma state11 it ha.8 been held sufficient whether he could write or not. St. Louis Hospital v. Willie.ms's .Administrator, 19 Mo.
609. See Hay"· Hill. 3 Strobh. 297. And.in England it has been held that signing by initials
-De Savory, 15 .Jur. 1042-or by a fictitious name-He Redding, 2 Rob. 339-was e. sufficient
Bi.gning.
(7) The atte11tation should not only be in the bodily presence of the testator, but he should be
in a conscious state, and able to obiJCrve what ii:1 bemg donll, if dit1prn1ed to do so. It is not
absolutely necessary, however, that he be in the same room with tho witncl:\8eB, if within sight. _
Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Met. 349; Watson "· Pipes, 3:.! .Mi:!8. 451; Wright "· Lewis, 5 Rich. 212.
But if the te~tator wa.'! where he could not 1!0e the witnesses in the act of attestation, it is insufficient. Brooks c. Duffell, :.!a Geo. 44 l ; Boldry ti. Parris, 2 Cu~h. 433.
An attestation cln.u:ie to a will is not essential, but it may neverthcles!I become very important in the event of the witne11ses not recollecting the facts recited therein, &.'! in that co.so the
due execution of the will mav be inferred from the recital!!. See Hitch"· Wells, 10 Beav. 84;
Lawyer c. Smith, 8 .Mich. 4li; Kirk ti. Carr, f'>4 Penn. St. 285.
•
·
(8) [This extend~ to devise11 of lands, and every interest given to the witnes1'es. But it has
been held that a witneSi! may be rendered oompetent to prove a will by a release, or the receipt
of his legacy. 4 Burn. Ecc. Law, 97.]

of his legacy. 4 Burn. Ecc. Law, 97.]
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r *g~g -I court *and jury before whom such will shall be contested. And in a

L ' J much later case (v) the testimony of three witnesses, who were cred-

itors was held to be sufficiently credible, though the land was charged with the

payment of debts; and the reasons given on the former determination were said

to be insufficient. (9)

Another inconvenience was found to attend this new method of conveyance

by devise; in that creditors by bond and other specialties, which affected the

heir provided he had assets by descent, were now defrauded of their securities,

not having the same remedy against the devisee of their debtor. To obviate

which, the statute 3 and 4 W. and M. c. 14. hath provided, that all wills and

testaments, limitations, dispositions, and appointments of real estates, by ten-

ants in fee-simple or having power to dispose by will, shall (as against such

creditors only), be deemed to be fraudulent and void: and that such creditors

may maintain their actions jointly against both the heir and the devisee. (10)

A will of lands, made by the permission and under the control of these stat-

utes, is considered by the courts of law not so much in the nature of a testa-

ment, as of a conveyance declaring the uses to which the land shall be subject:

with this difference, that in other conveyances the actual 8ubscription of the

witnesses is not required by law, (u>) though it is prudent for them so to do, in

order to assist their memory when living, and to supply their evidence when

dead; but in devises of lauds such subscription is now absolutely necessary by

statute, in order to identify a conveyance, which in its nature can never be set

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

up till after the death of the devisor. And upon this notion, that a devise

affecting lands is merely a species of conveyance, is founded this distinction

between such devises and testaments of personal chattels; that the latter will

operate upon whatever the testator dies possessed of, the former only upon such

real estates as were his at the time of executing and publishing his will, (a;) (11)

(r) M. 31 Geo. n. 4 Burr. 1, 430. (w) See pages 307, SOS. (z) 1 P. Wm«. 675. 11 Mod. 148.

(9) [A person who signs his name as witness to a will, by this act of attestation solemnly tes-

tifies tin1 sanity of the testator. Should snch witness afterwards attempt to impeach his own

act, and to prove that the testator did not know what he was doing when he made (what pur-

ported to be) his will; though snch testimony will be far indeed from conclusive: Hudson's case,

Skin. 70; Digg's case, cited, id.; and Lord Mansfield held, that a witness impeaching his own

act, instead of finding credit, deserved the pillory: Walton v. Shelley, 1 T. R. 300; Lowe v.

Jolliffe, 1 "W. Bla. 366; S. 0., 1 Dick. 389; Goodtitle v. Clayton, 4 Burr, 2225; yet, Lord Eldon

held that the evidence of snch parties was not to be entirely excluded: admitting, however, that

it is to be received with the most scrupulous jealousy. Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 504 ; Howard

v. Braithwaite, 1 Yes. and Bea. 208. And Sir John N irlmll has laid it down as a distinct rale,

that no fact stated by any witness open to such just suspicion, can be rolled on, where he is not

corroborated by other evidence. Einleside v. Harrison, 2 Phillim. 499; and see Burrowes r.

Lock, 10 Ves. 474.

The statute 1 Vie. e. 26, repeals the act 25 Geo. II, e. 6 (except as it affects the colonies), and

re-enacts and extends some of its provisions. It makes void devises and bequests, not only to

an attesting witness, but to the husband or wife of snch witness, and expressly provides that

the incompetency of a witness, to be admitted to prove the execution of a will, shall not render

it invalid. The statute further enacts that any creditor, or the wife or husband of any creditor,

whose debt is charged upon the property devised or bequeathed by the will, may be admitted to

prove the execution thereof as an attesting witness, and that an executor of a will may be ad-

mitted to prove its execution—a point on which some doubts had previously existed.]

(10) "Wills of both real and personal estate in the United States are made subject to the rights

of creditors, as well by simple contract as by specialty, and, to the extent that it is necessary to

appropriate the property to the satisfaction of their demands, the intended bounty is defeated.

And the same is now true in England. See statutes 11 Geo. IV and 1 "Wm. IV, o. 47 ; 3 and 4

id. c. 104, and 2 and 3 Vic. o. 60.

(11) [Lord Mansfield has declared, that this does not turn upon the construction of the stat-

ute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, (as some have supposed) which says, that any person having lands, Ac.,

may devise: for the same rule prevailed before the statute, where lands were devisable by

custom. Oowp. 90. It has been determined, that where a testator has devised all his lands,

or all the lands which he shall have at the time of his death; if he purchase freehold lands,

and then make a codicil duly executed according to the statute, though no notice is taken of

the after-purchased lands; yet if the eodicil is annexed to, or confirms the will, or, as it

Eeems, has a reference to it, this amounts to a rcpublication of the will, and the after-pur-
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Wherefore no *after-pnrchased lands will pass under such devise, (y) r *oyq -i

unless, subsequent to the purchase or contract, (z) the devisor repub- L ' J

lishes his will, (a) (12)

We have now considered the several species of common assurances, whereby a

title to lands and tenements may be transferred and conveyed from one man to

another. But, before we conclude this head, it may not be improper to take

notice of a few general rules and maxims, which have been laid down by courts

of justice, for the construction and exposition of them all. These are,

1. That the construction be favourable, and as near the minds and apparent

intents of the parties, as the rules of law will admit, (b) For the maxims of law

are, that "verba intentioni debent inservire;" and "benigne interpretamur

chartas propter simplicitatem laicorum." And therefore the construction must

also be reasonable, and agreeable to common understanding, (c) (13)

2. That quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas ibi nulla expositio contra verba

fienda est: (d) but that, where the intention is clear, too minute a stress be not

laid on the strict and precise signification of words: nam qui hmret in litera,

heeret in cortice. Therefore, by a grant of a remainder a reversion may well

pass, and e converso. (e) And another maxim of the law is, that " mala gram-

matica non vitiat chartam;" neither false English nor bad Latin will destroy a

deed. (/) Which perhaps a classical critic may think to be no unnecessary

caution.

3. That the construction be made upon the entire deed, and not merely upon
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disjointed parts of it. "Nam ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima

interpretatio." (a) And therefore that every part of it be (if possible) r *oo0 \

made to take effect: and no word but what may operate in some shape "• '

or other, (h) "Nam verba debent intelligi cum e/ectu, ut res magis valeat quam

pereat." (i) (14)

(y) Moor. 255. 11 Mod. 127. ft} 1 Ch. Cas. 89. 2 Ch. Cas. 144. fa) Salk. 238.

(b) Ami. 60. (e) 1 Bulstr. 175. Hob. 304. (d) 2 Saund. 157. (e) Hob. 27.

(f) 10 Kep. 133. Co. I-ill. 223. 2 Show. 334. (gj 1 ISulslr. 101. (K) 1 F. Wma. 457.

(1) Flowd. 156.

chased lands will pass under the general devise. Cowp. 158; Com. 383; 4 Bro. 2; 7 Ves. Jun.

98. But if the codicil refer expressly to the lands only devised by the will, then the after-

purchased lands will not pass under the general devise of the will. 7 T. R. 482. This also is a

general rule, that if a man is seized of an estate in fee, and disposes of it by will, and afterwards

makes a conveyance of the fee-simple, and takes back a new estate, this new estate will not pass

by the will, for it is not the estate which the testator had at the time of publishing his will.

Brydges v. Duchess of Chandos, 2 Ves. Jun. 417.

Equity admits no revocation which would not upon legal grounds be a revocation at law.

There are three cases which are exceptions to this general rule, vir.: mortgages, which are revo-

cations pro tanto only, a conveyance for payments of debts, or a conveyance merely for the

purpose of a partition of an estate. In the two first, a court of equity decrees the redemption,

or the surplus, to that person who would have been entitled if such mortgage or conveyance had

not existed, i e. the devisee. 2 Ves. Jun. 428.

If an estate is modified in a different manner,as where a new interest is taken,from that in

which it stood at the making of the will, it is a revoeattoo. 3 Atk. 741. And equitable,

being governed by the same rules as legal estates, if any new use be limited, or any alteration

of the trusts upon which they were settled take place,, a devise of them will be revoked. 2

Atk. 579. If A Having devised lands to B, afterwards convey to him a less estate, as for years,

to commence from the death of the devisor, this is a revocation of the devise to B; Cro. Jac.

49; but a grant only of an estate for years is not a revocation of a devise in fee. 2 Atk. 72. Or,

if A after devising in fee, mortgage his lauds or convey them iu fee to trustees to pay debts,

though this is a revocation at law, it is not so iu equity, exsejt pro tanto. 1 Vern. 329, 342; see

also 3 Ves. Jun. 6T>4.]

(12) Under the recent wills act of 1 Vic. c, 26, after-acquired real estate may pass, and as to

propertv of every kind, the will speaks and takes effect from the testator's death, unless re-

strained by the terms of a particular description. The last preceding note must be understood to

apply exclusively to wills made before that act took effect.

(13) See Parkhurst ». Smith, Willes, 332; Kane p. Hood, 13 Pick. 282; Ingalls ». Cole, 47 Me.

530; Bird t>. Hamilton, Wai. Ch. 361; Long Island B. R- Co. c. Conklin, 32 Barb. 381; French

e. Carhart, 1 N. Y. 96.

(14) Duke of Northumberland «. Ewington, 5 T. R. 526; Folsom v. McDonough, 6 Gush.

208; Browning ». Wright, 2 B. and P. 13; Jackson «. Stevens, 16 Johns. 110; Babcock c. Wil-
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4. That the deed be taken most strongly against him that is the agent or con-

tractor, and in favour of the other party. " Verba fortius accipiuntur contra

proferentem." (15) As, if tenant in fee-simple grants to any one an estate for life,

generally, it shall be construed an estate for the life of the grantee, (j) For the

principle of self-preservation will make men sufficiently careful not to prejudice

their own interest by the too extensive meaning of their words: .and hereby all

manner of deceit in any grant is avoided; for men would always affect ambigu-

ous and intricate expressions, provided they were afterwards at liberty to put

their own construction upon them. But here a distinction must be taken

between an indenture and a deed-poll: for the words of an indenture, executed,

by both parties, are to be considered as the words of them both; for, though

delivered as the words of one party, yet they are not his words only, because the

other party hath given his consent to every one of them. But in a deed-poll,

executed only by the grantor, they are the words of the grantor only, and shall

be taken most strongly against him. (k) And, in general, this rule, being a rule

of some strictness and ngour, is the last to be resorted to; and is never to be

relied upon, but where all other rules of exposition fail. (I)

5. That, if the words will bear two senses, one agreeable to, and another

against law; that sense be preferred, which is most agreeable thereto. (»») As

if tenant in tail lets a lease to have and to hold during life generally, it shall be

construed to be a lease for his own life only, for that stands with the law ; and

not for the life of the lessee, which is beyond his power to grant, (16)
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r $001 -I *6. That in a deed, if there be two clauses so totally repugnant to

*• J each other, that they cannot stand together, the first shall be received,

and the latter rejected; (n) wherein it differs from a will; for there, of two such,

repugnant clauses the latter shall stand, (o) Which is owing to the different

natures of the two instruments; for the first deed and the last will are always

most available in law. (17) Yet in both cases we should rather attempt to recon-

cile them, (p)

7. That a devise be most favourably expounded, to pursue if possible the will

of the devisor, who, for want of advice or learning, may have omitted the legal

or proper phrases. And therefore many times the law dispenses with the want

of words in devises, that are absolutely requisite in all other instruments. Thus,

a fee may be conveyed without words of inheritance; (q) and an estate-tail

without words of procreation, (r) By a will also an estate may pass by mere

implication, without any express words to direct its course. As, where a man

devises lands to his heir at law, after the death of his wife; here, though no

estate is given to the wife in express terms, yet she shall have an estate for life

by implication ; (s) for the intent of the testator is clearly to postpone the heir

()) Co. Litt. «. (Tc) Co. LItt. 134. (I) Bacon's Elem. o. 8- (m) Co. Lilt. «.

(n) Hardr. W. (o) Co. Litt. 112. (p) Cro. Eliz. «0. 1 Vern. 80. (q) Sec page 108.

(r) See page 115. (») H. 13 Hen. VII, 17. 1 Vent. 876.

son, 17 Me. 372; Norrisr. Shower-man, 2 Dong. Mich. 16; Moore ». Jackson, 4 "Wend. 58; Jack-

Bon v. Blodget, 16 Johns. 172.

(15) Hathaway v. Power, 6 Hill, 453; Cicotte v. Gagnier, 2 Mich. 381; Glover p. Shields, 32

Barb. 374. This rule, however, is one which the courts only apply when no satisfactorv result

can be reached by other rules of analysis and construction. 2 Washb. Real Prop. 628; Marshall

v. Kiles, 8 Conn. 369; Carroll v. Norwood, 5 H. and J. 163.

(16) See Post ». Hoover, 33 N. Y. 593.

(17) [Such was held to be the law in the time of Lord Coke. See, accordingly, 6 Vcs. 102;

6 id. 247, 407. But now where the same estate is devised to A in fee, and afterwards to B in

fee, in the same will, they are construed to take the estate as joint tenants or tenant* in common,

according to the limitation of the estates and interests devised. 3 Atk. 493; Harg. Co. Litt. 112,

b. n. 1.]

The rule that the last clause shall prevail where two are irreconcilable, is one to be applied

only in the last resort, where the instalment does not furnish better means of ascertaining the

probable intent. Inglehart v. Kirwan, 10 Md. 559 ; Bradley v. Amidon, 10 Paige, 235. And see

Auburn Seminary v. Kellogg, 16 N". Y. 83; Thrasher v. Ingram, 32 Ala. 645; Everitt v. Everitt.

29 N. Y. 39; Sweet v. Chase, 2 N. Y. 73; see also the English cases of Doe v. Davies, 4 M. and

"W. 599; Langham v. Sandford, 19 Ves. 647; Clayton v. Lowe, 5 B. and Aid. 636.
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till after her death ; and, if she does not take it, nobody else can. (18) So, also,

where a devise is of black-acre to A, and of white-acre to B in. tail, and if they

both die without issue, then to C in fee ; here A and B have cross remainders

by implication, and on the failure of cither's issue, the other or his issue shall

take the whole ; and C's remainder over shall be postponed'till the issue of both

shall fail, (t) But, to avoid confusion, no such cross remainders are allowed

between more than two devisees: (u) (19) and, in general, where any implica-

tions are allowed, they must be such as are neassary (or at least highly

*probable) and not merely possible implications, (w) (20) And herein r *3go i

*• Ol " '

there is no distinction between the rules of law and of equity ; for the

will, being considered in both courts in the light of a limitation of uses, (2) is

construed in each with equal favour and benignity, and expounded rather on its

own particular circumstances, than by any general rules of positive law. (21)

And thus we have taken a transient view, in this and the three preceding

chapters, of a very large and diffusive subject, the doctrine of common assur-

ances : which concludes our- observations on the title to things real, or the

means by which they may be reciprocally lost and acquired. We have before

considered the estates which may be had in them, with regard to their duration

or quantity of interest, the time of their enjoyment, and the number and con-

nexions of the persons entitled to hold them : we have examined the tenures,

both ancient and modern, whereby those estates have been, and are now, holden :
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and have distinguished the object of all these inquiries, namely, things real into

the corporeal or substantial and incorporeal or ideal kind ; and have thus con-

sidered the rights of real property in every light wherein they are contemplated

by the laws of England. A system of laws that differs much from every other

system, except those of the same feudal origin, in its notions and regulations of

landed estates ; and which, therefore, could in this particular be very seldom

compared with any other.

The subject which has thus employed our attention, is of very extensive use,

and of as extensive variety. And yet, I am afraid, it has afforded the student

less amusement and pleasure in the pursuit, than the matters discussed in the

preceding book. To say the truth, the vast alterations which the doctrine of

real property has undergone from the conquest to the present time ; the infinite

determinations upon points that continually arise, and which have been heaped

one upon another for a course of seven centuries, without any order or

*method ; and the multiplicity of acts of parliament which have amended, r ,000 -,

or sometimes only altered, the common law : these causes have made the I -"

study of this branch of our national jurisprudence a little perplexed and intri-

cate. It hath been my endeavour, principally, to select such parts of it as were of

the most general use, where the principals were the most simple, the reasons of

them the most obvious, and the practice the least embarrassed. Yet I cannot

presume that I have always been thoroughly intelligible to such of my readers

as were before strangers even to the very terms of art which I have been obliged

ft} Frcera. 484. (Vj Cro. Jan. 655. 1 Ventr. 224. 2 Show. 139.

(tcj Vangh. 482. (x) Fiteg. 236. 11 Mod. 153.

till after her death ; and, if she does not take it, nobody else can. (18) So, also,
where a devise is of black-acre to A, and of white-acre to :B in. tail, and if they
both die without issue, then to C in fee; here A and B have cross remainders.
by implication, and on the failure of either's issue, the other or his issue shall
t~ke the whole; and C's remainder over shall be postponed till the issue of both
shall fail. (t) Hut, to a.void confusion, no such cross remainders are allowed
between more than two devisees: ( u) ( 19) and, in general, where any implications are allowed, they must be such as are nec1ssary (or at least highly
•probable) and not merely possihl~ implications. (w) (20) And herein [ *382 J
there is no distinction between the rules of law and of eguity; for the
will, being considered in both courts in the light of a hmitation of uses, (x) is
construed in each with equal favour and benignity, and expounded rather on its
own particular circumstances, than by any general rules of positive lu.w. (21)
And thus we have taken a tmnsient view, in this and the three preceding
chapters, of a very large and diffusiYe subject, the doctrine of common assurances: which concludes our· observations on the title to things real, or· the
means by which they may be reciprocally lost and acquired. We have before
considered the estates which may be ha<l m them, with regard to their <lnration
or quantity of interest, the time of their enjoyment, and the number and connexions of the persons entitled to hold them: we have examined the tenures,
both ancient an<l modern, whereby those estat~s have been, and are now, hol<len:
and have distinguished the object of all these inquiries, namely, things real into
the corporeal or substantial and incorporeal or ideal kind; and have thus considered the rights of real property in every light wherein they are contemplated
by the laws of England. A system of laws that differs much from every other
system, except those of the same feudal origin, in its notions and regulations of
landed estates ; and which, therefore, could in this particular be verv seldom
·
•
compared with anv other.
'fhe subject whfoh has thus employed our attention, is of very extensive use,
and of as extensive variety. And yet, I am afraid, it has afforded the student
less amusement and plea.sore in the pursuit, than the matters discussed in the
preceding book. 'fo say the truth, the vast alterations which the doctrine of
re.al property has nnder~one from the conquest to the present time; the infinite·
determinations upon pomts that continually arise, and which have been heaped
one upon another for a course of se,·en centuries, without any order or
•method; and the multiplicity of acts of parliament which have amended, [ • 383 ]
or sometimes only altered, the common law: these canses have made the
study of this branch of our national jurisprudence a little perplexed and intricate. It hath been my endeavour, principally~ to select such parts of it as were of
the most general use, where the pnncipals were the most simple, the reasons of
them the most obvious, and the practice the least em ba.rrassed. Yet I cannot
presume that I have always been thoroughlv intelligible to such of my readers
88 were before strangers eYen to the very terms of art which I ha,•e been obliged

(18) [But the heir shall not be disinherited but by a plain, and not merely a probable inten-

tion. Doe «. Wilkinson, 2 T. R. 209.]

(t) Froem. 4/U.
(tc) Vaugh. 262.

(u1 Cro. Jae. 6M. 1 Ventr. 22-&.
(:r) Jfib.g. ~. Jl Mod. 163.

ll Show. 139,

(19) [The contrary has for some time been fully established ; and this has been laid down by

Lord Mansfield, as a general rule, viz. : wherever cross remainders are to be raised between two

and no more, the favorable presumption is in support of cross remainders ; where between more

than two, the presumption is against them ; but the intention of the testator may defeat the pre-

• sumption in either case. Perry et al. t>. White, Cowp. 777, 797 ; 4 T. R. 710.]

In a will there may be cross remainders among any number by implication, where it is the

manifest intention of the testator, though he has given the estates to the respective heirs of their

bodies. 2 East, 36. See 1 Taunt. 234 ; 2 Jann. on "Wills, 457.]

(20) See what is said by Lord Eldon on this subject in 1 Yes. and B. 466.

(21) Fur Mr. Jarnian's rules for the construction of wills, see 2 Jarm. on Wills, ed. 1861, 762

et. seq. ; Rcdf. on Wills, 425, note. For general rules on the same subject, ace Maun t. Mann, 14

Johns. 1 ; Christie v. Phyfe, lit N. T. 344.
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(18) [But the heir shall not be dildnherited but by a plain, and not merely a probable intention. Doc v. WilkinA<m, 2 T. R. 209.)
·
(19) [The contrary has for some time been fully establi~hcd ; and this has been laid down by
Lord l!ansfield, a~ a general rule, viz. : wherever cross remainders are to be rwsed between two
and no more, the fa.vorahle presumption is in support of crot1s remainders; where between more
than two, the presumption is against them; bnt the intention of the testator may defeat the pre• mmption in either ca.~e. Perry et al. v. White, Cowp. 777, 797; 4 T. R. 710.]
In a will tbere may be cro~s remainders among any number by implication, where it is the
manifest intention of tho te~tator, though ho bas given the et1tates to the respectit:e heirs of their
bodh~s. 2 En..~t, 36. See 1 Taunt. 234; 2 Jarm. on Wills, 457.]
(20) See whut is Mid by Lord Eldon on this Elubject in 1 Vf:~. and B. 466.
(:ll) }'or Yr. Jo.rmau's rule~ for the con;.;truction of wills, sec 2 Jann. on Will!!, ed. 11361, 7tn
et. treq.; Redf. on Will;;, 425, note. For general rules on the same subject, see Mann v. Mann, 14
Jo.bn&. 1; Christie ti. Phyfe, W N. Y. 344.
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to make use of; though, whenever those have first occurred, I have generally

attempted a short explication of their meaning. These are indeed the more

numerous, on account of the different languages which our law has at different

periods been taught to speak; the difficulty arising from which will insensibly

diminish by use and familiar acquaintance. And therefore I shall close this

branch of our inquiries with the words of Sir Edward Coke: (y) "Albeit the

student shall not at any one day, do what he can, reach to the full meaning of

all that is here laid down, yet let him no way discourage himself, but proceed:

for on some other day, in some other place " (or perhaps upon a second perusal

of the same), " his doubts will be probably removed."

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF THINGS PERSONAL.

to make uee of; though, whenever those have first occnrred, I have genera11y
at.tempted a short explication of their meaning. These a.re indeed the more
numerous, on account of the different languages which our law bas at different
periods been taught to speak; the difficulty arising from which will insensibly
diminish by use and familiar acquaintance. And therefore I shall close this
branch of our inquiries with the words of Sir Edward Coke: (y) "Albeit the
student shall not at any one day, do what he can, reach to the full meaning or
all that is here laid down, yet let him no way discourage himself, butjroceed:
for on some other day, in some other place" (or perhaps upon a secon perusal
of the same)," his doubts will be probably removed."

UNDER the name of things personal are included all sorts of things movable,

which may attend a man's person wherever he goes; (1) and, therefore, being

only the objects of the law while they remain within the limits of its jurisdic-

tion, and being also of a perishable quality, are not esteemed of so high a nature,

nor paid so much regard to by the law, as things that are in their nature more

CHAPTER XXIV.

permanent and immovable, as lands and houses and the profits issuing thereout.

These being constantly within the reach, and under the protection, of the law,

OF THINGS PERSONAL.

were the principal favourites of our first legislators: who took all imaginable

care in ascertaining the rights, and directing the disposition, of such property

as they imagined to be lasting, and which would answer to posterity the trouble
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and pains that their ancestors employed about them; but at the same time

entertained a very low and contemptuous opinion of all personal estate, which

they regarded as only a transient commodity. The amount of it indeed was

comparatively very trifling, during the scarcity of money and the ignorance of

luxurious refinements, which prevailed in the feudal ages. Hence it was, that

a tax of the fifteenth, tenth, or sometimes a much larger proportion, of all the

movables of the subject, was frequently laid without scruple, and is mentioned

with much unconcern by our ancient historians, though now it would justly

, ^__, , alarm our opulent merchants and stockholders. And hence, "likewise,

L "°a J may be derived the frequent forfeitures inflicted by the common law, of

all a man's goods and chattels, for misbehaviours and inadvertencies that at

(y) Pronmc to 1 Iimt.

(1) ["Chattels" are real or personal. Co. Lit. 118, b. Chattels real are snch as concern the

realty, as a term for years. Id. Chattels personal arc cattle, stuff, <to., fowls, tame or re-

claimed, deer, coneys tame, fish in a trunk, tithes severed from the nine parts, trees sold or

reserved upon a sale,—Hob. 173—and emblements. Com. Dig. Biens, A. 2. The terms "goods

and chattels" include choses in action as well as those in possession. 12 Co. 1; 1 Atk. 182.

But a bill of exchange, mortgage, bond, and banker's receipt, will not pass by a bequest of all the

hmgsmi

than " goods," and will conclude animate as well as inanimate property. The term " goods "

•vrill not include fixtures ; but the word "effects" may embrace the same. 7 Taunt. 183; 4 J.

UNDER the name of things personal are included all sorts of things mm:aol-e,
which may attend a man's person where\·er he ~oes; (1) and, therefore, being
only the objects of the law while they remain within the limits of its jurisdic·
tion, and being also of a perishable quality, are not esteemed of so high a nature,
nor paid so much regard to by the law, as things that are in tht-ir nature more
permanent and immovable, as lands and houses and the profits issuing thereout.
These being constantly within the reach, and under the protection, of the law,
were the principal favourites of our first lE"gislators: who took all imaginable
care in ascertaining the ri~hts, and directing the disposition, of such property
as they imagined to be laetrng, and which would answer to posterity the trouble
and pains that their ancestors employed about them ; but at the same time
entertained a very low and contemptuous opinion of all personal estate, which
they regarded as only a transient commodity. The amount of it indeed was
comparatively very trifling, during the scarcity of money and the ignorance of
luxurious refinements, which prevailed in the feudal ages. Hence it was, that
a tax of the fifteenth, tenth, or sometimes a much larger proportion, of all the
movables of the subject, was frequently laid without scruple, and is mentioned
with much unconcern by our ancient historians, though now it would justly
[ • 385 ] alarm our opulent merchants and stockholders. And hence, *likewise,
may be derived the frequent forfeitures inflicted by the common law, of
all a me.n's goods and chattels, for misbehaviours and inadvertencies that at

B. Moore, 73; 4 B. and A. 206. Invalid exchequer bills are securities and effects within mean-

tr> Proeme &o 1 loll

ing of 15 Geo. II, c. 13. 1 New. R. I. The terms " effects, both real and personal," in a will,

pass freehold estates, and all chattels real and personal. 3 Brp. P. C. 388. As to tifes, see Com.

Dig. Biens, H.; 2 Saund. index, Trees: Bridgm. index, tit. Timber, when severed or contracted

to be severed, from the land passes as personal property. Hob. 173 ; 11 Co. 50 ; Com. Dijj. Biens;

H. Toller's L. Ex. 195, 196.] Upon the general subject, see the very complete aud satisfactory

treatise on Personal Property by Mr. Williams.
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(1) ["Chattels" are real or personal. Co. Lit. 118, b. Chattels real are such as concern the
realty, as a term for years. Id. Chattels personal are cattle, stuff, &c., fowls, tame (IT reclaimed, deer, coneys tame, fish in a trunk, tithes 8eVcred from the nine parts, trees sold or
reAerved upon a salo,-Hob. 173-e.nd emblements. Com. Dig. Biens, A. 2. The terms ''goods
and chattel8" include choses in action as well as those in po~session. 12 Co. 1; 1 Atk. 182.
But a bill of excban~e, mortg~e, bond, and banker's receipt, will not pMs by a bequest of all the
testator's "property ' in a particular house, though cash and bank notes would have passed, they
being quasi cash; for bills, bonds, &c., are mere evidence of title to thin~ out of the house and
not things in it. 1 Sch. and Lef. 318 ; 11 Vee. 662. The term "chattels' is more compl'ehensive
than " goods," and will conclude animate as well as inanimate property. The term " goods "
will not include fixtures; but the word "effects" may embrace the same. 7 Taunt. l&l; 4 J.
B. Moore, 73; 4 B. and A. 206. Invalid exchequer bil!R are Aecnrities and effects within mean- •
ing of' 15 Geo. II, c. 13. 1 New. R. I. The tenn11 "effects, both real and penional," in a \Till,
p8118 freehold estates, and all chattelll real and personal. 3 Bro. P. C. 388. As to t*ea, 11ee (;Qm.
Dig. Biens, H. ; 2 Saund. index, Trees : Bridgm. index, tit. Timber, when severed or contrn<•t~d
to be se1"ercd, from the land p8118es as personal property. Hob. 173; 11 Co. 50; Com. Ui~. Biens;
H. Toller's L. Ex. 195, 196.] Upon the Fcneral subject, 11ee the very complete and satisfactory
treatise on Personal Property by Mr. Willi!imS.
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present hardly seem to deserve so severe a punishment. Onr ancient law-books,

which are founded upon the feudal provisions, do not, therefore, often condescend

to regulate this species of property. There is not a chapter in Britton, or the

Mirror, that can fairly be referred to this head ; and the little that is to be found

in Glanvil, Bracton, and Fleta, seems principally borrowed from the civilians.

But of later years, since the introduction and extension of trade and commerce,

which are entirely occupied in this species of property, and have greatly aug-

mented its quantity, and, of course, its value, we have learned to conceive differ-

ent ideas of it. Our courts now regard a man's personalty in a light nearly, if

not quite, equal to his realty : and have adopted a more enlarged and less tech-

nical mode of considering the one than the other; frequently drawn from the

rules which they found already established by the Roman law, wherever those

rules appeared to be well grounded and apposite to the case in question, but

principally from reason and convenience, adapted to the circumstances of the

times ; preserving withal a due regard to ancient usages, and a certain feudal

tincture, which is still to be found in some branches of personal property.

But things personal, by our law, do not only include things movable but also

something more : the whole of which is comprehended under the general name

of chattels, which, Sir Edward Coke says, (a) is a French word, signifying goods.

The appellation is in truth derived from the technical Latin word, catalla:

which primarily signified only beasts of husbandry, or (as we still call them)

cattle, but in its secondary sense was applied to all movables in general, (b) In
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the grand cousiumier of N ormandy (e) a chattel is described as a mere mova-

ble, but at the same time it is set in opposition to a fief or feud : so that not only

goods, but whatever was not a feud, were accounted chattels. *And it r !„„„ -,

is in this latter, more extended, negative sense, that our law adopts it ; *• J

the idea of goods, or movables only, being not sufficiently comprehensive to

take in everything that the law considers as a chattel interest. For since, as

the commentator on the cousiumier (d~) observes, there are two requisites to

make a fief or heritage, duration as to time, and immobility with regard to

place : whatever wants either of these qualities is not, according to the Normans,

an heritage or fief; or, according to us, is not a real estate; the consequence of

which in both laws is, that it must be a personal estate, or chattel.

Chattels therefore are distributed by the law into two kinds ; chattels real,

and chattels personal, (e)

1. Chattels real, saith Sir Edward Coke, (/) are such as concern, or savour

of, the realty ; as terms for years of land, wardships in chiyalry (while the mili-

tary tenures subsisted), the next presentation to a church, estates by a statute-

merchant, statute-staple, elegit, or the like ; of all which we have already spoken.

And these are called real chattels, as being interests issuing out of, or annexed

to, real estates : of which they have one quality, viz., immobility, which denomi-

nates them real; but want the other, viz., a sufficient, legal, indeterminate

duration ; and this want it is that constitutes them chattels. The utmost

period for which they cjin last is fixed and determinate, either for such a space

of time certain, or till such a particular sum of money be raised out of such a

particular income ; so that they are not equal in the eye of the law to the lowest

estate of freehold, a lease for another's life ; their tenants were considered upon

feudal principles as merely bailiffs or farmers ; and the tenant of the freehold

might at any time have destroyed their interest, till the reign of Henry VIII. (a)

A freehold, which alone is a real estate, and seems (as has been said) to answer

to the fief in Normandy, is conveyed by corporal investiture and *livery r +g^w ,

of seisin ; which gives the tenant so strong a hold of the land, that it never "- J

after can be wrested from him during his life, but by his own act of voluntary

transfer or of forfeiture ; or else by the happening of some future contingeiiQY

fa) I Inst. 118. ft) llnfresne II, 409. fc) C. 87. '

ffl) II conviendroit qvilfust non mouitable ft tie ditrtt a toil sionrs. fol. 107. a.

f e ) So, too, in the .N orman law, Calmx tout menllei et immeubles t si comme vrnis meublct tout gui *»._

porter tcptuvent et ensuivir le corps ; immeubles sont choses gni ne peuvent en suivir le corps, ni estre c ,, '

porteet, et lout ce qui n'ett point en heritage. LL. Will. JJothi, c. 4, apud Dufreene, II. 4011. **

(f) 1 lust. 113. (g) See page 142.
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present hardly seem to deserrn so seYere a punishment. Our ancient law-books,
which are founded upon the feudal pro,·isions, do not, therefore, often condescend
to regulate this species of property. There is not a chapter in Britton, or the
MiITor, that can fairly be refen-ed to this head ; and the little that is to be found
in Glanvil, Bra.cton, and Fleta, seems principally borrowed from the civilians.
But of later years, since the introduction and extension of trade and commerce,
which are entirel.Y occupied in this species of property, and have greatly augmented its quantity, and, of course, its value, we have learned to conceive different ideas of it. Our courts now regard a man's personalty in a light nearly, if
not quite, equal to his realty: and ha.Ye adopted a more enlarged and less technical mode of considering the one than the other; frequently drawn from the
rules which they found already established hy the Roman law, wherever those
rules appeared to be well rounded and apposite to the case in question, but
principally from reason an convenience, adapted to the circumstances of the
times; presen-ing withal a due regard to ancient usages, and a certain feudal
tincture, which is still to be found in some branches of personal property.
But things personal, by our law, do not only include things movable but also
something more: the whole of wl1ich is comprehended under the general name
of cluzUels, which, Sir Edward Coke says, (a) is a French word, signifying goods.
The appellation is in truth derived from the technical Latin word, r:atalla:
which primarily signified only beasts of husbandry, or (as we still call them)
cattle, but in its secondary sense was applied to all movables in general. ( b) In
the grand coustumier of Normamly (c) u. cltattel is described as a mere movable, but at the same time it is set in opposition to a fief or feud: so that not only
6'oods, but whate,·er was not a fend, were accounted chattels. *And it [ • 386 ]
1s in this latter, more extended, negative sense, that our law adopts it;
the idea of goods, or movables only, being not sufficiently comprehensive to
take in everything that the law considers as a chattel interest. For since, as
the commentator on the coustumier (d) obsen·es, there are two requisites to
make a fief or heritage, duration as to time, and immobility with regard to
place; whatever wants either of these qualities is not, according to the Normans,
an heritage or fief; or, according to us, is not a real estate; the consequence of
which in both laws is, that it must be a personal estate, or chattel.
Chattels therefore are distributed by the law into two kinds; chattels real,
and chattels personal. (e)
1. Chattels real, saith Sir Edward Coke,(/) aro such as concern, or savour
of, the realty; as terms for years of land, wardships in chiyalry (while the milita.rv tenures subsisted), the next presentation to a church, estates by a statutemerchant, statute-staple, elegit, or the like; of all which we have already spoken.
And these are called real chattels, as being interests issuin~ out of, or annexed
to, real estates: of which they have one quality, viz., immobility, which denominates them real; but want the other, viz., a sufficient, legal, indeterminate
duration; and this want it is that constitutes them chattels. The utmost
period for which t.hey qi.n last is fixed and determinate, either for such a space
of time certain, or till snch a particular sum of money be raised out of such a
particular income ; so that they are not equal in the eye of the law to the lowest
estate of freehold, a lease for another's life; their tenants were considered upon
fendal principles A.S merely bailiffs or fll.rmers; and the tenant of the freehold
might at any time have destroyed their interest, till the reign of Henry VIII. (.q)
A freehold, which alone is a real estate, and seems (as has been said) to answer
to the fief in Normandy, is com·eyed by corporal investiture and *livery [ • 38 .., l
of seisin; which gives the tenant so strong a hold of the land, that it never
· '
after can be wrested from him during his life, hut by his own act of rnluntary
transfer or of forfeiture; or else by the happening of some future continge11(!j,
l Inst. 118.
(b) Hnt'regne II, 40ll.
(c) C. tn.
fd) 1l C(>fll1iendrolt 111dlfu.•t non 11W'Utlable et tie durtt a to" noura. fol. 107, a.

(a)

(t) So. too, in Lhe ;lionnRn lnw. Cnte"z •<mt mcuble•et immct1bll'-'; ricomme t:'mU meuble11 11011t quit..-~
11Drter 11e ~vcnl d msuivir lc CQf"]JI ; inir1teNble11 a(Jnt clw•e• qui nc peuf'f'nt en "1cfrir lc cvrp1, nt utre e..-. ~·
porttta, d tout ccq1d n'ut pci11t en heritage. LL. Will. Nothl. c. ,&, apvd Dufre~ne, ll, 40ll.
~~.
( f) 1 luat. 111!.
(fl) Seu page 1-12.
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as in estates per auter vie, and the determinable freeholds mentioned in a former

chapter. (A) And even these, being of an uncertain duration, may by possibility

last for the owner's life; for the law will not presuppose the contingency to

happen before it actually does, and till then the estate is to all intents and pur-

poses a life-estate, and therefore a freehold interest On the other hand, a chat-

tel interest in lands, which the Normans put in opposition to fief, and we to

freehold, is conveyed by no seisin or corporal investiture, but the possession is

gained by the mere entry of the tenant himself; and it will certainly expire at

a time prefixed and determined, if not sooner. Thus a lease for years must neces-

sarily fail at the end and completion of the term; the next presentation to a

church is satisfied and gone the instant it comes into possession, that is, by the

first avoidance and presentation to the living; the conditional estates by statutes

and elegit are determined as soon as the debt is paid; and so guardianship in

chivalry expired of course the moment that the heir came of age. And if there

be any other chattel real, it will be found to correspond with the rest in this

essential quality, that its duration is limited to a time certain, beyond which it

cannot subsist. (2)

2. Chattels personal, are, properly and strictly speaking, things movable;

•which may be annexed to or attendant on the person of the owner, and car-

ried about with him from one part of the world to another. Such are animals,

household stuff, money, jewels, corn, garments, and everything else that can

properly be put in motion, and transferred from place to place. And of this
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kind of chattels it is that we are principally to speak in the remainder of this

book; having been unavoidably led to consider the nature of chattels real, and

r *oog -i their incidents, in the former chapters, which were *emploved upon real

"• -I estates; that kind of property being of a mongrel, amphibious nature,

originally endowed with one only of the characteristics of each species of things;

the immobility of things real, and the pn-carious duration of things personal.

Chattel interests being thus distinguished and distributed, it will be proper to

consider, first, the nature of that property, or dominion, to which they are liable;

which must be principally, nay solely, referred to personal chattels: and, sec-

ondly, the title to that property, or how it may be lost and acquired. Of each

of these in its order.

CHAPTER XXV.

OF PROPERTY IN THINGS PERSONAL.

PROPERTY in chattels personal may he either in possession: which is where a

as in estates per attfer vie, and the determinable freeholds mentioned in a former
chapter. (It) .And even these, being of an uncertain duration, may by possibility
last for the owner's life; for the law will not presuppos~ the contingt>ncy to
happen before it actually does, and till then the estate is to all intents und purposes a life-estatt>., and therefore a freehold interest. On the other hand, a chattel interest in lands, which the Kormans put in op_position to fief, and we to
freehold, is conveyeJ. by no seisin or corporal investiture, but the possession is
gained by the mere entry of the tenant himself; and it will certainly expire at
a time prefixed and determined, if not sooner. Thus a lease for years must necessarily fail at the eud and completion of the term; the next presentation to a
church is ~tistied and gone the instant it comes into possession, that is, by the
first avoidance and presentation to the living; the conditional estates by statutes
and elegit a.re determined 118 soon as the <lebt is paid; and so guardianship in
chivalry expired of course the moment that the heir came of age. .And if there
be any other chattel real, it will be found to correspond with the rest in this
essential quality, that its duration is limited to a. time certain, beyond which it
cannot subsist. (2)
2. Chattels personal, a.re, properly a.nd strictly speaking, things mo11able;
which may be annexed to or attendant on the person of the owner, and carried a.bout with him from one part of the world to another. Such are animals,
household stuff, money, jewels, corn, garments, and everything else that can
properly be put in motion, and transferred from place to place. And of this
kind of chattels it is that we are principally to speak in the remainder of this
book; having been unavoidably led to consider the nature of chattels real, and
[ • 388 ] their incidents, in the former chapters, which were •emploved upon real
estates; that kind of property being of a mongrel, amphilJious nature,
originally endowed with one only of the characteristics of each species of things;
the immobility of things real, and the pr1·carions duration of things personal.
Chattel interests being thus distinguished and distribute<l, it will be pro~r to
consider, first, the nature of that pl'Operty, or dominion, to which they are liable;
which must be principally, nay solely, referred to personal chattels: and. secondly, the titl~ to that property, or how it may be lost and acquired. Of each
of these in its order.

man hath not only the right to enjoy, but hath the Actual enjoyment of, the

thing: or else it is in action ; where a man hath only a bare right, without any

occupation or enjoyment. And of these the former, or property in possession

is divided into two sorts, an absolute and a qualified property.

I. First, then, of property in possession absolute, (1) which is where a man

nath, solely and exclusively, the right, and also the occupation, of any movable

CH.APTER XXV.

(h) Page 120.

(2) [It is a rule of the law of England, in common with that of most other nations, that the

OF PROPERTY IN THINGS PERSONAL.

title by succession to personal property, wherever it is situated, shall be determined by the

law of the domicile of the deceased owner. 1 H. Bl. 670; 5 Ves. 750; 5 B. and Or. 451: 1

Hagg. 474,496; 8 Sim. 310. But it has been denied by a Justly esteemed writer that this rule

extends to chattels real, on the ground that the treatment of such property ai personalty \*

peculiar to our own law. 1 Jarm. on Wills, 4 ; 2 id. 740. The point appears to be unaffected

by decision, and is perhaps open to argument on both sides. See 2 P. Wins. 628.]

(1) [It is a rule of law, that the absolute or general property of personal chattels, draws to it

the supposed possession. 2 Saund. 47, a.]
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PROPERTY in chattels personal may be either in possessi'.on: which is where a
man hath not only the right to enJoy, but hath the f<'.tual enjoyment of, the
thing: or else it ism action; where a. man hath only a bare right, without any
occupation or enjoyment. .And of these the former, or property in possessiot&,
is divided into two sorts, an absolute and a qualified propert~.
I. First, then, of property in po.,session absolute, (1) which is where a man
nu.th, solely and exclusiYely, the right, and also the occupation, of any mouble
(1') Pnge 1!0.

(2) [It is a. rule of the law of England, in common with that of mo8t other nations, that the
title by succcSl!ion to per~onal property, wherever it is l'ituated, shall be detennined by tho
Jaw of the domicile of the decea.~ed owner. 1 H. Bl. 670; 5 Yes. 750; 5 B. and (,'r. 451; 1
Hagg. 474, 498; 8 Sim. 310. Dut it bas hl'en denied by a jul!tly esteemed witter that thi>< rule
extends to chattels real, on the gruuncl that the treatment or such property a.~ p<·nionalty i~
peculinr to our own law. 1 Jarm. on Wills, 4; 2 id. 740. The point appe1u·i> to be unaffected
by deci11ion, and is perhaps open to argument on both sides. See 2 P. Wms. 622.]
(1) [It hi a rule of law, that the absolute or general property of personal ohattdl', draws to i~
the supposed possession. 2 Saund. 47, a.]
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chattels; so that they cannot be transferred from him, or cease to be his, with-

out his own act or default Such may be all inanimate things, as goods, plate,

money, jewels, implements of war, garments and the like: such also may be all

vegetable productions, as the fruit or other parts of a plant, when severed from

the body of it; or the whole plant itself, when severed from the ground; none

of which can be moved out of the owner's possession without his own act or

consent, or at least without doing him injury, which it is the business of the

law to prevent or remedy. Of these, therefore, there remains little to be said.

But with regard to animals which have in themselves a principle and power

of motion, and (unless particularly confined) can convey themselves from one

part of the world to another, there is a great diiference made with respect to

*their several classes, not only in our law, but in the law of nature and r *OQQ -i

of all civilized nations. They are distinguished into such as are domitce, *• *

and such as are fercB natures: some being of a tame and others of a wild dispo-

sition. In such as are of a nature tame and domestic (as horses, kine, sheep,

poultry, and the like), a man may have as absolute a property as in any inani-

mate beings; because these continue perpetually in his occupation, and will not

stray from his house or person, unless by accident or fraudulent enticement, in

either of which cases the owner does not lose his property: (a) in which our law

agrees with the laws of France and Holland, (b) The stealing, or forcible

abduction, of such property as this, is also felony; for these are things of intrin-

sic value, serving for the food of man; or else for the use of husbandry, (c) But
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in animals feres natures a man can have no absolute property.

Of all tame and domestic animals, the brood belongs to the owner of the dam

or mother; the English law agreeing with the civil, that "partus sequitur ven-

trem " in the brute creation, though for the most part in the human species it

disallows that maxim. And therefore in the laws of England, (d) as well as

Home, (e) " si equam meam equus tuus presgnantem fecerit, non eat tunm sed

meum quod natum est." And, for this Puffeudorf (f) gives a sensible reason:

not only because the male is frequently unknown; but also because the dam,

during the time of her pregnancy, is almost useless to the proprietor, and must

be maintained with great expense and care: wherefore, as her owner is the loser

by her pregnancy, he ought to be the gainer by her brood. An exception to this

rule is in the case of young cygnets; which belong equally to the owner of tho

cock and hen, and shall be divided between them. (g) But here the reasons of

the general rule cease, and " cessante *ratione cessat et ipsa lex:" for the r ,091 -i

male is well known, by his constant association with the female; and L " "

for the same reason the owner of the one doth not suffer more disadvantage,

during the time of pregnancy and nurture, than the owner of the other.

II. Other animals, that are not of a tame and domestic nature, are either not

the objects of projwrty at all, or else fall under our other division, namely, that

of qualified, limited, or special property; which is such as is not in its nature

permanent, but may sometimes subsist, and at other times not subsist. In dis-

cnssing which subject, I shall in the first place show, how this species of

property may subsist in such animals as are ferce natures, or of a wild nature;

and then how it may subsist in any other things, when under particular

circumstances.

First, then, a man may be invested with a qualified, but not an absolute, prop-

erty in all creatures that are feres natures, either per industriam, propter im-

po'tentiam, or propter privilegium.

1. A qualified property may subsist in animals feres natures per industriam

hominis: (2) by a man's reclaiming and making them tame by art, industry,

and education; or by so confining them within his own immediate power, that

(a) 2 Mod. 319. (6) yin. in Init. I «, tit. 1, } 15. (c) 1 Hal. P. C. 511, 518.

(d) Bro. Abr. tit. propertte, 29. («) ff. 8.1, 5. (/) L. of N. 1, 4, 0. 7. (g) 1 Rep. 17.

(2) See Williams on Real Prop. 19, and the observations by Mr. Justice Barley, 2 B. and C.
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chattels; so thnt they cannot be transferred from him, or cease to be bis, with·
out his own act or default. Such may be all inanimate things, W! goods, pJate,
money, jewels, implements of war, garments and the like: such also may be all
vegetable productions, as the fruit or other parts of a plant, when sewred from
the body of it; or the whole plant itself, when severed from the ground; none
of which can be moved out of' the owner's possession without his own act or
eousent, or at ]east without doing him injury, which it is the business of the
law to prevent or remedy. Of these, theref'o1·e, there remains little t<'i be said.
But \\;th regard to animals which have in themselves a principle and power
of motion, and (unless particularly confined) can convey themselves from one
of the world to another, there is a great clifference made with respect to
their several clUBses, not only in our law, but in the law of nature and [ • 390 ]
of all civilized nations. They are distinguished into such lLB are d01nila,
and such as are ferOJ natur<JJ: some being of a tame and others of a 1vild disposition. In such as a.re of a nature tame and domestic (as hor813s, kine, sheep,
poultry, and the like), a man may have as absolute a property as in any inanimate beings; because these continue perpetually in his occupation, and will not
etrsy from his house or person, unless by accident or fraudulent enticement, in
either of which cases the owner does not lose his property: (a) in which our law
aarees with the laws of France and Holland. (b) The stealing, or forcible
abduction, of such property as this, is also felony; for these are things of intrinsic value, serving for the food of man; or else for the use of husbandry. ( c) But
in animals ferm naturm a man can have no absolute property.
Of all tame and domestic animals, the brood belongs to the owner of the dam
or mother; the English law agreeing with the civil, that "partus sequitur ventrem" in the brute creation, though for the most part in the human species it
disallows that maxim. And therefore in the laws of England, (d) as well as
Rome, (e) "si equam m.eam equus tims prmgnantmi fecerit, non est tumn sed
meum quod nntum est." And, for this Putfeudorf ( f) gives a sensible reason:
not only because the male is frequently unknown; but also because the dam,
during the time of her pregnancy, is almost useless to the proprietor, and must
be mamtained with great expense and care: wherefore, as her owner is the loser
by her pregnancy, he ought to be the gainer by her brood. An exception to this
role is m the case of young cygnets; which belong equally to the owner of tho
cock and hen, and shall be d1nded between them. (g) But here the reasons of
the general rule cease, and "cessante *ratione cessat et ip3a lex:" for the [ • 391 ]
male is well known, by his constant association with the female; and
for the same reason the owner of the one doth not suffer more disadYantage,
during the time of pregnancy and nurture, than the owner of the other.
II. Other animals, that are not of a tame and domestic nature, are either not
the objects of property at all, or else fall under our other division, namely, that
of q1tal1'jied, limited, or special property; which is such as is not in its nature
permanent, but may sometimes subsist, and at other times not subsist. In discussing which subject, I shall in the first place show, how this species of
property may subsist in such animals as are fer<B naturm, or of a wild nature;
and then how it may subsist in any other things, when under p~rticular
circumstances.
First, then, a man may be invested with a. qualified, but not an absolute, properly in all creatures that are .ferOJ natur<JJ, either per industriam, propter -inipotentiam, or propter privilegium.
1. A qualified property may subsist in animals ferm naturm per industriam.
'/wnl'in·i s: (2) by a man's reclaiming and making them tame by art, industry,
and education; or by so confining them within his own immediate power, that

?!'irt

(al 2 Mod. 319.
(bl Vin. In If!#. I. i , IU. I, f 15.
(df Bf'O. Al>r. tU. propwtM, t9.
(e) F/. 6, 1, II,

(C) 1 Hal. P. c. im, llli.
(/l L, of N. l, o&, o. 7.

(g) 7 Rep.17.

(2) See Williama on Real Prop. 19, and the observatioll11 by Mr. Justice Bayley, 2 B. and C.
9'J7.
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they cannot escape and use their natural liberty. And under this head some

writers have ranKed all the former species of animals we have mentioned, ap-

prehending none to be originally and naturally tame, but only made so by art

and custom, as horses, swine, ana other cattle; which, if originally left to them-

selves, would have chosen to rove up and down, seeking their food at large, and

are only made domestic by use and familiarity: and are therefore, say they,

called maiisueta, quasi, manui assueta. But however well this notion may be

founded, abstractedly considered, our law apprehends the most obvious distinc-

tion to be, between such animals as we generally see tame, and are therefore

seldom, if ever, found wandering at large, which it calls domitce natures: and

such creatures as are usually found at liberty, which are therefore supposed to

r „„„„ -, be more emphatically/em *nuturm, "though it may happen that the lat-

L -I ter shall be sometimes tamed and confined by the art and industry of

man. Such as are deer in a park, hares or rabbits in an enclosed warren, doves

in a dove-house, pheasants or partridges in a mew, hawks that are fed and com-

manded by their owner, and fish in a private pond or in trunks. These are no

longer the property of a man, than while they continue in his keeping or actual

possession: but if at any time they regain their natural liberty, his property

instantly ceases; unless they have ammum revertendi, which is only to be

known by their usual custom of returning. (A) A maxim which is borrowed

from the civil law; (t) " revertendi anitnum videntur desinere habere tune,

cum revertendi consuetudinem deseruerint." The law therefore extends this
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possession farther than the mere manual occupation; for my tame hawk that

is pursuing his quarry in my presence, though he is at liberty to go where he

pleases, is nevertheless my property; for he hath animum revertendi. So are

my pigeons, that are flying at a distance from their home (especially of the carrier

kind), and likewise the deer that is chased out of my park or forest, and is in-

stantly pursued by the keeper or forester; all which remain still in my posses-

sion, and I still preserve my qualified property in them. But if they stray

without my knowledge, and do not return in the usual manner, it is then law-

ful for any stranger to take them, (k) But if a deer, or any wild animal reclaimed,

hath a collar or other mark put upon him, and goes and returns at his pleasure;

or if a wild swan is taken, and marked and turned loose in the river, the

owner's property in him still continues, and it is not lawful for any one else to

take him: (I) but otherwise, if the deer has been long absent without returning,

or the swan leaves the neighbourhood. Bees also are ferce natures ; but when

hived and reclaimed, a man may have a qualified property in them, by the law

T *3931 °^ nature'M we^ ** by the civil law. (m) *And to the same purpose, not

*• J to say in the same words, with the civil law, speaks Bracton: (n)

occupation, that is, hiving or including them, gives the property in bees; for

though a swarm lights upon my tree, I have no more property in them till I

have hived them, than I have in the birds which make their nests thereon, and

therefore if another hives them, he shall be their proprietor: but a swarm,

which fly from and out of my hive, are mine so long as I can keep them in

sight, and have power to pursue them; and in these circumstances no one else

is entitled to take them. But it hath been also said, (o) that with us the only

ownership in bees is rations soli; and the charter of the forest, (p) which allows

every freeman to be entitled to the honey found within his own woods, affords

great countenance to this doctrine, that a qualified property may be had in

Bees, in consideration of the property of the soil whereon they are found. (3)

(ft) Bracton, 1. 2, c. 1. 7 Rep. 17. (fl Itat. 1.1. IS. !*) Finch, L. 177.

(/) Crompt. of Courta. 167. 7 Kep. 16. (») Puff. J. 4, a. ft, t 6. Jtut. «. 1,14. (n) I. S, c. 1. > S.

(o) llr.,. Mr. tit. properOe. 37, cites 4:1 Kdw. Ill, 24. (p} 9 Ben. Ill, c. 18.

(3) [With respect to rooks it has been recently determined, that no action is sustainable

against a person for maliciouRlv causing loaded guns to be discharged near a neighbors close

and trees, and thereby disturbing and driving away the rooks which used to resort to and

they cannot escape and use their natuml liberty. And under this head some
writers ha,·e ranked all the former species of animals we have mentioned, apprehending none to be originally and naturally tame, but only made so by a.rt
and custom, as horses, swine, and other cattle; which, if originally left to themselves, would have chosen to rove up and down, seeking their food at large, and
are only made domestic by use and familiarity: and are therefore, say they~
called ma1isueta, quasi, mantei assueta. But however well this notion may be
founded, abstractedly considered, our law apprehends the most obvious distinction to be, between such animals as we generally see tame, and are therefore
seldom, if ever, found wandering at lar~e, which it calls do111it<S natur<B: and
such creatures as are usually found at hberty, which are therefore supposed to
[ • 392 ] be more emphatically fe1·m •naturm, though it may happen that the latter shall be sometimes tamed and confined by the art and industry of
man. Such as are deer in I\ park, hares or rabbits in an enclosed warren, doves
in a dove-house, pheasants or partridges in a mew, hawks that are fed and commanded by their owner, and fish in a prini.te pond or in trunks. These are no
longer the property of a man, than while they continue in his keeping or actual
possession: but if at any time they re~ain their natural liberty, his property
mstantly ceases; unless they have anim.um revertendi, which is only to be
known by their usual custom of returning. (h) A maxim which is borrowed.
from the civil law ; ( i) " rer1ertendi animmn videntur desinere habere tune,
cum revertendi consuetudinem deseruerint." 'fhe law therefore extends this
rossession farther than the mere manual occupation; for my tame hawk that
is pursuing his quarry in my presence, though he is at liberty to go where he
pleases, is nevertheless my property ; for he hath animum revertendi. So are
my pigeons, that are flying at a distance from their home (especially of the carrier
kind), and likewise the deer that is chased out of my park or forest, and is instantly pursued by the keeper or forester; all which remain still in my possession, and I still preserve my qualified property in them. But if they stray
without my knowledge, and do not return in the usual manner, it is then luwful for any stranger to take them. (k) But if a deer, or any wild animal reclaimed,
hath a collar or other mark put upon him, and goes and returns at his pleasure;
or if a wild swan is taken, and marked and turned loose in the river, the
owner's property in him still continues, and it is not lawful for any one else to
take him: (l) but otherwise, if the deer has been long absent without returning,
or the swan leaves the neighbourhood. Bees also are fer<S naturw; but when
hived and reclaimed, a man may have a qualified property in them, by the law
[ • 393 ] of nature, as well as by the civil law. ( m) •And to the same purpose, not
to say in the same words, with the civil law, speaks Bract.on: (n)
occupation, that is, hiving or includinf them, gives the property in bees; for
though a swarm liahts upon my tree, have no more pro~rty in them till I
haYe hived them, than I have in the birds which make their nests thereon, and
therefore if another hives them, he shall be their proprietor: but a swarm,
which fly from and out of my hive, are mine so long as I can keep them in
sight, and have power to pursue them; and in these circumstances no one else
is entitled to take them. But it ha.th been a.Jim said, (o) that with us the onlv
ownership in bees is ratione soli; and the charter oft he forest, (p) which allow"s
e>ery freeman to be entitled to the honey found within his own woods, affords
great countenance to this doctrine, that a. qualified property may be had in
bees, in consideration of the property of the soil whereon they are found. (3)
(k) Bracton, l. 'l, c. 1. 7 Rep. 17.
(I) Iiut. 2.1.. l· HI.
(k) Fln~.h, L. 177.
(ta) 1'1111'. I. 4, o. 8, f 6. Jn#. 2. 1, H.
lll Crompt. of Courts. 187. 7 Hep. 18.
(o) Bro• .4br. tU. properlk., lf7, cites '-1 Edw. ill, U.
(p) 9 Hen. Ill. c. 18.

(ft) I. I,

a. 1. JS.

have young in the game, inasmuch ag rooks are a species of birds fera natural, destructive

in I heir habits, not properly an article of food, and not protected by any act of parliament,*

590

(3) [With respect to rooks it has been recently determined. that no aotion is sustaina.blo
against a person for maliciouRly causing loaded guns t.o be discharged noar a neighbor'11 close
and tree11, and thereby disturbing and driving away the rook11 which used t.o resort to and
have young in the same, ina.'lmuch u rooks are a species of birds fcr<e natt.irro, dQstntctive
in their hnbits, not properly an article of food, and not protected by any act of parliament,..
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In all these creatures, reclaimed from the wildness of their nature, the prop-

erty is not absolute but defeasible: a property, that may be destroyed if they

resume their ancient wildness and are found at large. For if the pheasanta

escape from the mew, or the fishes from the trunk, and are seen wandering at

large in their proper element, they become ferae natures again ; and are free and

open to the first occupant that hath ability to seize them. But while they thus

continue my qualified or defeasible property, they are as much under the pro-

tection of the law, as if they were absolutely and indefeasibly mine ; and an

action will lie against any man that detains them from me, or unlawfully des-

troys them. (4) It is also as much felony by common law to steal such of them

as are fit for food, (4) as it is to steal tame animals : (q) but not so, if they are

only kept for pleasure, curiosity, or whim, as dogs, bears, cats, apes, parrots, and

singing-birds; (r) because their value is not intrinsic, but depending only on

the caprice of the owner : («) though it is such an invasion of property as may

*amount to a civil injury, and be redressed by a civil action, (t) Yet r *on< -i

to steal a reclaimed hawk is felonv both by common law and statute ; •• '

(u) which seems to be a relic of the tyranny of our ancient sportsmen. And,

among our elder ancestors the ancient Britons, another species of reclaimed ani-

mals, viz., cats, were looked upon as creatures of intrinsic value ; and the killing

or stealing one was a grievous crime, and subjected the offender to a fine; espe-

cially if it belonged to the king's household, and was the custos horrei regii, for

which there was a very peculiar forfeiture. («>) And thus much of qualified
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property in wild animals, reclaimed per industriam. (5)

2. A QUALIFIED property may also subsist with relation to animals feres

natures, ratione impotentice, on account of their own inability. As when hawks,

herons, or other birds build in. my trees, or coneys or other creatures make their

nests or burrows in my land, and have young ones there ; I have a qualified

fg) 1 Hal. P. C. 812. frj Lamb. Eiren. 275. (•) 7 Rep. 18. 3 hist. 10!).

(t) Bro. Abr. tit. trespass, 407. (u) 1 Hal. P. C. 514 1 Hawk. P. 0. o. S3.

capite

Wutto . . . . .

there anciently was for stealing swans; only suspending them by the beak, Instead of the tail.

and that the plaintiff therefore could not have any property in them. Hannam v. Mockett,

2 Bar. and C. 934; 4 Dowl. and If. 518, S. C. Bat an action on the case lies for discharging

In all these creatures, reclaimed from the wildness of their nature, the prop-

erty is not absolute but defeasible: a property, that may be destroyed if they
resume their ancient wildness and are found at large. For if the pheasants
escape from the mew, or the fishes from the trunk, and are seen wandering at
large in their proper element, they become .ferm naturm again; and are free and
open to the first occupant that hath ability to seize them. But while they thus
continue my qualified or defensible property, they are as much under the/rotootion of the law, as if they were absolutely and indefeasibly mine; an an
action will lie against any man that detains them from me, or unlawfully destroys them. (4) It is also as much felony by common law to steal such of them
as are fit for food, (4) as it is to steal tame animals: (q) but not so, if they are
only kept for pleasure, curiosity, or whim, as dogs, bears, cats, apes, parrots, and
singing-birds; ( r) because their value is not intrinsic, but depending only on
the caprice of the owner: (s) though it is such an invasion of property as may
•amount to a civil injurv, and be redressed by a civil action. (t) Yet [ • 394 ]
to steal a reclaimed hawk is felonv both by common law and statute;
(u) which seems to be a relic of the tyranny of our ancient sportsmen. And,
among our elder ancestors the ancient Britons, another species of reclaimed animals, viz., cats, were looked upon as creatures of intrinsic value; and the killing
or stealing one was a grievous crime, and subjected the offender to a fine; especially if it belonged to the kin~'s household, and was the custos horrei regii, for
which there was a very pecnlmr forfeiture. (w) And thus much of qualified
property in wild animals, reclaimed per industriam. (5)
2. A QUALIFIED property may also subsist with relation to animals ferm
naturm, ratione impotentiro, on account of their own inability. As when hawks,
herons, or other birds build in my trees, or coneys or other creatures make their
nests or burrows in my land, and have young ones there; I have a qualified
(q) 1 Hal. P. C.1112.
(r) Lamb. Efren. 2i5.
(•) 7 Rep. 18. II lost. 109.
(t) Bru. Abr. lit. truptUs, 407.
(u} 1 Hal. P. C. 512 1 Hawk. P . C. o. 83.

(IO) '' Si qu'8 f'len, Aorrei regii ctUto<ktn. occiderit 11el jurto abatulerU, fel'8 IVIAflMI cauda auapendatur
caPiU arm111 uttinge11te, d fa eam grana tritki 'l/fu1ulaHtur, tuquedum 1uramilaa caudal lrltico co-operiatur, ,I
Wotton. LL. Wall. l. 3, c. 6, t 5. An amercement similar to which, Sir l!:dward Coke tells us (7 Hep. 18),
there anciently was for stealing swans; ouly snspondlngthem by the beak, lnetead of the tall.

i_'i i us near the decoy-pond of another, with design to damnify the owner, by frightening away

the wild fowl resorting thereto, by which the wild fowl are frightened away, and the owner

damnified, for wild fowl are protected by the 25 Hen. VIII, c. 11, and they constitute a known

article of food ; and a person keeping up a decoy expends money and employs skill in taking

that which is of use to the public. It is a profitable mode of employing his land, and was

considered by Lord Holt as a description of trade. Keeble v. HickeringUl, 11 Bast, 574 ; 2 B.

and C. 943. Other animals are specially protected by acts of parliament, as hawks, falcons,

swans, partridges, pheasants, pigeons, wild ducks, mallards, teal, widgeons, wild gaese, black

game, red game, bustards and herons, and consequently, in the eye of the law, are tit to be pre-

served. Bees are property, and the subject of larceny. Per Bayley, J., 2 B. and C. 944; Sir

T. Raym. 33.]

As to the larceny of dogs and birds or beasts ordinarily kept in confinement, see infra, p. 394,

note. And as to fish, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, $$ 24, 26.

(4) [But it is not felony to steal such animals of a wild nature, unless they are either so con-

fined that the owner can take them whenever he pleases ; or are reduced to tamoness, and

known by the thief to be so. And his knowledge of this fact may be made out before the jury

by circumstantial evidence, arising out of his own conduct, and the condition and situation of

the animal stolen. East's P. C. 16, s. 41; Hawk. b. 1, c. 33, s. 26.]

(5) Upon this general subject see 2 Kent, 348 ; Williams on Pers. Prop. 19 ; Pierson v. Post, 3

Caines, 175; Buster v. IJewkirk, 20 Johns. 75; Commonwealth ». Chace, 9 Pick. 15. A prop-

erty is acquired in bees by hiving and reclaiming them ; but merely marking the tree in which

bees are found does not vest any property in the tinder. Gillett ». Mason, 7 Johns. 16 ; Fergu-

son e. Miller, 1 Cow. 243 ; sec Wallis r. Mease, 3 Binn. 546. If bees once reclaimed fly off, the

owner sustains his property so long as he can keep them in sight and pursue them. Guff v.

Kilts, 15 Wend. 550.

Oysters planted in a bay or arm of the sea, in a bed clearly marked ont, and whore there

were no oysters growing spontaneously, are the property of the planter. Fleet v. Hogeman, 14

and that the plaintiff therefore could not have any property in them. Hannam 11. Mookett,
2 Bar. and.C. 934; 4 DowL and R. 518, S. C. But an action on the case lies for discharging
guns near the decoy-po11d of another, with design to damnify the owner, by frightening away
the wild fowl resorting thereto, by which the wild fowl are frightened away, and the owner
damnifi.ed, for wild fowl are protected by the 25 Hen. VIII, c. 11, and they coruitituto a known
article of food; and a person keeping up a decoy expends money and employs Rkill in taking
that which is of use to the pubhc. It is a profitaule mode of employing his land, and was
coMdered by Lord Holt as a description of trade. Keeble"· Hickeringill, 11 EMt, 574; 2 B.
and C. 943. Other animals are spcciallr. protected by acts of parliament, as hawks, falcons,
swall11, partridged1 phoa"lants, pigeons, wild duck~, mallards, toal, widgeonR, wild geese, black
game, red game, tmstard~ and heron!\, and consequently, in the eye of the law, are tit to be preserved. Bees are property, and the subject of larceny. Per Bayley, J ., 2 B. and C. 944; Sir
T. Raym. 33.)
.A.s to the larceny of dogs and birds or boasts ordinarily kept in confinement, see infra, p. 394,
note. And as to fish, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, ~~ 24, 26.
( 4) [But it is not felony to steal such animal:! of a wild natnre, unless they are either so confined that the owner can take them whene\'er hP. pleases ; or are reduced to tameness, and
known by the thief to be i>o. .,\.ml his knowledge of this fa.ct may be m11de out before tho jury
by circumstantial evidence, ari><iug out of his own conduct, and the condition and ~ituation of
the animal stolen. Eu;;t's P. C. 16, s. 41; Hawk. b. 1, c. :J:J, s. 26.]
(5) Upon thi.i geneml i!Ubject see 2 Kent, 348; Williams on Pers. Prop. 19; Piel'l!on "·Post, 3
Caines, 175; Bu8ter "·Newkirk, 20 Johni!. 75; Commonwealth "·Chace, 9 Pick. 15. .A prop·
erty is ac9uired in boo~ by hiving and reclaiming them; but merely marking the tree in which
bee11 are found does not ve"t any property in the tinder. Gillett"· MBiJOn, 7 Johns. 16; Ferguson t:. Miller, 1 Cow. ~43; see Wallis t'. .Men..ie, 3 Binn. 546. If bees once reclaimed Hy off, the
owner su11Wui1 hiil proptJrty so long as he can keep them in sight and pursue them. Goff v.
Kilts, 15 Wend. 550.
Oy11ters planted in a ba'I' or arm of the sea, in a bed clearly marked out, and where there
wen~ nu oyl!tcl'l! gro\\·i:lg ;pontaneously, are the property of the planter. Fleet "· Hogemau, 14
Wend.-&::.

•Wend. 42.
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property in those young ones till such time as they can fly or run away, and

property in those young ones till such time as they can fly or run away, and
then my property expires: (x) but, till then, it is in some cases trespass, and in
others felony, for a stmnger to take them away. (y) For here, as the owner of
the land has it in his power to do what he pleases with them, the law therefore
vests a property in him of the young ones, in the same manner as it does of the
old ones if reclll.imed and confined; for these cannot through weakness, any
more than the others through restraint, use their natuml libertv and forsake him.
3. A man may, lastly, have a qualified property in animals fer<» 1wtur<e,
propter privilegium: that is, he may have the privilege of hunting, taking, and
[ • 395 ] killing them, in *exclusion of other persons. Here he has a transient
J?roperty in these animals, usually called game, so long as they continue
within his liberty; (z) and may restram any stranger from taking them
therein: but the instant the.Y depart into another liberty, this qualified property
ceases. The manner in which this privilege is acquired will be shown in a
subsequent chapter.
· The qualified property which we have hitherto considered extends only to
animals fer<B natur<B, when either reclaimtd, impotent, or· privileged. :Many
other thfogs may also be the objects of qualified property. It mav subsist in the
very elements, of fire or light, of air aud of water. A man can luive no absolute
permanent property in these, as he may in the earth and land; since these are
of a vague and fugitive nature, and therefore can admit only of a precarious
and qualified ownership, which lasts so long as they are in actual use and occupation, but no longer. If a man disturbs another, and deprives him of the lawful enjoyment of these.; if one obstructs another's ancient windows, (a) (6) cor-

then my property expires: (x) but, till then, it is in some cases trespass, and in

others felony, for a stranger to take them away, (y) For here, as the owner of

the land has it in his power to do what he pleases with them, the law therefore

vests a property in him of the young ones, in the same manner as it does of the

old ones if reclaimed and confined; for these cannot through weakness, any

more than the others through restraint, use their natural liberty and forsake him.

3. A man may, lastly, nave a qualified property in animals ferce natures,

propter privilegium: that is, he may have the privilege of hunting, taking, and

i- ^OQK -I killing them, in *exclusion of other persons. Here he has a transient

I "' ' property in these animals, usually called game, so long as they continue

within his liberty; (z) and may restrain any stranger from taking them

therein: but the instant they depart into another liberty, this qualified property

ceases. The manner in which this privilege is acquired will be shown in a

subsequent chapter.

The qualified property which we have hitherto considered extends only to

animals feres natures, when either reclaimed, impotent, or' privileged Many

other things may also be the objects of qualified property. It may subsist in the

very elements, of fire or light, of air and of water. A man can have no absolute

permanent property in these, as he may in the earth and land; since these are

of a vague and fugitive nature, and therefore can admit only of a precarious

and qualified ownership, which lasts so long as they are in actual use and occu-
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pation, but no longer. If a man disturbs another, and deprives him of the law-

ful enjoyment of these; if one obstructs another's ancient windows, (a) (6) cor-

(x] Carta deforat. 9 Hon. HI, o. 1J. (y) ' ROD. 17. Lamb. Eiren. 274.

(*) Cro. Car. SM. Mar. 48. 6 Mod. 376. 12 Mod. ill. (a) 9 Rep. 58.

(6) [See Book III, pp. 216, 217. The enjoyment of lights for twenty years, with the acqui

czl Carla d~forul. 9 Hen. III, c. lS.
<rl 1 Rep. 17. Lamb. Elren. 274.
Cro. Car. llM. Mar. UL b Mod. 376. 12 Mod. i«.
(al 9 Hep. !IS.

escence of the party who, after that time, does any thing to impede such enjoyment, affords so

(s)

strong a presumption of a right, by grant or otherwise, that, even before the recent act of 2'

and 3 "Win. IV, c. 71, it was held that, unless the exercise of the right were contradicted or

(6) l8ee Book III, pp. 216, 217. The enjoyment of lights for twenty yea~, with the acqui
escence of the party who, o.fter that time, doe11 any thing to impede 11uch enjovment, affords so
strong a pre~umption of a right, by grant or otherwi:m, that, even before the recent act of 2'
and 3 Wm. IV, c. 71, it was held that, nnle~s the exercise of the right wero contradicted or
explained. o. jury ought to support it. Darwin v. Upt.on, 2 Saund. 175 c. in note; C'roRs "·
Lewis, 2 Barn. and CreRs. 689; 4 D. and R. 238, S. C. 'fhis rule, however, was qualified in
eases to which the custom of the city of London applied, permitting houses to be mised, upon
ancient foundationM, to any height the owner plca.-::cd, notwithstanding such additional ele,·ation might obl!Cure and darken the windows of other ancient me:11mages, unles>1 there wa.s,
bv agreement, some restriction to the contrary. However, in the recent cat1e of Shadwell v.
Hutohin8on, :.i Carr. and P. N. P C. 619, Lord Tentenlen held, that the custom ought to be
ooufiued to buildings on ancient foundations, where all the four wall.!I belonged to the party ;
and that no one would be justified by the custom in raising an obstruction hy means of tho"e
walls of his, so a.i to darken the ligh~ in a fourth wall belonging to his neighbor. His lordship also intimated an opinion, obiter, but without deciding the qnei!tion, that. in order to t1upport the custom, the walls 80 raised ought to be, at lea:>t, a11 old &1 the lights which they
ob:itructed. The cu11tom is set forth in Wyustanfoy v. Lee, 2 Swanst. 339; and see al110 Plum·
mer v. Benthaw, 1 Burr. 249. This custom, though formerly allowed to be good, dnea not
seem to have been favorod at law; and great care wo.s requirod tn plead it pnlperly: Hughes
ti. Keymi.ih, and Newell v. Barnarde, both reported in Bulstr. llti; though. in e later ca~.
(reported anonymously in Cowyn. 274,) the custom is said to be founded on gtKid rea.~on111 and
that it needed not be pleaded, but might he girnu in evidence upon the general i~«ue. However, though the cu11tom authorized a party who built on an old foundation to raise hi11 walls
higher than they formerl,Y 11tood, although he might thereby ohstruct equally ancient lights
in an adjooent house ; it 1s not to be undeutood that the custom ever extended to building,,;' on
new foundations; Hughes v. Kerne, Yelv. 216; Fi:ihmongers' Company 11. Eo..'lt India Company, 1 Dick. 164; and to determine the foot whether the buildin~ were or were not on old
foundat.ionij, a trial at law Wail often directed before an injunction is.~ued: .Attorney General
11. Bentham, 1 Dick. 277; S. C. 1 Ve11. Son. 543; for, whenever the legul right is douhtful,
8Q,Uity will not interpose ooforo that question i8 determined, Where the natnro Of the alleged
injury does not strongly call for imme~ie.to interference. Wyn:;to.nley v. Lee, 2 Swan,o.t. 342;
Be.neon v. Gardiner, 7 Ves. 308; .Mom11 v. Le811ees of Lord Borkt•fof, 2 Ve1:1. Sen. 435; The
Society of Gray's Inn v. Dou~hty, 2 Vos. Sen. 453; Attorney-Genera v. Nichol, 16 Ves.. 343..
But, an action at law, for a nw:;ance in obstructing light~. mny be brought either by the actual
poss011sor of the promises, or hy the yarty entitled thereto in rcveniion; by the one in ruspect
of his possession, and by the other 111 re11pect of hhi inhtilitnnce. Je;;::ior v. Giffhrd, 4 Burr.
2141. The qu01Jtio11, not only as regarl!s cln.ims to the use of lights in general C8S8S, but also

explained, a jury ought to support it. Danrin «. Upton, 2 Saund. 175 c. in note; Cross r.

Lewis. 2 Barn, and Cress. 689; 4 D. and R. 238, S. C. This rule, however, was qualified in

cases to which the custom of the city of London applied, permitting houses to be raised, upon

ancient foundations, to any height the owner pleaded, notwithstanding such additional eleva-

tion might obscure and darken the windows of other ancient messuages, unless there was,

hv agreement, some restriction to the contrary. However, in the recent cane of Stmdwell r.

Hutchinson, 2 Carr. and P. N. P C. 619, Lord Tenterden held, that the custom ought to be

confined to buildings ou ancient foundations, where all the four tc«W« belonged to the party ;

and that no one would be justified by the custom in raising an obstruction by means of those

walls of his, so as to darken the lights in a fourth wall belonging to his neighbor. His lord-

ship also intimated an opinion, obiter, but without deciding the question, that, in order to sup-

port the custom, the walls so raised ought to be, at least, as old as the lights which they

obstructed. The custom is set forth in Wynstanley ». Lee, 2 Swanst. 339; and see also Plum-

mert). Benthaui, 1 Burr. 249. This custom, though formerly allowed to be good, does not

geem to have been favored at law; and groat care was required to plead it properly : Hughes

I;. Keymish, and Newell ». Barnarde, both reported in Bulstr. 116; though, in a later case,

(reported anonymously in Comyu. 274,) the custom is said to be founded on good reasons, and

that it needed not be pleaded, but might be given in evidence upon the general issue. How-

ever, though the custom authorized a party who built on an old foundation to raise his walls

higher than they formerly stood, although he might thereby obstruct equally ancient lights

in an adjacent house; it is not to be understood that the custom ever extended to buildings on

new foundations: Hughes e. Kerne, Telv. 216; Fishmongers' Company v. East India Com-

pany, 1 Dick. 164; and to determine the fact whether the buildings were or were not ou old

foundations, a trial at law was often directed before an injunction issued: Attorney General

». Bentham, 1 Dick. 277; S. C. 1 Tes. Son. 543; for, whenever the legal right is doubtful,

equity will not interpose before that question is determined, where the nature of the alleged

injury does not strongly call for immediate interference. 'Wynstanley v. Lee, 2 Swanst. 342;

Hanson t>. Gardiner, 7 "Tea. 308; Morris v. Lessees of Lord Berkeley, 2 Yes. Sen. 435; The

Society of Gray's Inn v. Doughty, 2 Vos. Sen. 453; Attorney-General ». Nichol, 16 Ves. 343.

But, an action at law, for a nuisance in obstructing lights, may bo brought either by the actual

possessor of the promises, or by the party entitled thereto in reversion; by the one in respect

of his possession, and by the other in respect of his inheritance. .lessor f. Gifford, 4 Burr.

2141. The question, not only as regards claims to the use of lights in general cases, but also

...
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rupts the air of his house or gardens, (5) (7) fouls his water, (c) or nnpens and

lets it out, or if he diverts an ancient watercourse that used to run to the other's

mill or meadow; (d) the law will animadvert hereon as an injury, and protect

the party injured in his possession. But the property in them ceases the instant

they are out of possession; for, when no man is engaged in their actual occupa-

tion, they become again common, and every man ha* an equal right to appropri-

ate them to his own use.

These kinds of qualification in property depend upon the peculiar circum-

fitances of the subject-matter, which is not capable of being under the absolute

dominion of any proprietor. But property may also be of a qualified or special

nature, on account of the peculiar circumstances of the owner, when the thing

itself is very capable of absolute ownership. *As in case of bailment, r*oqgi

or delivery of goods to another person for a particular use; as to a car- •- -I

rier to convey to London, to an innkeeper to secure in his inn, or the like.

Here there is no absolute property in either the bailor or the bailee, the person

delivering, or him to whom it is delivered: for the bailor hath only the right,

and not the immediate possession ; the bailee hath the possession, and only a

temporary right. But it is a qualified property in them both; and each of

them is entitled to an action, in case the goods be damaged or taken away: the

bailee, on account of his immediate possession; the bailor, because the poses-

sion of the bailee is, immediately, his possession also, (e) So also in case of

3ods pledged or pawned upon condition, either to repay money or otherwise;
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sth the pledger and pledgee have a qualified, but neither of them an absolute,

property in them: the pledger's property is conditional, and depends upon the

(//) 9 Rep. 5'J. I.iit. Si. (c) 9 Bep. 59. (d) 1 Leon. 273. Skin. 389. (e) 1 Boll. Abr. 607.

«fi that right was formerly qualified by the custom of the city of London, seems set at rest by the

statute of 2 and 3 William IV, c. 71. $ 3, which enacts, that where the access and use of light

to and for any building shall have been enjoyed therewith for twenty years, without interruption,

ntpts the air of his house or gardens, (b) (7) fouls his water, (c) or nnpens and
lets it out, or if he diverts an ancient watercourse that used to run to the other's
mill or meadow; (d) the law will animach·ert hereon as an injury, and protect
the party injured in his possession. But the property in them ceases the mstant
they are out of possession; for, when no man is engaged in their actual occupation, they become again common, and every man h8.b an equal right to appropriate them to his own use.
These kinds of qualification in property depend upon the peculiar circumP.tances of the subject-matter, which is not capable of being under the absolute
dominion of anv proprietor. But property may also be of a qualified or special
nature, on acco1int of the peculiar circumstances of the owner, when the thing
itself is very capable of absolute ownership. *As in case of bailtnent, [ • 396 ]
or delivery of goods to another person for a particular use; as to a carrier to convey to London, to an innkeeper to secure in his inn, or the like.
Here there is no absolute property in either the bailor or the bailee, the person
delivering, or him to whom it is delivered: for the bailor hath only the right,
and not the immediate possession ; the bailee hath the possession, and only a
temporary right. But it is a qualified property in them both; and each of
them is entitled to an action, in case the goods be damaged or taken away: the
bailee, on account of his immediitte possession; the bailor, because'the posession of the bailee is, immediately, his possession also. (e) So also in case of
goods pledged or pawned upon condition, either to repay money or otherwise;
both the pledger and pledgee have a qualified, but neither of them an absolute,
property in them: the pledger's property is conditional, and depends upon the
(bl 9 Rep. 69. Lut. 92.

(C)

9 Rep. 59.

(d) 1 Leon. 273. Skin. 389.

(el 1 Roll. Abr. 607.

the right thereto shall be indefeasible : unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed under

some particular agreement in writing; in which case, of course, the right must be subject to the

conditions of the agreement.

It would be unreasonable to presume a grant, where no adverse right hag ever been exer-

cised against the party who alone was capable of making the grant; consequently, the usurpa-

tion of an easement, or right of way, for twenty years, merely by the acquiescence of a

tenant, without the knowledge of his landlord, will not authorize a presumption against the

owner of the reversion, or inheritance, but even in such cases, the origin of the right claimed

adversely must be traced, in order to repel the doctrine of presumption. It will not be

enough to show, that the hereditaments which are deteriorated by the alleged encroachments

have been, for twenty years, in the occupation of tenants; it should, also, be made to appear,

that the encroachments complained of had their commencement within the period of such

tenancy: Daniel». North, 11 East, 374; Wood ». Veal, 5 Barn, and Aid. 456; Harper v.

Charlesworth, 4 Bam. and Cress. 591; 6 D. and R. 589, S. C.; Cross ». Lewis, 4 Dowl. and

ByL. 239; S. C., 2 Bam. and Cress. 688 ; and, hi order to prevent such claims of rights of way, or of

•water courses, or of other similar easements, from becoming indefeasible after forty years' unin-

terrupted enjoyment, the owner of a reversion expectant on the determination of a term of

years, must (according to the eighth section ot the act cited), resist the claims within three

years next after the determination of the term. The last mentioned section of the act has refer-

ence only to rights of way and water courses; and from the 3d and 7th sections it appears that

after the uninterrupted enjoyment of use of light to any building for twenty years, the claim,

though it may have originated in encroachment, will be indefeasible, notwithstanding the

parties injured thereby may have been incapable, owing to personal disabilities, or any cause

whatever, to resist the encroachments. Formerly, the rule of law (as may be seen by referring to

the first of the cases already cited) allowed a landlord to build up against encroaching lights,

though his tenant had acquiesced under the encroachment for above twenty years: upon the

same principle which still prevails with respect to ways and water courses.]

Upon the subject of the preceding note, see Story ». Odin, 12 Mass. 157 ; Robeson v. Pettinger,

1 Gruen, Ch. 57 ; Gcrber r. Grabel, 16 111. 217; Dnvel v. Brisblanc, 1 La. An. 407. The courts in

this country have generally, however, rejected the English doctrine respecting the prescriptive

right to the enjoyment of fight and air, as being unsuited to the condition and circumstances of

this country. See Parker v. Poote, 19 Wend. 309; Napier v. Bulwinkle, 5 Rich, 311; Cherry v.

Stein, 11 Md. 1; Havorstick v. Sipe, 33 Penn. St. 368; Ingraham t>. Hutchinson, 2 Conn. 597 :

Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500; 2 Washb. Real Prop. 62.

that right w&.'! formerly qualified by the cuFltom of the city of London, seems set at rest by the
statute of 2 and 3 William IV, c. 71, ~ 3, which euact.-1, that where the access and use of light
to and for any building ~hall have been enjoyed therewith for tweuty ye1m>, without interruption,
the right thereto shall be indefeasible : unlesR it Bhall appear that the same was enjoyed under
some particular agreement iu writing; in which case, of course, the right must be subject to the
conditions of the agreement.
It would be unrea.'lOuable to preAume a jl:mnt, where no adverse right has ever been exer·
ciood against the pnrty who alone was capo.hie of making the grant; consequently, the usurpation of an easement, or riirht of way, for twenty ycat"R, merely by the acquiescence of a
tenant, without the knowledjl:e of hiR landlord, will not authorize a presumption against the
owner of the reven;ion, or inheritance. but even in 11nch C&l!e1:1, the origin of the right claimed
adxer,;ely must be traced, in order to repel the doctrine of presumption. It wlll not be
enough to show, that the hercditaments which are deteriorated by the alleged encroachments
have ·been, for twenty yelll"l:I, in the occupation of tenants ; it should, also, be ma.de to appear,
that the encroe.chmeut8 complained of ha.d their commencement within the period of such
tenancy: Daniel v. North, 11 East. 374; Wood v. Veal, 5 Barn. and .Aid. 456; Harper v.
Charlesworth, 4 Barn. and Crel!s. 591 ; 6 D. and R. 589, S. C. ; CroE1s v. LewiR, 4 Dow}. and
:Rd. 239; S. C., 2 Barn. and Cress. 688; and, in order to prevent such claims of rights of way, or of
water courses, or of other similar easements, from becoming indefeasible aft.er forty/earri' uninterrupted enjoyment, the owner of a reveniion expectant on the determination o a term of
ye.an;, mnst (according to the eighth section ot the act cited), rei:iist the claims within three
yeam next at'Wr the determination of the term. The last mentioned l!Cction of the act has reference only to right$ of wny n.nd water cour$eS; and from the 3d and 7th sections it appears that
aft.er the uninterrupted enjoyment of use of light to any building for twenty yenrs, the claiw,
though it may have originated in encroachment, will be indefeasible, notwithstanding the
parties injured thereby may have been incapable, owing to perRonal disabilities, or any cause
'Whatcwer, to resist the encroachments. Formerly, the rule of law (as may be 8een by referring to
the finJt of the cases already cited) allowed a landlord to build up against encroaching ligJ1t.~,
though his tenant had R.Cquiesced under the encroachment for above twenty years: upon the
same principle which ;.till pre'l"ail~ with reRpect to ways and water oourses. l
Upon the b-Uhject of the prec1,>ding note, sec Story v. Odin, 12 MaRs. 157; liobeRon 11. Pettinger,
1 Grl'.en, Ch. 57; Gerber ,._ Grabel, 16 Ill. 217; Duvel"· Brisblanc, I La. An. 407. The courts in
this country hn\"e genenlly, howe\"er, rejected the English doctrine re11pecting the prescriptive
ri:,!ht to the enjoyment of light and air, 11.H being uu1:1uited to the condition and circumstances of
thi!4 country. See Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309; Napier v. Bulwinkle, 5 Rich, :Jll; Cherry v.
Stein, 11 Md. 1 ; Huveri>tick v. Sipe, 33 Penn. St. 368; Ingraham v. Hutohin:!on, 2 Conn. 597 ;
Ward r. Neal, 37 A.la. 500; 2 Wa.'!hh. Ree.I Prop. 62.
(7) See 3 Kent, 448; 2 Wa;ihb. Real Prop. 60, 64; Washb. on Easem. 389.
811

(7) See 3 Kent, 448; 2 Washb. Real Prop. 60, 64; Washb. on Easem. 389.
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performance of the condition of repayment, &c.; and so, too, is that of the

pledgee, which depends upon its non-performance. (/) The same may be said

of goods distreined for rent, or other cause of distress: (8) which are in the

nature of a pledge, and are not, at the first taking, the absolute property of either

the distreinor, or party distreined upon ; but may be redeemed, or else forfeited,

by the subsequent conduct of the latter. But a servant, who hath the care of his

master's goods or chattels, as a butler of plate, a shepherd of sheep, and the like,

hath not any property or possession either absolute or qualified, but only a mere

charge of oversight, (g)

Having thus considered the several divisions of property in possession, which

subsists there only, where a man hath both the right and also the occupation of

the thing; we will proceed next to take a short view of the nature of property

in action, or such where a man hath not the occupation, but merely a bare

-right to occupy the thing in question ; the possession whereof may however be

recovered by a suit or action at law; from whence the thing so recoverable is

I *"')" 1 '"'"'''^ *u thing or chose in action, (li) Thus, money due on a bond is a

*- J chose in action; for a property in the debt vests at the time of forfeiture

mentioned in the obligation, but there is no possession till recovered by course

of law. If a man promises, or covenants with me, to do any act, and fails in it

whereby I suffer damage, the recompense for this damage is a chose in action ;

for, though a right to some recompense vests in me at the time of damage done,

yet what, and how large such recompense shall be, can only be ascertained by
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verdict; and the possession can only be given me by legal judgment and execu-

tion. In the former of these cases the student will observe, that the property,

or right of action, depends upon an express contract or obligation to pay a

stated sum : and in the latter it depends upon an implied contract that if "the

covenantor does not perform the act he engaged to do, he shall pay me the

damages I sustain, by this breach of covenant And hence it may be collected,

that all property in action depends entirely npon contracts, either express or

implied; which are the only regular means of acquiring a chose in action, and.

of the nature of which we shall discourse at large in a subsequent chapter. (9)

At present we have only to remark, that upon all contracts or promises, either

express or implied, and the infinite variety of cases into which they are and

may be spun out, the law gives an action of some sort or other to the party in-

jured in case of non-performance; to compel the wrongdoer to do justice to

the party with whom he has contracted, and, on failure of performing the

identical thing he engaged to do, to render a satisfaction equivalent to the dam-

age sustained. But while the thing, or its equivalent, remains in suspense, and

the injured party has only the right and not the occupation, it is called a chose

inaction; being a thing rather in poteittia than in esse: though the owner

T*398l nia} 'lttve as *a1;)S0^ute a Property in, and be as well entitled to, such

"- J things in action, as to things in possession.

And, having thus distinguished the different degree or quantity of dominion

or property to which things personal are subject, we may add a word or two

(/) Cro. Jac. M. (g) 3 Inst. 108.

(A) The -.-mir Men. and the snmo denomination of property prevailed tn the civil law. " Jltm in fcovi*

nontria Hnbere inMliffnnnr. quotient ad rtcHptruutlvm ettm ncwiurm A«ta«wv«." \Ff~ 11. 1, fi2.) Ami again,

••<"/«. AI/HI* tfliiii.a'inii-iliii' ttium riquitlat in uctioitilitu, petitianibiu, iiermvtivnilau. Xa» tt lute iu

(...i-i's a»e vitUntur.' (l-r. 50. 16, 49.)

(8) [Or taken in execution by the sin-nil*. 2 Moo. and S. 197; 6 Bligh, 277; 2 Saund. 47.

So the tinder of a chattel hag the right uf possession against nil the wurld, except the owner.

1 Sir. 004; 1 Lead. Cas. 151.]

(9) Tlierc are many rights of action, however, which, spring from torts, and yet are recog-

nized as properly so UK to be the subject of equitable assignment, and of survivorship to personal

representatives on the death of the person entitled to ni.iiiii.-iin suit. This is so, generally, as to

rights of action fur such torts as are not merely personal. See North r. Turner, 9 S. and R.

244j MeKee i>. Judd. 12 N. Y. 022; Uice t>. Stone, 1 Allen, 666; Joidan ». Gillen, 44 N. H.

424; Final r. Backus, 18 Mich. 218; Tome t. Dubois, 6 Wai. 548; More ». Massini. 82 Cal.

690. And so distinctly are such rights possessed of the attributes of property that it Is not

even cMtiijii'iiMit for the legislature to deprive the party of them by prohibiting the maintenance

of suit. Griffln ». Wilcox, 21 Ind. 870.
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concerning the time of their enjoyment, and the number of their owners: in

conformity to the method before observed in treating of the proper" of things

real.

First, as to the time of enjoyment. (10) By the rules of the ancient common

law, there could be no future property, to take place in expectancy, created

in personal goods and chattels; because, being things transitory, and by many

accidents'subjec*'. to be lost, destroyed, or otherwise impaired, and the exigencies

of trade requiring also a frequent circulation thereof, it would occasion perpet-

ual suits and quarrels, and put a stop to the freedon of commerce, if such lim-

itations in remainder were generally tolerated and allowed. But yet in last wills

and testaments such limitations of personal goods and chattels, in remainder

after a bequest for life, were permitted: (f) though originally that indulgence

was only shewn, when merely the use of the goods, and not the goods them-

selves, was given to the first legatee; (k) the property being supposed to con-

tinue all the time in the executor of the devisor. But now that distinction is

disregarded: (/) and therefore, if a man either by deed or will limits hig books or

furniture to A for life, with remainder over to B, this remainder is good. But,

where an estate-tail in things personal is given to the first or any subsequent

possessor, it vests in him the total property, and no remainder over shall be

permitted on such a limitation, (m) For this, if allowed, would tend to a per-

petuity, as the devisee or grantee in tail of a chattel has no method of barring

the entail; and therefore the law vests in him at once the entire dominion of
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the goods, being analogous to the fee-simple which a tenant in tail may acquire

in a real estate.

*Next, as to the number of owners. Things personal may belong to r +nnn -\

their owners, not only in severally, but also in joint-tendency and in •• ^

common, as well as real estates. They cannot, indeed, be vested in copar-

cenary; because they do not descend from the ancestor to the heir, which

is necessary to constitute coparceners. But if a horse or other personal chattel

be given to two or more, absolutely, they are joint-tenants hereof; and, unless

the jointure be severed, the same doctrine of survivorship shall take place as in

estates of lands and tenements, (n) And, in like manner, if the jointure be

severed, as, by either of them selling his share, the vendee and the remaining

part owner shall be tenants in common, without any jus accrescendi or survivor-

ship, (o) So, also, if 100?. be given by will to two or more, equally to be divided

between them, this makes them tenants in common; (p) as, we nave formerly

seen, (q) the same words would have done in regard to real estates. But, for

the encouragement of husbandry and trade, it is held that a stock on a farm,

though occupied jointly, and also a stock used in a joint Undertaking, by way

of partnership in trade, shall always be considered as common and not as joint

property, and there shall be no survivorship therein, (r) (11)

(n Kan. On. Abr.:!"». (i) Mar. 106. (1) 2 Frucm. 206. (m) 1 P. Wins. 290.

(it) Lilt. f2S2. I Vern. 4SJ. (o) Litt » 821. (pi 1 Equ. CM. Abr. £14. (?) Page MS.

(r) 1 Vern. 217. Co. Litt. 182.

(10) [At this day chattels real and personal cannot be directly entailed, but they may by deed

concerning the time of their enjoyment, and the number of their owners: in
conformity to the method before observed in treating of the proper' of things
real.
First, .as to the time of enjoyment. (10) By the rules of the ancient common
ln.w, there could be no future property, to . take place in expectanr.y, created
in personal goods and chattels; because, being things transitory, and by many
aceidents·snbJect-. to be lost, destroyed, or otherwise impaired, and the exigenciE:s
of trade requiring also a frequent circulation thereof, it would occasion perpetual suits and quarrels, and put a stop to the freedon of commerce, if such limitations in remainder were generally tolerated and allowed. But yet in last wills
and testaments such limitations of personal goods and chattels, in remainder
after a bequest for lite, were permitted: ( i) though originally that indulgence
wa.s only shewn, when merely the use of the goods, and not the goods themselves, was given to the first legatee; (k) the property being supposed to continne all the time in the executor of the devisor. But now that distinct.ion is
disregarded: ( l) a.nd therefore, if a. man either by deed or will limits his books or
furniture to A for life, with remainder over to B, this remainder is good. But,
where an estate-tail in things personal is given to the first or any subsequent
possessor, it VE>.sts in him the total property, and no remainder over shall be
permitted on such a limitation. (m) For this, if allowed, would tend to a perpetuity, as the devisee or grantee in tail of a chattel has no method of barring
the entail; and therefore the la\V vests in him at once the entire dominion of
thA goods, being analogous to the fee-simple which a tenant in tail may acquire
in a real estate.
*Next, && to tba number of owners. Things personal may belong to [ • 399 ]
tl1eir owners, not only in severalty, bnt also in joint-tendency and in
common, e.s well as real estates. Thev cannot, indeed, be vested in coparcenary; because the,v: do not descend from the ancestor to the heir, which
is necessary to constitute coparceners. But if a horse or other persona.I chattel
be given to two or more, absolutely, they are joint-tenants hereof; and, unless
the jointure be severed, the same doctrine of survivorship shall take place as in
esta.tes of lands and tenements. ( n) And, in like manner, if the join tu re be
se>ered, as, by either of them selling his share, the vendee and the remaining
po.rt owner shall be tenants in common, without any .fus accrescendi or survivorship. (o) So, also, if lOOl. be given by will to two or more, equally to be divided
between them, this makes them tenants in common; (p) as, we have formei-ly
seen, (q) the same words would have done in regard to real estates. But, for
the encoura.gement of husbandry and trade, it is held that a stock on a. farm,
though occupied jointly, and also a stock used in a joint•underta.king, by way
of partnership in trade, shall always be considered as common and not as joint
property, and there shall be no survivorship therein. (r) (11)

of trust be as effectually settled to one for life with remainders over, as an estate of inheri-

tance, if it be not attempted to render them mialienable beyond the period allowed by law.

See <;ill>. Uses and Trusts, by Sugden. 121, note I. and Mr. Hargrave's uote 5 to Co. Litt.

(fl EQu. Cas. Abr. 300.
(J:) MRr. 108.
(lJ 2 Frecm. 206.
(na) 1 P. Wms. !90.
Utt. I~. l Vern . (S'J.
(o) Litt. I 321.
iPJ l Equ. Cu. Abr. 2:12.
((l) Page 191.
(r) 1 \'ern. 217. Co. Liu. I~.

(9')

20 a.]

(11) [But although there is no survivorship as to partnership property in possession, yet at

law there is as to choses in action, for when one or mure partners, having a joint legal interest

on a contract, dies, an action against thn Raid parties must be brought in the namo of the

survivor, and the executor or administrator of the deceased cannot be joined, neither can ho

sue separately, but must resort to a court of equitv to obtain from the survivor the testa-

tor's shore of the sum which has been recovered. 1 E"ast, 497; 2 Salk. 441; 1 Ld. Raym. 346;

Carth. 170; Vin. Ab. Partner, D. See Cowp. 445; 1 Yes. Sen. 242. As to the conversion iu

equity of real estate into partnership stock, see 3 P. Wms. 158; 1 Buss, and M. 45; 7 Sim.

271; 8id. 829; 11 id. 496.]
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(10) [At this day chattels real and personal cn.nnot be directly e1ttailed, but they may bv deed
of tru.-t be M etrectul\lly i;ett.led to one .for l~t"e with remainders otier, a!! &n e~t&te of inheritanc11 if it be not attempted to render them uue.lienable beyond the period allowed by law.
Bee lrilb. Uses and Trusts, by Sugden, 121, note 4, and Mr. Hargrave's note 5 to Co. Litt.
20 a..]
(11) [But although there is no eurrivorship as to partnership property in pos$ession, yet at
law there is as to chosea in. action., for when one or more partneri:;, having a joint legal interest
on a eontract, di~ an action a.:iain~t th0 ~ill partie~ m1ut be brouirht in the name of the
snrrivor, and the exocutor or o.dministra.tor of the clecea~d cannot be joined, neither can he
sn.e separately, bnt mn~t re8ort to a court of equitv to obtain from the survivor the te~ta
t.or's share of the sum 'l'l"hich ha..'4 been reco\•erod. 1 Ea.~t. 497 ; 2 Salk. 441 ; 1 Lrl. Raym. 346 ;
Carth. 170; ViIL A.b. Partner, D. See Cowp. 445; 1 Ves. Sen. 2tl. A.s to the conversion in
eq.n ity <!f re~l est.a~ into partnerahip stock, see 3 P. Wms. 158; 1 Ruse. and .M. 45; 7 Sim.
271; 8 id. 8'29; 11 Jd. 496.)
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CHAPTER XXVI.

WE are next to consider the title to things personal, or the various means of

acquiring, and of losing, such property as may be had therein : both which con-

siderations of gain and loss shall be blended together in one and the same view,

as was done in our observations upon real property; since it is for the most part

OF TITLE TO THINGS PERSONAL BY OCCUPANCY.

impossible to contemplate the one, without contemplating the other also. And

these methods of acquisition or loss are principally twelve:—1. By occupancy.

2. By prerogative. 3. By forfeiture. 4. By custom. 5. By succession. 6. By

marriage. 7. By judgment 8. By gift or grant. 9. By contract. 10. By

bankruptcy. 11. By testament. 12. By administration.

And, first, a property in goods and chattels may be acquired by occupancy:

which, we have more than once remarked, (a) was the original and only primi-

tive method of acquiring any property at all; but which has since been

restrained and abridged, by the positive laws of society, in order to maintain

peace and harmony among mankind. For this purpose, by the laws of England,

gifts, and contracts, testaments, legacies, and administrations, have been intro-

duced and countenanced, in order to transfer and continue that property and

possession in things personal, which has once been acquired by the owner. And,

F *4011 wnere such *things are found without any other owner, they for the

L -1 most part belong to the king by virtue of his prerogative; except in

some few instances, wherein the original and natural right of occupancy is still
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permitted to subsist, and which we are now to consider.

1. Thus, in the first place, it hath been said, that any body may seize to his

own use such goods as belong to an alien enemy. (6) For such enemies, not

being looked upon as members of our society, are not entitled during their state

of enmity to the benefit or protection of the laws; and therefore every man

that has opportunity is permitted to seize upon their chattels, without being

compelled, as in other cases, to make restitution or satisfaction to the owner.

But this, however generally laid down by some of our writers, must in reason

and justice be restrained to such captors as are authorized by the public author-

ity of the state, residing in the crown; (c) and to such goods as are brought into

this country by an alien enemy, after a declaration of war, without a safe-con-

duct or passport. And, therefore, it hath been holden, (d) that where a foreigner

is resident in England, and afterwards a war breaks out between his country and

ours, his goods are not liable to be seized. (1) It hath also been adjudged, that

if an enemy take the goods of an Englishman, which are afterwards retaken by

another subject of this kingdom, the former owner only shall lose his property

therein, and it shall be indefeasibly vested in the second taker; unless they were

retaken the same day, and the owner before sunset puts in his claim of prop-

erty, (e) Which is agreeable to the law of nations, as understood in the time

of Grotins, (/") even with regard to captures made at sea; which were held to

be the property of the captors after a possession of twenty-four hours; though

F *4021 modern authorities (g) require, that before the property can *be

L *«*J changed, the goods must have been brought into port, and have con-

tinued a night intra presidia, in a place of safe custody, so that all hope of

recovering them was lost. (2)

(a) See pajtesS. 8, 238. (6) Finch. I,. 178. (c) Freem. 40.

(<l) Bro. Abr. tit. propertie. 3S. furniture. 57. (el Ibid. (/) Dej. ». $p. I. .1, c. M 3.

l$>) Uynkersh. qua»t.jur. pubt. 1. 4 Kooo. de Assecur. not. 66.

(1) And his right to bring unit upon contracts made during peace is only suspended, not for-

feited, by the war. Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 4, oh. 1, J 12.

(2) [By the practice of the law of nations, in order to vest the property, at least of a ship

taken at sea, in the captors, a legal sentence of condemnation by a prize court is necessary. 1

Bob. 139; 3 id. 97 and 236.] This is now the law of England, and is regulated by statute 2T

and 28 Vic. c. 25.
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WE are next to consider the title to things personal, or the various means of
acquiring, and of losing, such propertv as mu.y be had therein : both which considerations of gain and loss shall be blended together in one and the same view,
as was done in our observations upon real property; since it is for the most part
impossible to contemplate the one, without contemplating the other also. And
these methods of acquisition or loss are principally twelve :-1. By occupancy.
2. By prerogative. 3. By forfeiture. 4. By custom. 5. By succession. 6. By
marriage. 7. By judgment. 8. By gift or grant. 9. By contract. 10. By
bankmptcy. 11. By testam~nt. 12. By administration.
And, first, a property in goods and chattels may be acquired by occupancy:
which, we have more thu.n once remarked, (a) was the original and only primitive method of acquiring any property at all; but which has since been
restrained and abridged, by the positive laws of society, in order to maintain
peace and harmony among mankind. For this purpose, by the laws of En~land,
gifts, and contracts, testaments, legacies, and administrations, have been mtrodnced and countenanced, in order to tru.nsfl'r and continue that property and
possession in things personal, which has once been acquired by the owner. And,
[ ,..401 ] where such "'things aro fonud without any other owner, they for the
most part belon&' to the king by virtue of his prerogative; except in
some few instances, wherein the original and natural right of occupancy is still
permitted to subsist, and which we are now to consider.
1. Thus, in the first place, it hath been said. that any body may seize to his
own use such goods as belong to an alien enemy. (b) For such enemies, not
being looked upon as members of our society, are not entitled during their state
ot' enmity to the benefit or protretion of the laws; and then~fore e\"ery man
that has opportunity is permitted to seize upon their chattels, without being
compel1ed, as in other cases, to make restitution or satisfaction to the owner.
But this, however ~nerally laid down by some of our writers, must in reason
and justice he restmmecl to such captors as are autho1ized by the public authority of the state, residing in the crown; (c) and to such goods as are brought into
this country by an alien enemy, after a declaration of war, without a safe-conduct or passport. And, therefore, it huth been holden, (d) that where a foreigner
is resident in England, ancl afterwards a w:Lr breo.ks out between his country and
ours, his goods are no! liable to be seized. (1) H hath also been adjudged, that
if an enemy take the goods of an Englishman, which are afterwards retaken by
another subject of this kingdom, the iormer owner only shall lose his property
therein, and it shall be indefeasibly vested in the second taker; unless they were
retaken the same day, and the owner before sunset puts in his claim of property. (e) Which is agreeable to the law of nations, as understood in the time
of Grotius,(/) even with regard to captures made at sea; wl1ich were held to
be the property of the captors after a possession of twenty-four hours; though
* . ] the modern authorities (g) require, that before the property can *be
[ 402 changed, the goods must hnve been brought into port, and ha.Te continued a night intra presidia, in a place of safe custody, so that all hope of
recovering them was lost. (2)
(a) See pages3. 8, 'A''(b) Finch. J,. 178.
(c\ Froom. 40.
(d) Rm . .Abr. tu. proper& 38. forftit11re. 57.
(el Ibid.
If) IMJ. ll • .,,._ l. 3, c.I, § S.
Cg) Bynkersh. qucu,. jur. ptlbt. 1. 4 l:l.ooc. ,U .A•HC11r. nol. 66.

(1) And bis right to bring snit upon contmct~ mllde during peace is only suspended, DO~ forfeitoil, hy the war. Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 1, § 12.
(2) [By the practice of tho law of nations, in order to vest the property, at least of a ship
taken at sea, in tho captora, a legal sentence of comlomnation hy a prize court is noce.'l!'lary. 1
Rob. 139; 3 id. 97 and 236.] This is now the law of England, and is regulated by sto.tut.e Wand ~ Vic. c. 25.
·
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And, as in the goods of an enemy, so also in his person, a man may acquire a

sort of qualified property, by taking him a prisoner in war; (A) at least till his

ransom be paid. («') (3) And this doctrine seems to have been extended to negro

servants, (/) who are purchased when captives, of the nations with whom they

»re at war, and are therefore supposed to continue in some degree the property

of the masters who buy them: though, accurately speaking, that property (if it

indeed continues), consists rather in the perpetual service, than in the body or

f ergon of the captive, (k)

2. Thus again, whatever movables are found upon the surface of the earth,

or in the sea, and are unclaimed by any owner, are supposed to be abandoned by

the hist proprietor; and, as such, are returned into the common stock and mass

of things: and therefore they belong, as in a state of nature, to the first occu-

pant or fortunate finder, unless they fall within the description of waifs, or

estrays, or wreck, or hidden treasure; for these, we have formerly seen, (I) are

Tested by law in the king, and form a part of the ordinary revenue of the

crown.

3. Thus, too, the benefit of the elements, the light, the air, and the water, can

only be appropriated by occupancy. If I have an ancient window (4) overlook-

ing my neighbour's ground, he may not erect any blind to obstruct the light:

but if I build my house close to his wall, which darkens it, I cannot compel

him to demolish his wall; for there the first occupancy is rather in him than in

me. If my neighbour * makes a tan-yard, so as to annoy and render less r * JQO -i
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salubrious the air of my house and gardens, the law will furnish me >- -I

with a remedy; but if he is first in possession of the air, and I fix my habita-

tion near him, the nuisance is of my own seeking, and may continue. If a

stream be unoccupied, I may erect a mill thereon, and detain the water; yet

not so as to injure my neighbour's prior mill, or his meadow: for he hath by the

first occupancy acquired a property in the current. (5)

4. With regard, likewise, to animals feroe natures all mankind had by the

original grant of the Creator a right to pursue and take any fowl or insect of the

air, any fish or inhabitant of the waters, and any beast or reptile of the field:

and this natural right still continues in every individual, unless where it is

restrained by the civil laws of the country. And when a man has once so seized

them, they become while living his qualified property, or if dead, are absolutely

his own: so that to steal them, or otherwise invade this property, is, according to

their respective values, sometimes a criminal offence, sometimes only a civil

injury. The restrictions which are laid upon this right, by the laws of England,

relate principally to royal fish, as whale and sturgeon, and such terrestrial,

aerial, or aquatic animals as go under the denomination of game ; the taking

of which is made the exclusive right of the prince, and such of his subjects to

whom he has granted the same royal privilege. (6) But those animals which are

not expressly so reserved, are still liable to be taken and appropriated by any of

the king's subjects, upon their own territories; in the same manner as they

might have taken even game, itself, till these civil prohibitions were issued:

(*) Bro. Abr. tit. propertie, 18.

(t) We meet with a curious writ of trespass in the register (102), for breaking a man's house, ami setting

snch his prisoner at large. " Quarc domum ipriut A. apud W. (in <fua idem A. quendam II. Scotumper

And, as in the goods of an enemy, so also in his person, a man may acquire a
sort of qualified property, by taking him a prisoner in war; (It) at least till his
ransom be paid. (i) (3) And this dootrine seems to have been extended to negro
serYants, (j) who are purchased when captives, of the nations with whom they
are at war, and w·e therefore supposed to continue in some degree the property
of the masters who buy them: though, accurately speaking, that property (if it
indeed continues), consists rather in the perpetual service, than in the body or
person of the captive. (k)
2. Thus again, whatever movables are found upon the surface of the earth,
or in the sea, and are unclaimed by any owner, are supposed to be abandoned by
the ht.St proprietor; and, as snch, are returned into the common stock and mass
of things: and therefore they belong, as in a state of nature, to the first occupant or fortunate finder, unless they fall within the description of waifs, or
estr&J:S, or wreck, or hidden treasure; for these., we have formerly seen, (l) a.re
vegted by law in the king, and form a part of the ordinary revenue of the
crown.
3. Thus, too, the benefit of the elements, the light, the air, and the water, can
only be appropriated by occupancy. If I haYe an ancient window (4) o\·erlooking my neighbour's ground, he may not erect any blind to _obstruct the light:
but if I build my house close to his wall, which darkens it, I cannot compel
him to demolish his wall; for there the first occupancy is rather in him than in
me. If my neighbour • makes a. tan-yard, so &i to annoy and render less [ • 403 ]
salubrious the air of my house and gardens, the law will furnish me
with a remedy; but if he is first in possession of the air, and I fix my habitation near him, the nuisance is of my own seeking, and may continue. If a.
stream be unoccupied, I may erect a mill thereon, and detain the water; yet
not so as to injure my neighbour's prior mill, or his mood.ow: for he hath by the
first occupancy acquired a property in the current. (5)
4. With regard, likewise, to animals fer<B naturOJ all mankind had by the
original grant of the Creator a right to pursue and take any fowl or insect of the
air, any fish or inhabitant of the waters, and any beast or reptile of the field:
and this natural right still continues in every indiYidual, unless where it is
restrained by the ch·il laws of the country. And when a man baa once so seized
them, they become while liYing his qualified property, or if dood, are absolutely
his own: so that. to steal them, or otherwise invade this property, is, according to
their res~ctive values, sometimes a criminal offence, sometimes only a civil
injury. The restrictions which are laid upon this right, by the laws of England,
relate principally to royal fish, as whale and sturgeon, and such terrestrial,
aerial, or aquatic animals as go under the denomination of game; the taking
of which is made the exclusiYe right of the prince, and such of his subjects to
whom he has granted the same royal privilege. (6) But those animals which are
not exJ>ressly so resen-ed, are still liable to be taken and appropriated by any of
the kmg's subjects, upon their own territories; in the same manner as they
might have taken even game, itself, till these civil prohibitions were issued:

ipsum A. de. ffuerra cttptum tfinquam prfamemMfun, quoiuqwaibi tie cetttvm librit, per qvosidem H. rtdcmp-

tionv. num cum prafato A. proeita tua talvnnda fecerct laiu/actumforct, dttinuitjfregU, et ipmm H. cepit

et uhduxit, rtl into roluit abirepermitit, ifc."

U) 2 Lev. 201. Ji) Carth. 396. Ld. Raym. 147. Salt. «G7. (I) Book I, ch. 8. »

(3) In England the ransom of nhips, except in cases of necessity to be allowed by the admi-

(ll Bro. ..4br. tU. propertU., 18.
(ii We meet wilb a curious writ of trC'gp11M In the register (102), for brenklng a man's house, nmt setting
such bis prisoner at !11rge. "Qturre dt>nmm ipriu• .A. apud W. (in qtta idem A . quendam II. Scott1m per
ip•u• A . tk fltlerTll cnptum tnnqunm ,,,.Uo- """'"• quowqru .Wide ee1iltt111 librl.I, per qtUU idem H . r&femption= nat1t ettM pra!/tdo A. prorlta 1tU1 Mloanda /e~ aatuflict..m /oret, detinuil) /regit, et ipaum H. upil
d abda.:eU, 11d qwo wluU 11bire permint, <f'c."
U1 2 Lev. 201.
\J:) Carth. aoo. Ld. Raym. 1'7. Salk. 1167.
(l) Book I, ch. 8.

ralty, is made illegal by statute. See 2 Doug. 649; 3 Taunt. 6.

(4) [The subject of this paragraph does not belong to the head of personal property. Rights

to light, air, 4c., are not of a personal nature, but are incidents to the enjoyment of real

estate ; and even easements annexed to the person, or in gross, are real property.] See ante, p.

395, note.

(5) See the preceding note. And on the general subject of rights in water courses, see the

treatise on that subject by Mr. Angell.

(6) [See this controverted in page 419, note.]
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(3) In England the ran~om of BhipR, except in CSRCS of necessity to be allowed by the admiralty, is made illegal by statute. See 2 Doug. 649; 3 Taunt. 6.
( 4) [The subject of this paragraph doe~ not belong to the bead of personal property. Rights

to light, air, d:c., a.re not of a personal nnture, but are incidents to the enjoyment of real

estate; and e>en easements annexed to the per1son, or in gross, are real property.) See ante, p.
395, note.
(!">) See the preceding note. .And on the general subject of rights in water courses, see the
treatise on that suhject by Mr. .Angell.
(6) [8ee this cuntro>erted in page 419, note.)

697

Dig ize b

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

403 TITLE TO THINGS PERSONAL. [Book II.

403

[Book Il.

TITLE TO THINGS PERSON.AL.

there being in nature no distinction between, one species of wild animals and

another, between the right of acquiring property in a hare or a squirrel, in a

partridge or a butterfly: but the difference, at present made, arises merely from

the positive municipal law.

5. To this principle of occupancy, also, must be referred the method of acquir-

ing a special personal property in corn growing on the ground, or other embie-

f *404 1 men^s' (?) by any posneasor *of the land who hath sown or pluuted it,

"- -1 whether he be owner of the inheritance, or of a less estate which

emblements are distinct from the real estate in the land, and subject to many,

though not all, the incidents attending personal chattels. They were devisable

by testament before the statute of wills, (m) and at the death of the owner shall

vest in his executor and not his heir; they are forfeitable by outlawry in a per-

sonal action ; (n) and by the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, though not by the com-

mon law, (0) they may be distrained for rent arrere. The reason for admitting

the acquisition of this special property, by tenants who have temporary interests,

was formerly given; (p) and it was extended to tenants in fee, principally for

the benefit of their creditors: and therefore, though the emblements are assets

in the hands of the executor, are forfeitable upon outlawry, and distreinable for

rent, they are not in other respects considered as personal chattels; and particu-

larly they are not the object of larceny before they are severed from the

ground, (q)

6. The doctrine of property arising from accession is also grounded on the
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right of occupancy. By the Koman law, if any given corporeal substance

received afterwards an accession by natural or by artificial means, as by

the growth of vegetables, the pregnancy of animals, the embroidering of cloth,

or the conversion of wood or metal into vessels and utensils, the original

owner of the thing was entitled, by his right of possession, to the property

of it under such its state of improvement: (r) but if the thing itself, by such

operation, was changed into a different species, as by making wine, oil, or

bread out of another's grapes, olives, or wheat, it belonged to the new opera-

tor ; who was only to make a satisfaction to the former proprietor for the mate-

rials which he had so converted. (*) (8) And these doctrines are implicitly

I *405 1 c°P'e<l an(i adopted by our Bracton, (t) and have since been *confirmed\

L J by many resolutions of the courts. («) It hath even been held, that if

one takes away and clothes another's wife or son, and afterwards they return

(m) Perk. } 513. (it) Bro. Abr. tit. emblemmtt, 21. 5 Rep. 116. (o) 1 Roll. Abr. 668.

(p) Panes 1M, 146. (q) 3 lust. 100. (r) In»t. 2,1, 2A, SU, 31. ff. 6, 1, S.

(i) Intt. -I, 1, -25, St. (1) I. 2, c. -1 and 3. (u) Uro. Mr. tit. propertie, 23. Moor. 30. Poph. SS.

there being in nature no distinction between .one epecies of wild animals and
another, between the right of ac9.uiring property ID a bare or a squirrel, in a
partrid~e or a butterfly: but the d1fference, at present made, arises merely from
the positive municipal law.
5. 'fo this principle of occupancy, also, must be referred the method of acquiring a special personal property in corn growing on the gronnd, or other emble[ • 404 ] meN.ts, (7) l>y any poSJJe88<tr *of the lund who hath sown or planted it,
whether he be owner of the inheritance, or of a Jess estate which
emblements are distinct from the real estate in the land, and subject to many,
though not all, the incidents attending ,1>erso11al chattels. They were devisable
by testament bofore the statute of wills, (m) and at the deatb of the owner shall
vest in hi~ executor and not his heir; they are forteitable by outlawry in a pel"sonal action; (n) and by the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, though not by the- common law, (o) they may be distreined for rent arrere. The reason for admitting
the acquisition of this~ial property, by tenants who have temporary intere8t~
wo.s formerly giYen; (p an<l it was extended to tenants in fee, principalJy for
the benefit of their er itors: and therefore, though the emblements are assets
in the hands of the executor, are forfeitable upon outlawry, and distreinable for
rent, they are not in other respects considered as personal chattels; and particularly they are not the object of larceny before they are severed from the
ground. (q)
6. The doctrine of property arising from accession is also grounded on the
right of occupancy. By the Roman law, if any given corporeel substance
received afterwards an accession by natural or by artificial means, as by
the growth of vegetables, the pregnancy of animals, the embroidering of cloth,
or the conversion of wood or metal into vessels and utensils, the original
owner of the thing was entitled, by his right of possession, to the property
of it under such its state of improvement: (r) but if the thing itself, by such
operation, was changed int-0 a different spteies, as by making wine, oil, or
bread out of another's grapes, olives, or wheat, it belonged to the new operator; who was only to make a satisfaction to the former proprietor for the materials which he had so converted. (s) (8) And these doctrines are implioitly
l • 405 ] copied and adopted by onr Bracton, (t) and ha¥e since been *con finned
by many resolutions of the courts. (tt) It hath even been held, that if
one takes uway and clothes another's wife or son, and afterwards they return

(7) [The right to emblements does not seem to be aptly referred to the principle of occupancy;

for they are the continuation of an inchoate, and not the nrquistiou of an original right.]

(8) [This also has long been the law of England; for it is laid down, in the Tear hunks, that

(m) Perk. f :112.
(p) Pagee 1~, H6.

(a) lnat. :!, I, !II, lU.

(R) Bro, Abr. tit. eaablementa, 21. II Rep. 116.
(o) l
(q) 3 Ina,. 109,
(r) /rut . 2, l, 2.~, 211, 31. JiJ'. 6, I,
(t) l. 2, c. 2 and 3.
(u) Bro. Abr. tit. propertie, 23.

Roll. A.br. 668.
5.
Moor. 20. Popb. SS.

•whatever alteration of form any property has undergone, the owner may seize it in its new

shape, if he can prove the identity of the original materials; as if leather be made into shoes,

cloth into a coat, or if a tree be squared into timber, or silver melted or beat into a different

figure, 5 Hen. VII, fo. 15; 12 Hen. VIII, fo. 10. See also 2 Campb. 576; 15 Ves. 442.]

An intermixture of property by accident, or without the fuult of parties, does not deprive

either owner of his right; Tmt if the intermixture be intentional, and with fraudulent purpose on

the part of the party causing it, and it is impossible afterwards to distinguish what belonged to

each, the innocent party shall have all. Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62; Willard v. Rice,

II Met. 493; Hesseltine v. Stockwell, 30 Me. 237 ; Jenkins v. Steanka, 19 Wis. 126. And in a

well reasoned case in New York, it has been held, that where a willful trespasser takes corn

and converts it into whisky, the property is not changed, and the owner of the com may

rec'laim it. Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379. See the valuable brief of Mr. Hill in this case.

See also Snydcr r. Vaux, 2 Rawle, 427; Kiddle v. Driver, 12 Ala. 590. But where the admix-

ture was not fraudulent, even though done purposely—for example, under a claim of right—the

party causing it does not lose his right. Ryder v. Hathaway, 21 Pick. 298. Nor in any other

case, if the property of each can be afterwards distinguished. Frost t>. Willard, 9 Barb. 440.

Nor would he, even when it could not be distinguished, if the property of each was of the same

description, so that an equal quantity to what he before possessed, restored to each from the

common mass, would place him substantially in statu quo. See Stephenson t'. Little, 10 Mich.

433; Seymour v. Wyckoff, 10 N. Y. 213; Lupton t>. White, 15 Ves. 442.]
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(7) [The right to emblements does not ~eem to be aptly referred to the principle of ooonp&ncy;
for they are the continuation of an inchoate, and not the acquit1tion of an originnl right.]
(8) [This also has long been tho law of England; for it is laid down in the Year bookP, that
whatever alteration of form any property has undergone, the owner may seize it in its new
shape, if he can prove the identity of the original materials; a.<1 if leather be made into ~hoe.<1,
cloth int-0 a coat, or if a tree be squared into timber, or 11ilver melted or beat into a different
figure. fi Hen. VII, fo. 15; 12 Hen. VIII, fo. 10. See also 2 Campb. fi76; 15 VeR. 442.]
.An intcrmLtture of property by accident, or without the fuult of J,>Rrties, does not deprive
either owner of his right; but. if the intennixture be intentional, and mth fraudulent pw-pose on
the part of the party cau!dng it, and it is impossible afterwards to distinguitili what belonged to
each, the innocent party Phall have all. H11rt "·Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Cb. &l; Willard "· Rice,
11 .Met. 493; HesRCltine v. Stockwell, 30 Me. 2:J7; JenkinR t'. Steanka, 19 Wis. 126. And in &
well ren..;;oned ca.~e in New York, it hss been held, that where a willful trespa.-;8er takes <'om
and converts it into whisky, the property is not eho.n~d, and the owner of the com may
reelaim it. Silsbury ''· .McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379. See the valuable l>rief of .Mr. Hill in this case.
See also Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle, 427 ; Riddle v. Driver, 12 .Ala. 590. But where the admixture was not fraudulent, even though done purposely-for rxample, under a claim of right-the
party rnu~ing it dc>e11 not lose hi~ right. Ryder v. Ilathawn.y, 21 Pick. 298. Nor in any other
cai<e: if the property of each can be afterwards distinguii<hed. Frrn~t v. Willard. 9 Barb. 440.
Nor would he, eYen when it could not be dii1tingni8hed, if the property of each wu.s of the same
dr.~cription, so that an equal quantity to what he before po.~sr.si;ed, restored to each from the
common mass, would place him substantially in statu 7110. 8ee Stephenson t•. Little, 10 llich.
433; Seymour v. Wyckoff, 10 N. Y. 213; Lupton v. White, ll> Ves. 442.]
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home, the garments shall cease to be his property who provided them, being

annexed to the person of the child or woman, (w)

7. Bnt in the case of confusion of goods, where those of two persons are so

intermixed that the several portions can be no longer distinguished, the Eng^

lish law partly agrees with, and partly differs from, the civil. If the inter-

mixture be by consent, I apprehend that in both laws the proprietors have an

interest in common, in proportion to their respective shares, (x) But if one

willfully intermixes his money, corn, or hay, with that of another man, without

his approbation or knowledge, or casts gold in like manner into another's melt-

ing pot or crucible, the civil law, though it gives the sole property of the whole

to him who has not interfered in the mixture, yet allows a satisfaction to the

other for what he has so improvidently lost (y) But our law, to guard against

fraud, gives the entire property, without any account, to him whose original

dominion is invaded, and endeavoured to be rendered uncertain without his own

consent, (z)

8. There is still another species of property, which (if it subsists by the com-

mon law) being grounded on labour and invention, is more properly reducible

to the head of occupancy than any other; since the right of occupancy itself is

supposed by Mr. Locke, (a\ and many others, (b) to be founded on the personal

labour of the occupant. (9) And this is the right which an author may be

supposed to have in his own original literary compositions: so that no other

person without his leave may publish or make profit of the^opies. When a man
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by the exertion of his rational powers has produced an original work, he seems

to have clearly a *right to dispose of that identical work as he pleases, r „ ,,.„ ,

and any attempt to vary the disposition he has made of it appears to be L -I

an invasion of that right. Now the identity of a literary composition consists

entirely in the sentiment and the language; the same conceptions, clothed in

the same words, must necessarily be the same composition: and whatever method

be taken of exhibiting that composition to the ear or the eye of another, by

recital, by writing, or by printing, in any number of copies, or at any period of

time, it is always the identical work of the author which is so exhibited; and

no other man (it hath been thought) can have a right to exhibit it, especially

for profit, without the author's consent This consent may perhaps be tacitly

given to all mankind, when an author suffers his work to be published by an-

other hand, without any claim or reserve of right, and without stamping on it

any marks of ownership; it being then a present to the public, like building a

church or bridge, or laying out a new highway; but, in case the author sells a

single book, or totally grants the copyright, it hath been supposed, in the one

case, that the buyer hath no more right to multiply copies of that book for sale,

than he hath to imitate for the like purpose the ticket which is bought for ad-

mission to an opera or a concert; and that, in the other, the whole property, with

all its exclusive rights, is perpetually transferred to the grantee. On the other hand

it is urged, that though the exclusive property of the manuscript, and all which

it contains, undoubtedly belongs to the author, before it is printed or published;

(w) Moor. 2U. (x) Intt. 2. 1, 27, 28. 1 Vern. 217. (y) Inet. 2, 1, 28.

(z| Poph. 31. 2 Bulatr. 8». 1 Hal. P. C. 513. 2 Vern. 516. (a) On Uov. part J, ch. 5.

Co See page 8.

(9) Mr. Sweet calls attention to the fact that the right to the exclusive use of distinctive trade

marks, or of a particular partnership firm, for the purpose of enabling the public to know if it i*

dealing with or buying the manufacture* of a particular person, is somewhat analogous to lit-

erary copyright, and though partially founded on the notion of protecting the public from fraud:

3 Myl. and Cr. 33tJ; 8 Sim. 477; is an example of a right much more evidently arising out of occu-

pancy. And he cites 3 Doug. 393; 3 B. and C. 541; -2 Yes. and B. 218; 2 Keen, 213; 3 Myl. and

Cr. 1, 338; 5 Scott, N. S. 562. The court'of chancery will restrain the violation of a trade mark:

Motley «. Dowmnan, 3 Myl. and Cr. 1; Millington «. Fox, ib. 333 ; Perry r. Truefult, 6 Bcav. 66;

Frauks e. Weaver, 10 Beav. 297; Sexio it. Provezeado, Law Rep. 1 Ch. Ap. 192; Barrows t'.

Knight, 6 R. I. 434; Devinger v. Plate, 29 Cal. 292; Kerr on Injunctions (by Herrick), 474, et scq.

Bnt not where the trade mark itself is an imposition, and dcsijrbed for purposes of fraud. Clark

v. Freeman, 10 Beav. 112; Stewart v. Smithson, 1 Hilt. 119; Ketr on Injunctions, 481.

.-

599

406 TITLE TO THINGS PERSONAL. [Book II.

406

TITLE TO THINGS PERSONAL.

fDook IL

yet, from the instant of publication, the exclusive right of an author or big

assigns to the sole communication of his ideas immediately vanishes and evapo-

rates ; as being a right of too subtile and unsubstantial a nature to become the

subject of property at the common law, and only capable of being guarded by

positive statutes and special provisions of the magistrate.

The Roman law adjudged, that if one man wrote anything on the paper or

parchment of another, the writing should belong to the owner of the blank

materials: (c) meaning thereby the mechanical operation of writing, for which

r *.Q~ -• it directed the *scribe to receive a satisfiiction; for in works of genius

' ' and invention, as in painting on another man's canvas, the same law

(d) gave the canvas to the painter. As to any other property in the works of

the understanding, the law is silent; though the sale of literary copies, for the

purposes of recital or multiplication, is certainlj as ancient as trie times of Ter-

ence, (e) Martial, (/) and Statins. (</) Neither with us in England hath there

been (till very lately) any final (A) determination upon the right of authors at

the common law. (10)

(c) .S7 in ctuirtix membranUre (nil airmen vel historiamvcl oraiionem Titita tcripscrU, kujns corporit non

Til I ii-s sal tu dominut ate viderit. Itut. 2, 1, S3. See page nil.

(rf) Ibid. ( 31. (e) Prol. in Eunw-h. 20 (/) Epigr. i. 67, Iv. 72, xiii, 3, xlv, 194.

(a)Juv. vii, 83.

In) Since this was first written, it was determined, in the cage of Miller v. Taylor. In /( R. Ptuch. 0 Geo.

Ill, I7(>9, that an exclusive and permanent copyright in authors subsisted 117 the common law. Rut after-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

wanla. in the case of Donaldton v. iiecket, before the house of lords, H l-'rin-. 1774, It was held that no copy-

right now subsists in autliojrs, alter the expiration of the several terms created by the statute of Queen Anne.

yet, from the instaht of publication, the exclusive right of an author or hie
assigns to the sole communication of his ideas immediately vanishes and evaporates; as being a right of too subtile and unsubstantial a nature to become the
subject of property at the' common law, and only capable of being guanied by
positive statutes and special provisions of the mu.gistrate.
The Roman law adjudged, that if one man wrote anything on the paJ>ET or
parchment of another, the writing should belong to the owner of the blank
materials: (c) meaning th~reby the mechanical operation of writing, for .,.·bich
[ • 407 ] it directed the •scribe to receive a satisfuction; for in works of genius
and invention, as in painting on another man's canv~ the same law
(d) gave the canvas to the painter. As to any other property in the works of
the understanding, the law is silent; though the sale of literary copies, for the
purposes of recital or multiplication, is certainly as ancient as the times of 1.'erence, (e) Martial,(.{) and Sta.tins. (g) Neither with us in England hath there
been (till very lately) any final (Ii) determination upon the right of authors at
the common law. (10)
Cc) Si in chartU tMlrlbnl11i.rre ttril cnrmm m liatorimllm oralioloeit 'l'UitU «rlp-U, ~ ~ "°n
7'itltu s&l tu dotnim1• uae Wlert.. Jut. 2, 1, &>. Seo page 40l.
(e) Prol. ill Eunurll. 21.1
l/J Epigr. I. f>T, Iv. '721 xiii, 31 xiv, 19'.
(d) Ibid. t :u.
(gJ Ju11. vii, 83.
(I&) Since thid WM tint written, It \VM tletennlnetl, In the cnsc of Miller'\". 7b11lor. In B. R. Pa1el&. 9 Geo.
DI, lili9, that nn exeln~h·e 1111'1 pennnnent eopy1·lght in 1rnthors snh~i,tctl h7 the common lnw. Rnt aRerwa... ts. 111 the ease or Dottald.on v. Beckd, bef<ire the house oflonl~. 2'l l't:l>r. 177~, It w119 belol that 110 copyright now subslste In authQlll, al'ter tho expimllon ot' the Bo\·eral &e1·me created by the iltatute of Queen Anne.

(10) [For the history of the law of copyright see Lowndes on Copyright, and Miller v. Taylor,

4 Burr. 2303. In that case it was decided that the authors had, by the common law, a perpetual

copyright in their works, and that the statute of Anne, without interfering with this right, gave

them additional remedies during a certain term. But this doctrine was overruled in the house

of lords in Donaldsons v. Beeket, 4 Burr. 2403; and it was held that the statute of Anne had

entirely taken away the common law copyright.

The statute 5 and 6 Vic. o. 45, now regulates copyright and limits its duration to the period of

forty-two years from the first publication, or the period of the life of the author, and toe seven

years next following his death, whichever is the longest. The copyright of articles contributed

to an encyclopedia, review, or other periodical work, is, in certain cases, to belong to the pro-

jector, publisher or proprietor of such work, subject to the right of any contributor under any

contract, express or implied, to publish his own contributions separately. A copy of every book

is directed to be delivered at the British Museum within a month of the time of publication, and,

after demand, copies are to be delivered to the Stationers' Company for the use of the Bodleian,

Cambridge^ Advocates, and Trinity College, Dublin, libraries.

The Universities of Cambridge and Oxford, and the Colleges of Eton, "Westminster, and Win-

chester, enjoy a perpetual, unalienable copyright in such works as have been or may be given or

bequeathed to them by the author or his representatives, such books not having been previously

published or assigned. Statute 10 Geo. Ill, c. 53.

The statute 1 and 2 Vic. c. 59, (the International Copyright Act) authorizes the queen, by-

order in council, to grant a copyright in any book published abroad, to the author and his repre-

sentatives and assignees. As to the copvright in books composed and published abroad, inde-

pendently of this act, see 2 Sim. 237; 5 Id. 395; 10 id. 329; 1 You. and C. 288; 4 id. 485; 2 B.

and Cr. 861; 9 Law J., N. S. Ch. 227.

The copyright of an unprinted and unpublished work may subsist for any length of time in the

proprietor for the time being of the original manuscript. Ambl. 604; 2 Eden, 329; 2 Meriv.

4:55; 4 Bun-. 2330; 1 Chit. 26; 2 Yes. and B. 23. It seems that the receiver of a letter, though

he may keep the original, has no right to publish copies, unless for the purpose of vindicating his

character, <fcc. 2 Atk. 342; Ambl. 737; 2 Ves. and B. 19; 2 Swanst. 402.

Upon the principle that no rights can originate in an act which is illegal or against public pol-

icy, it has been decided, with more of legal soundness than of good policy, that there is no copyright

in a work which the court may consider to be detrimental to good morals or religion; so Uiat

assistance is refused even to the author himself wishiug to suppress a work of this nature. 2

Meriv. 437; 2 Camp. 30; 5 B. and Cr. 173; Jac. 471.]

As to copyright in dramatic pieces, see statute 3 and 4 "William IV, c. 15; 1 Ad. and El.

580; 5 Scott/242; 8 C. and P. 68, 78; in musical compositions, see statute 5 and 6 Tic. c. 45;

in lectures, see statute 5 and 6 "William IV, c. 65; in designs for sculpture and articles of man-

(10) [For the history of the law of copyright see Lowndes on Copyright, and Miller t1. Taylor,
4 Burr. 2303. In that case it wa.'! decided that the authors had, by the common law, a perpetual
copyright in their works, and that the statute of .Anne, without interfering with this right, gave
them additional remedies during a certain term. But this doctrine was overruled in the house
of lords in DonaldROns ti. Becket, 4 Burr. 240~; and it was held that the statute or Anne had
entirely taken away the common law copyright.
The statute 5 RDd 6 Vic. c. 45, now regulate~ copyright and limits itR duration to the period
forty-two yeani from the first publication, or the period of the life of the author, and the seven
ycBI'll next following his death, whichu¥er is the longest. The copyright of articles contributed
to an encvclopedia, ·review, or other periodical work, is, in certain ca.~es, to belong to the projector, publi8her or proprietor of snch work, subject to the right of any contributor under any
contmct, expre;;s or implied, to publish hiR own contributions separately. .A copy of every book
is directed to be delivered at the British Museum within a month of the time of publication, and,
after dc!mand, copies are to be deli¥ered to the Stationen' Company for t.he we of t.he Bodleian,
Cambridgl\ .Advocatc11, and Trinity College, Duhlin, lihmries.
The Uni¥ersities of Cambridge and Oxrord, and the C<Jlleges of Eton, We11tminster. and Winchester, enjoy a perpetual, unalienable copyright in such works as have boon or may be given OI'
bequeathed to them by the author or his representatives, such books not having been previously
published or assigned. Statute 10 Geo. Ill, c. 53.
The statute 1 and 2 Vic. c. 59, (the International Copyright Act) authorizes the queen, by
order in council, to grant a copyright in any book published ahroed, to the author and his representatives and ae11ignees. .A.s to the copvright in books composed and published Rbroed, independently of this act, see 2 Sim. 2.17 ; 5 Id. 395; 10 id. 3'..?9; 1 You. and C. 288; 4 id. 485 ; 2 B.
and Cr. 861; 9 Law J., N. S. Ch. z-n.
The copy1ight of an unprinted and unpuhlfahed work may subsist for any length of time in the
proprietor for the time being of the original manut1Cript. Ambl. 694; 2 Eden, 329; 2 Meriv.
4:J5; 4 Burr. 23.'JO; 1 Chit. 26; 2 Ves. and B. 23. It seems that the receiver of a letk1r, though
he may keep the original, has no right to publi8h copies, unless for the purpose of \"indicating his
chllructer, &c. 2 Atk. 342; Ambl. 737; 2 Ves. and B. 19; 2 Swanst. 402.
Upon the princiJ.>le that no rights can originat~ in an act which is illegal or against public policy, 1t ha.~ been decided, with more of legal soundnes;; than of good policy. that there is no copynght
in a work which t.be court may consider to be detrimental to good morals or religion; so that
&.'!sistancc is refused even to the author himself wishing to suppress a work of this nature. :i
lleriv. 437; 2 Camp. 30; 5 B. and Ci·. 173; J ac. 471.]
As to copyrij!:ht in dramatic piece~, see s.tatute 3 an~. 4 William IV, c. 15 ; 1 Ad: Rnd El.
580 ; 5 Scott., 242; 8 C. and P. 68, 78; m mur11cal compos1t1on~, see 8tatute 5 and 6 Vic. e. 45;
in lectnres, see statute 5 and 6 William IV, c. 65; in designs for sculpture and articles of manufacture, see statute 38 Geo. III, o. 71; 54 Geo. III, c. 56; 5 and 6 Vic. c. 100; 6 and 7
Vic. c. 65.
.A foreigner is entitled to the copyright of a work composed by him, whi~h ill first pnblifihcd in
En~land. Boosey "· Davidson, l:J Q. B. 257; lloosey t1. Jeffery, 6 Exch. 680; Low "· Routledge, Law Rep. 1 Ch. .Ap. Cas. 42.

or

ufacture, see statute 38 Geo. Ill, o. 71; 54 Geo. Ill, c. 56; 5 and 6 Vie. c. 100; 6 and 7

Vic. c. 65.
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A foreigner is entitled to the copyright of a work composed by him, which is first published in

England. Boosey r. Davidson, 13 Q. B. 257; Boosey c. Jefiery, 6 Exch. 580; Low ». Rout-

ledge, Law Hep. 1 Ch. Ap. Gas. 42.
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But whatever inherent copyright might have been supposed to subsist by the

common law, the statute 8 Ann. c. 19, (amended by statute 15 Geo. Ill, c. 53,)

hath now declared that the author and his assigns shall have the sole liberty of

printing and reprinting his works for the term of fourteen years, and no longer;

(i) and hath also protected that property by additional penalties and forfeitures:

directing farther, that if, at the end of that term, the author himself be living,

the right shall then return to him for another term of the same duration; and

a similar privilege is extended to the inventors of prints and engravings, for the

term of eight-and-twenty years, by the statute 8 Geo. II, c. 13, and 7 Geo. Ill,

c. 38, besides an action for damages, with double costs, by statute 17 Geo. III. c.

57. All which parliamentary protections appear to have been suggested by the

exception in the statute of monopolies. 21 Jac. I, c. 3, which allows a royal

patent of privilege to be granted for fourteen years to any inventor of a new

manufacture, for the sole working or making of the same; by virtue whereof it

is held, that a temporary property therein becomes vested in the king's patentee.

W (11)

(i) By statute IB G«o. III. c. S3, some additional privileges In this respect are granted to the universities,

And certain other learned societies.

(k) 1 Vern. 62.

On the general subject of copyright, see "Williams Pers. Prop. 224; 2 Kent, 373; Curtis on

Copyright, and the leading American case of Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591. The act of congress

of i'eb. 4, 1831, (4 Stat. 436), secures to the authors of books, maps, charts, and musical composi-
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tions, and to the inventors and designors of prints, cuts and engravings, being citizens of the

United States or residents therein, the exclusive right of printing, publishing and vending them

for the term of twenty-eight years from the time oi recording the title thereof, with a renewal of

the right at the end of the term to themselves, if living, or to their widows and children, for a

further terra of fourteen years, on complying with the conditions of the act. The act of Feb. 5,

1859 (11 Stat. 380), extends the privilege of copyright to photographs and the negatives thereof,

and makes some changes in the requisites to perfect the right.

That the writer of a letter has such a property in it. as will enable him to enjoin its publication

-without his consent, see AVoolsey p. Judu, 4 Duer, 379, and Brandrcth ». Lance, 8 Paige, 24.

(11) [When the crown, on behalf of the public, grants letters patent, the grantee thereby

enters into a contract with the crown, in the benefit of which contract the public are partici-

pators ; under certain restrictions, affording a reasonable recompense to the grantee, the use

of his invention, improvement, and employment of capital, is communicated to the public. If

any infringement of a patent be attempted, after there has been an undisputed enjoyment by

the patenteennder the grant for a considerable time, courts of equity will deem it a less in-

convenience to issue an injunction until the right can be determined at law, then to refuse

such preventive interference, merely because it is possible the grant of the crown may, upon

investigation, prove to be invalid. Such a question is not to be considered as it affects the

parties on the record alone; for, unless the injunction issues, any person might violate the

patent, and the coilfeequence would be, that the patentee must be ruined by litigation. Manner

v. Playne, 14 Ves. 132 : Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Richardson, C id. 707; Williams

c. Williams, 3 Meriv. 160. But, if the patent be a very recent one, and its validity is disputed,

an injunction will not be granted before the patentee has established his legal right. Hill r.

Thompson, Sid. 624.

The grant of a patent, as already stated, is in the nature of a purchase for the public, to

whom the patentee is bound to communicate a free participation in the benefit of his inven-

tion, at the expiration of the time limited; Williams v. Williams, 3 Meriv. 160: if, therefore,

the specification of a patent be not so clear as to enable all the world to use the invention,

and all persons of reasonable skill in such matters to copy it, as soon as the term for which it

has been granted is at an end, this is a fraud upon the public, and the patent cannot be sus-

tained. Newbury v. James, 2 Meriv. 451; Ex Parte Pox, 1 Ves. and Bea. 67; Turner v. Winter,

1 T. R. 605; Harmcr t>. Playne, 11 East, 107. If a patentee seek, by his specification, more

than he is strictly entitled to, his patent is thereby rendered ineffectual, even to the extent to

which he would otherwise be entitled. Hill v. Thompson, 3 Meriv. 629; Banner r. Playne, 14

Ves. 135.

When a person has invented certain improvements upon an engine, or other subject, for which

a patent has been granted, and those improvements cannot be used without the original

engine; at the expiration of the patent for such original enjrine, a patent may be taken out

for the improvements; but, before that time, there can be no right to make use of the substra-

tum protected by the first patent. Ex Parte Fox, 1 Ves. and Bea. 67. And, where industry

and ingenuity have been exerted in annexing to the subject of a patent, improvements of such

a nature that their value gives an additional value to the old machine j though a patent may

be obtained for such improvements; yet, if the public choose to use the original machine
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CHAPTER XXVII.

CHAPTER XXVII.

OF TITLE BY PREEOGATIVE AND FOEFEITUEE.

A SECOND method of acquiring property in personal chattels is by the icing's

prerogative; whereby a right may accrue either to the crown itself, or to snch

as claim under the title of the crown, as by the king's grant, or by prescription,

OF TITLE BY PREROGATIVE AND FORFEITURE.

which supposes an ancient grant.

Such, in the first place, are all tributes, taxes, and customs, whether constitu-

tionally inherent in the crown, as flowers of the prerogative and branches of the

census regalia or ancient royal revenue, or whether they be occasionally created

by authority of parliament; of both which species of revenue we treate'd largely

in the former book. In these the king acquires and the subject loses a property,

the instant they become due; if paid, they are a chose in possession; if unpaid,

a chose in action. Hither also may be referred all forfeitures, fines, and amerce-

ments due to the king, which accrue by virtue of his ancient prerogative, or by

particular modern statutes: which revenues created by statute do always assim-

ilate, or take the same nature, with the ancient revenues; and may therefore be

looked upon as arising from a kind of artificial or secondary prerogative. And,

in either case, the owner of the thing forfeited, and-the person fined or amerced,

lose and part with the property of the forfeiture, fine, or amercement, the instant

the king or his grantee acquires it.

T *409 1 **n tnese s^61?1! methods of acquiring property by prerogative there

*• J is also this peculiar quality, that the king cannot have & joint property
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with any person in one entire chattel, or such a one as is not capable of division

or separation; but where the titles of the king and a subject concur, the king

shall have the whole: in like manner as the king cannot, either by grant or

contract, become a joint-tenant of a chattel real with another person; (a) but

by such grant or contract shall become entitled to the whole in severalty. Thus,

if a horse be given to the king and a private person, the king shall have the sole

property: if a bond be made to the king and a subject, the king shall have the

whole penalty; the debt or duty being one single chattel; (b) and so,if two per-

sons have the property of a horse between them, or have a joint debt owing

(o) Sec page 184. (6) Fitah. Abr. t.delte, 38. Plowd. MS.

without the improvements, they may do so without restriction, at the expiration of the original

grant; if the public will abstain from the use of the first invention, in consideration of the supe-

rior advantages of the improved instrument, it is well; but the choice must be left open. Harrner

t>. Playne, 14 Ves. 134.

A SECOND method of acquiring property in personal chattels is hy the king'11
prerovative; whereby a right may accrue either to the crown itself, or to such
as clu.1m under the title of the crown, as by the king's grllllt, or by prescription,
which supposes an ancient grant.
Snch, in the first place, are all tributes, taxes, and ettstoma, whether constitutionally inherent in the crown, a.s flowers of the prerogative and branches of the
cens1ts regalis or ancient royal revenue, or whether they be occasionally created
by authority of parliament; of both which species of revenue we treated largely
in the former book. In these the king acquires and the subject loses afroperty,
the instant they become due; if paid, they are a chose in possession; i nu paid,
a cltose in action. Hither also may be referred all forfeitures, fines, and amercements due to the king, which accrue by virtue of his anciPnt prerogative, or by
P.&-rticular modern statutes: whi~h revenues. created by statute do always assimilate, or take the same nature, with the ancient revenues; and may therefore be
looked upon as arising from a kind of artificial or secondary prerogative. And,
in either case, the owner of the thing forfeited, and· the person fined or amerced,
lose and part with the property of the forfeiture, fine, or amercement, the instant
the king or his grantee acquires it.
*In these eeveial methods of acquiring property by prerogative there
[ • 409 ]
is also this peculiar quality, that the king cannot have a joint property
with any J.>Crson in one entire chattel, or such a. one as is not capable of division
or separation; but where the titles of the king and a subject concur, the king
shall have the whole: in like manner as the king cannot, either by grunt or
contract, become a joint-tenant of a chattel real with another person; (a) but
by such grant or contract shall become entitled to the whole in seYeralty. 'l'hus,
if a horse be given to the king and a private person, the king shall have the sole
property: if a bond be made to the kmg and a subject, the king shall have the
whole penalty; the debt or duty being one single chattel; (b) and so, if two persons have the property of a horse between them, or have a joint debt owing

The Patent Amendment Act, 15 and 16 Tic. c. 83, now regulates the terms npon which

(G)

letters patent may be granted. By this statute the fees which it was formerly necessary to pay,

See page J.M.

(b) Fiull. AW. '· ddte, 38. Plowd. HS.

upon obtaining a patent, have been greatly reduced, and the payment of them is spread over the

space of several years; so that, if an invention be not found lucrative, the patent may be dis-

continued and the fees saved. Letters patent granted under this act contain a condition that

the same shall be void at the end of three years, unless a fee of 401. with 10/. stamp duty, be

then paid; and again at the end of seven years from the grant, unless a fee of 80J. and ••!!>/. stamp

duty de paid.

The statute 5 and 6 Win. IV, c. 83, authorized a prolongation of the original term, not exceed-

ing seven years, to be given on the recommendation of the judicial committee of the privy conn-

oil ; and by statute 7 and 8 Vic. c. 69, a further term, not exceeding fourteen years, mav be

granted, if it be shown that the inventor has not been remunerated during the former period for

the expense and labor incurred in perfecting his invention.]

Letters patent granted by the United States are now granted for seventeen years, and are not

allowed to be afterwards extended. Act of Congress of March 2, 1861, 12 Stat246. Any citi-

zen or any alien who has resided one year in the United States, and taken an oath of intention to

become a citizen, may patent any new' and original design or manufacture, either for three and a

half, seven, or fourteen years, on payment of a fee of ten dollars for the first term, fifteen for tho

second, and thirty for the third period, and of this there may be an extension for seven years.

The fees payable to obtain patents are, on filing the original application, fifteen dollars, and on

issuing the patent twenty dollars. There is also a fee of ten dollars on filing a caveat.

On the subject in general, see the elaborate treatise on patents by Curtis.
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grant ; if the public will abstain from the use ot the first invention, in con!lider.ation of the su~
rior advant&f[es of the improved instrument, it is well; but the choice m1111t be let\ open. Harmer
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them on bond, and one of them assigns his part to the king, or is attainted,

•whereby his moiety is forfeited to the crown; the king shall have the entire

horse, and entire debt, (c) For, as it is not consistent with the dignity of the

crown to be partner with a subject, so neither does the king ever lose his right

in any instance; but where they interfere, his is always preferred to that of

another person; (d) from which two principles it is a necessary consequence,

that the innocent though unfortunate partner must lose his share in both the

debt and the horse, or in any other chattel in the same circumstances. (1)

This doctrine has no opportunity to take place in certain other instances of

title by prerogative that remain to be mentioned ; as the chattels thereby vested

are originally and solely vested in the crown without any transfer or derivative

assignment either by deed or law from any former proprietor. Such is the ac-

quisition of property in wreck, in treasure-trove, in waifs, in estrays, in royal

fish, in swans, and the *like; which are not transferred to the sovereign r ^,, Q -,

from any former owner, but are originally inherent in him by the rules ^ •*

of law, and are derived to particular subjects, as royal franchises, by his bounty.

These are ascribed to him, partly upon the particular reasons mentioned in the

eighth chapter of the former book; and partly upon the general principle of

their being bona vacantia, and therefore vested in the king, as well to preserve

the peace of the public, as in trust to employ them for the safety and ornament

of the commonwealth.

There is also a kind of prerogative copyright subsisting in certain books,
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which is held to be vested in the crown upon different reasons. Thus, 1. The

king, as the executive magistrate, has the right of promulgating to the people

all acts of state and government. This gives him the exclusive privilege of

printing, at his own press, or that of his grantees, all acts of parliament proc-

lamations and orders of council. 2. As supreme head of the church, he hath

a right to the publication of all liturgies and books of divine service. 3. He is

also said to have a right by purchase to the copies of such lam-books, grammars,

and other compositions, as were compiled or translated at the expense of the

crown. And upon these two last principles, combined, the exclusive right of

printing the translation of the Bible is founded. (2)

There still remains another species of prerogative property, founded upon a

very different principle from any that have been mentioned before; the prop-

erty of such animals ferw naturce, as are known by the denomination of game,

with the right of pursuing, taking, and destroying them: which is vested in the

king alone, and from him derived to such of his subjects as have received the

grants of a chase, a park, a free warren, or free fishery. This may lead us into

an inquiry concerning the original of these franchises, or royalties, on which

we touched a little in a former chapter: (f) the *right itself being an r ^..., -,

incorporeal hereditament, though the fruits and profits of it are of a L -I

personal nature.

In the first place, then, we have already shown, and indeed it cannot be denied,

that by the law of nature every man, from the prince to the peasant, has an

equal right of pursuing, and taking to his own use, all such creatures as are

fer<e natures, and therefore the property of nobody, but liable to be seized by

the first occupant. And so it was held by the imperial law, even so late as Jus-

tinian's time: " Perm igiturbestice, et volucres, et omnia animalia qua mart,

(0) Cro. Eliz. 263. Plowd. 328. Finch, Law, 178. 10 Mod. 241. (d) Co. I .in. 30. (/) Pages 38, 39.

(1) [If a joint tenant in any chattel interest commits suicide, the right to the whole chattel

becomes vested in the king. Plowd 262, Bug. ed. But in favor of commercial interests, it

has been holden, that on an extent, or extent in aid, against one of several parties, only the

them on bond, and one of them assigns his part to the king, or is attainted,
whereby his moiety is forfeited to the crown; the king shall have the entire
horse, and entire debt. (c) For, as it is not consistent with the dignity of the
crown to be partner with a subject, so neither does the king ever lose his right
in any instance; but where they interfere, his is always preferred to that of
another person; (d) from which two principles it is a. necessary consequence,
that the innocent though unfortunate partner must lose his share in both the
debt and the horse, or in any other chattel in the same circumstances. (1)
This doctrine has no opportunity to teke place in certain other instances of
title by prerogative that remain to be mentioned; as the chattels thereby vested
are or1gmally and solely vested in the crown without any transfer or derivative
assi~nment either by deed or law from any former proprietor. Such is the acqui1ntion of property in wreck, in treasure-trove, in waifs, in estrays, in royal
fish, in swans, and the *like; which are not transfer1·ed to the soyereign [ • 410 ]
from any former owner, but are originally inherent in him by the rules
of law, and are derived to particular subjects, as royal franchises, by his bounty.
These are ascribed to him, partly upon the particular reasons mentioned in the
eighth chapter of the former book ; and partly upon the general principle of
their being bona vacnntia, and therefore vested in the king, as well to presene
the peace of the public, as in trust to employ them for the safety and ornament
of the common wealth.
There is also a kind of prerogative copyr1'.ght subsisting in certain books,
which is held to be vested in the crown upon different reasons. Thus, 1. rrhe
king, SB the execufrve magistrate, has the right of promulgating to the people
all acts of state and government. This gives him the exclusive privilege of
printing, at his own press, or that of his grantees, all acts of parliament proclamations and orders of council. 2. As supreme head of the church, he hath
a right to the publication of all liturgies and books of divine service. 3. He is
also said to have a right by purchase to the copies of such law-books, grammars,
and other compositions, as were compiled or translated at the expense of the
crown. And upon these two last principles, combined, the exclusive right of
printing the translation of the Bible is founded. (2)
'fhere still remains another species of prerogative property, founded upon a
very different principle from any that haYe been mentioned before; the property of such animals .ferre nalurm, as are known by the denomination of game,
with the right of pursuing, taking, and destroying them: which is vested in the
king alone, and from him derived to such of his subjects as haYe received the
grants of a chase, a park, a free warren, or free fishery. rrhis may lead us into
an inquiry concerning the original of these franchises, or royalties, on which
we touched a little in a former chapter: (/)the *right itself being an [ • 411 ]
incorporeal her~ditament, though the frmts and profits of it are of a
personal nature.
In the first place, then, we have already shown, and indeed it cannot be denied,
that by the law of nature e\·ery man, from the prince to the peasnnt, has an
equal right of pursuing, and taking to his own use, all such creatures as are
ferm nafurOJ, and therefore the property of nobody, but liu.ble to be l!eized by
the first occupant. And so it was held by the imperial law, e,·en so late as Justinian's time : " Ferm igiturbestire, et volucres, et ornnia animalia qum rnm·i,

beneficial interest in that one can be taken. 1 "Wightw. 50 ; Chitty Prerog. Cr. 287.]

(2) [However, it seems to be agreed now that both the Bible and statutes may be printed by

(o) Cro. Ell:i:. 263. Plowd. 323. Finch, Law, 178. 10 Mod. W.

(di Co. Litt. SO.

(/) Pages 38, 39.

others than those deriving the right from the grant of the crown, provided such edition com-

prises bona fide notes; but with this exception the sole right to print these works is now vested

ui the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and the patentees of the crown. Baskett v.

Cambridge University, 2 Burr. 661.]

."-
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(1) [U a joint tenant in any chattel interest commits suicide, the right to the whole chn.ttel
becomes vested in the king. Plowd 26:.!, Eng. ed. But in farnr of commercial interest.'!, it
bas been holden, that on an extent, or extent in aid, against one of ~everal parties, only the
beneficial interest in that one can he taken. 1 Wightw. 50; Chitty Prerog. Cr. 287.]
(2) (However, it seems to be agreed now that both the Bible and statutes may be J!rinted by
othel'B than those deriving the right from the grant of the crown, pl'O\"ided such edition comprises bona fide notes; but with this exccpti<>n the sole right to print these works i.ti now vei:1t(ld
m the Universities of Oxford o.nd Cambridge, and the patentees of the crown. Bwikett 11.
Cambridge University, 2 Burr. 661.]
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coslo, et terra nascuntur, simul atque db aliquo capta fuerint, jure gentium statim

illius esse incipiunt. Quod enim nullius eat, id naturali ratione occupanti con-

ceditur." (g) But it follows from the very end and constitution of society, that

this natural right as well as many others belonging to a man as an individual,

may be restrained by positive laws enacted for reasons of state, or for the sup-

posed benefit of the community. This restriction may be either with respect to

the place in which this right may or may not be exercised; with respect to the

animals that arc the subject to this right; or with respect to the persons

allowed or forbidden to exercise it. And, in consequence of this authority, we

find that the municipal laws of many nations have exerted such power of re-

straint; have in general forbidden the entering on another man's grounds, for

any cause, without the owner's leave; have extended their protection to such

particular animals as are usually the objects of pursuit; and have invested the

prerogative of hunting and taking such animals in the sovereign of the state

only, and such as he shall authorize, (h) Many reasons have concurred for mak-

ing these constitutions: as, 1. For the encouragement of agriculture and

improvement of lands, by giving every man an exclusive dominion over his own

soil. 2. For preservation of the several species of these animals, which would

soon be extirpated by general liberty. 3. For prevention of idleness and dissi-

r * j i o i pation in husbandman, artificers, and *others of lower rank; which

"- J would be the unavoidable consequence of universal license. 4. For pre-

vention of popular insurrections and resistance to the government, by disarming
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the bulk of the people; (i) which last, is a reason oftener meant than avowed by

the makers of forest or game laws. (3) Nor, certainly, in these prohibitions is

there any natural injustice, as some have weakly enough supposed; since, as

Puffendorff observes, the law does not hereby take from any man his present

property, or what was already his own, but barely abridges him of one means of

acquiring a future property, that of occupancy ; which indeed the law of nature

would allow him, but of which the laws of society have in most instances very

justly and reasonably deprived him.

Yet, however defensible these provisions in general may be, on the footing of

reason, or justice, or civil policy, we must, notwithstanding, acknowledge that,

in their present shape, they owe their immediate original to slavery. It is not

till after the irruption of the northern nations into the Roman empire, that we

read of any other prohibitions, than that natural one of not sporting on any

private grounds without the owner's leave; and another of a more spiritual

nature, which was rather a rule of ecclesiastical discipline, than a branch of

municipal law. The Roman or civil law, though it knew no restriction as to

persons or animals, so far regarded the article of place, that it allowed no man

to hunt or sport upon another's ground, but by consent of the owner of the soil.

" Qui alienum fundum ingreditur venandi aut aucupandi gratia, potest a

domino prohiberi ne inyrediatur." (k) For if there can by the law of nature,

be any inchoate imperfect property supposed in wild animals before they are

taken, it seems most reasonable to fix it in him upon whose lands they are found.

And as to the other restriction, which relates to persons and not to place, the

pontifical or canon law (1) interdicts, "venationes, et sylvaticas vagaliones cum

canibus et accipitribus," to all clergymen without distinction; grounded on

f *4131 *a 8avin£ °f ^k Jerome5 (m) that it is never recorded that these diver-

I- J sions were used by the saints, or primitive fathers. And the canons of

our Saxon church, published in the reign of King Edgar, (n) concur in the

(g) Init. 9, 1, J12. (\) Puff. L. N. I. -t. c. B,} 5. (i) Warbnrton's Alliance, 324. (k) iMt. 2,1, ^ 18.

(1) Decretal. 1. 5, tU. W, c. 2. (m) Decrel. part 1, dint. 34, i 1. (n) Cap. 64.

(3) [I am inclined to think that this reason did not operate upon the minds of those who

ftnmed the game laws of this country; for in several ancient statutes the avowed object is to
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cmlo, et terra n~cuntur, sinml atque ab aliquo capta .fuerint, .fure gentitmi· statim
illitls esse incipiunt. Quod em'.m nulli-us est, id naturali ratione occupanti conceditur." (g) But it follows from the very end and constitution of society, that
this natural right as well as many others belonging to a man as an individual,
may be restrained by posith-e laws enacted for reasons of st.at~, or for the supposed benefit of the community. This restriction may be either with respect to
the place in which this right may or may not be exercised; with respect to the
animals that o.rc the subject to this right ; or with respect to the person11
allowed or forbidden to exercise it. And, in consequence of this authority, we
find that the municipal laws of many nations have exerted such power of restraint; have in general forbidden the entering on another man's grounds, for
any cause, without the owner's leM·e; have extended their protection to such
particular animals as are usually the objects of pursuit; and have imested the
prerogative of hunting and taking such animals in the sovereign of the state
only, and such as he shall authorize. (h) Many reasons have concurred for making these constitutions: as, 1. For the encouragement of agriculture and
imf.rovement of lands, by giving every man an exclusive dominion over his own
soi. 2. For preservation of the several species of these animals, which would
soon be extirpated by general liberty. 3. For pre\-ention of idleness and dissi[ • 412 ] pation in husbandman, artifi<X'rs, and *others of lower rank; which
would be the unavoidable consequence ofuniversal license. 4. For prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to the government, by disarming
the bulk of the people; (i) which last, is a reason oftener meant than avowed h.Y
the ma.kers of forest or game laws. (3) Nor, certainly, in these prohibitions is
there any natural injustice, as some have weakly enough supposed; since, aa
Puffendorff observes, the law does not hereby take from any man his present
property, or what was already his own, but barely a.bridges him of one means of
acquiring a future property, that of occupancy; which indeed the law of nature
would allow him, but of which the laws of society have in most instances ..-ery
justly and reasonably deprived him.
Yet, however defensible these provisions in general may be, on the footing of
reason, or justice, or civil policy, we must, notwithstanding, acknowledge that,
in their present shape, they owe their immediate original to sla,·ery. It is not
till after the irruption of the northern nations into the Roman empire, that we
read of any other prohibitions, than that natural one of not sporting on any
private grounds without the owner's leave; and another of a more spiritual
nature, which was rather a rule of ecclesiastical discipline, than a branch of
municipal law. The Roman or civil law, though it knew no restriction as to
persons or animals, so far regarded the article of place, that it allowed no man
to hunt or sport upon another's ground, but by consent of the owner of the soil.
" Qui alienum [undum ingredif?tr venandi aut aucupandi gratia, potest a
domino 11rolliberi ne ingrediatur." (k) For if there can by the law of nature,
be any mchoe.te imperfect property supposed in wild animals before they are
taken, it seems most reasonable to fix it in him upon whose lands they are found.
And as to the other restriction, which relates to persons and not to place. the
pontifical or canon law (l) interdicts, "venatione3, et sylvaticas vagationes cum
canibus et accipifribus," to all clergymen without distinction; grounded on
[ • 413 ] •a saymg of St. Jerome, (m) that it is never recorded that these divel'sions were used by the samts, or primitive fathers. And the canons of
our Saxon church, published in the reign of King Edgar, (n) concur in the

encourage the use of the longbow, the most effective armour then in use; and even since the

modem practice of killing game with a gun has prevailed, every one is at liberty to keep or
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carry a gun, if he does not use it for the destruction of game. CHRISTIAN.]
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(3) [I n.m inclined to think that tbiil reason did not operate upon the minds of those who
f'mmed the game laws of this country; for in several ancient Btututes the avowed object is to
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same prohibition : though our secular laws, at least after the conquest did, even

in the times of popery, dispense with this canonical impediment ; and spiritual

persons were allowed by the common law to hunt for their recreation, in order

to render them litter for the performance of their duty : as a confirmation whereof

we may observe, that it is to this day a branch of the king's prerogative, at

the death of every bishop, to have his kennel of hounds, or a composition in

lieu thereof, (o)

But, with regard to the rise and original of our present civil prohibitions, it

will be found that all forest and game laws were introduced into Europe at the

same time, and by the same policy, as gave birth to the feudal system ; when

those swarms of barbarians issued from their northern hive, and laid the founda-

tion of most of the present kingdoms of Europe on the ruins of the western

empire. For when a conquering general came to settle the economy of a

yanquished country, and to part it out among his soldiers or feudatories, who

were to render him military service for such donations ; it behooved him, in

order to secure his new acquisitions, to keep the rustici, or natives of the

country, and all who were not his military tenants, in as low a condition as pos-

sible, and especially to prohibit them the use of arms. Nothing could do this

more effectually than a prohibition of hunting and sporting, and therefore it

was the policy of the conqueror to reserve this right to himself, and such

on whom he should bestow it : which were only his capital feudatories or

greater barons. And accordingly we find, in the feudal constitutions, ( p) one
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aud the same law prohibiting the rustici in general from carrying arms, and

also proscribing the use of nets, snares or other engines for destroying the

game.

conquering

and slaughter, bore some resemblance to war. Vita minis (says Caesar, speaking

of the ancient Germans) in venationibus atque instudiis reimilitaris consistit. (r)

And Tacitus in like manner observes, that quoties bella non ineunt, multum ven-

atilus plus per otium transigunt. ($) And indeed, like some of their modern

successors, they had no other amusement to entertain their vacant hours ; despis-

ing all arts as effeminate, and having no other learning, than was couched in

such rude ditties as were sung at the solemn carousals which succeeded these

ancient huntings. And it is remarkable that, in those nations where the feudal

policy remains the most uncorrupted, the forest or game laws continue in their

highest rigour. In Prance all game is properly the king's ; (4) and in some parts

of Germany it is death for a peasant to be found hunting in the woods of the

nobility, (t)

With us in England, also, hunting has ever been esteemed a most princely

diversion and exercise. The whole island was replenished with all sorts of game

in the time of the Britons ; who lived in a wild and pastoral manner, without

enclosing or improving their grounds, and derived much of their subsistence

from the chase, which they all enjoyed in common. But when husbandry took

place under the Saxon government, and lands began to be cultivated, improved,

and enclosed, the beasts naturally fled into the woody and desert tracts ; which

were called the forests, and, having never been disposed of in the first distribu-

tion of lands, were therefore held to belong to the crown. These were filled

with great plenty of game, which our royal sportsmen reserved for their own

diversion, on pain of a pecuniary *forfeiture for such as interfered with r +A-IK -i

their sovereign. But every freeholder had the full liberty of sporting ' ' '

(o) 4 Inst. 309. ( p\ Feud. I. 2, tit. 27, J 8.

( >/ 1 In the laws o( Jemthiz Khun , founder of tho Mogul and Tartarian empire, published A. D. 1203. there

Is one which prohibits the killing of all ff.tmi? from March to October ; that the court of soldiery might fiud

plenty enough in the winter, during their recess from war. (Mod. Univ. Hist. ir,4tS8.)

(r) 'De Bell. Gall. 1. 15. o. 80. («) C. IS.

I*) Matthens </»• Crtmin. c. 3, tit. 1. Carpzov. PracUc Saxonio. p. 2, e. St.

(4) [One of the first consequences of the French revolution was the repeal of the ancient game

laws, which took place in 1789. Since which their system of jurisprudence with respect to game,

same prohibition: thoug-h our secular laws, at least after the conquest did, even
in the times of popery, a.ispense with this canonica.1 impediment; and spiritual
persons were allowed by the common law to hunt for their recreation, in order
to render them fitter for the performance of their duty: as a confirmation whereof'
we may observe, that it is to this day a branch of the king's prerogative, at
the death of every bishop, to have his kennel of hounds, or a composition in
lieu thereof. (o)
But, with regard to the rise and original of our present civil prohibitions, it
will be found that all forest and game laws were introduced into Europe at the
same time, and by the same policy, as gave birth to the feudal system; when
those swarms of barbarians issued from their northern hive, and laid the foundation of most of the present kingdoms of Europe on the ruins of the western
empire. For when a conquerin8 general came to settle the economy of a
vanquished country, and to part it out among his soldiers or fendatories, who
were to render him military service for such donations ; it behooved him, in
order to secure his new acquisitions, to keep the rustici, or natives of the
country, and all who were not his military tenants, in as low a condition as possible, and especially to prohibit them the use of arms. Nothing could do this
more effectm\lly than a prohibition of hunting and sporting, and therefore it
was the policy of the conqueror to reserve this right to himself, and such
on whom he should bestow it: which were only his capital feudatories or
greater barons. And accordingly we find, in the feudal constitutions, ( p) one
aud the same law prohibiting the rustici in general from carrying arms, and
also proscribing the use of nets, snares or other engines for destroying the
game. •'rhis exclusive privilege well suited the martial genius of the [ • 414 ]
conquering troops who delighted in a sport, (q) which~ in its pursuit
and slaughter, bore some resemblance to war. Vita omnis (says Cresar, speaking
of the a.ncien t Germans) in venationihus atque instudit's reimilitaris co Mist it. (r)
And Tacitus in like manner observes, that q1wtiP-S bella rnm ineunt, rnulturn 't:BJiaUlms plus per otium transigunt. (s) And indeed, like some of their modern
successors, they had no other amusement to entertain their vacant hours; despising all arts as effeminate, and having no other learning, than was couched in
snch rude ditties as were sung at the solemn carousals which succeeded theso
ancient huntings. And it is remarkable that, in those nations where the feudal
policy remains the most uncorrupted, the forest or game laws continue in their
highest rigour. In France all game is properly the kmg's; ( 4) and in some parts
of Germany it is death for a peasant to be found hunting in the woods of' tho
nobility. (t)
With us in England, also, hunting has ever been esteemed a most princely
diversion aud exercise. 'rhe whole island was replenished with all sorts of &'a.me
in the time of the Britons; who lived in a wild and pastoral manner, without
enclosing or improving their grounds, and derived much of their subsistence
from the chase, which they all enjoyed in common. But when hm~bandry took
place under the Saxon government, and lands began to be cultivated, improved,
and enclosed, the bea.dts naturally fled into the woody and desert tracts; which
were called the forests, and, having never been disposed of in the first distribution of lands, were therefore held to belong to the crown. These were filled
with g-reat plenty of game, which our royal sportsmen reserYed for their own
diversion, on pain of a pecuniary *forfeiture for such as interfered with •415]
their sovereign. But eyery freeholder had the full liberty of sporting
(ol 4 Inst 309.
(pl Feud. l. 9, tu. !7, J II.

r

(qi In the la\n of Jenithlz Khlln, romuter of the Mogul and T!lrtarlan empire. pnbllahed A. D. 1200. there

ta one which prohlbllll Lhf' klllin!I" oroll lfl\IDO t'rom March to October; that the court of soldiery might llud
plcnL\" ennngh In the winter, during their recess rrom war. (Mod. Univ. Hist. Iv, 468.)
(r) TH Rell. Gnll. t. tl. ll. :IO.
(I) C. 111.
1tl M&&thens d~ Crimin. c. 3,

eu. l.

Carpzov. Pracik Sazonlo. p. ll,

ll.

84.

has been very much altered. See Code Penal, 28, 1-. J

60o

( 4) (One of the first consequences of the French revolution was the repeal of the ancient game
law11, which took plooe in 1789. Since which their system of jurisprudence with respect to game,
has ueen very much altered. See Cude Penal,~. 4:4.]
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upon his own territories, provided he abstained from the king's forests: as is

fully expressed in the laws of Canute, (w), and of Edward the Confessor: (v)

" Sit quilibet homo dignus venations sua, in sylva, et in agris, sibi proprii», et

in dominio suo: et abstinent omnis homo a venariis regiis, ubicunque pacem eis

habere voluerit:" which indeed was the ancient law of the Scandinavian con-

tinent, from whence Canute probably derived it " Cuique enim in propriofundo

quamlibet feram quoquo modo venari permissum." (w)

However, upon the Norman conquest, a new doctrine took place; and the

right of pursuing and taking all beasts of chase or venary, aud such other

animals as were accounted game, was then held to belong to the king, or to such

only as were authorized under him. And this, as well upon the priciples of

the feudal law, that the king is the ultimate proprietor of all the lands in the

kingdom, they being all held to him as the chief lord, or lord paramount of the

fee; and that therefore he has the right of the universal soil, to enter thereon,

and to chase and take such creatures at his pleasure: as also upon another

maxim of the common law, which we have frequently cited and illustrated,

that these animals are bona vacantia, and having no other owner, belong to the

king by his prerogative. As therefore the former reason was held to vest in the

king a right to pursue and take them anywhere; the latter was supposed to

give the king, and such as he should authorize, a sole and exclusive right

This right, thus newly vested in the crown, was exerted with the utmost

rigour, at and after the time of the Norman establishment: not only in the
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ancient forests, but in the new ones which the conqueror made, by laying to-

F *4161 Se^er vas*; *tracts of country depopulated for that purpose, and reserved

•• J solely for the king's royal diversion; in which were exercised the most

horrid tyrannies and oppressions, under colour of forest law, for the sake of

preserving the beasts of chase: to kill any of which, within the limits of the

forest, was as penal as the death of a man. And in pursuance of the same

principle, King Jokn laid a total interdict upon the winged as well as the four-

footed creation: "capturam avium per totam Angliam interdixit." (x) The

cruel and insupportable hardships whicli those forest laws created to the subject,

occasioned our ancestors to be as zealous for their reformation, as for the relaxa-

tion of the feudal rigours, and the other exactions introduced by the Norman

family, and accordingly we find the immunities of carta deforesta as warmly

contended for, and extorted from the kinj* with as much difficulty, as those of

magna carta itself. By this charter, confirmed in parliament (y) many forests

were disafforested, or stripped of their oppressive privileges, and regulations

were made in the regimen of such as remained; particularly (2) killing the

king's deer was made no longer a capital offense, but only punished by a fine,

imprisonment, or abjuration of the realm. And by a variety of subsequent

statutes, together with the long acquiescence of the crown without exerting

the forest laws, this prerogative is now become no longer a grievance to the

subject

But, as the king reserved to himself the forests for his own exclusive diver-

sion, so he granted out from time to time other tracts of land to his subjects,

under the names of chases or parks, (a) or gave them license to make such in

their own grounds; which indeed are smaller forests, in the hands of a subject,

but not governed by the forest laws: and by the common law no person is at

liberty to take or kill any beasts of chase, but such as hath an ancient chase or

park; unless they be also beasts of prey-

F *4171 *^? to a^ mfe".or species or game, called beasts and fowls of warren,

I 417 J ^ne jj^j-ty of taking or killing them is another franchise of royalty,

derived likewise from the crown, and called free warren ; a word which sigjii-

fies preservation or custody: as the exclusive liberty of taking and killing fish in a

public stream or river is called a. free-fishery: of which, however, no new franchise

can at present be granted, by the express provision of magna carta, c. 16. (6)

I'M) C. 77. (v) C. 3K. fvj Stlcrnhook dejure Suton. t, 8, c. 8. (x) M. l':irK 303.

(y) B Hen. III. (zj Cap. 10. (a,) Sec page 3H. (bj MIrr. o. S, f a. See page «.
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upon his own t.erritories, provided he abstained from the king's forests: as is
fully expressed in the laws of Canute, (u), and of Edward the Confessor: (v)
" Sit quilibet lwrno dign1ts venationB sua, in s-ylva, et in agris, sibi propriis, et
in dominw suo: et abstineat omnis homo a venariis regiit1, ttbicunque pacem ei8
kabere voluerit :" which indeed was the ancient law of the Scandinavian continent, from whence Canute probably derived it. "Ouique enim in pr<rpriofundo
quam.libet feram quoquo modo venm·i permissum." (w)
However, upon the Norman conquest, a new doctrine took place ; and the
right of pursuing and taking all beasts of chase or venary, and such other
animals as were accounted game, was then held to belong to tlie king, or to such
only 1\8 were authorized under him. And this, as well upon the priciples of
the feudal law, that the king is the ultimate proprietor of all the lands in the
kingdom, they being all held to him as the chief lord, or lord para.mount of the
fee; and that therefore he hu.s the right of the universal soil, to enter thereon,
and to chase and take such creatures at his pleasure: as also upon another
maxim of the common law, which we have frequently cited and illustrated,
that these animals are bona vacantia, and having no other owner, belong to the
king by his prerogative. As therefore the former rea8on was held to vest in the
king a right to pursue and take them anywhere; the latter was supposed to
give the king, o.nd such as he should authorize, a sole and exclusive right.
This right, thus newly vested in the crown, was exerted with the utmost
rigour, at and after the time of the Norman establishment: not only in the
ancient forests, but in the new ones which the conqueror made, by laying to[ • 416 ] gethcr vast •tracts of country depopulated for that purpose, and reserved
solely for the king's royal diversion; in which were exercised the most
horrid tyrannies and oppresaions, under colour of forest law, for the sake of
preserving the beasts of chase: to kill any of which, within the limits of the
forest, was as penal as the death of a man. And in pursuance of the same
principle, King Jolin laid a total interdict upon the wi-nged as well as the fourfooted creation: "capt1'ram avium per totam Angliam interdixit." (x) · The
cruel and insupportable hardships which those forest laws created to the subject,
occasioned our ancestors to be as zealous for their reformation, as for the relaxation of the feudal rigours, and the other exactions introduced by the Norman
family, and accordingly we find the immunities of carta de.foresta as warmly
contended for, and extorted from the kin~ with as much difficulty, o.s those of
magna carta itself. By this charter, confirmed in parliament (y) many forests
were disafforested, or stripped of their oppressive privileges, and regulations
were made in the regimen of such as remained; particul:i.rly (z) killing the
king's deer wns made no longer & capital offense, but only punished by a fine,
imprisonment, or abjuration of the 1-ealm. And by a >ariety of subsequent
statutes, together with the long acquiescence of the crown without exerting
the forest laws, this prerogative is now become no longer a grievance to the
subject.
But, as the king reserved to himself the forests for his own exclusive diversion, so he granted out from time to time other tracts of land to his subjects,
under the names of chases or parks, (a) or gave them license to make such in
their own grounds; which indeed are smaller forests, in the hands of a subject.,
but not governed by the forest laws: and by the common law no person is at
liberty to take or kill any beasts of chase, but such as hath an ancient chase or
park ; unless they be also beasts of prey.
•As to all inferior species of game, called beasts and fowls of warren,
[ • 417 ]
the liberty of taking or killing them is another franchise of royaltv,
derived likewise from the crown, and called free warren; a word which signifies preservation or custody: as the exclusive liberty of taking and killing fish in a.
public stream or ri,·er is called a free:ft..~hery: of which, however, no new franchise
can at present be granted, by the express provision of magna carta, c. 16. (b)

c. 77.

(H)
(I/) 11

Hen. III.

(") C. 86.
(~)

(Tl1)

Cap. 10.

8Uel1lhook !Uju~ s -. I. t, c. 8.
(:z:) M. Paris, 303.
(a) Sec pii.ge 311.
(b) Allrr. c. Ii, I i. 8oo page to.
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The principal intention of granting to any one these franchises or liberties

was in order to protect the game by giving the grantee a sole and exclusive

power of killing it himself, provided he prevented other persons. And no man,

but he who has a chase or free warren, by grant from the crown, or prescription,

which supposes one, can justify hunting or sporting upon another man's soil;

nor indeed, in thorough strictness of common law, either hunting or sporting

at all.

However novel this doctrine may seem to such as call themselves qualified

sportsmen, it is a regular consequence from what has been before delivered;

that the sole right of taking and destroying game belongs exclusively to the

king. This appears, as well from the historical deduction here made, as because

he may grant to his subjects an exclusive right of taking them; which he could

not do, unless such a right was first inherent in himself. And hence it will fol-

low, that no person whatever, but he who has such derivative right from the

crown is by common law entitled to take or kill any beasts of chase, or other

game whatsoever. It is true that, by the acquiescence of the crown, the frequent

grants of free warren in ancient times, and the introduction of new penalties of

late by certain statutes for preserving the game, this exclusive prerogative of

the king is little known or considered; every man that is exempted from these

modern penalties, looking upon himself as at liberty to do what he pleases with

the game; whereas the contrary is strictly true, that no man, however well

qualified he *may vulgarly be esteemed, has a right to encroach on the r *^i g -i
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royal prerogative by the killing of game, unless he can show a particular >• ••

grant of free warren; or a prescription, which presumes a grant; or some

authority under an act of parliament. As for the latter, I recollect but two

instances wherein an express permission to kill game was ever given by statute;

the one by 1 Jac. I, cap. 27, altered by 7 Jac. I, cap 11, and virtually repealed

by 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 25, which gave authority, so long as they remained in force,

to the owners of free warren, to lords of manors, and to all freeholders having 40Z.

per annum in lands of inheritance, or 801. for life or lives, or 400?. personal estate

(and their servants), to take partridges and pheasants upon their own, or their

master's free warren, inheritance, or freehold; the other by 5 Ann. c. 14, which

empowers lords and ladies of manors to appoint game-keepers to kill g^vme for

the use of such lord or lady; which, with some alteration, still subsists, and

plainly supposes such power not to have been in them before. The truth of the

matter is, that these game laws (of which we shall have occasion to speak again

in the fourth book of these Commentaries) do indeed qualify nobody, except in

the instance of a game-keeper, to kill game; but only, to save the trouble and

formal process of an action by the person injured, who perhaps, too, might remit

the offence, these statutes inflict additional penalties, to be recovered either in A

regular or a summary wav, by any of the king's subjects, from certain persons

of inferior rank who may 1>e found offending in this particular. But it does not

follow that persons excused from these additional penalties, are therefore autho-

rized to kill game. The circumstance of having 1001. per annum, and the rest,

are not properly qualifications, but exemptions. And these persons, so exempt-

ed from the penalties of the game statutes, are not only liable to actions of tres-

pass by the owners of the land; but also, if they kill game within the limits of

any royal franchise, they are liable to the actions of such who may have the right

of chase or free warren therein. (5)

(5) [The game laws were revised in 1831, by statute 1 and 2 William IV, o. 32, which allowed

any person who purchased a certificate or licence to kill game upon his own land, or on the land

of any other person with his permission—thus doing away with the qualification of birth or estate.

Persons sporting without license are stall liable UP a penalty, except that by statute 11 and 12

The principal intention of granting to any one these franchises or liberties
was in order to protect the game by giving the grantee a sole and exclusive
power of killing it himself, provided he prevented other persons. And no man,
but he who has e. chase or free warren, by grant from the crown, or prescription,
which suprses one, can justify hunting or sporting upon another man's soil;
nor indee in thorough strictness of common law, either hunting or sporting
at all.
However novel this doctrine may seem to such as call themselves qualified
sportsmen, it is a regular consequence from what has been before delivered;
that the sole right of taking and destroying game belongs exclusively to the
king. This appears, as well from the historical deduction here made, as because
he may grant to his subjects an exclusive right of taking them; which he could
not do, unless such a right was first inherent in himself. And hence it will follow, that no person whate,·er, but he who has such derivative right from the
crown is by common law entitled to take or kill any beasts of chase, or other
game whatsoever. It is true that, by the acquiescence of the crown, the fre9uent
grants of free warren in ancient times, and the introduction of new penalties of
late by certain statutes for preserving the game, this exclusive prerogative of
the king is little known or considered; every man that is exempted from these
modern penalties, looking upon himself as at liberty to do what he pleases with
the ~me; whereas the contrary is strictly true, that no man, however well
qualified he •may vulgarlv be esteemed, has a right to encroach on the [ • 418 ]
royaf prerogative by the kllling of game, unless he can show a particular
grant of free warren; or a prescription, which presumes a grant; or some
authority under an act of parliament. As for the latter, I recollect but two
instances wherein an express permission to kill game was ever given by statute;
the one by 1 Jae. I, cap. 27, altered by 7 Jae. I, cap 11, and virtually repealed
by 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 25, which gave authority, so long as they remained in force,
to the owners of free warren, to lords of manors, and to all freeholders having 40l.
pe1· annum in lands of inheritance, or 80l. for life or lives, or 4001. personal estate
(and their servants), to take partridges and pheasants upon their own, or their
master's free warren, inheritance, or freehold; the other by 5 Ann. c. 14, which
empowers lords and ladies of manors to appoint game-keepers to kill game for
the use of such lord or lady; which, with some alteration, still subsists, and
plainly supposes such power not to have been in them before. The truth of the
matter is, that these game laws (of which we shall have occasion to speak again
in the fourth book of these Commentaries) do indeed q·ualify nobody, except in
the instance of a game-keeper, to kill game; but only, to save the trouble and
formal process of an action by the person injured, who perhaps, too, mi~ht remit
the offence, these statutes inflict additional penalties, to be recovered either in a.
regular or & summary wa.v, by any of the king's subjects, from certain persons
of inferior rank who may be found offending: in this particular. But it does not
follow that persons excused from these additional penu.lties, a.re therefore autlwrized to kill game. 'fhe circumstance of having 1001. per annum, and the rest,
are not properly qualifications, but exemptions. And these persons, so exempted from the penalties of the game statutes, are not only liable to actions of trespass by the owners of the land ; but also, if they kill game within the limits of
any royal franchise, they are !iable to the actions of such who may have the right
of chaBe or free warren the rem. (5)

Vic. c. 29, and c. 30, the owner or occupier of enclosed grounds, having a right to kill game

thereon, may kill hares, either in person or by any one authorized by him in writing, without tak-

ing out a game certificate. The law is very severe against persons not authorized, who take and

destroy game by night, or are found in possession of any which appears to have been recently

killed. A license is also required to entitle one to sell game.]

607

(5) [The game la.ws were re\'ised in 1831, by statute 1 and 2 William IV, o. 32, which allowed
any person who puroba.'lfl<l a certificate or licenl!O to kill game upon hi11 own land, or on the land
of any other peNon with hfa pcnnii>sion-thus doing a.way with tlie qualification of birth or estate.
P eMmil 1.1porting without license are still liable to a penalty, except thllt by 11tatute 11 an<l 12
Vic. (.'.. 29. and c. 30, the owner or occupier of enclosed grounds, having a ri~ht to kill game
thereon, may kill hare11, either in pel'tlOll or by any one authorized by him iu writing, without taking out a game certificate. The law is very se\·ere against peT110ns not autboriasd, who take and
de!!troy game by night, or are found in .Pos..;ession of any which appears to ho.ve boon recently
killed. .A. licellilO is ah10 required to entitle one to sell game.]
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-i *TJpon the whole it appears, that the king, by his prerogative, and

-I such persons as have, under his authority, the royal franchises of chase,

park, free warren, or free fishery, are the only persons who may acquire any

Sroperty, however fugitive and transitory, in these animals ferae natures, while

ving; which is said to be vested in them, as was observed in a former chapter,

propter privilegium. (6) And it must also be remembered, that such persons as

may thus lawfully hunt, fish, or fowl, ratione privilegii, have, (as has been said)

only a qualified property in these animals; it not being absolute or permanent,

but lasting only so long as the creatures remain within the limits of such

respective francnise or liberty, and ceasing the instant they voluntarily pass out

of it. It is held, indeed, that if a man starts any game within his own grounds,

and follows it into another's and kills it there, the property remains in him-

self, (c) And this is grounded on reason and natural justice: (d) for the pro-

perty consists in the possession; which possession commences by the finding it

in his own liberty, and is continued by the immediate pursuit. And so if a

stranger starts game in one man's chase or free warren, and hunts it into another

liberty, the property continues in the owner of the chase or warren ; this prop-

erty arising from privilege, (e) and not being changed by the act of a mere stran-

ger. Or if a man starts game on another's private grounds and kills it there,

the property belongs to him in whose ground it was killed, because it was also

started there',(/) the property arising ratione soli. Whereas, if, after being

started there, it is killed in the grounds of a third person, the property belongs
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not to the owner of the first ground, because the property is local; nor yet to

the owner of the second, because it was not started in his soil; but it vests in

the person who started and killed it, (g) though guilty of a trespass against

both the owners. (7)

F *420 1 *^' Procee<l now t° a third method, whereby a title to goods and

' J -• chattels may be acquired and lost, viz.: ^forfeiture; as a punishment

for some crime or misdemeanor in the party forfeiting, and as a compensation

for the offence and injury committed against him to whom they are forfeited.

Of forfeitures, considered as the means whereby real property might be lost aud

acquired, we treated in a former chapter, (h) It remains, therefore, in this place

only to mention by what means or for what offences, goods and chattels become

liable to forfeiture.

In the variety of penal laws with which the subject is at present encumbered,

it were a tedious and impracticable task to reckon up the various forfeitures,

inflicted by special statutes, for particular crimes and misdemeanors; some of

which are mala, in se, or offences against the divine law, either natural or

revealed; but by far the greatest part are malaprohibita, or such as derive their

guilt merely from their prohibition by the laws of the land: such as is the for-

teiture of 40s. per month by the statute 5 Eliz. c. 4, for exercising a trade

without having served seven years as an apprentice thereto; and the forfeiture

of 101. by 9 Ann. c. 23, for printing an almanack without a stamp. (8) I shall

(e) 11 Mod. 75. (A) Puff. L. X. 1. 4, c. «. (e) Lord Raym. CT.

(f) Lord Kaym. 251. (g) Farr. 18. Lord Raym. 251. (h) See page 2G7.

In America no similar laws exist. There are laws prohibiting the destruction of game in the

[ • 419 ]

•Upon the whole it appears, that the king, by his prerogative, and
such persons as barn, under his authority, the royal fmnchises of chase,
park, free warren, or free fishery, are the only persons who may acquire any
property, however fugitive and transitory, in these animnls/erm natur<e, while
lhing; which is said to be vested in them, as was observed in a former chapter,
propter privilegiitm. (6) Aud it must also be remembered, that such persons as
may thus lawfully hunt, fish, or fowl, ratione pn'.vilegii, have, (as has been said)
only a qualified property in these animals; it not being absolute or permanent,
but lasting only so long as the creatures remain wit.bin the limits of such
respective franchise or liberty, and ceasing the instant they voluntarily pass ont
of it. It is held, indeed, that if a man starts any game within his own grounds,
and follows it into another's and kills it there, the property remains in himself. (c) And this is grounded on reason and natural justice: ( d) for the property consists in the possession; which possession commences by the finding it
rn his own liberty, and is continued by the immediate pursuit. And so if &
stranger starts game in one man's chase or free warren, and hunts it into another
liberty, the property continues in the owner of the chase or warren; this property arising from privilege, (e) and not being changed by the act of a mei·e stran._
ger. Or if a man starts ~ame on another's prirnte grounds and kills it there,
the property belongs to him in whose ground it was killed, because it was also
started there;(/) the property arising ratione soli. Whereas, if, after being
started there, it is killed in the grounds of a third person, the property belongs
not to the owner of the first ground, because the property is local; nor yet to
the owner of the second, because it was not started in his soil ; but it vests in
the person who started and killed it, (g) though guilty of a trespass against
both the owners. (7)
•111. i proceed now to a third method, whereby a title to goods and
[ • 420 ]
chattels may be acquired and lost, viz.: bv forfeiture; as a punishment
for some crime or misdemeanor in the party forfefting, and as a compensation
for the offence and injury committed against him to whom they are forfeited.
Of forfeitures, considered as the means whereby real property might be lost and
acquired, we treated in a former chapter. (Ii) It remains, therefore, in this place
only to mention by what means or for what offences, goods and chattels become
liable to forfeiture.
In the variety of penal laws with which the subject is at present encumbered,
it were a tedious and impracticable task to reckon up the various forfeitures,
inflicted by special statutes, for particular crimes and misdeme.anors; some of
which are mala in se, or offences against the divine law, either natural or
revealed; but by far the greatest part are mala proldbita, or such as derirn their
~uilt merely from their prohibition by the laws of the land: such as is the forfeiture of 40s. per month by the statute 5 Eliz. c. 4, for exercising a trade
without having served se\·en years as an apprentice thereto; and the forfeiture
of lOl. by 9 Ann. o. 23, for printing an almanack without a stamp. (8) I shall

breeding season, or iu seasons when it is unfit for market, but it is no part of their purpose to en-

force discrimination against any class of persons, or to preserve game for any other purpose than

(c) 11 Mod. iii.
( f) Lord Kaym. 2111.

(d) Pulr. L. N. l. 4, o. 6.
(fl)

(e)

Farr. 18. Lord Raym. 251.

Lord Raym. 2.R
fAJ ~page 267.

the general benefit.

(6) Mr. Christian controverts this doctrine—and Mr. Justice Coleridge thinks successfully—in

a learned and somewhat lengthy note, but the importance of the subject does not appear suffi-

cient to warrant its republieation. Mr. Hovenden thinks the statute 1 and 2 Win. IV, c. ifi, in

doing away with the qualification previously required, has recognized the correctness of Mr.

Christian's position.

(7) [Thetie distinctions never could have existed, if the doctrine had been true that all the

game was the property of the king: for in that case the maxim, in aquali jurepotior eat coNdi-

tio posaidentis,

va» the property of the king : fo

Mentis, must have prevailed.J

(8) These forfeitures' are now abolished.
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Jn America no similar lawR exist. There are laws prohibiting the de11truction or game in the
breeding Rtlll!lon, or in season11 when it itc unfit for market, but it is no part of thoir purpose to enforce dii..crimino.tiou ugain11t any cla&s of pcrsous, or to preserve go.me for auy other purpose than
the general benefit.
(6) Mr. Christian controverts this doctrine-and Mr. Justice Coleridge thinks succCB.<11\tlly-in
a learned and somewhat lengthy note, but the importance of tho subject does not appear sufficient to warrant it.A republication. llr. llovenden thinks the ~tatnte 1 and ~ Wm. l V, c. 32, in
doing away with th" qualification previonsly required, has recogni2ed the ootTOOtness or M.r.
Christie.n's position.
(7) ( The110 distinctlon11 never could have exist(ld, if the doctrine boo boon true that all the
ge.mo was the property of the king : for in that ca.so the maxim, in o:quali ju~e poti0t· ut condttio posaidontis, mu11t have pr1m1ilcd.J
(8) Theile forfeitureti are now abolished.

608

Dig 1ze b

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

.Chap. 28.] TITLE BY CUSTOM. 420

.Chap. 28.]

4~0

. TITLE BY CusToK•

therefore, confine myself to those offences only, by which all the goods and chat-

tels of the offender are forfeited: referring the student for such, where pecu-

niary mulcts of different quantities are inflicted, to their several proper heads,

under which very many of them have been or will be mentioned; or else to the

.collections of Hawkins, and Burn, and other laborious compilers. Indeed, as

most of these forfeitures belong to the crown, they may seem as if they ought

to have been referred to the preceding method of acquiring personal property,

namely, by prerogative. But as, in the instance of partial forfeitures, a moiety

often goes to the.informer, the poor, or sometimes to other persons; and as one

.total forfeiture, namely, that by a bankrupt who is guilty of felony by

"•concealing his effects, accrues entirely to his creditors, I have therefore r , ,^-. •,

made it a distinct head of transferring property. " '

Goods and chattels, then, are totalty forfeited by conviction of high treason or

misprision of treason; (9) of petit treason; (10) of felony in general, and par-

ticularlv of felony de se, and of manslaughter; nay, even by conviction of

excusable homicide ; (i) by outlawry for treason or felony; by conviction of petit

larceny ; (11) by flight, in treason or felony, even though the party be acquitted

of the fact; (12) by standing mute, when arraigned of felony; by drawing a

.weapon on a judge, or striking any one in the presence of the king's courts ; by

prastnunire ; by pretended prophecies, upon a second conviction; by owling ; by

the residing abroad of artificers; (13) and by challenging to fight on account of

money won at gaming. All these offences, as will more fully appear in the
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fourth book of these Commentaries, induce a total forfeiture of goods and chattels.

And this forfeiture commences from the time of conviction, not the time of

committing the fact, as in forfeiture of real property. For chattels are of so

vague and fluctuating a nature, that to affect them by any relation back, would

be attended with more inconvenience than in the case of landed estates: and

part, if not the whole of them, must be expended in maintaining the delinquent,

between the time of committing the fact and his conviction. Yet a fraudulent

conveyance of them, to defeat the interest of the crown, is made void by statute

13 Ehz. c. 5.

CHAPTER XXVIII.
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A FOURTH method of acquiring property in things personal, or chattels, is by

therefore, confine myself to those offences only, by which all the goods and chattels of the offender are forfeited: referring the student for such, where pecuniary mulcts of different quantities are inflicted, to their several proper heads,
under which very many of them have been or will be mentioned; or else to the
collections of Hawkins, an<l Burn, and other laborious compilers. Indeed, as
most of these forfeitures belong to the crown, they may seem as if they ought
to have been referred to the preceding method of ac<1niring personal property,
namely, by prerogative. But as, in the instance of partial forfeitures, a moiety
often goes to the. informer, the poor, or sometimes to other persons ; and as one
.total forfeiture, namely, that by a bankrupt who is guilty of felony by
•concealing his effects, accrues entirely to his creditors, I have therefore [ • 421 ]
made it a distinct head of transferring property.
Goods and chattels, then, are totalty forfeit.eel bv conviction of high treason or
1mi.<;pri.~ion of treason; (9) of petit treason; (10) of felony in general, and particularlv of fewny de se, and of manslaughter; nay, even by comiction of
ucu.~able lt01nicide; (i) by outla·wry for treason or felony; by conviction of petit
larceny; (11) by fiiglit, in treason or felony, even though the party be acquitted
of the fact; (12) by standing mute, when arraigned of felony; by dratving a
:roeapon on a judge, or striking any one in the presence of t!UJ king's courts; by
promiunire; by pretended propltecies, upon a second conviction; by owling; by
the residing abroad of artificers; (13) and by challengfog to fight on account of
money won at gaming. All these offences, as will more fully appear in the
fourth book of these Commentaries, induce a total forfeiture of goods and chattels.
And this forfeiture commences from the time of conviction, not the time of
committing the fact, as in forfeiture of real property. For chattels are of so
vague and fluctuating a nature, that to affect them by any relation back, would
be attended with more inconvenience than in the case of landed estates: and
part, if not the whole of them, must be expended in maintaining the delinquent,
between the time of committing the fact and his conviction. Yet a fraudulent
conveyance of them, to defoat the interest of the crown, is made void by statute
13 Ehz. c. 5. (14)

custom: whereby a right vests in some particular persons, either by the local

usage of some particular place, or by the almost general and universal usage of

(i) Co. T.itl. 391. 3 I nst. 816. SI list. 320.

(9) [This forfeiture extends to all the offenders personal property, including chattels real,

CHAPTER XXVIII.

•whether legal or equitable, in possession or in action. Cro. Jac. 513; 2 B. and Al. 258; 2 C. M.

and K. 416; with the exception of contingent interest*. 1 Keen, 145.
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The goods vest in the crown immediately upon conviction; and, as a felon who is transported

is not restored to his civil right* until he is pardoned, or the term expires, all personal property

accruing to him in the interval is forfeited to the crown. 2 B. and Al. 258; 1 Myl. and K.

752.]

(10) Petit treason is now unknown to the law.

(11) [The distinction between grand and petit larceny is abolished. Statute 7 and 8 Goo. IV

c. 29, 8. 2.

A FOURTH method of acquirin~ property in things personal, or chattels, is by
custom: whereby a right vests m some particular persons, either by the local
usage of some particular place, or by the almost general and universal usage of
Ill Co. J..itt. 391. ! Inst. 316. 3 lnat. m.

(12) [By statute 7 and 8 Geo. IT, c. 28, ». 5, on indictments for felony, the jury is no longer to

be charged to inquire concerning the prisoner's land or goods, or whether he fled for the offence.")

(13) [Owling is no longer an offence: 5 Geo. IV", o. 47. By the 5 Geo. IV, o. 97, all the laws

relating to artificers or colliers going into foreign parts are repealed.]

(14) [A IHIIKI jiilr sale of goods and chattels by the offender, for good consideration, after the

offence and before conviction, is good. 8 Bep. 171. See Skin. 357; 1 Stark. 319; 6 Car. and

P. 145.]
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(9) [This forfeiture extends to all the offenders personal property, including chattel11 real,
whuther legal or equitable, in possession or in action. Cro. Jae. 513; 2 B. and Al. 258; 2 C. M.
and R. 416; with the exception of continitent interests. 1 Keen, 145.
The goods vest in the crown immediat~ly upon conviction ; and, as a felon who i~ tran11ported
fa not restored to his civil rights until he i8 pardoned, or the term expires, all personal pruperty
acrruing to him in the interval is forfeited to the crown. 2 B. and Al. 2513; 1 Myl. and K.
752.]
(10) Petit treason is now unknown to the law.
(11) ['rhe distinction betwoon grand and petit larceny is abolished. Statute 7 and 8 Goo. IV,
c. :.!9, ~. 2.
(l~) [By statute 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, A. 5, on indictments for felony, the jury iR no longer to
Le charged to in9uire concerning the prisoncr'11 land or good11, or whether he flod for the offence. l
( 13) [ Owlin~ 111 no longllr an offt111ce : 5 Geo. IV, c. 47. By the 5 Geo. IV, o. 97, all the laws
relating to artificers or colliers going into foreign parts are repealed.]
( 14) (A. bmia fide l!3le of goods and chattels by the offender, for ~nod <¥lnRideration, after the
offence and before conviction, i::1 good. 8 Rep. 171. See Skin. 357; 1 Stark. 319; 6 Car. and
P. 145.]
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the kingdom. It were endless should I attempt to enumerate all the several

the kin2'dom. It were endless should I attempt to enumerate all the 8"eral
kinds o1 special customs, which may entitle a man to a chattel interest in dift'erent parts of the kingdom ; I shall, therefore, content myself with making some
observations on three sorts of customary intel'etlts, which obtain pretty generally
throughout most parts of the nation, and are therefore of more universal concern ; viz., heriot.", mortuaries, a.nd heir-looms.
1. Herio~ which were slightly touched upon in a former chapter, (a) are
usually divided into two sorts, heriot-sennce, and heriot-cu.dom. The former
are such 88 are due upon a special reservation in a grant or lease of lands, and
therefo1e amount to little more tha.n a mere rent: (b) the latter arise upon no
special reservation whatsoever, but depend merely upon immemorial usage and
custom. (c) Of these, therefore, we are here princripally to speak: amd they are
defined to be a customary tribute of jtOOds and chattels, payable to the lord of
the fee on the decease of the owner of the land.
[ ,.. 423 ]
~he first establishment, if not introduction, of compu1&0ry beriot.s
into England, was by the Danes: and we find in the la.ws of King
Canute (d) the several heregeates or heriots specified which were then exacted by
the king on the death of divers of his subjects, according to their respective
dignities; from the highest earle down to the most inferior th~ or landholder.
These, for the most part, consisted ·in arms, hones, and habiliment~ of Will";
which the word itself, according to Sir Henry Spelman, (t) signifies. These
were delivered up to the sovereign on the death of the vassal, who could no longer
use them, to be put into other hands for the service and defence of the country.
And upon the plan of this Danish establishment did William the Conqueror
fashion his law of relief, 88 was formerly obsen-ed; (/) when he uoortWned the
precise relief to be taken ~f every tenant in chivalry, and, contrary t.o the feudal
custom and tha usage of his own duchy of Normandy, required arms and implements of war to be paid instead of money. (g)
The Danish compulsive heriots being thus transmuted int.o reliefs, underwent
the same several vicissitudes as the feudal tenures, and in socage estates do frequen tly remain to this day in the shape of a double rent payable at the death
of the tenant: the heriots which now continue among us, and preserve that
name, seeming rather t.o be of Saxon parentage, and at first t.o have been merely
discretionary. (h) These are now for the most ~rt confined to copyhold tenures, and are due by custom only, which is the life of all estates by copy; and
perhaps are the only instance where custom has favoured the lord. For this
payment was originally a voluntary donation, or gratuitous legacy of the tenant; perhaps in acknowkdgrnent of his ba,-ing been raised a degree above villeinage, when all his goods and chattels were q nite at the mercy of tbe lord ;
[ • 424 ] and *custom, which has on the one hand confirmed the tenant's interest
in exclusion of the lord's will, has on the other hand established this
discretional piece of gratitude into a ;permanent duty. An heriot may also appe~
tain to free land, that is held bl sernce and suit of court; in which case it is
most commonly a copyhold enfranchised, whereupon th.e heriot is still due by
custom. Bracton (i) speaks of heriots as frequently due on the death of both
species of ten an ts: "est quidem a/.ia prcestatio q-u0 nominatur herriellum; "bi
tenens, liber vel servus, tn morte wa, dominum B'Num, de f[MO te'M"erit, re.spicil
de melwri averio suo, vel dt scC'lendo moliori, secundu-m ditiersam, locorum t:t>nMietudinem." And this he adds, "1nagis jit de gratia qvam de j11re; in which
Fleta (k) and Britton (l) agree: thereby plainly intimating the original of this
custom to have been merely voluntary, asa legacy from the tenant; though now
the immemorial usage has established it as of right in the lord.
This heriot is sometimes the best live beast, or a·verium, which the tenant dies
possessed of (which is particularly denominated the vilfoin's relief in the twentyninth law of King William the Conqueror), sometimes the best immiml\te good~
under which a jewel or piece of plate may be included: but it is always a pe.r-

kinds of special customs, which may entitle a man to a chattel interest in differ-

ent parts of the kingdom; I shall, therefore, content myself with making some

observations on three sorts of customary interests, which obtain pretty generally

throughout most parts of the nation, and are therefore of more universal con-

cern ; viz., heriotit, mortuaries, and heir-looms.

1. Heriots, which were slightly touched upon in a former chapter, (a) are

usually divided into two sorts, heriot-wrvicc, and herioWui/ont. The former

are such as are due upon a special reservation in a grant or lease of lands, and

therefoie amount to little more than a mere rent: (b) the latter arise upon no

special reservation whatsoever, but depend merely upon immemorial usage and

custom, (c) Of these, therefore, we are here principally to speak: and they are

defined to be a customary tribute of goods and chattels, payable to the lord of

the fee on the decease of the owner 01 the land.

r ,,400 -i *The first establishment, if not introduction, of compulsory heriots

' J into England, was by the Danes: and we find in the laws of King

Canute (d) the several heregeates or heriots specified which were then exacted by

the king on the death of divers of his subjects, according to their respective

dignities; from the highest earle down to the most inferior thegne or landholder.

These, for the most part, consisted in arms, horses, and habiliments of war;

which the word itself, according to Sir Henry Spelman, (e) signifies. These

were delivered up to the sovereign on the death of the vassal, who could no longer
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use them, to be put into other hands for the service and defence of the country.

And upon the plan of this Danish establishment did William the Conqueror

fashion his law of relief, as was formerly observed; (/) when he ascertained the

precise relief to be taken of every tenant in chivalry, and, contrary to the feudal

custom and the usage of his own duchy of Normandy, required arms and imple-

ments of war to be paid instead of money. (//)

The Danish compulsive heriots being thus transmuted into reliefs, underwent

the same several vicissitudes as the feudal tenures, and in socage estates do fre-

quently remain to this day in the shape of a double rent payable at the death

of the tenant: the heriots which now continue among us, and preserve that

name, seeming rather to be of Saxon parentage, and at first to have been merely

discretionary, (h) These are now for the most part confined to copyhold ten-

ures, and are due by custom only, which is the life of all estates by copy; and

perhaps are the only instance where custom has favoured the lord. For this

payment was originally a voluntary donation, or gratuitous legacy of the ten-

ant; perhaps in acknowledgment of his having been raised a degree above vil-

leinage, when all his goods and chattels were quite at the mercy of the lord ;

T *4241 an^' *cus*°in, which has on the one hand confirmed the tenant's interest

I J in exclusion of the lord's will, has on the other hand established this

discretional piece of gratitude into a permanent duty. An heriot may also apper-

tain to free land, that is held by service and suit of court; in which case it is

most commonly a copyhold entranchised, whereupon the heriot is still due by

custom. Bracton (t) speaks of heriots as frequently due on the death of both

species of tenants: "est quidem alia prcestatio quee nominatur herrietfvm; itbi

tenens, liber vel servus, in morte sua, dominum suitm, de quo tenuerit, respicit

de meliori averio suo, vel de secundo meliori, secundum dirersam, locorttni consve-

tudinem." And this he adds, "magis fit de gratia quam de jure; in which

Fleta (k) and Britton (7) agree: thereby plainly intimating the original of this

custom to have been merely voluntary, as a legacy from the tenant; though now

the immemorial usage has established it as of right in the lord.

This heriot is sometimes the best live beast, or averium, which the tenant dies

possessed of (which is particularly denominated the villein's relief in the twenty-

ninth law of King William the Conqueror), sometimes the best inanimate good,

under which a jewel or piece of plate may be included: but it is always a per-

(a> Pure 97. (b> 9 Sannd. 166. (c) Co. Cop. t M. ft) C. S9. (e) Of Fcn.ls. «. 18.

(f) Page 85. (a) LL. Gutt. Cong. c. K. 23, 24. (h) LaniUnnl. Perarnb. ol'Kcut, 494.

(\) 1. 2, c. 38, } 9. (k) 1. 3, c. 18. (I) C. 69.

CIO

faJ Pllg(l 97.
(.f) l'age 6.'1,
(i) l. 2, c. 86, t 9.
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(b)

t Saond. 168.

(g) LL. Gull. COllf.

( k) l. 8,

c. ld.

(c)

Co. Cop. t ii.

c. .!'l. !3, U.
(l)

c.

(d) C. 819.
. (e) Of Fen•ls. c. 18.
(A) Lam!Jartl. Peram!J. of Kcul, M.

69.
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gonal chattel, which, immediately on the death of the tenant who was the

owner of it, being ascertained by the option of the lord, (m) becomes vested in

him as his property; and is no charge upon the lands, but merely on the goods

and chattels. The tenant must be the owner of it, else it cannot be due; and

therefore, on the death of a feme-covert, no heriot can be taken; for she

can have no ownership in things personal. («) In some places there is a cus-

tomary composition in money, as ten or twenty shillings in lien of a heriot, by

which the lord and tenant are both bound, if it be an indisputably ancient cus-

tom ; but a new composition of this sort will not bind the representatives of

either party; for that amounts to the creation of a new custom, which is now

impossible, (o) j[l)

*2. Mortuaries are a sort of ecclesiastical heriots, being a customary r *<051

gift claimed by and due to the minister in very many parishes on the *- ' *

death of his parishioners. They seem originally to have been, like lay heriots,

only a voluntary bequest to the church; being intended, as Lyndewode informs

us from a constitution of Archbishop Langham, as a kind of expiation and

amends to the clergy for the personal tithes, and other ecclesiastical duties,

which the laity in their lifetime might have neglected or forgotten to pay. For

this purpose, after (p) the lord's heriot or best good was taken out, the second

best chattel was reserved to the church as a mortuary: "si decedens plura

kabuerit animalia optima cui de jure fuerit debitum reservato, ecclesia sues sine

doto, fraude seu contradictions qualibet, pro recompensatione subtractions decima-
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rum personalium, necnon et oblationum, secundum melius animal reservetur, post

obitum, pro salute anima SUM" (q) And therefore in the laws of King

Canute (r) this mortuary is called Boul-scoifvp.lj'CClKorsymbohimanimcB. And,

in pursuance of the same principle, by the laws of Venice, where no personal

tithes have been paid during the life of the party, they are paid at his death ont

of his merchandise, jewels, and other movables. («) so also, by a similar policy,

in France, every man that died without bequeathing a part of his estate to the

church, which was called dying without confession, was formerly deprived of

Christian burial: or, if he died intestate, the relations of the deceased, jointly

with the bishop, named proper arbitrators to determine what he ought to have

given to the church, in case he had made a wilL But the parliament, in 1409,

redressed this grievance, {t)

It was anciently usual in this kingdom to bring the mortuary to church along

with the corpse when it came to be buried; and thence («) it is sometimes called

a corse-present: a *term which bespeaks it to have been once a voluntary .- ^^R ~\

donation. However, in Bracton's time, so early as Henry III, we find it >• -I

riveted into an established custom: insomuch that the bequests of heriots and

mortuaries were held to be necessary ingredients in every testament of chattels.

'• Imprimis autem debet quilibet, qui testanwntum fecerit, dominum suum de

meliori re quam habuerit recognoscere ; et postea ecclesiam de alia meliori:" the

lord must nave the best good left him as an heriot, and the church the second

best as a mortuary. But yet this custom was different in different places: " In

quibusdam locis riabet eeclesia melius animal de cpnsuetudine ; in quibusdam

secundum vel terbium melius; et in quibusdam nihil: etideo consideranda est

consuetudo loci." (w) This custom still varies in different places, not only as to the

mortuary to be paid, but the person to whom it is payable. In Wales a mor-

tuary or corse-present was due upon the death of every clergyman to the bishop

of the diocese; till abolished, upon a recompense given to the bishop, by the

statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 6. And in the archdeaconry of Chester a custom also

l«> Hob. «». («) Keilnr. 84. 4 Leon. 239. (o) Co. Cop. j 31.

<p) Co. Litt. 185. (?) Provtnc. 1. 1, tit. $. (r) C. 18.

it| Pinriraiitan. ad decretal. 1. :!<. SO, c. 3-2. (<) Sp. L. b 28, c. 41.

(«) Seldea, Hist, of Titties, e. 10. (K>) Braeton, /. *, e. 26. Fl.-t, /. 2, <•. B7.

(1) [ And indeed heroits themselves will in time cease to be exigible, one of the Copyhold En-

franchisement Acts, 15 and 16 Vic. c. 51, $ 27, having enabled either lord or tenant to compel the

eiiinguisljincut of this ancient feudal burden.]
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aonal chattel, which, immediately on the death of the tenant who was the
owner of it, being a.soertained by the option of the lord, (m) becomes vested in
him as his property; and is no charge upon the hl.nds, but merely on the goods
and chattels. 'fhe tenant must be the owner of it, else it cannot be due; and
therefore, on the death of a feme-covert, no heriot can be ta.ken ; for she
can have no ownership in things personal. (n) In some places there is a customary composition in money, as ten or twenty shillings in lien of a heriot, by
which the lord and tenant are both bound, if it be an indisputably ancient custom; but a new composition of this sort will not bind the representatives of
either ~rty; for that amounts to the creation of a new custom, which is now
im,r.oss1ble. (o) (1)
2. Mortuaries are a. sort of ecclesiastical heriots, being a customary [ • 425 ]
gift claimed by and due to the minister in verv many parishes on the
death of his parishioners. They seem originally to have been, like lay heriots,
only a voluntary bequest to the church; being intended, as Lyndewode informs
us from a constitution of Archbishop Langham, as a kind of expiation and
amends to the clergy for the personal tithes, and other ecclesiastical duties,
-which the laity in their lifetime might have neglected or forgotten to pay. For
this purpose, after (p) the lord's heriot or best good was taken out, the second
best chattel was reserved to the church as a mortuary: "si decedena plura
liabuerit animalia optima cui de .fure ftterit dehitum reseri;ato, eccle:~ir.e StUB sine
dol-0, jraude seu contradidi<Jne qualibet, pro rerompensati<Jne subtractionis decimarum personaliu,m, necnon et oblationum, secundum melius animal reservetur, post
obitum, pro salute animr.e stus." (i.) And therefore in the laws of King
Canute ( r) th is mortuary is called sou -scot ra.'Jltree a'nor symbolum animr.e. And,
in pursuance of the same principle, by the laws of Venice, where no personal
tithes have been paid during the life of the party, they are paid at his death out
of his merchandise, jewels, and other movables. (s) So also, by a similar policy,
in France, every man that died without bequeathing a part of his estate to the
church, which was called dying without ronfession, was formerly deprived of
christia.n burial: or, if he died intestate, the relations of the deceased, jointly
with the bishop, named proper arbitrators to determine what he ought to have
given to the church, in case he had made a wilt But the parliament, in 1409,
redressed this grievance. ( t)
It was anciently usual m this kingdom to bring the mortuary to church a.long
with the corpse when it came to be buried; and thence (u) it is sometimes called
a corHe-present : a •term which bespeaks it to hal'e been once a. voluntary [ • 426 ]
donation. However, in Bracton's time, so early as Henry III, we find 1t
riveted into an established custom: insomuch that the bequests of heriots and
mortuaries were held to he neeessary ingredients in every t.esta.ment of chattels.
'· lmprim1·a autem debet quilibet, qtti testanumtum .fecerit, domimem suum de
meliori re qttam habuerit recognoscere ; et postea er,clesiam de alia meliori :"the
lord must have the best good left him as an heriot, and the church the second
best as a mortuary. But yet this custom was different in different places: "Jn
quibuadam Z.Ods ha/Jet ecclesi.a rnelius animal de consue.tudine; in quibusdam
secundmn fJel tertfum melius; et in qttibusdam niltil: et ideo consideranda est
con.auetud-0 loci." ( w) This custom still varies in different plllCes, not only as to the
mortuary to be pa.id, but the person to whom it is pa.yable. In Wales a mortuary or corse-present was due upon the death of every clergyman to the bishop
of the diocese; till abolished, upon a recompense given to the bishop, by the
statute 12 Ann. st.. 2, c. 6. And in the archdeaconry of Chest.er a custom also
(•l Hob. to.

(•) Keilw. 8'. 4 Leon.~-

(o) Co. Cop. 131.
(rl C. 13.
(t) Sp. L. b. 28, c. 41.
(11') Bract.on, l. t, c. !lEI. Flet. I. 2. c. 57.

(p) Co. Litt.. 181.
(qi l"r-t'U. l . I, tit. S.
la) PaoormUao. aJ. duretal.. l. :H. 20, c. 32.
(IJ)

tlel4eo, Hilt. ofTltbea, e. 10.

(1) [And indeed heroits them!lclves will in time cease to be exigible, one of tbe Copybold Enf'rancbii<ement Actti, 15 and 16 Vic. c. 51, ~ Zl, having cn1'b1ed either lord or tenant to compel the
extinguisbment of this ancient feudal burden.]
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prevailed, that the bishop, who is also archdeacon, should have, at the death

prevailed, that the bishop, who is also archdeacon, should have, at the death
of every clergyman dying therein, his best horse or mare, bridle, saddle, and
spurs, his best gown or cloak, hat, upper garment under his gown, and tippet,
and also his best signet or ring. (x) But by statute 28 Geo. II, c. 6, this mortuary is direct.ed to cease, and the act has settled upon the bishop an equivalent
in its room. The kin ifs claim to many goods, on the death of all prelates in
England, S('ems to be of the same nature: though Sir Edwar<l Coke (y) apprehends, that this is a duty due upon death and not a mortuary : a distinction
which seems to be without a difference. For not only the king's ecclesiastical
ch!lrocter, as supreme ordinary, but also the species of the goods claimed, which
bear so near a resemblance to those in the archdeaconry of Chester, which 'vas
an acknowledged mortuary, pnts thE: matter out of dispute. 'l'he kin~, according to the record vouched by Sir Edward Coke, is entitled to six tlungs: the
[ • 427 ] *bishop's best horse or palfrey, with his furniture; his cloak, or gown,
and tippet; his cup and cover; his basin and ewer; his gold ring; and,
lastly, his muta can um, his mew or kennel of hounds; as was mentioned in the
preceding chapter. (z)
This variety of customs, with regard to mortuaries, giving frequently a handle
to exactions on the one side, and frauds or expensive litigations on the other; it
was thought proper by statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. l:i, to reduce them to some kind of
certainty. For this purpose it is enacted, that all mortuaries or corse-presents to
persons of any parish, shall be taken in the following manner; unless where by
custom less or none at all is due; viz.: for every person who does not leave goods
to the value of ten marks, nothing: for everv person who leaves goods to the
value of ten marks and under thirty pounds, 3s. 4d.; if above thirty pounds and
under forty pounds, 6s. Bd.; if above forty pounds, of what value soe\·er they
may be, 10.s. and no more. And no mortuary shall, throughout the kingdom,
he paid for the death of any feme-covert; nor for anv child; nor fo1· any one of
full age, that is not a housekeeper; nor for any way.faring man; but such wayfaring man's mortuary shall be paid in the parish to which he belongs. And
upon this statute stands the law of mortuaries to this day.
3. Heir-looms (2) are such goods and personal chattels, as, contrary to the
nature of chattels, shall go by special custom to the heir along with the inheritance, and not to the executor of the last yroprietor. The termination, lomn, is
of Saxon original; in which language it signifies a limb or member; (a) so that
an heir-loom is nothing else but a limb or member of the inheritance. They
arc generally such things as cannot be taken awa'/ without damaging or dismembering the freehold: otherwise the general rule is, that no chattel interest whatsoever shall go to the heir, notwithstanding it be expressly limited to a man
[ • 428 ] and his heirs, but shall vest in the executor. (b} But deer in a real *authorised park, fishes in a pond, doves in a dovehouse, &c., though in themselves personal chattels, yet they are so annexed to and so necessary to the wellbein~ of the inheritance, that they shall accompany the land where\'er it \·ests,
by either descent or purchase. (c) Fo1· this reason also I apprehend it is, that
the ancient jewels of the crown arc hehl to be heir-looms; (d) ibr they are necessary to maintain the state, and support the dignity, of the soyereign for the time
being. Charters likewise, (3) and tlet'ds, court-rolls, and other evidences of the
land, together with the chests in which they are contained, shall pass together
with the land to the heir, in the nature ot' heir-looms, and shall not go to the
executor. (e) By special custom, also, in some places carriages, utensils, and
(J'l 2 lnst. '9i.
(z} Page ·U3.
(s} Spelm. O,_.. m.
(zl Cro. Cnr. 237.

of every clergyman dying therein, his best horse or mare, bridle, saddle, and

spurs, his best gown or cloak, hat, upper garment under his gown, and tippet,

and also his best signet or ring, (x) But by statute 28 Geo. II, c. 6, this mor-

tuary is directed to cease, and the act has settled upon the bishop an equivalent

in its room. The king's claim to many goods, on the death ot all prelates in

England, seems to be of the same nature: though Sir Edward Coke (y) appre-

hends, that this is a duty due upon death and not a mortuary: a distinction

which seems to be without a difference. For not only the king's ecclesiastical

character, as supreme ordinary, but also the species of the goods claimed, which

bear so near a resemblance to those in the archdeaconry of Chester, which was

an acknowledged mortuary, puts the matter out of dispute. The king, accord-

ing to the record vouched by Sir Edward Coke, is entitled to six things: the

F *427 1 ""Chop's best horse or palfrey, with his furniture; his cloak, or gown,

•• " -1 and tippet; his cup and cover; his basin and ewer; his gold ring; and,

lastly, his muta canum, his mew or kennel of hounds; as was mentioned in the

preceding chapter, (z)

This variety of customs, with regard to mortuaries, giving frequently a handle

to exactions on the one side, and frauds or expensive litigations on the other; it

was thought proper by statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 6, to reduce them to some kind of

certainty. For this purpose it is enacted, that all mortuaries or corse-presents to

persons of any parish, shall be taken in the following manner; unless where by
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custom less or none at all is due; viz.: for every person who does not leave goods

to the value of ten marks, nothing: for every person who leaves goods to the

value of ten marks and under thirty pounds, 3s. 4d.; if above thirty pounds and

under forty pounds, 6*. 8d.; if above forty pounds, of what value soever they

may be, 10*. and no more. And no mortuary shall, throughout the kingdom,

be paid for the death of any feme-covert; nor for any child; nor for any one of

full age, that is not a housekeeper; nor for any wayfaring man; but such way-

faring man's mortuary shall be paid in the parish to which he belongs. And

upon this statute stands the law of mortuaries to this day.

3. Heir-looms (2) are such goods and personal chattels, as, contrary to the

nature of chattels, shall go by special custom to the heir along with the inherit-

ance, and not to the executor of the last proprietor. The termination, loom, is

of Saxon original; in which language it signifies a limb or member; {«) so that

an heir-loom is nothing else but a limb or member of the inheritance. They

are generally such things as cannot be taken away without damaging or dismem-

bering the freehold: otherwise the general rule is, that no chattel interest what-

soever shall go to the heir, notwithstanding it be expressly limited to a man

f *428 1 anc^ heirs, but shall vest in the executor, (b) But deer in a real *author-

*• J ised park, fishes in a pond, doves in a dovehouse, &c., though in them-

selves personal chattels, yet they are so annexed to and so necessary to the well-

being of the inheritance, that they shall accompany the land wherever it vests,

by either descent or purchase, (c) For this reason also I apprehend it is, that

the ancient jewels of the crown are held to be heir-looms; (d) for they are neces-

sary to maintain the state, and support the dignity, of the sovereign for the time

being. Charters likewise, (3) and deeds, court-rolls, and other evidences of the

land, together with the chests in which they are contained, shall pass together

with the land to the heir, in the nature of heir-looms, and shall not go to the

executor, (e) By special custom, also, in some places carriages, utensils, and

(x) Cro. Cfir. 837. (jr) 2 Inst. 491. d) Page 413. l«) Spelm. Oloia. 277.

(6) Co. Lite. 388. (Olbid. 3. (d)]Md.lS. W Bro. Abr. tit. ctuittela, 18.

(2) Heir-looms do not seem to be reoognUed in the law of the United States. 1 'Washb. Real

Prop. 6.

(3) [In general the right to the custody of title-deeds descends or passes with the estate to the

existing present owner, whether tenant for life or in fee, and he may retain or recover the deed

(bl Co. Utt. 3&!.

(c) Ibid.

8.

(cl) JWd.18.

(f) B1"0.

.4br. "'· clMIUdu, 19.

from any other person. 4 Term

(2) Heir-loomti do not eeem to be reoogni1ed in the law of the United States. 1 Wae.hb. Real
Prop. 6.
(~) [In general the right t.o the custody of title-deedR deecends or p&'itles :with the eRtate to the
e.risling present owner, whether tcnf\nt for lifo or in foe, and he n11~y retain or recover the dood
from uny othor pcrtKm. 4 Torm R. 2'~.]
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other household implements, may be heir-looms; (/) but such custom must be

strictly proved. On the other hand, by almost general custom, whatever is

strongly affixed to the freehold or inheritance, and cannot be severed from

thence without violence or damage, " quod ab mdibus non facile revellitur," (</)

is become a member of the inheritance, and shall thereupon pass to the heir;

as chimney-pieces, pumps, old fixed or dormant tables, benches, and the like, (h)

A very similar notion to which prevails in the duchy of Brabant; where they

rank certain things movable among those of the immovable kind, calling them

by a very particular appellation, prasdia volantia, or volatile estates; such as

beds, tables, and other heavy implements of furniture, which (as an author of

their own observes), "dignitatem istam nacta sunt, ut villis, sylvis, et adibus,

aliisque pradiis, comparentur; quod solidiora mobiha ipsis cedibus ex dentina-

tione patrisfamilias cohcerere mdeantur, et pro parte ipsarum tedium wsti-

mentur." (i)

Other personal chattels there are, which also descend to the heir in the nature

of heir-looms, as a monument or tombstone in a church, (4) or the coat-armour

of his ancestor there *hung up, with the penons and other ensigns of r +tnn -i

honour, suited to his degree. In this case, albeit the freehold of the L ' J

church is in the parson, and these are annexed to that freehold, yet cannot the

parson or any other take them away or deface them, but is liable to an action

from the heir, (k) Pews (5) in the church are somewhat of the same nature,

which may descend by custom immemorial (without any ecclesiastical concur-
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rence) from the ancestor to the heir. (I) (6) But though the heir has a property

in the monuments and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has none in their

bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action against such as indecently,

(f) Co. Lltt. 18, 185. (g) Spelm. Qlou. 277. fh} 12 Mod. 520.

f'ii Stockman's dtjurt devolutiotut, c. S, i IB. (k) 12 Uep. 106. Co. Lltt 18.

(I) 3 lost. 202. 12 Jiep. 105.

(4) [See Spooner v. Brewster, 3 Bing. 136; 10 Moore, 494.]

(5) [The right to sit in a particular pew in a church arises cither from prescription as appur-

other household implements, may be heir--looms; (/)but such custom must be
strictly proved. On. the other hand, by almost general custom, whatever is
strongly affixed to the freehold or inheritance, and cannot be severed from
thence without violence or damage, "quod ah mdilms non facilB revelWur," (g)
is become a member of the inheritance, and shall thereupon pass to the heir;
as chimney-pieces, pumps, old fixed or dormant tables, benches, and the like. (It)
A very sin1ilar notion to which prevails in the duchy of Brabant; where they
rank certain things movable among those of the immovable kind, calling them
by a very particular appellation, pr<JJdia wlantia, or volatile estates ; such as
beds, tables, and other heavY. implements of furniture, which (as an author of
their own observes), "dignitakm istam nacta sunt, ut villis, sylvis, et mdihus,
aliisque prmdiis, comparcntur; quod solidiora mohilia ipsis md-ihus ex destinati-OM patrisfamilias ·rok<arere videa,dur, et pro parto ipsarum tsdium mstimentltr." (i)
Other personal chattels there are, which also descend to the heir in the nature
of heir-looms, as a monument or tombstone in a church, (4) or the coat-armour
of his ancestor there •hung up, with the penons and other ensigns of [ • 429 ]
honour, suited to his degree. In this case, albeit the freehold of the
church is in the parson, a.nd these are annexed to that freehold, yet cannot the
parson or any other take them away or deface them, but is liable to an action
from the heir. (k) Pews (5) in the church are somewhat of the same nature,
which may descend by custom immemorial (without any ecclesiastical concurrence} from the ancestor to the heir. (l) (6) But though the heir has a property
in the monuments and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has none in their
bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action against such as indecently,
( /J Co. Litt. 18, 185.

(g) Spelm. Olo,..
(•J Stoekma11·e M.,;.~ ~l1ttWHJI, c. 3, t 16.
(l) S Inst.~ 12 Uep. 105.

'l17.
(/&)

(1&) 12 Mod. !120.
12 liep. 106. Co. Litt. 18.

tenant to a messuage, or from a faculty or grant from the ordinary, for he has the disposition to

all pews which are not claimed by prescription. Gibs. Cod. 'Jill. See generally as to the right

to pews, 1 PhilL E. C. 316.

In an action upon the case at law for a disturbance of the enjoyment of a pew in the body of

the church, if the plaintiff1 claims it by prescription, he must state it in the declaration as appur-

tenant to a messuage in the parish. 5 B. and A. 356. But a pew in the aisle or chancel of the

church may be prescribed for in respect of a house out of the parish. Forrest Rep. 14 ; 5 B.

and A. 361, S. P. This prescription may be supported by an enjoyment for thirty-six years, and

perhaps any time above twenty years. 1 T. R. 4:28. But where a pew was claimed as appur-

tenant to an ancient messuage, and it was proved that it had been so annexed for thirty years,

but that it had no existence before that time, it was hold this modern commencement defeated

the prescriptive claim. 5 T. R. 296. In an action against the ordinary, the plaintiff must allege

and prove repairs of the pew. 1 Wils. 328. But a possessory right to a pew is sufficieut to sus-

tain a suit in the ecclesiastical court against a mere disturber. 1 Phill. E. C. 316. See further

the cases and precedents, -2 Chitty on PI. 817; Com. Dig. Action on Case for Disturbance, A. 5;

SSaund. 175, c. d.]

(6) In some of the United States pews are expressly declared by statute to be real, and in

others personal estate. In the absence of such statute they partake of the nature of the realty.

1 Washb. Real Prop. 9. The pew holder has an exclusive right to occupy his pew and to main-

tain trespass against any one who disturbs him in his seat. Gay v. Baker, 17 Mass. 435; Gorton

«. 11 ml-rll. 9 Gush. 508; Freligh «. Platt, 5 Cow. 494. The pew owners, however, are not own-

ers or part owners of the church lot; their interest consists m the right to occupy their respec-

tivejxjws as a part of the auditory upon occasions of public worship. Wheaton r. Gates, 18 •

N. Y. 404; Cooper v. Presb. Church, 34 Barb. 226; Kimball v. Second Parish, 24 Pick. 347.

And their right of occupancy must yield to circumstances of necessity, convenience or expedi-

ency, growing out of the rights in common of the society; and if the "trustees make changes in

the edifice upon any of these considerations, and a pew is thereby destroyed, the owner must be

content with a just and adequate compensation. Wentworth v. First Parish, 3 Pick. 344;

Cooper c. Presb. Church, 32 Barb. 22(3. Aud if the church edifice become useless by dilapida-

tion, and has to be rebuilt, the right of the pew holder is gone. Voorhies v. Presb. Church, 17

Barb. 103; Howard ». First Parish, 7 Pick. 138; Yan Houten v. Reformed Dutch Church. 2

Green, N. J. 126. But the destruction of a church edifice by the trustees does not conclude a

pew owner, and he may nevertheless show it to have been unnecessary, and claim compensa-

(4) [Sec Spooner 11. Brewster, 3 Bing. 136; 10 Moore, 494.]
(5) [The right to sit in a particular pew in a church arises either from prescription &.'! appurtenant to a. me~ue.ge, or from a faculty or grant from the ordinary, for he has the dispo~ition to
all pews which are not claimed by prescription. Gibe. Cod. ~ll. See generally as to the right
to pews, 1 PhilL E. C. 316.
Jn an action upon the case at law for a disturbance of the enjoyment of a pew in the body of
the church, if the plaintiff claims it by prescription, ho must state it in the doclarl\tiou as appurtenant to a messuago in the parish. 5 B. and .A.. 356. But a pew in the aiide or chancel of the
church may be pre:!Cribed for in respect of a house out of the parish. Forrest Rep. 14 ; 5 B.
and .A.. 361, S._ P. This prescription may be supported by an enjoyment for thirt~'-six yoal'l!, and
perhaps any time above twenty years. 1 T. R. 4~. But where a pew was cluimed ns appurtenant to an ancient messuage, and it wa.~ proved that it had boon so annexed for thirtv years,
but that it had no existence before that time, it wa.q h(1ld this modem commencement 1\efeatud
the pre11Criptive claim. 5 T. R. 296. In an action against the ordinary, the plaintiff must allege
and prove repail'I! of the pew. 1 Wils. :H6. But a po~:1eswry right to a pew is sufficient to sustain a suit in the ecclei!iMtical court against a mere di;iturher. 1 Phil!. E. C. 316. See further
the ca.~s and precedents, ~ Chitty on Pl. 817; Com. Dig. Action on Case for Disturbance, .A.. 5;
2 Saund. 175, c. d.]
(6) In some of the United States pews are expreRsly declared by statute to be real, and in
othel'tl personal estate. In the absence of 11uch ;itatute they partake of the nature of the realty.
l Washb. Real Prop. 9. The pew holder ha~ an exclusive right to occupy hi;; pew and to maintain trespa.~>1 again>1t any one who di>1turbs him in his se11.t. Gay v. Baker, 17 M:nsR. 435; Gorton
"· Hadsell, 9 Cush. 50d; Freligh v. Platt, 5 Cow. 494. 'fhe ,PCW owners, however, are not owner:1 or part owners of the church lot; their interest oonRists m the right to oooupy their respective pews &.'! a part of the auditory upon occasions of public worship. Wheaton t'. Gate!!, 18 .
N. Y. 404; Cooper v. Presb. Church, 32 Barb. 226; Kimball v. Second Parit<h, 24 Pick. 347.
And their right of occup:lncy mu~t yield to circum,;timcea ot necos.;ity, convenience or expediency, ~rowing out of the right'! in common of the society; antl if the trustees make changes in
the edifice upon any of the:ie con;iidcration11, and a pew 1e thereby destroyed, the owner must ho
content with a just and adequate compensation. Wentworth v. First Parish, 3 Pick. 344;
Cooper "· Presb. Church, 32 Barb. 2·~6. Aud if the church edifice become u:ielc$~ bv dilapitlatiou, e.nd hll.13 to be rebuilt, the ri~ht of the pew holder ie gone. Voorhies v. Presb. ·church, 17
Barb. 103; Howard 11. First Par1::1h, 7 Pick. 138; Van Houten v. Reformed Dutch Church. 2
Green, N. J. 126. But the de~trnction of a church edifice by the trustee:! doeR not conclude a
pew owner, and he may neverthele~s show it to have been unneceSilllry, and claim compensation. Gorton v. Had11ell, 9 Cush. 508.

tion. Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Gush. 508.
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at least, if not impiously, violate and disturb their remains, when dead and

buried. The parson, indeed, who has the freehold of the soil, may bring in

action of trespass against such as dig and disturb it; and if any one in taking

up a dead body steals the shroud or other apparel, it will be felony; (m) for the

property thereof remains in the executor, or whoever was at the charge of the

funeral. (7)

But to return to heir-looms; these, though they be mere chattels, yet cannot

be devised away from the heir by will; but such a devise is void, (») even by a

tenant in fee-simpla For though the owner might during his life have sold or

disposed of them, as he might of the timber of the estate, since as the inher-

itance was Ms own, he might mangle or dismember it as he pleased; yet they

being at his death instantly vested in the heir, the devise (which is subsequent

and not to take effect till after his death) shall be postponed to the custom,

whereby they have already descended.
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at least, if not impiously, violate and disturb their remains, when dead and
buried. 'l'he parson, indeed, who has the freehold of the soil, may bring in
action of trespass against such as dig and disturb it; and if any one in taking
up a dead body steals the shroud or other apparel, it will be felony; (m) for the
property theroof remains in the executor, or whoever was at the charge of the
funeral. (7)
But to return to heir-looms; these, though they be mere chattels, yet cannot
be devised away from the heir by will; but such a devise is void, (n) even by a
tenant in fee-Simple. For though the owner might during his life have sold or
disposed of them, as he might of the timber of the estate, since as the inheritanoe was ltis own, he might mangle or dismember it as he pleased; yet they
being at his death instantly vested in the heir, the devise (which is subsequent
and not to take effect till after his death) shall be postponed to the custom,
whereby they have already descended.

IN the present chapter we shall take into consideration three other species of

title to goods and chattels.

V. The fifth method, therefore, of gaining a property in chattels, either per-

sonal or real, is by succession: which is, in strictness of law, only applicable to

CHAPTER XXIX.

corporations aggregate of many, as dean and chapter, mayor and commonalty,

master and fellows, and the like; in which one set of men may, by succeeding
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another set, acquire a property in all the goods, movables, and other chattels

of the corporation. The true reason whereof is, because in judgment of law a

OF TITLE BY SUCCESSION, MARRIAGE, AND JUDGMENT.

corporation never dies: and therefore the predecessors, who lived a century

ago, and their successors now in being, are one and the same body corporate, (a)

Which identity is a property so inherent in the nature of a body politic, that,

even when it is meant to give any thing to be taken in succession by such a

body, that succession need not be expressed: but the law will of itself imply it.

So that a gift to such a corporation, either of lands or of chattels, without

naming their successors, vests an absolute property in them so long as the cor-

F *4311 Poration subsists, (ft) And thus a lease for years, an *obligation, a

L J jewel, a flock of sheep, or other chattel interest, will vest in the succes-

sors, by succession, as well as in the identical members to whom it was origi-

nally given.

But, with regard to sole corporations, a considerable distinction must be

made. For if such sole corporation be the representative of a number of per-

sons ; as the master of an hospital, who is a corporation for the benefit of the

poor brethren; an abbot, or prior, by the old law before the reformation, who

represented the whole convent; or the dean of some ancient cathedral, who

stands in the place of and represents, in his corporate capacity, the chapter;

such sole corporations as these have, in this respect, the same powers as corpora-

tions aggregate have, to take personal property or chattels in succession. And

therefore a bond to such a master, abbot, or dean, and his successors, is good in

rmJSImtllO. U Rep. 113. 1 Hal. P. C. 515. (n) Co. Lilt. 185.

(nj 4 Kep. 65. (I') Bro. Mr. t. atata, 90. Cro. Kliz. 464.

(7) [It hag been determined that stealing dead bodies, though for the improvement of the sci-

ence of anatomy, is an indictable offense as a misdemeanor; it being considered a practice con-

trary to common decency, and shocking to the general sentiments and feelings of mankind. 2

T. K. 733; 2 Leach, 560, 8. C.
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IN the present chapter we shall take into consideration three other species of
title to goods and chattels.
V. The fifth method, therefore, of gaining a properly in chtLttels, either personal or real, is by succession: which is, in strictness of law, only applicable to
corporations aggregate of many, as dean and chapter, muyor and commonalty,
master and fellows, and the like; in which one set of men may, bv succeeding
another set, acquire a property in all the goods, movables, and other chattels
of the corporation. The true reason whereof is, because in judgment of law a
corporation never dies: and therefore the predecessors, who lived a century
~o, and their successors now in being, are one and the same body corporate. (a)
'\\ hich identity is a property so inherent in the nuture of' a body politic, that,
even when it is meant tof ve any thing to be taken in succession bv such a
body, that succession nee not be expressed: but the law will of itself Imply it.
So that a $'ift to such a corporation, either of lands or of chattels, without
ntLming their successors, vests an absolute property iu them so long a.s the cor[ ,..431 ] poration subsists. (h) And thus a lease for years, an "'obligation, a
Jewel, a flock of' shee,p, or other chattel interest, will vest in the successors, by succession, as WE'il as m the identical members to whom it was originally given.
But, with regard to sole corporations, a considerable distinction must be
made. For if such sole corporation be the representative of a number of persons; as the master of an hospital, who is a corporation for the benefit of the
poor brethren; an abbot, or pnor, by the old law before the reformation, who
represented the whole convent; or the dean of some ancient cathedral, who
stands in the place of and represents, in his corporate capacity, the chapter;
such sole corporations as these have, in this respect, the same powers as corporations aggregate have, to take personal property or chattels in succession. And
therefore a bond to such a master, abbot, or dean, and his successors, is good in
(m) 3 lnsl 110.
(a) 4. liep. ~.

It Rep. 113. 1 Hal. P. C. 613.
(A) Co. LIU. 186.
(b) Bro. ..4br. i. matu, llO. Cro. Eli&. W.

(7) [It has been determined that 11tealing dead bodies, though for the improvemont of the science of anatmny, is an indictable offense ari a mh1demeanor; it being cnm11dered a prnctice contrary to common decency, and shocking to the general sentiments and feelingg of mankind. j
T. R. 733; 2 Lea.ch, 560, S. C.
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law; and the successor shall have the advantage of it, for the benefit of the

aggregate society, of which he is in law the representative, (c) Whereas, in the

case of sole corporations, which represent uo others but themselves, as bishops,

parsons, and the like, no chattel interest can regularly go in succession: and,

therefore, if a lease for years be made to the bishop of Oxford and his successors,

in such case his executors or administrators, and not his successors, shall have

it (d) For the word sticcessors, when applied to a person in his political capa-

city, is equivalent to the word heirs in his natural; and as such a lease for years,

if made to John and his heirs, would not vest in his heirs but his executors; so

if it be made to John, bishop of Oxford, and his successors, who are the heirs of

his body politic, it shall still vest in his executors and not in such his successors.

The reason of this is obvious: for besides that the law looks upon goods and

chattels as of too low and perishable a nature to be limited either to heirs, or

such successors as are equivalent to heirs; it would also follow, that if any such

chattel interest (granted to a sole corporation and his successors) were allowed

to descend to such, successor, the property thereof must be in abeyance from the

*death of the present owner until the successor be appointed: and this •- IMQO i

is contrary to the nature of a chattel interest, which can never be in L *

abeyance or without an owner; («) but a man's right therein, when once sus-

pended, is gone forever. This is not the case in corporations aggregate, where

the right is never in suspense; nor in the other sole corporations before men-

tioned, who are rather to be considered as heads of an. aggregate body, than
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subsisting merely in their own right; the chattel interest therefore, in such a

case, is really and substantially vested in the hospital, convent, chapter, or

other aggregate body; though the head is the visible person in whose name

every act is carried on, and in whom every interest is therefore said (in point of

form) to vest But the general rule, with regard to corporations merely sole, is

this, that no chattel can go to or be acquired by them in right of succession. (_/")

Yet to this rule there are two exceptions. One in the case of the king, in

whom a chattel may vest by a grant of it formerly made to a preceding king and

his successors. (g) The other exception is, where, by a particular custom, some

particular corporations sole have acquired a power of taking particular chattel

interests in succession. And this custom, being against the general tenor of the

common law, must be strictly interpreted, and not extended to any other chattel

interests than such immemorial usage will strictly warrant Thus the chamber-

lain of London, who is a corporation sole, may, by the custom of London, take

bonds and recognizances to himself and his successors, for tlie benefit of the

orphan's fund: (A) but it will not follow from thence, that he has a capacity to

take a lease for years to himself and his successors for the same purpose; for the

custom extends not to that: nor that he may take a bond to himself and his

successors, for any other purpose than the benefit of the orphan's fund : for that

also is not warranted by the custom. Wherefore, upon the whole, we may close

this head with laying down this general rule; that such right of succession to

chattels is "universally inherent by the common law in all aggregate r „, 33 -i

corporations, in the king, and in such single corporations as represent a *• '"'" '

number of persons; and may, by special custom, belong to certain other sole

corporations for some particular purposes; although generally, in sole corpora-

tions, no such right can exist (1)

VI. A sixth method of acquiring property in goods and chattels is by mar-

riage; whereby those chattels, which belonged formerly to the wife, are by act

of law vested in the husband with the same degree of property and with the

same powers, as the wife, when sole, had over them.

(e) Dyer, 48. Cro. Ella. 464. (d) Co. Lltt. 40. !«) Brownl. 13Z.

(/) Co. Lltt. 46. (g} Ibid. 90. (») 4 Kep. 85. Cro. KlU. &8.

(1) [Thus, the ornaments of the chapel of a preceding bishop belong to his successor, and

the bishop may take nuch chattels in succession.]
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law; and the successor shall have the advantage of it, for the benefit of the
aggregate society~ of which he is in Jaw the representative. (c) Whereas, in the
cue of sole corporations, which represent no others but themselves, as bishops,
pacsons, and the like, no chattel interest can re1,rularly go in succession: and,
therefore, if a lease for years be made to the bishop of Oxford and his.successors,
in such case his exooutol'S or administrators, and not his successors, shall have
it. ( d) :For the word sicc~ors, when applied to a. person in his political capacity, is equivalent to the word heirs in his natural; and as such a lease for years,
if made to John and his heirs, would not vest in his heirs but his executors; so
if it be made to John, bishop of Oxford, and his successors, who are the heirs of
his body politic, it shall still vest in his executors and not in such his successors.
The reason of this is obvious: for besides that the law looks upon goods and
chattels a.a of too low and perishable a nature to be limited either to heirs, or
such successors as are equivalent to heirs; it would also follow, that if any such
chattel interest (granted to a sole corporation and his successors) were allowed
to descend to such sucoossor, the property thereof must be in abeyance from the
•death of the present owner until the successor be appointed: and this [ • 432 ]
is contrary to the nature of a chattel interest, which can never be in
abeyance or without an owner; (e) but a man's right therein, when once suspended, is gone forever. 'fhis is not the caBe in corporations aggregate, where
the right is never in suspense; nor in the other sole corporations before mentioned, who are rather to be considered as heads of au aggregate body, than
subsisting merely in their own right; the chattel interest therefore, in such a
case, is really and substantially vested in the hospital, convent, chapter, or
other aggregate body; though the head is the visible person in whose name
every act is carried on, and in whom every interest is therefore said (in point of
form) to vest. But the geneml rule, with regard to corporations merely sole, is
this, that no chattel can go to or be acquired by them in right of succession.(/)
Yet to this rule there are two exceptions. One in the case of the king, in
whom a chattel may vest by a grant of it formerly made to a preceding king and
his successors. ( g) The other exception is, where, by a part-ic?tlar custom, some
particul,ar corporations sole have acquired a power of taking particular chattel
mterests in succession. And this custom, being against the general tenor of the
common law, must be strictly interpreted, and not extended to any other chattel
interests than such immemorial usage will strictly warrant. Thus the chamberlain of London, who is a corporation sole, may, by the custom of London, take .
bonds and recognizances to himself and his successors, for the benefit of the
orphan's fund: (k) but it will not follow from thence, that he has a capacity to
take a lease for years to himself and his successors for the same lmrpose; for the
custom extends not to that: nor that he may take a bond to iimself and his
successors, for any other purpose than the benefit of the orphan's fuud; for that
also is not warranted by the custom. Wherefore, upon the whole, we may close
this head with laying down this general rule; that such right of succession to
chattels is *universally inherent bv the common law in all aggregate [ • 433 ]
corporations, in the krng, and in s~uch single corporatious as represent a
number of persons; and may, by special custom, belong to certain other sole
corporations for some particular purposes; although generally, in sole corporations, no such right can exist. (1)
VI. A sixth method of acquiring property in goods and chattels is by marriage; whereby those chattels, which belonged formerly to the wife, are by act
of law vested in the husband with the same degree of property and with the
eame powers, as the wife, when sole, had over them.
(cl D_yeri48. Cro. Ella. 464.
Cd) Co. Litt. 46.
i/l Co. ltt. 46.
{g) Ilrid. 90.
(l) ~ Rep. M.

te) Brown). 1311.
Cro. Ells. &'2.

(1) [Thus, the ornamenta of the chapel of a preceding bishop belong to bis successor, and
the bi11hop may take iJach chattels in isucccil::!ion.]
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This depends entirely on the notion of an unity of person between the hug-

band and wife; it being held that they are one person in law, (t) BO that the

very being and existence of the woman is suspended during the coverture, or

entirely merged or incorporated in that of the husband. ^2) And hence it fol-

lows, that whatever personal property belonged to the wife, before marriage, is

by marriage absolutely vested in the husband. In a mil estate, he only gains a

title to the rents and profits during coverture; for that, depending npon feudal

principles, remains entire to the wife after the death of her husband, or to her

heirs, if she dies before him; unless, by the birth of a child, he becomes tenant

for life by the curtesy. But, in chattel interests, the sole and absolute property

vests in the husband, to be disposed of at his pleasure, if he chooses to take pos-

session of them: for unless he reduces them to possession, by exercising some

act of ownership upon them, no property vests in him, but they shall remain

to the wife, or to her representatives, after the coverture is determined. (3)

(0 See Book I, c. IS.

This depends entirely on the notion of an unity of penon· between the: husband and wife; it being held that they are one pe1"80n in law, (i) so that the
very being and existence of the woman is suspended during the coverture, or
entirely merged or incorporated in that of the husband. (2) And hence. ii follows, that whateyer personal _{>roperty belonged to the wife, before marriage, is
by marriage absolutely vested m the husband. In a real estate, be only gains a
title to the rents and profits during co~·erture; for that, depending upon feudal
principles, remains entire to the wife after the death of her husband, or to her
heirs. if she dies before him ; unleas, by the birth of a child, he becomes tenant
for life by the curtesy. But, in cliattel interuts, the sole and absolute property
vests in the husband, to be disposed of at his pleasure, if he chooaes to take possession of them: for unless he reduces them to passession, by exercising some
act of ownership upon them, no property vests m him, but they shall remain
to the wife, or t-0 her representatiYes, after the coverture is determmed. (3)

(2) The tendency of legislation in the United States is to the utter abrogation of this doc-

(f) See Book I,

trine, 80 far as civil righU depend upon it, and to leave property right* existing at the time of

c. 111.

the marriage wholly unchanged by that relation. The tendency further is to remove the dis-

ability under which the married woman lay at the common law, to acquire and take property,

real and personal, generally for her own use, and to control and dispose of the same; and the

statutes of some of the states now declare that she shall have the same power and right in

these particulars that she would have had if unmarried. Except as modified by these statutes,
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the English rules so fully stated by Mr. Chitty in the following note, are still in force in the

United States. As to the reduction of the wile's choses to possession by the husband, further

reference is made to Poor v. Hazelton, 15 N. H. 565; Van Epps v. Van Densen, 4 Paige, 64;

Mardree v. Mardree, 9 Ired. 295; Searing v. Searing, 9 Paige, 283. And as to the protection

of the wife's equity in the property she brings her husband, for the benefit and support of

herself and her children, to Keuney r. Udall, 3 Cow. 590; Van Epps v. Van Donsen, 4 Paige,

64; Smith ». Kane, 2 id. 303; Moore v. Moore, 14 B. Monr. 259; 2 Kent, 139 et scq.; Story

Eq. Juris. J$ 1402, 1420, and cases cited.

(:'.) [It seems to be, at present, clearly held, that a deed by which the husband assigns his

wife's contingent or reversionary chattel interests, is not such a reduction thereof into pos-

session by him, as to give even a qualified title to his assignee, if the wife prove to be the

survivor. Pardew «. Jackson, 1 Russ. 50; Hornsby v. Lee, 2 Mad. 20. And though, in Gage

v. Acton, 1 Salk. 327, Chief Justice Holt said, that when the wife has any right or duty,

which by possibility may happen to accrue during the marriage, the husband may, by release,

discharge it; this dictum cannot now be relied on, without qualifying it by a condition, that

the possibility shall actually come into possession durinp the coverture. Keeping this restric-

tion in mind, there is no doubt that a wife's possibilities are assignable by ner husband, for

a valuable consideration; though the assignee may be compelled to make some provision for

the wife, when the subject of assignment is of such a nature, that when the contingency has

happened, it cannot be reached without the aid of equity: Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Jac. and

'Walk. 477; Beresford c. Hobson, 1 Mad. 373; Lloyd v. Williams, 1 id. 457; and it seems, that

courts of equity do not merely act in analogy to the legal doctrine, but were the first to hold

that such assignment by the husband ought to be supported. Grey v. Kentish, 1 Atk. 280;

Hawkyns ». Obyn, 2 id. 551; Bates v. Dandy, id. 208; Duke of Chandos c. Talbot, 2 P.

"Wins. 608, and cases there cited; Spragg v. Blinkes, 5 Ves. 588.

It appears settled, however, that where the wife's interest was such that the husband could

not, even for valuable consideration, have released it at law, equity will not assist him. Thus,

if the reversion could not possibly fall into possession during the husband's life,—for in-

stance, if it were a reversion upon his own death,—there the husband's release, or assignment,

would be invalid at law; and clearly, the wife's consent would not be taken, in order to give

it effect in equity. Dalbiac v. Dalbiac, 16 Ves. 122. So, if a woman, before marriage, stipu-

late that her property shall revert to her own absolute disposal in the event of her surviving

her husband, or if a bequest be made to her, accompanied with direction, and no power of

disposition over the fund, during the marriage, be reserved by her, in one case, or given to

her, in the other, there it would obviously be to defeat the plain object of the settlement, or

will, if the wife, while under the possible influence of her husband, were permitted, either by

examination in court, or by any other act during the coverture, to dispose of her right of sur-

vivorship. Richards v. Chambers, 10 Ves. 586; Lee r. Muggeridge, 1 Ves. and Bea. 123.

An assignment by a husband, to a particular assignee, of a chose en action, or equitable in-

(~) The tendency of legislation in the United States is to the utter abrogation of this doctrine, 80 far 88 civil rights depend upon it, sud to lean·e property rights exilliing at the time of
the marriage wholly unchanged by that relation. The t.endency further is to remove the disability under which the married woman lay at the common law, to BCquire and take property,
-real and personal, generally for her own use, and to contn>l and dispose of the i;ame; and the
statutes of some of the state11 now declare that she shall have the ttame power and right in
these particulars that she would have bad if unmarried. Except 88 modified by the.«e statutes,
the Engli11h rules 80 fully stated by Mr. Chitty in the following noro, are still in force in the
United States. As to the reduction of the wife's chose!! to pos:;es11ion by the husband, further
reference is made to Poor "· Hazelton, 15 N. H. 565; Van Epps "· Van Deusen, 4 Paige, 64;
lrlardree "· lrlardree, 9 Ired. 295; Searing "· Searing, 9 Paige, ~. An<l tM to the protection
of the wife's equit,y in the property she brings her husband, for the benefit and support of
hel'l!elf and her ch1ldre!11 to Kouuey v. Udall, 3 Cow. 590; Van Epps "· Van Deneen, 4 Paige,
64; Smith "· Kane, 2 111. 30:l ; Moore v. Moore, 14 B. Monr. 259; 2 Kent, 139 et acq.; Story
Eq. Juris. O 140'.l, 1420, and cased cited.
(3) [It seems to be, at present, clearly held, that a deed by which the husband lli!tdgns his
wife's contingent or rever11ionary chattel intere:its, is not 1:1uch a reduction thereof into posBe88ion by him, 88 to give even a qualified title to his assignee, if the wife pro¥e to be the
survivor. Pardew "· Jackson, 1 Rul!l!. 50; Hornsby v. Lee, 2 Mad. 20. And though, in Gage
v• .Acton, 1 Salk. 327, Chief Jmitice Holt 11aid, that when the wife has any right or duty,
which by p_ossibility may happen to accrue during the marriage, the husband may, by release,
diKCbarge 1t; this dictum cannot now be relied on, '\\ithont qualifying it by a condition, that
the po88ibility shall actually oome into posses8ion durinr.; the coverture. Keeping this restriction in mind, there is no doubt that a wife's possibilities are &.'lsiguable by her hullband, for
a \"wuable consideration ; though the a."l!lignee may be compelled to make some provision for
the wife, when the subject of Msignment is of 11uch a nature, that when the contingency has
happened, it cannot be reached w-ithout the aid of equitv: Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Jae. and
Walk. 47i; Deret1ford o. Hobson, 1 Mad. 373; Lloyd v. Wllliam11, 1 id. 457 ; and it seems, that
courts of equity do not merely act in analoiry to the legal doctrine, but were the first to hold
that such &11signment by tho husband ought t<1 be supported. Grey ti. Kenth1b, 1 .Atk. 28();
Hawkyns v. Obyn, 2 id. iJ?l; Bates 17. Da~dy, id. 200;r. Duke of Chandos i-. Talbot, 2 P.
Wms. 608, and casea there cited; Spragg v. Blmkes, 5 Ves. 588.
It appeari1 settled, however, that whllre the wife's interest Wllll BUch that the hu~band could
not, even for valuable consideration, ha\·e releMed it at law, equity will not a.~!dst him. Thus,
if the re\'ersion could nut possibly fall into posl!ession dnrmg the husband's life,-for instance, if it were a reversion upon bis own dcath,-thero the husband's rele&Je, or a.~signment,
would be invalid at law; and clearly, the wife's coni>ent would not be taken, in order to ~vo
it effect in equity. Dalbiac v. Dalh1nc, 16 Ves. 12:l. So, if a woman, before marriage, stipulate that her prov.erty shall renirt to her own absolute dispoRal in the event of her aurvinng
her husband, or 1£ a bequest be made to her, nccompauied with direction, and no power of
disposition over the fund, during the marriage, be rellOrved by her, in one cat1e, or gi\'en to
her, in the other, there it would ob¥iously be to defeat tho plain object of the 11ettlement, or
will, if the wife, while under the possible influence of her hui>band, were permitted, either by
examination in court, or by any other act during the covcrture, to dispose of her right of surTh-or8hip. Richards v. Chambel"ll, 10 Vos. 586; Leet•. Yuggeridge, 1 Ve11. and Dea. l~t
An a~sigument by a husband, to a particular assignee, of a cl1ose en action, or equitable intere11t, given to his wife for her life only (guch assi~ment being made for vnluable con8ideration, and at a time when the husband was maintaining his wife), will, it seem,_;, not only be
supported, but the purchaeer will not be bound to make. any provisi~1n for th.e wife. Ellio~ '"
Cordell, 5 Mad. 156; Wright "· Morley, 11 Vos. 18; ll1tfonl "· llitfonl, 9 ul. 100. Equity,

terest, given to his wife for her life only (such assignment being made for valuable consider-

ation, and at a time when the husband was maintaining his wife), will, it seems, not only be
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supported, but the purchaser will not be bound to make any provision for the wife. Elliot c.

Cordell, 5 Mad. 156; Wright v. Morley, 11 Ves. 18; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 id. 100. Equity,
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There is therefore a very considerable difference in the acquisition of this

species of property by the husband, *according to the subject matter; r nt^

viz., whether it be a chattel real or chattel personal; and, of chattels "-

personal, whether it be in possession or in action only. A chattel real vests in

the husband, not absolutely, but sub modo. As, in case of a lease for years,

the husband shall receive all the rents and profits of it, and may, if he pleases,

sell, surrender, or dispose of it during the coverture; (k) if he DC outlawed or

attainted, it shall be forfeited to the king:(Z) it is liable to execution for his

debts: (m) and, if he survives his wife, it is to all intents and purposes his own.

(re) Yet, if he has made no disposition thereof in his lifetime, and dies before

his wife, he cannot dispose of it by will (o) for, the husband having made no alter-

ation in the property during his life, it never was transferred from the wife; but

after his death she shall remain in her ancient possession, audit shall not go to

his executors. So it is also of chattels personal (or choses) in action: as debts

upon bond, contracts, and the like; these the husband may have if he pleases;

that is, if he reduces them into possession by receiving or recovering them at

law. (4) And upon such receipt or recovery they are absolutely and entirely his

ftj Co. Lltt. 46. (I) Plowd. 283. (m) Co. Utt. 851.

(n)lbid. 300. (o) Poph. 6. Co. Litt. 351.

however, will not allow the general assignee under a commission of bankruptcy against a hus-

band, to obtain possession of such property, without making some provision for the wife; since,

There is therefore a very considerable difference in the acquisition of this
epecies of property by the husband, •according to the subject matter; [ • 434 ]
viz., whether it be a chattel real or chattel persmial; and, of chattels
personal, whether it be in possession or in action only. A cliattel real vests in
the husband, not absolutelv, but sub modo. As, in case of a lease for years,
the husband shall receive all the rents and profits of it, and may, if he pleases,
sell, surrender, or dispose of it during the coverture; (k) if he be outlawed or
attaiuted, it shall be forfeited to the kin~: (Z) it is liable to execution for his
debts: (m) and, if he snrvives his wife, it is to all intents and purposes his own.
(n) Yet, if he has made no disposition thereof in his lifetime, and dies before
his wife, he cannot dispose of it by will (o) for, the husband having ma.de no alteration in the property during his life, it never was transferred from the wife; but
after his death she shall remain in her ancient possession, and it shall not go to
bis executors. So it is also of chattels personal (or choseR) in action: as debts
upon bond, contracts, and the like; these the husband may have if he pleases ;
that is, if he reduces them into possession by receiving or recovering them at
law. ( 4) And upon such receipt or recovery they are absolutely and entirely his
(I:) Co. Litt. '6.
(n) Ibid. 300.

(l) Plovrd.
(o) Popb. II.

263.
(m) Co. Utt. 331.
Co. LIU. Ml.

when the title of such last described assignee vests, the incapacity of the husband to maintain
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his wife has already raised this equity in her favor. Elliott v. Cordell, ubi supra; and where

the right to the whole equitable interest, or chose en action, was in the wife, absolutely, and not

for lite only, there, the preponderance of modern authority (after considerable fluctuation of

judicial opinion), seems fully to establish, that the wife's right to a provision cannot be resisted

oy the particular assignee of her husband, more than by his general assignee. Johnson v. John-

son, 1 Jac. and Walk. 477; Like v. Berseford, 3 Yes. 512; Macaulay v. Philips, 4 id. 19; Beres-

ford v. Hobson, 1 Mad. 373; Earl of Salisbury ». Newton, 1 Eden, 371; Oswell v. Probert, 2 Tea.

Jun. 682.

"WTien a husband makes a settlement in consideration of the wife's whole fortune, whatever

fortune she then has, notwithstanding it may consist entirely of chases en action, is looked on

as purchased by the husband, and it will go to his executors, though he may not have reduced

it into possession; but, if the settlement was made in consideration of a part only of the

wife's fortune, then the remaining part, if not reduced by the husband into possession during

his life, will survive to his wife: Cleland v. Cleland, Prec. in Cha. 63; for, the mere fact of

his having mode a settlement upon his wife at the time of the marriage, is not sufficient to

entitle a husband to his wife's chases en action, or chattels; to constitute him a purchaser

thereof, so as to exclude the wife's equity, there must be an agreement, either expressed or

implied: Salwey t>. Salwey, Arnbl. 693; and, according to the modern cases, a settlement

made by the husband is no purchase of the wife's equitable interests, or choscs en action, unless

such settlement either distinctly expresses it to bo made in consideration of the wife's

fortune; or the contents thereof altogether import that, and plainly import it, as much as if

it were expressed. Drucc v. Dennison, 6 Ves. 395. It is also well settled, that a settlement

in consideration of the wife's fortune will be understood to have been intended to apply only

to her fortune at the time; unless the settlement expressly, or by necessary implication, shows

that it was the intention to comprehend all future property which might devolve upon the

wile. Where no distinct agreement to that effect appears, should any subsequent accession of

dioses en action accrue to the wife, in such a shape that the husband cannot lay hold of it

without the assistance of a court of equity, the wife will, according to the established rule of

such courts, be entitled to an additional provision out of that additional fortune, as against

either the husband or assignee: Ex Parte O'Ferrall, 1 Glyn and Jameson, 348; and if the

husband die first, not having reduced the property into possession nor having assigned it, for

valuable consideration, the whole will survive to the wife. Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 95, 96;

Carr v. Taylor, 10 id. 579; Burnett v. Kinaston, 2 Froem. 241, 2d ed.; Wildman p. AVildnian,

9 Ves. 177; Nash v. Nash, 2 Mad. 139. But, if the wife's property be of such a nature that

the husband or his assignees can reach it by process of common law, there is no ground for

the interposition of equity to restrain the exercise of the legal right. Oswell v. Probert, 2 Yes.

Jun. 682; Attorney-General v. Whorwood, 1 Ves. Sen. 539; Macaulay v. Phillips, 4 Ves. 18;

Langham v. Nenny, 3 id. 469; Jewson ». Moulson, 2 Atk. 420; "Purdew ?. Jackson, 1

Rnss. 54.]

(4) [If a bill or note be mode to a feme-sole, and she afterwards marry, being possessed of the

note, the property vests in the husband, and he may indorse it or sue atone for the recovery of .

however, will not allow the general assignee under a oommi811ion of bankruptcy against a husband, to obtain possession of such property, without making some provision for the wife; i;iuce,
when the title of such last described o..-;t!ignee vests, the incapacity of the hu:1band to maintain
his wife ho..~ already raised this equity in her favor. Elliott v. Cordell, ul>i attpra; and where
the right to the whole equitable interest, or chose en action, waii in the wife, absolutely, and nut
for life only, there, the preponderance of modem authority (atl;or con~iderable fluctuation of
judicial opinion), seom8 fully to establish, that the wife's right to a provision cannot bo resisted
by thl' particular as.-;ignee of her husband, more than by his general ai;signee. Johnson"· Johnson, 1 Jae. and Walk. 477; Like"· Bon!eford, 3 Ves. 512; llacaulay "· Philips, 4 id. 19; Beresford v. Hobson, 1 lilad. 373; Earl uf Salisbury v. N ewtun, 1 Eden, 371 ; Oswell "· Probert, 2 V es.
Jun. 68'.l.
When a husband makes o. settlement in consideration of the wife's whole fhrtnne, "'"°hatcver
fortune she then ho..'l, notwithsto.nding it may consist entirely of choses e1~ acti<m, i~ looked on
as pnrcho..~ed by the hu.iband. and it will go tu his executora, though he may not have reduced
it ir..to po1111eAAion; but, if the settlement was made in consideration of a part only of the
wife's fortune, then the remaining part, if not reduced by tho husband into possez>siun during
his life, will survive tu his wife : Cleland v. Cleland, Pree. in Cha. 63; for, the mere fa.ct of
bis having made a settlement upon his wife at the time of the mani~e, is not sufficient tu
entitle a husband tu his wife's choses en actwn, or chattel!!; to constitute him a pureha.~er
thereof, so as to exclude the wife's equity, there mul!t be an agreement, either exprc>1l'!ed or
implied: Salwey v. Salwey, .A.mbl. 693; and, a.ccordincr to tho modern cases, a settlumeut
madr. by the husband is no pureho..~e oft.he wife's equitabfe interests, or choses en action, unless
such settlement either distinctly expresses it to be made in consideration of the '\\'ife's
fortune; or the contents thereof altogether import that, and plainly import it, o.s much as if
it were expressed. Druce "· Dennison, 6 Vee. a95. It is also well settled, that a settlement
in cunt'lideration of the wife'11 fortune will be undel'!ltood to have been intended to apply only
. to her fortune at the time; unle:!ll the settlement expre:1sly, or by neces,,ary implication, shows
that it was the intention to comprehend all future property which might devolve upon the
wifo. Where no distinct agreement to that effect appears, should any sub~equent accession of
cJwses en action accrue to the wife, in such a shape that the husband cannot lay hold of it
without the assistance uf a court of equity, the wife will, according to the establi~bed rule of
such court.'!, be entitled to an e.dditional provision out of that additional fortune, as a~ninst
either the husband or assignee: Ex Parte O'l<'errnll, 1 Glyn and Jameson, 348; and 1f the
husband <lie firat, not. having reduced the property into poi1sessiou nor ha•ing a.~signed it, for
valuable consideration, the whole will survfre tu the wife. Mitford t'. :Mitford, 9 Ves. 95, 96;
Carr "· Taylor, 10 id. 579; Burnett v. Kine.<1ton, 2 Fremn. 241, 2d ed. ; Wildman v. Wildman,
9 Ves. 177; Nash v. Nash, 2 Mad. 139. But, if the wife's property be uf such a nature that
the hn1>hand or his ~signees cau reach it by process of common law, there is no ground for
the interposition of eqwty to restrain the exercise of the legal right. Oswell "· Probert, 2 Ves.
Jun. 68-l; .Attorney-General ·v. Whorwood, 1 Ves. Sen. 539; Macaulay v. Phillips, 4 Ves. 18;
Langham v. Neuny, 3 id. 469; Jewson v. liloulson, 2 .Atk. 4~; Purdew v. Jackson, 1
Rwt1. 54.]
( 4) [If a bill or note be made to a feme-sole, and she af\erwards marry, being posseRsed of the
not.e the property '\"Ct!ts in the hu.i band, aud he may indur:'!e it or sue alone for the recovery of
the ~mount: 3 Wils. 5; 1 B. and A. 218 ; for those instruments, when in possession of the wife,
are to be considered rather as chattehi personal, the.n cho::ies en action. Id. The transfer of

VoL. I.-78
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own; and shall go to his executors or administrators, or as he shall bequeath

them by will, and shall not revest in the wife. But if he dies before he haa

recovered or reduced them into possession, so that at his death they still con-

tinue chases in action, they shall survive to the wife; for the husband never ex-

erted the power he had of obtaining an exclusive property in them. (p) And

BO, if an estray cornea into the wife's franchise, and the husband seizes it, it is

absolutely his property, but if he dies without seizing it, his executors are not

now at liberty to seize it, but the wife or her heirs; (q) for the husband never

exerted the right he had, which right determined with the coverture. Thus, in

both these species of property the law is the same, in case the wife survives the

husband; but in case the husband survives the wife, the law is very different

F *435 1 w*'k resPec'; t0 chattel* real and chases in action: for he shall have the

"• J chattel real by survivorship, but not the chose en action; (r) except in

the case of arrears for rent, due to the wife before her coverture, which in case

of her death are given to the husband by statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 37. And the

reason for the general law is this: that the husband is in absolute possession of

the chattel real during the coverture, by a kind of joint-tenancy with his wife;

wherefore the law will not wrest it out of his hands, and give it to her repre-

sentatives ; though in case he had died first, it would have survived to the wife;

unless he thought proper in his lifetime to alter the possession. But a chose in

action shall not survive to him, because he never was in possession of it at all

during the coverture; and the only method he had to gain possession of it was
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by suing in his wife's right; but as, after her death he cannot (as husband)

bring an action in her right, because they are no longer one and the same per-

son in law, therefore he can never (as such) recover the possession. But he

still will be entitled to be her administrator; and may,in that capacity, recover

such things in action as become due to her before or during the coverture. (5)

Thus, and upon these reasons, stands the law between husband and wife, with

regard to chattels real and choses in action: but, as to chattels personal, (or

chases) in possession, which the wife hath in her own right, as ready money,

jewels, household goods, and the like, the husband hath therein an immediate

and absolute property, devolved to him by the marriage, not only potentially

but in fact, which never can again revest in the wife or her representatives. (*)

And, as the husband may thus generally acquire a property in all the per-

sonal substance of the wife, so in one particular instance the wife may acquire

a property in some of her husband's goods: which shall remain to her after his

death and not go to his executors. These are called her paraphernalia,

\ *4Sfi 1 *whi°h is a term borrowed from the civil law, (t) and is derived from

"- J the Greek language, signifying something over and above her dower.

Our law uses it to signify the apparel and ornaments of the wife, suitable to her

(p) Co. Litt. 351. (q) Ibid. (r) t Mod. 1W. ftj Co. Lltt. 851. (tj ff. 23, 8, 9, f S.

stock into the wife's name, to which she became entitled during the marriage, will not be con-

sidered as payment or transfer to her husband, so as to defeat tier right by survivorship: 9 Ves.

own; and shall go to his executors or administrators, or as he shall bequeath
them by will, and shall not revest in the wife. But if he <lies before he has
recovered or reduced them into possession, so that at his death they still continue choses in action, they shull survive to the wife; for the husband never exerted the power he had of obtaining an exclusive jroperty in them. (p) And
so, if an estray come.s into the wife's franchise, an the husband seizes it, it is
absolutely bis property, but if he dies without seizing it, his executors are not
now at libert7 to seize it, but the wife or her heirs; (q) for the husband never
exerted the right he had, which right determined with the coverture. Thus, in
both these species of property the luw is the same, in case the wife survives the
husband; but in case the husband survives the wife, the law is very different
[ • 435 ] with respect to clmttel.s real and clwses in action: for he shall have the
cluittel real by survivorship, but not the chose en act-ion; ('r) except in
the case of arrears for rent, due to the wife before her coverture, which in case
of her death are given to the husband by statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 37. And the
reason for the general law is this: that the husband is in absolute possession of
the cltattel real during the coverture, by a kind of joint-tenancy with his wife;
wherefore the law will not wrest it out of his hands, and give it to her representatives; though in case he had died first, it would have survived to the wife;
unless he thought proper in his lifetime to alter the possession. But a chose in
action shall not survive to him, becau6e he never was in possession of it at all
during the coverture; and the only method he had to gain possession of it was
by suing in his wife's right; but as, after her death he cannot (as husband)
bring an action in her right, because they are no longer one and the same person rn law, therefore he can ne,·er (as such) recover the possession. But he
still will be entitled to be her administrator; and may, in that capacity, recover
such things in action as become due to her before or during the coverture. (5)
'l'hus, and upon these reasons, stands the law between husband and wife, with
regard to chattels real and cltoses in action: but, as to chattels personal, (or
choses) in posse&.-;ion, which the wife hath in her own right, as ready money,
jewels, household goods, and the like, the husband hath therein an immediate
and absolute property, devolved to him by the marriage, not only potentially
but in fact, which never can ag"in revest in the wife or her representatives. (s)
And, as the husband may thus generally acquire a property in all the personal substance of the wife, so in one particular instance the wife may acquire
a property in some of her husband's goods: which shall remain to her after his
death and not ~o to his executors. These are called her para:pl1en1alia,
[ • 436 ] *which 1s a term borrowed from the civil law, (t) and is denved from
the Greek language, signifying something over and above her dower.
Our law uses it to signify the apparel and ornaments of the wife, suitable to her

174 ; 16 id. 413 ; but if it is transferred into his name, it is a reduction of it into his possession.

(p)

1 Roper's Law of Hus. and Wife, 218. So if a promissory note be given to the wife, the hus-

Co. Litt. Sil.

(q) Ib44,

(f'JS Mod. 181.

(t)

F/. 23, 3, 9, f S.

band's receipt of tha interest thereon will not defeat the right of the wife by survivorship. 2

Madd. 133. But where the husband does and can bring an action for a chose in action of the

wife, in his own name, and dies after judgment, leaving his wife surviving, his representatives

will be entitled. If, however, she is joined, she will be entitled, and may have a scirefacias

upon such judgment 1 Vein. 396; 2 Ves. Sen. 677 ; 12 Mod. 346; 3 Lev. 403; Soy, 70. And

if previously to marriage she had obtained a judgment, and afterwards she and her husband

sued out a seire facias and had an award of execution, and she died before execution, the prop-

erty would be changed by the award, and belong to the husband as the survivor. 1 Salk. 116;

Koper L. Hus. and wife, 1 vol. 210.]

(5) [By 29 Carr. II, c. 3, s. 25, the husband shall have administration of all his wife's personal

estate, which he did not reduce into his possession before her death, and shaU retain it to his

own use; but ho must first pay his wife's debts before coverture; and if he die before adminis-

tration is granted to him, or he has recovered his wife's property, the right to it passes to his

personal representative, and not to the wife's next of km. 1 F. Wms. 378; 1 Mod. SSI; But-

ler's Co. Litt. 351; 1 Wils. 168.]
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stock into the wife's name, to which she became entitled dnrin~ the marriage, will not be considered as payment or transfer to her huilband, so o.s to defeat her right by survivorship: 9 Ves.
174; 16 id. 4l:J; bnt if it is transferred into his name, it is a reduction of it into his po118e11..~ion.
1 Roper'fl Law of Hus. and Wife, 218. So if a promisR<>ry note be given to the wife, the hu:1band t1 receipt of the interest thereon will not defeat the right of the wife by surrivorsbip. 2
Madd. 133. Dut where the hu:1band does and can bring an action for a chose in action of the
wife, in his own name. and die11 after judgment, leaving his wife survivin~, bis reprcsentath'es
will be entitled. If, however, l!he is joined, she will be entitled, and may have a scil·efacias
npon such judgment. 1 Vern. 396; 2 Ve~. Sen. 677; 12 Mod. 346; 3 Lev. 403; Noy, 70. And
if previouHly to marriage she had obtained a judgment, and afterwards she and her husband
sued out a scire frsci<UJ and bad an award of execution, and she died before execution, the pmperty would be changed by the award, and belong to the husband as the survivor. 1 Salk. 116;
RoJ>er L. Hns. and Wife, 1 vol. 210.]
(5) [lly :l9 Carr. II, c. 3, s. 25, the husband ilhall have administration of all his wife's personal
estate, which he did not reduce into his p<>R:ression before her death, and shall retain 1t to his
own u~ ; but he must fi.l'l!t pay his wife's debts before coverture; and if be die before administration is granted to him, or he has recornred his wife's property, the right to it pa.~seR to his
pe~so~al r~pre.!!~nte.tive •. and not to the wife's next of kin. 1 P. Wms. :m:!; 1 Mod. 2:11; But·
lex 11 Co. Litt. 351; 1Wils.168.]
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rank and degree; and therefore even the jewels of a peeress usually worn by her,

have been held to be paraphernalia, (u) These she becomes entitled to at the

death of her husband, over and above her jointure or dower, and preferably to all

other representatives, (w) Neither can the husband devise by his will such orna-

ments and jewels of his wife; though during his life perhaps he hath the power

(if unkindly inclined to exert it) to sell them or give them away, (a;) But if

she continues in the use of them till hia death, she shall afterwards retain them

against his executors and administrators, and all other persons except creditors

where there is a deficiency of assets, (y) And her necessary apparel is protected

even against the claim of creditors, (z) (6)

VII. A judgment, in consequence of some suit or action in a court of justice,

is frequently the means of vesting the right and property of chattel interests in

the prevailing party. (7) And here we must be careful to distinguish between

property, the right of which is before vested in the party, and of which only

possession is recovered by suit or action; and property to which a man before

had no determinate title or certain claim, but he gains as well the right as the

possession by the process and the judgment of the law. Of the former sort

(u) Moor. 213. (») Cro. Car. 8tt. 1 Roll. Abr. 911. 2 Leon. 168.

(x) Nov'a Max. c. 49. Gnihme v. 1x1. Londonderry, 24 Nov. 1748. Cano.

fy) 1 P'. Wins. 730. (*) Noy's Max. o. 48.

(6) [The husband may dispose absolutely of his wife's jewels or other paraphernalia in his

rank and degree; and therefore even the jewels of a pooress usually worn by her,
have been held to be[arapkernalia. (u) These she becomes entitled to at the
death of her husban , over and above her jointure or dower, and preferably to all
other representatives. (w) Neither can the husband devise by his will such ornaments and jewels of his wife; though during his life perhaps he ha.th the power
(if unkindly inclined to exert it) to sell them or give them away. (x) But if
she continues in the use of them till his death, she shall afterwards retain them
against his executors and administra.t-0rs, and all other persons except creditors
where there is a deficiency of assets. (y) And her necessary apparel is protected
even against the claim of creditors. (z) (6)
VII. A judgment, in consequence of some snit or action in a court of justice,
is frequently the means of vesting the right and property of chattel interests in
the prevailing party. (7) And here we must be careful to distinguish between
property, the rigM of which is before vested in the party, and of which only
possession is recovered by suit or action; and property to which a man before
had no determinate title or certain claim, but he gains as well the right as the
possession by the process and the judgment of the law. Of the former sort
(u) Moor. 213.
(tD) Cro. Car. 8l:l. 1 Roll. Ahr. 911. 2 Leon. 166.
(:r) :S-oy's Max. c. (9. Grl\h1ne "· Ld. Lon<lun<le1Ty, 2i Nov. 17.f8. Cano.
(fl) 1 P. Wma. 730.
(•) Noy'a Max. c. "'9.

lifetime. 3 Atk. 394. And although after his death they are liable to his debt*, if his personal
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estate is exhausted, yet the widow may recover from the heir the amount of what she ia obliged

to pay in consequence of her husband's specialty creditors obtaining payment out of her para-

phernalia. 1 P. Wins. 730; 3 Atk. 369, 393.

But she is not entitled to them after his death, if she has barred herself by an agreement be-

fore marriage of every thing she could claim out of his personal estate either by the common

law or custom. 2 Atk. 642.

Where the husband permits the wife to make profit of certain articles for her own use, or

in consideration of her supplying the family with particular necessaries, or makes her a

yearly allowance for keeping house, the profits or savings will be considered in equity as the

wife's own separate estate. Sir P. Neat's case, cited in Herbert v. Herbert, Pre. Ch. 44 ; 3 P.

Wins. 337; 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 156, in inarg.; except as against creditors , Pre. Ch. 297 ; sec also 1

Vern. 244; 2 id. 535; 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 346, pi. 18; 1 Atk. 278. And she may dispose of her

separate estate by anticipation, and her right of alienation is absolute, unless she is expressly

restrained by the settlement. Jackson r. Hobhouse, 2 Meriv. 483; 11 Tes. 222; 1 Ves. Jun.

189 ; 3 Bro.'C. C. 340, S. C.; 12 Ves. 501; 14 id. 302. A husband's agreement before marriage

that a wife shall have separate property, converts him into her trustee: see 1 Ventr. 193;

29 Ch. II, c. 3, g. 4 ; 1 Ves. Jun. 196; 12 Ves. 67 ; unless by fraud of the husband he prevents

the agreement from being reduced to writing. Montacnte v. Maxwell, 1 P. Wms. 620; 1 Stra.

236, S. C.]

The statutes of the American states not only save to the widow her own paraphernalia, but

generally give her also the wearing apparel aud personal ornaments of the husband, besides set-

ting apart Tor her use other personal property to some specified amount, to the exclusion of the

claims of creditors. In some of the states, also, the court having jurisdiction in the settlement

of the estate is empowered to make provisions from the assets for the support of the widow and

children, if any, while the settlement is in progress.

(7) And sometimes also in the defeated party; for if the plaintiff in an action of trespass

de bonis asportatis, or trover, recovers judgment and obtains satisfaction, the title to the

property is transferred from the plaiutiff to the defendant; the damages recovered being con-

Bidered'in law the price of the chattel so transferred. And indeed it has in several cases been

held that the judgment alone, without satisfaction, will change the property. Brown v. Wot-

ton, Cro. Jac. 73; Adams v. Broughton, Strange, 1078; Rogers ». Moors, 1 Rice, 60; White

v. Philbrick, 5 Greenl. 147; Carbsle v. Buriov, 3 id. 250; Murrell ». Johnson's Adur'r, 1

H. and M. 452; Floyd v. Browne, 1 Rawle, 121; Marsh c. Pier, 4 id. 273; Pox v.

Northern Liberties, 3 W. and S. 107; Merrick's Estate, 5 W. and S. 17; Foreman v. Neilson,

2 Rich. Eq. 287 ; Hunt v. Bates, 7 R. I. 217. But there are many other cases which treat the

judgment as a security merely, which does not deprive the plaintiff of any other right until

the security has actually been made available by producing payment. Sturtevant v. Water-

bury, 2 Hall, 449; Curtis v. Groat, 6 Johns. 168; Osterhout v. Roberts, 8 Cow. 43; Morris v.

Berkley, 2 Rep. Con. Ct. 228 ; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aiken. 203; Elliott v. Porter, 5 Dana,

(6) [The hmiband may di!ipose ab!lolntely of his wife's jewels or other paraphornRlia in his
lifetime. 3 .A.tk. 394. And although after hi1:1 death they are liable to his debt>!, if his personal
estate iR exhausted, yet the widow may recover from the Mn- the amount of what she is o!Jliged
to pay in consequence of her husband's Rpccialty creditors obtaining payment out of her par&pherualia. 1 P. Wms. 730; 3 .A.tk. 369, 393.
But she is not entitled to them all.er his death, if she has barred hel'l!elf by an agreement before marriage of every thing she couhl claim out of his personal estate either by the common
law or cu!ltom. 2 Atk. 642.
Where the husband permits the wife to mRke profit of certain articles for her own use, or
in con.;iderstion of her supplying the family with particular neces.-.aries, or makes her a
yearly allowance for keeping house, the profits or savings will be considered in equity as the
wife's own separate estate. Sir P. Neal't1 ca.~e. cited in Herbert ti. Herbert, Pre. Ch. 44; 3 P.
Wms. 337; 2 Eq. Ca. Ahr. 156, in marg.; except as against creditors, Pre. Ch. 297; sec al"o 1
Vern. 244; 2 id. 535; 1 E9· Ca. .A.br. :W6, pl. 18; 1 .A.tk. 278. And she may di.-p<•>Mi of her
separate estate by o.nticipat10n, and her right of alienation it1 absolute, unless she 18 expreso,ily
restrained IJy the 11ettlement. Jackson 11. Hobhouee, 2 Meriv. 483; 11 Ves. 222; 1 Ves. Jun.
189 ; 3 Bro. C. C. 340, S. C. ; 12 Ves. 501 ; 14 id. 30.:l. A husband's agreement before marriage
that a wife shall have separate property, converts him into her trustee: l\ee 1 Ventr. rn:t;
29 Ch. II, c. 3, s. 4; 1 Ves. .Jun. 196; 1:! Vcs. 67; unless lly fraud of the hnslland he prevents
the agreement from being reduced to writing. Montacute ti. Maxwell, 1 P. Wms. 620; 1 Stra.
236, S. C.]
The statutes of the American states not only so.ve to the widow her own paraphernalia, bnt
generally give her also the wearing apparel aud personal ornaments of the husband, buside;i settins apart for bar use other per..anal property to some specified amount, to the exclusion of the
c!B1ms of creditors. In some of the ~tates, also, the court having jurisdiction in the settlement
of the estate is empowered to make provhi.ions from the 88Set8 for the suppurt of the widow and
children, if any, while tho settlemant is in progre,;s.
(7) And sometimes also in the detented party; for if the :plaintiff in an action of trespags
~ lwni.!1 asportati.11, or trover, recm·ers judgment and obtams satisfaction, the title to the
property is trarn~ferred from the pla.iutiff to tho defendant ; the damages recovered being con11idered.in Jaw the price of the chattel so tmmcferred. And indeed it has in several c&11es been
held that the judgment alone, without satisfaction, will change the property. ~rown fl. WC!tt.on, Cro. Jac. 73; .A.dams ti. Brou~hton, Strange, 1078; Rogers ti. Moors, 1 Rice, 60; White
.,, Philbrick, 5 Greeol. 147; Carh:!le fl. Burley, 3 id. 250; Murrell ti. Johnson's Adm'r, 1
H. and M. 452; Floyd v. Drowne, 1 Rawle, 121 ; Marsh v. Pier, 4 id. 273 ; !''ox v.
Northern Libcrtic~. 3 W. and S. 107; .Merrick'~ Estate, 5 W. and 8. 17; Foreman ti. Neilson,
2 Rich. Eq. 287 ; Hunt 11. Bates, 1 R. I. 217. Bat there are man~· other 08868 which treat tho
judgment Bl:l a security merely, which does not deprive the plaintiff of any other right until
the security ha.'I actually been made available by producing payment. Sturtevant v. Waterburv, 2 Hall, 449; Cortis ti. Groat, 6 Johns. 168; Osterhout"· Roberts, 8 Cow. 43; Morris ti.
Berkley, 2 Rep. Con. Ct. 228; ~auden1on 11. C~ldwell, 2 .Aiken, 203; Elliott v. Porter, 5 Dana,
200; Campbell v. Phelps, 1 Pick. 70, per Wilde J.; Sharp"· Gray, 6 B. Monr. 4; Hepburn v.
Sewell, 5 Har. and J. 211 ; Spi\·ey ti. Morris, 18 Ala. 254; Drake v. Mitchell, 3 East, ~. per
Ellenborough, Ch. J.; Cooper ti. Shepherd, 3 C. B. 266. And this seems the most reasoDBble
doctrine.

299; Campbell v. Phelps, 1 Pick. 70, per Wilde J.; Sharp «. Gray, 5 B. Monr. 4; Hepburn v.

Sewell, 5 Har. and J. 211; Spivey v. Morris, 18 Ala. 254; Drake v. Mitchell, 3 East, 258, per

Elleuborough, Ch. J.; Cooper v. Shepherd, 3 C. B. 266. And this seems the most reasonable

doctrine.
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are all debts and choses in action; as if a man gives bond for 20/., or agrees to

buy a horse at a stated sum, or takes up goods of a tradesman upon an implied

contract to pay as much as they are reasonably worth: in all these cases the

right accrues to the creditor, and is completely vested in him, at the time of the

bond being sealed, or the contract or agreement made; and the law only gives

him a remedy to recover the possession of that right, which already in justice

r *4jj™ -i belongs to him. *But there is also a species of property "to which a

' J man has not any claim or title whatsoever, till after suit commenced and

judgment obtained in a court of law: where the right and the remedy do not fol-

low each other, as in common cases, but accrue at one and the same time: and

where, before judgment had, no man can say that he has any absolute property,

either in possession or in action. Of this nature are,

1. Such penalties as are given by particular statutes, to be recovered on an

action popular ; or, in other words, to be recovered by him or them that will sue

for the same. Such as the penalty of 500£, which those persons are by several

acts of parliament made liable to forfeit, that, being in particular offices or sit-

uations in life, neglect to take the oaths to the government: which penalty is

given to him or them that will sue for the same. Now here it is clear that no

particular person, A or B, has any right, claim or demand, in or upon this penal

sum, till after action brought; (a) for he that brings his action, and can bona

fide obtain judgment first, will undoubtedly secure a title to it, in exclusion of

everybody else. He obtains an inchoate imperfect degree of property, by com-
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mencing his suit: but it is not consummated till judgment; for, if any collu-

sion appears, he loses the priority he had gained, (b) But, otherwise, the right

so attaches in the first informer, that the king (who before action brought may

grant a pardon which shall be a bar to all the world) cannot after suit com-

menced remit anything but his own part of the penalty, (c) For by commenc-

ing the suit the informer has made the popular action his own private action,

and it is not in the power of the crown, or of any thing but parliament, to

release the informer's interest. This, therefore, is one instance, where a suit and

r *4og -i judgment at law are *not only the means of recovering, but also of

' J acquiring, property. And what is said of this one penalty is equally

true of all others, that are given thus at large to a common informer, or to any

person that will sue for the same. They are placed, as it were, in a state of

nature, accessible by all the king's subjects, but the acquired right of none of

them; open therefore to the first occupant, who declares his intention to possess

them by bringing his action; and who carries that intention into execution, by

obtaining judgment to recover them. (8)

2. Another species of property, that is acquired and lost by suit and judg-

ment at law, is that of damages given to a man by a jury, as a compensation

and satisfaction for some injury sustained; as for a battery, for imprisonment,

for slander or for trespass. Here the plaintiff has no certain demand till after

verdict; but, when the jury has assessed his damages, and judgment is given

thereupon, whether they amount to twenty pounds or twenty shillings, he

instantly acquires, and the defendant loses at the same time, a right to that

specific sum. It is true, that this is not an acquisition so perfectly original as

in the former instance: for here the injured party has unquestionably a vague

and indeterminate right to some damages or other the instant he receives the

injury ; and the verdict of the jurors, and judgment of the court thereupon, do

not in this case so properly vest a new title in him, as fix and ascertain the old

one; they do not give, but define, the right. But, however, though strictly

speaking, the primary right to a satisfaction for injuries is given by the law of

nature, and the suit is only the means of ascertaining and recovering that

fa) 2 Lev. 141. Stra. 1169. Combe c. Pitt. B. B. Tr. 8 Gco. III.

fbj Stat. 4 Hen. VH, 0. 20. (c) Cro. Eliz. 13S. 11 Rep. 65.

(8) The right to a penalty given by statute roav at any time before recovery be taken away by

statute. Oriental Bauk v. Freeze, 6"Shep. 109; Confiscation Cases, 7 Wai. 454.

620

are all debts and clioses in act-ion; as if a man gives bond for 201., or agrees to
buy a horse at a stated sum, or takes up goods of a tradesman upon an implied
contract to pay as much as they are reasonably worth: in all these cases the
right accrues to the creditor, and is completely vest{ld in him, at the time of the
bond being sealed, or the contract or agreement made; and the law only gives
him a remedy to recover the possession of that right, which already in justice
[ • 437 ] belongs to him. *But there is also a species of pro:perty to which a
man has not any claim or title whatsoever, till after suit commenced and
, judgment obtained in a court of law: where the right and the remedy do not follow each other, as in common cases, but accrue at one and the same time: and
where, before judgment had, no man can say that he has any absolute property,
either in possession or in action. Of this nature are,
1. Such penalties as are given by particular statutes, to be recovered on an
action popular; or, in other words, to be recovered by him or them that will sue
for the same. Such as the penalty of 5001., which those persons are by sernral
acts of parliament made liable to forfeit, that, being in particular offices or situations in life, neglect to take the oaths to the government: which penalty is
given to him or them that will sue for the same. Now here it is clear that no
particular person, A or B, has any right, claim or demand, in or upon this penal
sum, till after action brought; (a) for he that brings his action, and can bona
fide obtain judgment first, will undoubtedly secure a title to it, in exclusion of
everybody else. He obtains an inchoate imperfect deuree of property, by com- mencing his suit: but it is not consummated till juJ'gment; for, if any collusion appears, he loses the priority he had gained. (b) But, otherwise, the right
so attaches in the first informer, that the king (who before action brought may
grant a pardon which shall be a bar to all the world) cannot after suit com~
menced remit anything but his own part of the penalty. (c) For by commencing the suit the informer has made the popular action his own p1irnte action,
and it is not in the power of the crown, or of any thing but parliament, to
release the informer's interest. This, therefore, is one instance, where a suit and
[ • 438 ] judgment at law are •not only the means of recovering, but also of
acquiring, property. And what is said of this one penalty is equally
true of all others, that a.re given thus at large to a common informer, or to any
person that will sue for the same. 'rl1ey arc placed, as it were, in a state of
nature, accessible by all the king's subjects, but the acquired right of none of
them; open therefore to the first occupant, who declares bis inl{lntion to poss~
them by brin~ing his action; and who calTies that intention into execution, by
obtaining judgment to recover them. (8)
2. Another species of property, that is acquired and lost by snit and judgment at law, is that of damages given to a man by a jury, as a compensation
and satisfaction for some injurv sustained; as for a batten', for imprisonment.,
for slander or for trespass. Here the plaintiff has no certain demand till after
verdict; but, when the jury has assessed his damages, and judgment is given
thereupon, whether they amount to twenty pounds or twenty shillings, he
instantly acquires, and the defendant loses at the same time, a right to that
specific sum. It is true, that this is n.ot an acquisition so perfectly original as
in the former instance: for here the injured party has unquestionably a vague
and indeterminate ri~ht to some damages or other the instant he receives the
injury; and the verdict of the jurors, and judgment of the court thereupon, do
not in this case so properly vest a new title in him, as fix and ssccrtain the old
one; they do not give, but define, the right. But, however, though strictll
speaking, the primary right to a satisfaction for injuries is given by the law o
nature, and the suit is only the means of ascertaining and recovering that
(11)
(b)

2 Lev. 141. Stm. 1169. Combe"· Pitt. B. R. Tr. S Geo. Ill.
Stilt.' Hen. VIl, c. 20.
(C) Cro. Eli&. 133. 11 !Wp. 66.

(8) The right to B penalty given by statut~ mav st e.ny time before recovery be taken away by
statute. Oriental Bank v. Freeze, 6 Shep. 109; Confiscation C~es, i Wal. 454.
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satisfaction; yet, as the legal proceedings are the only risible means of this

acquisition of property, we may fairly enough rank such damages, or satisfac-

tion assessed, under the head of property acquired by suit and judgment at

law.

*3. Hither also may be referred, upon the same principle, all title to r *^g -,

costs and expenses of suit; which are often arbitrary, and rest entirely *• "' •

on the determination of the court, upon weighing all circumstances, both as to

the quantum, and also (in the courts of equity especially, and upon motions in

the courts of law,) whether there shall be any costs at all. These costs, there-

fore, when given by the court to either party may be looked upon as an acquisi-

tion made by the judgment of law.

CHAPTER XXX.

satisfaction; yet, as the legal proceedings are the only visible means of this
acquisition of' property, we may fairly enough rank such damages, or satisfaction assessed, under the head of property acqufred by suit and judgment at
law.
*3. Hither also may be referred, upon the same principle, all title to [ ,.. 439 ]
·
costs and expenses of suit; which are often arbitrary, and rest entirely
on the determination of the conrt, upon weighing all circnmstances, both as to
the quantum, and also (in the courts of equity especially, and upon motions in
the courts of law,) whether there shall be any costs at all. These costs, therefore, when given by the court to either party may be looked upon as an acquisition made by the judgment of law.

OF TITLE BY GIFT, GRANT AND CONTRACT.

WE are now to proceed, according to the order marked out, to the discussion

of two of the remaining methods of acquiring a title to property in things per-

sonal, which are much connected together, and answer in some measure to the

conveyances of real estates; being those by gift or grant, and by contract: whereof

the former vests a property in possession, the latter a property in action.

CHAPTER XXX.

VIII. Gifts then, or grants, which are the eighth method of transferring per-

sonal property, are thus to be distinguished from each other, that gifts are

always gratuitous, grants are upon some consideration or equivalent; and they

OF TITLE BY GIFT, GRANT AND CONTRACT.

may be divided, with regard to their subject-matter, into gifts or grants of chat-
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tels real, and gifts or grants of chattels personal. Under the head of gifts or

grants of chattels real, may be included all leases for years of land, assignments,

and surrenders of those leases; and all the other methods of conveying an

estate less than freehold, which were considered in the twentieth chapter oi the

present book, and therefore need not be here again repeated: though these very

seldom carry the outward appearance of a gift, however freely bestowed; being

usually expressed to be made in consideration of blood, or natural affection, or

of five or ten shillings nominally paid to the grantor; and, in case of leases,

always reserving a rent, though it be but a pepper corn : any of which consid-

erations will, in the eye of the law, convert the gift, if executed, into a grant; if

not executed, into a contract.

*Grants or gifts, of chattels personal,(l) are the act of transferring r *,,.. -•

the right and the possession of them; whereby one man renounces, and *• •"

(1) [A gift or grant of personal property may be by parol. 3 M. and S. 7. But when an

assignment is for a valuable consideration, it is usually in writing; and when confined merely

to personalty, is termed a bill of sale. An assignment, or covenant, does not pass after-

acquired personal property: 5 Taunt. 212; but where there has been a subsequent change of

new for old articles, and the assignment is afterwards set aside, it will in general be left to a

jury to say, whether the new were not substituted for the old. In general there should be an

immediate change of possession, or the assignment made notorious, or creditors, who were

ignorant of the transfer, may treat it as fraudulent and void, on the ground that the grantor

was, by his continuance of possession, enabled to gain a false credit. Twyne's Cose, 3 Co. 81,

gee cases, Tidd. Prac. 8th ed. 1043, 1044; 1 Campb. 333, 334; 5 Taunt. 212. As to the noto-

riety of the sale, 2 B. and P. 59; 8 Taunt. 838; 1 B. Moore, 189. If possession be taken at

WE are now to proceed, according to the order m11.rked out, to the discussion
of two of the remaining methods ot' acquiring a title to :property in things personal, which are much connect-0d together, and answer m some measure to the
conveyances of real estates; being those by gift or grant, and by contract: whereof
the former vests a. property in possession, the latter a property in action.
VIII. Gifts then, or grants, which a.re the eighth method of transferrin~ personal property, are thus to be distinguished from ea.ch other, that gijZs are
always gratuitous, grants are upon some consideration or equivalent; and they
mav be divided, with regard to their subject-matter, into gifts or grants of chattels real, and gifts or grants of chattels personal. Under the head of gifts or
grants of chattels real, may be included all leases for years of land, assignments,
and surrenders of those leases; and all the other methods of conveyin~ an
estate less than freehold, which were considered in the twentieth chapter of the
present book, and therefore need not be here again repeated: though these very
seldom carry the outward appearance of a gift, however freely bestowed; being
usually expressed to be made in consideration of blood, or natural affection, or
of five or ten shillings nominally paid to the grantor; and, in case of leases,
always reserving a rent, though it be but a pepper corn : any of which considerations will, in the eye of the law, convert the gift, if executed, into a grant; if
not executed, into a contract.
*Grants or gifts, of chatt<'ls personal, (1) are the act of transferring [ • 441 ]
the right and the possession of them; whereby one man renounces, and

auy'time before an adverse execution, though long after the date of the deed, it seems it will

be valid. 15 East, 21. An assignment to a creditor of all a party's effects, in trust for him-

self and other creditors, is valid. 3 M. and S. 517. And as a debtor may prefer one creditor

to another, he may, on the eve of an execution of one creditor, assign his property to

another, so a* to satisfy the latter, and leave the other unpaid. 5 T. R. 235. But an assign-

ment made by way of sale, to a person not a creditor, in order to defeat au execution, will, if
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(1) [A gift or grant of personal property may be by paroL 3M. and 8. 7. But when an
is for a ''o.luable consideration, it is usually in writing ; and when llOnfined merely
to personalty, ie tenued a bill of !<ale. An a~;iignment, or covenaut, does not pa.'li! afteraequirud personal property: 5 Tl\unt. 212; hut where there bas been a subsequent change of
new for old article:<, and the 8Sl!ignment is afterwanls 110t aside, it will in p:enen\l be left to a
)nry to say, whether the new were not Kubstituted for the old. In general there should be an
mnnediate change of possession, or the &.'!signment made notorious, or creditors, who were
ignorant of the transfor, may treat it a.~ fraudulent and void, on the ground that the i,rrantor
was, by hi:i continuance of possession, enabled to gain a false credit. Twyne's Case, 3 Co. 81,
see cases, Tidd. Prsc. ~th ed. 1043, 1044 ; 1 Ce.mph. 33.1, 334 ; 5 Taunt. 212. .As to the notoriety of the sale, 2 B. and P. 59; 8 Taunt. 838 ; 1 B. Moore, 189. If possei1sion be taken at
any time before au adveri;e execution, though Ion~ after the date of the deed, it seeruil it will
be 'f'alid. 15 Ea~t, 21. An a:1signment to a creditor of all a party's effects, in trust for himself and other creditorf!, is valid. 3M. and S. 517. And &'! a debtor may prefer one creditor
to another, ho may, on .the eve of an execution of one creditor, assign bis pro1:ierty to
another, so a.~ to R&t1:1fy the latter, and leave the otbor unpaid. 5 T. R. 235. But au a:1signment wade by way of sale, tu a pol'llun not a creditor, in order to defeat an execution, will, if
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another man immediately acquires, all title and interest therein, which may be

done either in writing, or by word of mouth, (a) attested by sufficient evidence,

of which the delivery of possession is the strongest and most essential. But

this conveyance, when merely voluntary, is somewhat suspicious; and is usually

construed to be fraudulent, if creditors or others become sufferers thereby.

And, particularly, by statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 4, all deeds of gifts of goods, made

in trust to the use of the donor, shall be void: because otherwise persons might

be tempted to commit treason or felony, without danger of forfeiture; and the

creditors of the donor might also be defrauded of their rights. And by statute

13 Eliz. c. 5, every grant or gift of chattels, as well as lands, with an intent to

defraud creditors or others, (o) shall be void as against such persons to whom such

fraud would be prejudicial; but, as against the grantor himself, shall stand good

and effectual; and all persons partakers in, or privy to, such fraudulent grants,

shall forfeit the whole value of the goods, one moiety to the king, and another,

moiety to the party grieved; and also on conviction shall suffer imprisonment

for half a year.

A true and proper gift or grant is always accompanied with delivery of pos-

session, and takes effect immediately, (2) as if A gives to B 1001., or a flock of

sheep, and puts him in possession of them directly, it is then a gift executed in

the donee; and it is not in the donor's power to retract it, though he did it

without any consideration or recompense: (c) unless it be prejudicial to credit-

ors ; or the donor were under any legal incapacity, as infancy, coverture, duress,
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or the like; or if he were drawn in, circumvented or imposed upon, by false

pretences, ebriety, or surprise. But if the gift does not take effect, by delivery

of immediate possession, it is then not properly a gift, but a contract;

f *442 1 *an^ "lis a man cann°t be compelled to perform, but upon good and

*• •• sufficient consideration; as we shall see under our next division.

IX. A contract, which usually conveys an interest merely in action, is thus

defined: "an agreement upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a

particular thing." From which definition there arise three points to be con-

templated in all contracts; 1. The agreement; 2. The consideration; and 3.

The thing to be done or omitted, or the different species of contracts.

First then it is an agreement, a mutual bargain or convention; and therefore

there must at least be two contracting parties, of sufficient ability to make a

contract; as where A contracts with B to pay him 1001. and thereby transfers

a property in such sum to B. Which property is however not in possession,

but in action merely, and recoverable by suit at law ; wherefore it could not be

transferred to another person bv the strict rules of the ancient common law;

for no chose in action could be assigned or granted over, (d) because it was

thought to be a great encouragement to litigiousness, if a man were allowed to

make over to a stranger his right of going to law. But this nicety is now dis-

regarded : though in compliance with the ancient principle, the form of assign-

ing a chose in action is in the nature of a declaration of trust, and an agree-

(a) Perk. \ 57. (b) See S Rep. 82. (c)Jeak. 109. (d) Co. Lltt. JU.

the purchaser (new that intention, be void, although he paid a full price for the goods. 1

East, 51; 1 Burr. 474.] See Burrill on Assignments, passim.

That gifts prejudicial to existing creditors are void, see 1 Para, on Cont. 5th ed. 235. They

another man immediately acquires, all title and interest therein, which may be
done either in writing, or by word of mouth, (a) attested bv sufficient evidence,
of which the delivery of possession is the strongest and ~most essential. But
this conveyance, when merely voluntary, is somewhat suspicious; and is usually
construed to be fraudulent, if creditors or others become suffe.rers therebv.
And, particularly, by statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 4, !!.Il deeds of gifts of goods, made
in trust to the use of the donor, shall be void: because otherwise persons might
be tempted to commit treason or felony, without danger of forfeit.nrc; and the
creditors of the donor might also be defrauded of their rights. And by statute
13 Eliz. c. 5, every grant or gift of chattels, as well as lands, with an mt.ent to
defraud creditors or others, ( b) shall be void as against such persons to whom such
fraud would be prejudicial; but, as against the grantor himself, shall stand good
and effectual; and all persons partakers in, or privy to, such fraudulent grants,
shall forfeit the whole value of the goods, one moiety to the king, and another,
moiety to the party grieved; and also on conviction shall suffer imprisornent
for half a year.
A true and proper gift or grant is always accompanied with delivery of possession, and takes effect immediately, (2) as if A gives to B 1001., or a flock of
sheep, and puts him in possession of them directly, it is then a gift executed in
the donee; and it is not in the donor's power to retract it, though he did it
without any consideration or recompense: (c) unless it be prejudicial to creditors; or the donor were under any legal incapacity, as infancy, coverture, duress,
or the like; or if he were drawn in, circumvented or imposed upon, by false
pretences, ebriety, or surprise. But if the gift doea not take effect, by delivery
of immediate possession, it is then not properly a gift, but a contract;
[ ,..442 ] *and this a man cannot be compelled to perform, but upon good and
sufficient consideration; as we shall see under our next division.
IX. A contract, which usually conveys an interest merely in action, is thus
defined: "an agreement upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a
particular thing." From which definition there arise three points t-0 be cont.emplated in all contracts; I. The agreenunt; 2. The consideration; and 3.
The thing to be done or omitted, or the different species of contracts.
First then it is an agreement, a mutual bargain or convention; and thel'(lfore
there must at least be two contracting parties, of sufficient ability to make a
contract; as where A contracts with B to pay him lOOl. and thereby transfers
a property in such sum to B. Which property is however not in possession,
but in action merely, and recoverable by snit at law ; wherefore it could not be
transferred to another person bv the strict rnles of the ancient common law;
for no chose in action could he assigned or granted over, (d) because it was
thought to be a great encouragement to litigiousness, if a man were allowed to
make over to a stranger his right of going to law. But this nicety is now disregarded: though in compliance with the ancient principle, the form of assigning a chose in action is in the nature of a declaration of trust, and an agree(a)

may also be void as to subsequent creditors if made under actual or expected insolvency, or

Perk. J 117.

(b) See 3 Rep. 8'J.

(c)

Jenk. 109.

(d) Co. Litt. 21'.

with fraudulent intent as to such subsequent creditors. Id.

(2) Delivery is essential to a gift. Noble e. Smith, 2 Johns. 52; Withers v. Weaver, 10 Penn.

St. 391; Sims ». Sims. 2 Ala. 117 ; Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 Vt. 595. It has been held, however,

that if the gift be evidenced by writing it is sufficient without delivery. Cranz ». Kroger, 22

HI. 74. But this may be questionable. But a constructive delivery is sufficient when an

actual delivery is impracticable. Williams on Pens. Prop. IM.

[And now by the statute 17 and 18 Vic. c. 36, s. 1, bills of sale, which is the actual denomi-

nation of a grant of chattels personal, must be tiled with the clerk of docquets and judg-y

ments in the court of queen's bench within twenty-one days after the making or giving them ^

otherwise any such grant will, as against awignees in bankruptcy or insolvency, or creditonu.

be null and void.]
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the purohaser Truew that intention, be void, although he paid a full price for the goods. 1
Ea.o1t, 51 ; 1 Burr. 474.1 See Burrill on Assignments, passim.
That gift.ii prejudicial to existing creditors are void, seo 1 Paril. on Cont. 5th ed. 235. Thriy
may also be void all to subsequent creditors if ~ade under actual or expected insoh"eucy, or
with fraudulent intent 88 to such subsequeut creditors. Id.
(2) Delivery is essential to a gift. Noble ti. Smith, 2Johns. 52; Withers ti. Weaver, lO Penn.
St. :¥.11; Sim;; v. SlmR, 2 .Ala. 117; Carpenter"· Dodge, 20 Vt. 595. It has been held, bnwe;or,
that if the gift be eridenced by writing it is sufficient without delivery. Cran.z "· Kroger, 22
Ill. 74. Dut this mar be questionable. But a constructive delivery is sufficient when an
!Actual delivery is imprncticablc. Williams on Pen1. Prop. :14.
(And now by the statute 17 and 18 Vic. c. 36, s. 1, bills f!f sale, which is the actual dc~omi- .
nation of a grant of chattel& personal, must be filed with the clerk of docquets and JUdg- ·
ments in the court of queen'11 bench within twenty-one days after the making or giving tlmm '
otherwise any such gr11.11t will, as ag&inat &Sl!ignees in bankrupt-0y or irumlvency, or creilitoni..,
be null and void.]
,
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ment to permit the assignee to make use of the name of the assignor, in order

to recover the possession. And, therefore, when in common acceptation a debt

or bond is said to be assigned over, it must still be sued in the original creditor's

name; the person to whom it is transferred being rather an attorney than an

assignee. (3) But the king is an exception to this general rule, for he might

always either grant or receive a chose in action by assignment: (e) and our

courts of equity, considering that in a commercial country almost all personal

property must necessarily lie in contract, will protect the assignment of a chose

in action, as the law will that of a chose in possession. (/)

*This contract or agreement may be either express or implied. Ex- r „,,,, -•

press contracts are where the terms of the agreement are openly uttered "• -"

and avowed at the time of the making, as to deliver an ox, or ten loads of tim-

ber, or to pay a stated price for certain goods. Implied, are such as reason and

justice dictate, and which therefore the law presumes that every man under-

takes to perform. As, if I employ a person to do any business for me, or per-

form any work; the law implies that I undertook, or contracted, to pay him as

much as his labour deserves. If I take up wares from a tradesman, without

any agreement of price, the law concludes that I contracted to pay their real

value. And there is also one species of implied contracts, which runs through

and is annexed to all other contracts, conditions, and covenants, viz: that if I

fail in my part of the agreement, I shall pay the other party such damages as

he has sustained by such my neglect or refusal. In short, almost all the rights
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of personal property (when not in actual possession) do in great measure

depend upon contracts, of one kind or other, or at least might be reduced

under some of them: which indeed is the method taken by the civil law; it

having referred the greatest part of the duties and rights, which it treats of, to

the head of obligations ex contractu and quasi ex contractu. (g)

A contract may also be either executed, as if A agrees to change horses with

• B, and they do it immediately; in which case the posssesion and the right are

transferred together: or it may be executory, as if they agree to change next

week; here the right only vests, and their reciprocal property in each other's

horse is not in possession but in action; fora contract executed (which differs

nothing from a grant) conveys a chose in possession ; a contract executory con-

veys only a chose in action.

Saving thus shown the general nature of a contract, we are, secondly, to

proceed to the consideration upon which it is founded; or the reason which

moves the contracting party to *enter into the contract "It is an , + ... -,

agreement, upon sufficient consideration." The civilians hold, that in L J

all contracts, either express or implied, there must be something given in

exchange, something that is mutual or reciprocal, (h) This thing, which is

the price or motive of the contract, we call the consideration; and it must be

a thing lawful in itself, or else the contract is void. A good consideration, we

have before seen, (t) is that of blood or natural affection between near rela-

tions ; the satisfaction accruing from which the law esteems an equivalent for

whatever benefit may move from one relation to another. (/) This cousidera-

('•) Dyer, 30. Bro. Abr. tit. ckoK in octtoa, 1 and 4. <f) 3 P. Wins. 199. (;/) Intt. 3. 14, 2.

fh) In omiiOxu coniractibut, tire nomlaatit, give innomtnatii, permutatio continetur. Gravin. I. i. 1 12.

(t) Page 287. (JJ 3 ttep. 83.

(3) There are several exceptions to this rale. Bills of exchange when made payable to order

were negotiable by the law merchant, and the person U> whom they were indorsed might bring

Bait in his own name. The statute 3 and 4 Anne, c. 9, pnt promissory notes on the same footing,

ment to }K'nnit the assignee to make use of the name of the assignor, in order
to recover the possession. And, therefore, when in common acceptation a debt
or bond is said to oo assigned over, it must still be sued in the original creditor's
name; the person to whom it is transferred bein~ rather an attorney than an
assignee. (3) Bnt the king is an exception to this general rule, for he might
always either grant or receive a clwse in action by assignment: (e) and our
courts of equity, considering that in a commercial country almost all personal
property must necessarily lie in contract, will protect the assignment of a chose
m action, as the law will that of a chose in possession. (/)
*This contract or agreement may be either express or implied. Ex- [ • 443 ]
press contracts are where the terms of the agreement are openly uttered
and avowed at the time of the ma.king, as to deliver an ox, or ten loads of timber, or to pay a stated price for certain goods. Implied, are snch as reason and
justice dictate, and which therefore the law presumes that every man undertakes to perform. As, if I employ a. person to do any business for me, or perform any work; the law implif's that I undertook, or contracted, to pay him as
much as his labour deserves. If I take up wares from a tradesman, without
any agreement of price, the law concludes that I contracted to pay their real
valne. And there 1s also one species of implied contracts, which rnns through
and is annexed to all other contracts, conditions, and covenants, viz: that if I
fa.ii in my part of the agreement, I shall pay the other party such damages as
he has sustained by such my neglect or refusal. In i!hort, almost all the rights
of personal property (when not in actual possession) do in great measure
depend upon contracts, of one kind or other, or at 1east might be reduced
under some of them: which indeed is the method taken by the civil law; it
having referred the greatest part of the duties and rights, which it treats of, to
the head of obligations ex confractu and quasi. ex contractu. ( g)
A contract may also be either executed, as if A agrees to change horses with
• B, and they do it immediately; in which case the posssesion and the right are
transferred together: or it may be executory, as if they agree to change next
week; here the right only vests, and their reciprocal property in each other's
horse is not in possession but in action; for a contract exe(,-uted (which differs
nothing from a grant) conveys a chose in possessi.on; a contract executory conveys only a ch-Ose in action.
Having thus shown the general nature of a contract, we are, secondly, to
proceed to the oonsideratfr:m upon which it is founded; or the reason which
moves the contracting party to *enter into the contract. "It is an *
agreement, upon sufficient consi.deration." The civilians hold, that in [ 444 J
all contracts, either express or implied, there must be something given in
exchange, something that is mutual or reciprocal. (k) This thing, which is
the price or motive of the contract, Wt' call the consideration; and it must be
a thmg lawful in itself, or else the contract is void. A good consideration, we
have before seen, (i) is that of blood or natural affection between near relations; the satisfaction accruing from which the law esteems an ~uivalent for
whatever benefit may move from one relation to another. (j) This considera<~J Dyer, 3D. Bro. ..4l>r. ut. clwae"' IJdlo•, i and 4.
{f) 3 P. Wms. ioo.
{JI) Inn. 3, 14, 2.
{II) In ot11mhlu ~ractibw, rirl<! nomiRatu, riiie '""°"''raatl1, peNl&tdatio oo*'nelur. Gravin. l. t, t i2.
(I) l'age 2:97.
(J) 3 Hep. llS.

and if payable to bearer instead of to order they require no indorsement, and the property posses

by mere delivery for value. Bills of lading ana checks upon bankers are also negotiable, and tho

tendency of recent decisions is to hold all contracts for the payment of monev. which by their

terms are parable to bearer, and also all which by custom are transferable on mere de-

liverv, as occupying the like position. See Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill, 159; Ide v. Connecticut,

Ac.," R. B. Co., 32 Vt. 297 ; 1 Pare, on Cont. 5th ed. 291. The statutes of some of the states

eo very much further, and allow the assignee of any chose in action to bring suit in his own name.

See Final v. Backus, 18 Mich. 218.
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(3) There are several exceptions to thit! rule. Bills of exchange when made payable to orcler
were ne~otiaule by the law merchant, and the pel'llOn to whom they were indorsed might uring
snit in bis own name. The statute 3 and 4 .Anne, c. 9, put promissory notes on the same footing,
and if payable to bearer inste.ad of to order they require no indorsement, and the property passes
by mere delivery for Vlllue. Bills of lading and checb upon uankers are all!O negotiable, and tho
tendency of rec1~nt deci,.font1 is to hold all contract.I' for the payment of monevi which by their
terms are payable to bearer, and aJ:40 all which by eu11tom aro transferal> e on mere deliverv, a.'! occupyinit tbl' like position. See Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill, 159; Ide tJ. Connecti<'ut,
.tc., • R. R. Cu.. 32 Vt. 'J.97; 1 Para. on Cont. 5th ed. 291. The statut.os of wme of the state&
go very much farther, o.nd allow the a.ssiguee of any cho11e in action to bring suit In his own naw11.
See .final v. Backus, 18 Mich. 218.
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tion may sometimes, however, be set aside, and the contract become void, when

it tends in its consequences to defraud creditors, or other third persons, of their

just rights. But a contract for any valuable consideration, as for marriage, for

money, for work done, or for other reciprocal contracts, can never be impeached

at law ; and, if it be of a sufficient adequate value, is never set aside in equity ;

for the person contracted with has then given an equivalent in recompense, and

is therefore as much an owner, or a creditor, as any other person. (4)

These valuable considerations are divided by the civilians (4) into fotir

species. 1. Do ut d.es : as when I give money or goods, on a contract that I

shall be repaid money or goods for them again. Of this kind are all loans of money

upon bond, or promise of repayment ; and all sales of goods, in which there is either

an express contract to pay so much for them, or else the law implies a contract

to pay so much as they are worth. 2. The second species is, facio, ut facias;

as, when I agree with a man to do his work for him, if he will do mine for

me; or if two persons agree to marry together; or to do any positive act on

both sides. Or, it may be to forbear on one side on consideration of something

done on the other, as, that in consideration A, the tenant, will repair his house,

B. the landlord, will not sue him for waste. Or, it may be for mutual forbear-

I *445 1 ance on ^th s*4es 5 *as» that in consideration that A will not trade to

•- •" Lisbon, B will not trade to Marseilles; so as to avoid interfering with

each other. 3. The third species of consideration is, facio ut des : when a

man agrees to perform any thing for a price, either specifically mentioned, or
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left to the determination of the Taw to set a value to it. As when a servant

hires himself to his master for certain wages or an agreed sum of money : here

the servant contracts to do his master's service, in order to earn that specific

sum. Otherwise, if he be hired generally ; for then he is under an implied

contract to perform this sen-ice for what it shall be reasonably worth. 4. The

fourth species is do, utfaciaf: which is the direct counterpart of the preceding.

As when I agree with a servant to give him such wages upon his performing

such work: which, we see, is nothing else but the last species inverted : for

servus facit, ut herus det, and herusdat, ut servus faciat.

A consideration of some sort or other is so absolutely necessary to the form-

ing of a contract, that a nudum pactum, or agreement to do or pay any thing

(i) ry. w. s, 5.

(4) [If there be no fraud in the transaction, mere inadequacy of price would not be deemed,

even in equity, sufficient to vacate a contract. 10 VOB. 292, 295; 1 Brid. Kq. D. 369. Nor is

tion may sometimes, however, be set aside, and the contract become void, when
it tends in its consequences to defrnud creditors, or other third persons, of their
just rights. But a contract for any valuable consideration, as for marriage, for
money, for work done, or for other reciprocal contracts, can never be impeached
at law; and, if it be of a sufficient adequate value, is never set a.side in equity;
for the person contracted with hll.B then given an equivalent in recompense, and
is therefore as much an owner, or a creditor, as any other person. (4)
These valuable considerations are divided by the civilians (k) into four
species. 1. Do ut des: as when I give money or ~oods, on a contract that I
shall be repaid money or goods for them again. Of tlus kind are all loans of money
upon bond, or promise of repayment; and all sales of goods, in which there is either.
an express contra.ct to pay so much for them, or else the law implies a contrn.ct
to pay so much as they are worth. 2. 'rhe second species is, facio, ut facias;
as, when I agree with a man to do his work for him, if he will do mine for
me; or if two persons agree to marry together; or to do any positive act on
both sides. Or, it may be to forbear on one side on consideration of something
done on the other, as, that in consideration A, the tenant, will repair his house,
B. the landlord, will not sue him for waste. Or, it may be for mutual forbearL• 445 ] ance on both siqes; *as, that in consideration that A will not trade to
J. . isbon, B will not trade to Marseilles; so as to avoid interfering with
each other. 3. The third species of consideration is, facio ut des: when a
man agrees to perform any thing for a price, either specifically mentioned, or
left to the determination of the law to set a value to it. As when a servant
hires himself to his master for certain wages or an agreed sum of money: here
the servant contracts to do his master's service, in order to earn that specific
sum. Otherwise, if he be hired generally; for then he is under an implied
contract to perform this senice for what it shall be reasonably worth. 4. The
fourth species is do, ut Jaci<U: which is the direct counterpart of the preceding.
As when I agree with a senant to give him such wages upon his performing •
such work: which, we see, is nothing else but the last species inverted: for
servus facit, u.t lterus det, and lierus dcit, ut servu.11 fad.at.
A consideration of some sort or other is so absolutely necessary to the fonning of a contract, that a nudum pactum, or agreement to do or pay any thing

mere folly without fraud a foundation for relief. 8 Price, 620. And on the question of eie-

('k)

Ff. L'l, 5, 5.

cnting an agreement, hardship cannot be regarded, unless it amount to a degree of inconven-

ience and absurdity so great as to afford judicial proof that such could not be the meaning of

the parties. 1 Swans. 329. But if there be such an inadequacy as to show that the person

did not understand the bargain he made, or that, knowing it, he was so oppressed that he was

flad tn make it ; this will show such a command over the grantor as may amount to fraud.

Bro. Ch. C. 167 ; 2 Brid. Eq. Dig. 55. An action was brought on an agreement to pay for a

horse a barley corn a nail for every nail in the horse's shoos and double every nail, which

came to five hundred quarters of barley ; and, on a trial before Holt, C. J., the jury gave only

the value of the horse. 1 Lev. 111. And in an action of assnuipsit, in consideration of 2s.

6rf. paid, and 41. 17s. 6ri. to be paid, the defendant undertook to deliver two rye corns next

Monday, and double every succeeding Monday for a year, which would have required the

delivery of more rye than was grown in all the world : on demurrer, Probyn, J., said, that

though the contract was a foolish one, yet it would hold in law, and the defendant ought to pay

something for his folly, and made the defendant refund the 2s. 6rf. and costs. Ld. Rayni. 1 !(>•».

This seems to have been a vacating of the bargain as void, and a return for that reason of the

money received without consideration.]

If there be a consideration of some value the courts do not usually inquire into its ade-

?nocy, and a very small consideration may support a very onerous promise. Mete, on Cont.

68. Nevertheless, if the contract is plainly unconscionable, the party who sues for a breach

of it in a court of law will be awarded such damages only as seem reasonable : Cutler t>. How,

8 Mass. 257 ; and if he seeks specific performance in a court of equity it will be refused. Osgood

«. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 23 ; Chambers v. Liverinore, 15 Mich. 281 : A. seal to a contract

imports a consideration, and, at law, obviates the necessity of proving one : Mete, on Cont.

161, 233 ; but not, it seems, in equity, whcu enforcement of the contract is sought in that forum.

Black i'. Cord, 2 Har. and G. 100. Sharpe e. Rogers, 12 Minn. 174.
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( 4) [If there be no fraud in the transaction, mere inadequacy of price would not be deemed,
e;en in equity, 1mfficient to vacate a contract. 10 Ves. 292, 295; 1 Brid. Eq. D. 359. Nor is
mere folly without fraud a foundation for relief. 8 Price, 620. .And on the question of executing an agreement, hardship cannot l>e regarded, unless it amount t-0 a degree of incon;enience and alnmrdity so great 811 to afford juuicial proof that 11uch could not be the meaning of
the partie~. 1 Swans. 3'29. But if there be such an inadeqnacy 88 to show that the person
did not undemtand the barge.in he made, or that, knowing it, be wae so oppreBtled that he waa
glad to mako it; this will show such a command over the grant-Or as may amount to fraud.
2 Bro. Ch. C. 167 ; 2 Brid. Eq. Dig. &5. An o.ction was brought on an agreement to ~ay for a
horse a barley com a nail for e;ery nail in the horse's shoe1:1 and double every nail, which
came to five hundred quarters of barley; and, on a trial befol'e Holt, C. J., the jury ~ve only
the value of the horse. 1 Lev. 111. .And in an action of assumpsit, in consideration of 2s.
6d. paid, and 4l. 17s. 6d. to be paid, the defendnnt undertook to deli;er two rye corns ne:s:t
Jdo~day, and double every succeeding . .Monday for a year, which would have requi.red the
dehvory of more rye than wll.ll grown m all the world: on demurrer, Probyn, J., ~aid, that
though the contract was a foolish one, yet it would hold in law, and the defendant ought to pny
something for his folly, and made the defendant refund the 28. 6d. and costs. Ld. Raym. llf..& •.
Thi11 seems t<> have been a vacatinl'i of t.he bargain as ;oid, and a return for that reason of the
money recei;ed without consi.derat10n.]
If there be a oonsidera.tion of !IOme value the courts do not usually inquire int<> its adequacy, and a very small consideration may support a ;cry onerous promise. .Mete. on Cont.
168. N everthelees1 if the contract i!'. plainly unconscionable, the party who sues for s breach
of it in a court of Jaw will be awarded 1mch damages only as ~eem reasonable: Cutler t'. Bow,
H Jda11s. 257; and if he seeks specific performance in a court of equity it will be refused. ORgOO(l
ti. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 23; Chambers t', Livermore, 15 Mich. 2t!l: A. eeal to a coutrac'
im1>9rts a con11ideration, and, at law, obviates the necessity of proring one: Mew. on C-ont.
161, 2!'3; but not, it seems, in equity, when enforcement of the contract is sought in that forum.
Black v. Cord, 2 Har. and G. 100. Sharpe v. Rogers, 12 Jd.inn.174.
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on one side, without any compensation on the other, is totally void in law; and

a man cannot be compelled to perform it. (I) (5) As if one man promises to give

another 10iV., here there is nothing contracted for or given on the one side,

and therefore there is nothing binding on the other. And, however a man

may or may not be bound to perform it, in honour or conscience, which the

municipal laws do not take upon them to decide; certainly those municipal

laws will not compel the execution of what he had no visible inducement to

engage for: and therefore our law has adopted (m) the maxim of the civil

law, (») that ex nudo pacto non oritur actio. But any degree of reciprocity will

prevent the pact from being nude: nay, even if the thing be founded on a

prior moral obligation (as a promise to pay a just debt, though barred by the

statute of limitations,) it is no longer nudum pactum. (6) And as this rule

was principally established to avoid the inconvenience that would arise from

setting up mere verbal promises, for which no good reason could *be r +, .„ -,

assigned, (o) it therefore does not hold in some cases, where such prom- L J

ise is authentically proved by written documents. For if a man enters into a

Voluntary bond, or gives a promissory note, he shall not be allowed to aver the

•want of a consideration in order to evade the payment: for every bond, from the

solemnity of the instrument, (p) and every note, from the subscription of the

drawer, (q) (7) carries with it an internal evidence of a good consideration.

(I) Dr. A St. rt. 2, c. 24. (m) IJro. Abr. tit. dette. 79. Salt 129. (n) Cod. 2, 8, 10 and 5, H, 1.

(o) rimv.l. 308, 309. (p) Hurdr. 200. 1 Ch. It. 157. (?) !.<!, Ravin. 780.
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(5) [This must be read as confined to simple contracts; for no consideration is essential to

the validity of a contract under seal, though in goine cages creditors may treat voluntary deeds

on one side, without any compensation on the other, is totally void in lnw; and
a man cannot be compelled to perform it. (l) (5) As if one man promises to give
another 1001., here there is nothing contracted for or given on the one side,
and therefore there is nothing binding on the other. And, however a man
may or m11.y not be bound to perform it, in honour or conscience, which the
municipal laws do not take upon them to decide; certainly those municipal
laws will not compel the execution of what he had no visible inducement to
enga~e for: and therefore our law has adopted (m) the maxim of the civil
law, (ti) that ex nu.do pa.eta non orUur actw. But any degree of reciprocity will
prevent the pact from being nude: nay, even if the thing be founded on a
prior moral obligation (as a promise to pay a just debt, though barred by the
statute of limitations,) it is no longer nudum pactum. (6) And as this rule
was principally established to avoid the inconvenience that would arise from
setting up mere verbal promises, for which no good reason could •be [ • 446 ]
assigned, (o) it therefore does not hold in some cases, where such promise is authentically proved by written document& For if a man enters into a
'voluntary bond, or gives a promissory note, he shall not be allowed to aver the
want of a consideration in order to evade the payment: for every bond, from the
solemnity of the instrument, (p) and every note, from the subscription of the
drawer, (q) (7) carries with it an internal evidence of a good consideration.
(ll Dr. .t St. <t. 2, e. 2'.
(o) Plowd. 308, S09.

(ml nro. Ahr.

(p) Hu1·dr. 200.

tu. ddu. 79. Salk. 12!1.

1 Cb. li. l1i7.

(q)

(n) Cod. 2, S, 10 and 6, H, 1.
Ld. Raym. 7t!O.

without consideration, aa fraudulent and invalid. 7 T. R. 477; 4 East, 200; 2 Sch. and Lef.

228; FonbL Eq. 3d ed. 347, n. f.; Plowd. 308, 309. The leading rule with respect to con-

sideration is, that it must be some benefit to the party by whom the promise is made, or to a

third person at his instance, or some detriment sustained at the instance of the party promis-

ing, by the party in whose favor the promise ia made. 4 Ea-it, 455; 1 Taunt. 523. A written

agreement, not under seal, is nudum paclum, without consideration ; and a negotiable security

as a bill of exchange, or promissory note, carries with it prima facie evidence of considera-

tion, which is binding in the hands of a third party, to whom it has been negotiated, but may

be inquired into between the immediate parties to the bill, &<•,, themselves. The considera-

tion for a contract, as well as the promise for which it is given, must also be legal. Thus a

contract for the sale of blasphemous, obscene, or libellous prints, or for the furtherance of

immoral practices, or contrary to public policy, or detrimental/ to the rights of third parties, or

in contravention of the statute law, in all these cases the considerations are invalid, and the con-

tracts void.]

(6) A mere moral obligation is not a sufficient consideration to support an express con-

tract, except in those cases where there was originally an obligation which was enforceable

but for the interference of some positive rule of law. The reporters, in a note to the leading

case of Wennall c. Adney, 3 B. and P. 352, state the law very correctly to be, that " an

express promise can only revive a precedent good consideration, which might have been

enforced at law. through the medium of an implied promise, had it not been suspended by

some positive rule of law, but can give no original right of action if the obligation on which

it is founded could never have been enforced at law, though not barred by any legal maxim

or statute provision." Accordingly it has been held that a promise made by a father to pay

expenses incurred in caring for his adult child taken sick at a distance from his relatives,

would not support an action. Mills c. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207. Neither would a promise to pay

for labor expended by the plaintiff on land" which he claimed, but which the defendant recov-

ered from him. Frear v. Hardenberg, 5 Johns. 272. Nor a promise to pay a witness a sum

beyond his legal fees for attendance upon court. Willis v. Peckham, 1 Brod. and Bing. 515.

And see Eastwood «. Kenyon, 11 A. and E. 438; Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; Parker v. Car-

ter, 4 Muuf. 273; and the cases cited in Mete, on Cont. 178; et seq., and 1 Pars, on Cout. 5th

ed. 434.

A promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, or discharged in bankruptcy, or

contracted during infancy, may be enforced within this rule; and so may the promise of an

indorser to pay a bill' from which he is discharged by neglect to give notice of dishonor. But

where one released his debtor in order to make him a witness, the debtor's promise to pay the

debt was held to be nudum pactum. Valentine «. Foster, 1 Met. 520.

(7) [Mr. Konblanque, in his discussion of the subject of consideration, referred to in the

(5) (This must be read &!! confined to simple contmct;1; for no consideration is essential to
the validit:v of a contract under seal, thongh in !!Orne eases creditors may treat voluntary deeds
without consideration, as froudulent and invalid. 7 T. R. 477; 4 EMt, 200; 2 Sch. and Lef.
~; FonbL Eq. 2d ed. 347, n. f. ; Plowd. 308, 309. The leading rule with respect to considerr.tion is, that it must be some benefit to the part7 by whom the promise is made, or to a
third person at his in:1tancc, or some detriment sustamed at the instance of the party promising, by the party in whose favor the promise fa made. 4 Ea4, 4!">5; 1 Taunt. 523. .A. written
agreement, not under ~al, is muliim pact1mt, without consideration; and a negotiable security
as a. bill of exchange, or promisl!Ory note, carries with it prime. facie evidence of consideration, which is binding in the hands of a third party, to whom it. has been negotiated, but mo.y
be inquired into between the immedio.t.e parties to the bill, &c., themselves. The con~idero.
tion for o. contract, as well &."'l the promise for which it is given, must also be legal. Thus a
contract for the sale or blasphemous, ob11eene, or libellous prints, or for the furtherance of
immoral practices, or contr&r)' to puhlic policy, or detrimental to the rights of third jarties, or
in c-0ntraventfon of the statute law, in all these C8Se8 the con.liderations are invalid, an the contract.-1 void.]
(6) .A. mere moral obligation is not a sufficient consideration to support an express contra.ct, exeept in those co.sea where there wo.s originally an obligation which was enforceable
but for the interference of some positive rule of law. The reporters, in a note to the leading
case of Wenna.11 "· .Adney, 3 Il. and P. 352, state the law very correctly to be, that "an
expre:sii promise can only revfre o. precedent good consideration, which might have been
enforced at Jaw{ through the medium of an implied promi~e, hA.d it not been ~uspendcd by
eome positive ru e of law, but can give no original right of action if the obligation on which
it is founded could ne"l'er have been enforced at law, though not barred by any legal maxim
or statute provision." Accordingly it ha.~ been held that a promise made by a father to pay
expenses incuncd in co.ring for his adult child taken sick at o. distance from hi>1 rclath·es,
would not support an action. Mills "· Wyman, 3 Pick. 207. Neither would a prumise to pay
for labor expended by the plaintiff on land which he claimed, but which the defendant recovered from him. Frear ti. Hardeuberg, 5 Johns. 272. Nor o. promise to pay a. witues8 a sum
beyond his legal fees for attendance upon court. Willis "· Peckhe.m, 1 Brod. and Bing. 515.
And sue Eastwood ti. Kenyon, 11 .A.. e.nd E. 438; Cook ti. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; Parker ti. C1uter, 4 :Munr. 273 ; a.nd the cases cited in Mete. on Cont.. 178 ; et seq., and 1 PR.ril. on Cont. 5th
ed. 434•
.A promise to pay a debt barred by the statute or limitations, or discharged in bankrnptcv, or
contmcted during iufancy' may be enforced within thi>I rule; and 80 may the promhm of an
indorser to pay a bill· from which he ill discharged by ney;lect to give notice of dt~honor. nut
where one released his debtor in order to make him a w1tne~11, the debtor's promise to pay the
debt wM held to be 1mdum pa.ctttm. Valentine ti. Foster, l llet. 520.
(7) [Mr. }'onblanque, in his di~cussiou or the subject of consideration, referred to in the
last note but one, hu.~ taken notice of this inaccuracy : he Bays, what certainly is fully establi!!hed, that the want of consideration canuot be averr11d by the maker of a note, if the action
be brought by an indorsee; hut if the action be brought by the payee, the want of consid-

last note but one, has taken notice of this inaccuracy: he says, what certainly is fully estab-

VoL I.-79

lished, that the want of consideration cannot be averred by the maker of a note, if the action

be brought by an indorsee; but if the action bo brought by the payee, the want of consid-
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Courts of justice will therefore support them both, as against the contractor

himself; but not to the prejudice of creditors, or strangers to the contract.

We are next to consider, tiiirdly, the thiug agreed to be done or omitted.

'• A contract is an agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a

particular thing." The most usual contracts, whereby the right of chattels

personal may be acquired in the laws of England, are, 1. That of sale or

exchange. 2. That of bailment. 3. That of hiring and borrowing. 4. That

of debt.

1. Sale, or exclutnge, is a transmutation of property from one man to another,

in consideration of some price or recompense in value: for there is no sale

without a recompense: there must be quid pro quo. (r) If it be a commutation

of goods for goods, it is more properly an exdiange : but if it be a transferring

of goods for money, it is called a tale; which is a method of exchange intro-

duced for the convenience of mankind, by establishing an universal medium,

which may be exchanged for all sorts of other property ; whereas, if goods were

only to be exchanged for goods, by way of barter, it would be difficult to adjust

the respective values, and the carriage would be intolerably cumbersome. All

civilized nations adopted, therefore, very early the use of money ; for we find

Abraham giving " four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the

merchant," for the field of Macpelah ; («) though the practice of exchange still

subsists among several of the savage nations. But with regard to the law of

r *AA~ ] *sales and exchanges, there is no difference. I shall, therefore, treat of
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' ' J them both under the denomination of sales only ; and shall consider

their force and effect, in the first place where the vendor hath in himself, and

secondly where he hath not, tho property of the thing sold.

Where the vendor hath in himself the property of the goods sold, he hath

the liberty of disposing of them to whomsoever he pleases, at any time, and in

any manner; unless judgment has been obtained against him for a debtor dam-

ages, and the writ of execution is actually delivered to the sheriff! For then,

by the statute of frauds, (/) the sale shall be looked upon as fraudulent, and the

property of the goods shall be bound to answer the debt, from the time of

delivering the writ. (8) Formerly it was bound from the teste, or issuing of the

writ, (u) and any subsequent sale was fraudulent; but the law was thus altered

in favour of purchasers, though it still remains thesame between the parties; and

therefore if a defendant dies after the awarding and before the deli very of the

writ, his goods are bound by it in the hands of his executors, •(v) (9)

If a man agrees with another for goods at a certain price, he may not

carry them away before he hath paid for them ; for it is no sale without pay-

ment, unless the" contrary be expressly agreed. And therefore, if the vendor

says, the price of a beast is four pounds, and the vendee ssiys he will give four

pounds, the bargain is struck ; and they neither of them are at liberty to be off,

provided immediate possession be tendered by the other side. But if neither

the money be paid nor the goods delivered, nor tender made, nor any subsequent

agreement be entered into, it is no contract, and the owner may«dispose of the

goods as he pleases. (*») But if any part of the price is paid down, if it be but

a penny, or any portion of the goods delivered by way of earnest (which the

frj Nov's Mai. c. 42. (•) Gen c. S3, v. U. ft) 29 Car. II, c. 3. fn) 8 Sep. 171. 1 Mod. 181

ftJCSah.it, 14 Mod. i. 1 Mod. 95. (a) Hob. 41. Noy's Max. c. 42.

is a bar to the plaiuttffV recovering -upon it 1 Stna. 674 ; Bull. ST. P. 274 ; 1 B. and P.

Courts of justice will therefore support them both, as against the contractor
himself; but not to the prejudice of cr(..>ditors, or strangers to the oontra.ct.
We are next to consider, tliirdlg, the thiug agreed to be dooe or omitted"A contract is ll.ll agJ·ccment, upon enfficient consideration, to do <>r 1Wt .W dQ a
particular tlii-ng." The most uau&l contracts, whereby the right of cbat~tels
personal may be acqairod in the la.ws of England, are, L '.l'hat of sak or
~xoliallge. 2. That of -bau~nt. 8. ~.rha.t of hi.ring imd llorrowiug. i. That
of debt.
1. Sale, or excluin~, is a tranmmtaticm of property from ooe man to another,.
in consideratio11 of sorne price or reoompen80 in \'al 11e: for there is no sale
without a recompense: there mnst be quid pro '/U"- (r) Ifit be a commutation
of goods for goods, it is more properly an excbtmg~: but if it be a. transferring
of goods for money, it is ca.lied a 3ale; which is a method of exchange introduced for the convenience of mankind, by establishing .ao universal medium,.
which may be exchu.nged for all sorts of other property; whereas, if goods were
only to he exchanged for goods, by way of hart.er, it would be difficult to adjust
·the respective values, and the cn.rriagl! would be int~embly cumbersome. All
civilized nations adopted, therefore, very early the use <0f money; for we find
Abraham giving" four hundred shekels Qf 11ihrcr, current m-0ney with the
merchant," for the field -0f Macpelah; (s) though the practice of exchange still
subsists among several of the savage nations. But with regard to the law of
[ • 44..,] *sa.les and exchanges, there is DO dift'erenoe. I shall, therefore~ treat -0f
'
them both under the denomination of sales only; and shall consider
their force and effect, in the first place where the vendor bath in himself~ and
secondly where he hath not, tho property of the thing sold.
Wbere the vendor kaih in himself the property of the goods sold, he hath
the liberty of disposing of them to whomsoever he pleases, at any time, an<l in
any manner; unless judgment hu.s boon obtained !\,11'81llSt him for a debt or damages, and the writ of execntion is actually delivered to the sheriff: For theu,
by the statute of frauds. (t) the sale shall be looked upon as fraudulent, and th&
property of the goods shall be bound to an@weT' the dobt, from the time of
·delivering the writ. (8) Formerly it was bound from the tesf.e, or issuing of the
writ, ( u) and any subsequent su.le wa.s frandulent; but the law was thus a.ltered
in favour ofpttrclMJ.Ser~, though it still remains the 83Ille between the partie..~; and
therefore if a defendant dies after the awarding and befo:re the deli~·ery of tbe
writ, his goods are bound by it in the hands of his executors. (v) (9)
If a man agreei with auoth.er for goods a.t a oert.ain price, he may not
carry them &WllV bafore be hath pu.id for them; for it is no sale without payment, unless the· contrary be expressly agreed. And therefore, if the vendor
says, the price of a beast is four pounds, and the vendee says he will give four
pounds, the barg~u is struck; and they ueither of them a.re a.t liberty to be off,
provided immediate p086!ession be tendered by the other side. But if neither
the money be puid nor the goods de1ivered, nor tAmder m1~e, nor any subsequent
agreement be entered into, it is no contract, a.nd the owner ruay•d1spose of the
goods as he pleases. ('411) But if a.uy part of the prioo is p&id down, if it be but
a penny, or any portion -0f the goods .d elivered by w11oy <>f tsrnest (which the

651 ; 2 Atk. 1*J; and Chitty on Bills, (H An indorsee, who has given full value for a bill of

exchange may maintain an action lnAh against him who drew it aud him who accepted it, with-

out any consideration. 4 T. E. 339, 471 ; 5 Esp. Bop. 178; 3 id. 46.]

(r) Noy~& Max. .c.
(~) (.;uiulJ. all. Ii

42.
OJGen. c. ta, v. 111.
OJ 211 O.r. Il, e. I.
(•)·8 Bep. 111. l lllod. 188.
lolu'1 . .6. 1 MU(\. llj.
(atJ) llob. H. Noy'$ .Max. e. U .

(8) This rule is believed nut to prevail generally in the United States, but the goods are bound

onHT from the time when they are actually levied npon by virtue of the writ.

(9) [If two writs are delivered to the sheriff on the same day, he is bound to execute the first

which ho receives; but if ho levies and sells under the second, the sale to a vendee, without

notice of .thefirht, is irrevocable, and the sheriff makes himself answerable to both parties. 1

Salk. 3dO ; 1 T. K. 729.]

£26

.,erntion is u. bar 5o the plaiutiff'11 reoo"~riug ·u pon it. 1 Stl'B.. 674; BuU. N. P. 274; 1 B. and P.
651 · 2 Atk. ll'i:l; and 0h1tty on llills, I.kl. An indon1ee, wb.o has given full t"ruue for a bill of
exchange, may wnmtain an action lloth &E,ra.intit him who drew _it ll!ld him who acceptoo it, vi.'ithout anv-conllideratioo. 4 'f. R. 339, 4.71 ; ~ Esp. Rop. 178; 3 11L 46.]
(8) 1'his rule is bolie;ed not to prevn.il goner~ly in the Un_itod States, b~t the goods are bonnd
only from the time :when tbuy are actually 11'\IOO npon by v1rtuo of the wrlt.
(9) [If ~wo wriu aru deli\'ered to the 11herilf on tbe l!ll.llle d1~y, he is bound to oxoontc th_e fi~t
which be recoil'os · but if ho levies and Mllid uudor the flecund, the salo to a vendee, wtthout
notfoe of .tbti firr,t, i~ irrtivocable, uJ the .iherilf wake~ hlrnllelf answerable w both parties. 1
Sulk. 3:.>Q; 1 T. R. 729.]
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tractte arffwment-um.,") (x), the property of the goods is absolutely bound "- ' ' '

by it; and the vendee may recover the goods by action, as well as the vendor

may the price of them, (y) (10) And, such regard does the law pay to earnest as

an evidence of a contract, that, by the same statute, 29 Car. II, c. 3, no contract

for the sale of goods, to the value of 10?. or more, shall be valid, unless the buyer

actually receives part of the goods sold, by way of earnest on his part; or unless

he gives part of the price to the vendor by way of earnest to bind the bargain, or

in part of payment; or unless some note in writing be made and signed by the

party, or his agent, who is to be charged with the contract. (11) And "with

regard to goods under the value of 10Z. no contract or agreement for the sale

of them shall be valid, unless the goods are to be delivered within one year, or

unless the contract be made in writing, and signed by the party, or his agent,

who is to be charged therewith. (12) Anciently, among all the northern nations,

shaking of hands was held necessary to bind the bargain; a custom which we

still retain in many verbal contracts. A sale thus made was called liandsale,

" venditio per muttiam manuum compkzionem ;" (z) till in process of time the

same word was used to signify the price or earnest, which was given immediately

after the shaking of hands, or instead thereof.

As soon as the bargain is struck, the property of the goods is transferred to the

vendee, and that of the price to the vendor; but the vendee cannot take the

(i) lust. 3, tit. 24. (y) Nov. ibid. ft) Stiernhookdejure <1M. I '.', 0. (.
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(10) [The property does not seem to be absolutely bound by the earnest: for Lord Holt has

laid down the following rules, viz.: "That notwithstanding the earnest the money must be

chil law calls arrlta, and inte1'Prets to be·" em,,.,tionis
vemliUonfs *con- [ *448]
r
tracltE ll1"ffltmenttwr,") ( x ), the p1'0perty of the goods is absolutely bound
by it; and the vendee may recover the goods by action, as well as the vendor
may the price of them. (y) (10) And.such regard does the law pay t-0 earnest as
an evidence of a contract, that, by the same sta,tute, 29 Car. II, c. 3, no contract
for the sale of goods, to the value of IOl. or more, shall be valid, unless the buyer
actually receives part of the goods sola, by way of earnest on bis part; or nn less
he gives part of the price to the vendor by way of earnest to bind the bargain, or
in part of paymmt; or unless some note in writing be made and signed by the
party, or bis agent, who is to be charged with the contract. (11) And with
regard to goods under the value of IOl. no contra.ct or agreement for the sale
of them shall be valid, unless the goods are to be delivered within one year, or
unless the contr&ct be made in writing, and signed by the party, or his a~N1t,
who is to be charged therewith. (12) Anciently, among all the northern nat10ns,
shaking of hands was held necessary to bind the bargain ; a custom which we
still retain i:n many verbal contracts. A sale thus made was calfod lwndsale,
"venditio per m:utuam manuum cmnplext'onem ;" (z) till in process of time the
same word was used to signify the price or earnest, which was given immediately
after the shaking of hands, or inst.end thereof.
As soon as the bargain is .struck, the property of the goods is transferred to the
vendee, aud that of the prwe to the vendor; bnt the vendee cannot take the

paid upon fetching away the goods, because no other time for payment is appointed; that

earnest only binds the bargain, and gives the party a right to demand; but then a demand

(Z) Jut.

3, tU. M.

(g)

Noy, Ibid.

(11)

Sdemhook tie.Jure GQIA. i. 2, c. Ii.

without the payment of the money is void; that after earnest given, the vendor cannot sell

the goods to another, without a default in the vendee; and therefore if the vendee does not

come and pay, and take the goods, the vendor onght to go and request him; and then if he

does not oome and pay, and take away the goods in a convenient time, the agreement is

dissolved, and he is at liberty to sell them to any other person." 1 Salk. 113; see 3

Camp. 426.]

(11) [In construing the statute of frauds, the principal difficulty has arisen in determining

what acts between the parties amount to a delivery on the one part, and acceptance on the

other. An actual delivery by the seller, and acceptance by the buyer, is not necessary in all

cases; as where goods are ponderous, delivery of the key of the warehouse in which they are

deposited, or delivery of other tokens of property is sufficient. 1 Atk. 170; 1 East, 194. Or

payment of warehouse rent by the purchaser. 1 Camp. Rep. 452. Where goods are sold by

gtuhple, delivery of the sample to the purchaser may be part deliver}' within the statute: 5

Esp. 267; 7 East, 564; bnt it is otherwise if the sample be not part of the bulk. 7 T. R. 14 ;

1 i i 'it. N. P. 179. Delivery of an order by the seller, to a wharfinger or warehouseman who has

the custody of the goods, to deliver them to the vendee, is sufficient to satisfy the statute.

2 Esp. Rep. 598. So, if a purchaser write his name or initials upon the article bought, it

•will suffice; but other articles bought at the same time will not pass unless the signature is

put upon them also. 1 Camp. 233, 235, n. But in the ease of Tempest v. Fitzgerald, where

the defendant agreed to purcha.se a horse for ready money, and to take it at a distant speci-

fied day, before which day defendant rode the horse and gave directions as to its treatment,

bat requested that it might remain in plaintiffs possession for a further time, when he would

fetch it away and pay the price, to which plaintiff assented, and the horse died in the interval, it

was held that there was no acceptance of the horse within the meaning of the statute of frauds.

la this can* there was no earnest given, nor part payment, nor any note or memorandum in

•writing, which distinguishes it from the case in the text; and as it was a ready money bargain.

the purchaser could have no right to take away the horse till the price was paid, and of course

there could be no acceptance on the part of the defendant. These cases will illustrate the princi-

ple on which the statute of frauds is founded, the object of which (in the language of Mr. J.

Holroyd) was to remove all doubts as to the completion of the bargain, and it therefore requires

some dear and unequivocal acts to be done in order to show that the thing had ceased to be in

fieri. 3 Bar. and Aid. 684.]

(12) [And this enactment is, by Lord Tenterden's act (9 Geo. IV, c. 14), extended to all con-

iracts for the f»le of goods of the value of 101. sterling and upwards, notwithstanding the goods

mav be intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not, at the time of the contract, be

actually mode, or provided, or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making or

(10) [The property does not Reem to be absolutely bouml by the earnest: for I~ord Holt has
laid down the f<illowing rnle11, viz.: "That notwith1:1tanding the eamest the moncv mu~t be
po.id upon fetching away the good11, because no other time for payment is appointed; that
earne~t mtly bindil the bargain, and ~vcs the party a right t-0 demand; but then a df'ma11d
without the payment of the money JR void; that after carne11t ginn. the nmdor cannot ~ell
the goods to another, without a default in the vendec; and therefore if the vcndee docs n<•t
come and pay, and tskr. the good~. the vendor ought to go and request him; and then if he
does not oome a.nd pay, and take away the goods in a convenient time, the agreement is
di:c110lved, a.nd he is at liberty t-0 sell them to ony other person." 1 Salk. 113; tree 3

~fj [~]con,,trv.ing

the f!tatute of frauds, the principal difficulty bas arisen in detcrruining
whe.t a.ots between the partic;; amount to a delivery on the one part, aud a.cccptanC'e on tho
other. .A.n actual delivery by the seller, aud acceptance by the buyer, iM not necessary in ull
C88CS; as where goods are ponderous, tlclirnry of the key of the warebou~c in which the.v are
d(lpo!Jited. or delivery of other tokens of property h1 suilicicut. 1 .Atk. liO ; 1 East, 194. Or
pa~'lllent of warchou~ rent by the purchaser. 1 Ca.mp. Hep. 452. 'Where good;; are sold hy
saunple, delivery of the sample to the purcha:;er may he part dcli•err within the statute: 5
E8p. 26'i; 7 EMt, 564; but it is otberwi11c if the i<ample be not part of the bulk. 7 T. R. 14 ;
Holt. N. P. 179. Delivery of on order by the 1<cller, to a wharfiugur or warehouseman who 1111'3
the custody uf the golitl~, to deli\·er them to the \•eudee, is suffieient to 8ati~fy the ,-;tatnte.
2 E;;p. Rep. 598. So, if a imrcha."er write hfa name or initials upon the artiele bought, it
will su1Ik-e; but other article~ bought at the ~ame time will not pa..;s unless the ~ignature is
put upon them al~o. 1 Camp. 2:~, 2:l.'l, Jl. But in the case of Tempe8t tJ. Fitzgerald, where
the defondaut agn-ed to purchase a hor~ for ready money, and to tnke it at a dii;tant $peeified da.y, before whic:h day dufoudant rode the horse and gaye directions M to its truatmeut,
hut requested that it might ren111.ia in plaintitr~ po~S0$Sion for fl further time, whr,n he wonlll
fetc.h it awo.y and pay the pric(!, to whieh plaintiff as~ented, and tho hor$e died in the interrnl, it
vas held th&t there was no acceptance of the hori.:c within the meaning of th(~ i>t.ntnte of frnncl~.
J.n this CMe there wa.s no earnest given, nor part payment, nor any note or memorandum iu
v.·ritin,r, which di!!tinguit1hes it from the ea.;e in the text; and 8.8 it was a ready morrnv bargain,
the pnrc~r could b&~e no right t-0 take away the horse till the price wa8 paid, a.nd 'of ccltme
there oou.ld be no acceptaooe on the part of the defendant. These C.'11Se8 will illustrate the priudple on which the ~tatute of frauds is foundl'd, thll object of whieh (in the language of Mr. J.
Holroyd) 11"&8 to rew'?ve all doubts as t-0 the ~ompletion ot the barg11i1i, ai:d it therefore rcquirns
t!ome clear and uneqruvocal s.ct11 to be done Ill order to show that the thmg had cea.~ed to be in
:fieri. 3 Bar. and ~.\Id. 684.]
(12) [And this eooetmeut is, by Lord Tenterd1:n's act (9 Geo. IV, c. 14), extended to all coutmctii for the Mle of goods of the >aluc of 101. sterling aud upward~, notwith~tm1ding: the goods
ruav !Jo intended to be delivered at 8ome fnt.ure time, or may not, at the time or the contraet, bo
actil&ly made, or pro•ided, or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making or
completing thereof; or ren'lering the tillllle fit fur delivery.]

completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery.]
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goods, until lie tenders the price agreed on. (a) (13) But if he tenders the

money to the vendor, and he refuses it, the vendee may seize the goods, or have

(aj Hop. 41.

goods, until he tenders the price a~eed on. (a) (13) But if he tenders thfl
money to the vendor, and he refuses it, the vende.e may seize the goods, or ha.,·e

(13) [It has long been settled that delivery to an agent of the vendee (and for this purpose

(a)

common earners, packers, and wharfingers, are considered to stand in that character) is for

Hop.il.

most puqwses a delivery to the vendee himself. Bttt this species of delivery affords a

security to the vendor upon credit, which does not exist where the delivery is actually made

to the vendee himself; for if the vendor discover that the vendee is insolvent, or has

become bankrupt, he may seize upon the goods so sold upon credit, and delivered into the

hands of such carrier, &c., at any time before their actual and complete delivery to the

vendee. This branch of the law is called STOPPAOB IN TRANSITT;, and though not referred to

in the text, may be properly stated in this place, from its importance in the concerns of trade

and commerce. This law is founded upon an equitable right in the vendor to detain the

goods until the price be paid or tendered, for stoppage in transitu does not rescind the con-

tract of sale: 1 Atk. 245; 3 T. E. 466; 6 East, 27; and if the vendor afterwards offer to

deliver them, ho may, unless he had resold them, recover the price, which he could not do if

by stopping in transitu the sale was rescinded. 1 Camp. 109; 6 Taunt. 162. The right extends

to every case in which the contract is in effect a sale, and the consignor substantially the

vendor of the goods. 3 East, 93; Amb. 399; 3 T. B. 783. It extends also to contracts of

exchange, as to an agreement between consignor and consignee that the latter shall return

another commodity of equal value in payment, and the fulfilment of which engagement is

rendered hazardous by his insolvency. Sittings post M. Term. Guildhall, 1822; 3 Chit. C. L.
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346. The consignor of in mils for sale on the joint account of himself and the consignee,

may exercise this right in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvencv of the latter: 6 East,

371; but it does not arise between principal and factor, for the property is never devested out of

the principal, and the factor m against him has only a right of lien upon the goods, and he can-

not, after parting with them, repossess himself of them while in transitu. 1 East, 4; 2 New

R. 64. Nor can the surety for the payment of the price of g^oods, by the vendee, though

he may have accepted the bills drawn upon him by the consignee for that purpose, stop the

goods in transitu. 1 Bos. and Pul. 563. It a party, being indebted to another, on the balance

of accounts, including bills of exchange ranniug accepted by the latter, consign goods to him

on account of this balance, the consignor has no right to stop them in transitu, upon tlie

consignee becoming insolvent before the bills are paid. 4 Campb. 31. If a sale be legalized by

license, and the vendor be an alien enemy, he may stop the goods in transitn: 15 East. 419;

and any authorized agent of the consignor may exercise the right. See 1 Campb. 368:

Though the consignment must be on credit, at least for some part of the price, yet partial

payment, acceptance of bills on account of, and not as actual payment, or the vendor's

being indebted to the vendee in part of the value, will not defeat the right to resume posses-

sion before actual delivery to the vendee. 7 T. R. 440, 464 ; 3 East, 93; 2 Tern. 203. It is

necessary that the consignee should become bankrupt or be insolvent for the vendor to exer-

cise this right. 6 Robinson Ad. R. 321. It is not necessary that the vendor, to exercise this

right of stoppage, should actually take possession of the property consigned, by corporal

touch: he may put in his claim or demand of his right to the goods in transitn, either verbally

or in writing, and it will be equivalent in law to an actual stoppage of the goods, provided

it be made before the transit has expired. 2 B. and P. 457, 462; 2 Esp. R. 613; Co. B. L. 494;

1 Atk. 45; Amb. 3U9; 3 East, 394. This right may be exercised by making out a new in-

voice or bill of lading: Holt, N. P. 338; but such a claim on the part of the consignee

would not be sufficient to devest the former of his right. 2 Esp. 613; 5 East, 175; 14 id.

308. The transitus in goods continues till there has been an actual delivery to the vendee or

his agent exjn-essly authorized for that purpose, with the express or implied consent of the ven-

dor to sanction such delivery. 3 T. R. 466; 5 East, 181. The delivery of goods to the mas-

ter on board a ship wholly chartered by the consignee, is not such a delivery to the vendee as

to put an end to the transitus ; for the master is a carrier of both consignor and consignee; and

till a ship is actually at the end of her voyage, the right of stoppage in transita continue* ;

and where a ship came into port without performing quarantine, when she ought to have done

so, and the assignees of the consignee, who had become bankrupt, took possession of the

goods, and the ship was ordered out of port to perform quarantine, where an agent of the con-

signor claimed the goods on behalf of Bis principal, it was held that the consignor had properly-

exercised and might claim a stoppage in trausitu. 1 Esp. 240. And goods deposited in the

king's warehouses under 26 Geo. Ill, c. 59, may be stopped in transitu, though they have been

claimed by the consignee. 2 Esp. 663.

On the other hand, the transitus may bo determined by delivery of the key of the warehouse

(13) [It bas long been settloo that delivery to an agent of the vendee (and for this purpose
common carriere, pncker1.<, and wbarfingen;, are conaidered to 11tand in that charact.er) is for
most purposes a delivery to the vcnclec himself. Bnt this species of delivery affords a
eecurity t-0 the vendor upon credit, which does not exist where the delivery is aciually made
to the nndee himself; for if the vendor di~cover that the vendee is insolYent, or bu
become bankrupt, ho may seize upon the goods so sold upon credit, and deliYered into the
hands of such carrier, &:c., at any time before their actu61 and complete delivery to the
vendee. This branch of the law is called STOPPAOB IK TRAKSITU, and though not referred to
in the text, may be propcrlv stated in this place, from its importance in the concerns of trade
and commerce. This law ls founded npon an equitable right in the vendor to detain the
goods until the prfo.e be paid or tendered, for lltoppage in transitn does not rebcind the contract of sale: 1 .Atk. 245; 3 T. R. 466 · 6 East, 27; and if the vendor afterwards otter to
deliver them, be may, unleaio te had resold them, recover the price, which he could not do if
by 11topping in tnmllitu the sale was rescinded. 1 Camp. 109; 6 Taunt. lffl. The right extend.a
to every case in which the contract is in effect a sale, and the consignor substa.ntially the
\"endor of the goodt1. 3 East, 93; Amb. 399; 3 T. R. 783. It extends also to contracts of
excliange, as to an ~eeruent between consignor and consignee that the latter shall return
another commodity oi C<J.Ual value in payment, and the fulfilment of which engagement ia
rendered hazardous by h1s i~ol¥ency. Sittings post M. Term. Guildhall, 1822; 3 Chit. C. L.
346. The consipior of ~odtl for sale on the joint account of himself and the consignee,
may exercise th1s right m the en>nt of tho bankrnptcy or insolvencv of the latter: 6 East,
371; but it does not arise between vrineipal and factor, for the pl"Operty Is never devested out
the principal, and the factor a.~ agam.~t him has only a right of lien upon the good11, and be cannot, after parting with them, repolll!ess himself of them while in transitu. 1 East, 4; 2 Now
R. 64. Nor can the surety for the payment of the price of goodt1, by the vendee, though
he ma,r have accepted the bills drawn upon him by the conR1gnee for that purpose, stop the
goods m trllll:>itu. 1 Bo~. and Pul. 563. It a party, being indebted to another, on the balance
of accounts, including billR of exchange running accetited by the latter, consign goods to him
on account of this balance, the cou~ignor has no nght to stop them in tran~itu, upon the
con11ignce becoming insolvent before the bill8 are paid. 4 Campb. 31. If a sale be legalised by
license, and the vendor be an alien enemy, he may t1top the goods in transitu: 15 East. 419;
and any authoriaed agent of the con><il(Dor may exercise the right. See 1 Campb. 369:
Though the comrignment must be on credit, at least for t10me part of the price, yet partial
pa~·ment, acceptance of bills on account of, and not 88 act.oe.l payment, or the vendor's
bemg indebted to the vendee in pru-t of the value, will not defeat the right to resume poil888sion before actual ddivery to tho Yendee. 7 T. R. 440, 464; 3 East, 9'J; 2 Vern; 203. His
necessary that the cont!ignee should become bankrupt or be in1mlv1mt for &he vendor to exercise this right. 6 Robinson Ad. R. 3'll. It is not necef!sary tbot tho vendor, to exercise this
right of ~toppage, should actually take possession of the property eoniti~ed, by corporal
touch : he may put in his claim or demand of his right to the goods in tranS1tu, either verbally
or in writing, aml it will be equivalent in law to an actual st.oppage of the goods, provided
it be made before tho transit has expired. 2 B. and P. 457, 462; 2 Esp. R. 613; Co. B. L. 494;
1 .A.tk. 45; .Amb. 3U9 ; 3 East, 394. Thi~ right may be exeroil!Od by ruaking ont a new invoice or bill of lading: Holt, N. P. 33-'3; but sueh a claim on the part of the tJ<>n#ignn
would not be tiufficieut to de;est tho fonner of his right. 2 Esp. 613; 5 East. 175; 14 id.
308. The trallb'itus in goods continues till there has been an actual delivery to the vendee or
his agent exi.n-essly authorized for that pury,_ose, with the exprostl or implied consmJt of the Yendor to sanction Ruch delivery. 3 T. R. 466; 5 Ea.'!t, 181. The delivery of goods to the mMter on boo.rd a ship wholly chartered by the consignee, is not such a delivery to the vendee as
to put an end to the tra11sit11B; for the master is a carrier of both consignor and oon11ignee; nnd
till a ship is actually at the end of her voyage, the right of stoppsge in trant1itu oontinn011 ;
and where a sh!P came into port ~thont performing quarantine, when she ought ~have done
tlO, and the 81!s1gne1Js of the consignee, who had become bankrnpt, took po~on of the
goods~ and the ship was onlured ont of port to perform quarantine, where an agent of Uie consignor claimed the good~ on bebalf of ni~ principal. it WBB be)d that the t'OllsigDOT bid properly
ex1Jrcised and might claim a Rtoppsge in tran~itn. 1 Ei.p. 240. And JCOQds depoei&ed in the
king's wnrehouses under 26 Geo. l II, c. 59, may be ~topped in transitn, thou~ they b&Te boon
churned by the con..Uguco. 2 E:;p. 003.
On tho other hand, the transitua may be determined by delivery of the key of the warehouse
where the good8 are depoi!ited to the vendee. 3 T. R. 464; 8 T. R. 199: or payment of rent for
such warehout10 to the vendor, or to the wharfinger, with the vendor's yrivity. 1 Campi>. 452; 2
id. 243; 1 M1u·sh. 257, 258. And in all t1imilar cases of oon:Jtmotive delivery and aooeptance, the
right to s!-0pp~e in tran~itn ?s a,t a~ end. . Seo 7 Taunt. 278; 2 Bar. and Cree. 540; 1 Ryan and
Moody, :N. P. C. 6; and 3 Ch1tt~ 11 Com. L. 340.]
Upon the right of stoppage m tnmsitu, see the .American cases collected in 1 Para. on COillt.
5th Am. ed. 595-601. A.ud see Houston on Stoppage in Trawiltu.
.

or

where the goods are deposited to the vendee. 3 T. R. 464; 8 T. R. 199: or payment of rent for

such warehouse to the vendor, or to the wharfinger, with the vendor's privity. 1 Campb. 452; %

id. 243 ; 1 Marsh. 257, 258. And in all similar cases of constructive delivery and acceptance, the

right to stoppage in transitu is at an end. See 7 Taunt. 278; 2 Bar. and Ores. 540; 1 Ryau and

Moody, N. P. C. 6; and 3 Chitty's Com. L. 340.]

Upon the right of stoppage in transitu, see the American cases collected in 1 Pan. on Cant.

5th Am. ed. 595-601. And see Houston on Stoppage in Transitu.
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an action against the vendor for detaining them. And by a regular sale, without

delivery, the property is so absolutely vested in the vendee, that if A sells a

horse to B for 10/., and he pays him earnest or signs a note in writing of the

bargain; and afterwards, before the delivery of the horse, or money paid, the

horse dies in the vendor's custody, still he is entitled to the money, because by

the *contract the property was in the vendee, (b) Thus may property ,- „. .„ ,

in goods be transferred by sale, where the vendor hath such property in L J

himself.

But property may also in some cases be transferred by sale, though the

vendor hath none at all in the goods; for it is expedient that the buyer, by tak-

ing proper precautions, may at all events be secure of his purchase; otherwise all

commerce between man and man must soon be at an end. And therefore the

general rule of the law is, (c) that all sales and contracts of any thing vendible, in

fairs or markets overt, (14) (that is, open,) shall not only be good between the

parties, but also be binding on all those that have any right or property therein.

And for this purpose, the Mirror informs us, (d) were tolls established in

markets, viz.: to testify the making of contracts; for every private contract

was discountenanced by law: insomuch that our Saxon ancestors prohibited the

sale of anything above the value of twenty pence, unless in open market, and

directed every bargain and sale to be contracted in the presence of credible wit-

nesses, (e) Market overt in the country is only held on the special days pro-

vided for particular towns by charter or prescription ; but in London every day,
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except Sunday, is market day. (/) The market place, or spot of ground set

apart by custom for the sale of particular goods, is also in the country the only

market overt \(g) but in London every shop in which goods are exposed pub-

licly to sale is market overt, for such things only as the owner professes to trade

in. (A) But if my goods are stolen from me, and sold, out of market overt, my

property is not altered, and I may take them wherever I find them. And it is

expressly provided by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 21, that the sale of any goods, wrong-

fully taken, to any pawnbroker in London, or within two miles thereof, shall

not alter the property: for this, being usually a clandestine trade, is therefore

made an exception to the general rule. And even in market overt, if the goods

be the property of the king, such sale (though regular in other respects)

*will in no case bind him; though it binds infants, feme-coverts, idiots, r **rn -i

and lunatics, and men beyond sea or in prison: or if the goods be stolen L d J

from a common person, and then taken by the king's officer from the felon, and

sold in open market; still, if the owner has used due diligence in prosecuting

the thief to conviction, he loses not his property in the goods, (t) (15) So like-

wise, if the buyer knoweth the property not to be in the seller; or there be any

other fraud in the transaction ; if he knoweth the seller to be an infant, or feme-

covert not usually trading for herself; if the sale be not originally and wholly

made in the fair or market, or not at the usual hours; the owner's property is

not bound thereby. (;') If a man buys his own goods in a fair or market, the

contract of sale shall not bind him, so that he shall render the price: unless the

property had been previously altered by a former sale, (k) And notwithstand-

ing any number of intervening sales, if the original vendor, who sold without

having the property, comes again into the possession of the goods, the original

owner may take them, when found in his hands who was guilty of the first

breach of justice. (I) By which wise regulations the common law has secured

the right of the proprietor in personal chattels from being divested, so far as was

ft) Noy, c. 42. (cj 2 Inst. 713. (d) C. I, i 3. (e) LL. Ethel. 10, 12. LL. Eadg. Wllk. SO.

(ft Cro. JHC. 68. (g) Godb. 131. (kj 6 Rop. 83. 12 Mod. 621.

(tj Bacon's Use of the law,158. (j) S Inst. 713, 9H. ft; Perk. } 93. (1) 2Inst. 713.

(14) This rule does not obtain in the United States. Wheelwright n. Depeyster, 1 Johns.

471.

(15) This subject is now covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 100. See 7 C. and P. 431;

id. 646. The effect of the statute is, upon conviction of the thief, to restore to the owner the

property in the goods stolen, with all the legal remedies incident to that right; and this not-

withstanding a sale in market overt. Scattergood v. Sylvester, 15 Q. B. 506; Roscoo, Cr. Ev. 212.
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an action against the vendor for detaining them. And by a regular sale, without
delivery, the property is so absolutely vested in the vendee, that if A sells a
horse t.o B for 101., and he pays him earnest or signs a note in writing of the
bargain; and afterwards, before the delivery of the horse, or money paid, the
horse dies in the vendor's custody, still he is entitled to the money, because by
the *contract the property was in the vendee. (b) 'fhus may property [ • 449 ]
in goods be transferred by sale, where the vendor kath such pro~rty in
himself.
But property may also in some cases be transferred by sale, though the
vendor katk no1te at all in the goods; for it is expedient that the buyer, by taking proper precautions, may at all events be secure of his purchase; otherwise all
commerce between man and man must soon be at an end. And therefore the
general rule of the law is, (c) that all sales and con tracts of any thing vendible, in
fairs or markets overt, (14) (that is, open,) shall not only be good between the
parties, but also be binding on all those that have any nght or property therein.
And for this purpose, the Mirror informs us, (d) were tolls established in
markets, viz.: to testify the making of contracts; for every private contract
was discountenanced by law: insomuch that our Saxon ancestors prohibited the
sale of anythinga.bove the value of twenty pence, unless in open market, and
directed every bargain and sale to be contracted in the presence of credible witnesses. (e) Market overt in the country is only held on the special days provided for particular towns by charter or prescription; but in London every dav,
except Sunday, is market day.(/) The market place, or spot of ground set
apart by custom for the sale of particular goods, is also in the country the only
market overt;(!/) but in London every shop in which goods are exposed publicly to sale is market overt, for such things only as the owner professes to trade
in. (h) But if my goods a.re stolen from me, and sold, out of market overt, my
property is not altered, and I mav take them wherever I find them. And it is
expressly provided by statute 1 Jiic. I, c. 21, that the sale of any goods, wron~
fully taken, to any pawnbroker in Loudon, or within two miles thereof, shall
not alter the property: for this, being usually a clandestine trade, is therefore
made an exception to the general rule. And even in market overt, if the goods
be the property of the king, such sale (though regular in other respects)
*will in no case bind him ; though it binds infants, feme-coverts, idiots, [ *4:r:o]
and lunatics, and men beyond sea or in prison: or if the goods be stolen
from a common person, and then taken by the king's officer from the felon, and
sold in open market; still, if" the owner has used due diligence in prosecuting
the thief to conviction, he loses not his property in the goods. ('i) (15) So likewise, if the buyer knoweth the property not to be in the seller; or there be any
other fraud in the transaction ; if he knoweth the seller to be an infant, or femecovert not usually trading for herself; if thE' sale be not originally and wholly
made in the fair or market, or not at the usual hours; the ~ner'sproperty is
not bound thereby. (i) If a man buys his own goods in a fair or murket, the
contrad of sale shall not bind him, so that he shall render the price: unless the
property had been previously altered by a former sale. (k) And notwithstandmg any number of intervening sales, if the original vendor, who sold without
having the property, comes again into the possession of the goods, the original
owner may take them, when found in his hands who was guilty of the first
breach of justice. (l) By which wise regulations the common law bas secured
the right of the proprietor in personal chattels from being divested, so far as was

°

(b) Noy, c. {2.
(f) t.;ro. Jae. 68.

OJ Bacon's Use of the

(c) 2 Inst. 713.
(g) G(l(lb. 131.
law,l~.

(d.) C. 1, f 3.
(e) LL. Ethd. 10, 12.
(h) 5 Rep. 83. 12 Mod. 1121.
(k) Perk. f 93.

{j) 2 Inst. 713, 91{.

LL. Eadg. WUk. SO.
{l) 2 Inst. 713.

(14) This rule does not obtain in .the United States. Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns.
471.
(15) ThiR subject i8 now covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 100. Sec 7 C. and P. 4:n;
id. 646. The· effect of the 11tatute is, upon conviction of the thief, to restore tn the owner the
property in the goods stolen, with all the legal remedies incident to th1Lt right; a.nd this not.with:.1tanding a i:;o.le in market overt. Scattergood v. Sylvester, 15 Q. B. 506; Ro:;coe, Cr. Ev. 212.
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consistent with that other necessary policy, that purchasers, Twnafi&e, in a fair,

open and regular manner, shall not be afterwards put to difficulties by reason of

the previous knavery ot the seller.

But there is one species of personal chattels, in which the property is not

easily altered by sale, without the express consent of the owner, and those are

horses, (m) For a purchaser gains no property in a horse that has been stolen,

unless it be bought in a fair or market overt, according to the direction of the

statutes 2 P. and M. c. 7, and 31 Eliz. c. 12. By which it is enacted, that the

horse shall be openly exposed, in the time of such fiiir or market, for one whole

hour together, between ten in the morning and sunset, in the public place vised

for such sales, and not in any private yard or stable; and afterwards brought by

both the vendor and vendee to the book-keeper of such fair or market; that toll

F *4"11 k6 Ptt^' ^ Miy *")e ^uei M1€^ ^ no';' one P81111^ *° the book-keeper, who

L J shall enter down, the price, colour and marks of the horse, with the

names, additions, and abode of the vendee and vendor; the latter being properly

attested. Nor shall such sale take away the property of the owner, if within six

months after the horse is stolen he puts in his claim before some magistrate,

where the horse shall be found; and, within forty days more, proves such his

property by the oath of two witnesses, and tenders to the person in possession

such price as he bonafide paid for him in market overt. But in case any one of

the points before mentioned be not observed, such sale is utterly void; and the

owner shall not lose his property, but at any distance of time may seize or bring
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an action for his horse, wherever he happens to find him.

By the civil law (n) an implied warranty was annexed to every sale, in respect

to the title of the vendor; and so, too, in our law, a purchaser of goods and

chattels may have a satisfaction from the seller, if he sells them as his own and

the title proves deficient, without any express warranty for that purpose, (o) (16)

But with regard to the goodness of the wares so purchased, the v.endor is not

bound to answer; unless he expressly warrants them to be sound and

good, (p) (17) or unless he knew them to be otherwise, and hath used any art to

(m) 2 Inst. 719. (n) ff. 21, 2,1. (o) Cro. Jac. 474. 1 Boll. Air. 90. (p) F. N. B. 94.

(16) Mr. Parsons in his treatise on contracts states the rule as settled in the United- States

'• that the seller of a chattel, if in possession, warrants by implication that it is hn own, ami

is answerable to the purchaser if it be taken from him by one who has a better title than the

seller, whether the seller knew the defect of his title or not, and whether he did or did not make

a distinct affirmation of his title. But if the seller is out of possession, and no affirmation of

title is made, then it may be said that the purchaser buys at his peril." " If the seller is in pos-

session, but the possession is of such a Kind as not to denote or imply title in him, there

would be no warranty of title in England, and we are confident there would be none in this

country." 1 Pare, on Cont. 5th ed. 574 Chancellor Kent says there is an implied warranty of

title •• if the seller has possession of the article, and he sells it as his own, and not as ageut tor

another, and for a fair price." 2 Kent, 478; see cases cited by these, authors; also Benj. on

Sales, 406, et seq.

(17) There are some exceptions, however, to the doctrine here stated. One of these exceptions

is, where chattels are sold In sample, in which ease there is an implied warranty that they cor-

respond with the sample exhibited. Bradford 2. Mauley, 13 Mass. 139; Service r. lh.nl. 2 Sandf.

89, and 5 N. Y. 95; Borrekins v. Sevan, 3 Eawle, 37; Rose v. Beatie, 2 Nott and McC. 538;

Hall ». Plasson, 19 La. An. 11. Another is where an article is ordered from a manufacturer fora

special purpose, and is supplied for that purpose, in which case the manufacturer taken upon him-

self the risk of supplying that which is ht tor the purpose. The leading case upon this subject U

Jones r. Bright, 5 Bing. 533, in which.it was decided that one who soils goods manufactured by

himself, knowing the purpose for which they are to be used bv the purchaser, implicdly warrants

that they are reasonably tit and proper for that purpose, and is answerable for lateut defects, in-

asmuch as, being the maker, he has the means of ascertaining and of guarding against tfaese

defects, whereas the purchaser must necessarily be altogether ignorant of them. See also Loiug

i). Fidgeon, 6 Taunt. 108; Chanter r. Hopkins, "4 M. and W. 399; Howard ». Hoev, 23 Wend.

351; Dicksoni). Jordan, 11 Ired. 106; Breuton t>. Davis, 8 Blackf. 317; Bird ». Mayer, 8 Wis.

362; Rodgors t>. Nile*, 11 Ohio, N. S. 48; Seals D. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 114. Another is where pro-

visions are sold, not to a dealer, for immediate domestic use. Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio, 378 ; Em-

erson v. Brigham, 11 Mass. 197; Winsor v. Lombard, 18 Pick. 57; Humphreys c. Comline, 8

Blackf. 516; Hoover v. Peters, 18 Mich. 51; Divine v. McCormiek, 50 Barb. 116.

In judicial sales, however, there is no implied warranty. The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat. 644.
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disguise them, (17) or unless they turn out to b& different fr ja what he repre-

sented them to the buyer. (18)

2. Bailment, (19) from the French bailler, to deliver, is a delivery of goods

in trust, upon a contract, express or implied, that the trust shall be faithfully

f q) Z EoU. Rep. 5.

(18) Any distinct assertion of the quality Or condition of the thing sold, not intended as mere

matter of opinion or belief, made by the seller during the negotiations foe the sale, for the pur-

pose of assuring the buyer of the truth of the fact asserted, and inducing him to make the pur-

r|j;|j[>. if received and retted upon bv him, is an express warranty. Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Har. and

G. 495; Roberts v. Morgan, 2 Cow. 438; Hawking r. Berry, 5 Gil. 36; Otto v. Alderson, 10 8.

and 1C. 476; Cook r. Moscley, 13 Wend. 277. But if the contract of sale is in writing, and con-

tains no warranty, parol evidence is not admissible to add a warranty. Tan Ostrand r. If ml,

1 Wend. 424 ; L°mub «. Crafts, 12 Met. 353; Dean o. Mason, 4 Conn. 432; Reed B. "Wood, 9 Vt.

365; 1 Pare, on Cout. 5th ed. 589. A mere receipted bill of gale, however, does not preclude

proof of warranty. Hcrsom >\ Henderson, 1 Post. 224; Bradford v. Manly, 13 Mass. 142;

Picard r. McCormiek, 11 Mich. 68. As to what will constitute frauds in a sale, see 1 Pars, on

Cont. 5th ed. 57£

(19) [There are two,celebrated classifications of the various kinds of bailments: that of

Lord Holt in the case of Coggs ». Bernard, Lord Baym. 909; 1 Smith Lead. Cos. 77 ; and that

of Sir. Wni. Jones. Lord Holt's was thus expressed: " There are six sorts of bailments. Tho

first sort of bailment is a bare naked bailment of goods delivered by one man to another to

keep for the use of the bailor; and this I call a depositum; and it is that sort of bailment which
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is mentioned in Southcope's Case, 4 Rep. 83. The second sort is when goods or chattels that

are useful are lent to a friend- gratis, to be used by him, and this is called commodatum, be-

cause the thing is to be restored in specie. The third sort is when goods are left with the bailee

to be used by him for hire: this is called locntio et eonductio, and the lender is called the loca-

tor, and the borrower conductor. The fourth sort is when goods or chattels are delivered to

another as a pawn, to be security to him for money borrowed of him by the bailor; and this is

called in Latin vadinm, and in English a pawn or a pledge: The fifth sort is when the goods or

chattels are delivered to be carried, or something in to be done about them for a reward, to be

paid by the person who delivers them, to the bailee, who is to do the thing about them. The

sixth sort is when there is a delivery of goods or chattels to somebody who is to carry them,

or to do something about them gratis, without any reward for such, his work or carriage." The

fifth sort of bailment mentioned by Lord Holt is called locatio operis faciendi, and the sixth,

mandatmn.

Upon this judgment of Lord Holt, Sir W. Jones has these remarks: " His division of bail-

ments into six sorts appears in the first place a little inaccurate; for in fact his fifth sort is no

more than a branch or his third, and he might with equal reason have added a seventh, since

the fifth is capable of another subdivision. I acknowledge, therefore,, but five species of bail-

ment, which I shall now enumerate and define, with all the Latin names, one or two of which

Lord Holt has omitted. 1. Depositvm, which is a naked bailment, without reward, of goods to

be kept for the bailor. 2. Ifandatotm or commiggiou, when the mandatory undertakes without

recompense to do some act about the things bailed, or simply to carry them; and hence Sir II.

Finch divides bailments into two sorts, to keep, and to employ. 3. Commodatum, or loan for

nse, when goods are bailed without pay. to be used for a certain time by the bailee. 4. Piqnori

atceptum, when a thing is bailed by a debtor to his creditor in pledge, or as security for th»

debt. 5. Location or hiring, which is always for a reward, and this bailment is either. Locatio

rei, by which the hirer gains the temporary use of the thing; or, 2. Locatio operif faciendi,

when work and labor, or care and pains are to be performed or bestowed on the thing deliv-

ered ; or 3. Locatio operis mzrcium vehendarvm, whcu goods are bailed for the purpose of being

carriedfrom place to place, either to & public carrier, or to a private person*" fir. Story makes

a separate subdivision under the head of hiring, of locatio cuxtoditt, which Sir Vf. Jones refers

to the general title of locatio operis faciendi. I ani unable to guess at the analogy which could

have led Sir "W. Jones to confuse locatio operis with locatio rei, and to rank Lord Holt's fifth

sort of bailment as a branch of his third.

The difference between the first and sixth classes, it will be observed, is merely that, in the

one, the bailee's care extends only to the keeping of the goods, while in the other he carries

or performs some work upon them. If there were any real distinction, for the purposes of ar-

rangement, between the care bestowed in keeping and watching, and the care bestowed in car-

rying or working upon goods, the fifth class, which includes bailments with reward for custody,

as well as for carriage or for ma-iiipulation, should have been divided into two. But the arrange-

ment may be better amended by uniting the first and sixth kinds; and theu (setting aside the

case of a pawn, which is peculiar, and involves a contingent dereliction of ownership) we-

have four kinds of bailment, reducible to two general heads, viz.: 1. Bailment of goods to be

kept carried, or manufactured with or without reward. 2. Hiring of goods, with or without

payment.

There are two- considerations of importance with respect to a bailee, which should not be

passed over: his liability for loss or injury to the thing bailed.; and his lieu for the recompense

for hi« labor bestowed upon it.
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executed on the part of the bailee. As if cloth be delivered, or (in our legal

dialect) bailed, to a tailor to make a suit of clothes, he has it upon an implied

contract to render it again when made, and that in a workmanly manner, (r)

If money or goods be delivered to a common carrier, to convey from Oxford to

London, he is under a contract in law to pay, or cany them, to the person

appointed, (s) If a horse, or other goods, be delivered to an inkeeper or his

frj I Vern. WB. (t) IS Mod. 48Z.

The liability of the bailee for losses and injuries depends npon the nature of the contract of

bailment, and the amount of care which might have prevented the injury. The result of the

cases is thus stated by Mr. Smith: " Bailees may be divided into three general classes, varying

from one another in their degrees of responsibility. The first of these is when the bailment

is for the benefit of the bailor alone ; this includes the cases of mandatories and deposits, and

in this the bailee is liable only for gross negligence. See 11 Mee. and W. 113. The second is

where the bailment is for the benefit of the bailee alone; this comprises loans, and in this class

the bailee is bound to the very strictest diligence. The third is where the bailment is for the

benefit both of bailor and bailee; this includes locatio ret, radium, and locatio opens: and in

this class an ordinary and average degree of diligence is sufficient to exempt the bailee from

responsibility. 1 Lead. Cas. 104; 4 Nev. and M. 170; 1 H. Bl. 158; 8 Mee. and W.258; 3

Scott, if. R. 1. All bailees become responsible for loss by casualty or violence, after their

refusal to return the goods bailed, npon a lawful demand. Noy's Max. 215; Jones on Bailments,

42, 120. The liabilities of innkeepers and carriers rest on peculiar grounds, and deserve more

particular notice.
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An innkeeper's liability is not so extensive as that of a carrier, nor is he regarded, as a car-

rier is, in the light of a surety. He is bound to keep safely all such things as his guests deposit

in his custody, or within his inn; and all losses, except those arising from irresistible force, the

act of God, or the king's enemies, are prima facie presumed to arise from the negligence of him-

self or his servants.

He may excuse himself by showing, if he can, that he and his servants were guilty of no

negligence, and that the loss was the result of inevitable accident or superior force, or arose

from the guest's own default, as that the robbery was committed by the guest's own servant

or companion; but the plea of sickness or even insanity at the time, will not avail him; nor is

the guest's mere negligence any excuse. Jeremy, 145 ; Cro. Eliz. 622; 3 B. and Al. 283; 8 Li.

and Cr. 9; see 7 Jurist, 1038. He cannot discharge himself from responsibility by refusing to

take charge of the goods, because there are suspected persons in the house, whose conduct he

cannot control. Jones, 95; 5 T. R. 273; 8 Coke, 32. If he refuse because his house is full

of parcels, he is still liable for a loss, if the goods are deposited there, though he is not in-

formed of it, provided the owner remains a guest. 8 Rep. 63; 5 T. R. 273. When the guest

quits the inn, the goods, if left. becomes a simple deposit, gratuitous or for hire, as the case

may be. But if the guest obtain exclusive use of a room, for the purpose of a shop or ware-

house, his conduct may exonerate the innkeeper as to the property therein. Holt, 209, 211, n.;

1 Stark. 249; see also"4 Mau. and S. 306; 4 Bowl, aud Ry. 636; 2 Barn, and Adol. 803; 1 AdoL

and El. 533.

The 6 Ann. o. 31, and 14 Geo. Ill, c. 78, seem to exonerate bailees generally from liability

for losses occasioned by fire beginning in any house or chamber; the latter act extends to barns,

stables, or other buildings, on any person's estate, within the bills of mortality; but it seems

that in keepers and carriers are not within the protection of this statute. 4 T. B. 581; 5 id. 389 ;

1 Stark. 72.

Special carriers who do not undertake to carry for all persons indiscriminately, have no

greater liabilities than any other bailees for hire. Common carriers are those who undertake to

carry for all persons indifferently, see 8 Car. and P. 207, and they are bound to do so for rea-

sonable hire and reward. 2 Show. 81, 129; IB. and Al. 32; 4 Mee. and W. 749; 8 id. 443; 10

id. 161.

A common carrier is not merely answerable as a bailee for the consequences of his own

negligence, but has a further liability in the character of an insurer against accidents and

losses, however inevitable, that do not arise from the act of the queen's enemies, or of God,

such as tempests, At-.; and even for losses arising from such causes as these latter, if he vol

untarily encounters the mischief. 1 T. R. 27; 5 id. 389; 1 Per. and D. 4. Carriers were in the

habit of endeavoring to limit their liabilities in this respect, by notices to the effect that they

would not bo accountable for property beyond a certain value, unless the value was declared,

and an insurance was paid; and wherever it could be proved that these notices had come to

the knowledge of their employers, they were allowed the benefit of the contract implied

from such knowledge: 6 B. and Cr. 601; see 12 Moore, 447; and remained answerable only

for the consequences of their gross negligence. 2 B. and Al. 356; 5 id. 53, see 4 id. 21; 2

Moo. and P. 319, 331; see 8 Mee. and W. 228; 10 id. 161. The land carriers' act, 11 Gco. IV,

and 1 Wm. IV, c. 68, deprives these general notices of effect, but provides that carriers, -who

affix in some pnblio and conspicuous part of their offices a notice in the form prescribed by

the act, shall not be answerable for the loss or damage of gold, silver, jewelry, silks, stamps,
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servants, he is bound to keep *them safely, and restore them when his r *..„ ••

guest leaves the house, (t) If a man takes in a horse, or other cattle, to L -"

graze aiid depasture in his grounds, which the law calls agistment, he takes

them upon an implied contract to return them on demand to the owner, (u) If

a pawnbroker receives plate or jewels as a pledge, or security, for the repayment

of money lent thereon at a day certain, he has them upon an express contract

or condition to restore them, if the pledgor performs his part by redeeming

them in due time: (tv) for the due execution of which contract many useful

(() Cro. Ellx. 622. («) Cro. Car. 271. (to) Cro. Jac. 245. Tolv. 178.

bonk notes, title deeds, pictures and other valuable goods, specified in the net, contained in any

parcel to the value of more than 10J., unless the value and notice of the articles shall have

been declared at the time of delivery, and an insurance paid or agreed to be paid. It is pro-

vided that the act shall not exonerate carriers from the liability for losses arising from the

felonious acts of their servants. It was thought that this act was intended to relieve carriers

from their peculiar liabilities as insurers only; and that they would still be liable for the loss

of any goods specified by the act, the value of which had not been declared, if such loss arose

from their own gross neglect: 2 Cr. and M. 353; but this opinion has been overruled. 2 Gale

and D. 36. See 8 Mee. and W. 443.

Carriers by water are still allowed to protect themselves by general notices, (provided they

come to the knowledge of the parties to be bound,) and are further protected from particular

liabilities by the statutes 7 Geo. II, c. 15; 26 Geo. Ill, c. 86; 53 id. c. 159; and 6 Geo. IV, o.

125, a. 86; see 2 B. and Al. 2.
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Most bailees for reward have a lien upon or right of detaining the thing bailed, until they

have received their remuneration, with this obvious exception, that the nature of the bail-

ment be not such as necessarily to preclude the bailee from claiming the uninterrupted posses-

sion of the chattels, as in the case of a horse-trainer. 5 Mee. and W. 350. The common law

right of lien arises in three coses: first, where the bailee has bestowed labor or expense to

alter or improve the chattels: 5 Man. and S. 180; 2 Cr. and M. 304; 5 Mee. and W. 342;

gecoudly, where the bailee wag compellable to receive the chattel, as in case of a carrier or

innkeeper: Bac. Ab., Inn, d; 2 B. and Al. 283; lastly, where the party in possession has saved

the chattel from peril by sea, or has recovered it a'fter actual loss at sea, or capture by an

enemy; in which case he may retain it until he is remunerated for the salvage. Ld. Rayin.

393; 8 East, 57. A lien is special, i. e. confined to the particular demand which arises in

respect of the thing detained, unless extended by special agreement or the usage of the par-

ticular business, into a general lien, for the entire balance due in respect of the mutual deal-

ings of the parties in that business. This general lien has been allowed in the case of a

factor (4 B. and Al. 27; and see statute 6 Geo. IV, o. 94), wharfinger (M'Clel. and Y. 173),

packer (1 Atk. 228), calico printer (3 Esp. 268) insurance broker, (2 East. 523), banker (15

id. 428; 2 Scott, IT. R. 96), attorney (Doug. 104, 238; 4 Taunt 807; 2 Hare, 177), stereotype

printer (Mood and M. 465). But carriers are not entitled to such a general lien, and the courts

do not encourage usages of this nature. 7 East, 229; see 7 B. and Cr. 212. The lien of an

innkneeper is necessarily general. 7 Car. and P. 67;: see 3 Mee. and W. 248.]

With respect to the common law liability of innkeepers as bailees, see Clnte r. Biggins, 14

Johns. 175. And as to the circumstances under which one whose property is deposited at an

inn is to he regarded as a guest, so that the extraordinary liability of innkeeper shall attach,

see Mason ». Thompson, 9 Pick. 280; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 488; Berkshire Co. v. Proctor,

7 Cush. 417; Carter r. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52. A permanent boarder at a hotel is not regarded

as a guest. Manning v. "Wells, 9 Humph. 746; Kiston r. Hilderbrand, 9 B. Monr. 72.

It seems to be well settled in the United States that common carriers may make special

contracts with persons sending goods by them, by which they limit their common law lia-

bility. N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 6 How. 344; Camden and A. R. R. Co. «.

Banldanf, 16 Penn. St. 67; Farm, and Mech. Bank ». Champlain Trans. Co., 23 Vt. 186. But

a mere notice by the carrier that he will not be responsible will not relieve him, unless it is

brought home to the knowledge of the bailor, and he, either expressly or by implication,

assents. Whether he does assent or not is a question for the jury. Brown c. Eastern R. R.

Co., 11 Gush. 97; Form, and Mech. Bank ». Champlain Trans. Co., 23 Vt 186; Sager v. P. S.

and P. R. R. Co., 31 Me. 228; Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Penn. St. 208; Cooper v. Berry. 21

Geo. 526.

The act of congress of March 3, 1859, 9 Statute at Large, 635, exempts the owners of any

sloop or vessel from liability for loss or damage to goods shipped, by reason of any fire hap-

pening on board without the design or neglect of the owners; and also makes other excep-

tions from the common law liability, and permits the parties to make special contracts as

they may see fit. But the act does not apply " to the owner or owners of any canal boat,

barge or lighter, or to any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in river or inland

navigation." It is held that the navigation of the great American lakes and their connecting

waters is not iiilnmt navigation within the meaning of this act. American Trans. Co. v.

Moore, 5 Mich. 368; same case in error, 24 How. 1.
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regulations are made by statute 30 G-eo. II, c. 24. And so if a landlord distrains

goods for rent, or a parish officer for taxe% these for a time are only A pledge in

the hands of the distrainors, and they are bound by an implied contract in law

to restore them on payment of the debt, duty and expenses, before the time of

sale: or, when sold, to render back the overplus. If a friend delivers any thing,

to his friend to keep for him, the receiver is bound to restore it on demand; and

it was formerly held that in the mean time he was answerable for any damage or

loss it might sustain, whether by accident or otherwise; (x) unless he expressly

undertook (y) to keep it only with the same care as his own goods, and then he

should not be answerable for theft or other accidents. But now the law seems to

be settled, (:) that such a general bailment will not charge the bailee with any

loss, unless it happens by gross neglect, which is an evidence of fraud; but, if he

undertakes specially to keep the goods safely and securely, he is bound to take

the same care of them, as a prudent man would take of his own. (a)

In all these instances there is a special qualified property transferred from the

bailor to the bailee, together with the possession. It is not an absolute property,

F *4531 becan8e °f hi3 'contract for restitution; the bailor having still left in

«- ' -" him the right to & chose in action, grounded upon such contract And,

on account of this qualified property of the bailee, he may (as well as the bailor)

maintain an action against such as injure or take away these chattels. The

tailor, the carrier, the innkeeper, the agisting fanner, the pawnbroker, (20) the dis-

trainor, and the general bailee, may all of them vindicate, in their own right,
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this their possessory interest, against any stranger or third person, (b) For,

being responsible to the bailor, if the goods are lost or damaged by his wilful

default or gross negligence, or if he do not deliver up the chattels on lawful

demand, it is therefore reasonable that he should have a right of action against

all other persons who may have purloined or injured them; that he may always

be ready to answer the call of the bailor.

3. Hiring and borrowing are also contracts by which a qualified property may

be transferred to the hirer or borrower: in which there is only this difference,

that hiring is always for a price, or stipend, or additional recompense; borrow-

ing is merely gratuitous. But the law in both cases is the same. They are

both contracts, whereby the possession and a transient property is transferred

for a particular time or use, on condition to restore the goods so hired or bor-

rowed, as soon as the time is expired or use performed; together with the price

or stipend (in case of hiring) either expressly agreed on by the parties, or left

to be implied by law according to the value of the service. By this- mutual con-

tract, the hirer or borrower gains a temporary property in the thing hired,

accompanied with an implied condition to use it with moderation, and not to

abuse it; and the owner or lender retains a reversionary interest in the same, and

acquires a new property in the price or reward. Thus if a man hires or borrows

ahorse for a month, he has the possession and a qualified property therein during

that period; on the expiration of which his qualified property determines, and

(x) Co. Litt. 89. (H) 4 Hep. 84. («1 Tx>rd Rapn. 909. 14 Mod. W7.

«>} By the laws of Sweden the depositary or bailee' of goods is not bounil to restitution, in case of acci-

dent by lire or theft, provided his own goods perished in the same manner; "jura enim nostra" says.

regulations are made by statute 30 Geo. II, c. 24. And so if a landlord distrains
goods for rent, or a parish officer for taxes, tht>se for a time are only a pledge in
the hands of the distrainors, and they are bound by o.n implied contra.ct in law
to restore them on payment of the. debt, dutv and expenses, before the time of
sale: or, when sold, to render back the overplus. If a friend delivers any thing
to his friend to keep for him, the receiver is bound to restore it on demand; and
it was formerly held that in the mean time he was answerable for any damage or
loss it might sustain, whether by accident or otherwise; (x) unless be e~pressly
undertook (y) to keep it only with the same care as his own goods, and then he
should not be answerable for theft or other accidents. But now the law seems to
be settled, (z) that such a. general bailm~nt will not charge the bailee with any
loss, unless it happens by gross neglect, which is an evidence of fraud; but, if he
undertakes specially to keep the goods safely and securely, he is bound to take
the same care of them, as a prudent man would ~ke of his own. (a)
In all these instances there is a special qualified property transferred from the
bailor to the bailee, together with the possession. It is not an absolute rroperty,
[ • 453 ] because of his "'contract for restitution; the ba.ilor having still left in
him the right to a. cltose in action, grounded upon such contract. And,
on account of this qualified property of the bailee, he may (as well ns the ba.ilor)
maintain an action agttinst such as injure or take a'rny these chattels. The
tailor, the carrier, the innkee~r, the agisting farmer, the pawnbroker, (20) the distrainor, and the general bailee, may all of them vindicate, in their own right,
this their possessory interest, against any stranger or third person. (b) For,
being responsible to the bailor, if the goods are lost or damaged by bis wilful
default or gross negligence, or if he do not delh·er up the chattels on lawful
demand, it is therefore reasonable that he sh<rnld have a right of action against
all other persons who mav have purloined or injured them; that he may always
be ready to answer the call of the bailor.
3. Hiring aud borrowing arc al.so contracts by which a qualified property may
be transferred to the hirer or borrower: in which there is only this difference,
that hiring is always for a price, or stipend, or additional recompense; bo1Towing is merely gratuitous. But the la\V in both cases is the same. Tlrny are
both cont1-acts, whereby the possession and a. transient property is tmmiferred
for a particular time or use, on condition to restore the goods so hirerl or borrowed, as soon as the time is ex~red or use performed; together with the price
or stipend (in rase of hiring) 01ther expressly agreed on by the parties, or left
to be implied by law according to the value of the sen ice. By this. mutual contract, the hirer or borrower gains a. tempoFa.ry property in the thing hired,
accompanied with an implied condition to use it with moderation, and not to
abuse it; and the owner or lender retains a reversionury interest in the same, and
acquires a new property in the price or reward. Thus if a man hires or borrows
a. horse for a month, he hus the possessron and a qualified property therein during
that period; on the expiration of which his qualified property determines, and

Btlernliook, '• dolumprcttumunt, tiitnanonpcreant." (Dejure Swoon. 1.t, e. 6.)

(b) 13 Kep. 68.

(20) [A pawn differs from a mortgage (which bjr special contract mar be innde even of a

personal chattel) and also from a hen, which confers no right of sale or appropriation. On

(z\ Co. Litt. 89.
Crtl 4 Rep. 84.
(el Lord Rsrm. OOll. 12 !lfod. "'87.
1a) By the laws or Sweden tho <lepoeltary or lmilue or go01ts is not bo1111<l to re11tituUon, In cnse of l\Cctrlent hy lire or theft, }>ro»id.,11 his own goods perish~! in the :111111e mannor; "jura e11i111 fWBtra" saya.
tstlernhook, •· dolumprcuumunt, ri una non p"7"etml.'" (De jun SUetm. l. 2, c. 6.)
(b) 13 Rep. 69.

breach of the condition the thing mortgaged becomes at law the absolute property of the

mortgagee; but in case of a pawn, non-payment at the time only authorizes the pawnee to

sell, and so long as the chattel remains in his hands unsold, the debtor may re-entitle himsolf

by payment or "tender of the debt. 2 Str. 919; 1 P. Wms. 261; 1 Salk. 65B. The pawnee ia

bound" to keep the pledge with ordinary care; and if he does this, he may recover the debt,

notwithstanding the loss of the pledge. And as the security ia collateral to the debt, ha may

commence an action for the debt without (dying up the pledge. Bac. Abr. Bailment, b.

In addition tx> these common law liabilities, pawnbrokers are regulated in their dealings by

statutes, which fix the rate of interest to be taken by them, and prescribe the mode of dis-

posing of the bailments when not claimed within the time limited.]
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(20) [.A. pawn differs from a mo~ge (whioh by i;pecial cont.root may be u111de even of a
penmual chaUul) and also frum a hen, which confen no right of sale or uppropriat.ion. On
breach of the condition the thing mortgaged becomel! at law the absolute property of the
mortgagee; but in case of a pawn. non-payment at the time only nuthorizCf! the pawnee to
sell, and 80 long a11 the chattel remains in hie hands nT18old, the debt.or may re-entitle him>'olf
bv payment or l:Rnder of tho debt. 2 Str. 919; 1 P. Wm8. 261; 1 Salk. 5~ The pawneu is
bOamf to kee_P the pledgo with ordinary care; and if he doe11 thiR, he may. recover the deut,
notwithstandmg the loss of the ple<l~. And IUI tho Hecmity i11 collateral to the debt, he may
commence an aotion for t.hc debt without J(iving up the pledge. Bae. Abr. Be.ihncnt, b.
In addition t.o thei>e common law liabilities, pawnbrokers a.re regulated in their dcl\lin~ by
statutoi:<, which fix the rate of interc11t to be takon by them, and prescribe the moda of disposing of the baihnonts when not claimed within thl~ time limited.]
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the owner becomes (in ease of hiring) entitled also to the price for which the

horse was hired, (c)

*There is one species of this price or reward, the most usual of any r ^. - , -•

but concerning which many good and learned men have in former times I ' ' '

very much perplexed themselves and other people, by raising doubts about its

legality inforo conscimtice. That is, when money is lent on acontract to receive

not only the principal sum again, but also an increase by way of compensation for

the use; which generally is called interest by those who think it lawful, and

usury by those who do not so. For the enemies to interest in gener.il make no

distinction between that and usury, holding any increase of money to be inde-

fensibly usurious. And this they ground as well on the prohibition of it by the

law of Moses among the Jews, as also upon what is said to be laid down by

Aristotle, (d) that money is naturally barren, and to make it breed money is

preposterous, and a perversion of the end of its institution, which was only to

serve the purposes of exchange and not of increase. Hence the school divines

have branded the practice of taking interest as being contrary to the divine

law both natural and revealed; and the canon law (e) has proscribed the taking

any, the least, increase for the loan of money, as a mortal sin.

But in answer to this, it hath been observed, that the Mosaical precept was

clearly a political, and not a moral precept. It only prohibited the Jews from

taking usury from their brethren the Jews; but in express words permitted

them to take it of a stranger: (/") which proves that the taking of moderate
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usury, or a reward for the use, for so the word signifies, is not malum in ««;

since it was allowed where any but an Israelite waa concerned. And as to tha

reason supposed to be given by Aristotle and deduced from the natural barren-

ness of money, the same may with equal force be alleged of houses, which never

breed houses; and twenty other tilings, which nobody doubts it is lawful to

make profit of, by letting them to hire. And though money was originally used

only for the purposes of exchange, yet the laws of any state *may be well ,- ^.. - ->

justified in permitting it to be turned to the purposes of profit, if the "- '"'* '

convenience of society (the great end for which money was invented) shall

require it. And that the allowance of moderate interest tends greatly to the

benefit of the public, especially in a trading country, will appear from that

generally acknowleged principle, that commerce cannot subsist without mutual

and extensive credit. Unless money, therefore can be borrowed, trade cannot

be carried on; and if no premium were allowed for the hire of money, few

persons would care to lend it; or at least the ease of borrowing at a short warn-

ing (which is the life of commerce) would be entirely at an end. Thus, in the

dark ages of monkish superstition and civil tyranny, when interest was laid

under a total inderdict, commerce was- also at its lowest ebb, and fell entirely

into the hands of the Jews and Lombards: bnt when men's minds began to be

more enlarged, when true religion and real liberty revived, commerce grew

again into credit: and again introduced with itself its inseparable companion^

the doctrine of loans upon interest. And, as to any scruples of conscience,

since all other conveniences of life may either be bought or hired, but money

can only be hired, there seems to be no greater oppression in taking a reccm*

pense or price for the hire of this, than of any other convenience, lo demand

an exorbitant price is equally contrary to conscience, for the loan of a horse, or

the loan of a sum of money: but a reasonable equivalent for the temporary

inconvenience which the owner may feel by the want of it, and for the hazard

of his losing it entirely, is not more immoral in the one case than it is in the

other. Indeed the absolute prohibition of lending upon any, even moderate

interest, introduces the very inconvenience which it seems meant to remedy.

The necessity of individuals will make borrowing unavoidable. Without some

profit allowed by law, there will be but few lenders; and those principally bad

men, who will break through the law, and take a profit; and then will endeavour

(c) Yelv 172. Cro. Jac. 236. (rf) Poiit. 1.1, c. 10. This passage hath been suspected to be spurious.

(<} Decretal, I. 5, tU. 19. (/) Dcut. xxlli. 20.
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the owner becomes (in case of hiring) entitled also to the price for which the
horse was hired. (c)
*There is one spreies of this price or reward, the most nsnal of any [ • 454 ]
but concerning which many good and learned men h&ve in former times
very much perplexed themselves and other people, by raising doubts about its
legality fo foro conscientim. That is, when money is lent on a contract to receive
not only the principal sum again~ but also an incre.ase by way of compensation for
the use; which generally is cu.lied i·nterest by those who think it lawful, and
usury by those who do not so. For the enemies to in!;erest in general make no
distinction between that and usury, holding any increase of money to be indefensibly usurious. And this they groand as well on the prohibition of it by the
law of Moses among the Jews, as also upon what is said to be laid clown by
Aristotle, (d) that money is naturally barren, and to make it breed money is
preposterous, and a perversion of the end of its institution, which was only to
serve the purposes of exchange and not of increase. Hence the school divines
bu.Ye bmn<led the practice of taking interest as being contrary to the divine
law both natural 11.nd revealed; and the canon law (e) has proscribed the ta.king
auy, the least, increase for the loan of money, as a. mortal sin.
But in answer to this, it hath been observed~ that the l\fosaical precept was
cle1~rly a political, and i~ot a moral precept. It onl.y prohibited the Jews ~rom
faking nsnr.v from their brethren the Jews; but m express words permitted
them to take it of a stranger: ( f) which proves that the taking of moderate
usury, or a reward for the use, for so the word signifies, is not malum in se;
since it was allowed where any hut an Israelite wa.s concerned. And as to th.e
reason supposed to be given by Aristotle and deduced from the natural barrennHss of money, the same may with equal force he alleged of houses, which never
breed houses; and twenty other thmgs, which nobody doubts it is lawful to
make profit of, by letting them to hire. And though money was originally used
only for the purpoS('S of exchange, yet the laws of any stattl *may be well [ • 455 ]
justified in permitting it to be tnrned to the purposes of profit, if the
'
convenience of society (the great end for which money was invented) shall
require it. And that the allowance of moderate interest tends greatly to the
benefit of the pnblic, especially in a trading country, will appeur from that
generally acknowleged principle, that commerce cannot subsist without mutual
and extensive credit. Unlc88 money, therefore can be borrowed, trade cannot
be carried on ; 1tncl if no premhmi were allowed for the hire of money,
persons ~ot~ld care. to lend it; or at least the eas: of borrowing at a, shol't. warn~
i:ng (which is the hfe of commerce) wonld be entirely at an end. 'IhW!, m the
dark ages of monkish superstition and civil tvrannv, when interest was laid
under ~i total inderclict. commerce was also at its lowest ebb, and fell euti1·ely
into the hands of the Jews and Lorn bards: bnt when men's minds began to be
more en large<l, when tnrn religion and real liberty revived, commerce grew
again into credit: and again introduced with itself its inseparable companion,
the doctrine of lonns upon interest. And, ae to a.ny scruples of conscience,
since all other conveniences of life may either be bought or hired, but money
can only be hire<l, there seems to be no greater oppression in ta.kin~ a recom ..
pense or price for the hire of this, than of any other convenience. 'Io demand
an exorbitant price is equally contrary to conscience, for the loan of' a horse, or
the loan of a sum of money: bnt a reasonable equivalent for the tempor.1.ry
inconvenience which the owner may fed by the want of it, and for the hazard
of his losing it entirely, is not more immoral in the one case than it is iu the
other. Indeed the absolute prohibition of lending upon any, even moderate
interest, introduces the very incom·enience which it seems meant to remedy.
The necessity of individ1tals will mnke borrowing umwoi<lable. Without some
profit allowt<l by law, there will be but few lenders; and those prinripally bad
men, who will break through the lnw, ancl take a profit; and then will endeavour

fe'"

(cl Yeh-. 172. Cro .•JRc. 236.
(tl Decrel<Jl, I. 5, tU. HJ.

(tf)

Polit. 1. I, c. 10.

(fl Ucut. xxlll, 20.

This pussllge huLh been sus11ccted to be spurious.
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to indemnify themselves from the danger of the penalty, by making that profit

F *456 1 exorkitllnt' A capital *distinction must therefore be made between a

*• ' J moderate and exorbitant profit ; to the former of which we usually give

the name of interest, to the latter the truly odious appellation of usury : the

former is necessary in every civil state, if it were but to exclude the latter,

which ought never to be tolerated in any well regulated society. For, as the

whole of this matter is well summed up by Grotius, (a) " if the compensation

allowed by law does not exceed the proportion of the hazard run, or the want

felt, by the loan, its allowance is neither repugnant to the revealed nor the

natural law ; but if it exceeds those bounds, it is then oppressive usury ; and

though the municipal laws may give it impunity, they can never make it

just."

We see that the exorbitance or moderation of interest, for money lent,

depends upon two circumstances ; the inconvenience of parting with it for the

present and the hazard of losing it entirelv. The inconvenience to individual

lenders can never be estimated by laws ; tne rate therefore of general interest

must depend upon the usual or general inconvenience. This results entirely

from the quantity of specie or current money in the kingdom ; for the more

specie there is circulating in any nation, the'greater superfluity there will be,

beyond what is necessary to carry on the business of exchange and the common.

concerns of life. In every nation or public community, there is a certain

quantity of money thus necessary, which a person well skilled in political
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arithmetic might perhaps calculate as exactly, as a private banker can the

demand for running cash in his own shop: all above this necessary quantity

may be spared or lent, without much inconvenience to the respective lenders ;

and the greater this national superfluity is, the more numerous will be the

lenders, and the lower ought the rate of the national interest to be ; but where

there is not enough circulating cash, or barely enough, to answer the ordinary

uses of the public, interest will be proportionably high : for lenders will be but

few, as few can submit to the inconvenience of lending.

1

'

*So also the hazard of an entire loss has its weight in the regulation

of interest : hence, the better the security the lower will the interest be;

the rate of interest being generally in a compound ratio, formed out of the

inconvenience, and the hazard. And as if there were no inconvenience, there

should be no interest but what is equivalent to the hazard, so, if there were no

hazard there ought to be no interest, save only what arises from the mere incon-

venience of lending. Thus, if the quantity of specie in a nation be such, that

the general inconvenience of lending for a year is computed to amount to three

per cent. : a man that has money by him will perhaps lend it upon a good per-

sonal security &i five per cent., allowing two for the hazard run ; he will lend it

upon lauded security or mortgage at four per cent., the hazard being proportion-

ably less ; but he will lend it to the state on the maintenance of which all his

property depends, at three per cent., the hazard being none at all. (21)

But sometimes the hazard may be greater than the rate of interest allowed

by law will compensate. And this gives rise to the practice of, 1. Bottomry,

or respondentia. 2. Policies of insurance. 3. Annuities upon lives.

And first, bottomry (which originally arose from permitting the master of a

ship, in a foreign country, to hypothecate the ship in order to raise money to

refit) is in the nature of a mortgage of a ship ; when the owner takes up money

(g) /ifj. b. if p. I. 2, e. It, ! 22.

(21) [This proportion between the inconvenience and the two descriptions of hazard is

to indemnify themselves from the danger of the penalty, by making that profit
[ • 456 ] exorbitant. A capital •distinction must therefore be made between a.
moderate and exorbitant profit; to the former of which we usually give
the name of interest, to the latter the truly odious appellation of usury: the
former is necessary in every civil state, if it were but to exclude the latter,
which ought never to be tolerated in any well regulated society. For, as the
whole of this matter is well summed up by Grotius, (g) "if the compensation
allowed by law does not exceed the proportion of the hazard run, or the want
- felt, by the loan, its allowance is neither repugnant t-0 the revealed nor the
natural law; but if it exceeds those bounds, it is then oppressive nsurv; and
tpou*h the municipal laws may give it impunity, they can never make it

JUSt. '
We see that the exorbitance or moderation of interest, for money lent,
depends upon two circumstances; the inconvenience of parting with it for the
present and the hazard .of losing it entirelv. The inconvenience to ind.h-idual
lenders can never be estimated by laws; the rate therefore of general mterest
must depend upon the usual or general inconvenience. This results entirely
from the quantity of specie or current money in the kingdom; for the more
specie there is circulatmg in any nation, the greater superfluity there will be,
beyond what is necessary to carry on the business of exchange and the common
concerns of life. In every nation or public community, there is a certain
quantity of money thus necessary, which a person well skilled in political
arithmetic might perhaps calculate as exactly, as a private banker can the
demand for running cash in his own shop: all above this necessary quantity
may be spared or lent, without much inconvenience to the respective h•nders;
and the greater this nat.ional superfluity is, the more numerous will be the
lenders, and the lower onght the rate of the national interest to be; but where
there is not enough circulating cash, or barely enough, to answer the ordinary
uses of the public, interest will be proportionably high: for lenders will be but
few, as few can submit to the inconvenience of lending.
[ • 457 J •So also the hazard of an entire loss has its weight in t.he regulation
of interest: hence, the better the security the lower will the interest be;
the rate of interest being generally in a compound ratio, formed out of the
inconvenience, and the hazard. And as if there were no inconvenience, there
should be no interest but what is equivalent to the hazard, so, if there were no
hazard there ought to be no interest, save only what arises from the mere inconvenience of lending. Thus, if the quantity of specie in a nation be such, that
the general inconvenience of lending for a year is computed to amount to tltree
per cent.: a man that has money by him will perhaps lend it upon a good personal security at five per cent., allowing two for the hazard rnn; he will lend it
upon lauded security or mortgage at four pm· cent., the hazard being proportionably less; but he will lend it to the state on the ma.inten&nce of which all his
property depends, at three per cent., the haze.rd being none at all. (21)
But sometimes the hazard may be ~reater than the rate of interest allowed
by law will compensate. And this gives rise to the practice of, I. Bot.tomry,
or respondentia. 2. Policies of insurance. 3. Annuities upon lives.
And first, hottomry (which originally arose from permitting the master of a
ship, in a foreign country, to hypothecate the ship in order to raise money to
refit) is in the nature of a. mortgage of a ship; when the owner takes up money
(g) JN}. Ii.

entirely arbitrary, and only put for an example.

4' p. l.

2, c. 12, f 22.

In this disquisition vfpou the principles wnich regulate the rate of interest, and on all sub-

jects connected with political economy, the author writes with the information only of bis

age : his reasoning is open to inurli observation, but as the subject is onty collateral, and could

not be explained satisfactorily except at considerable length, I mink it better to content myself

with this notice. COLERIDGE]
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(21) [This proportion between the inconvenience and the two descriptiom1 of hazard is
entirely arbitrary, and only put for an example.
In this diequhlition 1'pou the principle!! which regulate the rate of interest, aud on all !'!Ubjects connected with political economy, the author write!! with the infonnation on!~· of his
age ; his re8l!Oning is open to mnch observation, but as the subject is only collaternl, and could
not be explained satisfactorily except at considerable length, I think it better to conknt myself
with this notice. CoLBRIDOE]
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to enable him to cany on his voyage, and pledges the keel or bottom of the ship

(partem pro toto) as a security for the repayment. In which case it is under-

stood, that if the ship be lost, the lender loses also his .whole money; but, if it

returns in safety, then he shall receive back his principal, and also the premium

or interest agreed upon, however it may exceed the legal rate of interest. And

this is allowed to be a valid contract in all trading *nations, for the r *<r§ 1

benefit of commerce, and by reason of the extraordinary hazard run by <- ° -I

the lender. (A) And in this case the ship and tackle, if brought home, are

answerable (as well as the person of the borrower) for the money lent. But if

the loan is not upon the vessel, but upon the goods and merchandise, which

must necessarily be sold or exchanged in the course of the voyage, then only

the borrower, personally, is bound to answer the contract; who, therefore, in

this case is said to take up money at respondentia. These terms are also applied

to contracts for the repayment of money borrowed, not on the ship and goods

only, but on the mere hazard of the voyage itself; when a man lends a merchant

1,000?. to be employed in a beneficial trade, with condition to be repaid with

extraordinary interest, in case such a voyage be safely performed: (•/') which

kind of agreement is sometimes called fmnus nauticum, and sometimes usura

maritima. (j) But as this gave an opening for usurious and gaming contracts,

especially upon long voyages, it was enacted by the statute 19 Geo. II, c. 37,

that all monies lent on bottomry or at respondentia, on vessels bound to or

from the East Indies, shall be expressly lent only upon the ship or upon the
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merchandise; that the lender shall have the benefit of salvage; (k) and that

if the borrower hath not an interest in the ship or in the effects on board,

equal to the value of the sum borrowed, he shall be responsible to the lender

for so much of the principal as hath not been laid out, with legal interest and

all other charges, though the ship and merchandise be totally lost. (22)

Secondly, a policy of insurance is a contract between A and B, that upon A's

paying a premium equivalent to the hazard run, B will indemnify or insure

him against a particular event. This is founded upon one of the same princi-

ples as the doctrine of interest upon loans, that of hazard; but not that of

inconvenience. For if I insure a ship to the Levant, and back again, at five

percent; here I calculate the chance that she performs her voyage to be

twenty to one against her being lost; and, if she be lost, I lose 1000?. and get

51. J5ow this is much the same as if I lend the merchant, whose whole for-

(h) Moll, ite jnr. mar. 861. Malyno, lexmereat. b. ], c. 31. Bacon's Essays, o. 41. Cro. Jac. 208. Bynkersh.

miaxt.jtir.pnoat. l.S. c. 16.

fij 1 Sid. 27. (J) Molloy, {bid. Mulyiio. {bid. ft) Soe book I, page 291.

(22) [The general nature of a retrpondentia bond is this; the borrower binds himself in a

large penal sum, upon condition that the obligation shall be void, if he pay the lender the

sum borrowed, and so much a month from the date of the bond till the ship arrives at a cer-

tain port, or if the ship be lost or captured in the course of the voyage. The respondentia

interest is frequently at the rate of forty or fifty per cent, or in proportion to the risk and

profit of the voyage. The rospondentia lender maj insure his interest in the success of the

voyage, but it must be expressly specified in the policy to be respondentia interest: 3 Burr.

1391; unless there is a particular usage to the contrary. Park Ins. U. A lender upon

respondentia is not obliged to pay salvage or average losses, but he is entitled to receive the

whole sum advanced, provided the ship and cargo arrive at the port of destination; nor will

he lose the benefit of the bond, if an accident happens by the default of the borrower or the

captain of the ship. Id. 421. Nor will a temporary capture, or any damage short of the

destruction of the ship defeat his claim. 2 Park, 626, 627; 1 M. and S. 30.

Where bottomry bonds are sealed, and the money paid, the person borrowing runs the

hazard of all injuries by storm, fire, <tc., before the" beginuing of the voyage, unless it be

otherwise provided. As, that, if the ship shall not arrive at such a place at such a time, Ac.,

then the contract hath a beginning from the time of sealing; but if the condition be, that if

such ship shall sail from London to any port abroad, and shall not arrive there, <fco., then, <tc.,

the conhgency hath not its beginning till the departure. Beawes Lex. Merc. 143; Park, 626.

A lender on bottomry or respondentia is not liable to contribute in the case of general aver-

age, nor is he entitled to the benefit of salvage. Park, 627, 629; 4 M. and Slew. 141. See,

however, Marshal on Insurance, 6 ch., book 2. In the case of hypothecation the lender may

recover the ship itself in the admiralty court, but not in bottomry or rospondentia. See 6

Moore, 397.
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r *,-g -• tunes are embarked in this vessel, 1007, at *the rate of eight per cent.

' '" J For by. a loan I should be immediately out of possession of my money,

the inconvenience of which we have supposed equal to three per cent: "if

therefore, I had actually lent him 100Z., I must have added 31. on the score of

inconvenience, to the 61. allowed for the hazard, which together would have

made 8L But, as upon an insurance, I am never out of possession of my money

till the loss actually happens, nothing is therein allowed upon the principle of

inconvenience, but all upon the principle of hazard. Thus, too, in a loan, if

the chance of repayment depends upon the borrower's life, it is frequent

(besides the usual rate of interest) for the borrower to have his life insured till

the time of repayment; for which he is loaded with an additional premium,

suited to his age and constitution. Thus, if Sempronius has only an annuity

for his life, and would borrow 100J. of Titius for a year; the inconvenience and

general hazard of this loan, we have seen, are equivalent to 51., which is, there-

fore, the legal interest; but there is also a special hazard in this case; for, if

Sempronius dies within the year, Titius must lose the whole of his 100Z. Sup-

pose this chance to be as one to ten: it will follow that the extraordinary haz-

ard is worth WL more, and, therefore, that the reasonable rate of interest in

this case would be fifteen per csnt. But this the law, to avoid abuses, will not

permit to be taken; Sempronius therefore gives Titius, the lender, only 5/., the

legal interest; but applies to Gains, an insurer, and gives him the other Wl. to

indemnify Titius against the extraordinary hazard. And in this manner may
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any extraordinary or particular hazard be provided against, which the estab-

lished rate of interest will not reach; that being calculated by the state to

answer only the ordinary and general hazard, together with the lender's incon-

venience in parting with his specie for the time. But, in order to prevent these

insurances from being turned into a mischievous kind of gaming, it is enacted,

by statute 14 Geo. Ill, c. 48, that no insurance shall be made on lives, or on

any other event, wherein the party insured hath no interest; that in all policies

F *4601 ^e name °^ 8u°k interested party shall be *inserted; and nothing more

L •" shall be recovered thereon than the amount of the interest of the

insured.

This does not, however, extend to marine insurances, which were provided

for by a prior law of their own. The learning relating to these insurances hath

of late years been greatly improved by a series of judicial decisions; which

have now established the law in such a variety of cases, that (if well and judi-

ciously collected) they would form a very complete title in a code of commer-

cial jurisprudence: but, being founded on equitable principles which chiefly

result from the special circumstances of the case, it is not easy to reduce them

to anv general heads in mere elementary institutes. (23) Thus much, however,

may be said; that being contracts, the very essence of which consists in observ-

ing the purest good faith and integrity, they are vacated by any the least shadow

of fraud or undue concealment; and, on the other hand, being much for the

benefit and extension of trade, by distributing the loss or gain among a number

of adventurers, they are greatly encouraged and protected both by common

law and acts of parliament. But as a practice had obtained of insuring large

sums without having any property on board, which were called insurances,

interest or no interest, and also of insuring the same goods several times over;

both of which were a species of gaming without any advantage to commerce,

and were denominated wagering policies: it is therefore enacted by the statute

19 Geo. II, c. 37, that all insurances, interest or no interest, or without farther

(23) [This task was accomplished by Mr. Justice Park in his masterly treatise on the sub-

wot, which was followed by Mr. Serjt, Marshal's excellent work; and see 3 Chitty's Commer-

cial Law, 445 to Kttx]

See also Drier and Phillips on Insurance, ond the several treatises on Maritime and Mercantile

[ .., 459 ] tunes are embarked in this vessel, lOOl. st •the rate of eigltt per cent.
For by a loan I should be immediately out of po8808Sion of my money,
the inconvenience of which we have supposed equal to tltree per cent: if
therefore, I hud actually lent him lOOl., I must have added 3/. on the score of
inconvenience, to the 5l. allowed for the hazard, which together would have
made Bl. But, as upon an insurance, I am never ou.t of possession of my money
till the loss actually happens, n-0thing is therein allowed upon the principle of
inconvenience, but all upon the principle of hazard. Thus, too, in a Imm, if
the chance of rep11.yment depends upon the borrower's life, it is frequent
(hesidcs the usual rate of interest) for th<' borrower t-0 have his life insured till
the time of repayment; for which be is loaded with an additional premium,
B'nited to his age and oonstitution. 'l'hus, if Sempronius hW! only an annuity
for hi~ life, and would borrow IOOl. of Titius for a year; the inconvenience and
general hazard of this loan, we have seecn, are equivalent to -Ol., which is, thel'efore, the legal interest; bnt there is also a special hazard in this case ; for, if
Sempronius dies within the year, 'l'itius must lose the whole of his lOOl. Suppose this chance to be IUl one to ten : it will follow that the extraordinary hazard is worth lOl. more, and, therefore, that the reasonable rate of interest in
this case wonld be fifteen per ~nt. But this the law, to avoid abuses, will not
permit to be ta.ken; Sempronius therefore gives Ti ti us, the lender, only 5l., the
!egal in~res~;. but a~plies to Gaius, a~ insurer, and gives ~im ~he other lOl. t-0
mdemmfy TJtms against the extraordmary hazard. And m th1s manner may
any extraordinary or particular hazard be provided aga1nst, which the established rate of interest will not reach; that being calculated by the state to
answer only the ordinary and general hazard, together with the lender's incon·
venience in parting with his specie for the time. But, in order to prevent these
insurances from being turned int.o a mischievous kind of gaming, it is enacted
by statute 14 Geo. III, c. 48, that no insurance shall be made on lives, or on
any other event, woorein the party insured hath no interest; that in all policies
[ • 460 ] the n3me of such interested party shall be *inserted; and nothing more
shall be recovered thereon than the amount of the interest of the
insured.
This does not, however, extend to marine insurances, which were provided
for by a prior law of their own. The loorning relating to these insurances hath
of late years been greatly improved by a series of' Judicial decisions; whic>h
have now established the htw in such a variety of cases, that (if well and judiciously collected) they would form a very complete tit.le in a code of commercial jurisprudence: but, being founded on C'quitable principles which chiefly
result from the special circumstances of the case, it is not easy to reduce them
to anv general heads in mere elementary institutes. (23) 'fhus much, howeYer,
may be said; that being contracts, the very essence of which consists in obsen-ing the pure.st ~ood faith and integrity, they are vacated by any the lcrtst shadow
of frau{l or undue concealment; and, on the other hand, being much for the
benefit and extension of trade, by distributing the loss or gnin among a. number
of adventurers, they are greatly encouraged and protected both by common
law and acts of parliament. But as a practice had obtained of insuring large
sums without having any property on board, which were called insumnces,
inler~t or no interest, and also of insuring the same goods several times o,·cr;
both of which were a species of go.ming without any advantage to commerce,
and were denominated wagerfrig policies: it is therefore enacted by the statute
19 Geo. II, c. 37, that all insnnmoes, interest or no interest, or without farther

Law and Contract*. Also Angell on Fire and Life Insurance.

The subject is too broad to make any notes upon the text, reasonable in length, of much

value.
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tut: was IK'OOID~iEihP.d by Mr• .Jumce Park in bif! muterly trcatil!C on the 11ubwhich WM full owed by llr. Serjt. M&TSh&l'e excellent work; and eee 3 Chi tty's C-0mmerclnl Law, 445 to 5:16. l
See &lllO Duer 1md Phillips cm llltl1U'llnce, and the 11eveml treatises on Maritime 8.Dd Mercantile
Law a.ncl Contmct.8. Aleo Angell on Fire and Life Insurance.
The subject is too broad to :make any notes upon the text, ltl88onable in length, of much
value.
(23) (Thill
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proof of interest than the policy itself, or by way of gaming or wagering, or

without benefit of salvage to the insurer (all of which had the same pernicious

tendency), shall be totally null and void, except upon privateers or upon ships

or merchandise from the Spanish and Portuguese dominions, for reasons suffi-

ciently obvious; and that no re-assurance shall be lawful, except the former in-

surer shall be insolvent, a bankrupt, or dead: and lastly, that, in the East India

trade, the lender of money on bottomry, or at respondentia, shall alone have a

right to be insured for the money lent, and the borrower *shall (in case r *AQ\ n

of a loss) recover no more upon any insurance than the surplus of his L •*

property, above the value of his bottomry, or respondentia bond.

Thirdly, the practice, of purchasing annuities for lives at a certain price or

premium, instead of advancing the same sum on an ordinary loan, arises usually

from the inability of the borrower to give the lender a permanent security for

the return of the money borrowed, at any one period of time. He therefore

stipulates (in effect) to repay annually, during his life, some part of the money

borrowed; together with legal interest for so much of the principal as annually

remains unpaid, and an additional compensation for the extraordinary hazard

run, of losing that principal entirely by the contingency of the borrowers death:

all which considerations, being calculated and blended together, will constitute

the just proportion or quantum of the annuity which ought to be granted.

The real value of that contingency must depend on the age, constitution, situa-

tion, and conduct of the borrower; and therefore the price of such annuities
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cannot, without the utmost difficulty, be reduced to any general rules. So that

if, by the terms of the contract, the lender's principal is bona fide (and not

colonrably) (I) put in jeopardy, no inequality of price will make it an usurious

bargain; though, under some circumstances of imposition, it may be relieved

against in equity. To throw however some check upon improvident transactions

of this kind, which are usually carried on with great privacy, the statute 17

Geo. Ill, c. 26, has directed, that upon the sale of any life annuity of more than

the value of ten pounds per annum (unless on a sunicient pledge of lands in

fee-simple or stock in the public funds) the true consideration, which shall be in

money only, shall be set forth and described in the security itself; and a memo-

rial of the date of the security, of the names of the parties, cestuy que trusts,

cestuy que vies, and witnesses, and of the consideration money, shall within

twenty days after its execution be enrolled in the court of chancery; else the

security shall be null and void; (24) and, in case of collusive practices respecting

the consideration, the *oourt in which any action is brought or judg- r ^ ,„„ -,

ment obtained upon such collusive security, may order the same to be L *

cancelled, and the judgment (if any) to be vacated: and also all contracts for

the purchase of annuities from infants shall remain utterly void, and be incapa-

ble of confirmation after such infants arrive to the age of maturity. But to

return to the doctrine of common interest on loans:

Upon the two principles of inconvenience and hazard, compared together,

different nations have, at different times, established different rates of interest.

The Romans at one tune allowed centesimal, one per cent monthly, or twelve per

cent per annum, to be taken for common loans; but Justinian (wi) reduced it to

(I) Carth. 67

(ml I'<)'!. 4, SI, It. .Vup. 33, 84, 35. A short explication of these terms, ami of the division of the Roman

08, will be u -;'inl Co the studrnt. not only for uiyiersumdfng the civilians, bnt nlso the more classical writ-

ers, who perpetually refer to this distribution. Thus Horace, ad Pitonet, 335:

Ronuinl jntert-langi* ratttmUm* nssem

Diitcunt in pmrta pcutnm diducere. Tticait

FUiui Albini. si rlt <|iiiwmnce rmtota at

ITnr.ia. qind tuperet t poteral dixis«f.t triens ; ffu,

Bern poterlt tervare tuam! redU iincia, quid fit 1

Benns.

It Istherefore to be observed, th»t in cnhmlntiiiL' the I-M I <• of interest, the Romans fUvlctal the principal sum

Into an hundred parts, one of which they allowed to betaken monthly ; and this, which was the highest rate

(24) f_The statute cited in the text was repealed by the statute of 53 Geo. Ill, c. 141, -which

la«t-named act WOK explained by the subsequent one of 3 Geo. IT, c. 92, and lastly l»y that of

7 Geo. IV, c. 75. By these three acts the enrohuants aiid forms of attestation of annuity in-

•brxaients are now regulated.]

,-
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trientes, or one-third of the as or centesimm, that is, four per cent ; but allowed

higher interest to be taken of merchants, because there the hazard was greater.

So, too, Grotius informs us, (») that in Holland the rate of interest was then

r *463 1 eight per "cent in common loans, but twelve to merchants. And Lord

*• ' ' Bacon was desirous of introducing a similar policy in England : (o) but

pur law establishes one standard for all alike, where the pledge of security itself

is not put in jeopardy ; lest, under the general pretence of vague and indetermi-

nate hazard, a door should be opened in fraud and usury : leaving specific haz-

ards to be provided against by specific insurances, by annuities for lives, or by

loans upon respondentia, or bottomry. But as to the rate of legal interest, it

has varied and decreased for two hundred years past, according as the quantity

of specie in the kingdom has increased by accessions of trade, the introduction.

of paper credit, and other circumstances. The statute 37 Hen. VIII, c. 9, con-

fined interest to ten per cent, and so did the statute 13 Eliz. c. 8. But as,

through the encouragements given in her reign to commerce, the nation grew

more wealthy, so under her successor the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 17, reduced it to

eight per cent ; as did the statute 12 Car. II. c. 13, to six; and, lastly, by the

statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 16, it was brought down to five per cent yearly, which

is now the extremity of legal interest that can be taken. (25) But yet, if a con-

of interest permitted, they called umrce ctntetima. amounting yearly to twelve per cent. Now as the a* or

Komaii pound, was commonly used to express any Integral sum, and was divisible into twelve parts or

trientes, or one-third or the as or centesimm, that is, four per cent; but allowed
higher interest to be taken of merchants, because there the hazard was greater.
So, too, Grotius informs us, (1i) that in Holland the rate of interest was then
[ • 463 ] eight per •cent in common loans, but twelve to merchants. And Lord
Bacon was desirous of introducing a similar policy in England: (o) but
our law establishes one standard for all alike, where the pledge of secnritv itself
is not put in jeopardy; lest, under the general pretence of vague and indeterminate hazard, a. door should be opened to fraud and usury: leaving specific hazards to be provided against by specific insurances, by annuities for lirns, or by
loans upon respondcntia, or bottomry. But as to the rate of legal interest, it
bas varied and decreased for two hundred years past, according as the quantity
of specie in the kingdom has increased by accessions of trade, the introduction
of paper eredit, and other circumstances. The statute 37 Hen. VIII, c. 9, confined interest to ten per cent, and so did the statute 13 Eliz. c. 8. But as,
through the encouragements given in her reign to commerce, the nation grew
more wealthy, so under her successor the statute 21 Jae. I, c. 17, reduced it to
eight per ce1it; as did the statute 12 Car. II, c. 13, to six; and, lastly, by the
statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 16, it was brought down to five per cent yearl~i> which
is now the extremity of legal interest that can be taken. (25) But yet, if a con-

vncia, therefore these twelve monthly payments or uncue wore hold to amount annually to one pound, or
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of uturttriua i and so the untros attet were synonymous to the Uftira ctntaimce. And all lower rates of

interest were denominated according to the relation they bore to this centesimal usury, or uturce attet ;

for the several multiples of the uncia, or duodecimal parts of the at, were known by different names ac-

cording to their different combinations ; sextans quadrant, trtent, quincunx, temfs, teplunx, bet dodrant,

dej-tant, deunx. containing respectively 2, 3, 4. 5, «, 7, 8. «J. 10, 11. unaa, or duodecimal parts of an at. Ff.

28. 5, .".u. i 2. Can in. 11,1,, jur. civ. I. 2. : 47. Tills being premised, the following table will clearly exhibit

at once the subdivisions of the at, and the denomination! of the rate of interest :

T>ri;.v. PARTK* AMIS. PBK Ayttmt,

Aua, give ctntetima ............................ Inltger. .................................. 12 per eml.

Dnttca ........................................ 11-1ZIA* .................................. 11

Dactmta, vtl dematea .......................... 5-S .................................

IXidranttl ...................................... 3-4 .................................

Ana .......................................... 2-3 .................................

Srpimtn ....................................... '-U ........... ......................

Stmiiuet ........................................ 1-* ................................

"

of Interest pcrmlUe<t the1 c111lort uftl,.a centulnta. 11monntlng ye.arly to twoh·e per ttnt. Now as the iu or
Boman t>ound, wu commonly u-1 to expl"O&ll any lnte,ltl'lll sum, and \\'BB dhl11UJle h1to twlll\'O partll or
vncia!, thE?rerore theso twelve monthly 1iuy111ent.i or uncia were hl!lrt to amount annunlly to one pound, or
cu tuumnu•' 11nrt llO the Uni"°' a••ea were synonvmoU8 to the Uftlt'tl! centulma1. And all lower nites or
interest were dcnomin11ted according to the relation they bore to this centeaimal uaury, or uavt"G! aa•u;
for the se\·er11l m11ttl11le~ of Lhe uncia, or •lnotleclmal rarl.8 or the aa, were known b1 <ti11'rrent nam<'s nc.
co1"1lng to their dilferent combinations ; 1u:ta1u quad,.au, trklu, qwincunz, am!U, .epl•~. bu dodran•.
de.rtmu, dtu1&.1:, containing rn•1-1U\"Cly 2, 3 4, 5 II, 7, 8. II, 10, 11. uncial, or dnodeclmttl parts or au aa. Ff.
iS, 5, r.o. 12. Gnnln. Orlg.jur. cfo. l. 2. I •7. This being premieed, the following table w!.11 clearly exhibi'
at once the 1ubdlvlaloua oftbe 111, and the denomh1atlon11 or the rate of l11&o1s :
U1111e&
PAllTlll AMII.
P11a URlJll.
~
/,.ltgw. • .... . ............................ 12 ptr orM.

...,_, "°'

............... ,....... .... .

.l:>eu1t<u ........... , • • .. • .. .. • • • • .. .. • • • • • .. • .. • 11-1%1.U
:>-6
DodnznlU........... , • .. •• .. • • • .. • • • . . .. .. . . • .. 3-4
& - ........................................... l-3
&pl&..,,..,., •••••• •• , •• ,., •• , •••• ,. ........ ,.,.. T-12
1..:1

.Ded-, wl "--·.......... •• • • • •• • • • • • .. •

s.n.i-.........................................

~~::: :::::: ::::::::: :::::::::::: ::: ::::

Qoiadra,.,.. • • • • • • • • • • • .. • .. • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • .. • • .
- -......................................
Ulldal••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , •••••••••••• ,.
('ft) IMjur.

b. <f p. I, JI, n.

(o)

• .. • • • • • • .. .. .. • • • • • • .. • • • • • .. • • • • 1I
.................................. 10
• • .. • • • • • • • • .. .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • II
•• • ••·••••••·•·•••••··•••••••••••• 8
........... , .... , ......... , •• • • • • • T
................................. .

tJ:S ::: :::::::::::::::::::: :::::::: ::: :

1-lo

• • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1-6
1-11

••••••·•••••••••·••••••••••••••••• ,
........... , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • l

3

E66ay•, o. 41.

Triplet ........................................ 1-3

V.ctanctl ...................................... 1-6

Uncia .......................................... 1-1»

fnj Dt jur. b. if p. 8, IS, ». (o) Essays, 0. 41.

(25) [If the usury arise from error in computation, it will not vititate. Cro. Car. 501 ; 2 Bla.

Rep. ?!)•,! ; 1 Camp. 149. Exorbitant discount to induce tho acceptor to take up a bill before

it in due is not usurious, because there must be a loan or forbearance of payment, or some

devise for the purpose of concealing or evading the appearance of a loan or forbearance.

4 East, 55 ; 5 Esp. 11 ; Peake, 200 ; IB. and P. 144 ; 4 Taunt. 810. Nor if the charge alleged

to be usurious ig fairly referable to the trouble, expense, Ac., in the transaction. 3 B. and P.

154 ; 4 M. and S. 198 ; 2 T. K. 238 ; 1 Mad. Kep. 112 ; 1 Camp. 177 ; 15 Vos. 120. Bankers

may charge their usual commission beyond legal interest. 2 T. R. 52. The purchase of an

annuity at ever so cheap a rate, will not^rima facie be usurious, but if it be for years, or an

express agreement to repurchase, and on calculation more than tho principle with legal interest

is to be returned it will. 3 B. and P. 151 ; 3 B. and A. 666. And if part of the advance be in

goods, it must be shown that they were not overcharged in price. Doug. 735 ; 1 Ksp. 40 ; 2

Camp. 375; Holt, N. P. C. 256. A loan made returnable on a certain day, on payment of a sum

beyond legal interest, on default thereof, may be a penalty and not usurious interest, the iuten- •

tion of the parties being the criterion in all cases. If money be lent on risk at more than legal

interest, and the casualty affects the interest only, it is usury, not so if it affects the principal

oteo. Cro. J. 508; 3 Wils. 395. The usury must be part of tho contract in its inception, and be-

ing void in its commencement, it is so in all its stages : Doug. 735 ; I Stark. 385 ; though bills of

exchange so tainted, are by the 58 Geo. Ill, c. 93, rendered valid in the hands of a bo»a Jnte

holder, unless he has actual notice of the usury ; but if the drawer of a bill transfer it for a valu-

able consideration, he cannot set up antecedent usury with the acceptor as a defence. 4 Bar.

and Aid. 215. A security with legal interest only, substituted for one that is usurious, i» valid.

1 Camp. 165, n. ; 2 Taunt. 184 ; 2 Stark. 237. Taking usurious interest on a 6onn fide debt, does

not destroy the debt. 1 H. B. 462 ; 1 T. K. 153 ; 2 Vos. 567 ; 1 Saund. 295. The penalty of three

times the amount of the principal, is not incurred, till the usurious interest has been actually re-

ceived ; and the action must be brought within one year afterwards. 2 Bla. Kop. 792 , 2 B.' and

P. 381 ; 1 Saund. 295, a.]

(26) [If the usury arise from error in computation, it will not vitit.ate. Cro. Car. 501; 2 Bla.
Rep. 79'.l ; 1 Camp. 149. Exorbitant dii;oouut to induce tho acceptor to take up a. bill before
it i11 due is not usurious, becauRe there must be a loan or forbearance of payment, or some
devise for the purpose of coneealing or evading the appearance of a loan or forbearan<'e.
4 EW!t, !'l5 i 5 Esp..11 ; Peake, 200 ; 1 B. and P. 144 ; 4 Taunt. ~10. Nor if th~ charge alleged
to be u11unous is fairly referable to the trouble, expense, &o., in the transaction. 3 B. and P.
154 ; 4 M. and S. 19'.l; 2 T. R. 238; 1 Mad. Rep. 112; 1 Camp. 177; 15 Vos. 120. ll1mkcra
may charge their usual commission beyond letrnl interest. 2 T. R. 52. The purchase of an
annuity at ever so cheap a rate, will not pri1na fade be usurious, bnt if it be for years, or an
express agreement to repurcba.'!e, and on calculation more than the principle with legal intero11t
is to be returned it will. 3 B. and P. 151; a B. and A. 666. And if part of the adnnce he in
goods, it must be shown that they were not overcharged in pric~. Doug. 735; 1 Esp. 40 ; :i
Camp. 375; Holt, N. P. C. 256. .A. loan made returnable on a certmn day, on payment nf & sum
beyond legal interest, on default thcnmf, may be a penalty and not usurious interest, the iuten- •
tion nf the parties being the criterion in all c~es. If money be lent on rf:jk at more than legal
interest, and the casualty &ffectl! the interest only, it is USUrr, not SO if it llffect;! the priRciJial
also. Cro. J. 508; 3 Wils. 395. Tho ui;ury must be part o tho contmct in its inception, und being void in itll oommencement, it i>' so in all its stages : Doug. 73."i ; 1 Stark. 38."i; though bills of
exchange so tainted, are by the 58 Geo. Ill, c. 93, rendered valid in the hands of a OONa jiM
holder, unleBB he baa aotual notice of tho ni<ury; but if the drawer of a bill transfer it for a valuable consideration, he cannot set up ante{'edeut uAury with the aoooptor as a defence. 4 llar.
and .Aid. 215. A security with legal inwrest only, substituted for one that is usurious, ia Talid.
1 Camp. 165, n. ; 2 Taunt. 184; 2 Stark. 237. Taking u11utiouf! interel't on a bona fole debt, dOOil
not destroy the debt. 1 H .. n., 462 ;, 1 1'. ~· 153; 2 "fcl!. 56'7; 1. Sau~1d. 295. The penally of three
times the amount of the pnuc1pal, 1s not u~ct~rred, till tho uHunoud mtA.•rcst hM beeu actually received; and the action nrndt be brought w1thm one ye~r aftAlrwurdd. 2 Bl&. Rop. 79'"2 ; 2 B. and
P. 381; 1 Saund. 295, a.]
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tract which carries interest be made in a foreign country, our courts will direct

the payment of interest according to the law of that country in which the con-

tract was made, (p) Thus, Irish, American, Turkish, and Indian interest,

have *been allowed in our courts to the amount of even twelve per ,- „, „. -•

cent: for the moderation or exorbitance of interest depends upon local *• J

circumstances; and the refusal to enforce such contracts would put a stop to all

foreign trade. (26) And, by statute 14 Qeo. Ill, c. 79, all mortgages and other

securities upon estates or other property in Ireland or the plantations, bearing

interest not exceeding six per cent, shall be legal; though executed in the king-

dom of Great Britain; unless the money lent shall be known at the time to

exceed the value of the thing in pledge; in which case, also, to prevent usurious

contracts at home under colour of such foreign securities, the borrower shall for-

feit treble the sum so borrowed. (27)

4. The last general species of contracts, which I have to mention, is that of

debt; whereby a chose in action, or right to a certain sum of money, is mutually

jtcquired and lost (a) This may be the counterpart of, and arise from, any of

the other species of contracts. As, in case of a sale where the price is not paid

in ready money, the vendee becomes indebted to the vendor for the sum agreed

on; and the vendor has a property in this price, as a chose in action, by means

of this contract of debt In bailment, if the bailee loses or detains a sum of

money bailed to him for any special purpose, he becomes indebted to the bailor

in the same numerical sum, upon his implied contract, that he should execute
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the trust repSsed in him, or repay the money to the bailor. Upon hiring or

borrowing, the hirer or borrower, at the same time that he acquires a property

in the thing lent, may also become indebted to the lender, upon his contract to

restore the money borrowed, to pay the price or premium of the loan, the hire

of the horse, or the like. Any contract, in short, whereby a determinate sum of

money becomes due to any person, and is not paid, but remains in action merely,

is a contract of debt And, taken in this light, it comprehends a great variety

of *acquisition; bein^ usually divided into debts of record, debts by r **£* -i

special, and debts by simple contract. L -I

A debt of record (28) is a sum of money, which appears to be due by the evi-

dence of a court of record. Thus, when any specific sum is adjudged to be due

(p) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 288. 1 P. Wm«. 895. (j) F. N. B. 119.

(26) [Where foreign interest is to be taken or not, see in general 1 P. Wins. 395,696; 2 T. K.

52; 1 Bla. R. 267; Burr. 1094; 2 Bro. C. C. 2; 2 Vern. 395; 3 Atk. 727; 1 Ves. 427; Comyn

on Usury, 152.]

(27) The law of usury in England has undergone radical alteration since these Commenta-

ries were published. By statute 5 and 6 William IV, c. 41, bills and other securities are not to

be totally void because a higher rate of interest is reserved than was allowed by the statute of

12 Anne. By statute 3 and 4 William IY, c. 98, and 1 Yic. c. 80, bills and notes payable within

twelve months are exempted from the laws for the prevention of usury. The statute 2 and 3

Yic. c. 37, provides that no bill of exchange or promissory note made payable at or within

twelve months after date, or having not more than twelve months to run, nor any contract nf

loan for more than 102., shall, by reason of any interest taken thereon or secured thereby, or any

agreement to bny or receive, or allow interest in discounting;, or negotiating any such bill or

note, be void, nor any person so lending be liable to the penalties of the usury laws; but this re-

laxation of the law was not to extend to loans on the security of lands. And still later the

statute 17 and 18 Yic. c. 90, reciting that it is " expedient to repeal the laws at present in force

relating to usury," proceeds to repeal the statutory penalties for usury, with a saving, however,

of the rights, remedies or liabilities of any person in respect to previous transactions.

There is very little uniformity in the interest and usury laws of the states of the American

Union. In some of them the rate of interest is fixed for all cases in which it is allowed at all:

in others it is prescribed, but with permission to the parties to agree upon a higher rate, not to

exceed a certain percentage mentioned; in some, a reservation of usnnons interest renders the

contract void, in others, it makes the lender liable to a penalty only, and in still others, the

lender is only precluded from recovering the usurious interest.

(28) [Debts or contract* of record, being sanctioned in their creation by some court or magis-

trate, having competent jurisdiction, have certain particular properties distinguishing them as

well from simple contracts as from specialties. 1st. These debts or contracts cannot in plead-

ing be impeached or affected by any supposed defect or illegality in the transaction on
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from the defendant to the plaintiff, on an action or suit at law; this is a contract

of the highest nature, being established by the sentence of a court of judicature.

Debts upon recognizance are also a sum of money, recognized or acknowledged

to be due to the crown or a subject, in the presence of some court or magistrate,

with a condition that such acknowledgment shall be void upon the appearance

of the party, his good behaviour, or the like; and these, together with statutes

merchant and statutes staple, &c., if forfeited by non-performance of the condi-

tion, are also ranked among this first and principal class of debts, viz:debts of

record; since the contract, on which they are founded, is witnessed by the high-

est kind of evidence, viz., by matter of record.

Debts by specialty, or special contract, are such whereby a ram of money

becomes, or is acknowledged to be, due by deed or instrument under seaL Such

as by deed of covenant, by deed of sale, by lease reserving rent, or by bond or

obligation ; which last we took occasion to explain in the twentieth chapter of

the present book; and then showed that it is a creation or acknowledgment of

a debt from the obligor to the obligee, unless the obligor performs a condition

thereunto usually annexed, as the payment of rent or money borrowed, the

observance of a covenant, and the like; on failure of which the bond becomes

forfeited and the debt becomes due in law. These are looked upon as the next

class of debts after those of record, being confirmed by special evidence, under

seal.

Debts by simple contract are such, where the contract upon which the obliga-
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tion arises is neither ascertained by matter of record, nor yet by deed or special

instrument, but by mere oral evidence, the most simple of any; or by

F *466 1 uo^es *ans^aled, which are capable of a more easy proof, and (therefore

L ' J only) better, than a verbal promise. It is easy to see into what a vast

variety of obligations this last class may be branched out, through the numer-

ous contracts for money, which are not only expressed by the parties, bnt vir-

tually implied in law. Some of these we have already occasionally hinted at; and

the rest, to avoid repetition, must be referred to those particular heads in the

third book of these Commentaries, where the breach of such contracts will be

considered. I shall only observe at present, that by the statute 29 Car. II, e. 3,

no executor or administrator shall be charged upon any special promise to answer

damages, out of his own estate, and no person shall be charged upon any prom-

ise to answer for the debt or default of another, or npon any agreement in con-

wbich they ore founded, and if a judgment be erroneous, that circumstance win afford no

answer to an action of debt upon it, and the only coarse for tin- defendant in to reverse it by

writ of error. 2 Burr. 1005; 4 East, 311; 2 Lev. 161; Gilb. on U. and T. 109; Gilb. Debt,

from the defendant to the plaintiff, on an action or suit at law; this is a contract
of the highest nature, being established by the sentence of a court of judicature.
Debts upon recognizance are also a sum of money, recognized or aeknowledged
to be clue to the crown or a subject, in the presence of some court or magistrate.,
with a condition that such acknowledgment shall be void upon the appearance
of the party, his good behaviour, or the like; and these, together with statutes
merchant ~nd statutes staple, &c., if forfeited by non-performance of the condition, are also ranked among this first and principal class of debt~ viz: debts of
record; since the contract, on which they are founded, i8 witneued by the highest kind of evidence, viz., by matter of record.
Debts by specialty, or special contract, are such whereby a mm of money
becomes, or is acknowledged to be, due by deed or instrument under seal Such
M by deed of covenant, by deed of sale, by lease reserving rent, or by bond O\"
obligation ; which l~t we took occasion to explain in the twentieth chapter of
the present book; and then showed that it is a creation or acknowledgment of
a debt from the obligor to the obligee, unless the obligor performs a conditio~
thereunto usually annexed, as the payment of rent or money borrowed, the
observance of a covenant, and the like ; on failure of which the bond becomes
forfeited and the debt becomes due in law. These are looked upon as the next
class of debts after those of record, being confirmed by special evidence, under
seal.
Debts by simple e<mtract are such, where the contract upon which the obligution arises is neither ascertained by matter of record, nor yet by aeed or specuJ
instrument, but by mere oral evidence, the most simple of any; or by
[ • 466 ] notes •unsealed, which are capable of a more easy proof, and (therefore
only) better, than a verbal promise. It is easy to see into what a Yast
variety of obligations this last class may be branched out, through the numerous contracts for money, which are not only expressed by the parties, but vii:..
tually implied in law. Some of these we have already occasionally hinted at; and
the rest, to avoid repetition, must be referred to those particular heads in the
third book of these Commentaries, where the breach of such contracts will he
considered. I shall only observe at present, that by the statute 29 Car. II, c. 3,
no executor or administrator shu.ll he charged upon any special promise to answer
damages, out of his own estate, and no person shall bf;l charged upon any promise to answer for the debt or default of another, or upon any agreement in con-

412; Yelv. 155; Tidd. 6th ed. 1152. And though third persons, who have been defrauded by

a collusive judgment, may show such fraud, so as to prevent themselves from being prejudiced

by it, 13 Eliz. c. 5; 2 Harsh. 392; 7 Taunt. 97, the parties to such judgment are estopped

at law for pleading such a plea, and must in general apply for relief to a court of equity.

13 Eliz. c. 5; 2 Marsh. 392; 7 Taunt. 97 ; 1 Anstr. 8. There 'is, however, one instance in which

a party may apply to the common law court to set the judgment aside, viz.: where it has

been signed npon a warrant of attorney, given npon an unlawful consideration, or obtained

by fraud; in which case, as this is a peculiar instrument, affording the defendant no oppor-

tunity to resist the claim by pleading, and frequently given by persons in distressed circum-

stances, the court will afford relief npon a summary application. Dougl. 196; Cowp. 721; 1

Hen. Bla. 75. Semble, not so in exchequer; 1 Anstr. 7, 8. Another peculiar property of a

contract of record is, that its existence, if disputed, must be tried by inspection of the record,

entryof recognizance, Ac., and not by a jury of tho country. Tidd. 6th ed. 797. 798. Bat

notwithstanding, since the act of union, an Irish judgment is a record, yet it is only provable

anco is entitled to preference to a specialty and other debts of an inferior nature. 6 T. R.

384 ; Tidd. 6th edit. 967. Lastly, if a judgment be obtained expressly for a simple contract or

specialty debt, and not as a collateral security, the inferior demand is merged, according to the

rule transit in rem judieatum, bnt if the judgment were obtained merely as a collateral secu-

rity, tho creditor retains an election to proceed either on the judgment or inferior security. 3

East, 258.]
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which they are founded, nnd if a Jnd~ent be erroneous, that circumstance will afford no
answer to an action of debt upon 1t, and the only eon~ for ~be defendant iR to reverse it by
writ of error. 2 Borr. 1005; 4 East, 311; 2 Lev. 161; Gilb. on U. and T. 100; Gilb. Debt.
412; Yelv. lf.>5; Tidd. 6th ed. 115:!. .Aud though third persons, who have been defmnded hy
a collu.•.ive judgment, may ;.how ~uch frnud, so Bd to prevent themselves from being prejudiced
by it, 13 Eliz. c. 5; 2 Marsh. 39'.l; 7 'l'aunt. 97, the partieiJ to BUeh r·dgment are estopped
at law for pleading such a plea, and must in general apply for relie to a court of cqoity.
13 Eliz. c. 5; 2 Mar.>h. 39'.l; 7 'faunt. 97 ; 1 Ani~tr. 8. There is, however, one inst.a.nee in whkb.
a partr may apply to the common Jaw court to set the judgment aside, vis. : where it has
been 1ngnecl upon a warrant of attorney, gi\·en upon an unlawful cunaideration, or obtained
by fraud ; in which ca.'16, &.'! thiR is a peculiar im1tnunent, eJfurdint: the defendant no opportunity to rosi~t the elaim by pleadinir. anil frequently given bf persoDB in di~trcAAed circumstances, the conrt will afford relief upon a summary applicatum. Dongl. 196; Cowp. 721; 1
Hen. Bia. 75. Semble, not so in exch~ner; 1 .A.nstr. 7, 8. .Another peculiar property of a
contrnct of record is, that its exist~mce, it disputed, must be tried by in.~pection of the record,
entry of reco~nizanee, &:c., and not by a jury of the country. Tidd. 6th ed. 797 798. But
notwithstauding, Hince the act of union, au 11-hlh judgment is a record, yet it is ~y provable
by an examined co!_>y on oath, "'!Id therefo~ it is onl,v triable by a jury, 5 East! 473. Another
qualitv, and ouc ot the most important., 1s, that a Judgment when docketed biDdti the land as
ag1iinst sub11e<1ucnt purchasen1: Tidd. tjth ed. 966, 9li7; aud auch a_judi;rment. and recogni1auce is entitled to preference to a .-.p<>cinlty and other debts of an infenor nature. 6 T. R.
384; Tidd. 6th edit. 007. La.~tly, if a Judgment bo obtained e:xpreds!y for a :;imple contract or
specialty debt, aud not M a collaterol security, the inferior demand ie merged. according to the
rule traMit in rem j'IAdicatum, bot if the judgment were obtained merely as a collateral t!e<:urity, the creditor retains an election to proceed either on the judgment or inferior 11ecurity. 3
East, 258.]
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sideration of marriage, or upon any contract or sale of any real estate, or upon

any agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making ;

unless the agreement or some memorandum thereof be in writing, and signed

by the party himself, or by his authority. (29)

But there is one species of debts upon simple contract, which, being a trans-

action now introduced into all sorts of civil life, under the name of paper credit,

deserves a more particular regard. These are debts by bills of exchange, and

promissory notes.

A btti of exchange is a security, originally invented among merchants in dif-

ferent countries, for the more easy remittance of money from the one to the

other, which has since spread itself into almost all pecuniary transactions. It is

an open letter of request from one man to another, desiring him to pay a sum

named therein to a third person on his account; by which means a man at the

most distant part of the world may have money remitted to him from any trad-

ing country. If A lives in Jamaica, and owes B, who lives in England, 1000/.,

now if C be going from England to Jamaica, he may pay B this 1000A, and

take a bill of exchange drawn by B in England upon A in Jamaica, and receive

it when he comes thither. Thus does B receive his debt, at any distance of

place, by transferring it to C ; who carries over his money *in paper r+tfi-i

credit, without danger of robbery or loss. This method is said' to have <- '

been brought into general use by the Jews and Lombards, when banished for

their usury and other vices; in order the more easily to draw their effects out
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of France and England into those countries in which they had chosen to reside.

But the invention of it was a little earlier; for the Jews were banished out of

Guienne in 1387, and out of England in 1290 ; (r) and in 1236 the use of paper

credit was introduced into the Mogul empire in China, (s) In common speech

such a bill is frequently called a draft, but a bill of exchange is the more legal

as well as mercantile expression. The person, however, who writes this letter,

is called in law the drawer, and he to whom it is written the drawee; and the

third person, or negotiator, to whom it is payable (whether especially named, or

the bearer generally) is called the payee.

These bills are either foreign or inland; foreign, when drawn by a merchant

residing abroad upon his correspondent in England, or vice versa; and inland,

when both the drawer and drawee reside within the kingdom. Formerly for-

eign bills of exchange were much more regarded in the eye of the law than in-

land ones, as being thought of more public concern in the advancement of

trade and commerce. But now by two statutes, the one 9 and 10 Wm. Ill, c.

17, the other 3 and 4 Ann. c. 9, inland bills of exchange are put upon the same

footing as foreign ones; what was the law and custom of merchants with re-

gard to the one, and taken notice of merely as such, (t) being by those statutes

expressly enacted with regard to the other. So that now there is not in law

any manner of difference between them. (30)

Promissory notes, or notes of hand, are a plain and direct engagement in

writing, to pay a sum specified at the time therein limited to a person therein

named, or sometimes to his order, or often to the bearer at large. These also,

(r) 2 Carte. Hist Eng. 20S, 208. (t) Mo4 Un. Hist Iv, 499. (t) Roll. Abr. 6.

(29) Upon this subject in general, see Browne on the Statute of Frauds; a valuable and reli-

able treatise. Also the treatise* on contracts.

(30) There is this very important difference, that in the ease of a foreign bill, in order to bind

the drawer and indorsers it is necessary that it be protested if dishonored, while in the case of

sideration of marria~e, or upon any contract or sale of any real estate, or upon
any agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making;
unless the agreement or some memorandum thereof be in writing, and signed
by the party himself, or by his authority. (29)
But th.ere is one species of debt.a upon simple contract, which, being a transaction now introduced' into all sort.a of civil life, under the name of paper credit,
deser!es a more particular regard. These are debts by bills of exchange, and
promUJsory notea.
A bul of ezchange. is a security, originally invented among merchants in uifferent countries, for the more easy remittance of money from the one to the
other, which has since spread itself into almost all pecuniary transactions. It is
an open letter of request from one man to another, desiring him to pay a sum
named therein to a third pen1on on his account; by which means a man at the
most distant part of the world may have money remitted to him from any trading country. If A lives in Jamaica, and owes B, who lives in England, lOOOl.,
now if C be going from England to Jamaica, he may pay B this 10001., and
take a bill of exchange drown by B in England upon A in Jamaica., and receive
it when he comes thither. Thus does B receive his debt, at any dist.ance of
place, by transferring it to C; who carries over his money *in pa.per [ • 467 ]
credit, without danger of robbery or loss. This method is said. to have
bee11 brought into general use by the Jews and Lombards, when banished for
their usury and other vices; in order the more easily to draw their effects out
of France and England into those countries in which they had chosen to reside.
But the invention of it was a little earlier; for the Jews were banished out of
Gnienne in 1287, and· ont of England in 1290; (r) and in 1236 the use of paper
credit was i11troduced into the Mogul empire in China.. (s) In common speech
such a bill is frequently called a. dra/t, but a bill of exchange is the more legal
as well as mercantile expression. The person, however, who writes this letter,
is cs.lied in law the drawer, and he to whom it is written the drawee; and the
third person, or negotiator, to whom it is payable (whether especially named, or
the bearer generally) is called the payee.
These bills are either forelg1i or inland; forei,cp~, when drawn by a merchant
residing abroad upon his correspondent in En~land, or vice versa; and inland,
when both the drawer and drawee reside withm the kingdom. Formerly foreign bills of exchange were much more regarded in the eye of the law than inland ones. as being thought of more public concern in the advancement of
trade and commerce. But now by two statutes, the one 9 and 10 Wm. III, c.
17, the other 3 and 4 Ann. c. 9, inland bills of exchange are put upon the same
footing as foreign ones; what was the law and custom of merchants with regard to the one, and t.aken notice of merely as such, (t) being by those statutes
expreesly enacted with regard to the other. So that now there is not in law
any manner of difference between them. (30)
Promissory notes, or notes of hand, are a plain and direct engagement in
writing, to pay a. sum specified at the time therein limited to a person therein
nu.med, or sometimes to his oruer, or often to the bearer at large. These also,
(t) Roll Abr. 8.
(•)Mod. Un. Hist. h•, -&99.
(rJ 2 Carte. Hlst. Eng, w, 206.

an inland bill, although there may bo a protest, it is not essential, and the liability of the drawer

and indorsers will be fixed by due notice of dishonor without it. Burroughs v. Perkins, Holt,

121; Harris «. Benson, 2 Stra. 910; Windle a. Andrews, 2 Baru. and Aid. 696. The same dif-

ference is recognized in this country. Bdw. on Bills, 584, 565.

The several states of the American Union are so far foreign in reapect to each other, that a

bill drawn in one upon another is to be considered a foreign bill. Buckner t>. Finley, 2 Pot.

586 ; Hartridge v. Wesson, 4 Gteo. 101; Atwater v. Streets. 1 Doug. Mich. 455; Carter v. Union

Bank, 7 Humph 548; Chenowith ». Chamberlain, 6 B. Monr. 60; Wells c. Whitehead, 15 Wend.

£gr; Halliday v. McDougall, 20 Wend, 81.
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able tr;•att>'e: Also the treati:iet.4 on controct&.

(JO) 'rhere is _this very _in~portant ditt'eren<l?• th11.t in tho ~e ~fa foreign bil,l. i~ order to bind
the drawer .and mdorsers 1t LS nece~sary that 1t ~e protc~tcd if ?ishonored, '_Vh•.li: m the case of
an inland lnll, although there may be 11. protest, it is not essent111.l, and the hab1hty of t~e drawer
and indorsers will be fi.xed by dne notice of dishonor without it. Ilurrough11 v. Perkins, Holt,
rn1 ; Hurris v. Ben~on, 2 Stra. UlO; Windle "· A.ndrew11, ~ Barn. and A.ld. 696. The same difference i:i recogniz;}tl in this countty. Edw. on Bills, 584, 58.'>.
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by the same statute, 3 and 4 Ann. c. 9, are made assignable and indorsable in

like manner as bills of exchange. Bat, by statute 15 Goo. Ill, c. 51, all pro-

f *4681 m'S3ory or other notes, *bills of exchange, drafts, and undertakings in

" J writing, being negotiable or transferable, for the payment of less than

twenty shillings, are declared to be null and void; and it is made penal to utter

or publish any such; they being deemed prejudicial to trade and public

credit. And by 17 Geo. Ill, c. 30, all such notes, bills, drafts and undertakings,

to the amount of twenty shillings, and less than five pounds, are subjected to

many other regulations and formalities; the omission of any one of which

vacates the security, and is penal to him that utters it. (31)

The payee, we may observe, either of a bill of exchange or promissory note,

has clearly a property vested in him (not indeed in possession but in action) by

the express contract of the drawer in the case of a promissory note, and, in the

case of a bill of exchange, by his implied contract, viz.: that, provided the drawee

does not pay the bill, the drawer will: for which reason it is usual in bills of

exchange to express that the value thereof hath been received by the drawer; (u)

in order to show the consideration, upon which the implied contract of repay-

ment arises. And this property, so vested, may be transferred and assigned

from the payee to any other man; contrary to the general rule of the common

law, that no chose in action is assignable: which assignment is the life of paper

credit. It may therefore be of some use to mention a few of the principal inci-

dents attending this transfer or assignment, in order to make it regular, and
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thereby to charge the drawer with the payment of the debt to other persons

than those with whom he originally contracted.

In the first place, then, the payee, or person to whom or whose order such

bill of exchange or promissory note is payable, may by indorsement, or writing

his name in dorso, or on the back of it, assign over his whole property to the

bearer, or else to another person by name, either of whom is then called the in-

dorsee ; and he may assign the same to another, and so on in infinitum. And

a promissory note, payable to A, or bearer, is negotiable without any indorse-

r „ ,g9 -• ment, and payment thereof may be demanded by any bearer *of it. (v)

"- J But, in case of a bill of exchange, the payee, or the indorsee (whether

it be a general or particular indorsement), is to go to the drawee, and offer his

bill for acceptance; which acceptance (so as to charge the drawer with costs)

must be in writing, under or on the back of the bill. If the drawee accepts the

bill, either verbally or in writing, (w) he then makes himself liable to pay it;

this being now a contract on his side, grounded on an acknowledgment that

the drawer has effects in his hands, or at least credit sufficient to warrant the

payment. If the drawee refuses to accept the bill, and it be of the value of 201.

or upwards, and expressed to be for value received, the payee or indorsee may

protest it for non-acceptance; which protest must be made in writing, under a

copy of such bill of exchange, by some notary public; or, if no such notary be

resident in the place, then by any other substantial inhabitant in the presence

of two credible witnesses; and notice of such protest must, within fourteen

days after, be given to the drawer. (32)

(uj Stra. IMS. (v) 2 Show. 235. Grant». Vaugftan, T. * d.-o. in, It. It. (w) Str». 10W.

(31) A promissory note under 5Z. payable to the bearer on demand is illegal in England, by

statute 86 and 27 Vic. o. 105, and previous act*.

(32) [With respect to acceptance tmd protest, the law now is, in several material points, dif-

bv the same statute, 3 and 4 Ann. c. 9, are made assignable and indorsable in
like manner as bills of exchange. Bnt, by statute 15 Goo. III, c. 51, all pro[ • 468 ] missory or other notei!, *billi! of exchange, drafts, and undertakings in
writing, being negoth\ble or transferable, for the payment of less than
twenty shillings, are declared to be null and void; and it is mu.de penal to utter
or publish any such; they being deemed prejudicial to trade and public
credit. And by 17 Geo. III, c. 30, all such notes, bills, drafts and undertakings,
to the amount of twenty shillings, and less than five pounds, are subjected to
many other regulations and formalities; the omission of any one of which
vacates the security, and is penal t-0 him that utters it. (:31)
The payee, we may observe, either of a bill of exchange or promissory note,
has clearly a property vested in him (not indeed in possession but in action) by
the expre8s contract of the drawer in the case of a promissory note, and, in the
case of a bill of exchange, by hii! implied contract, viz.: that, provided the drawee
does not pay the bill~ the drawer will: for which reason it is usual in bills of
exchange to express that the mlue thereof hath been received by the drawer; ( u)
in order to show the consideration, upon which the implied contract of repayment arises. And this property, so vested, may be transferred and assigned
from the payee to any other man; contrary to the general rule of the common
law, that no clwse in action is assignable: which a.se;1gnment is the life of paper
credit. It may therefore be of some use to mention a few of the principal incidents attending this transfer or assignment, in order to make it regular, and
thereby to charge the drawer with the payment of the debt to other persons
than those with whom he originally contracted.
In the first place, then, the payee, or person to whom or whose order such
bill of exchange or promissorv note is payable, may by indorsement, or writing
his name in dorso, or on the back of it, assign over his whole property to the
bearer, or else to another person by name, either of whom is then called the indorsce; and he may assign the same to another, and so on in infinitum. And
a promissory note, payable to A, or bearer, is negotiable without any indorse[ • 469 ] ment, and payment thereof may be demanded by any bearer •of it. (v)
But, in case of a bill of exchange, the payee, or the mdorsee (whether
it be a general or particular indur:rement), is to go to the drawee, and offer his
bill for acceptance; which acceptance (so as to chn.rge the drawer with costs)
must be in writing, under or on the back of the bill. It' the drawee accepts the
bill, either verbally or in writin~, (w) he then m:,kes himself liable to pay it;
this being now a contmct on his side, grounded on an acknowledgment that
the drawer has effects in his hands, or at least credit sufficient to warrant the
payment. If the drawee refuses to !lccept the bill, and it be of the value of 201.
or upwurds, and expressed to be for value received, the payee or indorsee may
protest it for non-acceptance; which protest must be made in writing, under a.
copy of such bill of exchn.n<Te, by some notary public; or, if no such notary be
resident in the place, then by any other substantial inhabitant in the presence
of two credible witnesses; and notice of such protest mnst, within fourteen
days after, be gi>en to the drawer. (32)

ferent from the statement of it in the text. Acceptance is not necessary, thongb usual and

desirable, on bills payable at a certain time : but when tbe bill is payable at a certain distance

(u) Stra. lil~I.

(fl)

ll Show. m_ Grant"· Vaaghan, T.

j

Goo. m, B. 'R.

(•) S&ra. IODe.

of time after sight, then acceptance is essential and shonld not be delayed, because (as the time

for payment of the bill does not bejrin to run till it is accepted : 6 T. R. 212; Bnyl. 112 ;

Chitty on Bills, 268), the responsibility of tbe drawer would be thereby protracted. Accept-

ance of an inland bill can now be in writing only on the face of the bill itself, by 1 and 2 Goo.

IV, c. 78; though formerly, as is tlie case still utith foreign bills, it might have been verbal, or

in writing on any other paper. 4 East, 67 ; 5 id. 514. But in all cases, whether of an inland or

foreign bill, if it be presented and acceptance is refused, prompt notice (within fourteen, days
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(31) A promissory note under 51. parable to the bearer on dewaud i11 illegal m England, by
st.atute 2ll and '%'/ Vic. o. 105, and pl'l~viouH oot~.
(32) [With re1'pect to acceptance aud 11rote~t. the law now is, in several Dll\terial point..~ different from the t1ta.tement of it in tho text. Acceptance i1' not nooe.~R&ry, though u~nlLI and
dP;si.rablo, on ~ills payable at a certa!n time :. but when tho bill is payable at a certain dista~l'e
ol time af\er Bl{!l1t, then o.cceptanco 1~ e ..;...eut1al and should not be delayed, booau~e (al! the time
for payment of the bill due11 not begin to run till it iii acoopted: 6 T. R. 212; Bayl. lh!;
Chitty on Bills, 26i!), the re~ponsiuility ot' the drawer would be Uicroby protracted. .Acceptance of an inland bill can now ho in 1critiiig only on the face of the bill itself, by 1 and 2 Goo.
IV, c. 78; though formerly,&.'! iB the case still 11nthforeig11 bills, it might have been verbal, Ol"
in writini;, on any other paper. 4 Ea;t, fi7 ; 5 id. 514. But iu all Cll.'!OS, whether of an inland or
foreign \nil, if it be pre~uted and acceptance is refused, prompt notice ( wit.b.in fourteen. daya
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But in case such bill be accepted by the drawee, and after acceptance he fails

or refuses to pay it within three days after it becomes due (which three days

are called days of grace), (33) the payee or indorsee is then to get it protested

for non-payment, in the same manner, and by the same persons who are to pro-

test it in case of non-acceptance, and such protest must also be notified within

fourteen days after to the drawer. And he, on producing such protest, cither

of non-acceptance, or non-payment, is bound to make good to the payee, or in-

dorsee, not only the amount of the said bills (which he is bound to do within a

reasonable time after non-payment, without any protest, by the rules of the

common law), (x) but also interest and all charges to be computed from the

time of making such protest. But if no protest be made or notified to the

drawer, and any damage accrues by such neglect, it shall fall on the holder of

the bill. The bill, when refused, must be demanded of the drawer as soon as

conveniently may be: for though, when one draws a bill of *exchange, r *AHQ 1

he subjects himself to the payment, if the person on whom it is drawn •• ' "

refuses either to accept or pay, yet that is with this limitation, that if the bill

be not paid when due, the person to whom it is payable shall in convenient

time give the drawer notice thereof; for otherwise the law will imply it paid :

since it would be prejudicial to commerce if a bill might rise up to charge the

drawer at any distance of time: when in the mean time all reckonings and ac-

counts may be adjusted between the drawer and the drawee, (y)

If the bill be an indorsed bill, and the indorsee cannot get the drawee to dis-
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charge it, he may call upon either the drawer or the indorser, or, if the bill has

been negotiated through many hands, upon any of the indorsers; for each in-

dorser is a warrantor for the payment of the bill, which is frequently taken in

payment as much (or more) upon the credit of the indorser, as of the drawer.

And if such indorser, so called upon, has the names of one or more indorsers

prior to his own, to each of whom he is properly an indorsee, he is also at lib-

erty to call upon any of them to make him satisfaction; and so upwards. But

the first indorser has nobody to resort to but the drawer only.

What has been said of bills of exchange is applicable also to promissory notes,

that are indorsed over, and negotiated from one hand to another; only that, in

this case, as there is no drawee, there can be no protest for non-acceptance; or

rather the law considers a promissory note in the light of a bill drawn by a man

upon himself, and accepted at the time of drawing. And, in case of non-pay-

ment by the drawer, the several indorsees of a promissory note have the same

remedy, as upon bills of exchange, against the prior indorsers. (34)

(x) Lord Raym. 993. (y} Salk. 127.

•will not suffice, but usually the next day to the immediate indorser, and each indorser is allowed

a day) must be given to the drawer and indorsers, or they will be discharged from responsi-

But in case such bill be accepted by the drawee, ancl after acceptance he fails
or refuses t-0 pay it within three days after it becomes due (which three days
a.re called days of grace), (33) the payee or indorsee is then to get it protest~d
for 1wn-payment, in the same manner, and by the same persons who are to protest it in case of non-acceptance, and such protest must also be notified within
fourteen days after to the drawer. And he, on producing such protest, either
of non-acceptance., or non-payment, is bound to make good to the payee, or iu·
dorsee, not only the amount of the said bills (which he is bound to do within a
reasonable time after non-rayment, without any protest, by the rules of the
common law), (x) but also mterest and all charges to be computed from the
time of making such protest. But if no protest be made or notified to the
drawer, and any damage accrues by such neglect, it shall fall on the holder of
the bill. 1'hc bill, when refused, must be demanded of the drawer a.s soon as
conveniently may be: for though, when one draws a bill of *exchange, [ • 470 ]
he subjects himself to the pay.ment, if the person on whom it is drawn
refuses either to accept or pay, yet that is with this limit:ation~ that if the bill
be not paid when due, the person to whom it is payable shall in convenient
time give the drawer notice thereof; for otherwise the law will imply it paid :
since it would be prejudicial t-0 commerce if a bill might rise up to charge the
drawer at any distance of time: when in the mean time all reckonings and acconnts may be adjusted between the drawer and the drawee. (y)
If the bill be an indorsed bill, and the indorsee cannot get the drawee to discharge it, he may call upon either the drawer or the indorser, or, if the bill has
been negotiated through many hands, upon anY. of the indorsers; for each indorser is a warrantor for the payment of the bill, which is frequently taken in
payment as much (or more) upon the credit of the indorser, as of the drawer.
.And if such indorser, so called upon, has the names of one or more indorsers
prior to his own, to euch of whom he is properly an inuor!IOO, he is also at liberty to call upon any of them to make him satisfaction; and so upwards. But
the first indorser has nobody to resort to but the drawer only.
What has been said of bills of exchange is applicable also to promissory notes,
that are indorsed over, and negotiated from one hand to another; only that, in
this case., as there is no drawee, there can be no protest for non-accepbmce; or
rather the law considers a promissory note in the light of a bill drawn by a man
upon himself, and accepted at the time of drawing. Anu, in case of non-payment by the drawer, the several indorsces of a promissory note have the same
remedy, as upon bills of exchange, against the prior indorsers. (34)

bility. Upon non-acceptance, the holder may immediately sue the drawer (2 Camp. 458), and

(:c) Lord Raym, 998.

indorsers (4 East, 481), without waiting till the bill becomes due, according to the terms of it.

"So protest of an inland bill is essential to entitle the holder to recover interest and costs, aud

such a protest now seems useless. 2 B. and A. 696.]

An acceptance by parol, when not otherwise provided by statute, is sufficient. Leonard v.

Mason, 1 Wend. 522; "Ward v. Allen, 2 Mete. 53. But by statute in several of the United States

it is declared that no person shall be charged as acceptor on a bill of exchange, unless his ac-

ceptance be in writing, signed by himself or his lawful agent.

(33) "When the last day of grace falls on Sunday, or any general holiday, such as Christmas

day, Fourth of July. <tc., presentment must be made on the day preceding; but if the bill or

note were payable without grace, it would not be due until the day following. 1 Pars, on Bills

and Notes, 400, 401.

The law on this subject is very much regulated by statutes in the United States, and in the

absence of statutes, it may be affected by usage. Ordinary bank checks and demand notes are

not entitled to grace, and other negotiable paper is sometimes so drawn as by its terms to ex-

clude this extension.

(34) "We may briefly refer here to two other kinds of negotiable paper, premising that the sub-

ject is too broad for any discussion.

Sank notes are securities issued by banking corporations or private bankers, in the form of

promissory notes, and by which they undertake to pay to the bearer a certain sum of money
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will not suffice, but usuBlly the next dBy to the immediate indorsor, and each indorser is allowed
a day) must be given to the drawer and indorsers, or they will be discharged from refiponsibility. Upon non-acceptance, the holder may immodiately sue the drawer (2 Camp. 45t;), and
indol'l!ers (4 Ea11t. 481), without waiting till tho bill becomes due, according to the terms of it.
No protAl8t of an inland bill is es~ential to entitle the holder to recover interest and costs, and
such a protest now il66ms useless. 2 B. and A. 696.]
An acceptance by parol, when not otherwise provided by statute, is sufficient. Leone.rd ti.
Mason, 1 Wend. 52'2; Wo.nl ti. Allen, 2 Mete. 53. But by statute in several of the United States
it ie declared that no per~on shall be charged a..~ acceptor on e. bill of exchange, unless his acOOJ,>tance be in writing, signed by himself or his lawful e.gont.
(:i:J) When the Jo..~t day of grace falls on Sunday, or any general holiday, such e..~ Chri~tme.s
day, Fourth of July. &c., pre11entment must be made on the day preceding; but if the bill or
note were payable without grace, it would not be due until the day following. 1 Pars. on Bills
and Notes, 400, 401.
The law on this subject is very much regulated by 11tatutos in the United States, and in the
absence of statutes, it may be affected by usage. Ordinary bank checks and demand notes are
not entitled to grace, and other negotiable paper is sometimes t!O drawn as h.r its terms to exclude this extension.
(34) We may briefly refer here to two other kinds of negotiable paper, premising that the sub·
ject is too broad for any discu1111ion.
Bank n-0tes are securities issued by banking corporations or pri'l""ate bankers, in the form of
promissory notes, and by which they undertake to pay to the bearer a oertain sum of money
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CHAPTER XXXI.

OF TITLE BY BANKRUPTCY.

THE preceding chapter having treated pretty largely of the acquisition

CHAPTER XXXI.

of personal property by several commercial methods, we from thence shall be

easily led to take into our present consideration a tenth method of transferring

OF TITLE BY BANKRUPTCY.

property, which is that of

A. Bankruptcy; a title which we before lightly touched upon, (a) so far as rt

related to the transfer of the real estate of the bankrupt. At present we are to

treat of it more minutely, as it principally relates to the disposition of chattels,

in which the property of persons concerned in trade more usually consists, than

in lands or tenements. Let us, therefore, first of all consider, 1. Who may be-

come a bankrupt: 2. What acts make a bankrupt: 3. The proceedings on a

commission of bankrupt: and, 4. In what manner an estate in goods and chat-

tels may be transferred by bankruptcy.

1. Who may become a bankrupt. A bankrupt was before (5) defined to be " a

trader, who secretes himself, or does certain other acts, tending to defraud his

creditors." He was formerly considered merely in the light of a criminal or

offender, (c) (I) and in this spirit we are told by Sir Edward Coke, (d) that we

T *4721 nave itched as well the name, as the wickedness *of bankrupts from

' -" foreign nations, (e) But at present the laws of bankruptcy are eonsid-

(a.) See page 285. (b) Ibid. (c) Stat. 1 Jac. I, c. 15. ^ 17. (A) 4 lost. 277.

(<') The word itselfi* derived from tho word bancus or banqve, which signifies the table or connter of a
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tradesman (Dufrcsne, I, 969), uml ruptitx. broken ; denoting thereby one whose shop or place oftrade is bro-

ken and gone; though others rather choose to adopt the word roufe.whieh in French sigmfie-sa trace or track,

and tell ns that a bankrupt Is one who hath removed his banqne, leaving but a trace behind. (4 lust. 277.)

And it is observable that the title of the fli-st English statute concerning this oflfcnce i:H Hen. VIII, c. 4).

THE preceding chapter having treated pretty Ja,.gely of the acqnieition
of personal property by severnl commercial methods, we from thence shall be
easily led to take into our present consideration a tenth method of transferring
·
property, which is that of
X. Bankruptcy; a title which we before lightly touched npon, (a) so fsr as it
related to the transfer of the real estate of the bankrupt. At present we are to
treat of it more minutely, as it principally relates to the disposition of chattels,
in which the property of persons concerned in tmde more usually consists, than
in lands or tenements. Let us, therefore, first of all consider, 1. Who mav become a bankrupt: 2. What acts make a bankrupt: 3. The praceedings "on a
commission of bankrupt: and, 4. In what manner an estate in goods and chattels mav be tran.~ferred by bankruptcy.
1. Who may become a bankrupt. A bankrupt was before (b) defined to be" a
trader, who secretes himself, or does certain other acts, tending to defraud his
creditors." He was formerly considered merely in the light of a criminal or
offender, (c) (1) and in this sµirit we are told by Sir Edward. Coke, (d) that we
[ • 472 ] have fetched as well the name, as the wickedness *of bankrupts from
foreign nations, (e) But at present the laws of bankruptcy are consid-

" againstsuch personsuedomakc bankrupt," isa literal translation of the French idiom, qui font banqtte

route.

mentioned therein on demand. These securities are designed to circulalate as money, and they

are not allowed to be issued except by persons duly authorized by statute. But though they

circulate as money, no one is obliged to receive them as such, but has a right instead to insist

upon receiving the legal tender of the country. A tender of such notes is nevertheless good, if

(aJ See Jlllf!e 2811.
(b)lbld.
(e)Stat. IJac. I, e. 15. J 17.
(d)4 Inst. 277.
(e) The word itself ls derived from tho wont bancu.s or banque, which ~lgnltlcs the table or counter of a
trarlesman (Dufresne, I. 969), and "'pltu. broken ; dcnotlng thereb)' one whose shofl or place of trade ls broken and gone; thoogh othera rather choose to adopt the word route.which in French sig111nc~e trace or track,
anti tell ns that a bankrupt Is one who hath removed his banqne, leavlnfl' but a tmcc bchinrt. H Inst. m. l
And it Is 01-rvable thAt the title of the 11rst EnlJlilh 11t11tule concemmg this oll'<•nc.e (:J.f Hen. VIII, c. 4),
"against such persoos 1111 do make bankrupt," le a literal trnnslation of the French i•llom, q111 f011t ba11que

route.

accepted, or if refused on any other ground than because they are not money. Warren c.

Mains, 7 Johns. 476; Wright ». Reed, 3 T. R., 554; Snow v. Perry, 9 Pick. 539. The property

in these notes follows possession ; grace is not allowed upon them, and they bear no interest

until after demand of payment and refusal. They never become overdue in the law, and the

statute of limitations does not apply to them.

Sank checks are orders drawn by an individual upon his banker, directing him to pay the sum

of money specified therein, either to the bearer or to some person named, or to the order of a

person named. These instruments are supposed to be drawn against funds actually deposited

subject to call, and they are payable at presentation without grace. If payable to order or bearer

they are negotiable, and the person in whose favor the^ are drawn may make himself a party

thereto by indorsement, in which case his rights and liabilities correspond to those of the in-

dorsee of a bill or note. They ought usually to be presented for payment as soon as conveni-

ent, and if the holder retains them in his own hands without presentation for an unreasonable

time, he takes upon himself the risk of the banker's responsibility. 2 Pars. Notes and Bills. 72.

A check does not operate as an assignment of the amount thereof in bank to the drawee, and if

the banker refuses to pay, the recourse of the holder is to the drawer and indorsere if any. But

the banker would be liable to the drawer of the check for any injury to his credit by unjustifia-

ble refusal to pay. Marzetti «. Williams, 1 B. and Aid. 415; 14 C. B. 595. If a check is drawn

without funds, or if the funds are withdrawn by the drawer, before the check is presented, he

will be liable to the holder for the amount without presentment or notice.

Checks are sometimes presented to banks for certification, and after being certified by the

proper officer as good, are withdrawn to be used instead of money in business transactions.

This is sometimes done when there are no funds to meet them, and important questions then

arise, regarding the liability of the bank upon them. Upon this subject see oases collected and

discussed in 3 American Law Review, 612.

Upon the general subject of negotiable paper, the elementary treatises on bills and notes are

very full and satisfactory, especially the English treatises by Chitty and Byles, and the Amer-

ican by Edwards and Parsons.

(1) [Throughout the three first statutes the bankrupt is invariably called an offender, and the

original design of the bankrupt law appears to have been to prevent and defeat the frauds of

criminal debtors.]
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mentioned therein on demand. These secnrities are designed to ciroulalate as money, and they
are not allowed to be issued except by periJous duly authorized by statute. But though they
circulate as money, no one is obliged to receive them as such, but ha.~ a right in~tel\d to insh;t
upon receiving the legal tender of the country. A tender of 1mch notes is nef'ertheiess good, if
accepted, or if refused on any other ground than becauso they are not money. Warren ~.
Mains, 7 JohnM. 476; Wright v. Reed, 3 T. R., 554; Snow t'. Perry, 9 Pick. 53V. The property
in these notes follows posses.'lion; grace is u1•t allowed upon them, and they bear no intere8t
until after demand of payment and refusal. They never become overdue in the law, and the
statute of limitations dues not apply to them.
Bank checks are orders drawn by au individual upon his banker, directing him to pay the sum
of money specified therein, either to the bearer or to f!Ome person named, or to the order of a
person named. These instruments are supposed to be drawn against funds actually deposited
subject to call, and t.hev are payable at presentation without grace. If payable to order or bearer
they are negotiable, au·d the person in whose favor the,r are drawn may make himself a party
thereto by indorsement, in which case his right<i and habilities corre!lpond to those of the indonme of a bill or note. They ought u:mally to be presented for payment ad soon as cunnmicut, and if the bolder retains them in his own bands without presentation for an unroa.~onable
time, be takeH upon himself the risk of the banker's re11puugibility. 2 Pars. Note::! and Bills, 72.
.A check does not operate as IW &dsigumeut of the amount thereof in bank to the dmwee, and if
the banker refu11es to pay, the recouri!o of the holder is to the drawer and iudorsers if l\ny. But
the banker would be liable to the drawer of the check for any injury to his credit by unjustifiable refusal to pay. Marzetti v. Williami1, 1 B. and Ald. 415; 14 C. B. 595. If a check is drawn
without funds, or if the funds are withdrawn by the drawer, before the check is presented, be
will be liable to the bolder for the amount without presentment or notice.
Checks are sometimes presented to banks f 01· certjfi-0ation, and after beinF, certified by the
proper officer as good, are withdrawn to be U8ed instead of money in buSllless tra!18actious.
'fhis is sometimet1 done when there are no funds to meet them, and important que1<twni1 then
arise, regarding the liability of the bank upon them. Upon thit1 subject see cases collected and
discu8sed in 3 American Law Review, 6ll!.
Upon the general subject of negotiable ~aper, the elementary treatises on bills and note3 are
very full and t1ati.i!foctory, especially the English treatises by Chitty and Byles, and the American b}· Edwards and Parsons.
(1) [Throughout the three first statute11 the bankrupt is in'l"ariably called an offender, and the
original de8igo of the bWlkrupt law appew::> to have been to prevent and defeat the frauds of
criminal dcbtoI'l!.)
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ered as laws calculated for the benefit of trade, and founded on the principles

of humanity as well as justice ; and to that end they confer some privileges, not

only on the creditors, but also on the bankrupt or debtor himself. On the

creditors, by compelling the bankrupt to give up all his effects to their use,

without any fraudulent concealment: on the debtor, by exempting him from

the rigour of the general law, whereby his person might be confined at the dis-

cretion of his creditor, though in reality he has nothing to satisfy the debt:

whereas the law of bankrupts, taking into consideration the sudden and unavoid-

able accidents to which men in trade are liable, has given them the liberty of

their persons, and some pecuniary emoluments, upon condition they surrender

up their whole estate to be divided among their creditors.

In this respect our Legislature seems to have attended to the example of the

Roman law. I mean not the terrible law of the twelve tables; whereby the cred-

itors might cut the debtor's body into pieces, and each of them take his propor-

tionable share: if, indeed, that law, de debitore in paries secando, is to be

understood in so very butchery a light; which many learned men have with

reason doubted. (/) Nor do I mean those less inhuman laws (if they may be

called so, as 2A0t'r"meaning is indisputably certain), of imprisoning the debtor's

person in chains; subjecting him to stripes and hard labour, at the mercy of

his rigid creditor; and sometimes selling him, his wife, and children, to per-

petual foreign slavery trans Tiberim: (g) an oppression which produced so

many *popular insurrections, and secessions to the mons sacer. But I r ,,..,„ -,
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mean the law of cession, introduced by the Christian emperors; whereby, <- J

if a debtor ceded, or yielded up all his fortune to his creditors, he was secured

from being dragged to a gaol, " omni quoque corporali cruciatu semoto." (li)

For, as the emperor justly observes, (i) " inhumanum erat spoliatum fortunis

suis in solidum damnari." Thus far was just and reasonable: but, as the

departing from one extreme is apt to produce its opposite, we find it afterwards

enacted, (k) that, if the debtor by any unforeseen accident was reduced to low

circumstances, and would swear that he had not sufficient left to pay his debts,

he should not be compelled to cede or give up even that which he had in his

possession: a law which, under a false notion of humanity, seems to be fertile

of perjury, injustice and absurdity.

The laws of England, more wisely, have steered in the middle between both

extremes: providing at once against the inhumanity of the creditor, who is not

suffered to confine an honest bankrupt after his effects are delivered up; and at

the same time taking care that all his just debts shall be paid, so far as the effects

will extend. But still they are cautious of encouraging prodigality and extrava-

gance by this indulgence to debtors; and therefore they allow the benefit of the

laws of bankruptcy to none but actual traders; since that set of men are, gen-

erally speaking, the only persons liable to accidental losses, and to an inability

of paying their debts, without any fault of their own. If persons in other sit-

uations of life run in debt without the power of payment, they must take the

consequences of their own indiscretion, even though they meet with sudden

accidents that may reduce their fortunes: for the law holds it to be an unjusti-

fiable practice, for any person but a trader to inoumber himself with debts of

any considerable value. If a gentleman or *one in a liberal profession, r „. „. ••

at the time of contracting his debts, has a sufficient fund to pay them, <• ' -I

the delay of payment is a species of dishonesty, and a temporary injustice to his

creditor: and if, at such time he has no sufficient fund, the dishonesty and

injustice is the greater. He cannot therefore murmur, if he suffers the punish-

ment which he has voluntarily drawn upon himself. But in mercantile trans-

actions the case is far otherwise. Trade cannot be carried on without mutual

credit on both sides: the contracting of debts is therefore here not only justi-

fy.) Taylor, Comment In L. riocemviral. Bynkersh. Observ. Jnr. 1,1. Hojneco. Antiq. in, 30, 1.

ii'i) In Peru and the adjacent countries in* East India, the creditor is entitled to dispose of the debtor

liiiii -i-lt' anil likewise' or his wife and children : insomuch that he may even violate with Impunity the chastity

of the debtor's wife, but then, bv so doing, tho debt is understood to be discharged. (Mod. tin. llist. vii, liW.)

fhj Cod. 7, 71, per tot. '(i} Intt. 4, 6, 4(1. ft} Nov. 136, c. 1.

/

647

· ered as la.ws calculated for the benefit of trade, and fonnded on the principles
of humanity ae well as justice ; and to that end they confer some prfrileges, not
only on the creditors, but also on the bankrupt or debtor himself. On the
-creditors. by compelling the bankrupt to gh·e up all his effects to their use,
without a.ny fraudulent concealment: on the debtor, by exempting him from
the rigour of the general law, whereby his person might be confined at the discretion of his creditor, though in reality he has nothing to satisfy the debt:
whereas the Jaw of bankrupts, ta.king into consideration the sudden and unavoidable accidents to which men in trade are liable, has given them the liberty of
their persons, and some pecuniary emoluments, upon condition they surrender
up their whole estate to be divided among their creditors.
In this respect our Legislature seems to have attended to the example of the
Roma.n law. I me.an not the terrible law of the twelv'e tables ; whereby the creditors might cut the debtor's body into pieces, and each of them take h"is proportionable share: if, indeed, that law, de debitore in partu secando, is to be
understood in so very butchery a light; which many learned men have with
reason doubted.(/) Nor do I mean those less inhuman laws (if they may be
called B?, as t~eir mea!lin~ is in.disputabl.Y certain), of imprisoning the debtor's
person m chains; subJectmg him to stripes and h.11.rd labour, at the mercy of
his rigid creditor; and sometimes selling him, his wife, and children, to perpetual foreign slavery frans Tiberim: (g) an oppression which produced so
many *popular insurrections, and secessions to the mans sacer. But I [ • 473 ]
mean the law of cession, introduced by the Christian emperors; whereby,
if a debtor ceded, or yielded up all his fortune to his creditors, he was secured
from being dragged t9 a gaol, "omni quoqtte CfJrporali cruciatu semoto." (Ii)
For, as the emperor justly observes, (i) "inlmmanum erat sp'oliatum fortunis
suis in solidum damnari." Thus far was just and reasonable: but, as tlie
·departing from one extreme is apt to produce its opposite, we find it afterwards
enacted, (k) that, if the debtor by any unforeseen accident wa.s reduced to low
circumstances, and would swear that he had not sufficient left to pay his debts,
he should not be compelled to cede or give up even that which he had in his
possession: a law which, under e. false notion of humanity, seems to be fertile
of perjury, injustice and absurdity.
,
The laws of :England, more wisely, have steered in the middle between both
extremes: providing at once against the inhumanity of the creditor, who is not
suffered to confine an honest bankrupt after his effects are delivered up; and at
the same time ta.kin~ care that all his just debts shall be paid, so far as the effects
will extend. But still they are cautious of encouraging prodigality and extm'\"agance by this indulgence to debtors; and therefore they allow the benefit of the
laws of bankruptcy to none but actual traders.: since that set of men are, generally speaking, the only persons liable to accidental losses, and to an inability
of -paying their debts, without any fault of their own. If persons in other sitnat10ns of life run in clebt without the power of payment, they must take the
consequences of their own indiscretion, even though they meet with sudden
accidents that may reduce their fortunes: for the law bolds it to be an unjustifiable practice, for any person but a trader to incnmber himself with debts of
any considerable value. If a gentleman or •one in a liberal profession, [ • 4..,4 ]
at the time of contl"cl.Cting his debts, has a sufficient fund to pay them,
'
the delay of pa.rment is a species of dishonesty, and a temporary injustice to his
creditor: and 1f, at such time he has no sufficient fund, the dishonesty and
injustice is the greater. He cannot therefore murmur, if he suffers the punishment which he has voluntarily drawn upon himself. But in mercantile transactions the case is far otherwise. Trade cannot be carried on without mutual
credit on both sides: the contracting of debts is therefore here not only justi(fJ Taylor, Comment In L. oieeemvlral. Rynkersh. Ob&en. Jul'. J, 1. Holneeo. ,\o&lq. III, 30, '·
(gJ In l'Olt'll nod the l\lljacent countries in EMt IudiB. the credit-Or ls entitled to dispose of the ilebtor
blrnsctr and likewise of his wifo and chihlren : Insomuch thRt he mny enm ,·iolRte \Vlth lmp~unity the chastity
of the rlebtor's wife, bnt then, by ~o doing, the debt Is understo?c1 to be dlschurged. (;\loo. Un. llist. ,·ii, 12:1.)
lh.J Coo. 7, 11,pertot.
(•) In.t. •, G, AU.
{I:) Nov. 136, c. l.
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fiable, but necessary. And if by occidental calamities, as, by the loss of a ship

in a tempest, the failure of brother traders, or by the non-payment of persons

out of trade, a merchant or trader becomes incapable of discharging his own

debts, it is his misfortune and not his fault. To the misfortunes, therefore, of

debtors, the law has given a compassionate remedy, but denied it to their faults:

since, at the same time that it provides for the security of commerce, by enacting;

that every considerable trader may be declared a bankrupt, for the benefit of his

creditors as well as himself, it has also (to discourage extravagance) declared

that no one shall be capable of being made a bankrupt, but only a trader; nor

capable of receiving the full benefit of the statutes, but only an industrious

trader.

The first statute made concerning any English bankrupts was 34 Hen. VIII,

C. 4, when trade began first to be properly cultivated in England: which has

been almost totally altered by statute 12 Eliz. c. 7, whereby bankruptcy is con-

fined to such persons only as have used the trade of merchandise, in gross or by

retail, by way of bargaining, exchange, re-change, bartering, chevisance, (I) or

otherwise; or have sought their living by buying and selling. And by statute

21 Jac. I, c. 19, persons using the trade or profession of a scrivener, receiving

other men's monies and estates into their trust and custody, are also made liable

to the statutes of bankruptcy: and the benefits, as well as the penal parts of the

F *4751 ^aw> are *extended as well to aliens and denizens as to natural-born snb-

L J jects; being intended entirely for the protection of trade, in which aliens
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are often as deeply concerned as natives. By many subsequent statutes, but

lastly by statute 5 Geo. II, c. 30, (m) bankers, brokers, and factors, are declared

liable to the statutes of bankruptcy; and this upon the same reason that scriv-

eners are included by the statute of James I, viz.: for the relief of their cred-

itors ; whom they have otherwise more opportunities of defrauding than any

other set of dealers; and they are properly to be looked upon as traders, since

they make merchandise of money, in the same manner as other merchants do

of goods and other movable chattels. But by the same act, (n) no farmer,

grazier, or drover, shall (as such) be liable to be deemed a bankrupt: for,

though they buy and sell corn, and hay, and beasts, in the course of husbandry,

yet trade is not their principal, but only a collateral, object; their chief con-

cern being to manure and till the ground, and make the best advantage of its

produce. And, besides, the subjecting them to the laws of bankruptcy might

be a means of defeating their landlords of the security which the law has given

them above all others, for the payment of their reserved rents ; wherefore, also,

upon a similar reason, a receiver of the king's taxes is not capable, (o) as such,

of being a bankrupt; lest the king should be defeated of those extensive reme-

dies against his debtors, which are put into his hands by the prerogative. By

the same statute, (p) no person shall have a commission of bankrupt awarded

against him, unless at the petition of some one creditor, to whom he owes 100Z.;

or of two, to whom he is indebted 150?.; or of more, to whom altogether he is

indebted 2001. For the law does not look upon persons whose debts amount to

less, to be traders considerable enough, either to enjoy the benefits of the stat-

utes themselves, or to entitle the creditors, for the benefit of public commerce,

to demand the distribution of their effects. (2)

(1) That is, making contracts. Dufresne, H, 669. (m)} 39. (n)} 40. (o) IHd. (p)IS3.

(2) The English law of bankruptcy was entirely remodeled by the act 32 and 33 Vic. o. 71,

which took effect on the first day of January, 1870. The following is a summary of its pro-

visions :

[First, all persons, even including persons who have privilege of parliament, may be adjudged

~able, but necessary: And if by oocitlcnt.al calamities, as, by the loss of a ship
m a tempest, the failure of brnther trndcrs, or by t.he non-payment of persons
out of trade, a. merchant or trader becomes incapable of discharging his own
debts, it is his misfortune and not his fa.ult. To the misfortnn('s, therefore, of
debton, the law has given a compassionate remedy, bnt denied it to their faults:
since, at the same time that it provides for the security of commerce, by enacting
that every consicleroble trader may be declared a bankrupt, for the benefit of his
creditors as well as himself, it has also (to discourage extravagance) declared
that no one shall be capable of being made a. bankrupt, bnt only a trader; nor
capable of receiving the full benefit of the statutes, but only an industrious
trader.
The first statute made concerning any English bankrupts was 34 Hen. VIII,
c. 4, when trade began first to be properly cultivated in England: which has
been almost totally altered by statute 12 Eliz. c. 7, whereby bankruptcy is confined to such persons only as have used the trade of rnercltandise, in gross or by
retail, by way of bargaining, exchange, re-change, bartering, chevisance, (l) or
otherwise; or have souglit llteir living by buying and selling. And by statute
21 Jae. I, c. 19, persons using the trade or profession of a scrivener, receiving
other men's monies and estates into their trust an<l custody, are also made liable
to the statutes of bankruptcy: an<l the benefits, us well as the penal parts of the
[ • 475 ] law, are •extended as well to aliens and denizens as to natural-born subjects; being intended entirely for the protection of trade, in 'vhich a.liens
are often as deeply concerned as natives. By many subsequent statutes, but
lastly by statute 5 G00. II, c. 30, (rn) bankers, brokers, and factors, are declared
liable to the statutes of bankruptcy; and this upon the same reason that scriveners are included by the statute of James I, viz.: for the relief of their creditors ; whom they have otherwise more opportunities of defrauding than any
other set of dealers; and they are properly to be looked upon o.s traders, since
they make merchandise of money, m the same manner as other merchants do
of goods and other movable chattels. But by the same act, (n) no fiirmer,
grazier, or drover, shall (as such) be liable to be deemed a bankrupt: for,
though they buy and sell corn, and hay, and beasts, in the course of husbandry,
yet trade is not their principal, but only a collateral, object; their chief concern being to manure and till the ground, and make the best advantage of its
produce. And, besides, the subjecting them to the laws of bankruptcy might
be a means of defeating their landlords of the security which the law has given
them above all others, for the payment of their reserved rents; wherefore, also,
upon a. similar reason, a receiver of the king's taxes is not capable, (o) as such,
of being a bankrupt; lest the king should be defeated of those extensive remedies against his debtors, which are put into his hands by the prerogative. By
the same statute, (p) no person shall have a commission of bankrupt awarded
against him, unless at the petition of some one creditor, to whom he owes 1001.;
or of two, to whom he is mclebted 150l. ; or of more, to whom altogether he is
indebted 2001. For the law does not look upon persons whose debts amount to
less, to be traders considerable enough, either to enjoy the benefits of the statutes themselves, or to entitle the cr(•ditors, for the benefit of public commerce,
to demand the distribution of their effects. (2)
(l)

That is, making cootraeta. Dufresne, Il, 669.

(m) t

39.

(n)

t 40.

(o) l bid.

(p) f t3.

bankrupt, whether they be traders or not.

Next, a person becomes a bankrupt, when adjudged so by the court, upon the petition of a

creditor whose dobt, which must be a liquidated and unsecured debt, amounts to 501. or upwards,

or of several creditors whose debts in the aggregate amount to that sum at least. But before

such petition con be presented the debtor must have committed one of the acts or defaults which

are constituted " acts of bankruptcy."

648

(2) The E11glish law of bo.nkroptcy was entirely remodeled by the act 32 and 33 Vic. c. 71,
which took effoct on the first day of January, 1870. The following is a summary of its provi~ions:

[First, all persons, even including pemons who have privilege of parliament, may be adjudged
bankmpt, whether they be traders or not.
Next, a person becomes a bankrupt. when adjudged so by the court, upon the petition o( a
credit<ir whose d11bt, which mu~t be a liquidated and unsecured debt, amounts to 50l. or upwa.rdR,
or of 1mvere.l creditors whose debts in the aggregate amount to that sum at least. But before
sueh petition can be presented the debtor mul'!t have committed one of the acts or defaults which
are oonetituted "acts of bankruptcy."
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*In the interpretation of these several statutes, it hath been held r *.„„ -,

that buying only, or selling only, will not qualify a man to be a bank- •• -"

rupt; but it must be both ouying and selling, and also getting a livelihood by

it As, by exercising the calling of a merchant, a grocer, a mercer, or in one

general word, a chapman, who is one that buys and sells any thing. But no

handicraft occupation (where nothing is bought and sold, and where, therefore,

an extensive credit for the stock in trade is not necessary to be had) will make a

man a regular bankrupt; as that of a husbandman, a gardener, and the like, who

are paid for their work and labour, (q) Also an inn-keeper cannot, as such, be

a bankrupt: (r) for his gain or livelihood does not arise from buying and selling

in the way of merchandise, but greatly from the use of his rooms and furniture,

his attendance, and the like: and though he may buy corn and victuals, to sell

again at a profit, yet that no more makes him a trader than a school-master or

(</) Cro. Car. 31. (r) Cro. Car. 549. Skinn. 291.

These are, 1. Making a conveyance or assignment of all his property to a trustee for the

*In the int.erpretation of these several statutes, it hath been held
that buyin~ only, or selling only, will not qualify a man to be a bank- [ *476 ]
rupt; but it must be both buying and selling, and also getting a livelihood by
it. As, by exercising the calling of a merchant, afocer, a mercer, or in one
general word, a ehapman, who is one that buys an sells any thing. But no
handicraft occupation {where nothing is bought and sold, and where, therefore,
an extensive credit for the stock in trade is not necessary to be had) will make a
man a regnlar bankrupt; as that of a husbandman, a gardener, and the like, who
are paid for their work and labour. (q) Also an inn-keeper cannot, as such, be
a bankrupt: ( r) for his gain or livelihood does not arise from buying and selling
in the way of merchandise, but greatly from the use of his rooms and furniture,
his attendance, and the like: and though he may buy corn and victuals, to sell
again at a profit, yet that no more makes him a trader than a school-master or
{q)

benefit of his creditors generally. 2. Making a fraudulent conveyance, gift, delivery or trans-

Cro. Car. 31.

(rl Cro. Car. 549. Sldnn. 291.

fer of his property, or any part or it. 3. Doing, with intent to defeat or delay his creditors,

any of the following acts, viz.: departing from or remaining out of England; or (being a

trader) departing from his dwelling-house or otherwise absenting himself; or beginning to keep

house, or suffering himself to be outlawed; 4. Filing, in the manner prescribed by the rules

of the court, a declaration that he is unable to pay his debts; 5. Having execution levied by

seizure and sale of his goods, for payment of a debt of 502. or upwards; 6. Having neglected
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to pay, or secure, or compound the prisoner's debt, after having had a debtor's summons served

upon him, being a trader, within seven days, and, being a non-trader, within three weeks after

service.

An adjudication founded upon any of these acts of bankruptcy will not, however, be

granted, unless the petition be presented within six months after the act has been committed.

The act of bankruptcy upon which the petition is founded, or the earliest act of bankruptcy

that is proved to have been committed within twelve months preceding the presentation of

the petition, constitutes the commencement of the bankruptcy. As soon as the bankrupt has

been so adjudicated, no creditor may commence or prosecute any proceeding against the

bankrupt without leave of the court, and all the ordinary remedies are taken away, the rights

only of secured creditors with respect to their security being, however, preserved. Every

creditor must prove his debt under the bankruptcy, and is bound by it. Immediately an order

of adjudication has been made, the property of the debtor becomes divisible among his credi-

tors, and, for the purpose of making a division, a mooting of the creditors is to be called, at

which they are to appoint some fit person, whether a creditor or not, as a trustee, and also nom-

inate some other fit persons, not exceeding five, who are to be creditors who have proved their

debts, as a committee of inspection, for the purpose of guiding and in some measure controll-

ing the trustee in the discharge of his duties, or the creditors may leave the appointment of

the trustee to the committee. The title of the trustee relates back to the commencement of

the bankruptcy. The creditors may at the same or any subsequent meeting give any special

directions they may please as to the manner in which tho property is to be administered by the

trustee, and such directions are to bo binding upon him. The property which is to be divisible

among the creditors is not to include any property held by the bankrupt on trust for any other

person, nor the tools, if any, of his trade, nor the necessary wearing apparel and bedding of

himself, his wife and children; such tools, apparel and bedding not exceeding in value 201.

But it is to include, first, all such property as may be vested in the bankrupt at the com-

mencement of the bankruptcy, or may be acquired by or devolve upon him during its contin-

uance. Second, the capacity to exercise or take proceedings to exercise all powers over prop-

erty which might be exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit at the commencement, or at

any time during the continuance of the bankruptcy. Third, all goods and chattels being at

the commencement of tho bankruptcy in the possession, order or disposition of the bankrupt,

being a trader, by the consent and permission of the true owner; of which goods and chat-

tels the bankrupt is reputed owner, or of which he has taken upon himself the sale and dispo-

sition as owner: but it is provided that things in action, other than debts due to him in tho

course of his trade or business, are not to be deemed goods and chattels within the meaning of

this clause.

Upon the appointment of the trustee the property vests, without any conveyance, assign-

ment or transfer, in him; and the certificate of the court of his appointment constitutes his

title-deed. Until the/appointment of a trustee, and during any vacancy which may occur, the

registrar of the courtns the trustee; and the property also vests, as new trustees (if any) are

These are, 1. Making a. conveys.nee or assignment of e.ll his property to a trustee for the
benefit of his creditors genera.Uy. 2. Ma.king a fraudulent conveyance, gift, delivery or transfer of his property, or any part or it. 3. Doing, with intent to defeat or delay his creditors,
e.ny of the following acts, viz. : departing from or remaining out of England ; or (being a
trader) departin~ from his dwelling-house or otherwise absenting himself; or beginning to keep
house, or suffenng himself to be outlawed; 4. Filin~, in the manner prescribed by the rules
of the court, a declaration that he is unable to pay his debts ; 5. Having execution levied by
seizure a.nd 11ale of his goods, for payment of a. debt of 50l. or upwards; 6. Having neglected
to pay, or secure, or compound the prisoner's debt, after having had a debtor's summon~ sen·ed
npo~ him, being a. trader, within seven days, and, being a non-trader, within three weeks after
semce.
.An adjudication founded upon any of these acts of bankruptcy will not, however, be
granted, unless the petition be presented within six months after the act has been committed.
The act of bankruptcy upon which the petition is founded, or the earliest a.ct of bankruptcy
that is J_>roved to have been committed within twelve months preceding the presentation of
the petition, constitutes the commencement of tho bankruptcy. .A~ 11oon as the bankrupt hM
been so adjudicated, no creditor may commence or prosecute any proceeding again~t the
bankruft without leave of the court, and all the ordinary remedies aro taken away, tho rights
only o seenred creditors with respect to their imcurit_y being, however, preserved. Every
creditor must prove his debt nuder the bankrupt-0y, and is bound by it. Immediately a.n order
of adjudication has been made, the propert,r of the debtor become~ divisible among his creditors, and, for the purpose of making a division, a meeting of the creditor:! is to be called, at
which they are to appoint some fit parson, \Vhether a creditor or not, al! a. trustee, a.nd al.;:o nominate some other fit persons, not exceeding five, who are to be creditors who have proved their
debts, as a committee of inspection, fur the purpose of guiding and in s,1me mea~ure controlling the trustee in the discharge of his duties, or the creditors may leave the appointment of
the tru4ee to the committee. The title of the trustee rolate:i back to the commencemcmt of
the bankruptcy. The creditors may at the same or any subsequent meAting give any special
directions they ma.r plea..~ a..~ to the manner in which the prnperty is to be administered by the
trustee, a.nd such directions a.re to be binding upon him. 'fhe property which is to be dinsible
among the creditors is not to include a.ny property held by the ha.nkrupt on tru8t for any other
person, nor the tools, if any, of his trade, nor the necessary wee.ring apparel and bedcliug of
himself, his wife and children; such tools, apparel and bedding not exceeding in value :lOl.
But it is to include, first, all such property a..~ may be vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruJ.ltcy, or may be acqnired by or devolve upon him during its continua.nee. Second, the capacity to exerci>1e or take proceeding8 to exercise all powers over property which might be exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit at the commencement, or at
any time during the continuance of the bankruptcy. Third, all goods and chattels being a.t
the commencement of the bankruptcy in the possession, order or disposition of the bankrupt,
being a trader, by the consent and permission of the true owner; of which goods and chattels the bankn1pt is reputed owner, or of which he ho.s taken upon himself the sale and disposition as owner: but it is provided tha.t things in a.ctiou, other than debts due to him in tho
course of his trade or bu>1iness, a.re not to bu deemed goods aud chattels within the meaning of
this clause.
Upon the appointment of the trustee the property vests, without any conveyance, assignment or trarn•fer, in him; and the certificate of the court of his appointment constitutes his
title-deed. Until thwappointment of e. tru~tee, and during any vacancy which may occur, the
registrar of the oourt"is the tru~tee ; a.ud the property ali;io vests, as new trustees (if any) are
from time to time appointed, on their respective appointments.
When the property he.s been realized, the court makes an order declaring the bankruptcy
closed, and the bankrupt may apply for his discharg~. The onler o_f ~fo1oharge will only be
granted upon condition that the a~sets have been sufficrnnt to pay. a d1v1dend .o r _not. less than
10s. in the pound, unleBtl the creditors she.JI ha.ve passed a resolut10n, by a mo.Jonty m number

VoL. I.-82

from time to time appointed, on their respective appointments.

When the property has been realized, the court makes an order declaring the bankruptcy

closed, and the bankrupt may apply for his discharge. The order of discharge will only be

granted upon condition that the assets have been sufficient to pay a dividend of not less than

10*. in the pound, unless the creditors shall have passed a resolution, by a majority in number
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other person is that keeps a boarding-house, and makes considerable gains by

buying and selling what he spends in the house; and such a one is clearly not

within the statutes. («) But where persons buy goods, and make them up into

saleable commodities, as shoe-makers, smiths, and the like; here, though part

of the gain is by bodily labour, and not by buying and selling, yet they are

within the statutes of bankrupts: (/) for the labour is only in melioration of the

commodity, and rendering it more fit for sale.

One single act of buying and selling will not make a man a trader; but a re-

peated practice, and profit by it Buying and selling bank-stock, or other gov-

ernment securities, will not make a man a bankrupt; they not being goods,

wares or merchandise, within the intent of the statute, by which a profit may

be fairly made, (u) Neither will buying and selling under particular restraints,

F *477 1 or ^or Particular purposes; as, if *a commissioner of the navy uses to

"- J buy victuals for the fleet, and dispose of the surplus and refuse, he is

not thereby made a trader within the statutes, (w) An infant, though a trader,

cannot be made a bankrupt; (3) for an infant can owe nothing but for necessa-

ries : and the statutes of bankruptcy create no new debts, but only give a

speedier and more effectual remedy for recovering such as were before due: and

no person can be made a bankrupt for debts which ho is not liable at law to

pay. (x) But a feme-covert in London, being a sole trader according to the

custom, is liable to a commission of bankrupt, (y)

2. Having thus considered who may, and who may not, be made a bankrupt,
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we are to inquire, secondly, by what acts a man may become a bankrupt. (4) A

(<) Sklnn. 282. 3 Mod. 330. (<) Cro. Car. 31. Skinn. 292. («) 2 P. Wms. 308.

(ic) 1 Salk. 110. Skinn. •.",«. (z) Lord Baym. «;l. (y) La Vie r. J'hUipi, M. 6 Geo. HI, B. K.

representing three-fourths in value of the debts, present at a meeting called specially for the

purpose, to the effect that a discharge should be granted. An order of discharge releases the

bankrupt from all debts provable under the bankruptcy, except those which no incurred by

means of any fraud or breach of trust, and those of which he obtained forbearance by means of

fraud; and also except debts due to the crnwn or relatiug to the revenue : but of those last he

may be discharged if the commissioners of the treasury certify their consent in writing to such

discharge. If the bankrupt fail to obtain an order of discharge, then, after the close of the

bankruptcy, the following consequences ensue: a period of three years i* given to the bankrupt,

during which, if he pays to his creditors such additional sum as, together with the dividend

already paid, makes up 10x. in the pound, he is to obtain an order of discharge; and meanwhile

no debt provable under the bankruptcy shall be enforced against his property; but, if at the

expiration of the three years, he has not in this manner obtained an order of discharge, any

balance remaining unpaid in respect of any debt proved under the bankruptcy (without inter-

est) shall be deemed an existing debt, in the nature of a judgment debt, and may be enforced

as such.]

In the United States power is conferred npon congress by the constitution to establish a uni-

form system of bankruptcy. This power bos been three times exercised; by act of April 1,

1800, repealed Dec. 19, 1803; by act of Aug. 19, 1841, repealed in 1843 ; and by act of March 2,

1867, now in force. The present act embraces within its provisions not traders only, but " any

person residing within the jurisdiction of the United States," and owing debts to the amount of

more than three hundred dollars provable under it. It contains what are called voluntary pro-

visions, under which an insolvent debtor may himself be the petitioner for his discharge, and

involuntary provisions, under which the creditors become petitioners when they believe an act

of bankruptcy has been committed. No debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the

bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary capacity, is

barred by a certificate of discharge issued under the act. Original jurisdiction of the proceed-

ings is possessed by the United States district courts, but registers hi bankruptcy are appointed,

by whom the major part of the business ia transacted; but contested issues are adjourned by

the registers for hearing in court, and the debtor who disputes the allegations of the creditors

against him may demand trial by jury. See the Treatise of Avery and Hobbs on this law. And

for decisions under it, see digest of cases in bankruptcy in the American Law Review for April,

1869, and subsequent numbers.

(3) See Helton t>. Hodges, 9 Bing. 365; O'Brien v. Currie, 3 C. and P. 283; Stevens v. Jack-

son, 4 Camp. 164. But an infant may probably apply under the voluntary provisions of the

United States law. See Matter of Book, 3 McLean, 317. And a married woman doubtless

may, if resident where the law permits her to transact business in her own name: see Marshall

v. Rutton, 8 T. R. 545; or, if the wife of a transported convict. Ex parte Pranks, 7 Bing. 762.

(4) The acts of bankruptcy enumerated in the act of congress of March 2, 1867, are as fol-

lows (sec. 39):
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bankrupt is " a trader, who secretes himself, or does certain other acts, tending

to defraud his creditors." We have hitherto been employed in explaining the

former part of this description, " a trader;" let me now attend to the latter,

" who secretes himself, or does certain other acts tending to defraud his credit-

ors." And, in general, whenever such a trader, as is before described, hath

endeavoured to avoid his creditors, or evade their just demands, this hath been

declared by the legislature to be an act of bankruptcy, upon which a commis-

sion may be sued out For, in this extrajudicial method of proceeding, which is

allowed merely for the benefit of commerce, the law is extremely watchful to

detect a man whose circumstances are declining, in the first instance, or at

least as early as possible; that the creditors may receive as large a proportion of

their debts as maybe; and that a man may not goon wantonly wasting his

substance, and then claim the benefit of the statutes, when he has nothing left

to distribute.

To learn what the particular acts of bankruptcy are, which render a man a

bankrupt, we must consult the several statutes, and the resolutions formed

by the courts thereon. *Among these may therefore be reckoned: r ^. ~~ -,

1. Departing from the realm, whereby a man withdraws himself from the I- -"

jurisdiction and coercion of the law, with intent to defraud his creditors. (2)

2. Departing from his own house, with intent to secrete himself, and avoid his

creditors, (a) 3. Keeping in his own house, privately, so as not to be seen or

spoken with by his creditors, except for just and necessary cause; which is like-
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wise construed" to be an intention to defraud his creditors, by avoiding the pro-

cess of the law. (b) 4. Procuring or suffering himself willingly to be arrested, or

outlawed, or imprisoned, without just and lawful cause; which is likewise

deemed an attempt to defraud his creditors, (c) 5. Procuring his money, goods,

chattels, and effects, to be attached or sequestered by any legal process; which

is another plain and direct endeavour to disappoint his creditors of their

security, (d) 6. Making any fraudulent conveyance to a friend, or secret trustee

of his lands, tenements, goods or chattels; which is an act of the same suspicions

nature with the last, (e) 7. Procuring any protection, not being himself privi-

leged by parliament, in order to screen his person from arrests; which also is an

endeavour to elude the justice of the law. (f) 8. Endeavouring or desiring,

by any petition to the king, or bill exhibited in any of the king's courts against

any creditors, to compel them to take less than their just debts; or to procras-

tinate the time of payment originally contracted for; which are an acknowledg-

ment of either his poverty or his knavery. (#) 9. Lying in prison for two

months or more, upon arrest or other detention for debt, without finding bail

(*) Slat 13 Eliz. c. 7. (a) Ibid. 1 Jac. I, c. 15. (b) Stat. 13 KHz. c. 7. (c) Ibid. \ Jac. I, o. 15.

(d) Stat. 1 Joe. I, c. 15. («) Ibid. (/) Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 19. (g) Ibid.

1. Departing from the state, territory or district of which the person is an inhabitant, with

bankrupt is "a trader, who secretes himself, or does certain other acts, tending
to defrnud his creditors." We have hitherto been employed in explaining the
former part of this description, "a trnder ;" let me now attend to the latter,
"who secretes himself, or does certain other acts tending to defraud his creditors." And, in general, whenever such a trader, as is before described, hath
endeavoured to avoid his creditors, or evade their jnst demands, this hath been
declared by the legisl:i.turc to be an act of bankruptcy, upon which a commis~
sion may be sued out. For, in this extrajudicial method of proceeding, which is
allowed merely for the benefit of commerce, the law is extremely watchful to
detect a man whose circumstances are declining, in the first instance, or at
le1l8t as e.arly as possible; that the creditors may receive as large a proportion of
their debts as may be; and that a man muy not go on wantonly wasting his
substance, and then claim the benefit of the statutes, when he ha.s nothing left
to distribute.
To learn what the particular acts of b1.mkrnptcy are, which render a man a
bankrupt, we must consult the several statutes, and the resolutions formed
by the courts thereon. *Among these may therefore be reckoned: .[ • 4 8 ]
7
1. Departing from the realm, whereby a man wit.hdraws himself from the
jurisdiction and coercion of the law, with intent to defraud his creditors. (z)
.2. Departing from his own house, with intent to secrete himself, and avoid hie
creditors. (a) 3. Keeping in his own house, privately, so as not to be seen or
spoken with by his creditors, except for just and necessary cause; which is likewise construed t.o be an intention to defraud his creditors, by avoiding the f.rocess of the law. (b) 4. Procuring or suffering himself willingly to be arrestee, or
outlawed, or imprisoned, without just and lawful cause; which is likewise
deemed an attempt to defraud his creditors. (c) 5. Procuring his money, goods,
chattels, and effects, to be attached or sequestered by any legal process; which
is another plain and direct endea..-our to disappoint his creditors of their
security. (d) 6. Making any fraudulent conveyance to a friend, or secret trustee
of his lands, tenements, goods or chattels; which is an act of the same suspicious
nature with the last. (e) 7. Procuring any protection, not being himself privileged by parliament, in order to screen his person from arrests; which also is an
endeavour to elude the justice of the law.(/) 8. Endeavouring or desiring,
by any petition to the king, or bill exhibited m any of the king's courts against
any cr<.>ditors, to compel them to tnke less than their just debts; or to procmstinate the time of ;payment originally contracted for; which are an acknowledgment of either his poverty or his knavery. ( ,q) 9. Lying in prison for two
months or more, upon arrest or other detention for debt, without finding bail

intent to defrand his creditors:

2. Remaining absent when abroad with the like intent:

(.11) Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 7.
(d) Stat. 1 Jrui. I, c. 16.

(a) Ibid.

1 Jae. I, c. 111.

(e) I bid.

(bl Stat. 18 Eliz. c. 7.

(f) Stat. 21 Jae, I, c. 19.

(cl Ibtd. 1 Jae. I, o. 111.
(g) I bid.

3. Concealing himself to avoid the service of legal process for the recovery of any debt

provable under the act:

4. Concealing or removing property to avoid legal process :

6. Making an assignment, gift, sale, conveyance or transfer of his estate, property, rights or

credits, with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors:

6. Being under arrest for a period of seven days on an execution upon a debt provable

under the act, and for more than one hundred dollars:

7. Being actually imprisoned for more than seven days in a civil suit founded on contract,

for one hundred dollars or upwards:

8. Making any payment, gift, grant, sale, conveyance or transfer of money or other prop-

erty, estate, rights or credits, or giving any warrant to confess judgment, or procuring or suffer-

ing his property to be taken on legal process, while bankrupt or insolvent, or in contemplation

of bankruptcy or insolvency, with intent to give a preference to one or more of his creditors,

or to persons liable for him as sureties or otherwise, or with intent, by such disposition of

his property, to defeat or delay the operation of the act:

9. A banker, broker, merchant, trader, manufacturer or miner fraudulently stopping or sus-

pending, and not resuming payment of his commercial paper within a period of fourteen days.
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in order to obtain his liberty, (k) For the inability to procure bail, argues a

strong deficiency in his credit, owing either to his suspected poverty, or ill

character; and his neglect to do it, if able, can arise only from a fraudulent

intention; in either of which cases, it is high time for his creditors to look to

F *479 1 t^f mse^ve8' *an<i compel a distribution of his effects. 10. Escaping from

"• -1 prison after an arrest for a just debt of 1001. or upwards, (t) For, no man

would break prison, that was able and desirous to procure bail; which brings

it within the reason of the last case. 11. Neglecting to make satisfaction for

any just debt to the amount of 100?. within two months after service of legal

process for such debt, upon any trader having privilege of parliament, (k)

These are the several acts of bankruptcy, expressly denned by the statutes

relating to this title: which being so numerous, and the whole law of bank-

rupts being an innovation on the common law, our courts of justice have been

tender of extending or multiplying acts of bankruptcy by any construction or

implication. And, therefore, Sir John Holt held, (I) that a man's removing his

goods privately to prevent their being seized in execution, was no act of bank-

ruptcy. For, the statutes mention only fraudulent gifts to third persons, and

procuring them to be seized by sham process in order to defraud creditors: but

this, though a palpable fraud, yet falling within neither of those cases, cannot

be adjudged an act of bankruptcy. So, also, it has been determined expressly,

that a banker's stopping or refusing payment is no act of bankruptcy; for it is

not within the description of any of the statutes, and there may be good rea-
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sons for his so doing, as suspicion of forgery, and the like: and if, in conse-

quence of such refusal, he is arrested, and puts in bail, still it is no act of

bankruptcy: (m) but, if he goes to prison, and lies there two months, then, and

not before, he is become a bankrupt

We have seen who may be a bankrupt, and what acts will make him so: let

us next consider,

3. The proceedings on a commission of bankrupt; so far as they affect the

F *4801 Dankrupt himself. And these depend entirely *on the several statutes

' •" of bankruptcy; all which I shall endeavour to blend together, and

digest into a concise, methodical order.

And, first, there must be a petition to the lord chancellor by one creditor to

the amount of 1001. or by two to the amount of 1501., or by three or more to

the amount of 2001., (5) which debt must be proved by affidavit: (n) upon

which he grants a commission to such discreet persons as to him shall seem

good, who are then styled commissioners of bankrupt (o) The petitioners, to

prevent malicious applications, must be bound in a security of 200?. to make

the party amends in case they do not prove him a bankrupt And if, on the

other hand, they receive any money or effects from the bankrupt, as a recom-

pense for suing out the commission, so as to receive more than their ratable

dividends of the bankrupt's estate, they forfeit not only what they shall have so

received, but their whole debt. These provisions are made, as well to secure

persons in good credit from being damnified by malicious petitions, as to pre-

vent knavish combinations between the creditors and bankrupt, in order to

obtain the benefit of a commission. When the commission is awarded and

issued, the commissioners are to meet, at their own expense, and to take an

oath for the due execution of their commission, and to be allowed a sum not

exceeding 20s. per diem each, at every sitting. And no commission of bank-

rupt shall abate, or be void, upon any demise of the crown. (p)

When the commissioners have received their commission, they are first to

receive proof of the person's being a trader, and having committed some act

of bankruptcy; and then to declare him a bankrupt, if proved so; and to give

notice thereof in the Gazette, and at the same time to appoint three meetings.

At one of these meetings an election must be made of assignees, or persons to

•whom the bankrupt's estate shall be assigned, and in whom it shall be vested

(ft) IMd. ({) IMd. (tl Stflt. 4 Geo. m, c. 83. (I) T-onl Hnyni. 72S. (m) 7 Mod. 1S9.

(n) .st:ii. 5 Goo. II, o.;;«. (o) 3 .suit. 13 £liz. c. 7. (pj Stut. 5 CUD. II, c. 30.
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in order to obtain his liberty. (h) For the inability to procure bail, argues a
strong deficiency in his credit, owing either to his suspected povertv, or ill
character; and his neglect to do it, if able, can arise only from a. fraudulent
intention; in either of which cases, it is hi~h time for his creditors to look to
[ .., 479 ] themselves, "'and compel a distribution of his effect& 10. Escaping from
prison after an arrest for a just debt of lOOl. or upwards. (i) For, no man
would break prison, that was able and desirous to procure bail; whieh brings
it within the reason of the last case. 11. Neglecting to make satisfaction for
any just dE>bt to the amount of 100{. within two months after sen·ice of legal
process for such debt, upon any trader having privilege of parliament. (k)
These are the several acts of bankruptcy, expre88ly defined by the statutes
relating to this title: which being so numerous, and the whole law of bankrupts being an innovation on the common law, our courts of justice have been
tender of extending or multiplying acts of bankruptcy bv any construction or
implication. And, therefore, Sir John Holt held, (l) that man's removing his
goods privately to prevent their being seized in execution~ w11.s no act of bankruptcy. For, the statutes mention only fraudulent gifts to third persons, and
procuring them to be seized by sham proC(!SS in order to defraud creditors: but
this, though a palpable fraud, yet falling within neither of those cases, cannot
be adjudged an act of bankruptcy. So, also, it has been determined expressly,
that a banker's stopping or refusmg payment is no act of bankruptcy; for it 1s
not within the description of any of the statutes, and there may be ~ood reasons for his so doing, as suspicion of forgery, and the like: and if, m consequence of such refusal, he is arrested, and puts in bail, still it is no act of
bankruptcy: {m) but, if he goes to prison, and lies there two months, then, &nd
not before, he is become a bankrupt.
We have seen wlio may be a bankrupt, and what ads will make him so: let
us next consider,
3. 'rhe proceedings on a commission of bankrupt; so far as they affect the
[ ,..480 ] bankrupt himself. And these depend entirely "'on the several statutes
of bankruptcy; all which I shall endeavour to blend together, and
digest int-0 a concise, methodical order.
And, first, there must be a petition to the lord chancellor by one creditor to
the amount of lOOl. or by two to the amount of 150l., or by three or more to
the amount of 200l., (5) which debt must be proved by affidavit: (n) upon
which he grants a commission to such discreet persons as to him shall seem
good, who are then styled commissioners of bankrupt. (o) The petitioners, to
prevent malicious applications, must be bound in a security of 200l. to make
the party amends in case they do not prove him a bankrupt. Aud if, on the
other hand, they receive any money or effects from the bankrupt, as a recompense for suing out the commission, so as to receive more than their rntahle
dividends of the bankrupt's estate, they forfeit not only what they shall have so
received, but their whole debt. Thet1e provisions are made, as well to secure
persons in good credit from being damnified by malicious petitions, as to prevent knavish combinations between the creditors and bankrupt, in order to
obtain the benefit of a commission. When the commission is awarded and
issued, the commissioners are to meet, at their own expense, and t.o take an
oath for the due execution of their commission, and to be allowed a sum not
exceeding 20s. por diem each, at every sitting. And no commission of bankrupt shall abate, or be void, upon any demise of the crown. (p)
When the commissioners have received their commission, they are first to
receive proof of the person's being a trader, and having committed some act
of bankruptcy; and then to declare him a bankrupt, if prowd so; and to give
notice thereof in the Gazette, and at the same time to appoint three meetings.
At one of these meetings an election must be made of assignees, or persons to
whom the bankrupt's estate shall be assigned, and in whom it shull be vcstoo

a

(h) Ibid.

(!l Ibid.

(n) Stat. Ii Geo. II, o. 30.

(kl Stat. 4 Geo. ill, c. 8.1.
(o) 3 SI.at. 13 Eliz. o. 7.

(l) J,orcl Rnym. 7~.
(Pl Stat. Ii Geo. 11, c. 30.

(m) 7 :Uod. 139.
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for the benefit of the creditors; which assignees are to be chosen by the major

*part, in value, of the creditors who shall then have proved their debts: r

but may be originally appointed by the commissioners, and afterwards

approved or rejected by the creditors: but no creditor shall be admitted to vote

in the choice of assignees, whose debt on the balance of accounts does not

amount to 10Z. And at the third meeting, at farthest, which must be on the

forty-second day after the advertisement in the gazette (unless the time be

enlarged by the lord chancellor), the bankrupt, upon notice also personally

served upon him, or left at his usual place of abode, must surrender himself

personally to the commissioners: which surrender (if voluntary) protects him

from all arrests till his final examination is past: and he must thenceforth in

all respects conform to the directions of the statutes of bankruptcy; or, in default

of either surrender or conformity, shall be guilty of felony without benefit of

clergy, and shall suffer death, and his goods and estate shall be distributed among

his creditors, (q) (5)

In case the bankrupt absconds, or is likely to run away, between the time of

the commission issued, and the last day of surrender, he may by warrant from

any judge or justice of the peace be apprehended and committed to the county

gaol, in order to be forthcoming to the commissioners; who are also empowered

immediately to grant a warrant for seizing his goods and papers, (r)

When the bankrupt appears, the commissioners are to examine him touching

all matters relating to his trade and effects. (6) They may also summon before
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them and examine the bankrupt's wife, (*) and any other person whatsoever, as

to all matters relating to the bankrupt's affairs. And in case any of them shall

refuse to answer, or shall not answer fully to any lawful question, or shall refuse

to subscribe such their examination, the commissioners may commit them to

prison without bail, till they submit themselves and make and sign a full answer;

the commissioners specifying in their warrant of commitment the question so

refused to be answered. And any gaoler permitting such person to escape or go

out of prison shall forfeit 500/. to the creditors, (t)

*The bankrupt, upon this examination, is bound, upon pain of death, r *Aon -i

(7) to make a full discovery of all his estate and effects, as well in expec- *• J

tancy as possession, and how he has disposed of the same; together with all books

and writings relating thereto: and is to deliver up all in his own power to the

commissioners (except the necessary apparel of himself, his wife, and his children);

or, in case he conceals or embezzles any effects to the amount of 201., or with-

holds any books or writings, with intent to defraud his creditors, he shall be

guilty of felony without benefit of clergy; and his goods and estates shall

(?) Stst. 5 Goo. II, o. 30. (r) Stat. 6 Gco. II, c. 80.

(j) Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. in. (() Stat. S Goo. II, o. 80.

(5) The acts for which a bankrupt is criminally punishable under the act of congress of

March 2, 1867, are the secreting or concealing property belonging to his estate; concealing,

destroying, altering, Ac., books, papers, <tc., with fraudulent intent; making gift*, payments.

<tc., with the like intent; spending any part of his estate in gaming; fraudulent omission of

property from the schedule; failing to disclose knowledge of fraudulent claims against the

estate; attempting to account for any of his property by fictitious losses or expenses; obtain-

ing fraudulent credit within three months before commencement of the proceedings, and wilh

intent to defraud creditors; making disposition of property bought on credit and not paid fur,

otherwise than by bona fide transactions in the ordinary way of his trade, within three months

before the commencement of proceedings. Sec. 44. The maximum punishment that may be

inflicted is three month's imprisonment with or without hard labor.

(6) [A creditor attending to prove his debt before the commissioners, or a solicitor attend-

ing a bankrupt petition, is entitled to the same privilege of exemption from arrest, not only

whilst in actual attendance before the court, but euiulo et rcdcundo, bona fide, therefrom. List's

Case, 2 Ves. and Bea. 374 ; Ex parts Bryant, 1 Mad. 49; Gasooygne's Case, 14 Ves. 183; Castle's

Case, 16 id. 412. And any person attending under a summons of the commissioners will be

equally protected, Ex parts King, 7 Yes. 312, both from arrest and subsequent detainers lodged

against him. Sidgior v. Birch, 9 Yes. 69.]

(7) Under the act of congress of March 2, 1867, the bankrupt who neglects or refuses to obey

any order of the court is punishable as for contempt of court. Sec. 26. The barbarous punish-

ments mentioned in the text were long since abolished in England.
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be divided among his creditors, (u) And unless it shall appear that his ina-

bility to pay his debts arose from some casual loss, he may, upon conviction, by

indictment, of such gross misconduct and negligence, be set upon the pillory for

two hours, and have one of his ears nailed to the same and cut off. (v)

After the time allowed to the bankrupt for such discoveiy is expired, any

other person voluntarily discovering any part of his estate, before unknown to

the assignees, shall bo entitled to Jive per cent out of the effects so discovered,

and such farther reward as the assignees and commissioners shall think proper.

And any trustee wilfully concealing the estate of any bankrupt, after the expira-

tion of the two and forty days, shall forfeit 100Z., and double the value of the

estate concealed, to the creditors, (w)

Hitherto, every thing is in favour of the creditors; and the law seems to be

pretty rigid and severe against the bankrupt; but, in case he proves honest, it

makes him full amends for all this rigour and severity. For, if the bankrupt

hath made an ingenuous discovery (of the truth and sufficiency of which there

remains no reason to doubt), and hath conformed in all points to the directions

of the law; and if, in consequence thereof, the creditors, or four parts in five of

them in number and value (but none of them creditors for less than 201), will

sigu a certificate to that purport, the commissioners are then to authenticate

such certificate under their hands and seals, and to transmit it to the Lord

Chancellor; and he, or two of the judges whom he shall appoint, on oath

\ *483 1 *ma<^e by the bankrupt, that such certificate was obtained without
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"• -I fraud, may allow the same; or disallow it, upon cause shown by any

of the creditors of the bankrupt, (x) (8)

If no cause be shown to the contrary, the certificate is allowed of course; and

then the bankrupt is entitled to a decent and reasonable allowance out of his

effects, for his future support and maintenance, and to put him in a way of

honest industry. This allowance is also in proportion to his former good

behaviour, in the early discovery of the decline of his affairs, and thereby giving

his creditors a larger dividend. For, if his effects will not pay one-half of his

debts, or ten shillings in. the pound, he is left to the discretion of the commis-

sioners and assignees, to have a competent sum allowed him, not exceeding

three per cent; but if they pay ten shillings in the pound, he is to be allowed

five per cent; if twelve shillings and six-pence, then seven and a half per cent;

and if fifteen shillings in the pound, then the bankrupt shall be allowed ten per

cent; provided that such allowance do not, in the first case, exceed 200?., in the

second, 250?., and in the third, 3001. (y) (9)

(u) Stat. 5 (i<'n. l r, o. 30. By the laws of Naples, all fraudulent bankrnpta, particularly anon as do not

surrender themselves within four days, are punished with death : also all who eonce-il the effects of a

bankrupt or set up a pretended del>t to defraud his creditors. (Mod. I In. Mist, xxviii, 310.)

(i-1 Stat. 21. Jac. I, c. 19. (to) Stnt. 5 Geo. II, c. 30. (x) Stut. 5 Geo. II, c. 30.

(y) Stat. 5 Geo. U. c. 30. Bv the Roman law ofcession,lf the debtor acquired any considerable property

subsequent to the Riving up o'fhU all, it was liable to the demands of his creditors. "(/•>'. 42,3.4.) liut this

diil not extood to such allowance ;is was left to him on the scon; of compassion foi the maintenance of himself

anil family. .Si '/'"'•' mUericordiee cnuxi • ! fun-it relictttm, puta menstruum ml annum, nlimentortm nnminf,

non oportet propter hoc bona $us itenxto venundart i neoenimfraudanduaestalimentis cottitlitinu. (Ibid.l-G.)

(8) No such certificate from creditors is required under the act of congress, to entitle the

bankrupt to his discharge; but it ia granted, as a matter of coarse, unless he has been guilty

of some act forbidden by the statute, or of some fraud upon creditors, or lost property by

gaming, or suffered waste or destruction to his estate, &••(•.. But in cases commenced a year

after the act went into operation, no discharge is granted, unless the assets pay fifty por cent

of the debts, or a majority in number and value of the creditors assent; and m cases of second

bankruptcy no discharge is granted, unless the assets pay seventy per cent, or unless three-fourths

in value of the creditors absent, or unless the debts owing at the time of the previous bankruptcy

have been paid or released. Sees. 29 and 30.

(9) The act of congress of March '2. 1867, saves to the bankrupt his necessarv household

furniture, and other articles designated by the assignee, with reference to the family, condition

and circumstances of the bankrupt, not exceeding m valne $500, the wearing apparel of him-

self and family, the uniform, arms or equipments of any one who is or has been a soldier in

the militia or army, and any other property that is or may be exempt from levy by the laws of

the United States, or as would be exempt by the laws of the state in force in the year 1864.

And all such exempt property is excepted from the operation of the assignment which U mode by

the court, or by the register i u bankruptcy, of the bankrupt's effects. Sec. 14.
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Beside this allowance, he has also an indemnity granted him, of being free

and discharged forever from all debts owing by him at the time he became a

bankrupt; even though judgment shall have been obtained against him, and he

lies in prison upon execution for such debts; and for that, among other pur-

poses, all proceedings on commissions of bankrupt are, on petition, to be entered

of record, as a perpetual bar against actions to be commenced on this account:

though, in general, the production of the certificate, properly allowed, shall be

sufficient evidence of all previous proceedings, (z) Thus, ""the bankrupt r *AQA n

becomes a clear man again: and, by the assistance of his allowance and •• ' '

his own industry, may become a useful member of the commonwealth; which

is the rather to be expected, as he cannot be entitled to these benefits, unless

his failures have been owing to misfortunes, rather than to misconduct and

extravagance.

For no allowance or idemnity shall be given to a bankrupt, unless his cer-

tificate be signed and allowed, as before mentioned; and also, if any creditor

produces a fictitious debt, and the bankrupt does not make discovery of it, but

suffers the fair creditors to be imposed upon, he loses all title to these advan-

tages, (a) Neither can he claim them if he has given with any of his children

above 100?. for a marriage portion, unless he had at that time sufficient left to

pay all his debts; or if he has lost at any one time 51., or in the whole, 1QQI.,

within a twelvemonth before he became bankrupt, by any manner of gaming or

wagering whatsoever: or within the same time has lost the value of 1002. by

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577102
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

stock-jobbing. (10) Also to prevent the too common practice of frequent and

fraudulent or careless breaking, a mark is set upon such as have been once

cleared by a commission of bankrupt, or have compounded with their creditors,

or have been delivered by an act of insolvency: which is an occasional act, fre-

(z) Stal. 5. Geo. II, c. 30. la) Stat. 24 Geo. H, o. 57.

(10) The act of congress of March 2, 18(57, 8. 29, provides that " No discharge shall be

Beside this allowance, he has also an indemnity granted him, of being free
aml discharged forever from all debtg owing by him at the time he became a
bankrupt; even though judgment shall ha,·e been obtained against him, and he
lies in prison npon execution for such debts; and for that, among other purposes, all proceedings on commissions of bankrupt are, on petition, to be entered
of record, as a perpetual bar against actions to be commenced on this account:
thou~h, in general, the production of' the certificate, properly allowed, shall be
sufficient evidence of all previous proceedings. (z) Thus, ,.the bankrupt [ *484 ]
becomes a clear man again: and, by the assistance of his allowance and
his own industry, may become a useful member of the commonwealth; which
is the rather to be expected, as he cannot be entitled to these benefits, unless
bis failures have been owing to misfortunes, rather than to misconduct and
extravagance.
For no allowance or idemnity shall be given to a bankrupt, unless his certificate be signed and allowed, as before mentioned; and also, if any creditor
produces a fictitious debt, and the bankrupt does not make discovery of it, but
suffers the fair creditors to be imposed upon, he loses all title to these advantages. (a) Neither can he claim them if he has given with any of his children
aboYe lOOl. for a marria~e portion, unless he had at that time sufficient left to
pay all his debts; or if he has lost at any one time 5l., or in the whole, lOOl.,
within a twelvemonth before he became bankrupt, by any manner of gaming or
wagering whatsoever: or within the same time has lost the value of lOOl. by
stock-jobbing. (10) Also to prevent the too common practice of frequent and
fraudulent or careless breaking, a mark is set upon such as have been once
cleared by a commission of bankn1pt, or have compounded with their creditors,
or have been delivered by an act of insolvency: which is an occasional act, fre-

granted, or, if granted, shall be valid, if the bankrupt has willfully sworn falsely in his affidavit

(.z)

annexed to his petition, schedule or inventory, or upon any examination in the course of the

Stal Ii. Geo. ll, o. 00.

la) Stat. 24. Geo. II, o .. 117.

proceedings in bankruptcy, in relation to any material fact concerning his estate or his debts,

or to any other material fact; or if he has concealed any part of his estate or effects, or any

books or writings relating thereto, or if he has been guilty of any fraud or negligence in the

care, custody or delivery to the assignee of the property belonging to him at the time of the

presentation of his petition and inventory, excepting such property aa ho is permitted to retain

under the provisions of this act, or if he has caused, permitted or suffered any loss, waste or

destruction thereof; or if, within four months before the commencement of such proceedings,

he has procured his lands, goods, moneys or chattels to be attached, sequestered or seized on

execution; or if, since the passage of this act, he has destroyed, mutilated, altered or falsified

any of his books, documents, papers, writings or securities, or has made or been privy to the

making of any false or fraudulent entry in any book of account or other document, with intent

to defraud his creditors; or ban removed, or caused to be removed, any part of his property

from the district, with intent to defraud his creditors; or if he has given any fraudulent prefer-

ence contrary to the provisions of this act, or made any fraudulent payment, gift, transfer,

conveyance or assignment of any part of his property, or has lost any part thereof in gaming,

or has admitted a false or fictitious debt against his estate, or if, baring knowledge that any

person has proved such false or fictitious debt, ho has not disclosed the same to his assignee

within one month after suoh knowledge; or if, being a merchant or tradesman, he has not,

Bubsequentlv to the passage of this act, kept proper books of account; or if he, or any person

in his Dehalf, has procured the assent of any creditor to the discharge, or influenced the actiou

of any creditor at any stage of the proceedings by any pecuniary consideration or obligation;

or if he has, in contemplation of becoming bankrupt, made any pledge, payment, transfer,

assignment or conveyance of any part of his property, directly or indirectly, absolutely or con-

ditionally, for the purpose of preferring any creditor or person having a claim against him or who

is or may be under liability for him, or for the purpose of preventing the property from coming

into the hands of the assignee, or of being distributed under this act in satisfaction of his debts;

or if he has been convicted of any misdemeanor under this act, or has been guilty of auy fraud

whatever, contrary to the true intent of this act: and before any discharge is granted, the bank-

rupt shall take and subscribe an oath to the effect that he has not done, suffered, or been privy

to, any act, matter or thing specified in this act as a ground for withholding such discharge, or as

invalidating such discharge it granted."

(10) The act or congre88 of March 2, 1867, s. 29, provides that "No discho.rge shall be
granted, or, if granted, shall be valid, if the bankrupt has willfully swom falsely ill his affidavit
annexed to his petition, i;chedule or inventory, or upon any examination in the course of the
proceedings in llankrnptcy, in relation to auy material fact coneerning his estate or hiR debts,
or to any other material fact; or if he has concealed any part. of his estate or effect.;, or any
books or writingH relating thereto, or if he has been guilty of any fmud or ne~ligence in the
co.re, custody or delivery to the e.."signce of the property ooloniring to him at the time of the
presentation of his petition and inventory, exrepting such property a.~ he is permitted to retain
under the provisions of this act, or if he ha.~ cauHed, permitted or suffered any Joss, waste or
destruction thereof; or if, within four months bel.ore the commencement of Huch. proceedings,
be hM pnicured his lands, good11, mouey9 or chattuls to be attached, sequestered or seized ou
execution; or if, since the passage of this act, hti has destroyed, mutilated, e.ltered or falsified
a.ny of his books, documents, papers, writingl:I or l:lecurities, or has made or been privy to the
making of any false or fraudulent entry in any book of account or other document, with intent
to defraud his creditors; or hllol! removed, or caused to be removed, any part of his property
from the dil<trict, with intent to defraud hi11 creditors; or if he has given any fraudulent preference contrary to the p.rovisions of thi;i act, or made any fraudulent payment, gift, tmn~for,
convej.-o.nce or &.'!8ignment of anr part of biB ;>roperty, or has lost any part thereof in gaming,
or has admitted a false or fictitwu~ debt agamst his estate, or if, haring knowledge thnt auy
pcn;on hail pro'red such false or fictitiouti debt, ho hi\.'< not disclosed the t<ame to his e..<;11ignee
withir.. one month after such knowledge ; or if, being a merchant or tradesman, he has not,
sub"6q_uentlv to the pat'SllgC of this act, kt•pt proper books of account; or if he, or o.ny person
in his behalt has procured the llilseut of any crcditur to the discharge, or influenced the action
of any creditor at any stage of the proceedin~ by auy pecuniary con8ideration or obligation;
or if he has, in contomplation of becoming bankrupt, made any pledge, payment. tranllfer,
a...mgnment or conveyance of a.ny part of his property, directly or indirectly, absolutely or conditionally, for the purpoHe of preferring any creditor or person having a claim against him or who
!s or may be under Iiab~ty for him, or. for ~he_ purpose uf prt;vcntinl$ the vr~ipe_rty froD;l coming
mto the hands of the Rili>ijlnee, or of bomg rlistnbuted under this act m satislact10n of his debts;
or if he hllil been convicted of any milidemeauor under tbi;i act, or bas been guilty of any fraud
whn.tel'er, contrary to tho true intent of this act: and b!lfore any discharge i11 gmutecl, the bank·
rnpt ;ihall take and 11u.llscribe an outh to the effect that he has not done, imffcred, or been pri'ry
to, anr act, U1atter or thing ~peciticd in thll! act a..~ a ground for withholding such tlischurge, or as
in\"aliilating ~uch ditlebargc if granted."
.A~ to imveaching tht.i 1fo1cbo.rge, soe the treatIBe of Avery and Hobbs, and of Gazze.m on the
Daukrupt Law, and the digest of C&.li6s in bankruptcy in American Law Review.

As to impeaching the discharge, see the treatise of Avery and Hobbs, and of Gazzam on the
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Bankrupt Law, and the digest of cases in bankruptcy in American Law He view.
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qnently passed by the legislature: whereby all persons whatsoever, who are

either in too low a way of dealing to become bankrupts, or, not being in a

mercantile state of life, are not included within the laws of bankruptcy, are

discharged from all suits and imprisonment, upon delivering up all their estate

and effects to their creditors upon oath, at the sessions or assizes; in which

case their perjury or fraud is usually, as in case of bankrupts, punished with,

death. Persons who have been once cleared by any of these methods, and after-

r *,g5 -i wards become bankrupts again, unless they pay full *fifteen shillings

"- J in the pound, are only thereby indemnified as to'the confinement of their

bodies ; but any future estate they shall acquire remains liable to their creditors,

excepting their necessary apparel, household goods, and the tools and imple-

ments of their trades, (b)

Thus much for the proceedings on a commission of bankrupt, so far as they

affect a bankrupt himself personally. Let us next consider,

4. How such proceedings affect or transfer the estate and property of the

bankrupt The method whereby a real estate, in lands, tenements, and heredita-

ments, may be transferred by bankruptcy, was shown under its proper head in a

former chapter, (c) At present, therefore, we are only to consider the transfer

of things personal by this operation of law.

By virtue of the statutes before mentioned, (d) all the personal estate and

effects of the bankrupt are considered as vested by the act of bankruptcy, in

the future assignees of his commissioners, whether they be goods in actual
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possession, or debts, contracts, and other choses in action: and the commissioners

"by their warrant may cause any house or tenement of the bankrupt to be broke

open, in order to enter upon and seize the same. And when the assignees are

chosen or approved by the creditors, the commissioners are to assign every thing

over to them; and the property of every part of the estate is thereby as fully

vested in them, as it was in the bankrupt himself, and they have the same reme-

dies to recover it. (e)

The property vested in the assignees is the whole that the bankrupt had in

himself, at the time he committed the first act of bankruptcy, or that has been

vested in him since, before his debts are satisfied or agreed for. Therefore, it is

usually said, that once a bankrupt, and always a bankrupt; by which is meant,

F *4861 ^na^ a plftin> direct act of bankruptcy once ""committed cannot be purged,

<- J or explained away by any subsequent conduct, as a dubious equivocal act

may be; (/) but that, if a commission is afterwards awarded, the commission

and the property of the assignees shall have a relation, or reference, back to the

first and original act of bankruptcy, (g) Insomuch that all transactions of the

bankrupt are from that time absolutely null and void, either with regard to

the alienation of his property, or the receipt of his debts from such as are privy

to his bankruptcy ; for they are no longer nis property, or his debts, but those

of the future assignees. And if an execution be sued out, but not served and

executed on the bankrupt's effects, till after the act of bankruptcy, it is void as

against the assignees. But the king is not bound by this fictitious relation, nor

is within the statutes of bankrupts; (h) for if, after the act of bankruptcy

committed, and before the assignment of his effects, an extent issues for the

debt of the crown, the goods are bound thereby, (i) In France, this doctrine

of relation is carried to a very great length; for there, every act of a merchant,

for ten days precedent to the act of bankruptcy, is presumed to be fraudulent,

and is therefore void, (k) But with us the law stands upon a more reasonable

footing: for as rhese acts of bankruptcy may sometimes be secret to all but a

few, and it would be prejudicial to trade to carry this notion to its utmost

length, it is provided by statute 19 Geo. II, c. 32, that no money paid by a bank-

rupt to a bona fide or real creditor, in a course of trade, even after an act of

bankruptcy done, shall be liable to be refunded. Nor, by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 15,

shall any debtor of a bankrupt, that pays him his debt, without knowing of hia

(i) 8t*t. 5 Geo. II o. 90. («) Page 28S. (d) suit. 1 Jao. I, c. IS. li Jac. I, c. 19.

(e) 12 Mod. 324. (0 Sulk. 110. (g) 4 Burr. 32. (A) 1 Atk. 2138.

(<) Vlner Abr. tit. Creditor $ Bankrupt, 1W. (it) Sp. L. b. 29, o. 16.
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quently passed by the legislature: whereby all persons whatsoever, who are
either in too low a wu.y of dealing to become bankrupts, or, not being in a.
mercantile state of life, are not included within the laws of bankruptcy, are
discharged from all suits and imprisonment, upon delivering up all their estate
and effects to their creditors upon oath, at the sessions or assizes; in which
case their perjury or fraud is usually, as in case of bankrupts, punished with
death. Persons who hu,·e been once cleared by any of these methods, and after[ • 485 ] wards become bankrupts again, unless they pav full *fifte\>n shillings
in the pound, are only thereby indemnified as tO the confinement of their
bodies; but any future estate they shall acquire remains liable to their creditors7
excepting their necessary apparel, household goods, and the tools and implements of their trades. (b)
'l'hus much for the proceedings on a commission of bankrupt, so far as they
affect a bankrupt himself personally. Let us next consider,
4. How such proceedings affect or transfer the estate and property of the
bankrupt. 'l'he method whereby a real estate, in lands, tenements, and hereditaments, may be tnmsferred by bunkruptcy, was shown under its proper head in a.
former chapter. (c) At present, therefore, we are only to consider the transfer
of things personal by this operation of law.
By virtue of the statutes before mentioned, (d) all the personal estate and
effects of the bankrupt are considered as vested by the act of bankruptcy, in
the future assignees of his commissioners, whether they be goods in actual
possession, or debts, con tmcts, and other choses in action : and the commissioners
by their warrant may cause any house or tenement of the bankrupt to be broke
open, in order to enter upon and seize the same. And when the assignees are
chosen or approved by the creditors, the commissioners a.re to assign CY<!ry thing
over to them ; and the property of every pa.rt of" the estate is thereby as fully
vested in them, as it was in the bankrupt himself, and they have the same remedies to recoYer it. (e)
'l'he property vestRd in the assignees is the wliole that the bankrupt had in
himself, at the time he committed the first act of bankruptcy, or that has been
vested in him since, before his debts are satisfied or aO'reed for. Therefore, it is
usually said, that once a bankrupt, and always a ban1krupt; by which is meant,
[ • 486 ] tlrn.t a plain, direct act of bankruptcy once *committed cannot be purged,
or explained away by any subsequent conduct, as a dubious equivocal act
may be; (f) but that, if a commission is afterwards awarded, the commission
and the property of the assignees shall have a relation, or reference, back to the
first and original act of bankruptcy. (g) Insomuch that all transactions of the
bankrupt are from that time absolutely null and void, either with regard to
the alienation of his property, or the receipt of his debts from such as are prh-y
to his bankruptcv; for they are no longer his property, or his debts, but those
of the future assignees. And if an execution be sued out, but not serve<l and
executed on the bankrupt's effects, till after the act of bankru,Ptcy, it is void as
against the assignees. But the king is not bound by this fictitious relation, nor
is within the statutes of bankrupts; (h) for if, after the act of bankruptcy
committed, and before the assignment of his effects, an extent issues for the
debt of the crown, the goods are bound thereby. (i) In France, this doctrine
of relation is carried to a very great length; for there, every act of a merchant,
for ten days precedent to the act of bankruptcy, is presumed to be fmuduleut,
and is therefore void. (k) But with us the law stands upon a more reasonable
footing: for as these acts of bankruptcy may sometimes be secret to all but a
few, and it would be prejudicial to trade to carry this notion to its utmost
length, it is pro..-ided by statute 19 Geo. II, c. 32, that no money paid by a bankrupt to a bona fide or real creditor, in a course of trade, even after an act of
bankruptcv done, shall be liable to be refunded. Nor, by st.atute 1 Jae. I, c. 15,
8h1~ll any debtor of a bankrupt, that pays him his debt, without knowing of his
(b) Stat. 6 Geo. II, o. 90.
(o) Page 263.
(d) Stal 1 Jao. I. c. 111. 111 Jao. I, o. 11.
(e} 12 lllod. :m.
(f) Salk. 110.
(g) 4 Burr. 32.
(Ill I Atk. 2b'll.
(IJ Viner .Abr. tit. Creditor <f Banl.."npl, lOi.

656

Dig ize b

(.l:)

Sp. L. b. 29, o. 16.

Original from

NEW YORK PUBLIC LI BRA RY

Chap. 31.] TITLE BY BANKRUPTCY. 486

Chap. 31.]

486

TITLE BY BANKRUPTCY.

bankruptcy, be liable to account for it again; the intention of this relative

power being only to reach fraudulent transactions, and not to distress the fair

trader. (11)

The assignees may pursue any legal method of recovering thit> property so

Tested in them, by their own authority; but *cannot commence a suit in ,- *. „., -,

equity, nor compound any debts owing to the bankrupt, nor refer any <- •"

matters to arbitration, without the consent of the creditors, or the major part

of them in value, at a meeting to be held in pursuance of notice in the

Gazette. (I) (12)

When they have got in all the effects they can reasonably hope for, and reduced

them to ready money, the assignees must, after four and within twelve months

after the commission issued, give one-and-twenty days' notice to the creditors

of a meeting for a dividend or distribution; at which time they must produce

their accounts, and verify them upon oath, if required. And then the commis-

sioners shall direct a dividend to be made, at so much in the pound, to all

creditors who have before proved, or shall then prove, their debts. This divi-

dend must be made equally, and in a ratable proportion, to all the creditors,

according to the quantity of their debts; no regard being had to the quality

of them. Mortgages, indeed, for which the creditor has a real security in his

own hands, are entirely safe; for the commission of bankrupt reaches only the

equity of redemption, (m) So are also personal debts, where the creditor has a

chattel in his hands, as a pledge or pawn for the payment, or has taken the
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debtor's lands or goods in execution. And, upon the equity of the statute 8

Ann. c, 14 (which directs, that upon all executions of goods being on any premi-

ses demised to a tenant, one year's rent, and no more, shall, if due, be paid to

the landlord), it hath also been held, that, under a commission of bankrupt,

which is in the nature of a statute execution, the landlord shall be allowed his

arrears of rent to the same amount, in preference to other creditors, even

though he hath neglected to distrain, while the goods remained on the premises;

which he is otherwise entitled to do for his entire rent, be the quantum what it

may. (n) But, otherwise judgments and recognizances (both which are debts

of record, and therefore at other times have a priority), and also bonds and

obligations by deed or special instrument (which are called debts by specialty,

and are usually the next *in order), these are all put on a level with r * .^Q -i

debts by mere simple contract, and all paid pari passu. (o) Nay, so far >• -I

is this matter carried, that, by the express provision of the statutes, (p) debts

not due at the time of the dividend made, as bonds or notes of hand payable

at a future day certain, shall be proved and paid equally with the rest, (n) allow-

ing a discount or drawback in proportion. And insurances, and obligations

upon bottomry or respondentia bonafide made by the bankrupt, though forfeited

after the commission is awarded, shall be looked upon in the same light as

debts contracted before any act of bankruptcy, (r) (13)

(I) Stat 5 Geo. H, o. 30. (m) Finch. Rep. 498. (n) I Atk. 103, 104. (o) Stat. SlJuc. I, c. 19.

(p) Slat. 7 Geo. I, c. 3L (gj Lord Bayra. 15(9. Stra. 1211. (r) Stat. 19 Geo. 11. c. 32.

(11) By the act of confess of March 2, 1887, the assignment conveys to the assignee all the

estate of the bankrupt, with his deeds, books and papers relating thereto, and the assignment

relates l>ack to the commencement of the proceedings, but dissolves all attachments of any

of the property made on mesne process within four months previous to the commencement of

bankruptcy, be liable to account for it again; the intention of this relative
power being only to reach fraudulent transactions, and not to distress the fair
trader. (11)
The assignees may pursue any legal method of recovering thib property so
vested in them, by their own authority; but •cannot commence a suit in [ • 487 ]
equUy, nor compound an:y debts owing to the bankrupt, nor refer any
matters to arbitration, without the consent of the creditors, or the major part
of them in value, at a meeting to be held in pursuance of notice in the
Gazette. (l) (12)
When they have got in all the effects they can reasonably hope for, and reduced
them to ready money, the assignees must, after four and within twelve months
after the commission issued, give one-and-twenty days' notice to the creditors
of a meeting for a dividend or distribution; at which time they must produce
their accounts, and verify them upon oath, if required. And then the commissioners shall direct a dividend to be made, at so much in the pound, to all
creditors who have before proved, or shall then prove, their debts. This dividend must be made equally, and in a ratable proportion, to all the creditors,
according to the quantity of their debts; no regard being had to the quality
of them. Mortgages, indeedJ for which the creditor has a real security in his
own hands, are entirely sate; for the commission of bankrupt reaches only the
equity of redemption. (m) So are also personal debts, where the creditor has a
chattel in his hands, a.s a pledge or pawn for the payment, or has taken the
debtor's lands or goods in execution. And, upon the equity of the statute 8
Ann. c. 14 (which directs, that upon all executions of goods being on any premises demised to a tenant, one year's rent, and no more, shall, if due, be paid to
the landlord), it hath also been held, that, under a commission of bankrupt,
which is in the nature of a statute execution, the landlord shall be allowed his
arrears of rent to the same amount, in preference to other creditors, even
though he hath ne~lected to distrain, while the goods remained on the premises;
which he is otherwise entitled to do for his entire rent, be the quantum what it
may. (n) But, otherwise judgments and recognizances (both which are debts
of record, and therefore at other times have a priority), and also bonds and
obligations by deed or spe~ial instrument (which are called debts by specialty,
and are usually the next *m order), these are all put on a level with [ • 488 ]
debts by mere simple contract, and all paid pari passrt. (o) Nay, so far
is this matter carried, that, by the express provision of the statutes, (p) debts
not due at the time of the dindend made, as bonds or notes of hand pavable
at a future day certain, shall be proved and paid equally with the rest., (q) allowing a discount or drawback in proportion. And insurances, and obligations
upon bottomry or respondenUa bona fide made by the bankrupt, though forfeited
after the commission is awarded, shall be looked upon in the same light as
debts contracted before any act of bankruptcy. (r) (13)
(l) Stat. II Geo. II, a. SO.
(p) Stat. 7 Geo. I, e. 31.

(m) Finch. Rep. '68.
(q) Lord Raym. 1M9.

(n) 1 Atk.103, 101.
(oJ Stat. SI Jae. I, o.19.
Stra. 1211.
(r) Stat. a Geo. II, c. 32.

the proceedings. Property conveyed by a debtor, in fraud of creditors, will pass by the assign-

ment Sec. 14.

(12) Under the English statutes authority for these purposes is obtained by the assignee from

the c i m it.. And under the act of congress of 1864 the assignee may submit matters to arbitration

by leave of the court. Sec. 17.

(13) Under the bankruptcy laws of the United States the following demands are pre-

ferred:

1. The fees, costs, Ac., of the proceedings.

2. All demands owing to the United States.

3. All demands owing to the state in which the proceedings are had.

4. Wages due to any operative, clerk or house servant to an amount not exceeding fifty

VOL. I.—83 657

(11) By the act of conjZTes11 of March 2, 1867, the a.ssignment conveys to the assignee all the
estate o( the bankrupt, with his deeds, books and paperd relating thereto, a.nd the e.i1signment
related hack to tho commencement of the proceedings, but dissolves a.11 attachments 'or o.ny
of the property made on mesne process within four months previous to the commencement of
the proceedings. Property con\"eyed by a debtor, in fraud of creditors, will pa.ss by the a.isigument. Sec. 14.
(12) Under the English statutes authority for these purposes is obtained by the a.ssignee from
the court.. And under the act of congreas of 1864 the assignee may submit matters to arbitration
by lea\·e of the court. Sec. 17.
(13) Under the bankruptcy laws of the United States the following demands are preferred:
1. Tbe fees, costs, &o., of the proccedingt1.
2. All demands owing to the United States.
3. All demanlh\ owiug to the state in which the proceediug;i a.re had•
.4. Wages due to any operative, clerk or house servant to an amount not exceeding fift.y
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Within eighteen months after the commission issued, a second and final divi-

dend shall be made, nnless all the effects were exhausted by the first. (>•) And if

any surplus remains, after selling his estates and paying every creditor his full

debt, it shall be restored to the bankrupt, (t) This is a case which sometimes

happens to men in trade, who involuntarily, or at least unwarily, commit acts

of bankruptcy by absconding and the like, while their effects are more than

sufficient to pay their creditors. And, if any suspicious or malevolent creditor

will take the advantage of such acts, and sue out a commission, the bankrupt

has no remedy, but must quietly submit to the effects of his own imprudence;

except that, upon satisfaction made to all the creditors, the commission may be

superseded, (it) This case may also happen, when a knave is desirous of defraud-

ing his creditors, and is compelled by a commission to do them that justice,

which otherwise he wanted to evade. And, therefore, though the usual rule is

that all interest on debts carrying interest shall cease from the time of issuing

the commission, yet, in case of a surplus left after payment of every debt, such

interest shall again, revive, and be chargeable on the bankrupt, («•) or his

representatives.

CHAPTER XXXIL

OF TITLE BY TESTAMENT, AND ADMINISTRATION.

Within eighteen months after the commission issued, a second and fillal di vidend shaH be made, unless all the effects were exhausted by the first. (s) Aud if
any surplus remains, after selling his estates and paying every· creditor his full
debt, it shaH be restored to the bankrupt. ( t) 'l'his is a case which sometimes
happens to men in trade, who involuntarily, or at least unwarily, commit acts
of bankruptcy by absconding and the like, while their effects are more than
sufficient to pay their creditors. And, if any suspicious or malevolent creditor
will take the advantage of such acts, and sue out a commission, tbe bankrupt
ha.s no remedy, but must quietly submit to the effects of his own imprudence;
except that, upon satisfaction made to all the creditors, the commission may be
superseded. (u) This case may also happen, when a knave is desirous of defmuding his creditors, and is compelled by a commission to do them that justice,
which otherwise he wanted to evade. And, therefore, though the usual n1le is
that all interest on debts carrying interest shall cease from the time of issuing
the commission, yet, in case of a surplus left after payment of every debt, such
interest shall again revive, and be chargeable on the bankrupt, {w) or his
representatives.

THERK yet remain to be examined, in the present chapter, two other methods

of acquiring personal estates, viz.: by testament and administration. And

these I propose to consider in one and the same view; they being in their
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nature so connected and blended together, as makes it impossible to treat of

them distinctly, without manifest tautology and repetition.

CHAPTER XXXIL

XI, XII. In the pursuit, then, of this joint-subject, I shall, first, inquire into

the original and antiquity of testaments and administrations; shall, secondly,

show who is capable of making a last will and testament; shall, thirdly, con-

OF TITLE BY TESTAMENT, AND ADMINISTRATION.

sider the nature of a testament and its incidents; shall, fourthly, show what an

executor and administrator are, and how they are to be appointed; and. lastly,

shall select some few of the general heads of the office and duty of executors and

administrators.

First, as to the original of testaments and administrations. We have more

than once observed, that when property came to be vested in individuals by the

right of occupancy, it became necessary for the peace of society, that this occu-

pancy should be continued, not only in the present possessor, but in those per-

sons to whom he should think proper to transfer it; which introduced the

F *4<M) 1 Doctrine and practice of alienations, *gifts and contracts. But these

"- -" precautions would be very short and imperfect, if they were confined to

the life only of the occupier; for then, upon his death, all his goods would

again become common, and create an infinite variety of strife and confusion.

The law of very many societies has therefore given to the proprietor a right of

continuing his property after his death, in such persons as he shall name; and,

in defect of such appointment or nomination, or where no nomination is per-

mitted, the law of every society has directed the goods to be vested in certain

(!) stiit. B Geo. II, c. 30. (t) Stut. 15 Ellz. c. 7. («) 2 Ch. Cas. 141. («•) 1 Atk. 344.

dollars, for labor performed within six months next preceding the first publication of tne notice

of proceedings in bankruptcy.

5. All other debts, which by the laws of the United States are or may oe entitled to priority,

in like manner as if the act hod not pawed. Sec. 28.

Other demands are paid ratably, except that specific liens are not disturbed or divested, unles*

where created in contemplation ot bankruptcy, or in fraud of the law.
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THERE yet remain t.o be examined, in the present chapter, two other methods
of acquiring personal estates, \·iz.: by fo1tam..ent and administration. And
these I propose to consider in one and the same view; they bei11g in their
nature so connected and blended together, as makes it impossible to treat of
them distinctly, without manifest tautology and repetition.
XI, XII. In the pursuit, then, of this joint-subject, I shall, first, inquire into
the original and antiquity of testaments and administrations; shall, secondly,
show who is capable of making a last will and testament; shall, thirdly, consider the nature of a testament and its incidents; shall, fourthly, show what an
executor and administrator are, and how they are to be appointed; and~ lastly,
shall select some few of the general heads of the office and duty of executors and
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First, as to the or(qinal of testaments and administrations. We have more
than once observed, that when property came to be vested in individuals by the
right of occupancy, it became necessary for the peace of society, that this occupancy should be continued, not only in the present possessor, but in those p<>rsons to whom he should think rroper to transfer it; which introduced the
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the life only of the occupier; for then, upon his death, all his goods won Id
again become common, and create an infinite variety of strife and confusion.
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continuing his property after his dccith, in such persons as he shall name; and,
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dollan1, for labor performed within six months next preceding the first pnblication of the notice
of proceedings in bankruptcy.
5. .All other debtR, which by the law" of the United States are or may be entitled to priority,
in like m11nner as if the act had not p8118ed. Sec. 28.
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particular individuals, exclusive of all other persons, (a) The former method

of acquiring personal property, according to the express directions of the deceased,

we call a testament: the latter, which is also according to the will of the

deceased, not expressed, indeed, but presumed by the law, (b) we call in England

an administration; being the same which the civil lawyers term a succession

ab intestato, and which answers to the descent or inheritance of real estates.

Testaments are of very high antiquity. We find them in use among the

ancient Hebrews; though I hardly think the example usually given (c) of Abra-

ham's complaining (d) that, unless he had some children of his body, his steward,

Eliezer of Damascus, would be his heir, is quite conclusive to show that he had

made him so by will. And, indeed a learned writer (e) has adduced this very

passage to prove, that in the patriarchal age, on failure of children, or kindred,

the servants born under their master's roof succeeded to the inheritance as

heirs-at-law. (/) But (to omit what Eusebiusand others have related of Noah's

testament, made in writing and witnessed under his seal, whereby he disposed

of the whole world) (a) I apprehend that a much more authentic instance of the

early use of testaments may be found in the sacred writings, (It) wherein Jacob

bequeaths to his son Joseph a portion of his ""inheritance double to that r n^y^ -i

of his brethren: which will we find carried into execution many him- "• ' '

dred years afterwards, when the posterity of Joseph were divided into two distinct

tribes, those of Ephraim and Manasseh, and had two several inheritances

assigned them ; whereas the descendants of each of the other patriarchs formed
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only one single tribe, and had only one lot of inheritance. Solon was the first legis-

lator that introduced wills into Athens; (i) but in many other parts of Greece

they were totally discouutenaced. (k) In Rome they were unknown till the

laws of the twelve tables were compiled, (1) which first gave the right of

bequeathing: (1) and, among the northern nations, particularly among the Ger-

mans, (/») testaments were not received into use. And this variety may serve

to evince, that the right of making wills and disposing of property after death,

is merely a creature of the civil state; (n) which has permitted it in some coun-

tries and denied it in others: and, even where it is permitted by law, it is sub-

jected to different formalities and restrictions in almost every nation under

heaven, (o)

With us in England, this power of bequeathing is coeval with the first rudi-

ments of the law: for we have no traces or memorials of any time when it did

not exist. Mention is made of intestacy, in the old law before the conquest, as

being merely accidental; and the distribution of the intestate's estate, after pay-

ment of the lord's heriot, is then directed to go according to the established

law. " Sive gtiis incuria, sive morte repentina, fuerit intestatus mortuus, domi-

nus tamen null-am rerum suarum partem (pr&ter earn qua jure debetur Jiereoti

nomine) sibi assumito. Verum posses.iiones uxori, liberis, et cognationsproxi-

mis, pro suo cuique jure, distributanur." (p) But we are not to imagine, that

this power of bequeathing extended originally to all a man's personal estate.

On the contrary, Glanvil will inform us, (q) that by the common law, *as p $400 -i

it stood in the reign of Henry the Second, a man's goods were to be divided >• '

into three equal parts: of which one went to his heirs or lineal descendants,

another to his wife, and the third was at his own disposal: or, if he died without

a wife, he might then dispose of one moiety, and the other went to his children ;

and so e converse, if he had no children, the wife was entitled to one moiety, and

he might bequeath the other; but, if he died without either wife or issue, the

(a) Puff. L. of N. b. 4, c. 10. (\>) IHd. b. 4, c. 11.

(c) llurbeyr. Puff. 4.10, 4. Gortolph. Or|>h. I.CK. i. 1. (d) Gen. c. IB.

(e) Tavlor'g Klein. Civ. Law, 517. (f) Sec page 1!. fg) Selden, <le »nco. Ebr. c. 24.

(h)Uan. e. 48. (*<j Plutarch, in vita Solon, ft) Pott. Anliq. 1. 4, c. 15. flj last. 2, 22, 1.

particular individuals, exclusive of all other persons. (a) The fonner method
of acquiring personal property, according to the express directions of the deceased,
we call a tutament: the latter, which is also accordius: to the will of the
deceased, not expressed, indeed, but presumed by the law, (h) we call in England
an administration; being the same which the ch-il lawyers term a succession
ab itttestato, and which answers to the- descent or inheritance of re11.l estates.
'£estanients are of' very high antiquity. We find them in use among the
ancient Hebrews; though I hardly think the example usually gh-en (c) of Abraham's com£laining (d) that, unless he had some children of his body, his steward,
Eliezer of amascus, would be his heir, is quite conclusive to show that he had
made him so by ioill. And, indeed a learned writer (e) has adduced this very
passage to prove, that in the patriarchal age, on failure of children, or kindrc(l,
the servants born under their master's roof succeeded to the inheritance as
heirs-at-law.(/) But (to omit what Eusebiusand others have related of Noah's
testament, made in writt'.11.g and witnessed under his .Yeal, whereby he disposed
of the whole world) (g) I apprehend that a much more authentic instance of the
early use of testaments may be found in the sacred writings, (It) wherein Jacob
bequeaths to his son Joseph a portion of his *inheritance double to that [ • 491 ]
of his brethren: which will we find carried int-0 execution many hundred years afterwards, when the posterity of Joseph were divided into two distinct
tribes, those of Ephraim and Manasseh, and had two several inheritances
assigned them; whereas the descendants of each of the other patriarchs formed
only one single tribe, and had only one lot of inheritance. Solon was the first legislator that introduced wills into Athens; (i) but in many other parts of Greece
they were totally discountenaced. (k) In Rome they were unknown till the
laws of the twelve tables were compiled, (1) which first gave the right of
bequeathing: (l) and, among the northern nations, particularly among the Germans, (m) testaments were not received into use. And this rnriety may serve
to evince, that the right of making wills and disposing of propert,Y after death,
is merely a creature of the civil state; (n) which ha.s permitted it m some countries and denied it in others: and, even where it is permitted by law, it is subjected to different formalities and restrictions in almost every nation under
heaven. (o)
With us in England, this power of bequeathing is coenl with the first rudiments of the law: for we ha Ye no traces or memorials of any time when it did
not exist. Mention is made of intestacy, in the old law before the conquest, as
being merelv accidental; and the distribution of the intestate's estate, after pavment of the"lord's heriot, is then directed to go according to the establish~d
law. " Si-ve qttis incuri'.a, sive nwrte repenffoa, fuerit intestatus mortuus, dom in us tamen nullam rerum suarum partem (prroter earn qum jure dehetur liereoti
nomine) sibi assumito. Vermn po.'lses.~iones uxori, liber1:s, et cognatione proxirnis, pro suo cuique jure, distributanur." (p) But we are not to imagine, that
this power of begueathing extended originally to all a man's personal estate.
On the contrary, Glanvil will inform us, (q) that by the common law, *as [ ,..4921
it stood in the reign of Henry the Second, a man's goods were to be di\· itled
·
into three equal P.arts: of which one went to his heirs or lineal descendants,
another to his wife. and the third was at his own disposal: or~ if he died without
a wife, he might thert dispose of one moiety, and the other went to his children;
D;nd so e converso, if he had no children, the wife was entitled to one moiety, aud
he might bequeath the other; but, if he died without either wife or issue, the

(m) Tncit. de mnr. Gcrin. 91. (a) See page IB. (<,) Sp. L. b. 27, c. 1. Vinnius in lust. i. 2, tit. 10.

(F) LL. Cannt. e. <W. (,/) L. 2, o. 5.

(1) Mr. Chitty question this quoting ot Vinnius. lib. 2, tit. 10, and the commentary thereon

by Ueitteccius.' See also Maine a Ancient Law, oh. VI.

<•
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(aj Pnft'. L. ot N. b. 4, c. 10.
(b) 1171.d. b. 4, c. 11.
(c) Uarbeyr. Pnft'. 4. 10. 4. Gorlolph. Orph. J.eg. I, l.
(d) Gen. c. 15.
(e) Tn,·lor'a Ele1n; Clv. T..aw, 617;
( f) See 1~ 12.
(gJ Selden, de anco. Ehr. c . 24 .
. (11) Uen. e. '8.
(I) Plutarch. In vii~ Solon.
(I:) Poll. Anllq. l. 4, c. 15.
(l) Inst. 2, 22, I.
(M) Tnclt. de mor. Germ. 'll.
(n) See page lll.
(o) Sp. L. b. 27, c. 1. Vinnlus In Inst. l. 2, tit. 10.
(p) LL. C&nnt. c. 1111.
(q) L. 2, c. S.

'(1) ¥r· C!lltty questions t~s ~uotlnf! ot Vinnius. lib. 2, tit. 10, and the commentary thereon
by IIemecc111s. See also Maines Ancient Law, ch. VI.
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whole was at his own disposal, (r) The shares of the wife and children were

called their reasonable parts; and the writ de rationabili parte bonorum was

given to recover them, (s)

This continued to be the law of the land at the time of magna carta, which

provides that the king's debts shall first of all be levied, and then the residue

of the goods shall go to the executor to perform the will of the deceased; and, if

nothing be owing to the crown, " omnia catalla cedant defuncto; salvis uxori

ipsius et pueris suis rationabilibus partibus suis." (t) In the reign of King

Edward the Third, this right of the wife and children was still held to be the

universal or common law; («) though frequently pleaded as the local custom of

Berks, Devon, and other counties: (to) and Sir Henry Finch lays it down

expressly, (a;) in the reign of Charles the First, to be the general law of the land.

But this law is at present altered by imperceptible degrees, and the deceased

may now, by, will, bequeath the whole of his goods and chattels; though we

cannot trace out when first this alteration began. Indeed Sir Edward Coke (y)

F *4931 *s °^ 0P.ini°n> that this never was *the general law, but only obtained,

' ' in particular places, by special custom: and to establish that doctrine,

he relies on a passage in Bracton, which, in truth, when compared with the con-

text, makes directly against his opinion. For Bracton (2) lays down the doc-

trine of the reasonable part to be the common law; but mentions that as a

particular exception, which Sir Edward Coke has hastily cited for the general

rule. And Glanvil, magna carta, Fleta, the year-books, Fitzherbert, and Finch,
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do all agree with Bracton, that this right to the pars ratiomibilis was by the

common law: which also continues to this day to be the general law of our

sister kingdom of Scotland, (a) To which we may add, that whatever may

have been the custom of later years in many parts of the kingdom, or however

it was introduced in derogation of the old common law, the ancient method

continued in use in the province of York, the principality of Wales, and in the

city of London, till very modern times: when in order to favor the power of

bequeathing, and to reduce the whole kingdom to the same standard, three stat-

utes have been provided: the one 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 2, explained by 2 and 3

Ann. c. 5, for the province of York ; another 7 and 8 Wm. Ill, c. 38, for Wales ;

and a third, 11 Geo. I, c. 18, for London: whereby it is enacted, that persons

within those districts, and liable to those customs, may (if they think proper)

dispose of all their personal estates by will; and the claims of the widow, chil-

dren, and other relations, to the contrary, are totally barred. Thus is the old

common law now utterly abolished throughout all the kingdom of England, and

a man may devise the whole of his chattels as freely as he formerly could his

third part or moiety. In disposing of which, he was bound by the custom of

many places (as was stated in a former chapter) (b} to remember his lord and

the church, by leaving them his two best chattels, which was the original of

heriots and mortuaries; and afterwards he was left at his own liberty, to be-

queath the remainder as he pleased.

r *4.Q41 *^n case a Person made n° disposition of such of his goods as were

I ' testable, whether that were only part or the whole of them he was, and

is, said to die intestate; and in such cases it is said, that by the old law the

king was entitled to seize upon his goods, as the parens patriie, and general

trustee of the kingdom, (c) This prerogative the king continued to exercise for

some time by his own ministers of justice; and probably in the county court

where matte'rs of all kinds were determined: and it was granted as a franchise

to many lords of manors, and others, who have to this day a prescriptive right

(r) Bracton. 1. 2. n. 26. Flet. 1. 2, c. 57. f»jF. N. B. 128. fi}1> Hen. HI. o. 18.

(u) A wido\v brought an action of detinue against her husband's executors, qvoil cum per maurhiitnrm

totius regni Anglos hactemts uritatam ft approbatam uxorns debent et solf-ut a tempera. <fc.. hnlerr maiumtion-

alilcm partem bnnorvm maritorum morum .• ita riflelieil, quod rinnllot hnbvrriut tiberos, IUMC mnHtt<itrm ! *t

slhatnimnt, tune lertiampartem, <fe., and tbnt her husband died ivorth 200,000 marks, without issue hnd

between them; and thereupon she claimed the moiety. Some exceptions were Inken to the pleadings nnd i Im

fact of thi! husband's dying without issue was denied ; but the rale of law, «i staled in the writ, seems to

have been universally allowed. tM DOEiliv. Ill, 23.) And n similar ease occurs In H. 17 Edw. IH,£>.

(w) K«?. Brcv 14-2. Co. Utt. 178. (x)\jm\ 175. (y)2 Inst. SI. (*) 1. Z, c. 28, i SL

(aj Dairyinp. oI'Fcud. Property, U5. (I>J i'ago 428, fcja Itcu. 33.
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to grant administration to their intestate tenants and suitors, in their own

courts baron, and other courts, or to have their wills there proved, in case they

made any disposition, (d) Afterwards, the crown, in favour of the church,

invested the prelates with this branch of the prerogative; which was done, saith

Perkins, (e) because it was intended by the law, that spiritual men are of better

conscience than laymen, and that they had more knowledge what things would

conduce to the benefit of the soul of the deceased. The goods, therefore, of

intestates were given to the ordinary by the crown; and he might seize them,

and keep them without wasting, and also might give, aliene, or sell them at his

will, and dispose of the money in pios usus: and, if he did otherwise, he broke

the confidence which the law reposed in him. (/) So that, properly, the whole

interest and power which were granted to the ordinary, were only those of being

the king's almoner within his diocese; in trust to distribute the intestate's goods

in charity to the poor, or in such superstitious uses as the mistaken zeal of the

times had denominated pious, (g) And, as he had thus the disposition of intes-

tates' effects, the probate of wills of course followed: for it was thought just and

natural, that the will of the deceased should be proved to the satisfaction of the

prelate, whose right of distributing his chattels for the good of his soul was

effectually superseded thereby.

*The goods of the intestate being thus vested in the ordinary upon r *^ng -i

the most solemn and conscientious trust, the reverend prelates were, I '

therefore, not accountable to any, but to God and themselves, for their con-
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duct. (/*) But even in Flete's time it was complained (i) "quod or dinar ii,

hujusmodi bona nomine ecclesice occupantis nullam vel^ saltern indebitam faciunt

distributionem," And to what length of iniqnitv this abuse was carried, most

evidently appears from a gloss of Pope Innocent lv, (k) written about the year

1250; wherein he lays it down for established canon law, that "in Britannia

tertia pars bonorum decendentium ab intestato in opus ecclesice et pauperum dis-

pemanda est." Thus, the popish clergy took to themselves (1) (under the name

of the church and poor) the whole residue of the deceased's estate; after the

partes rationabiles, or two-thirds, of the wife and children were deducted; with-

out paying even his lawful debts, or other charges thereon. For which reason

it was enacted by the statute of Westm. 2, (m) that the ordinary shall be bound

to pay the debts of the intestate so far as his goods will extend, m the same man-

ner that executors were bound in case the deceased had left a will: a use more truly

pious, than any requiem, or mass for his soul. This was the first check given to

that exorbitant power, which the law had entrusted with ordinaries. 'But, though

they were now made liable to the creditors of the intestate for their just and

lawful demands; yet the residuum, after payment of debts, remained still in their

hands, to be applied to whatever purposes the conscience of the ordinary should

approve. The flagrant abuses of which power occasioned the legislature again

to interpose, in order to prevent the ordinaries from keeping any longer the ad-

ministration in their own hands, or those of their immediate *dependents: r *jgp T

and therefoie the statute 31 Edw. Ill, c. 11, provides, that, in case of *• ' ''

intestacy, the ordinary shall depute the nearest and most lawful friends of the

deceased to administer his goods; which administrators are put upon the same

footing, with regard to suits and to accounting, as executors appointed by will.

This is the original of administrators, as they at present stand; who are only

the officers of the ordinary, appointed by him in pursuance of this statute, which

singles out the next and most lawful friend of the intestate; who is interpreted (n)

to be the next of Hood that is under no legal disabilites. The statute 21 Hen.

VIII, c. 5, enlarges a little more the power of the ecclesiastical judge ; and per-

mits him to grant administration either to the widow, or the next of kin, or to

both of them, at his own discretion; and where two or more persons are in the

(d) Ibid. 37. (e) i 486. (f) Finch, Law, 173, 17«. (g) Plowd. 277.

(h) Plowd. OT. (i) 1. 2, c. 67, ! 10. (k) In Decretal, I. 5, t. 3, c. 42.

(1) The proportion given to the priest nnd to other pious uses, was different in different countries. In

the archdeaconry of Richmond in Yorkshire, this proportion was settled by ft papai bnlte. A. 1>. 1254

Kegist. honorit He Itichm. 101). and was observed till abolished by the etntntc 26 Hen. VIII, c. 18.

(mj 13 Edw. I, c. 19. (n) 8 Uep. 39.
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to grant administration to their intestate tenants and suitors, in their own
courts baron, and other courts, or to have their wills there proved, in case they
made any disposition. (d) Afterwards, the crown, in favour of the church,
invested the prelates with this branch of the prerogath·e; which was clone, saith
Perkins, (e) because it was intended by the law, that spiritual men are of better
conscience than laymen, and that they had more knowledge what things woultl
conduce to the benefit of the soul of the deceased. The goods, therefore, of
intestate~ were given to the ordinary by the crown; and he might seize them,
and keep them without wasting, and also might give, o.liene, or sell them at his
will, and dispose of the money in pios usus: and, if be did otherwise, he broke
the confidence which the law reposed in him.(/) So that, properly, the whole
interest and power which were granted to the ordinary, were only those of being
the king's almoner within his diocese; in trust to distribute the mt.estate's goods
in charity to the :poor, or in snch superstitious uses as the mistaken zeal of the
times had denommated pious. (g) And, as he had thus the disposition of intestates' effects, the probate of wills of course followed: for it was thought just anC.
natural, that the will of the deceased should be proved to the satisfaction of the
prelate, whose right of distributing his chattels for the good of his soul was
effectually superseded thereby.
*The goods of the intestate being thus vested in the ordinary upon [ • 49 - ]
the most solemn and conscientious trust, the reverend prelates were,
a
therefore, not accountable to any, but to God and themselves, for their conduct. (71) But even in Fleta's time it was complained (i) "quod ordhzarH,
h1~fusmodi bona nomine ecclesfrs occupantis nullam vel saltem indebitam .faciunt
distr1'.butionern." And to what length of iniquitv this abuse was carried, most
evidently api;iears from a gloss of Pope Innocent "I.V, (k) written about the year
1250; wherem he lays it down for established canon law, that "in Britannz'.a
tertia pars bonorum decendentium ab intestato in opus ecclesim et pauperum dispensanda est." Thus, the popish clergy took to t.hemselves (l) (under the name
of the church and poor) the whole residue of the deceased's estate; after the
partes rationabiles, or two-thirds, of the wife and children were deducted; without paying even his lawful debts, or other charges thereon. }'or which reason
it was enacted by the statute of Westm. 2, (m) that the ordinary shall be bound
to pay the debts of the intestate so far as his goods will extend, m the same manner that executors were bound in case the deceased had left a will: a use more truly
pious, than any requiem, or mass for his soul. This was the first check given to
that exorbitant power, which the law had entrusted with ordinaries. ·But, though
they were now ma-de liable to the creditors of the intestate for their just and
lawful demands; yet the residuum, after payment of debts, remained still in their
hands, to be applied to whatever purposes the conscience of the ordinary should
approve. The fla~rant abuses of which power occasioned the legislature again
to interpose, in orcter to prevent the ordinaries from keeping any longer the administration in their own hands, or those of their immediate *dependents: [ 11496 ]
1
and therefo1e the statute 31 Edw. III, c. 11, provides, that, rn case of
intestacy, the ordinary shall depute the nearest and most lawful friends of the
deceased to administer his goods; which administrators are put upon the same
footing, with regard to snits and to accounting, as executors appointed by will.
This is the original of administrators, as they at present stand; who are only
the officers of the ordinary, appointed by him m pursuance of this statute, which
singles out the next and most lawf1tl friend of the intestate; who is interpreted ( n)
to be the next of blood that is under no legal disabilites. The statute 21 Hen.
VIII, c. 5, enlarges a little more the power of the ecclesiastical judge; and permits him to grant administration e'itlter to the widow, or the next of kin, or to
both of them, at his own discretion; and where two or more persons are in the
(d) Ibid. :rT.
(e) § 486.
(/) Finch, Law, 173, 174.
(g) Ploml. '!77.
l'lowd. 'm.
(i) l. 2, c. 5i, §IO.
(k) In Dccrelal, l . 5, t. 3, c. 42.
The prolJ')rtio. n given to the p_rie~l and to other pious uses, was dlll'erent In ilU!'erent countries. In
the 11rchrlenconr'· ol' Rlchmon•l In Yorkshrro. this r.ro110rtlon wne l!Ctlle1t by a pRpl\l bnlle. A. D. l~
Regist. lwrwrla de Riehm. 101). an<l wns obsened till abolished by the statute 26 Hen. VIII, c. 15.
(m) 13 Edw. I, c. 19.
(n) D llcp. 39.
(Ii)
(l)
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same degree of kindred, gives the ordinary his election to accept which ever he

pleases.

Upon this footing stands the general law of administrations at this day. (2) I

shall, in the farther progress of this chapter, mention a few more particulars,

with regard to who may, and who may not, be administrator; and what he is

bound to do when he has taken this charge upon him ; what has been hitherto

remarked only serving to show the original and gradual progress of testaments

and administrations; in what manner the latter was first of all Tested in the

bishops by the royal indulgence; and how it was afterwards, by authority of

parliament, taken from them in effect, by obliging them to commit all their

power to particular persons nominated expressly by the law.

I proceed now, secondly, to inquire who may, or may not, make a testament;

or what persons are absolutely obliged by law to die intestate. And this law (o)

is entirely prohibitory; for, regularly, every person hath full power and liberty

to make a will, that is not under some special prohibition by law or custom;

F*497l wn'c^i prohibitions are principally upon three *accounts: for want of

•- J sufficient discretion ; for want of sufficient liberty and free will; and

on account of their criminal conduct.

1. In the first species are to be reckoned infants, under the age of fourteen if

males, and twelve if females ; which is the rule of the civil law. (p) (3) For,

though some of our common lawyers have held that an infant of any age (even

four years old) might make a testament, (q) and others have denied that under
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eighteen he is capable, (r) yet, as the ecclesiastical court is the judge of every

testator's capacity, this case must be governed by the rules of the ecclesiastical

law. So that no objection can be admitted to the will of an infant of fourteen,

merely for want of age; but, if the testator was not of sufficient discretion,

whether at the age of fourteen or four-and-twenty, that will overthrow his tes-

tament. Madmen, or otherwise non compotes, idiots or natural fools, persons

grown childish by reason of old age or distemper, such as have their senses

besotted with drunkenness; (4) all these are incapable, by reason of mental

disability, to make any will so long as such disability lasts. To this class also

(o) Goilolph. Orph. Leg. p. 1, c. 7. (p) Goilolph. p. 1, c. 8. Wentw. 212. 2 Vern. KM, 4S9. Gilb.

Rep. 74. (q) Perkins, J 603. (r) Co. Lilt. 89.

(2) The probate act of 1857, 20 and 21 Vic. c. 77, abolished the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical

courts to grant probate of wills and letters of administration, and established a new court, called

the court of probate, to exercise this anthoritv. The new court, however, is not to entertain suits

for legacies, or for distribution; this being left to the court of chancery.

(3) By the wills act of 1 Vic. c. 26, no will is valid made by any person under the age of

twenty-one years.

In several of the United States wills may be made at an earlier age. and in some a distinction is

made between wills of real and personal estate. The subject is regulated by statutes in all the

states.

(4) Upon the subject of mental competency in general, the reader will consult the treatises on

medical jurisprudence, wills and contracts.

Old age of itself, even though combined with disease, is no disqualification to execute a will,

where the person retains sufficient memory and understanding to have a general knowledge of

his property, and of the persons who are o'r should be the objects of his bounty. It is not essen-

tial that the mind should be wholly unimpaired, and capable of enlarged business transactions

and contracts; justice requires only that there should be a strength of mind equal to the purpose

to which it is to be applied. The power to dispose of his property is 1'requeutlv the chief pro-

tection which one in extreme old age possesses against abuse and outrage ; and the testamentary

dispositions of this class of persons ought to be treated with great tenderness and liberality. See

Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. 580; Hathoru v. King, 8 Mass. 371; "Watson v. Watson, 2 B. Monr.

74; Dornick ». Roichenback, 10 S. and R. 84; McDaniels' Will, 2 J. J. Man*. 331; Delafield v.

Parish, 25 If. Y. 9.

The fact that one is under intoxicating liquor at the time of making a will will not avoid it,

unless where the intoxication has proceeded to the extent of depriving him of consciousness of

what he is doing. Storret v. Douglas, 2 Ycates, 48; Temple v. Temple, I Hen. and Munf. 47G;

Harper's Will, 4 Bibb, 244; Peck v. Carey, 27 N. Y. 9. But either extreme old age or any degree

of drunkenness is always an important circumstance to be taken into consideration in connection

with any circumstances tending to show that fraud has been practiced or undue influence exerted

in procuring the will.
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may be referred such persons as are born deaf, blind, and dumb ; who, as they

have always wanted the common inlets of understanding, are incapable of having

animvm te»tandi,&ad. thtiir testaments are therefore void. (5)

2. Such peraons as are intestable for want of liberty or freedom of will, are,

by the civil law, of various kinds ; as prisoners, captives, and the like, (s) But

the law of England does not make such persons absolutely intestable; but only

leaves it to the discretion of the court to judge, upon the consideration of their

particular circumstances of duress, whether or no such person could be supposed

to have liberum animum testandi. And, with regard to feme-coverts, our law

differs still more materially from the civil. Among the Romans there was no

distinction; a married woman was as capable of bequeathing as a feme-sole, (t)

But with us a *married woman is not only utterly incapable of devising r *ina i

lands, being excepted out of the statute of wills, 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, "- J

c. 5, but also she is incapable of making a testament of chattels, without the

license of her husband. For all her personal chattels are absolutelv his; and he

may dispose of her chattels real, or shall have them to himself if he survives

her: it would be therefore extremely inconsistent, to give her a power of defeat-

ing that provision of the law, by bequeathing those chattels to another. («) Yet

by her husband's license she may make a testament; (v) and the husband, upon

marriage, frequently covenants with her friends to allow her that license; but

such license is more properly his assent; for, unless it be given to the particular

•will in question, it will not be a complete testament, even though the husband
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beforehand hath given her permission to make a will, (w) Yet it shall be suffi-

cient to repel the husband from his general right of administering his wife's

effects; and administration shall be granted to ner appointee, with such testa-

mentary paper annexed, (x) So that, in reality, the woman makes no will at all,

but only something like a will; (y) operating in the nature of an appointment,

the execution of which the husband, by his bond, agreement, or covenant, is

bound to allow. A distinction similar to which we meet with in the civil law.

For though a son who was in potentate parentis could not by any means make a

formal and legal testament, even though his father permitted it, (z) yet he might,

with the like permission of his father, make what was called a donatio mortis

caitsa. (a) The queen consort is an exception to this general rule, for she may

dispose of her chattels by will, without the consent of her lord: (b) and any

feme-covert may make her will of goods, which are in her possession in auter

droit, as executrix or administratrix; for these can never be the property of the

husband: (c) and, if she has any pin-money or separate maintenance, it is said

she may dispose of her savings thereout *by testament, without the con- •- * <„„ -i

trol of her husband, (d) But, if a feme-sole makes her will, and after- *• '

wards marries, such subsequent marriage is esteemed a revocation in law, and

entirely vacates the will, (e) (6)

3. Persons incapable of making testaments, on account of their criminal con-

duct, are, in the first place, all traitors and felons, from the time of conviction;

for then their goods and chattels are no longer at their own disposal, but for-

feited to the king. Neither can a felo de se make a will of goods and chattels,

for they are forfeited by the act and manner of his death ; but he may make a

devise of his lands, for they are not subjected to any forfeiture. (/) (7) Outlaws

I. p. 1, c. ». (t) Ff. 81,1, 77.

. d. 1, c. 7. (w) Bro. Abr. tit. E

. . ig v. JSeUeswarth, T. 13 Geo. II, B. R. ... ....

(z) Ff. 28, 1,6. (a) Ff. 39, 6, 35. (bj Co. Litt. 133. (c) Godulph. 1, 10.

(dj IVec. Clmn. 14. (e) t Rep. 60. * P. Wms. 624. ff) IMowd. 261.

(5) This notion is now exploded. See Reynolds «. Reynolds, 1 Speers, 256; "Weir «. Fit*-

gerold, 2 Bradf. Sur. R. 42; Redf. on Wills, 53-58.

(G) The tendency ia very strong in the United States to remove all the disabilities which cov-

may be referred such persons as !lre born deaf, blind, and dumb; who, as they
have always wanted t.he common inlets of understanding, are incapu.ble of having
ant:mum t~1tandi,and tht~ir t.cstarnents are therefore void. (5)
2. Such persons as al'e intestable for want of liberty or freedom of will, are,
by the civil !aw, of various kinds; as prisoners, captives, an~ the like. (s) But
the law of Engla.ud does not make such persons absolutely mtestable; but only
leaves it to the discretion of the court to judge, upon the consideration of their
particular circumstanet's of duress, whether or no such person could be supposed
to have li!Jerum tl1limum testandi. And, with regard to feme-coverts, our law
differs still more materially from the civil. Among the Romans there was no
distinction; a married woman was as capable of bequeathing as a feme-sole. (t)
But with us a *married woman is not only utterly incapable of devising [ • 498 ]
lands, being excepted out of the statute of wills, 34 and 35 Hen. VIII,
c. 5, but also she is incapable of making a testament of chattels, without the
license of her husband. For all her personal chatt.els are absolutelv his; and he
may dispose of her chattels real, or shall have them to himself ii he survives
her: it would be therefore extremely inconsistent, to give her a power of defeating that provision of the law, by bequeathing those chattels to another. (1') Yet
by her husband's license she may make a testament; (v) and the husband, upon
marriage, frequently covenants with her friends to allow her that license; but
such license is more properly his assent; for, unless it be giYen to the particular
will in question, it will not be a complete testament, even thou~h the husband
beforehand hath given her permission to make a will. (w) Yet it shall be sufficient to repel the husband from his general right of administering his wife's
effects; and administration shall be granted to her appointee, with such testamentary paper annexed. (x) So that, in reality, the woman makes no will a.tall,
but only something like a will; (y) opera.tin~ in the nature of an appointment,
the execution of which the husband, by hie bond, agreement, or co'·enant, is
bound to allow. A distinction similar to which we meet with in the civil law.
For though a son who was in potestate parentis could not by any means make a
formal and legal testament, even though his father permitted it, (z) yet he might,
with the like permission of hie father, make what was called a donatio mortis
ca.usa. (a} 'rhe queen consort is an exception to this general rule, for she may
dispose of her chattels by will, without the consent of her lord: (b) and any
feme-coveit may make her will of goods, which are in her poBBession in auter
droit, as executrix or administratrix; for these can never be the property of the
husband: (c) and, if she has any pin-money or separate maintenance, it is said
she may dispose of her savings thereout *by t~ament, without the con- [ • 499 ]
trol of her husband. (d) But, if a feme-sole makeB her will, and aft~rwards ma11·ies, such sub~uent marriBge is esteemed a revocation in law, and
entirely vacates the will. (e) (6)
3. Persons incapable of making testaments, on account of their criminal conduct, are, in the first place, all traitors and felons, from the time of conviction;
for then their goods a.nd chattels are no longer at their own disposal, but forfeited to the king. Neither can a felo de se make a will of goods and chattels,
for they are forfeited by the act and manner of his death ; but he may make a
devise of his lands, for they are not subjected to any forfeiture. (/) (7) Outlaws
(I) Godolph. p . 1, C. t.
(t) Pf. Si, l, TT.
(V) 'Rep. 51.
(v) Dr. •t .'lt. d. i, c. 7.
(JD) Bro. Abr. itt. Det:Ve, 34. Stra. 891.
(:z:) 7'he King,.. Bdlenoorlll, T. 13 lieo. 11, B. R.
(1/) Cro. Car. 378. l Mod. SU.
(z) 1'[ 28, I, 6.
(a) Ff. 39, 6, j,~.
(b) Co. Utt.
(c) Godolph.
10.
(d) 1 rec. Chan."·
(e) & Rep. 60. IP. Wms. 62&.
(f) Plowd. 261.

isa.

i,

erture imposes to the disposition of property, whether by will or otherwise, and in some of the

states this is already done.

(7) Lands were never forfeited •without an attainder by due course of law, and now attainders

do not extend to the corruption of blood.

(•) Godolph. u. 1, c. 9. (t) Ff. 81,1, 77. (u) 4 Rep. 51.

(v) Dr. A St. d. 1, c. 7. (w) Bro. Abr. tit. Oevite, 34. Stra. 89

(x) The King v. ISettesworth, T. 13 Geo. II, B. R. (y) Cro. Car. 379. 1 Mod. 311.

663

(5) Tbis notion is now exploded. See Reynolds 11. Reynolds, 1 Speers, 256; Weir 11. Fitsgerald, 2 Brndf. Sur. R. 42; Redf. on Wills, 53--58.
(G) '.l'he tendency is very strong in the United States to remove all the di!labilities which coverture impo8es to the di~position of property, whether by will or otherwise, and in some of the
states this is alreadv doue.
(7) Lands were never forfeited without an attainder by d11e course of law, and now attainders
do not extend to the corruption of blood.
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also, though it be for debt, are incapable of making a Trill, so long as the out-

lawry subsists, for their goods and chattels are forfeited during that time. (0) As

for persons guilty of other crimes, short of felony, who are by the civil law pre-

cluded from making testaments, (as usurers, libelers, and others of a worse

stamp), by the common law their testaments may be good. (A) And in general

the rule is, and has been so, at least ever since Glanvil's time, (i) quod libera git

cujuscunque ultima voluntas.

Let us next, thirdly, consider what this last will and testament is, which

almost every one is thus at liberty to make; or, what are the nature and inci-

dents of a testament. Testaments, both Justinian (;') and Sir Edward Coke (k)

agree to be so called, because they are testatio mentis: an etymon which seems

to savour too much of the conceit; it being plainly a snbstantiye derived from

the verb testari, in like manner as juramentum, incrementum, and others, from

other verbs. The definition of the old Boman lawyers is much better than

their etymology; " voluntatis nostrm justa sententia de eo, quod quis post mortem

suam fieri velit:" (1) which may be thus rendered into English, " the legal decla-

f *500 1 ra^on °f a man's intentions, *which he wills to be performed after his

' J death." It is called sententia, to denote the circumspection and pru-

dence with which it is supposed to be made; it is voluntatis nostrce sententia

because its efficacy depends on its declaring the testator's intention, whence in

England it is emphatically styled his will: it is justa sententia; that is, drawn,

attested, and published, with all due solemnities and forms of law; it is de eo,
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quod quis post mortem suam fieri velit, because a testament is of no force till

after the death of the testator.

These testaments are divided into two sorts: written and verbal or nuncupa-

tive ; of which the former is committed to writing, the latter depends merely

upon oral evidence, being declared by the testator in extremis before a sufficient

number of witnesses, and afterwards reduced to writing. A codicil, codicillus,

a little book or writing, is a supplement to a will, or an addition made by the

testator and annexed to, and to be taken as part of, a testament; being for its

explanation, or alteration, or to make some addition to, or else some subtraction

from, the former dispositions of the testator, (m) This may also be either writ-

ten or nuncupative.

But, as nuncupative wills and codicils (which were formerly more in use than

at present, when the art of writing is become more universal) are liable to

great impositions, and may occasion many perjuries, the statute of frauds, 29

Car. II, c. 3, hath laid them under many restrictions; except when made by

mariners at sea, and soldiers in actual service. As to all other persons, it enacts:

1. That no written will shall be revoked or altered by a subsequent nuncupative

one, except the same be in the lifetime of the testator reduced to writing, and

read over to him, and approved; and unless the same be proved to have been so

done by the oaths of three witnesses at the least: who, by statute 4 and 5 Ann.

c. 16, must be such as are admissible' upon trials at common law. 2. That no

nuncupative will shall in anywise be good, where the estate bequeathed exceeds

301., unless proved by three such witnesses, present at the making thereof (the

Boman law requiring seven), («) and unless they or some of them were specially

r^F-ni -i required to bear *wituess thereto by the testator himself; and unless

L -I it was made in his last sickness, in his own habitation or dwelling-

house, or where he had been previously resident ten days at the least, except he

be surprised with sickness on a journey, or from home, and dies without return-

ing to his dwelling. 3. That no nuncupative will shall be proved by the wit-

nesses after six months from the making, unless it were put in writing within

six days. Nor shall it be proved till fourteen days after the death of the testa-

tor, nor till process hath first issued to call in the widow, or next of kin, to

contest it, if they think proper. Thus hath the legislature provided against any

frauds in setting up nuncupative wills, by so numerous a train of requisites,

(a) Fitz. Abr. tit. Descent, 18. (A) Godolph. p. 1, c. 12. (0 1. 7, o. 5. (j\ Inst. 2. 10.

(i) 1 lost. Ill, 322. (I) fy. 28, 1, 1. (m) Godolph. p. 1, 0.1, i 3. (n) lust. 2,10, U.
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also, thou~h it be for debt, are incapable of making a will, so long as the outlawry subsists, for their goods and chattels are forfeited during that time. (g) As
for persons guilty of other crimes, short of felon..r, who are by the civil law precluded from making testaments, (as usurers, libelers, and others of a worse
stamp), by the common law their testaments may be good. (/i) And in general
the rule is, and has been so, at least ever since Glanvil'a time, (i) guod libera sil
cuju.~cunque ultima i•oluntas.
Let us next, tltirdly, consider what this last will and testament is, which
almost every one is thus a.t liberty to make; or, what are the nature and incidents of a testament. Testaments, both Justinian (.j) and Sir Edward Coke (k)
agree to be so called, because they are testat-io ment-is: an etymon which seems
to savour too much of the conceit; it being plainly a substantin derived from
the verb testari, in like manner as furamentum, incrcm.entum, and others, from
other verbs. The definition of the old Roman lawyers is much better than
their etymolo~; "volttntatis nostraJ justa sententia de eo, quod quis post mortem
suam jieri 11elit :" (l) which may be thus rendered into English, "the le~al decla[ ,..500 ] ration of a man's intentions, "'which he wills to be performecJ. after his
death." It is called sententia, to denote the circumspection and prudence with ·which it is supposed to be made; it is voluntatis nostrm sentenUa
because its efficacy depends on its declaring the testator's intention, whence in
England it is emphatically styled his will: it is justa sententia; that is, drawn,
attested, and published, with all due solemnities and forms of law; it is de eo,
quod quis post mortem suam fteri velit, because a testament is of no force till
after the death of the testator.
These testaments are divided into two sorts: 1oritten and verbal or nuncupative; of which the former is committed to writin~, the latter depends merely
upon oral evidence, being declared by the testator m extremis before a sufficient
number of witnesses, and afterwards reduced to writing. A codicil, codicillus,
a litt.le book or writing, is a supplement to a will, or an addition made by the
testator and annexed to, and to be taken as part of, a testament; being for its
explanation, or alteration, or to make some addition to, or else some subtraction
from, the former dispositions of the testator. (m) This may a.lso be either written or nuncupative.
But, as nuncupative wills and codicils (which were formerly more in use than
at present, when the art of writing is become more universal) are liable to
great impositions, and may occasion many perjuries, the statute of frauds, 29
Car. II, c. 3, hath laid them under many restrictions; except when made by
mariners at sea, and soldiers in actual sen·ice. As to all other persons, it enacts:
1. That no written will shall be revoked or altered bya subsequent nuncupath·e
one, except the same be in the lifetime of the testator reduced to writing, and
reo.d over to him, and approved; and unless the same be proved to have been so
done by the oaths of three witnesses a.t the least: who, by statute 4 and 5 Ann.
c. 16, must be such as are admissible . upon trials at common law. 2. That no
nuncupative will shall in anywise be good, where the estate beci.ueathed exceeds
301., unless proved by three such witnesses, present at the makmg thereof (the
Roman law requiring seven), ( n) and unless they or some of them were specially
* ] required to bear "'witness thereto by the testator himself; a.nd unless
[ 501 it was made in his last sickness, in his own habitation or dwellinghouse, or where he had been previously resident ten days at the least, except he
be surprised with sickness on a journey, or from home, and dies without returning to his dwelling. 3. That no nuncupative will shall be proved by the witnesses after six months from the making, unless it were put in writing within
six days. Nor shall it be proved till fourteen days after the death of the testator, nor till process hath first issued to call in the widow, or next of kin, to
contest it, if they think proper. Thus hath the legislature provided against any
frauds in setting up nuncupative wills, by so numerous a. train of requisites,
lg) Fitz. Abr. tit. Duoent, 16.
(l) Godolph. p. 1, o. 12.
(f) I. 7, o. 6.
(I) Ff. 28, l, 1.
(m) Godolpb. p. I, c. 1, J 3.
(kl 1 Inst. lll, :l'Z'l.

(}1 Inst. !. 10.
(•) lneL 2, 10, 1'.
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that the thing itself has fallen into disuse; (8) and is hardly ever heard of, but

in the only instance where favor ought to be shown to it, when the testator is

surprised by sudden and violent sickness. The testamentary words must be

spoken with an intent to bequeath, not any loose, idle discourse in his illness;

for he must require the by-standers to bear witness of such his intention:

the will must be made at home, or among his family or friends, unless by

unavoidable accidents; to prevent impositions from strangers: it must be in

his last sickness; for, if he recovers he may alter his dispositions, and has time

to make a written will: it must not be proved at too long a distance from the

testator's death, lest the words should escape the memory of the witnesses; nor

yet too hastily and without notice, lest the family of the testator should be put

to inconvenience, or surprised.

As to written wills, they need not any witness of their publication. I speak

not here of devises of lands, which are quite of a different nature; being con-

veyances by statute, unknown to the feudal or common law, and not under

the same jurisdiction as personal testaments. But a testament of chattels writ-

ten in the testator's own hand, though it has neither his name nor seal to it, nor

witnesses present at its publication, is good; provided sufficient proof can be

had that it is his handwriting, (o) And though *written in another r *KQO i

man's hand, and never signed by the testator, yet, if proved to be accord- *- -*

ing to his instructions and approved by him, it hath been held a good testa-

ment of the personal estate, (p) Yet it is the safer and more prudent way,
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and leaves less in the breast of the ecclesiastical judge, if it be signed or

sealed by the testator, and published in the presence of witnesses: which last

was always required in the time of Bracton; (q) or, rather, he in this respect

has implicitly copied the rule of the civil law. (9)

(o) Godolph. p. 1, c. 21. Gilb. Rep. 260. (p) Comyns, 452, «3, 1M. (?) f. 2, c. 26.

(8) [Nuncupative wills are not favorites with courts of probate, though, if duly proved,

they are equally entitled to be pronounced for with written wills. Much more, however, is

that the thing itself has fallen into disuse; (8) and is hardly ever heard of, but
in the only instance where favor ought to be shown to it, when the t.estator is
surprised by sudden and violent sickness. The testamentary words must be
spoken with an intent to beqnea.th, not any loose, idle discourse in his illness;
for he must require the by-standers to bear witness of such his intention:
the will must be made at home, or among his family or friends, unless by
unavoidable accidents; to prevent impositions from stran~ers: it must be in
his last sickness; for, if he recovers he may alter his dispositions, and has time
to make a written will: it must not be proved at too long a distance from the
testator's death, lest the words should escape the memory of the witnesses; nor
yet too hastily and without notice, lest the family of the testator should be put
to inconvenience, or surprised.
As to written wills, they need not any witness of their publication. I speak
not here of devises of lands, which are quite of a different nature; being conveyances by statute, unknown to the feudal or common law, and not under
the same jurisdiction as personal testaments. But a testament of chattels written in the testator's own hand, though it has neither his name nor seal to it, nor
witnesses present at its publication, is good; provided sufficient proof can be
had that it is his handwriting. (o) And though *written in another [ • 502 ]
man's hand, and never signed by the testator, yet, if proved to be according to his instructions and approved by him, it hath been held a good testament of the personal estate. (p) Yet it is the safer and more prudent wuy,
and leaves less in the breast of the ecclesill.Stical juclge, if it be signed or
sealed by the testator, and published in the presence of witnesses: which last
was always required in the time of Brncton; (q) or, rather, he in this respect
bas implicitly copied the rule of the civil law. (9)
(o) Godolph. p. 1, c. 21. Gilb. Rep. 200.
(p) Comyns, '-'i2, W, '-'W.
( q) /,. !, c. 28.

requisite to the due proof of a nuncupative will than of a written one, in several particulars.

In the first place, the provisions of the statute of frauds must be strictly complied with, to

entitle auy nuncupative will to probate. Consequently, the absence of due proof of any oue

of these (that enjoining the rogatto tcstmm, or calling upon persons to bear witness of the apt,

for instance: Bennett v. Jackson, 1 Phillim. 191; Parsons ». Miller, id. 195, is fatal, at once,

to a case of this species. But, added to this, and independent of the statute of frauds, the

factum of a nuncupative will requires to be proved by evidence more strict and stringent

than that of a written one, in every single particular. This is requisite in consideration of

the facilities with which frauds in setting up nuncupative wills are obviously attended; facili-

ties which absolutely require to be counteracted by courts insisting on the strictest proof as

to the facta of such wills. The testamentary capacity of the deceased, and the animus tcstandi

at the time of the alleged nuncupation, must appear by the clearest and most undisputable

testimony. Above all, it must plainly result from the evidence, that the instrument pro-

pounded contains a true substance and import, at least, of the alleged nuncupation; and

consequently that it embodies the deceased's real testamentary intentions. Lcman v. Bonsall.

1 Addams, 389.

The statute of frauds is imperative, that a nuncupative will must be proved by the oaths

of three witnesses; therefore, supposing no more than three witnesses were present at the

making of such will, the death of any one of them, before such proof lias been formally

made, will render the nuncupative will void; however clear and unsuspected the evidence of

the two surviving witnesses to the transaction may be: Phillips e. the Parish of St. Clement's

Danes, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 404; though at law, the execution of a written will is usually proved by

calling one of the subscribing witnesses; and notwithstanding it is the general rule of equity

to examine all the subscribing witnesses, this rule does not apply when any of the witnesses

are dead, or cannot be discovered, or brought within the jurisdiction. ]

The power to make a nuncupative will is very much restricted in the United States, being

confined generally to soldiers in service and sailors upon a voyage, who are allowed to dispose

of personal estate in this manner, but usually to the extent of a few hundred dollars only. As to

the hazards attending the authority to make such wills, see Prince v. Hazlctpn, 20 Johns.

502. In England now, the right to make a nuncupative will is restricted to soldiers and mari-

ners. See statute 1 Vic. c. 26, J 9 and 12.

(9) Witnesses are generally required to all wills in the United States, though the number

varies; in some three being requisite, and in others two only. And the wills act of 1 Vic. o.

26, requires wills of either real or personal estate to be attested by and subscribed by two or

(8) [Nnncuplltive wills arc not favorites with court~ of probate, though, if duly proved,
they are cq1mlly entitled to be pronouncell for with written wills. Much more, however, iR
requisite to the due proof of a nuncupBtive will than of a written one, in 11eTernl particulars.
In the fin1t place, the provisions of the statute of frauds mm1t be strictly complied with, to
entitle any nuncupative will to probate. Uonsequently, the absence of duo :eroof of anv one
of these (that enjoining the rogatio te.~ti11m, or calling upon person~ to bear witue~s of the ad,
for instance: Bennett ti. J a.ck son, 1 Phillim. 191; Parsons v. Miller, id. 195, is fatal, at onee,
to a cMe of this speciet1. But, added to this, and independent of the statute of fraud~, the
factu111 of a nuncupative will requires to be proved by evidence more strict and stringent
than that of a written one, in every single particular. This is requisite in consideration' of
the facilities with which frauds in setting up nuncupative wills are obviously attended; focili·
ties which abRolutely require to be counteracted by courts insisting on the strictest proof a.g
to tho .facta of such wills. The te.~tamcntary capacity of tho deceased, and the animus testmida
at the time of the allel!oo nuncupatiou, must appear by the clearest and most undi8putable
testimony. Above all, it must plainly result from the evidence, that the iustmment propounded contains a true substance aud import, at least, of the alleged nuncupation; and
con~equeutly that it embodies tho decea.scd's rtJal testamentary intentiollll. Leman v. Bon>iall,
1 Adrlam~, 389.
The Rtatute of frauds is imperative, that a nuncupative will must be proved by the oaths
of t.hreo witnesses; therefore, supposing no more than three witnesses were present at the
making of such will, the death of any one of them, before snt•h proof bas been formally
made, will render the nuncupative will void; however clear and unsuspeeted the evidence of
the two surviving witnesses to the transaction may be: Phillips ti. the Parish of St. Clement's
Danefl, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 404; though at law, the execution of a written 'l'l'ill hi u1mally proved hy
calling one of the subscribing witnesses; and notwith11tanding it is the general ntlu of' equity
to examine all the sub1mribing witneRHel!, this rule does not apply when any of the witncs.~c•
are dettd, or eannot be discovered, or brought within the juri.-diction.]
The power to make a nuncnpativo will is very much restricted in the United States, being
confined generally to soldiers m 110rvice and sailors upon a voyage, who are allowed to dispoi:e
of pe~onal estate in this manner, but usnnlly to the extent of a few hundred dollars only. As to
the hazards att"Alnding the authority to make such wills, see Prince ti. Hazleton, ~O Johns.
S0-2. In England now, the right to make a nuncupative will is restricted to soldiers and marincl'l'. See statute 1 Vic. c. 26, ~ 9 and 12.
(9) Witne~ses are generally required to all wills in tho United State11, though the number
varies; in ;;omo three being requi~ite, and in other~ two only. .A..nd the wills act of 1 Vic. o.
26, n•qniros wills of either real or personal estate to be attested by and subscribed by two or
more witnesse11. Soc. 9.
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No testament is of any effect till after the death of the testator. " Nam omno

testam-entum morte conswmmatum est: et voluntas testatoris est ambulatoria

usque ad mortem." (r) (10) And therefore, if there be many testaments, the last

overthrows all the former :(s) but the republication of a former will revokes

one of a later date, and establishes the first again. (/) (II)

Hence it follows, that testaments may be avoided tnree ways: 1. If made by

a person labouring under any of the incapacities before mentioned: 2. By

making another testament of a later date: and, 3. By cancelling or revoking it.

For, though I make a last will and testament irrevocable in the strongest words,

yet I am at liberty to revoke it: because my own act or words cannot alter the

disposition of law, so as to make that irrevocable which is in its own nature

revocable. («) For this, saith Lord Bacon, (w) would be for a man to deprive

himself of that, which of all other things is most incident to human condition;

and that is, alteration or repentance. It hath also been held, that, without au

express revocation, if a man, who hath made his will, afterwards marries and

hath a child, this is a presumptive or implied revocation of his former will,

•which he made in a state of celibacy. (2) (12) The Romans were also wont to

set aside testaments as being inofficiosa, deficient in natural duty, if they dis-

F *5031 ^h^ted or totally passed by (without assigning a true and *8nfficieut

L ' -I reason) (y) any of the children of the testator, (z) But, if the child had

any legacy, though ever so small, it was a proof that the testator had not lost

his memory or his reason, which otherwise the law presumed; but was then
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supposed to have acted thus for some substantial cause: and in such case no

querela inofficiosi testamenti was allowed. Hence probably hath arisen that

groundless vulgar error, of the necessity of leaving the heir a shilling, or some

other express legacy, in order to disinherit him effectually: whereas the law of

England makes no such constrained suppositions of forgetfulness or insanity;

and therefore,*though the heir or next of kin be totally omitted, it admits no

querela inofficiosi, to set aside such a testament. (13)

We are next to consider, fourthly, what is an executor, and what an admin-

istrator; and how they are both to be appointed,

An executor is he to whom another man commits by will the execution of

that his last will and testament. And all persons are capable of being execu-

tors, that are capable of making wills, and many others besides; as feme-

coverts (14) and infants; nay, even infants nnborn, or in venire sa mere, may

(r) Co. Lilt. 112. |»| I.it.l. 5 168. Perk. 478. (<) Perk. 479. («) 8 Rep. 82. (w) Elem. c. IflL

(x) Lord ii.-iyiii. 441. 1 F. \Vma. 204. (y, See book I, cli. 16. (z) last. 2, 18,1.

(10) [This, Lord Loughborough observed, was the most general maxim he knew: Matthews

No testament is of any effect till after the death of the testator. "Nam 01mUJ
testainentum morte consummatum est: et volimtas testatoris est amlmlatoria
tJ,,"Jque ad m{}rttfm." (r) (10) And therefore, if there be many testaments, the las&
overthrows all the former: (s) but the republication of a former will revokea
one of a later date, and establishes the first again. (t) (11)
Hence it follows, that testaments may be avoided three ways: 1. II made by
a person labouring under any of the incapacities before mentioned: 2. By
making another testament of a later date: and, 3. By canoelling or revoking it.
For, though I make a. last will and testament irrevocable in the strongest words~
yet I am at liberty to revoke it: because my own act or words cannot alter the
disposition of law, so as to make that irrerncable which is in its own nature
revocable. (u) For this, saith Lord Bacon, (w) would be for a man to deprive
himself of that, which of all other things is most incident to human condition;
and that is, alteration or repenta.uce. It hath also been held, that, without an
express revocation, if a man, who hath made his will, afterwards marries and
hath a. child, this is a presumptive or implied revocation of his former will,
which he ma.de in a state of celibacy. (x) (1~) 'fhe Romans were also wont to
set aside testaments as being inofficiosa, deficient in natural duty, if thev dis[ • 503 ] inherited or totally passed by (without assigning a true and *sufficient
reason) (y) any of the children of the testator. (z) But, if the child had
any legacy, though ever so small, it was a proof that the te.stator had not lost
his memory or his reason, which otherwise the law presumed; but was then
supposed to have acted thus for some substantial cause: a.nd in such case no
querela inojficiosi test.amenti was allowed. Hence probably hath arisen that
groundless vulgar error, of the necessity of lee.ving the heir a. shilling, or some
other express legacy, in order to disinherit him effectually: whereas the law of
England makes no such constrained suppositions of forgetfulness or insanity;
and therefore:though the heir or next of kin be totally omitted, it admits no
quercla inofficiosi, to set aside such a testament. (13)
We are next to consider,/ourtltly, what is an executor, and what an administrator; and how they a.re both to be appointed.
An executor is he to whom another ma.n commits by will the execution of
that his last will aml tei;tament. And all persons are capable of being executors, that are C&J?able of ma.king wills, and many others besides; as femecoverts (14) and mfa.nte; nay, even infants unborn, or in ventre sa mere, may
(rl Co. Lit\. U2.
l•l Litt. 0 168. Perk. 478.
(I) Perk. 479.
Lord R&ym. «I. 1 P. Wms.~.
(¥1 Soe book I, ch. 16.

v. Warner, 4 Ves. 210: it ia essential to every testamentary instrument, that it may be altered

(~)

even in artieulo mortis: Balch v. Symes, 1 Turn, and Kuss. 92; irrevocability would destroy

(ti)

8 Rep. 8'j.
(IP) Elem. C. 111..
Inst. 2, 18, 1.

l~l

its essence as a last will. Hobsou t>. Blackburn, 1 Addams, 278; Reid v. Shergold, 10

Ves. 379.]

(11) [Kepubli cation of a will makes the will speak as of the time of such republication.

Long i: A hired. 3 Addamg, 51; G-oodtitle e. Meredith, '2 Man. and Si-l. 14. If a man by a

second will revokes n former, but keeps the first undestrnycd, and afterwards destroy the

second; whether the first will is thereby revived, has beeu much questioned: the result seems

to be, that no general and invariable rale prevails upon the subject, but it must depend upon

the intention of the testator, as that is to be collected from the circumstances of each particu-

lar case.]

(12) Now by the wills act of 1 Vic. D. 26, $ 18, every will made since 1837, by man or

woman, is revoked by his or her marriage, excepting only certain wills executed under a

power of appointment.

(13) [Courts of probate, however, look with much greater jealousy at, and require more

stringent evidence in support of, an inofficious testament than one which is couMiuant with,

the testator's duties, and with natural feeling. Brogden ». Brown, 2 Addams, 449; Dow v.

Clerk, Sid. 207.]

(14) [But a feme-corerte should not be allowed to act as an executrix or administratrix^

without the assent of her husband: for, as he would be answerable for her acts in either of

those capacities, he ought not to be exposed to this responsibility, unless by his own concur-

rence. See 1 Anders. 117, case 164. It might be equally injurious to the "legatees, creditors,

or next of kiu, of a testator, or intestate, if a married woman were allowed to act 03

666

(10) [This, Lord Long:hborongh observed, we.~ the most general maxim he knew: Matthews
Warner, 4 Ves. 210: 1t is e880ntiaJ to e\"ery te11tamentary instn1ment, that it may be altered
even in articulo 111.fJ'f'tia : Balch " · Symes, 1 Turn. and RuAA. 92; irrevocaulility woold destroy
its essence 88 a last will. Hobson "· Blackburn, 1 .Addams, Z18; Reid "· Shergold, 10
Ves. 379.]
(11) [Republication of a. will makes the will speak M of the time of sneh republication.
Long v. Aldred, 3 Addams, 51; Goodtitle ti. Meredith, 2 ¥au. and Bel. 14. If a man by a
second will revokes " former, hut keeps the first nnde;;;troycd, and afterwl\l'ds de:itroy the
second; whether the first will iii thereby revived, has been muoh questioned: the result seems
tn be, that no general and invariable rule prevailR upon the 1<ubj11et, but it must depend upon
the intention of the testator, 88 that is t.o be collected from the circumst&nces of each particular ea.'!e.1
(12) Now by the wills act of 1 Vio. c. 26, § 18, every will made irince 1837, by man or
woman, is revoked by hill or her marriage, exoepting only certain wills executed under a
power of appointment.
(13) [Courts of probate, however, look with much greater jealousy at, and require more
stringent evidence in support of, an inofficious te:1tamcut than one which is colll;ona.nt " ·ith
the test.at.or's duties, and with nato.ral feeling. Brogden 11. Brown, 2 .A.dd&mR, 449; Dew "·
Clerk, 3 id. 207.]
(14) (But a feme-ooverte 11honld not be allowed to act as an executrix or admini11tmtrix
without the as8ent of her husband : for, as he would be answerable for her acts in either
those capacities, he ought not to be expo11ed t.o this responsibility. unless by his own connurrence. See 1 Anders. °117, case 164. It might be equally injurious to the legatee.-, emditon1,
or next of kin, of a testator, or intestate, if a married woman were allowed to act wt
ci.
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be made executors, (a) But no infant can act as such till the age of seventeen

years; till which time administration must be granted to some other, durante

minors estate, (b) (15) In like manner as it may be granted durante absentia,ov

pendents lite ; when the executor is out of the realm, (c) or when a suit is com-

menced in the ecclesiastical court touching the validity of the will, (d) This

appointment of an executor is essential to the making of a will: (e) and it mav

be performed either by express words, or such as strongly imply the same. (16)

But if the testator makes an incomplete will, without naming any executors, or

if he names incapable persons, or if the executors named refuse to act: in any

of these cases the ordinary must *grant administration cum testamento , *-0, •,

annexo (/) to some other perso'n ; and then the duty of the administra- L J

tor, as also when he is constituted only durante minors estate, &c., of another,

is very little different from that of an executor. And this was law so early as

the reign of Henry II; when Glanvil (g) informs us, that " testamenti execu-

tores ease debent it, quos testator ad hoc elegerit, et qitibus curam ipse comiserit j

si vero testator nullos ad hoc nominaverit, possunt propinqui et consanquinei ip-

sius defuncti ad id faciendum se ingerere."

But if the deceased died wholly intestate, without making either will or

executors, then general letters of administration must be granted by the ordi-

nary to such administrator as the statutes of Edward the Third and Henry the

Eighth, before mentioned, direct. In consequence of which we may observe:

1. That the ordinary is compellable to grant administration of the goods and
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chattels of the wife, to the husband, or bis representatives: (/*) and of the hus-

band's effects, to the widow, or next of kin; but he may grant it to either, or

both, at his discretion, (i) 2. That, among the kindred, those are to be preferred

that are the nearest in degree to the intestate; but, of persons in equal degree,

the ordinary may take which he pleases, (k) 3. That this nearness or propin-

quity of degree shall be reckoned according to the computation of the civil-

ians ; (I) and not of the canonists, which the law of England adopts in the

descent of real estates :(m) because, in the civil computation, the intestate him-

self is the terminus, a quo the several degrees are numbered; and not the com-

mon ancestor, according to the rule of the canonists. And, therefore, in the

first place the children, or (on failure of children) the parents of the deceased,

are entitled to the administration ; both which are indeed in the first degree;

but *with us (») the children are allowed the preference, (o) Then r*r(Vj-|

follow brothers, (p) grandfathers, (q) uncles or nephews, (rWand the >- '>'°J

females of each class respectively,) and lastly, cousins. 4. The half-blood is

admitted to the administration as well as the whole; for they are of the kindred

of the intestate, and only excluded from inheritances of land upon feudal rea-

sons. Therefore, the brother of the half-blood shall exclude the uncle of the

fa) West. Symb.. p. 1. > 835. fbj Went. Oft Ex. c. 18. (e) \ Lutw. 342.

(d) -2 P. \Vnis. 5S9. KH). (e) Went. c. 1. 1'lowd. 281. (f) 1 Roll. Abr. 907. Comb. 20.

(g)l. 7, c. 0. (b) Cro. Car. 108. Stat. 20 Car II.C. 3. 1 P. Wins. 3sl. (i) Salk. 86. Stra. 532.

be made executors. (a) But no infant Cl\D act as such till the age of seventeen
years; till which time administration must be granted to some other, durante
minore wtate. (b) (15) In like manner as it may be granted durante ab.~enlia,or
pendente lite; when the executor is out of the realm, (c) or when a suit is commenced in the ecclesiastical court touching the validity of the will. (d) Thia
appointment of an executor is essential to the making of a will: (e) and it mav
be performed either by express words, or such M strongly imply the same. (16)
But if the testator makes an incomplete will, without naming any executors, or
if he names incapable persons, or if the executors named refuse to act: in any
of these cases the ordinary must *grant administration cum testamento [ *~ 04 ·]
annexo (.() to some other person ; and then the duty of the administraa
tor, as also when he is constituted only durante minore mtate, &c., of another,
is very little different from that of an executor. And this wss law so early as
the reign of Henry II; when Glanvil ( g) informs us, that "testamenti exec1ttore~ esse debent ii, quos te.~tator ad hoc elegerif., et quibus C1tram ip86 corniserit;
si vero testator nullos ad hoc nominaverU, possunt propinqtti et consanquinei ipsius defundi ad id faciendum se ingerere."
But if the deceased died wholly intestate, without making either will or
executors, then general letters of administration must be granted bv the ordinary to such administrator as the statutes of Edward the Third and Henry the
Ei911th, before mentioned, direct. In consequence of which we may observe:
1. That the ordinary is compellable to grant administration of the goods and
chattels of the wife, to the husband, or his representatives: (li) and of the husband's effects, .to the widow, or next of kin; but he may grant it to either, or
both, at his discretion. (i) 2. That, 11.mong the kindred, those are to be preferred
that are the nearest in degree to the intestate; but, of persons in equal degree,
the ordinary may take which he pleases. (k) 3. That this nearne~s or propinquity of de~ree shall be reckoned according to the computation of the civilians; (l) and not uf the canonists, which the law of England adopts in the
descent of real estates: (m) because, in the civil computation, the intestate himself is the terminus, a quo the several degrees are numbered; and not the common ancestor, according to the rule of the canonists. And, therefore, in the
first place the children, or (on failure of children) the parents of the deceased,
are entitled to the administration; both which are indeed in the first degree;
bnt *with us (n) the children are allowed the preference. (o) Then [ ,..505 ]
follow brothers, ( p) grandfathers, ( q) uncles or nephews, (r) (and the
females of each class respectively,) and lastly, cousins. 4. The hnlf-blood is
admitted to the administration as well as the whole; for they are of the kindred
of the intestate, and only excluded from inheritances of land upon feudal reasons. Therefore, the brother of the half-blood shall exclude the uncle of the

(k) See page 498. (1) Prec. Chuiic. 593. (mj See pages 203, 807, 224.

(n) Godolph. p. 2. c. 34, H. 2 Vern. 125.

(o) In Gcrmanv there was a long dispute whether a man's children should Inherit hig effects rtnrmg the

life of their grandfather ; whinli depends (as we shall see hereafter,) on the same principles as the granting

of administrations. At last it was agreed at the diet of Arenaberg, about the middle ot the tenth century,

that the point should be decided by combat Accordingly, an equal number of champions being chosen

on both sides, those of the children obtained the victory.'and so the law was established in their favour,

thai the issnc of a person deceased shall be entitled to his goods and chattels in preference to hi. parents.

(Mod. Un. Hist. xxix. i8.)

(p) Harris in Nov. 118, c. 2. (q) free. Chan. 527. 1 P. Wins. 41. (r) Atk. 455.

(a) West. Symb.. p. 1. J 6311.
fb) Went. Off. Ex:. c. lil.
(c) 1 Lntw. 3,2,
(a):.?
Wms. :.SS. li!IO.
(e) Wc:it. c. l . l'lowd. 281.
(f) l Roll. Ahr. 907. Comb. 20.
(g) l. 7, c. 6.
(h)(;l'O . Car. lOG. Stat. ll!l Car 11.c. 3. IP. Wms. a1>1.
OJ Salk. 86. Stra. Gn.
(/.:) See pllge 496.
(l) Pree. Chane. ~.
(tn.) See page$ 203, 207, 224.
(n) Goclolph. p. 2. c. Si, 11. 2 \"ern. 12.'i.
(o) In Gerruanv there wl\s n long clispnte whether a mnn's chiltlren 11bo11ld Inherit hl1 ell"ects llnrmg the
life of their grandfather; whid1 dc(Jen<l~ (as we shl\ll see hcrearwr) on the same r.rinciples a~ the granting

r.

ofndmlnistmtious. At last it WM 11~reetl at the rlict of Arenehl•rg, about the mi• die of the tenth century,
ihllt the point should be 1lechlc•I by ..combat. Accrmllngiv. an eq1111l nnmber of champions being chosen
on IJoth sides, those or the chilrlren ohtalned the \"l<'tory. ·and 80 the lnw Wll8 eotllhll8hed in their fin-our,
that the l~su!l o(a pc"'?n deceased shall be eutltled to his goo•ls and chattels In preference to bis p:1rents.
(lfo•l. Un. Hl~t. xxlx:. :!8. )
(p) Han·is In No\', 118, c . 2.
(q) Proc. ChM. 627. 1 P. Wms. 41.
(r) .Al.k. o&M.

executrix, or administratrix, when her husband was not amenable to the courts of this country ;

for, if she should waste the assets, the parties interested would have no remedy, as the

husband must bo joined in any action brought against her in respect of such transactions.

Taylor ». Allen, 2 Atk. 213.]

See Barber r. Bush, 7 Mass. 510; Palmer ». Oakley, 2 Dong. Mich. 433; Edmnndson v.

Boburts, 1 How. Miss. 322.

(15) But no such grant is necessary where there are two executore, one of whom is of full

age. See Foxwist r. Tremain, 1 Mod. 47.

(16) See Pickering ». Towers, Ambl. 364.

,

executrix, or administratrix, when her hu;1band we.s not amenable to the courts of this country ;
for, if she should v.-aste the m;;iet;i, the parties intero~tcd would have no remedy, S'i the
husband must be joined in any action brought against her in respect of such transactions.
Ta~'lor v . .Allen, 2 Atk. 213.)
See Barber v. Bush, 7 Mass. 510; Palmer 11. Oakley, 2 Doug. Mich. 433; Edmundson 11.
Roberts, 1 How. Miss. 322.
(lfl) But no ~uch grant i~ neces~ary where there are two executors, one of whom is of full
age. See Foxw1st I'. Trcmam, 1 Mod. 47.
(16) See Pickering v. Towers, Ambl. 364.
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whole blood: («) and the ordinary may grant administration to the sister of the

half, or the brother of the whole blood, at his own discretion, (t) 5. If none

of the kindred will take out administration, a creditor may, by custom, do it. (?/)

6. If the executor refuses, or dies intestate, the administration may be granted

to the residuary legatee, in exclusion of the next of kin. (w) 7. And, lastly, the

ordinary may, in defect of all these, commit administration, (as he might have

done (x) before the statute of Edward III,) to such discreet person as he approves

of; or may grant him letters ad colligendum bona defuncti, which neither

makes him executor nor administrator ; his only business being to keep the

goods in his safe custody, (y) and to do other acts for the benefit of such as are

entitled to the property of the deceased, (z) IF a bastard, who has no kindred,

being nulliusfilius, or any one else that has no kindred, dies intestate, and with-

out wife or child, it formerly hath been held (a) that the ordinary might seize

bis goods and dispose of them in pios usus. But the usual course now is for

F*'5061 8ome one *° procure letters *patent, or other authority from the king:

•• •* and then the ordinary of course grants administration to such appointee

of the crown, (b)

The interest vested in the executor by the will of the deceased may be con-

tinued and kept alive by the will of the same executor: (17) so that the executor

of A's executor is to all intents and purposes the executor and representative

of A himself; (c) but the executor of A's administrator, or the administrator

of A's executor, is not the representative of A. (d) For the power of an execu-
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tor is founded upon the special confidence and actual appointment of the

deceased ; and such executor is therefore allowed to transmit that power to

another, in whom he has equal confidence ; but the administrator of A is merely

the officer of the ordinary, prescribed to him by act of parliament, in whom the

deceased has reposed no trust at all : and therefore, on the death of that officer,

it results back to the ordinary to appoint another. And, with regard to the

administrator of A's executor, he has clearly no privity or relation to A; being

only commissioned to administer the effects of the intestate executor, and not

of the original testator. Wherefore, in both these cases, and whenever the

course of representation from executor to executor is interrupted by any one

administration, it is necessary for the ordinary to commit administration afresh,

of the good* of the deceased not administered by the former executor or admin-

istrator. And this administrator de bonis non is the oulv legal representative

of the deceased in matters of personal property, (e) But ne may, as well as an.

original administrator, have only a limited or special administration committed

to his care, viz. : of certain specific effects, such as a term of years, and the like ;

the rest being committed to others. (/)

P *-Q,V -I *Having thus shown what is, and who may be, an executor or admin-

I- -1 istrator, I proceed now, fifthly and lastly, to inquire into some few of the

principal points of their office and duty. These in general are very much the

same in both executors and administrators ; excepting, first, that the executor is

bound to perform a will, which an administrator is not, unless where a testament

is annexed to his administration, and then he differs still from an executor ; and,

secondly, that an executor may do many acts before he proves the will, ( g) (18)

(») 1 Ventr. 425. ft) Aleyn. 36. Styl. 74. fit) Salk. 38. (v>) 1 Sid. 281. 1 Veutr. 219.

(x) Plowrt. 278. OJWentw.Ob.lt. («; 2 Inst. 398. (a) Salk. 37.

(bl .'1 P. Wins. 33. (c) Stat. 25 Eilw. in, st. 5, c. ». 1 Leon. 275.

whole.blood: (8) and the ordinary may grant administrnt.ion to the sister of the
half, or the brother of the whole blood, at his own discretion. (t) 5. If none
of the kindred will take out administration, a creditor may, by custom, do it. ( u)
6. If the executor refuses, or dies intestate, the administration may be grante(l
to the residuary legatee, in exclusion of the next of kin. (w) 7. And, lastly, the
ordinary may, m defect of all these, commit administration, (as he might have
done (x) before the statute of Edward III,) to such discreet person as he approws
of; or may grant him letters ad colligendum bona defundi, which neither
makes him executor nor administrator; his only business being to keep the
goods in his safe custody, (l/) and to do other acts for the benefit of such as are
entitled to the property of the deceased. (z) If a bastard, who has no kindred,
being nullius.filius, or any one else that has no kindred, dies intestate, and without wife or child, it formerly hath been held (a) that the ordinary might seize
bis goods and dispose of them in p1:os usus. But the usual course now is 1'or
[ *:>0 6 ] some one to procure letters *patent, or other authority from the king:
and then the ordinary of course grants administration to such appoint~
of the crown. (h)
The interest vested in the executor by the will of the deceased may be continued and kept alive by the will of the same executor: (17) so that the executor
of A's executor is to all intents and furroses the executor and representatfre
of A himself; (c) but the executor o As administrator, or the administrator
of A's executor, is not the representatiYc of A. (d) For the power of an executor is founded upon the special confidence and actual appointment of the
deceased; and such executor is therefore allowed to transmit that power to
another, in whom he has equal confidence ; but the administrator of A is merely
the officer of the ordinary, prescribed to him by act of parliament, in whom the
deceased has reposed no trust at all : and therefore, ou the death of that officer,
it results back to the ordinary to appoint another. And, with regard to the
administrator of A's executor, he has clearly no privity or relation to A; being
only commissioned to administer the effects of the intestate executor, and not
of the original testator. Wherefore, in both these cases, and whenever the
course of representation from executor to executor is interrupted by any one
administration, it is necessary for the ordinary to commit administration afresh,
of the good.-J of the deceased not administered by the former executor or administrator. And this administrator de bo11is non is the only legal representat.irn
of the deceased in matters of personal property. (e) But he may, as well as an
original administrator, haYe only a Umifed or special administration committed
to his care, viz.: of certain specific effects, such as a term of years, and the like;
the rest being committed to others.(/)
*Having thus shown what 1s, and who may be, an executor or ad min07 ]
[ 0
istrator, I proceed now,fiftlily and lastly, to inquire into some few of the
principal points of their office and duty. These in general are very much the
same in both executors and administrators; excepting, first, that the executor is
bound to perform a will, which an admini8trator is not, unless where a teshiment
is annexed to his administration, and then he differs still from an executor; and,
secondly, that an executor may do many acts before he proves the will, ( g) ( 18)

.w

fai Bro. Awr. tit. Admimttrntor, 7. (el Stvl. 225.

I"/; 1 Boll. Abr. 90S. Uodolph. p. 2, c. 30. Salk. 30. (g) Wcntw. ch. 3.

(17) This, it is apprehended, is not generally true in the United States, but, on the other hand,

on the death of an executor, administration de bonis non with the will annexed must be

granted.

(•) l Ventr. ,2.5,
(I) Aleyn. 36. Styl. 7(.
(u) Salk. M.
(tc) 1 Sid. 281. 1 Vcntr. 2.19,
Plowd. 278.
(ti) Wentw. eh. H.
(11:) 2 lnet. 398.
(a) ::ialk. $7.
(bJ :~ P. Wms. 33.
• (cJ Stat. 2.~ E1lw. Ill, st. 6. c. II. 1 Leon. 2711.
(d) Bro. Ahr. tit. Ad1ninutral0t', 7.
(e) 'ltvl. 2'l6.
(/) 1 Roll. Abr. oos. Godolph. p. 2, e. 30. Salk. 36.
(g) Wentw. eh. S.
(z)

(1H) [Before he proves the will, he may lawfully perform most acts incident to the office :

"Wankford ». WinWord, 1 Salk. 301 ; he does not derive his title under the probate, but under

the will ; the probate is only evidence of his right : Smith v. Milles, 1 T. K. 480 ; it is true, that,

ill order to assort completely his claims in a court of justice, ho must produce the copy of the

•will, certified under the seal of the ordinary; but it is not necessary he should be in possession

668

(17) This, it is apprehended, is not generally true in the United Stat-011, but, on the other hand,
on the death of an executor, administration de bonia Mn with the will annexed mn8t be
granted.
(lt:!) [Defore he proves the will, he may lawfully perform most Bet.'! incident t-0 the office:
Wo.nkfortl ti. Wo.nkford, 1 So.lk. 301; he does not derive his title under the probate, but uudn
the will; the probate is only t:t!idcnce of hL'l right: Smith ''· Milles, 1 T. R. 480; it iii tn1e. that-,
in order to assert completely hiH claims in a court of Ju~tico, ho must produce the copy of tho
will, certified under the seal of the ordinary; but it Ill not necessary ho should be in posse~-ion
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but an administrator may do nothing (19) till letters of administration are

issued; for the former derives his power from the will and not from the

probate, (h) the latter owes his entirely to the appointment of the ordinary.

If a stranger takes upon him to act as executor, without any just authority

(as by intermeddling with the goods of the deceased, (i) and many other transac-

tions), (k) he is called in law an executor of his own wrong (de son tort), (20) and

is liable to all the trouble of an executorship, without any of the profits or

advantages : but merely doing acts of necessity or humanity, as locking up the

goods, or burying the corpse of the deceased, will not amount to such an inter-

meddling as will charge a man as executor of his own wrong. (I) Such a one

cannot bring an action himself in right of the deceased, (m) (21) but actions

may be brought against him. And in all actions by creditors against such an

officious intruder, he shall be named an executor, generally; (n) for the most

obvious conclusion which strangers can form from his conduct is, that he hath

a will of the deceased, wherein he is named executor, but hath not yet taken

probate thereof. (o\ He is chargeable with the debts of the deceased, so far as

assets come to his hands; (p) and, as against creditors in general, shall be

allowed all payments made to any other creditor in the same or a superior

degree, (q) *nimself only excepted. (r) And though, as against the

rightful executor or administrator, he cannot plead such payment, yet it I

shall be allowed him in mitigation of damages; (s) unless, perhaps, upon a defi-

ciency of assets, whereby the rightful executor may be prevented from satisfying
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his own debt (t) (22) lint let us now see what are the power and duty of a

rightful executor or administrator.

1. He must bury the deceased in a manner suitable to the estate which he

leaves behind him. Necessary funeral expenses are allowed, previous to all

other debts and charges; but if the executor or administrator be extravagant, it

is a species of devastation or waste of the substance of the deceased, and shall

(h) Comyns. 151. (i) 5 Hep. 83, 34. ft) Went*, ch. 14. Stat. 43 Ellx. c. 8. (I) Dyer, 106.

(ml Bra. Abr. t. Administrator, 8. (n) 5 U«p. 31. (o) 12 Mod. 471. (p) Dyer, 1C8.

bnt an administrator may do nothing (19) till letters of administration are
issued ; for the former deriYes his power from the will and not from the
probate, (It) the latter owes his en ti rely to the appointment of the ordinary.
If a stranger takes upon him to act as executor, without any just authority
(as by intermeddling with the goods of the deceased, (i) and many other transactions), (k) he is called in law an executor of his own wrong (de son tort), (20) and
is liable to all the trouble of an execntorship, without any of the profits or
adrnntages: bnt merely doing acts of necessity or humanity, as locking up the
goods, or burying the corpse oi' the deceased, will not amount to such an intermeddling as will charge a man as executor of his own wrong. (l) Such a one
cannot bring an action himself in right of the deceased, (m) (21) but actions
may be brought against him. And in all actions by creditors against such an
officious intruder, be shall be named an executor, generally; (n) for the most
obvious conclusion which strangers can form from his conduct .is, that he hath
a will of the deceased, wherein he is named executor, bnt ha.th not yet taken
probate thereof. (o) He is chargeable with the debts of the. deceased, so far as
assets come to his hands; (p) and, as against creditors in gent-ral, shall be
allowed all payments made to any other creditor in the same or a superior
degree, (q) *himself only excepted. (r) And though, as against the [ • 508 ]
rightful executor or admmistrntor, he cannot plead such payment, yet it
sl1all be allowed him in mitigation of damages; (s) unless, perhaps, upon a deficiency of assets, whereby the rightful executor may be prevented from satisfying
bis own debt. (t) (22) Bnt let us now see what are the power and duty of a
rightful executor or administrator.
1. He must bury the deceased in a manner suitable to the estate which he
leaves behind him. Necessary funeral expenses are allowed, previous to all
other debts and charges; but if the executor or administrator be extravagant, it
is a species of devastatio1i or waste of the substance of the deceased, and shu.ll

(q) 1 Chau. Cas. 83. (r) 5 Hep. 30. Moor, 527. (t) 12 Mod. 441, 471. (t) Wentw. ch. 14.

ioo.

(It) Comyns. !SI.
(i) II Rep. :13, M.
(k) Wentw. ch. H. Stat. 4S Eliz. c. 8.
(l) Dyer,
(m) Bro. ,\.br. t. A1lminutrutor1• S.
(n) ii Ut•p. SI.
(o) 12 l\lod. •71.
(p) Dyor, 100.
(q) 1 Ch~n. Cas. SS.
(r) ~ u.e1>. 30. .a!oor, ftl.7.
(•) 12 Mod. 441, 471.
(I) Wentw. ch. 1'.

of this evidence of his right at the time he commences an action at law, as executor; it will

be in due time, if he obtain it before ho declares iu such action (see the last note): so, if he

file a bill in equity, in the same character, a probate obtained at any time before the hearing of

the cause will sustain the suit. Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P. Wins. 351.] See alsoSeabrook

p. Williams, 3 McCord, 371; Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. 337; Shirley ». Healds, 34 N. H. 407 ;

Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Met. 256. The title of an administrator, however, so far as may be neces-

euiT to prevent injustice and protect the interest of the estate, will relate back to the death of the

intestate. See Foster ». Bates, 12 M. and W. 333; Welehman ». Sturgis, 13 Q. B. 552. The

practical difference between the two cases is not therefore very important.

(19) LA person who takes upon himself to interfere with the effects of a party deceased, or, at

all events, to dispose thereof, or apply them to his own use, will, by such interference, constitute

himself an executor de son tort, as stated in the text: and see Edwards v. Harben, 2 T. R. 597;

but Lord Hardwicke held, that, although a person entitled to administration could not, before

administration actually granted to him, commence an action at law (see the last note, as to an exe

cutor who has not obtained probate), he might be allowed to file a bill in equity, as administrator,

and that such bill would be sustained by an administration subsequently taken out. Fell v. Lut-

widgc, Barnard. Ch. Rep. 320; S. C., 2 Atk. 120.]

(20) [Whether a man has or has not rendered himself liable to be treated as an executor de son

tort, is not a question to be left to a jury ; but is a conclusion of law to be drawn by the court

before which that question is raised. Padget v. Priest, 2 T. R. 99.

(21) [But, if a person entitled to letters of administration is opposed in the ecclesiastical

court, and does any acts pendente lite to make himself executor de son tort, those acts will be

purged by his afterwards obtaining letters of administration. Curtis v. Vernon, 3 T. R. 590.

It is held, that the least intermeddling with the effects of the intestate, even milking cows, or

taking a dog, will constitute an executor de son tort. Dy. 166. An executor of his own wrong

will be liable to an action, unless he has delivered over the goods of the intestate to the right-

ful administrator before the action is brought against him. And he cannot retain the intestate's

property in discharge of his own debt, although it is a debt of a superior degree. 3 T. R. 590;

2 i<£ 100.

(22) The law on this subject is practically obsolete in the United States. See Redf. on "Wills,

13, note.

S

of this evidence of his right at the time he commonces an action at lnw, as exocntor; it will
he in due time, if he obtain it before ho declares in such action ( ~ee the la.~t note) : so, if he
file a bill in ~quity, in the same character, a probate obtained at any time before the hearing of
the cause will su1<tain the i<uit. HumphreyrJ "· Humphrey8, 3 P. Wms. :J..'ll.] See also Seabrook
t•. Williams, 3 McConl, 371; Dawes v. Boylston, 9 lia.'Js. :m; Shirley ti. HealdK, 34 N. H. 40i;
Randt'. Hubbard, 4 Met. 256. Tho title of an &dministmtor, however, so far as may he necesi;ary to prevent injustice and protect the interest of the estate, will rolato _back to tho death of the
inte::1tate. See Fogt.er ti. Bates, 12 M. and W. 333; Welchman v. Sturgis, 13 Q. B. 552. The
practical difference between the two C&i!6il is not therefore very important.
(19) LA person who takes upon himself to interfere with the effects of a party deceased, or, at
all events, to dispose thereof', or apply them to bis own use, will, by 1:1uch interference, constitute
himself an executor de son tort, ~ Rtated in the text: and sec Edwards "· Harben, 2 T. R. 597;
lmt Lonl Ilardwicke held, that, although a person entitled to &dminigtration could nut, before
administration actually granted to him, rommci~ an action at law (i,iee the last now, as to an exe
entor who has not obtained probate), he might be allowed to file a bill in equity, IWl &dminist.rat-0r,
and that such bill would be sustained by an administration subsequently taken out. Foll "· Lutwidgti, Barne.rd. Ch. Rep. 3'20; S. C., 2 .Atk. 120.]
(~O) [Whether a man has or hM not rendered himself liable to be treated a.q an executor de son
tort, i~ not a qu08tion to be left to a jury; but is a oonclu~ion of law to be drawn by the court.
before which that question is raised. Padget"· Priest, 2 •r. R. 99.
(21) [But, if a person entitled to letters of adminii1tmtion is oppoRed in the ecclesiasticru
court, and does any acts pendcnte lite to make himself oxecut-0r de son tort, those act.~ will be
urged by his afterwards obtaining lettel'!I of administration. Curtis "· Vernon, 3 T. R. 590.
t is held, that the least intermeddling with the effects of the intestate, even milking cows, or
taking a dog, will constitute an executor d'3 son tort. Dy. 166, .An executor of his own wrong
will be liable to an action, nnless he ha:! delivered over the goods of the intestate to the rightful administrator before tho action is brought again~t him. And he cannot retain tho intestate's
pn1perty in discharge of his own debt, although it is a debt of a superior dogma. 3 T. R. 590;
~id. 100.
(~.l) The law on this subject is practically obsolete in the United States. See Redf. on Wills,
13, note.
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only be prejudicial to himself, and not to the creditors or legatees of the

deceased. («)

2. The executor, or the administrator dwrante minore (elate, or durante absen-

tia, or cum testamento annexo, must prove the will of the deceased: which is

done either in common form, which is only upon his own oath before the ordi-

nary, or his surrogate; or per testes, in more solemn form of law, in case the

validity of the will be disputed, (w) When the will is so proved, the original

must be deposited in the registry of the ordinary; and a copy thereof in parchment

is made out under the seal of the ordinary, and delivered to the executor or

administrator, together with a certificate of its having been proved before him:

all which together is usually styled the probate. In defect of any will, the per-

son entitled to be administrator must also, at this period, take out letters of

administration under the seal of the ordinary; whereby an executorial power to

collect and administer, that is, dispose of the goods of the deceased, is vested in

him: and he must, by statute 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 10, enter into a bond with

sureties, faithfully to execute his trust If all the goods of the deceased lie

r *,Qg •, within the same j urisdiction, a probate before the "ordinary, or an admin-

"- J istration, granted by him, are the only proper ones: but if the deceased

had '(mutt notabilia, or chattels to the value of a hundred shillings, in two dis-

tinct dioceses or jurisdictions, then the will must be proved, or administration

taken out before the metropolitan of the province, by way of special preroga-

tive ; (a;) whence the courts where the validity of such wills is tried, and the
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offices where they are registered, are called the prerogative courts, and the pre-

rogative offices, of the provinces of Canterbury and York. Lyndewode, who

flourished in the beginning of the fifteenth century, and was official to Arch-

bishop Chichele, interprets these hundred shillings to signify solidos legalis; of

which he tells us, seventy-two amounted to a pound of gold, which in his time

was valued at fifty nobles, or 161.13s. id. He therefore, computes (y) that the

hundred shillings, which constituted bona notabilia, were then equal in current

money to 231. 3s. 0 l-4d. This will account for what is said in our ancient

books, that bona notabilia in the diocese of London, (z) and indeed everywhere

else, (a) were of the value of ten pounds by composition: for if we pursue the

calculations of Lyndewode to their full extent, and consider that a pound of

gold is now almost equal in value to an hundred and fifty nobles, we shall

extend the present amount of bona notabilia to nearly 70£. But the makers of

the canons of 1603, understood this ancient rule to be meant of the shillings

current in the reign of James I, and have, therefore, directed (b) fh&t five pounds

shall, for the future, be the standard of bona notabilia, so as to make the pro-

bate fall within the archiepiscopal prerogative. Which prerogative (properly

understood) is grounded upon this reasonable foundation: that, as the bishops

were themselves originally the administrators to all intestates in their own

diocese, and as the present administrators are, in effect, no other than their offi-

cers or substitutes, it was impossible for the bishops, or those who acted under

them, to collect any goods of the deceased, other than such as lay within their

r*"10l *own dioceses, beyond which their episcopal authority extends not

L J But it would be extremely troublesome, if as many administrations were

to be granted, as there are dioceses within which the deceased had bona nota-

bilic.; besides the uncertainty which creditors and legatees would be at, in case

different administrators were appointed, to ascertain the fund out of which theii

demands are to be paid. A prerogative is, therefore, very prudently vested in

the metropolitan of each province, to make in such cases one administration

serve for all. This accounts very satisfactorily for the reason of taking out

administration to intestates that have large and diffusive property, in the pre-

rogative court: and the probate of wills naturally follows, as was before observed,

the power of granting administrations; in order to satisfy the ordinary that

(u)galk. 198. Godolph. p. 3, c. 8fl. f S. (to) Gndolph. p. 1. o. 90. t 4. I*) 4 Inet. 885.

;i/} rriminc. I. 8, t. 13, c. item. v. centum., ifc.. itututumv. Until. Is) 1ID8L335. Godoloph. p. 2, c. tl.

(a) 1'luiv.l. jsi. (fcj Cau. 92.
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only be prejudicial to himself, and not to the creditors or legatees of the
deceased. (u)
2. 'l'he executor, or the administrator durante minore wtate, or du.rante absentia, or cum testamento annexo, must prove lite will of the deceased: which is
done either in common form, which is only upon his own oath before the ordinary, or his surrogate; or per testell, in more solemn form of law, in case the
validity of the will be disputed. (w) When the will is so proved, the original
must be deposited in the registry of the ordinary; and a copy thereof in parchm~nt
is made out under the seal of the ordinary, and delivered to the executor or
administrator, together with a certificate of its having been proved before him:
all which together is usually styled the probate. In defect of any will, the person entitled t-0 be administrator must also, at this period, take out letters of
administration under the seal of the ordinary; whereby an executorial power to
collect and administer~ that is, dispose of the goods of the deceased, is vested in
him: and he must, by statute 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 10, enter into a bond with
sureties, faithfully to execute his trust. If all the goods of the deceased lie
[ • 509 ] within the same jurisdiction, a probate before the *ordinary, or an administration, granted by him, are the only proper ones: but if the deceased
had bona notabiUa, or chattels to the value of a hundred shillings, in two distinct dioceses or jurisdictions, then the will must be proved, or administration
taken out before the metropolitan of the province, by way of special prerogative; (x) whence the courts where the vah<lity of such wills is tried, and the
offices where they are registered, are called the prerogative courts, and the prerogative offices, of the provinces of Canterbury and York. Lyndewode, who
flourished in the beginning of the fifteenth century, and wa.s official to Archbishop Chichele, interprets these hundred shillings to signify solidos legaUs; of
which he tells us, seventy-two amounted to a pound of gold, which in his time
was valued at fifty nobles, or 161. 13s. 4d. He therefore, computes (y) thiit the
hundred shillings, which constituted bona notabUia, were then equa'i in current
money to 23l. 3s. 0 1-4d. 'rhis will account for what is said in our nncient
books, that bona notabilia in the diocese of London, (z) and indeed everywhere
else, (a) were of the value of ten pounds by composition: for if we pursue the
calculations of Lyndewode to their full extent, and consider that a pound of
gold is now almost equal in \'alne to an hundred and fifty nobles, we shall
extend the present amount of bona notabi'.Ua to nearty 70l. But the makers of
the canons of 1603, understood this ancient rule to be meant of the shillings
current in the reign of James I, and have, therefore, directed (l>) that five pounds
shall, for the future, be the standard of bona notabilia, so as to make the probate fall within the archiepiscopal prerogative. Which prerogative (properly
understood) is grounded upon this reasonable foundation: that, as the bishops
were themselves originally the administrators to all intestates in their own
diocese, and as the present administrators are, in effect, no other than their officers or substitutes, it was impossible for the bishops, or those who acted under
them, to collect any goods of the deceased, othtr than such as lay within their
•own dioceses, beyond which their episcopal authority extends not.
[ •-io]
0
But it would be extremely troublesome, if as many administrations were
to be granted, as there are dioceses within which the dece.ased had bona notabUfrt.; besides the uncertainty which creditors and legatees would be at., in case
different administrators were appointed, to ascertain the fund out of which theii
demands are to be paid. A prerogative is, therefore, very prudently vested in
the metropolitan of each province, to make in such cases one administration
serve for all. This accounts very satisfactorily for the reason of taking out
administration to intestates that have large and diffusive property, in the prerogative court: and the probate of wills naturally follows, as was before observed,
the power of granting administrations; in order to satisfy the ordinary that
(ul Salk. 1118. Godolph. p. i, o. ill. t S.
(tol Gndolph. p . 1, o.
lJI) l'rovlnc.1. :I, t. 13, c. Uem. "· centum., cJc., 1tatutumt1. laicY.
(a) l'lowd. 21!1.
(b) <.:au. 02.

'°· t 4;4Inst. 83:1. 'Inst.
Godoloph. p. i, o. ta.
I•)

8311.
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the deceased has in a legal manner, by appointing his own executor, excluded

Aim and his officers from the privilege of administering the effects.

3. The executor or administrator is to make an inventory (c) of all the goods

and chattels, whether in possession or action, of the deceased; which he is to

deliver in to the ordinary upon oath, if thereunto lawfully required. (23)

4. He is to collect all the goods and chattels so inventoried; and to that end

he has very large powers and interests conferred on him by law; being the rep-

resentative of the deceased, (d) and having the same property in his goods as

the principal had when living, and the same remedies to recover them. And if

there be two or more executors, a sale or release by one of them shall be good

against all the rest; (e) but in case of administrators it is otherwise. (/) (24)

Whatever is so recovered, that is of a salable nature and may be converted into

ready money, is called assets in the hands of the executor or administrator; (g)

that is sufficient or enough (from the French attez) to make him chargeable to a

creditor or legatee, so far as such goods and chattels extend. *Whatever r,».-., -i

assets so come to his hands he may convert into ready money, to answer •- •"

the demands that may be made upon him: which is the next thing to be con-

sidered: for,

5. The executor or administrator must pay the debts of the deceased. In

payment of debts he must observe the rules of priority; otherwise, on

deficiency of assets, if he pays those of a lower degree first, he must answer

those of a higher out of his own estate. And, first, he may pay all funeral
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charges, and the expense of proving the will, and the like. Secondly, debts due

to the king on record or specialty. (A) Thirdly, such debts as are by particular

statutes to be preferred to all others: as the forfeitures for not burying in

woolen, (i) money due upon poor rates, (k) for letters to the post-office, (/) and

some others. Fourthly, debts of record; as judgments, docketed according

to the statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 20,) statutes and recognizances, (m) (25)

Fifthly, debts due on special contracts; as for rent (for which the lessor has

often a better remedy in his own hands by distraining), or upon bonds, cove-

nants, and the like, under seal, (n) Lastly, debts on simple contracts, viz.: upon

notes unsealed and verbal promises. (26) Among these simple contracts, ser-

vants' wages are by some (o) with reason preferred to any other: and so stood the

(e) Stat. 41 Hen. VIII, c. 6. (d) Co. Lltt. SO). ft) Dyer, 23. (f) 1 Atk. 480.

(n) See page 244. (h) 1 And. 129. ft} Stat. 80 Car. II. c. 3. ft} Stat. 17 Geo. II. 0. SS.

(i) Stat. 9 Ann. c. 10. (m) 4 Hep. 60. Cro. Car. S3. fn} Wentw. ch. 11 (o} IHoll. Abr. SOT.

(23) [The ecclesiastical courts do not compel all executors to give an inventory; and always

inquire into the interest of a party who requires one; but, even a probable or contingent

t'he deceased has in a. legal manner, by appointing his own executor, excluded
and his officers from the privile~e of administering the effects.
3. The executor or administrator is to make an inventory (c) of all the goods
and chattels, whether in possession or action, of the deceased; which he is to
deliver in to the ordinary upon oath, if thereunto lawfully required. (23)
4. He is to collect all the goods and chattels so inventoried; and to that end
he has very large powers and interests conferred on him by law; being the representative of the deceased, (d) and having the same property in his goods as
the principal had when living, and the same remedies to recover them. And if
there be two or more executors, i. eale or release by one of them shall be good
against all the rest; (e) but in case of administrators it is otherwise.(/) (24)
Whatever is so recovered, that is of & salable nature and may be converted into
ready money, is called assets in the hands of the executor or administrator; (g)
that is sufficient or enough (from the Fren11h assez) to make him chargeable to a.
creditor or legatee, so far as such goods anil chattels extend. *Whatever [ • 511 i
asisets so come to his hands he may convert into ready money, to answer
J
the demands that may be ma.de upon him: which is the next thing to be considered : for,
5. The execut.or or administrator must pay the debts of the deceased. In
payment of debts he must observe the rules of priority; otherwise, on
deficiency o! assets, if he pays those of a lower degree fiI'l!t, be must answer
those of a higher out of his own estate. And, first, he may pay all funeral
charges, and the expense of proYin~ the will, and the like. Secondly, debts due
to the king on record or specialty. Ii) Thirdly, such debts as are by particular
statutes to be preferred to all ot ers: as the forfeitures for not burying in
woolen, (i) money due upon poor rates, (k) for letters to the post-office> (l) and
some others. Fourthly, debts of record; a.s judgments, docketed according
to the sta.tnte 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 20,) statutes and reoognizances. (m) (t5)
Fifthly, debts due on special contracts; as for rent (for which the lessor has
often a better remedy in his own hands by distraining}, or upon bonds, covenimts, and the like, under seal. (n) Lastly, debts on simple contracts, viz.: upon
notes unsealed and verbal promises. (26) Among these simple contracts, servants' wages are by some (o) with reason preferred to any other: and so stood the
bim

(c) Stat. !I Hen. VIII, c. 5.
(d) Co.
(fl) See page 241.
(h) l Anfl. 1:19.
(l) Stat. 9 Ann. c.10.
(•) i Rep. 60.

Litt. \!00,
(e) Drer, "'·
(f) 1 A&lt. 480.
(I) SW. 30 Car. II. c. 8.
(kj S&llt. 17 Geo. Il. c. SS.
Cro. Car. llG3.
(n) \Ventw. ch. ll.
(o) 1 Roll. Abr.1171.

interest will justify a party in calling for an inventory; and, in such cases, that which is by law

required generally, must be enforced. There is only one case in which it could be refused; that

its, if a creditor hod brought a suit in chancery for a discovery of assets; there, the ecclesiastical

court might say, the party should not proceed in both courts. Phillips «. Bignell. 1 Phillim. 5240:

Myddlettm «. Rushout, id. 247.]

(24) No such distinction is any longer recognized, but each administrator possesses the power

of all. See 2 Redf. on Wills, 206.

(25) [A final decree for payment of a debt, or other personal demand, is equal to a judgment.

Gray ». Chiswell, 9 Yes. 125; Goate ». Fryer, 2 Cox, 202. Courts of equity will not restrain pro-

ceedings at law by creditors, who are seeking in that way to obtain payment by executors, nntil

there is a decree for carrying the trusts of the will into execution, under a bill filed by other

creditors. Rush v. Higgs, 4 Ves. 643: Martin v. Martin, 1 Ves. Sen. 213. But, from the

moment a final decree to that effect is made, it is considered as a judgment in favor at all the credi-

tors ; and there the court of equity eonld not execute its own decree, if it permitted the course of

payment to be altered by a subsequeut judgment of a court of law. Largan ». Bowen, 1 Sch. and

Let 299; Paxton ». Douglas, 8 Yes. 521. Between decrees and judgments, the right to priority

of payment is determined by their real[priority of date.]

(26") The order of payment of debts is not uniform in the United States, bnt generally all claims

are pliu-rd upon an equal footing except those for the expenses of administration, expenses of the

last sirlini'ss. and demands owing the general government and entitled to priority under

its JAWS.

., And by the recent English statute, 32 and 33 Vic. c. 4C, all the contract debts of the deceased,

whether existing by specialty or by simple contract, are to be treated as of eqnal degree.
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(23) [The ecclesiastical courts do not compel all executors to give an inventory ; and alwa.vs
inquire into the interest of a party who require11 one; but, even a probable or contingent
int.ereRt will justify a pa.rt\" in calling for an inventory; and, in such c88es, that which is by law
required generally, must he enforcea. There is only one cMe in which it could be refused; that
ii<, if a creditor had brought a suit in chancery for a di11Covery of &.'!Sets; there, the ecc!esiast.ical
court might say, the party should not proceed in both courts. Phillips v. Bignell, 1 Phillim. 240;
Mvddleton v. Rushout, id. 247.]
·(24) No such di~tinction is a.uy longer recognized, bnt each administrator po~llt!ill!es the power
of a!L See 2 Redf. on Wills, 206.
·
. (2.'J) [.A. final decroe for payment of a debt, or other personal demand, is eq_ual to a judgment.
Grsy o. Chiswell, 9 Ves. 125; Goate v. Pryer, 2 Cox, 20-.l. Courts of equity will not relltrain proceedings at law by creditors, who are seeking in tbnt way to obtain payment by executors, until
there is a decree for carrying the tru11ts of the will into execution, under a bill filed by other
creditors. Rush "· lligg:i, 4 Ves. 643: Martin "· Martin, 1 Ves. Sen. 213. But, trom the
moment a thud decree t.o that effect is nmde, it ill considered O..i a juclgulllut in favor of all the credi·
tor~; and there the oourt of equity could not execute it.'l own decree, if it permitted the course of
payment to ho altered by a subsequent judgment of a court of law. Lnrga.n v. Bowen, 1 Sch. and
~t:. 299; Paxton 11. Douglas,~ Ves. 5:.!l. Between decrees and judgments, tha right to priority
of p~1ent is determined by their real priority of c1ate.]
. (26) The order of payment uf debtll is not uniform in the United StateH, but generally all chum&
are p!a4>~ upon an equal footing except tho~ for the expent1es of administration, ex1,>enRes of the
la.~t swkne111, and demands owing the general government and entitled to pnority nndO'l'
ks laws.
· And by the recent Engli~h statute, 32 and 33 Vic. c. 4e, all the contract debt!! of the deceased,
whether existing by specialty or by simple contract, are to be treated as of equal degree.
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ancient law, according to Bracton (p) and Fleta, (g) who reckon among the first

debts to be paid, servilia servientium et stipendia famulorum. Among debts of

equal degree, the executor or administrator is allowed to pay himself first, by

retaining in his hands so much as his debt amounts to. (r) But an executor of

his own wrong is not allowed to retain : for that would tend to encourage credit-

ors to strive who should first take possession of the goods of the deceased;

and would besides be taking advantage of his own wrong, which is contrary to

l"*512l *^e ru'e °f l'lw>(*) ^ a ""creditor constitutes his debtor his executor,

' ' -I this is a release or discharge of the debt, whether the executor acts or

not; (t) provided there be assets sufficient to pay the testator's debts : for though

this discharge of the debt shall take place of all legacies, (27) yet it were unfair

to defraud the testator's creditors of their just debts by a release which is abso-

lutely voluntary. («) Also, (28) if no suit is commenced against him, the execu-

tor may pay any one creditor in equal degree his whole debt, though he has

(P) 2. 2. c. •». l-/i I. 2, c. 5fi. I 10. in 10 Mod. 496. See book III, p. 18. (•) 5 Rep. 10.

(i) rimv.i. 184. Sulk. 899. (in Sulk. 90S. 1 Hull. Abr. 921.

(27) [Such is, certainly, the role at common law; and it has been questioned, formerly,

whether it did not hold in equity: Brown i>. Selwin, Ca. temp. Talb. 242; but it seems to

ancient law, according to Bracton (p) and Fleta, (q) who reckon among the first
debts to be paid, servz:tia seruieutium et stipendia .famulorum. Among debts of
equal degree, the executor or administrator is allowed to pay himself first, by
retaining in his hands so much as his debt amounts to. (r) But an executor of
his own wrong is not allowed to retain : for that would tend to encourage creilitors to strive who should first take possession of the goods of the decea.sed;
and would besides be taking advantage of his own wrong, which is contrary to
[ • 512 ] the rule of la.w. (s) If a •creditor constitutes his debtor his executor,
this is a release or discharge of the debt, whether the executor acts or
not; ( t) provided there be assets sufficient to pay the testator's debts: for though
this discharge of the debt shall take place of all legacies, (27) yet it were unfair
to defraud the testator's creditors of their just debts by a release which is absolutely voluntary. (u) Also, (28) if no suit is commenced against him, the executor may pay any one creditor in equal degree his whole debt, though he has
Z. 2. c. 2fl.
(ql Z. 2, c. 511, ! 10.
Ir) 10 Mod. •96. See boot ill, p. ltl.
tl) Plowd. JS.. Salk.•·
(u) Salk. 808. 1 Roll. Abr. 9!1.

(JI)

(t) II Rep. Ill.

have been long esteemed tHe better opinion that a debt due from a testator's executor ig

general assets for payment of the testator's legacies: Phillips v. Phillips, 2 Freem. 11;

and that, in such cases, though the action of law is gone, the duty remains; which may

be Bued for either in equity or in the spiritual court: Find f. Rumsey, Telv. 150; Hudson c.
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Hudson, 1 Atk. 461; Lord Thurlow (in Casev v. Goodinge, 3 Br. Ill) and Sir William

Grant (in Berry ». Usher, 11 Ves. 90), treated this as a point perfectly settled. And Lord

Ernkine (in Simmons ». Gutteridge, 13 Ves. 264). said, a debt duo by an executor to the estate

of his testator is assets, but he cannot sue himself; and the consequence seems necessary, that,

in all cases, under the usual decree against an executor, an interrogatory ought to be pointed to

the inquiry, whether he has assets in his hands arising from a debt due by himself: and any

legatee has a right to exhibit such au interrogatory, if it boa been omitted in drawing up the

decree to account.

Some writers have, indeed, thought that the appointment of a debtor to be the executor of

his creditor ought to be considered in the light of a specific bequest or legacy to the debtor:

8ee Hargrave's note 1 to Co. Litt. 264, b ; yet, even if this really were so, it would be difficult

to maintain the executor's right of retainer as against other legatees: see post, p. 512; but

Lord Holt in Wankford v. Wankford, I Salk. 306, said, "When the obligee makes tho

obligor his executor, though it is a discharge of the action, yet the debt is assets: and the

making him executor does not amount to a legacy, but to payment and a release. If H be

bound to J. S. in a bond of 10(M., and then J. S. makes H his executor; H lias actually

received so much money, and is answerable for it, and if he does not administer so much, it is a

deeaiitavtt."]

(28)[It is not enough that a suit has been commenced : Sorrell v. Carpenter, 2 P. Wms. 483 ;

there must have been a decree for payment of debts, or an executor will be at liberty to give

a preference among creditors of equal degree, ifaltby r. Russell, 2 Sim. and Stu. 228; Perry

v. Phillips, 10 Yes. 39; and see ante, p. 511, note 33. But if an executor who has, in any way,

notice of an outstanding bond, or other specialty affecting his testator's assets confesses a judg-

ment in an action brought for a simple contract debt, should judgment be afterwards given ajrainst

him on the bond, he will be obliged, however insufficient the assets, to satisfy both the judgments:

for, to the debt on simple contract, he might have pleaded the demand of a higher nature

An executor must not, by negligence or collusion, defeat specialty creditors of his testator, by

confessing judgments on simple contract debts, of which he had notice. Sawyer t'. Mercer, 1

T. R. 690; Davis v. Monkhouse, Fitz. Gib. 77; Britton v. Bathuret, 3 Lev. 115. And where

the testator's debt was a debt upon record, or established by a judgment or decree, the executor

•will be held to have had sufficient constructive notice thereof, and it will be immaterial whether

he had actual notice or not. If he has paid any debts of inferior degree, he will be answerable

as for a devastavit. Littleton ». Hibbms, Cro" Eliz. 793; Searle v. Lane, 2 Freem. 104; S. C. 2

Tern. 37.

Tho personal estate of a testator is the primary ftmd for payment of his debts and legacies;

and it will not be enough for the personal representative to show that the real estate ig

charged therewith; he must satisfactorily show that the personal estate is discharged: Tower

v. Lord Rous, 18 Tes. 138; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 id. 518; Watson t>. Brickwood, 9 id. 454 ;

Bamewall v. Lord Cowder, 3 Mad. 456; still, where such an intention is plainly made out, it

will prevail: Greene v. Greene, 4 Mad. 157; Burton v. Knowlton, 3 Ves. 108; and parties

entitled, by descent or devise, to real estate, cannot claim to have the incnuibrance thereon

(27) [Such is, certainly, the rule at common law; and it has been questioned, formerly,
whether it did not hold in equity: Brown v. Selwin, Ca. temp. Talb. 242; but it seems to
have been long esteemed tlfe better opinion that a debt due from a testator's executor ii
general &.<!sets for payment of t.he testator'~ legacies : Phillips 11. Phillips, 2 Freem. 11;
and that, in such ca.-.es, though the action of law i:i irone, the duty remains; which may
be sued for either in equity or in the spiritual court: ~"Jud v. Rumgey, Yelv. 150; Hudson 11.
Hudson, 1 .Atk. 461; Lord Thurlow {in Ca~ey 1•. Goodiuge, 3 Br. 111) and Sir William
Grant (in Berry v. Usher, 11 Yes. !JO), troatl'd this as a point perfectly settled. And Lord
EI'l!kine (in SiwmonR 11. Gutteridge, 13 Yo~. 2f>4), said, a debt duo by an executor to the e~tate
of hi11 testator is a.~!<et>1, bnt he cannot sue himself; and the consequence seems neces1mry, that,
in all ease~, under the usunl decree again8t an executor, an interrogatory ought to be pointed to
the iuquiry, whether be ha.~ a~sets iu his handR aril'illll' fn1m a debt due by himself: and anv
legatee ba!I a right to exhibit such nu interrogatory, if it hn.'t been omitted in drawing up the
decree to account.
Some writers have, indeed, thought that the appointment of a debtor to be the executor of
his creditor ought to be cont<idered in thl' light of a :<pecific beque~t or legacy to the debtor:
see Hargmve's note 1 to Co. Litt. ~. b; yet., even if th1.; really were so, it would be difficult
to maintain the executor's right of retainer n.'I against other le1mtees: see post, p. 512; but
Lord Holt in Wankfonl v. Wnnkford, 1 Salk. 30f>, said, "When the obligee makes tho
ohligor his executor, thouith it i:i a dh1cho.rgo of the action, yet the debt is a.~sets : and the
making him executor doeii 11ot amount to a le9acy, but to payment nnd a rolea~e. If II he
bound to J. S. in a bond of lOOl., and then J. S. makes H his exoc:utor; H lias nctually
rec~it:ed so much mmu:y, and is a11s1Cerablt! for it, and if he does not administer so much, it is a.
dernstavit."]
(ttl)[lt is not enough that a suit bas been commenced: Sorrell v. Carpenter, 2 P. Wm!I. 483;
there mu8t have been a decree for payment of dt•bt:<, or an executor wil! be at liberty to gi\·e
a preference among <'reditors of equal degree. Maltby r.. Rus~cll, 2 Sim. and Stu. 2'".28; Perry
v. Phillip8, 10 Ve~. 39; and see an tc, p. 511, note 33. But if an executor who ha.q, in any ·way,
notice of an outstanding bond, or other specialty affecting hi~ testator's &."l~ct.~ confo~ses a judgment in an action brought for a simple contraet debt, should jndgment be afterward~ gh·en 1\1,?!linst
him on the bond, he will be obliged. however insufficient the ai>set.~. to sati;ofY both the jndgmcn~:
for, to the debt on simple cont.met, he miirht have plellded the demand of a higher nature
An executor must not, by negligence or collul:'ion, defeat specialty creditors of his testator, by
eonfesi<ing judgments on simple c·ontml't debts, of which he had notice. Sawyer v. Mercer, l
T. R. 690; Do.vis v. MonkhouMc, Fitz. Gib. 77; Britton v. Bathurat, 3 Lev. 115. And where
the testato1Js debt WW! a debt upon record, or established by a judgment or decree, the executor
will be held to have had snffieieut con~tructivo notice thereof, and it will be immaterial whether
he had nctual notice or not. Ifhe ha11 paicl any debt.> of inforior degree, he will be answerable
&11 for n clevastalrit. Littleton v. Hibbms, Cro. Eliz. 793; Searle 11. Laue, 2 Froom. 104; S. C. ~
Vern. 37.
The personal estate of s te8tator is the primary fund for payment of bis debts and legaoie11;
and it will not be enough for the personal representative to show that the real estate ia
charged therewith ; be mmt satisfactorilv t<how that the personal estate iii dii!cha~: Towt.r
ti. Lord Rous, 18 Ves. 1:JB; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 id. 518; Wat.'!on "· Brickwoud, 9 id. 454;
Bamewall v. Lord Cowder, 3 Mn.cl. 456; still, where such an intontion is plainly made oat, it
will prevail: Greene 11. Groene, 4 Mad. 157; Burton 11. Knowlton, 3 Ves. llld; and parties
entitled, by descent or devi~o. t.o real e11tate, cannot claim to have the incambrance the1e011
discharged out of their aucestor'i! or devii!or's personal estate, so as to interfere with 11pedfio,
or even with general legatees; Bishop v. Sharpe, 2 •'roem. 278; 'fippiug v. Tipping, 1 P. Wms.
730; O'Neale 11. Meo.de, id. 694; Da\ill v. Gardiner, 2 id. 190; Rider 11. Wager, id. 335; and Cl
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discharged" out of their ancestor's or devisor's personal estate, so as to interfere with specific,

ishop v. Sharpe, 2 Froem. 278 ; Tipping v. Tipping, 1 P. Wins.

730; O'NeaUT v. Meade, id. 694; Davis v. Gardiner, 2 id. 190; Rider v. Wagor, id. 335; and o

or even with general legatees; Bishop t
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nothing left for the rest: for, without a suit commenced, the executor has no le-

gal notice of the debt (to) (29)

6. When the debts are all discharged, the legacies claim the next regard; which

are to be paid by the executor so far as his assets will extend; but he may not

give himself the preference herein, as in the case of debts, (x)

A legacy is a bequest, or gift, of goods and chattels by testament; and the

person to whom it was given is styled the legatee: which every person is capable

of being, unless particularly disabled by the common law or statutes, as traitors,

papists, (30) and some others. This bequest transfers an inchoate property to

the legatee; but the legacy is not perfect without the assent of the executor:

for if I have a general or pecuniary legacy of 10(K, or a specific one of a piece

of plate, I cannot in either case take it without the consent of the executor, (y)

For in him all the chattels are vested; (31) and it is his business first of all to

(w) Dyer. 32. 2 Leon. 00. (*) 2 Tern. 134. 2 P. Wms. 25. (f) Co. Lltt. 111. Aleyn, 89.

fortiori, they could not maintain snch a claim, -when it would go to disappoint creditors. Lut-

kinsi). Leigh, Ca. temp. Talb. 54; GoreetJ. Marsh, 2 Freem. 113.

"When the owner 01 an estate has, himself, subjected it to a mortgage debt, and dies, his per-

eoual estate is first applicable to the discharge of his covenant for payment of that debt:

Eobinson v. Gee, 1 Ves. sen. 252; and the case would be the same even although the mortgagor

had entered into no such personal covenant, provided he received the money. King v. King,

3 P. 'Wms. 360; Cope v. Cope, 2 Salk. 449. The mere form of devising a mortgaged estate

subject to the incumbrattce tliereon (but without expressly exonerating the other funds from lia-
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bility in respect thereof), will not affect the question as to the application of assets in discharge

of the debt; those words convey no more than would be implied if they had not been used.

Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. Wms. 386; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 523. This rale, however, does

not apply where the mortgage debt was not contracted by the testator, and whose personal

estate, consequently, was never augmented by the borrowed money: for such a construction

wonld be to make the personal estate of one man answerable for the debt of another Evelyn v.

Evelyn, 2 P. Wins. 664 ; Earl of Tankerville v. Fawcett, 1 Cox, 239; Basset ». Percival, 1 Cox,

270;"Parsons c. Freeman, Ambl. 115; Tweddel v. Tweddel, 2 Br. 154. But any one may, of

course, so act as to make his personal assets liable to the discharge of debts contracted by another.

"Woods c. Huntingford, 3 yes. 132.

Though a court of equity cannot prevent a creditor from coming upon the personal estate of

his deceased debtor, in respect of a debt which might be demanded out of his real estate; still

the other creditors will have an equity to charge the real estate for so much as, by that means,

is taken out of the personal estate. Colchester v. Lord Stamford, 2 Freem. 124; Grise v. Good-

win, id. 265. And if a bill has been filed for administration of the assets, should it appear that

a specialty creditor has been paid out of the personal estate, it is not necessary to file another

bill for the purpose of marshalling the assets; but the court will, without being called on, give

the requisite directions. Gibbs «. Ougier, 12 Ves. 416.]

(29) "What has already been stated may be here repeated, that under the existing English

statutes, real estate, whether freehold or copyhold, is equitable assets for the payment of simple

contract debts.

(30) [This ground of disability no longer disgraces the statute book.]

(31) [It has been much questioned, whether it was not the intention of the legislature, that

a specific devise of stock in the public funds should be considered in the natnre of a parliament-

ary appointment, and not want the assent of the executor: Pearson v. The Bank of England, 2

Cox, 179; though a different practical construction has been put on the statute creating govern-

ment annuities: Bank of England r. Luun, 15 Yes. 578 ; and it must now be taken to be the law,

that stock, like all other personal property, is assets in the hands of the executor. The con-

sequence necessarily follows that it must vest in the executor, and till he assents the legatee has

no right to the legacy. Franklin v. The Bank of England, 1 Buss. 597; Bank of England v.

Moflat, 3 Br. 262. ,

The assent of the executor is equally necessary whether a legacy be specific or merely

pecuniary: Flanders v. Clarke, 3 Atk. 510; Abney v. Miller, 2 Atk. 598; a court of equity,

indeed, will compel the executor to deliver the specific article devised: Northey v. Northey,

S Atk. 77; but, as a general rule, no action at law can be maintained for a legacy, Decks v.

Strutt, 5 T. R. 692, or for a distributive share under an intestacy. Jones v. Tanner, 7 Barn,

and Cress. 544. It was held, however, in Doe v. Guy, 3 East, 123, to be clear from all the

authorities, that the interest in any specific thing bequeathed vests, at law, in the

legatee, upon the assent of the executor: and, therefore, that whenever an executor has given

assent (expressly, and not merely by implication), to a specific legacy, should he subsequently

withhold it, the legatee may maintain an action at law for the recovery of the interest

go vested in him. If a deficiency of assets to pay creditors were afterwards to appear, the court

of chancery would have power to interfere, and make the legatee refund, in the proportion

required.]
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see whether there is a sufficient fund left to pay the debts of the testator: the

rule of equity being, that a man must be just, before he is permitted to be

generous; or, as Bracton expresses the sense of our ancient law, (2) " de btmis

defuncti primo deducenda sunt ea quos sunt necegsitatis, et postea guce runt

utilitatis, et ultimo quce sunt voluntatis." And in case of a deficiency of assets,

all the general legacies must abate proportionably, in order to pay the debts;

F *513 1 *^ut a "Ptcific legacy (of a piece of plate, a horse, or the like) is not to

I- -I abate at all, or allow any thing by way of abatement, unless there be not

sufficient without it. (a) (32) Upon the same principle, if the legatees had been

paid their legacies, they are afterwards bound to refund a ratable part, in case

debts come in, more than sufficient to exhaust the residuum after the legacies

paid, (b) And this law is as old as Bracton and Fleta, who tell us, (c) " si plura

*int debita, vel plus legatum fuerit,ad qum catalla defuncti nan sufficiant, fiat

ubique defalcatio, excepio regis privilegio."

If a legatee dies before the testator, the legacy is a lost or lapsed legacy

and shall sink into the re&idvmm. (33) And if a contingent legacy be left to any

one, as when he attains, or if he attains, the age of twenty-one, and he dies

before that time, it is a lapsed legacy, (d) (34) But a legacy to one, to be paid

(z) I 2, c. M. (a) 2 Vem. 111. (l.i Ibid. Mil. (e) Bract. J. 2, o. tB. flct. 1.2, e. 57, i 11.

(ill Dyer, 09. 1 Eq. Gas. Abr. 295.

see whether there is a sufficient fund left to pay the debts of the testator: the
rule of equity being, that a man must be just, before he is permitted to be
generous; or, aa Bracton expresses the sense of our ancient law, (z) "d6 btmia
d~f1mcti pri11W deducnda 1Unt ea fj1t{B sunt nee&Sitatis, et poatea qua1 s-unt
utilitatis, et ultimo qum sunt volun.laUs." And in case of a deficiency of assets,
all the general legacies must abate proportionably, in order to pay the debts;
[ • 513 ] *but a SJHJcific legacy (of a piece of plate, a horse, or the like) is not to
abate at all, or allow any thing by way of aootement, unless there be not
sufficient without it. (a) (32) Upon the same principle, if the legatees bad boon
paid their legacies, they are afterwards bound to refund a ratable part, in case
debts come in, more than sufficient to exhaust the reaiduvm after the legacies
paid. (b) And this law is as old u Bracton and Fleta, who tell us, (c) "si plura
ttint debila, vel pl1'8 legalum fuerit, ad q'lUlJ eakilla ckf1'1'Cti noo 8'Ujjicia1il, jiat
ubique defalcatio, excepto regis privilegio."
If a legatee dies before the testator, the legacy is a lost or "lapsed legacy
and shall sink into the reaid11'Hm. (33) And if a contingent legacy be left to any
one, as when he attains, or if be attains, the age of twenty-one, and he dies
before that time, it is a lapsed. legacy. (d") (34) But a legacy to one, to be paid

(32) [A specific legacy is an immediate rift of any fund bequeathed, with all its prodnce; and

is therefore an exception to the general rule, that a legacy does not carry interest till the end of

(•I l. '· e. tS. .
(G) 2 Vern. 111.
(d) Dyer, Ge. 1 Eq. Cae. Abr. 2911.

(l>)ll>td.D.

(c) Bract. 1. 2, c. Ill. 1'1ee. I. i, c. IS1, l 11.
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A year after the testator's death : Raven e. Waite, 1 Swanst. 557 ; Harrington t>. Tri.stram,

6 Yes. 349 ; and, though the payment of a principal fond,.bequeathed to an infant, may depend

on his attaining his majority, yet, the interest accrued from the death of the testator, may belong

to the legatee, notwithstanding he does not live to take any thing in the principal. Deane ».

Test, 9 Ves. 153.

The criterion of a specific legacy is, that it is liable to adomption; that when the thing be-

queathed is once gone, in the testator's life time, it is absolutely lost to the legatee. Parrott v.

Worsfiold, 1 Jac. and Walk. 601. When, therefore, a testator hag bequeathed a lepicy of certain

stock in the public funds, or of a particular debt, so described as to render the bequest, in either

case, specific; if that stock should be afterwards sold out by the testator, or if that debt should,

in his life time, be paid or cancelled, the tejracy would be adeemed. Ashbumer ». McGnire,

2 Br. 109. And it appears that there is no distraction between a voluntary and a compulsory

payment to the testator, as to the question of adomption. Innes v. Johnson, 4 Ves. 574.

The idea of proceeding on the animus adimendi, (though supported by plausible reasoning), was

found to introduce a degree of confusion into the decisions on the subject, and to afford no

precise rule. Stanley v. Potter, 2 Cox, 182; Humphreys r. Humphreys, 2 id. IK. It seems,

therefore, now established that, whenever the testator has himself received, or otherwise dis-

posed of the subject of gift, the principle of ademption is, that the thing given m> longer exists.:

and if, after a particular debt given by will had been received by the testator, it could be de-

manded by the legatee, that would be converting it into a pecuniary, instead of a specific

legacy. Fryer ti. Morris, 9 Ves. 363; Barker v. Raynor, 5 Mad. 217. Where, indeed, the iden-

tical corpus is not given : Selwood e. Mildmay, 3 ves. 310; where the legacy is not specific, but

what is termed in the civil law a demonstrative legacy—that is, a general pecuniary legacy,

with a particular security pointed out as a convenient" mode of payment; there, although such

security may be called in, or Ml, the legacy will not be adeemed. Gillaume t>. Adderley, 15 Ves.

389; Sibley ». Perry, 7 id. 529; Kirby V Potter, 4 id. 751; Le Grice v. Finch, 3 Meriv. 52;

Fowler r. "Willoughby, 2 Sim. and Stu. 358 ; but, when it is once settled that a legacy is specific,

the only safe and clear way, it has been judicially said, is to adhere to the plain rule—that i hern

is an end of a specific gift, if the specific thing do not exist at the testator's death. Barker v.

Eayner, 5 Mad. 217 ;: S. C. on appeal, 2 Russ. 125.

Courts of equity are always anxious to hold a legacy to be pecuniary, rather than specific,

where the intention of the testator is at all doubtful. Chsworfh v. Beech, 4 Ves. ">66; Innes t>.

Johnson, id. 573; Kirby v. Potter, id. 752 ; Sibley v. Perry,? id. 529; Webster f. Hale, 8 id. 413.3

There may be cases, also, where general legacies do not abate; as where they arc founded

•upon some valid consideration, such as a release of dower, or a discharge of a debt. See what

is said in Duncan v. Alt, 3 Perm. 382; Williamson v. Williamson, 6 Paige, 298; Hubbard v.

Hubbard, 6 Met. 50.

(33) But by statute 1 Vic, c. 26, sec. 33, a gift to a child or other descendant does not lapse if

issue of the legatee survives the testator, but takes effect as if the legatee had died immediately

after the testator, unless a contrary intention appears by the will.

(34) [A legacy may be so given, as that the legatee shall be entitled to the interest or pro-

duce thereof, from the time of the testator's death to his own, although such legatee may not

live long enough to entitle himself to the principal. Deaue ». Tost, 9 Vea. 153, as cited in

note 32. i
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(32) [A Hpecific legacy is an immediate gift. of any fund bequeathed, with all its produce; and
ls thererore an exception to the general role, that a legacy does not carry interest till the end of
$ year atler the testator's death: Raven ti.· Waite, 1 Swanst. ll57; Barrington "· Trii.<tram.
6 Ves. 349; and, though the payment of a principal fund,. bequeathed to an infant, may depend
on hi11 attaining his majority, yet, the interest oocrued from the death of the testator, may belong
to the leglltee, notwithstanding he dOM not live to take any thing in the principal. Deane "·
Test, 9 Ves. 153.
The otjterion of a· specific legacy is, that it is liable to adomptfon; that when the thing bequeathed is once gi>ne, in the testfttor's life time, it is absolutely lost to the legatee. Parrot.t v.
W o~field, 1 J ac. and Walk. 601. When, therefore, a testator baa bequeathed a l9j?8Cy of certain
stock in the public funds; or of a particular debt, so described as t.o render the bequest, in either
ca.se, specific ; if that stock should be afterwards sold out by the testator, or if that debt should,
in his life time, 1!e. paid· or cancelled, _the le~J w~nld be tldeemed. .ARhbnmer v. lleGtrire,
2 Br. 109. And it appears that there 1s no distinction between a voluntarT and a compulsory
pByment to the testator, 88 to the qnestion of &demption. Innes "· Johnson, 4 Ves. 574.
The idea of proceeding on the a1ti11t1'3 adimendi, (thoueh support.ed by plaU81ble re&:!onin!(), was
found to introduce a degree of confusion into the aecisions on the subject, and to afford no
precise rnlt1. Stanler "· Potter, 2 Cox, 18'.l; Humphreys "· Humphreys, 2 id. 186. It ::ieema,
tben,fore, now established thst, whenever the testator bas himself received, or otherwi11e dittpoi!Cd of the subject of gift, the principle of ademption i11, that the thing given D() lon~r exists.:
and if, after a particular debt given by will had been received by the testator, it could be demanded by the legatee, that would be converting U into a pecuniary, inst;ead of a ;ipecifi.e
legacy. Fryer "·Morris, 9 Ves. 36:J; Barker v. Raynor, 5 Mad. :.!17. Where, indeed, the iden·
tical corpus is not given: Selwood ti. Mildmay, 3 Ves. 310; where the legacy is not specific, but
what is termed in the civil law a demonstrntive legacy-that is, a general poounia.ry legacy,
with a particular security pointed out· as a convenienc mode of payment; ~m. although such
11eeuritv may be called in, or fuil, the legacy will not be &deemed~ Gillaume ti. Adderley, 15 Ves.
389; Sibley "· Perry, 7 id. 529; Kirby '7. Potter, 4 id. 751; Le Grice "· Finch, 3 Meriv. 52;
Fowler 11. Willoughby, 2 Sim. and Stu. 358; but. when it is once aett.led that a legacy is specific,
the only 88fe and clear way, it bas been judicially !laid, is to adhere t.o the plain rule-th3t there
is an end of a specific gift, if the specific thin~
not exist at the telltator's death. Barker v.
.
Rayner, 5 Mad. 217 ;· S. c, on appeal, 2 Rntlll. 12.'l.
Courts of equity are always anxious to hold a legacy to be pecuniary, rather than specifie,
where the intention of the test.at.or ii! at all doubtt\il. · Obawortb "· ~h, 4 Ve11. !'>66; Junes"·
J ob1111on, id. 573; Kirby 11. Potter, id. 71>2 ; Sibley ti. Perry, 7 id. 529; Webster t. Hale, 8 id. 413.]
There may be casett, alt!O, where general legacies do not abate; as where they aro founded
upon some valid consideration, such M a rele~ of dower, or a ditJCba.rge of a debt. See what
is said in Duncan"· Alt, 3 Penn. 382; William110n "· Williamson, 6 Paige, 298; Hubbard "·
Hubbard, 6 Met. 50.
(33) But by statute 1 Vic, c. ~. sec. 33, a gift to a child or other deaoondant does oot lapee if
Issue of tho legatee survive11 the teetator, but take11 effect 88 if the legatee had died immediately
al'Wr the testator, nnlesa a contrary intention appeaT!I by the will.
(34) (A legacy may be 110 r·ven, BB that the legatee shall be entitled to the interest or produce thereof, from the time o the testator's death to bis own, although Rnch legatee may n°*
live ltmg- enough to entitle hilmelf to the principal. Deaue "· TOllt,. 9· VM. 153, as citied ill
note 3'..?.
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when he attains the age of twenty-one years, is a vested legacy; an interest

which commences in prcesenti, although it be solvendum infuturo; and if the

legatee dies before that age, his representatives shall receive it out of the testa-

tor's personal estate at the same time that it would have become payable, in case

the legatee had lived. (35) This distinction is borrowed from the civil law; (e)

and its adoption in our courts is not so much owing to its intrinsic equity, as

to its having been before adopted by the ecclesiastical courts. For, since the

chancery has a concurrent jurisdiction with them, in regard to the recovery of

legacies, it was reasonable that there should be a conformity in their determina-

tions; and that the subject should have the same measure of justice in what-

ever court he sued. (/) But, if such legacies be charged upon a real estate, in

both cases they shall lapse for the benefit of the heir, (g) (36) for, with regard to

devises affecting lands, the ecclesiastical court hath no concurrent jurisdiction.

(37) And in case of a vested legacy, due immediately, and charged on land or

money in the funds, which yield an immediate profit,'interest shall be T+K-IA n

payable thereon from the testator's death; (38) but if charged only on the «• -"

(t)ff. 3S, 1. 142. (f) 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 205. (g) 2 P. Wms. 601.

But where a bequest is made to a legatee, " at the age of twenty-one," or any other specified

ll"hen he attains the age of twenty-one years, is a vuted legacy; an interest
which commences in prmsenti, although it be solvendurn in /uturo; and if the
l~gatee dies before that age, his representatives shall receive it out of the testator's personal estate at the same time that it would have become payable, in case
the legatee had lived. (35) This distinction is borrowed from the civil law; (e)
and its adoption in our courts is not so much owing to its intrimic egnity, as
to its having been before adopted by the ecclesiastical courts. For, smce the
chancery has a concurrent jurisdiction with them, in regard to the recornry of
legacies, it was reasonable that there should be a conformity in their determinations; and that the subject should have the same measure of justice in whatever court he sued.(/) But, if such legacies be charged upon a real estate, in
both cnses they shall lapse for the benefit of the heir, (g) (36) for, with reO'ard to
devises affecting lands, the ecclesiastical court ha.th no concurrent jurisd'iction.
(37) And in case of a vested legacy, due immediately, and charged on land or
money in the funds, which yiel<l an immediate profit, *interest shall be [* 514 ]
payable thereon from the testa.t-Or's death; (38) but if charged only on the

age; or, " if he attains such age:" this is such a description of the person who is to take, that if

(e) Ff. 35, l. 1 & 2.

(fJ 1 Eq. Cas.

Abr. 205.

{g) 2 P. Wms. 601.

the legatee do not sustain the character at that time, the legacy will fail: the time when it is

to be paid is attached to the legacy itself, and the condition precedent prevents the legacy from

vesting. Parsons ». Parsons, 5 Yes. 582; Sansbury v. Bead, 12 id. 78 ; Errington c. Chapman,
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id. 24. But if the legacy be to an infant, "payable at twenty-one," the legacy is held to be

vested, the description of the legatee ia satisfied, and the other part of the direction refers to the

payment only. This distinction (as stated in the text) is borrowed from the civil law, but is

adopted as to personal legacies only, not as to bequests charged upon real estate; and it has been

spoken of in many cases, as a rule neither to be extended nor approved. Dawson ». Killett, 1

Br. 123; Duke of Chandos v. Talbot, 2 P. Wms. 613; Mackell v. Winter, 3 Yes. 543; Bolger v.

Mackell, 5 id. 509; Hansom c. Graham. 6 id. 245.]

The tendency of the decisions clearly is in the direction of holding all legacies vested where

that can be done without too great violence to the lauguage of the will. See Hansom ». Gra-

ham, 6 Yes. 239; Lane v. Goudge, 9 id. 225; Dodson v. Hay, 3 Br. C. C. 404; Wilson v. Mount,

19 Bcav. 292; Leeming v. Sherratt, 2 Hare, 14.

(35) [But it seems, if the testator's personal representatives were to be accountable for

interest, and the delay of payment, as to the principal, was only directed with reference to

the minority of the legatee, his executor or administrator may claim the legacy forthwith, pro-

Tided a year has elapsed since the death of the original testator. Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Yes. 13;

Cloberry ». Lampen, 2 Preera. 25; Anonym, id. 64; Anonym. 2 Yern. 199; Green v. Pigot, 1

Br. 105; Ponnerean c. Ponnereau. 1 Yes. sen. 119. But, a small yearly sum directed to be

paid for the maintenance of the infant legatee, will not be deemed equivalent, for the purpose

of vesting a legacy, to a direction that interest should be paid on the legacy. Chester v. Pain-

ter, 2 P. Wms. 323; Hausom v. Graham, 6 Yes. 249; Kodon ». Smith, Ambl. 588. If a be-

quest, however, be made to an infant, "at his age of twenty-one years, and, if he die before

that age, then over to another;" in such case, the legatee over does not claim under the in-

fant, but the bequest over t<> him is a distinct substantive bequest, and is to be paid on the

death of the infant under twenty-one. Laundry v. Williams, 2 P. Wms. 480; Crickett v. Dolby,

3 Yes. 16.]

(36) By the wills act of 1 Yic. c. 26, $ 25, unless a contrary intention appears by the will,

mich real estate or interest therein as shall be comprised in a lapsed devise, or in a devise which

foils as being contrary to law, or otherwise incapable of taking effect, shall be included in the

residuary devise, if any, contained in the will.

(37) [Where legacies are charged upon land, or if the gift at all savors of the realty, the

trusts must be carried into execution with analogy to the common law. Scott e. Tyler, 2 Dick.

719; Long v. Ricketts, 2 Sim. and Stu. 183. And the general rule of common law is, that lega-

cies, or portions, charged on lands, do not vest till the time of payment comes. Harvey ».

Aston, I Atk. 378, 379; S. C. Willes, 91; Harrison v. Uaylour, 2 Cox, 248. But a testa-

tor may make a legacy vested and transmissible, though charged on a real estate, and pay-

able at'a future time, provided he distinctly expresses himself to that effect, or the context of

the will affords a plain implication that such was his intention. See Lowther ». Condon, 2 Atk.

128; Dawson v. Killet, 1 fir. 123; Godwin t). Munday, id. 194; Smith ». Partridge, Ambl. 267 ;

Sherman v. Collins, 3 Atk. 320.]

(38) [The old authorities are in conformity with the text, and hold, that, where a fund, of

But where a bequest is made to a legatee, "at the age of twenty-one," or any othor specified
age; or, "if he attains such age:" this i:1 riuch a description of the I?erson who is to take, that if
the legatee do not sustain the character at that time, the legacy will fail: the time when it is
to be paid is attached to the legacy itsolf, aud the condition precedent prevents the legacy from
vesting. P3n1ous ti. Pa.rsons, 5 Ves. 58<!; Sansbury v. Read, 12 id. 78 ; Errington ti. Oh11.pma.n,
id. 24. But if the legacy ue to an infant, "pa!la.ble at twenty-one," the legacy is held to be
vested, the descrir,tion of the legatee is satisfied, and the other part of the direction refers to the
payment tmly. 'I hi11 clistinction (as stated in the text) is borrowed from the civil Jaw, but i11
adopted as to personal legacies only, not as to bcqne;its charged upon reo.l estate; and it has been
spoken of in many ca~e~, as a rule neither to be extended nor approved. Dawson v. Killett, 1
Br. l2;J; Duke of Chandos t•. Talbot, 2 P. Wm~. 61;J; Mackell v. \Vinter, 3 Ves. 643; Bolger ti.
Mackell, 5 id. 509; Hansom v. Graham. 6 id. 245.]
The tendency of the dccioJions clearly is in the direction of holding all legacies vested where
that can ue done without too great violence to the language of the will. See Hansom v. Graham, 6 Ves. 239; Lane ti. Goudge, 9 id. 2:l5; Dodson v. Hu.y, 3 Br. C. C. 404; Wilson v. Mount,
19 Hcav. W'l; Leeming v. Sherratt, 2 !Io.re, 14.
(35) [But it seems, if the te~tator's pel'l!onal representatives were to be accountable for
interest, and the delay of payment, as to the prinmpal, wa.s only directed with reference to
the minority of the legatee, hts executor or admmistrator may olo.im the legacy forthwith, proTided a year ha.~ elap,ied since the death of the original testator. Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Vell. 13;
Cloberry ti. Lmnpen, 2 Froom. 25; A.nonym. id. 64; Anonym. 2 Vern. 199; Green v. Pigot, 1
Br. 105; Ponncreau v. Ponnereau. 1 Ves. 8eu. 119. Bnt, a. small yearly sum directed t{1 be
paid for the maintenance of the infant legatee, will not be deemed equivalent, for the purpose
of vesting o. legacy, to a direction that interest should be 1iaid on the legacy. Chester v. Painter, 2 P. Wm:i. 3:l8; Hansom v. Gra.ha.m, 6 Ves. 24U; Roden v. Smith, Ambl. 588. If a bequest, however, be mstle to an infant, "at his age of twenty-one years, and, if he die before
that age, then over to another;" in such case, the legatee over does not claim under the .infant, but the bequedt over to him is a distinct sub~ts.utive beque<1t, and is to be paid on the
death of the iufe.ut under twenty-one. La.nndry v. Williams, 2 P. Wms. 480; Orickett v. Dolby,
3 Ves. 16.)
(36) By the wills act of 1 Vic. c. 26, ~ 25, unless a contrary intention appears by the will,
11ucb real estate or interest therein as shall be comprised in a lap3ed devise, or in a devi:le which
foils as being contrary to law, or otherwise incapable of taking effect, shall be included in the
residuary: dcriiie, if any, contained in the will.
(37) LWhere legacies are charged upon land, or if the gift at all savors of the realty, the
trusts must be carried into execution with analogy to the common law. Scott ti. T,rler, 2 Dick.
719; Long v. Rickett~, 2 Sim. and Stu. 183. Aud the gene~al rule of common law 18, that legacies, or fortiont1, charged on land.~ •. do not ve~t ~ill the time of payment comes. Harvey v.
.A.11ton,
A tk. 378, 379 ; S. C. W tiles, 91; Hamson v. Naylour, 2 Cox, 248. But a te4au1r may make a legacy vested and tran8mis8ible, th1n1gh charged on a real e;itatc, and payable at ·a future time, provided he distinctly expre8~e8 him,,clf to that effect, or the context of
~e will affords a plain implication that such we.>1 hi~ intention. See Lowther v. Condon, 2 .A.tk.
128; Dawson fl. Killet, 1 Br. l:l3; Godwin ti. Munday, id. 194; Smith"· Partridge, .A.mbl. 267;
Sherman v. Collins, 3 Atk. 3'.lO.J
(38) [The old authorities are m conformity with the text, and hold, that, where a fund, of
whatever nature, upon which a tes.ta.tor ha.~ charged legacies, is carrying interest, there interest shall be payable upon the legacies, from the time of the testator'>! death. But that is
exploded now by e\·ery day's practice. Though a testator i;nay have le~ no other property
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whatever nature, upon which a testator has charged legacies, is carrying interest, there inter-

est shall be payable upon the legacies, from the time of the testator's death. But that is

exploded now by every day's practice. Though a testator may have left no other property
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Ersonal estate, which cannot be immediately got in, it shall carry interest only

>m the end of the year after the death of the testator, (h) (39)

Besides these formal legacies, contained in a man's will and testament, there

is also permitted another death-bed disposition of property; which is called a

f hj 2 P. Wras. 88, 2T.

than money in the funds, interest upon the pecuniary legacies he has charged thereon is now

personal estate, which cannot be immediately got in, it shall carry interest only
from the end of the year after the deuth of the testator. (Ii) (39)
Besides these formal legacies, contained in a man's will amd testament, there
is also permitted another death-bed disposition of property; which is called a
(A)

never given till the end of a year after his death. Gibson v. Bott, 7 Yes. 97. The rule is dif-

2 P. Wms. 26, '17.

ferent with respect to legacies charged on laud. Whether the reason assigned fur this distinc-

tion in the text, and ui Maxwell v. Wettonhall, 1 P. Wins. 25, be the true one, has been

doubted: a fund, consisting of personalty, may be "yielding immediate profits," as well as

lands, but, it is obvious that the reason of the rule as to the commencement of interest upon

legacies given out of personal estate, which ia a role adopted merely for convenience (Garth-

shore v. Chalie, 10 Yes. 13; Wood v. Penoyre, 13 id. 333), cannot apply to the case of legacies

not dependent on the getting ia of the personal estate, and charged upon lands only ; in such

case, interest, it has been said, must be chargeable from the death of the testator, or not at

all. Pearson v. Pearson, 1 Sch. and Lef. 11; Spurway t. Glynn, 9 Yes. 483; Shirt v. Westby,

16 id. 396.]

(39) [As a legacy, for the payment of which no other period is assigned by the will

(Anonym. 2 Preem. 207), is not due till the end of a year after the testators death: Heorle r.

Greenbank, 3 Atk. 716; and as interest can only be claimed for non-payment of a demand

actually due; it is an undisputed general rule, that although a legacy vests (where no special

intention to the contrary appears) at the testator's death (Garthshore v. Chalie, 10 Yes. 13), it
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does not begin to carry interest till a year afterwards, unless it be charged solely on lauds.

(See the last note.) That general rule, however, has exceptions. Raven v. Waito, 1 Swanst.

5f>7 ; Beckford v. Tobin, 1 Yes. Sen. 310; a specific bequest of a corpus passes an immediate

gift of the fund, with all its produce, from the death of the testator. Kirby r. Potter, 4 Ves.

751; Barringtou ». Tristram, o id. 349. Another exception arises when a legacy is given to

an infant by a parent, or by a benefactor, who has put himself in loco parcntis; in such

case, the necessary support of the infant may require immediate payment of interest. Lowndes

v. Lowndes, 15 Ves. 304; Heath v. Perry, 3 Atk. 102 ; Mitchell v. Bower, 3 Yes. 287. It must,

however, be observed, this latter exception operates only when the child is otherwise unpro-

vided for; when a father gives a legacy to a child, it will carry interest from the death

of the testator, as a maintenance for the child, where no other fund is applicable for such

maintenance: Carew e. Askew, 1 Cox, 244; Harvey v. Harvey, 2 P. Wms. 22; but where

other means of support are provided for the child, then the legacy will not carry interest

from an earlier period than it would in the case of a bequest to a perfect stranger. Wyuch

v. AV'yuch, 1 Cox, 435; Ellis v. Ellis, 1 Sch. and Lef. 5; Tyrrel v. Tyrrel, 4 Ves. 5. And the

general rule as to non-puyment of interest upon a legacy, before such legacy becomes dne,

must not be broken in upon by an exception in favor of an adult legatee, however nearly

related to the testator: Haven v. Waite, 1 Swanst. 583; nor as illegitimate children are no

more, in legal contemplation, than strangers (Lowndes v. Lowndos, 15 Ves. 304), will interest

be allowed, by way of maintenance for such legatees : (Perry r. Whitehead, 6 Yes. 547), unless

it cau be satisfactorily collected from the will that the testator intended to give interest. Beck-

ford 0. Tobin, 1 Vos. Sen. 310; Ellis v. Ellis, 1 Sch. and Lef. 6; Newman t. Bateson, 3 Swanst.

690. Even in the case of a grandchild, an executor must not take upon himself to pay

interest upon a legacy by way of maintenance, when that is not expressly provided by the

will; for, though a court of equity will struggle in favor of the grandchild: (Crickett ».

Dolby, 3 id. 12; Collis v. Blackburn, 9 Yes. 470), yet it seems, there must be something

more than the mere gift of a legacy, something indicating that the testator put himself ia

loco parentig, to justify a court in decreeing iuterest for a grandchild's maintenance. Perry v.

Whitehead, 6 Ves. 547 ; Rawlins v. Goldtrap, 5 id. 443; Hill v. Hill, 3 Ves. and Bea. 186. But

of course, even when a legacy to a grandchild will never become due unless he attains his

majority, still, maintenance may be allowed for his support during his infancy, provided the

parties to whom the legacy is given over in case of the. infant's death are competent, and

willing, to consent. Caveudish v. Mercer, 5 Ves. 195, in note. Under any other circumstances,

when a legacy to infants is not given absolutely, and in all events, bnt is either not to vest till

a given period, or is subject to being devested by certain contingencies, upon the occurrence

of which it is given over: Errington v. Chapman, 12 Ves. 25; if the words of the will do

not authorize the application of interest t<> the maintenance of the infant legatees, a court

of equity never goes further than to say that, if it can collect before it, all the individuals

who may be entitled to the fund, so as to make each a compensation fur taking from him

part, it will grant an allowance for maintenance: Erratt v. Barlow, 14 Ves. 203; Marshall <-.

than money in the funds, interest upon the pecuniary legacies he baa charirod thereon is now
never given till the end of a year after hi" death. Gih~on ti. B11tt, 7 Vee. 97. The rule iii different with respect to le~ies charged on land. Whether tho rea.mn ae11ignod fur this distinction in the text, nnd m Yaxweil v. Wettenhall, 1 P. Wms. :.!5, he the true one, hae b1,-eu
douhted: a fund, consisting of personalty, may he "yfoldiug immediate profits." a&e well as
lands, but1 it i11 obvious thot tho reason of the rule as to the commencement of interest upon
legaci&1 given out of pert10uol e11tate, which i~ a role odopted merely for convenience (Garthshore ti. Chalie, 10 v~. 13; Wood v. Penoyre, 13 id. 333), cannot apply to the caee of legacies
not dependent on the getting in of the pert1oual C8tate, and charged upon land,; only; in such
ca:ie, interest, it has heon 1mid, must he chargeable from the death of the testator, or not at
all. Pearson ti. PeW'SOn, 1 Sch. and Lcf. 11; Spurway ti. Glynn, 9 Ves. 48."J; Shirt v. Westby,
16 id. 396.]
(39) [As a legacy, for the payment of which no other period is assigned by tho will
( Anonym. 2 Freem. 207), ii! not awe till the end of a year after the teste.tor's dee.th: Hearle ti.
Greenbank, 3 Atk. 716; and a.'! intere:;t cau only be claimed fi1r non-payment of a demand
actually due ; it is an undi11puted general rule, that although a legacy vests (where no special
inwntion to the contrary appean1) at the te~tator's death (Garth:,1hore "· Chalie, 10 Ves. 13), it
does not begin to carry iuterest till a year afterwsrd11, unless it be charged eolely on lauds.
(Sec the last note.) That ~eneral rule, however. has exceptions. Raven v. Waite, 1 Swaust.
'5!'>7 ; Beckfonl "· Tobin, 1 \ f!ll. Sen. 310; o tipecific beque.'lt of a. corpus po.'U!CS an immediate
gift of the fund, with all its produce, from the death of the t08tator. Kirby ti. Potter, 4 Ves.
751; Barrington v. Tristram, 6 id. :l-19. .Another exception ari868 when a legauy is given to
an infant by a parent, or by a henefactor, who has put himself in loco parenti8; in such
ca.~o, the necessary snpport of the infl\llt may require immediate payment of iutere:it. Lowndes
v. Lowndes, 15 Vee. 304; Heath"· Perry. 3 Atk. 10-.l; Mitchell v. Bower, 3 Vee. 287. It must,
however, be observed, thill latter exception operates only when the child is otherwise unprovided for; when a father ~ves a legauy to a child, it will carry interest from the death
of the testator, a.~ a maintenance for the child, where no other fund is applicahle for 11uch
iuaintenance: Carew v. .Askew, 1 Cox, 244; Harvey "· Harvey, 2 P. Wws. 22; but where
other means of support are provided for the child, then the legacy will not carry intcre:1t
frou~ an earlier peri~ th~u .it woul~ in the ca.;;e of a hequmit to a perfect s~anger. Wynch
v. '\\ yuch, 1 Cox, 435; Ell111 v. Ellis, 1 Sch. and Lef. 5; Tyrrel 11. Tyrrel, 4 ~es. 5. .And the
general rule as to non-p11yment of intere:st upon a legncy, before 1mch legucy becomes due,
lllllllt not be broken in npon by an eu·eption in favor of an ad11lt le~teo, however nearly
related to the testator: lfoven v. Waite, 1 Swanst. 58d; nor Bil illegit1lll1\te children are no
worll, in legal contemplation, than 11trangcrs (Lowndes v. Lowndos, 15 Ves. 304), will interetlt
be allowed, by way of maintenance for 11uch legatees: (Perryt1. Wbitehuad, 6 Ves. 547), unless
it can be l!atisfactorily collected fn>m the will that. the te8tator intended to give interedt. Beckford v. Tobin, 1 V 011. Sen. 310; Ellis ti. Ellis, 1 Sch. and Lcf. 6; Newmon 11. Batason, 3 Swanl!t.
690. Even in the C&:!e of a grandchild, an executor mu~t not take npon him1.1elf to pay
interest upon a legaoy by way of mainteuonce, when that is not expreii1dy provided hy the
will ; for, though a court of equity will struggle in favor of tho grandchild : (Crickett 11.
Dolby, 3 id. 1~; Collis v. Blackhurn, 9 Vei;. 470), yet it t!OOms, there lllU8t be son1othing
more than the mere gift. of a legacy, something indicatint: thot the te;;tator put himself in
loco.i1are11tid, to jm1tily a cou~ in decreeing int<:rest :or a _grandc~il~'s maintenance. Perry v.
Whiteheod, 6 Ve!'. 547; R11wlin11 v. Goldtrap, 5 1d. 443; Hill v. Hl11, 3 Ves. and Bea. 186. But
of course, ernn when a legacy to a grandchild will never become due unless he attains his
majority, still, maintenance may be allowed for his su1iport during bis infancy, pn1\·ided the
parties to whom the legacy is given over iu case of the. inf1U1t'11 deBth are oompoteut, and
willing, to con~ent. Cal·eudish v. Meroer, 5 Yes. 195, in note. Under any othllr oi.reumstanc&1,
when a legacy to infant:! i,; not given ab><0lutely, and in all events, bnt is either not to vest till
a i,rirnn period, or is subject to being devested by certain contingencies, upon the occurrence
of which it is given ovllr: Errington ii. Chapman, 12 Ves. 25; if t.he words of the will do
not authorize the application of interest to the maintenance of the infant legatees, a court
of equity never ~oe:i furthor than to say that, if it can collect before it, all the individnllls
who moy be entitled to the fund, so &.i to make eauh a oompelll!ation fur taking from hi1u
1mrt, it will ~rant an allowance for maintenance: Erro.tt ti. Barlow, 14 Ves. 203; llarsh&ll t1.
Holloway, 2 Swanst. 436; Ex parto Whitobead, 2 Younge and Jerb. 249; or, whllre there is
no gift. over, and all the children of a family are to take equally, there, although other
children may po11sihly come ;n esllt! a~r the onler made~ yet. Bil ~e ehildrun, l>oru ur to be
born, will he held to have o common mtero~t; and therefore, the mt.crest of the fund, as far
o.-; it may be requisite, will be npplicablo for mainteumwe. Fnirml\n ti. Green, 10 Yes. 4B;
GrncnwtllJ "· Greouwoll, 5 id. 199; Errat v. Barlow, 14 id. 205; Haley ti. B~nist.er, 4 lillMl.

Holloway, 2 Swanst. 436; Ex parte Whitehead, 2 Tounge and Jerb. 249; or, where there ia

no gift over, and all the children of a family are to take equally, there, although other

children may possibly come in esse after the order made, yet. all the children, boru ur to be

born, will be held to have a common interest; and therefore, the interest of the fund, as far

as it may be requisite, will be applicable for maintenance. Fairman c. Green, 10 Ves. 48;

Grcunwell v. Greouwell, 5 id. 199; Errat v. Borluw, 14 id. 205; Holey r. Bannister, 4 Mad.
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donation causa mortis. And that is, when a person in his last sickness, appre-

hending his dissolution near, delivers or causes to be delivered to another the

possession of any personal goods (under which have been included bonds, and

bills drawn by the deceased upon his banker,) to keep in case of his decease.

This gift, if the donor dies, needs not the assent of his executor: yet it shall

not prevail against creditors ; and is accompanied with this implied trust, that,

if the donor lives, the property thereof shall revert to himself, being only given

in contemplation of death, or mortis causa, (i) (40) This method of donation

fij Prco. Chanc. 269. 1 P. Wins. 406, 441. 3 P. Wma. J57.

280. But, if the will contain successive limitations, under which persons of another family, and

donation causa mortis. And that is, when a person in his last sickness, apprehending his dissolutio1t near, delh·ers or causes to be delivered to another the
. possession of uny personal goods (nnde1· which have been included bonds, and
bills drawn by the deceased upon his banker,) to keep in case of his decease.
·.This gift, if the donor dies, needs not the assent of his executor: yet it shall
not pl'evail against creditors; and is accompanied with this implied trust, that,
if the donor lives, the property thereof shall revert to himself, being only giYen
in contemplation of death, or morti& causa. (i) ( 40) '!'his method of donation

not in being, may become entitled; it is not sufficient that all parties presumptively entitled,

OJ Proo. Chane. 269. 1 P. Wms. '°6, «I. 3 P. Wms. 35'7.

then living, are before the court; for none of the living may bo the parties who, eventually,

may become entitled to the property. In such a case, an order for interest by way of mainte-

nance might be, in effect, to give to one person the property of another. Marshall v. Holloway,

2 Swanst. 436; Ex part* Kebble, 11 Yes. 603.

No exception is to be made, in favor of the testator's wife, to the general rule that a pecuni-

ary legacy does not bear interest before the time when the principal ought to be paid, unless a

distinct intention to give interest from an earlier period can be fairly collected from the testa-

tor's will. Stent v. Robinson, 12 Ves. 461; Lowndes v. Lowndes, 15 id. 304; Raven u. Waitc,

1 Swanst. 559.]

(40) A ilium/in CHUM mortis is a gift of personal chattels made by a person with a view to his

own death, and conditioned to take effect only on the donor's death by his existing disorder.
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Smith c. Kittridge, 21 Vt. 245; Wells r. Tucker, 3 Binn. 370; Raymond t>. Sellick, 10 Conn.

480; Smith v. Downey, 3 Ired. Eq. 268; Knott v. Hogan, 4 Met. Ky. 99. The gift is therefore

defeated if the donor survives the disorder. It has many of the properties of a legacy: it may

be revoked at any time; it is lost if the donor survives the donee, aud it is liable to the donor's

debts in case of deficiency of assets. Jones r. Selby, Prec. in Ch. 303; Tate ». Hilbert. 2 Ves.

120; Walter ». Hodge, 2 Swanst. 98; Miller e, Miller, 3 P. Wins. 357 ; Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn.

370; Grant v. Tucker, 18 Ala. 27; Jones v. Brown, 34 N. H. 439; Huntington v. Gilinore, 14

Barb. 244. But it docs not require to be probated as a will. Ward v. Turner, 2 Tes. Sen. 435.

There must be a delivery of the chattels by the donor in his lifetime; and this delivery ought

to be an actual delivery into the hands of the donee, or as near such a delivery as the circum-

stances render practicable. Bowers v. Hurd, 1C) Mass. 427; McDowell v. Murdock, 1 Xott and

McC. 239; Miller v. Jeffress, 4 Grat. 479; Harris v. Clark, 3 N. T. 93; Cutting v. Oilman, 41

N. H. 147; Lewis t>. Walker, 8 Humph. 508; Michener v. Dale, 23 Penn. St. 59. A previous

and continued possession, or an after-acquired possession by the donee will not generally be

sufficient. Gough v. Findon, 7 Exch. 48; Miller v. Jeffress 4 Grat 479; Dole r. Lincoln, 31

Me. 422. Delivery to a third person for the donee is a good delivery: Coutant v. Schuyler, I

Paige, 316; Sessions v. Moseley, 4 Gush. 87 ; Dresser v. Dresser, 46 Me. 48 ; Jones v. Deyer, 16

Ala. 221; and such delivery may be made to one iu trust for another. Dresser v. Dresser, 46

Me. 48; Kemper v. Kemper, 1 Duv. Ky. 401. It is doubtful if a written instrument of transfer

which is delivered is sufficient as a substitute for actual delivery of the chattels, but in Powell

v. Leonard, 9 Fla. 359, a deud of a mother and children, slaves, was sustained as a good gift of

all, where the mother was present at the time and the usual words of delivery were spoken,

though the children were absent and not delivered. Negotiable securities may be the subject of

this species of gift: Bradley t>. Hunt, 5 Gill and J. 58 ; Holley v. Adams, 16 Vt. 206; Grover

v. Grover, 24 Pick. 261; Harris c. Clark, 3 X. Y. 93 ; Bedell v. Oarll, 33 N. Y. 581; and so it

seems, may a bond, or any other written contract of a third person: Brown ». Brown, 18 Conn.

410; Meach ». Meoch. 24 Vt. 591; Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198; Waring v. Edmonds, 11 Md.

424 ; Sessions v. Moseley, 4 Gush. 87; Bonueman v. Sidliuger, 21 Me. 185; but not the donor's

own note or other executory promise : Holley v. Adams, 16 Vt. 206; Copp v. Sawyer, 6 N. H.

386; Thompson v. Dorsoy, 4 Md. Ch. Dec. 145; Parish v. Stone, 14 Couu. 198; "Michener v.

Dale, 23 Penn. St. 59; Harris v. Clark, 3 N. T. 93; Smith v. Kittridge, 21 Vt. 238; Dole v.

Lincoln, 31 Me. 422 ; Flint v. Pattee, 33 N. H. 520; nor his order on a third person, or his check

on a bank, which remains unaccepted at his death. See Nat. Bank e. Williams, 13 Mich. 282 ;

Brown r. Moore, 3 Head. 671; Ashbrook v. Ryon, 2 Bush, 228. A life insurance policy may be

the subject of this gift: Witt v. Amis, 1 El. B. and S. 10i); and so may a certificate of stock: Al-

lerton v. Lang, 10 13osw. 362 ; though this has been doubted. Pennington v. Gittings's Ex'r, 2

Gill and J. 208. The gift may be mode by wife to husband and husband to wife ; Caldwell v.

Renfrew, 33 Vt. 213 ; but if by law the wife cannot make a will except with the consent of the

husband, the power to muku this gift is subject to the same limitation. Jones v. Brown, 34 N.

H. 439. Resumption of possession by the donor revokes the gilt. Bnnn v. Markhain, 7 Taunt.

280. But, ifthe will contain s11cce&SifJe limitatiolt.S, under whioh persons of another family, and
not in being, ma.y become entitled; it is not sufficient that all partie11 presumptively entitled,
then living, are before the court; for none of the living may bo the parties who, eventually,
may become ontiUed to the property. In such a case, an order for int(lrti~t by way of maintenance might be, in eff'eot, to give to one per::1on the property of another. llal'l!hall ti. Holloway,
2 Swalll!t. 436; Ex pnrte Kcbble, 11 Vee. 603.
No exception is to be made, in favor of the testator's wife, to the general rule that a pecuniary legacy does not bear interest before the time when the principal OUl(ht to be paid, unless a
distinct intention to give intore:it from an earlier period can be fairly collected from tte testator's will. Stent "· Robinson, 12 Ves. 461; Lownde;i ti. Lowndes, 15 id. 30.S; Ra"en ti. Waite,
1Swanst.559.)
( 40) A doMtio caua morti8 is a. gift ofper8onal ch&ttelR made by a pet'llon with a view to his
own death. and conditioned to take effect only on the donor's death by his existing disorder.
Smith v. Kittridge, 21 Vt. 245; Well8 "· Tucker, 3 Dinn. 370; Raymund ti. Sellick, 10 Conn.
480; Smith c. Downey, 3 Ired. Eq. 268; Knott ti. Hogan, 4 Met. Ky. 99. The gift is therefore
defeated if the douorsurvi\·e~ the disorder. It b&.~ many of the properties of a legacy: it may
be reToked at any time; it is lost if the donor survives the donee, and it i11 liable to the donor's
debts in case of deficiency of asset.i. Jones "·Selby, Pree. in Cb. 30:J; Tate ti. Hilbert, 2 Ve11.
120; Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swanst. 98; Miller"· Miiler, 3 P. Wmi1. 357; Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn.
370; Grant v. Tucker, 18 .Ala. 27; Jones v. Brown, 34 N. H. 439; Huntington ti. Gilmore, 14
Barb. 244. Bnt it does not require to be probated ~ a will. Ward "· Turner, 2 Ves. Sen. 435.
There must be a delivery of the chattels by the donor in his lifetime ; and thi~ delivery ought
to be an actual delivery into the ho.lllls of the donee, or ail near su~h a delivery as the circumstances render pmctico.ble. Bowers v. Hunl. 10 llai:;s. 427; McDowell v. Murdock, 1 Xott and
McC. 239; Miller v. J cffress, 4 Grat. 479; Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93 ; Cutting v. Gilman, 41
N. H. 147; Lewis ti. Walker, 8 Humph. 508; Michener v. Dale, 23 Penn. St. &9. .A. previous
and continued poSdession, or an after-acq nired possession by the doneti will not generally he
sufficient. Gough ti. l<'indon, 7 Exch . 48; llilier t". Jetfro:ss 4 Grat. 479; Dole ii. Line.olu, :n
.Me. 42t.. Delivery to a third per:>on for the donee i11 a good delh-ery: Coutant v. Schuyler, 1
Paige, 316; Sessions v. Moseley, 4 Cush. 87; Dre~.ser ti. Dre;iser, 46 Ye. 48; Junes ti. Deyer, 16
.A.la. 2'.ll ; and such delivery may be made to one m tnu1t fur anuth11r. Dresser ti. Dresser, 46
lie. 48; Kemper v. Kemper, 1 Duv. Ky. 401. It is doubtful if a written iustrument of tran,.;for
which is delivered i11 sufficient &.i a ~ub,,:titute for actual delivery of the chat.tels, but in Powoll
ti. Leonard, 9 !<'I&. 359. a deud of a mi>ther and childreu, slaves, WllS sustained as o. good gift of
&11, where the mothur was prc:>cnt at the time and the nsual words of delivery were spoken,
though the children were 11.lJHent and not delivered. Negotiable securities may be the suhject of
this specie~ of !Si~: Bradley v. Hunt, 5 Gill and J. 58 ; Holley "· .A.do.m:1, 16 Vt. 206; Grorer
v. Gruver, 24 Pick. 261; Harris c. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93; Bodell v. Carll, :J:J N. Y. 581; and so it
seems, may a bond, or any other written contract of a thir<l person: Brown v. Brown, 18 Conn.
410; lleooh v. M1~ach. 24 Vt. 591; Pnri~h v. St.one, 14 Pick. Hl8; Waring ti. Edmonds, 11 Md.
424; Ses11ions v. Mo1mley, 4 Cul!h. 87; Bonnema.n ti. Sidlingor, 21 Me. l~; but not the donor's
own note or other executory promise: Holley v. Adams, 16 Vt. 206; Copp v. Sawyer, 6 N. H.
386; Thompson ti. porsoy, 4. lid. Ch. Dec. 145; Palish !'· Stone~ l~ Cun~. 198; ~ichener v.
Dale, 23 Penn. St. a9; Hams v. Clark, 3 .N. Y. 9"J; Smith "· K1ttndge, 21 Vt. ~JS; Dole v.
Lincoln, 31 Me. 422; Flint ti. Pattee, 3:J N. H. 5~; nor his order on a third person, or his check
on a bank, which remains unaccl'ptHd at his death. See Nat. Bank v. Williams, 13 Mich. 2'-ll!;
Hrown 11. Moore, 3 Head. 671; A.tilibnmk v. Ryon, 2 Bui;h, 2:.!8. .A. life insurance policy may be
the subject of this gift: Witt v. Amis, 1 El. B. and S. lOJ; and so may a certificate of stock: Allerton v. Lang, 10 llusw. 362; though this ha.~ been doubted. Pennington v. Gittings's Ex'r. 2
Gill a.nu J. :.!Od. The gift may be made by wife to husband and husband w wife; (Jaldwell v.
Rtmfrew, 33 Vt. 213; but ii by law tho wife cannot make a will except with the consent of the
husband, the power to make this gill. i11 subject to the l'ISme limitation. Jones t1. Brown, 3.t N.
H. 439. Resumption or po!lse~~iuu l>y the donor revokes t~e git\. Bunn ti. Mark~am, ~ 'faunt.
23'.l; S. C. 2 Mar'l!h. 53tJ. The so.me dangers attend these gift:! Ill! attend nuncupat1ve w11ls, and
they are not favored in the law. Westerloo v. De Witt, 35 Barb. :.!15. If made upon condition,
e. g., that the gift shall be all the donee shall have from the donor's property-they must be
accepted subject to the condition. Currie v. Steele, 2 Sandt'. 542.
T

232; S. C. 2 Marsh. 539. The same dangers attend these gifts as attend nuncupative wills, aud

they are not favored in the law. Westerloo v. De Witt, 35 Barb. 215. If made upon condition,

e. g., that the gift shall be all the donee shall have from the donor's property—they must be

accepted subject to the condition. Currie v. Steelo, 2 Saudi'. 542.
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might have subsisted in a state of nature, being always accompanied with* de-

livery of actual possession; (k) and so far differs from a testamentary disposi-

tion : but seems to have been handed to us from the civil lawyers, (I) who them-

selves borrowed it from the Greeks, (m)

7. When all the debts and particular legacies are discharged, the surplus or

residuum must be paid to the residuary legatee, if any be appointed by the will;

and if there be none, it was long a settled notion that it devolved to the execu-

tor's own use, by virtue of his executorship. (») But whatever ground there

might have been formerly for this opinion, it seems now to be understood (o)

with this restriction; that although where the executor has no legacy at all, the

residuum shall in general be his own, yet wherever there is sufficient *on the

F *5151 ^ace °^ a w^ (ky means of a competent legacy or otherwise,) to imply

*- l J that the testator intended his executor should not have the residue, the

undevised surplus of the estate shall go to the next of kin, (41) the executor

then standing upon exactly the same footing as an administrator, concerning

whom, indeed, there formerly was much debate, (p) whether or no he could

be compelled to make any distribution of the intestate's estate. For, though

(after the administration was taken in effect from the ordinary, and trans-

ferred to the relations of the deceased) the spiritual court endeavoured to com-

pel a distribution, and took bonds of the administrator for that purpose, they

were prohibited by the temporal courts, and the bonds declared void at law.

(q) And the right of the husband not only to administer, but also to enjoy ex-
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clusively, the effects of his deceased wife, depends still on this doctrine of the

common law: the statute of frauds declaring only, that the statute of distribu-

tions does not extend to this case. But now these controversies are quite at an

end; for, by the statute 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 10, explained by 29 id. c. 30, it is

enacted, that the surplusage of intestates' estates, (except of femes-covert, which

are left as at common law), (r) shall, after the expiration of one full year from

the death of the intestate, be distributed in the following manner: One-third

shall go to the widow of the intestate, and the residue in equal proportions to

his children, or, if dead, to their representatives; that is, their lineal descend-

ants : if there are no children or legal representatives subsisting, then a moiety

shall go to the widow, and a moiety to the next of kindred in equal degree and

their representatives: if no widow, the whole shall go to the children: if neither

widow nor children, the whole shall be distributed among the next of kin in

equal degree and their representatives: hut no representatives are admitted,

among collaterals, farther than the children of the intestate's brothers and sis-

ters. («) The next of kindred, here referred to, are to be investigated by the same

rules of consanguinity, as those who are entitled to letters of administration; of

F *51 fi 1 wnom we nave sufficiently spoken, (t) *And therefore by this statute

L J the mother as well as the father, succeeded to all the personal effects of

their children, who died intestate and without wife or issue; in exclusion of the

other sons and daughters, the brothers and sisters of the deceased. And so the

law still remains with respect to the father; but by statute 1 Jac. II, c. 17, if

the father be dead, and any of the children die intestate without wife or issue,

(k) Law of Forfeit. 18. (1) Inst. a. 7,1. -If- '• 39. *• 8-

(m) There is a very complete donatio mortit cauta, in the Odyssey, b. 17, T. 78, made by Telomachos to

his friend Pinens ; and another by HercnlCB in the Alcestes of Euripides, V. 1030.

roJPrec. Ch'anc.'jBS. 1 P. Wms.7, 544. 2 P. Wmg. 838. 3 P. Wins. 43, 1M. Stra. 689. Lavaon T. Law-

ton. Dom. Proc. 28 Apr. 1777.

(p) Godolpn, p. 2, c. 82. <q)\ LeT. 833. Cart. 125. 2 P. Wm». 447. (T) Stat. 29 Car. H, c. 3, J 25.

(t) Kaym. 496. Lord Baym. 571. (t) Page 604.

(41) But the rnle is now otherwise under statutes 11 Geo. IT, and 1 "William IV, o. 40, which

enacts that executors shall be deemed by courts of equity to be trustees for the persons who

would be entitled under the statutes of distributions, in respect of any residue not expressly

disposed of by any testator's will, unless it shall appear by the will, or a codicil thereto, that

the persons appointed executors were intended to take such residue beneficially.
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in the lifetime of the mother, she and each of the remaining children, or their

representatives, shall divide his effects in equal portions. (42)

• It is obvious to observe, how near a resemblance this statute of distributions

bears to our ancient English law, de rationabili parts bonorum ; spoken of at

•the beginning of this chapter; (7*) and which Sir Edward Coke (w) himself,

though he doubted the generality of its restraint on the power of devising by

will, held to be universally binding (in point of conscience at least) upon the

administrator or executor, in the case of either a total or partial intestacy. It

also bears some resemblance to the Roman law of succession aJb intestato (x)

which, and because the act was also penned by an eminent civilian, (y) has

occasioned a notion that the parliament of England copied it from the Koman

praetor: though, indeed, it is little more than a restoration, with some refine-

ments and regulations, of our old constitutional law; which prevailed as an

established right and custom from the time of King Canute downwards,

many centuries before Justinian's laws were known or heard of in the western

parts of Europe. So, likewise, there is another part of the statute of distribu-

tions, where directions are given that no child of the intestate (except his heir-

at-law) on whom he settled in his lifetime any estate in lands, or pecuniary

portion, equal to the distributive shares of the other children, shall have any

part of the surplusage with their "brothers and sisters; but, if the estates r +KJ « -i

so given them, by way of advancement, are not quite equivalent to the L •*

other shares, the children so advanced shall now have so much as will make
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them equal. This just and equitable provision hath been also said to be

derived from the collagio bonorum of the imperial law: (z) which it certainly

resembles in some points, though it differs widely in others. But it may not be

amiss to observe, that with regard to goods and chattels, this is part of the

ancient custom of London, of the province of York, and of our sister kingdom

of Scotland; and, with regard to lands descending in coparcenary, that it hath

always been, and still is, the common law of England, under the name of

hotchpot, (a) (43)

(11) Page 492. (v) 1 lust. 33. See 1 P. Wm«. 8.

(x) The general rale of such successions was this: 1. The children or lineal descendants in equal por-

tions. 2. On (allure of these, the parents or lineal ascendants, and with them the brethren or sister* of the

whole blood ; m-, if the parents were dead, all the brethren and sisters, together with the representatives

of a broi her or sister deceased. 3. The next collateral relations In equal degree. 4. The husband or wifo

of the dflccaMd. (/•/. 38, 15,1. Nov. 118, c. 1, 2, 3, 127, c. 1.)

(y) Sir Walter. Lord Raym. 574. (a) fy. 37, 6,1. (a) See oh. 12, page 191.

(42) [The next of kin, who ore to have the benefit of the statute of distribution*!, must be

ascertained according to the computation of the civil law, including the relations both on the

paternal and maternal aides.

And when the relations are thus found who are distant from the intestate by an equal num-

ber of degrees, they will share the personal property equally, although they are relations to

the intestate of very different denominations, and perhaps not relations to each other. There

is only one exception to this rule, viz.: where the nearest relations are a grandfather or

grandmother, and brothers or sisters, although all these are related in the second degree, yet

the former shall not participate with the latter; for which singular exception it does not appear

that any good reason can be given. 3 Atk. 762. No difference is made between the whole and

half blood in the distribution of intestate personal property.]

(43) An advancement is a giving by a parent to a child by anticipation, the whole or some

part of what it is supposed the child will be entitled to on the death of the parent. Osgood v.

Breed's Heirs, 17 Mass. 358; Jackson r. Matsdorf, 11 Johns. 91; Dillman v. Cox, 23 Ind. 442.

Whether a gift is to be regarded an absolute gift or an advancement must depend npon the

intent of the donor at the time it is made: Meeker v. Meeker, 16 Conn. 387; Sherwood v.

Smith, 23 id. 521; Kesmith v. Drasmore, 17 N. H. 515; Bay v. Cook, 31 111. 345; Kingsbury'8

Appeal, 44 Perm. St. 460; and this intent is generally to be arrived at by what took place at

the time, or by a charge made by the parent against the child, or by some writing given to

the parent by the child; and in some of the states written evidence is required by statute. In

the absence of any inflexible role by statute, and of evidence showing a contrary intent, a purchase

by a parent in the name of the child, or a gift of property to the child not by way of support or

education merely, is presumed to be intended as an advancement. Hatch v. Straight, 3 Conn. 34;

Dillman v. Cox, 23 Ind. 440; Murphy c. Nathans, 46 Penn. St. 508; Parks v. Parks, 19 Md. 323;

Baytr. Cook, 31 111. 336; Autrey v. Autrey'a Adminia. 37 Ala. 614; Merrill v. Rhodes, id. 449;

Johnson r. Hoyle, 3 Head. 56. If the parent die intestate, the advancement, must be brought
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Before I quit this subject I must, however, acknowledge that the doctrine and

limits of representation laid down in the statute of distributions, seem to have

been principally borrowed from the civil law: whereby it will sometimes hap-

pen, that personal estates are divided per capita, and sometimes per stirpes;

whereas the common law knows no other rule of succession but ih&tper stirpes

only, (b) They are divided per capita, to every man an equal share, when all

the claimants claim in their own rights, as in equal degree of kindred, and not

jure representation's, in the right of another person. As, if the next of kin be

the intestate's three brothers, A B and C; here his effects are divided into three

equal portions, and distributed per capita, one to each: but, if one of these

brothers, A, had been dead, leaving three children, and another, B, leaving two;

then the distribution must have been per stirpes: viz.: one-third to A's three

children, another third to B's two children, and the remaining third to C. the

surviving brother; yet, if C had also been dead, without issue, then A's and B's

five children, being all in equal degree to the intestate, would take in their own

rights per capita, viz.; each of them one-fifth part (c)

The statute of distributions expressly excepts and reserves the customs of the

F *518 1 ctty °^ London °f the province of York, *and of all other places having

*• J peculiar customs of distributing intestates' effects. So that, though in

those places the restraint of devising is removed by the statutes formerly men-

tioned, (d) their ancient customs remain in full force, with respect to the estates

of intestates. I shall, therefore, conclude this chapter, and with it the present
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book, with a few remarks on those customs.

In the first place we may observe, that, in the city of London, (e) and prov-

ince of York, (/) as well as in the kingdom of Scotland, (g) and probably

also in Wales, (concerning which there is little to be gathered but from the

statute 7 and 8 Wm. III. c. 38,) the effects of the intestate, after payment of

his debts, are in general divided ascording to the ancient universal doctrine of

the pars rationabilis. If the deceased leaves a widow and children, his sub-

stance (deducting for the widow her apparel and the furniture of her bed-cham-

ber, which in London is called the widow's clwimber) is divided into three parts;

one of which belongs to the widow, another to the children, and the third to

the administrator: if only a widow, or only children, they shall respectively, in

either case, take one moiety, and the administrator the other; (h) if neither

widow nor child, the administrator shall have the whole, (t) And this portion,

or dead man's part, the administrator was wont to apply to his own use, (k) till

the statute 1 Jac. II, c. 17, declared that the same should be subject to the stat-

ute of distributions. So that if a man dies worth 1,800?. personal estate, leav-

ing a widow and two children, this estate shall be divided into eighteen parts;

whereof the widow shall have eight, six by the custom and two by the statute;

and each of the children five, three by the custom and two by the statute: if he

leaves a widow and one child, she shall still have eight parts, as before; and the

child shall have ten, six by the custom and four by the statute: if he leaves a

(6) See oh. 14, page S17. (c) Free. Chanc. 54. (d) Page 493.

(e} Lord Ravin. 1329. (/) 2 Burn. E«:l. Law, 716. (g, Ibid. 782.

(h) 1 P. \Vnirt. 341. Salk. 246. (i) 2 Show. 173. (t) 2Frcem. 85. 1 Vern. 133.

into totchpot, by which is understood that it must be accounted for as a part of the estate,

in order that when an equal division is made the donee shall receive his share only, including

the advancement. Grattan v. Grattan, 18 111. 170; Thompson v. Carmichael, 3 Sandf. Ch.

120; Brcwton v. Brewton, 30 Geo. 416; Greene's Exr. v. Speer, 37 Ala. 532. And in case the

parent dies testate, the advancement may be taken into account in satisfaction, wholly or in

part, of a legacy, if such be the direction of the will. Hall v. Davis, 3 Pick. 450; Manning

v. Manning, 12 Rich. Eq. 410; Langdon ». Aster's Exr. 1(5 X. Y. 9. "When brought into

hotchpot, the child is charged with the value of the property at the time the advancement was

made. Bemis v. Stearns, 16 Mass. 200 ; Osgood v. Breed, 17 id. 356; Stearns v. Stearns, 1 Pick. 157;

Grattan v. Grattan, 18 111. 170; Towles v. Koundtree, 10 Fla. 299; Jackson e Matsdorf,

11 Johns. 91.

As a general thing this subject will now be found regulated by statute. See Barton v. Rice,

22 Pick. 508; Porter v. Porter, 51 Me. 376.
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•widow and no child, the widow shall have three-fourths of the whole, two by the

custom and one by the *statute; and the remaining fourth shall go by •- #5191

the statute to the next of kin. It is also to be observed, that, if the *• '

wife be provided for by a jointure before marriage, in bar of her customary part,

it puts her in a state of non-entity, with regard to the custom only ; (I) but she

shall be entitled to her share of the dead man's part under the statute of dis-

tributions, unless barred by special agreement, (m) And if any of the children

are advanced by the father, in his lifetime, with any sum of money (not amount-

ing to their full proportionable part), they shall bring that portion into hotch-

pot with the rest of the brothers and sisters, but not with the widow, (44) before

they are entitled to any benefit under the custom :(n) but, if they are fully

advanced, the custom entitles them to no further dividend, (o)

Thus far in the main the customs of London and of York agree; but besides

certain other less material variations, there are two principal points in which

they considerably differ. One is, that in London the share of the children (or

orphanage part) is not fully vested in them till the age of twenty-one, before

which they cannot dispose of it by testament: (p) and, if they die under that

age,. whether sole or married, their share shall survive to the other children;

but after the age of twenty-one, it is free from any orphanage custom, and, in

case of intestacy, shall fall under the statute of distributions, (q) The other that

in the province of York, the heir at common law, who inherits any land either

in fee or in tail, is excluded from any filial portion or reasonable part, (r) But,
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notwithstanding these provincial variations, the customs appear to be substan-

tially one and the same. And, as a similar policy formerly prevailed in every

part of the island, we may fairly conclude the whole to be of British original; or,

if derived from the Roman law of successions, to hare been drawn from that

fountain much earlier than the time of Justinian, from whose constitutions in

many points *(particularly in the advantages given to the widow) it very

considerably differs; though it is not improbable that the resemblances

which yet remain may be owing to the Roman usages; introduced in the time

of Claudius Caesar, who established a colony in Britain to instruct the natives in

fegal knowledge; (a) inculcated and diffused by Papinian, who presided at York

*& prafectus prcetorio, under the Emperors Severusand Caracalla: (t) and contin-

ued by his successors till the final departure of the Romans in the beginning

of the fifth century after Christ.

(I) 2 Vern. 686. 3 P. Wine. 18. (m) 1 Vcrn. 15. 2 Chan. Rep. 252.

(n)2 Freem. 279. 1 Eq. Cos. Abr. 155. 2 P. Wms. 520. (o) 2 P. Wms. 527. (p) 2 Vern. 558.

(q> Free. Chano. 637. (r) 2 Barn. 751. («) Tacit. Annul. L IS, c. 82.

(?) Selden, la Flctam, cap. 4, f 3.

(44) [Advances which an intestate has made to any of his children, are never brought into

hotchpot for the benefit of his widow: Kircudbright v. Kirkcudbright, 8 Tes. 64; but solely

widow and no child, the widow shall have three-fourths of the whole, two by the
custom and one by the •statute; and the remaining fourth shall go by [ • 5191
the statute to the next of kin. It is also to be observed, that, if the
wife be provided for by a join tu re before marriuge, in bar of her customary part,
it puts her in a state of non-entity, with regard to the custom only; (l) but s~e
shall be entitled to her share of the dead man's part under the statute of distributions, unless barred by special agreement. (m) And if any of the children
are advanced by the father, in his lifetime, with any sum of money (not amounting to their full proportionahlc part), they shall bring that portion into hotchpot with the rest of the brothers and sisters, but not with the widow, (44) before
they are entitled to any benefit under the custom: (n) but, if they are fully
advanced, the custom entitles them to no further dividend. ( o)
Thus far in the main the customs of London and of York agree; but besides
certain other less material variations, there are two principal points in which
they considerably differ. One is, that in London the share of the children (or
orphanage part) is not fully Yested in them till the age of twenty-one, before
which they cannot dispose of it by testament: (p) and, if they die under that
age, . whether sole or married, their share shall survive to the other children;
but after the age of twenty-one, it is free from any orphanage custom, 8nd, in
case of intestacy, shall fall under the statute of distributions. (q) The other that
in the province of York, the heir at common law, who inherits any land either
in fee or in tail, is excluded from any filial portion or reasonable part. (r) But,
notwithstanding these provincial variations, the customs appear to be substantially one and the same. And, as a similar policy formerly prerniled in every
part of the island, we may fairly conclude the whole to be of British original; or,
if derived from the Roman law of successions, to haTe been drown from that
fountain much earlier than the time of Justinian, from whose constitutions in
manv points •(particularly in the advantages given to the widow) itvery [ • 520 ]
conslderably differs; though it is not improbable that the resembhmces
which yet remain may be owing to the Roman usages; introduced in the time
of Claudius Cresar, who established a colony in Britain to instruct the natives in
fegal knowledge; (s) inculcated and diffused by Pnpini1m, who presided at York
JIB prwfectus prmtorio, under the Emperors Severus and Caracalla: ( t) and continded by his successors till the final departure of the Romans in the beginning
of the fifth century after Christ.
Ill 2 Vern. 0611. 3 P . Wms. lll.
Im) l Vern. 15. 2 Chan. Rep. 252.
(nJ 2 Freem. 279. 1 Eq. Cas. Abr, 15.~. 2 P. Wms. 52G.
(O) 2 P. Wms. flrl.
(q) Pree. Chane. 637.
\r) 2 Buro. 75&.
(IJ Tacit. Auna!. L 12, c. 8~.
(t) Selden, In l1ctam, cap. '• t 3.

(p) 2 Vern.

MS.

with a view to equality as amongst the children: Gibbons ». Cannt, 4 Ves. 847; and in cases

arising upon the custom of London, tbe effect of the full advancement of one child is merely

to remove that child out of the way, and to increase the shares of the others. Polices v.

Western, 9 Ves. 460. So, when a settlement bars, or makes a composition for, the wife's cus-

tomary share, that share, if the husband die intestate, will be distributable as if he had left

no wife: Knipe v. Thornton, 2 Eden, 121; Morris v. Burrows, 2 Atk. 629; Read v. Snell, id.

644; and will not go to increase what is called " the dead man's part:" Hcdcalfe v. Ives, 1

Atk. 63; to a distributive share of which the widow would be entitled, notwithstanding she

had compounded for her customary part: "Whithill v. Phelps, Free, in Ch. 328; unless the

expressed, or clearly implied, intention was, that she should be barred as well of her share

of the dead man's part, as of her share by the custom. Benson v. Bellasis, 1 Vern. 16. A

jointure in bar of dower, without saying more, will be no bar of a widow's claim to a customary

share of personal estate; for dower affects lands only, and land ia wholly out of the custom.

Babington v. Greenwood, 1 P. Wms. 531.]

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

( 44) [Advances which an intestate hl\S made t.-0 any of his children, are never brought iut.-0
hotcbpot for the benefit of his widow: Kircuclbright v. Kircadbright, 8 VeR. 64; hut solely
with a view t.-0 equality as amongst the children: Gibbons v. Cannt, 4 Ves. 847; and in cases
arising upon the custom of London, the effect of the full advancement of one child is merely
to remove that child out of the way, and t.-0 increase the shares of the others. Folkes v.
Western, 9 Ves. 4t'i0. So, when a i.ettloment barg, or makes a composition for, the wife's cust.-Omary share, that Rbare, if the hu~band die intestate, will be di~trilmtablo as if be had left
no wife: Knipe v. Thomt;on, 2 Eden, 121; Morris v. Burrows, 2 Atk. 629; Read v. Snell, id.
644; and will not go t.-0 increase what is called "the dead man's part:" .Medcalfe v. Ive:'l, 1
.A.tk. 63; to a distributive share of which the widow would be entitled, notwith8tanding 11he
had compounded for her cu~tomary part: Whithill ti. Phelps, Pree. in Cb. 3'~; uulcs:1 the
expressed, or clearly implied, intention was, that she Rhould be barred as well of her share
of the dead man'R part, as of her share by the cut'tom. Benson ti. Bellasi!1, 1 Vcm. 16. A
jointurc in bar of dower. without saying more, will be no bar of a widow's claim to a customary
share of personal estate ; for dower affects lands only, and land is wholly out of the cust.-Om.
Babington v. Greenwood, 1 P. Wms. 531.]
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APPENDIX.

No. I.

YETUS CARTA FEOFFAMENTI.

SOIAST presents et fhturi, quod ego "Willielmus, filins "Williehni de Segenhp,

dedi, coneessi, et hac present! carta moa confirmavi, Johanni quondam filio

Johannis de Saleford, pro quandam snmma peexmie quam michi debit pre mani-

bus, unai11 acram terre mee uralijlis, jacentem in campo de Saleford, juxta terram

APPENDIX.

quondam Richardi de la Mere: Habendam et Tenendam totam predictam acram ir<airn,inm and

terre, cum omnibus ejus pertinentiis, prefato Johanni, et heredibus suis, et suis

a-isijrimtis, de capitalibus dominis feodi: Jteddendo et faciendo annuatim eisdem

dominis capitalibus servitia inde debita et consueta: Kl ego predictus 'Williel-

mus, et heredes mei, et mei assignati, totam predictam acram terre, cum omnibus

Bnis pertinentiis, predioto Johanni de Saleford, et heredibus suis et suis assignatis,

No. I.

contra omnes gentes warrantizabimus in perpetuum. In cujus rei testimonium concimion.

liuic present! carte sigillum meum apnosui: llii.i testibus, Nigello de Saleford,

VETUS CA.RT.A.. FEOFFA..YENTI.

Jobanne de Seybroke, Radulpho clenco de Saleford, Johanne molendario de

eadem villa, et aliis. Data apud Saleford die Yeneris proximo ante festnm

saucte Margarets Tirgmis, anno regni regis EDWAKDI fillii regis EOWARDI sexto.

(L. S.)

MEMORANDUM, quod die et anno infrascriptis plena et pacifica Lirery of ««isln

geisina acre infraspecificate, cum pertinentiis, data et deliberate fuit endor«ed.

per infranominatum Williclumm de Segenho infrauominato Juhanni

de Saleford, in propriis personis suis, secumdum tenorem et effectun
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carte infrascripte, in presentia Xigolli de Saleford, Jobannis de Sey-

broke et aliorum.

No. II.

A MODERN CONVEYANCE BT LEASE AND RELEASE.

SECT. 1. LEASE OR BARGAIN AND SALE, FOR A YEAR.

THIS IJTOENTURE, made the third day of September, in the twenty-first year ;

SotABT presents et futuri, quod ego Willielmus, filius Willielmi de Segenho, Premtee&.
dedi, conoessi, et bac presenti carta mea confirmavi, Johanui quondam filio
.lohannis de Saleford, pro quandam BUillID& pecunie quam michi debit pre manibus, unam acram terre mee arobilis, jaci:utem in campo de Saleford, juxta terram
quondam Riohardi de la Mere: Habendatn et Timenda·m totum predictam acram HClbmecflml alld
terre, cum omnibll8 eju11 pertinentiis, prefato Johanni, et heredibus suis, et snis ~
assignatis, de capitalibus dominill fecidi: Reddendo et facieudo annuatim ciRdem ~
dominLi capitalibus lllln·itia inde dcbita et consueta: Et ego predictus Willie!·
mus, et heredes mei, et mei assignati, totam predictam acram terro, cum omnibus Wr.rnnty.
snis pertiuentiis, predioto J ohanni de Saleford, et heredibus suis et snis assignatis,
contra omnes gentes warrantizabimus in perpetuum. In cujU8 rei testimouinm Conolualoa.
huic presenti carte sigillum meum apJ?OSui : Hiis testibus, Nigello de Saleford,
Johanne de Seybroke, Raclulpbo clenco de Saleford, Johanne molendario de
eadem villa, et aliis. Daw apud Saleford die Veneris proximo ante fostwn
sancte Margarete virginis, anno regni regis EDwARDI fillii regis EDWAB.DI se:r.to.

of the reign of our sovereign lord GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God,

(L. S.)

king of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, defender of the faith, and so forth,

and in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and forty-seven,

between Abraham Barker, of Dale Hall, in the county of Norfolk, esquire, and Parties.

Cecilia his wife, of the one part, and David Edwards, of Lincoln's Inn, in the

county of Middlesex, esqnire, and Francis Golding, of the city of Norwich,

clerk, of the other part, witnesseth: that the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia

his wife, in consideration of five shillings of lawful money of Great Britain, to

lilBKORAlfDUH, quod die et anno infrasmiptis plena et pacifica
eeisina acre iufmspecificate, cum pertinentiis, data et deliberata fuit
per infranominatum Willielmum de Segenbo iufronominato Johanni
de Saleford, in propriis pel\lOnis suis, secumdum tenorem et efi'ectum
ca.rte iufrascripte, m present.ia Nigolli de Saleford, Johannia de Sey·
broke et aliorum.

Livery of 11elaln
endoned.

them in hand paid by the said David Edwards and Francis Golding, at, or

No. II.

before, the ensealing and delivery of these presents, (the receipt whereof is

l!fo.

n.

hereby acknowledged), and for other good causes and considerations, them the Consideration,

said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife, hereunto specially moving, have bar- Bargain and

A.. MODERN CONVEYL~CE BY LEASE A.ND RELEASE.

gained and sold, and by these presents do, and each of them doth, bargain and sell, «sie.

SECT. 1.

LEA8B OR BAR<JAIN AND SALB, FOB. A YEAR.

unto the said David Edwards and Francis Golding, their executors, administrators,

and assigns, All that, the capital messuage, called Dale Hall, in the parish of Dale, Parcel*,

in the said county of Norfolk, wherein the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his

wife now dwell, and all those their lands in the said parish of Dale, called or known

by the name of Wilson's farm, containing by estimation five hundred and forty

acres, be the same more or less, together with all and singular houses, dove-

bouses, barns, buildings, yards, gardens, orchards, lands, tenements, meadows,

pastures, feedings, commons, woods, underwoods, ways, waters, watercourses,

683

TBIB lNDBlfTURB, made the third day of September, in the twenty-firet year Prem,_
of the reign of our sovereign lord GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God,
king of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, defender of the faith, and so forth,
and in the vear of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and fortr-seven,
between Abraham Barker, of Dale Hall, in the county of Norfolk, esquire, and Parttea.
Cecilia bis wife, of the one part, and David Edwards, of Lincoln's Inn, in the
county of Middlesex, esqnire, and Franch! Golding, of the city of Norwich,
clerk, of the other part, witnessetb : that the Baid ~<\braham Barker ancl Cecilla
his wife, in consideration of five sbillingii of lawful money of Great Britain, to
them in hand poid by the said David Edwards and Francis Golding, at, or
before, tho cnsealing and deliverv of those presents, (the receipt whereof is
hereby acknowledged), and for other good canses and coui:iiderations, them the Consideration.
said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife, hereunto specially monng, hafJe bar- Bargain and
gained and sold, aud by these presents do, and each of them doth, bargain aud sell, eale.
unto the said Da>id Edwards and Francis Golding, their executors, administrators,
and assigns, All that, the capital mcssuoge, called Dale Hall, in the parish of Dale, p_,.q.
in the said county of Norfolk, wherein the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his
wife now dwell, aud all those their lands in the SRid parish of Dale, called or known
by the name of Wilson's farmf· containing by estimation five hundred and forty
acres, be the same more or ess, together with all and singular houses, dovehousea, barns, buildings, yardl', gardens, orchards, Iand1.1, t-enement:B, meadows,
pastures, feedings, rommons, woods, underwoods, ways, waters, watercouniea,
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50. II.

-===1'=o.=D.== tlshing11, privileges, profits, easements, commodities, advantagM, emoluments,
hcreditament~.

and appurtenance!J whate\"er to the said capital messuage and
f11nn bclnn¢ng or appertaining, or with the samo used or enjoyed, or acccpwd,
reputed, taken, or known, a.~ part, parcol, or member thereof, or a.~ beloncing to
the 11ame, or any part thereof; and the re\"e!'l(ion and reversions, remainder and
remainden1, yearly and other rent><, i>isuc~. and profitll thereof, and of every part
and parcel then•of: To liave atut t<1 hold the Mid capital we~aage, lands, tenemcn~, hereditament;;, and all and singular other tho premisei> bcroinbefore
mentioned, or intended to be bargained and ROid, and e\"ery part and parcel
thereof, with their and every of their right.~, membel'N, and appurtemwee;1, nnto
the said David Edwards and Francis Golding, their mtecntort1, administratorg,
and as~ign!I, from the day next belhre the clay -of the date of the~ present:!, for,
and durin~, and unto the full end and term of, one whole year from thence
next ensumg, and fully to be complete and ended : Yielding and paying, therefor, unto the said Abraham Barker, and Cecilia his wife, and their heir'!! and
Bll:!igns, the yearly rent of one pepper-corn at the expiration of the said term,
if the same shall be lawfullv clemnnded : To the inunt and purpose that, by
Tirtne of these presenti1, and of the stature for tran;1forriug Ut!CS into por1S&lsion, the
eaid David Edward11 and Frn.ncis Golding may be in actual posse8i!ion of the premi~es, and be thereuy enabled to take aud B<'cept a irront. and release of the free.
hold, re'l"en;ion, and Inheritance of the same premi~e11, 0.nd of every part and pan-el
thereof, to them, their heirs and o.~sign~; to the usc11 and upon the tru11t11, thereof
to be declared by another intlenture, inwnded to bear date the next day a.ft.er tbu
date hereof. In rcitness whereof, the parties tu these pre!!Cntll their hands and seaLJ
ban• rnbRC.ribed and i:et, the day and year fir~t above written.
.Abraham Barker, (L. S.)
Sealed IUld delivered, buing}
wt duly stamped, in the
Cecilia Barker, (L. S.)
presence of
David Edwards, (J,. S.)
George Carter,
Francis Golding. (L. S.)
William Browne.

Intent

'JoacluiioD.

Premises.

Putie*.

Becilal.

Consideration.

fishings, privileges, profits, easements, commodities, advantages, emoluments,

" hereditaments, and appurtenances whatever to the said capital messuage and

farm belonging or appertaining, or with the same used or enjoyed, or accepted,

reputed, taken, or known, as part, parcel, or member thereof, or as belonging to

the same, or any pnrt thereof; and the reversion and reversions, remainder and

remainders, yearly and other rents, issues, and profits thereof, and of every part

and parcel thereof: To have and to hold the said capital messuage, lauds'tene-

ments, hereditaments, and all and singular other the premises hereinbefore

mentioned, or intended to be bargained and sold, and every part and parcel

thereof, with their and every of their rights, members, and appurtenances, uuto

the said David Edwards and Francis Golding, their executors, admiuistrators,

and assigns, from the day next before the day of the dato of these presents, for,

and during, and unto the full end and term of, one whole year from thence

~elualou.

next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended : Yielding and paying, there-
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for, unto the said Abraham Barker, and Cecilia his wife, and their heirs and

assigns, the yearly rent of one pepper-corn at the expiration of the said term,

if the same shall be lawfully demanded: To the intent and purpose that, by

Tirtne of these presents, and of the statute for transferring uses into possession, the

Baid David Edwards and Francis Golding may bo iu actual possession of the pre-

SECT.

mises, and be thereby enabled to take and accept a grant and release of the free-

2.

DEED OF RBLBA.8B.

hold, reversion, and inheritance of the same premises, and of every part and parcel

thereof, to them, their heirs and assigns; to the uses and upon the trusts, thereof

to be declared by another indenture, intended to bear date the next day after the

date hereof. In witness whereof, the parties to these presents their hands and seals

have subscribed and set, the day and year first above written.

Sealed and delivered, being 1 Abraham Barker, (L. S.)

first duly stamped, in the I Cecilia Barker, (L. S.)

presence of ( David Edwards, (L. S.)

George Carter, J Francis Golding. (L. S.)

William Browne.

SECT. 2. DEED OF RELEASE.

THIS INDENTURE of five parts, made the fourth day of September, in the

twenty-first year of the reign of our sovereign lord GEORGE the Second, by the

grace of God, king of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, defender of the faith,

and so forth, and in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and forty-

seven, between Abraham Barker, of Dale Hall, in the county of Norfolk,

esquire, and Cecilia his wife, of the first part; David Edwards, of Lincoln's

Inn, in the county of Middlesex, esquire, executor of the last will and testament

of Lewis Edwards, of Cowbridge, in the county of Glamorgan, gentleman, his

late father, deceased, and Francis Golding, of the city of Norwich, clerk, of the

second part; Charles Browne, of Enstonc, in the county of Oxford, gentleman,

and Richard More, of the city of Bristol, merchant, of the third part; John

Barker, esquire, son and heir apparent of the said Abraham Barker, of the fourth

part; and Katherine Edwards, spinster, one of the sisters of the said David

Edwards, of the fifth part. Whereas a marriage is intended, by the permission

of God, to be shortly had and solemnized between the said John Barker and

Katherine Edwards: Now thin Indenture tcitnesscth, that in consideration of

the said intended marriage, and the sum of five thousand pounds, of good and

lawful money of Great Britain, to the said Abraham Barker, (by and with

the consent and agreement of the said John Barker and Katherine Ed-

wards, testified by their being parties to, and their sealing aud delivery of, these

presents), by the said David Edwards in hand paid, at or before the ensealing

and delivery hereof, being the marriage portion of the said Katherine Edwards,

Tms INDRNTURB of five parts, made the fourth day of September, in the
twenty·fil"llt [ear of the reign of our 11ovcreign lord GEORGE the Second, by the
grllt'e of Go , king of Great Britain, France, o.nd Ireland, defender of the faith,
and so forth, and in the year ot' our J,ord one th1msand seven hundred and fortyseven, between Abraham Barker, of De.le Hall, in the county of Norfolk,
esquire, o.nd Cecilia his wife, of the finit part; Dal"id Edwards, of Lineoln'R
Inn, in the countv of Middlesex, esquire, executor of the la.it will and te~tament
of Lewis EdwarJ~, of Cowbridge, in the county of Glamorgan, gentleman, hiR
late father, deeea.~cd, and :t'muci~ Golding, of the city of Norwich, clerk, of the
second part; Charlos Bniwue, of EnRtone, iu the county of Oxford, gentleman,
and Richard More, of the city of Brit1tol, merchant, of the third part; John
Barker, esquire, 11on and heir apparent of the said Abraham Barker, of the fourth
part; and Katherine Edward;1, spinster, one of the 11istc~ of the said David
&ecltal.
~dwards, of the fifth part. Wliercas a marriage is iutcntlod, by tho pcm11ss1on
of God, to be shortly hnd and solemnized between the said John Bu.rker and
Conalderatlou. Katherine Edwards: Noic tllis Indmiture teitn.essetlt, that in consideration of
the Raid intended mnrrif\jl:c, and tho sum of fi'l"o thou:'land pounds, of good and
lawful monoy of Great Britain, to tho said Abraham Barker, (by and with
the cono1ent and agreement of the ""lid John Barker o.nd Katherine Edward!!, testified by their being parties tu, and their sealing sud delive.ry of, these
presents), by the said David Edward" in hand paid, at or before the eu~e.aling
and dcili\"ery hereof, being the marriage portion of the AAid Katherine Edwards,
be<1ueatbed to her by the last will and tc11tament of tho 1mld Lewis F;dwards,
her late father, decea.~d; the receipt and payment whereof the said .A.bra.ham
Barker doth hereuy acknowledge. and thereof, and of every po.rt and p!Lreel
thereof, they the Raid Abraham BILrker, John Barker, and Katherine Edwardtt,
do, and each of them doth, release, acquit, and di$charge the i;aid Da\·id Ed·
w11rd8, his executors and Rdministrat.ol">', forever by thet:1e presents: and fur providing a. compet.ent jointnre and provir1ion of mainteno.nco for the !laid KRtb·
erine Edward!!I, in case she shall, after the 11aid intended marriae;e bud, suITh-e
and overli'l"e the llBid John Barker, her intended husband: and for settling and
assuring the capital messuage, lands, tenemenb, and horeditaments, hereinaft.er
montioned, unto such uses, and upon 11uch tntstt>, M are hcreinatl:~r expre&led.
and declared: and for and in consideration of the 11u111 of firn shillings, of lawful money of Great Britain, to the said Abraham B1uker and Cecilia his wife,
in baud paid by the said Da'l"id Edward1.1 and F'mncis Golding, and of ten shillings of like lawful money to them alKO in hand po.id by the said Charles Bro\11"tl
and Richard .More, at or !Jefore the ensealing and delivery heroof, (the several
Preml8el.

bequeathed to her by the last will and testament of the said Lewis Edwards,

her late father, deceased; the receipt and payment whereof the said Abraham

684

Barker doth hereby acknowledge, and thereof, and of every part aud parcel

Original from

thereof, they the said Abraham Barker, John Barker, and Katherine Edwards,

do, and each of them doth, release, acquit, and discharge the said David Ed-

wards, his executors and administrators, forever by these presents: aud for pro-

viding a competent jointure and provision of maintenance for the said Kath-

erine Edwards, in case she shall, after the said intended marriage had, survive

1£.
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receipts whereof are hereby respectively acknowledgnd,) they the said Abraham NO. a

Burker and Cecilia his wile, have, and each of them hath, granted, bargained, '" ""

sold, released, and contirmed, and by these presents do, and each of them doth, B"1<!aM-

grant, bargain, sell, release, and confirm unto the said David Edwards and

Francis Goldiug, their heirs and assigns, All that, the capital messuage called

Dale Hall, in the parish of Dale, in the said county of Norfolk, wherein the said

Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife now dwell, and all those their lands in

the said parish of Dale, called or known by the name of Wilson's farm, con-

taining by estimation five hundred and forty acres, be the same more or less,

together with all and singular houses, dove-houses, barns, buildings, stables,

yards, gardens, orchards, lands, tenements, meadows, pastures, feedings, com-

mons, woods, underwoods, ways, waters, watercourses, fishings, privileges,

profits, easements, commodities, advantages, emoluments, hereditaments, and

appurtenances whatsoever to the said capital messuage and farm belonging or

appertaining, or with the same used or enjoyed, or accepted, reputed, taken, or

known, as part, parcel, or member thereof, or as belonging to tho game or any

part thereof: fall which said premises are now in the actual possession of the

paid David Edwards and Francis Golding, by virtue of a bargain and sale to Mention of bu»

them thereof made by the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife, for one gui"aud *"'"•

whole rear, in consideration of five shillings to them paid by the said David

Edwards and Francis Golding, in and by one indenture, bearing date the day

next before the day of the date hereof, and by force of the statute for trans-
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ferring uses into possession;) and the reversion and reversions, remainder and

remainders, yearly and other rents, issues and profits thereof, and every part

and parcel thereof, and also all the estate, right, title, interest, trust, property,

claim, and demand whatsoever, both at law and in equity, of them the said

Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife, in, to, or out of the said capital messuage,

lands, tenements, hereditaments, and premises: to have and to hold the said cap- Batadvm.

ital messuage, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and all and singular other the

premises hereinbefore mentioned to be hereby granted and released, with their

and every of their appurtenances unto the said David Edwards and Francis

Golding, their heirs and assigns, to such uses, upon snch trusts, and to and for

such intents and purposes, as are hereinafter mentioned, expressed, and declared,

of and concerning the same: that is to say, to the use and behoof of the said th>c"n»iitor0uu

Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife, according to their several and respective marriage."" '

estates and interests therein, at the time of, or immediately before, the execu-

tion of these presents, until the solemnization of the said intended marriage:

and from and after the solemnization thereof, to the use and behoof of the said 7"*"? °J tl10

John Barker, for and during the term of his natural life; without impeachment iijj? „„ for

of or for any manner of waste: and from and after the determination of that vaitt:

estate, then to tho use of the said David Edwards and Francis Golding, and

their heirs, during the life of tho said John Barker, upon trust to support and ^\utr"»ta ' r*.

preserve the contingent uses and estates hereinafter limited from being defeated >ervo coutin-

and destroyed, and for that purpose to make entries, or bring actions, as the gent remain-

case shall require; but, nevertheless, to permit and suffer the said John Barker, erB-

and his assigns, during his life, to receive and take the rents and profits thereof,

and of evcrv part thereof, to and for his and their own use and benefit: and Remainder to

from and after the decease of the said John Barker, then to the use and behoof for hlrjoin "

of the said Katheriue Edwards, his intended wife, for and during the term of ore, ID bar of

her natural life, for her jointure, and in lieu, bar, and satisfaction of her dowor dower =

and thirds at common law, which she can or may have or claim, of, in, to, r

out of, all and every, or any, of the lands, tenements, and hereditaments,

whereof or wherein the said John Barker now is, ar at any time or times here-

after during the coverture between them shall be, seised of any estate of free-

hold or inheritance; and from and after the decease of the said Katherine Ed- Remainder to

wards, or other sooner determination of the said estate, then to the use and jJJ'JI',.'",1*^'"

behoof of the said Charles Browne and Kichard More, their executors, admin- tmit» after"1"0"

istrators, and assigns, for and during and unto the full end and term of five mentioned:

hundred years from thence next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended,

without impeachment of waste: upon such trusts nevertheless, and to and for

such intents and purposes, and under and subject to snch provisoes and agree-

ments, as are hereinafter mentioned, expressed, and declared of and concerning

the same: and from and after the end, expiration, or other sooner determina- Remainder to

tion of the said term of five hundred years, and subject thereunto, to the use ot'

and behoof of the first son of the said John Barker on the body of the said th

Katherine Edwards his intended wife to be begotten, and of the heirs of the in tail:

body of such first son lawfully issuing: and for default of such issue, then to

the use and behoof of the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth,

ninth, tenth, and of all and every other the son and eons of the said John
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to raise por-
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vounger cliil-
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lain times,

Trith mainte-

nance at the

rate of/oar po-

tent.

and benefit of

survivorship.

If no such child,

or if all dip,

or if the por-

tions be raised,

or paid,

or secured by

the person next

in remainder;

the residue of

the term to

cease.

Condition, that

J1 if uses and

estates hereby

granted shall

be void, on set-

tling other

lands of equal

value in recom-

pense.

and every of them Bhall be in seniority of age, and priority of birth, and of the

several and respective heirs of the body and bodies of all and every such son

and song lawfully issuing ; the elder of such sons, and the heirs of his body

issuing, being always to be preferred and to take before the younger of such

sons, and the heirs of his or their body or bodies issuiug: and for default of such

issue, then to the use and behoof of all and every the daughter and daughters of the

said John Barker on the body of the said Catherine Edwards his intended wife

to be begotten, to be equally "divided between them (if more than one), share

and share alike, as tenants in common and not as joint-tenants, and of the sev-

eral and respective heirs of the body and bodies of all and every such daughter

and daughters lawfully issuing: and for default of such issue, then to the use

and every of them shall be in 110niority of age, and prioritf of birth, and of the
several and respective heirs of the body and bodies of al and every such son
and sons lawfully issuing ; the cider of such sons, and the heirs of his body
is1ming, being always to be preferred and to take before the younger of such
!'Ons, and the heirs of hill or their body or bodies issuing: and for default of such
Remainder to issue, then to the use a.nd behoof of all and every the daughter and daughters of the
the daughters, said John Barker on the body of the sa.id Katherine Edwards his int.ended wife
to be begotten, to be eqnall;r divided between them (if more than one), shara
and share alike, &1 tenants 1n common and not as joint-tenants, and of the sevMteoant.aln
common, l.n
eral and respective heirs of the body and bodies of all and every such daughter
tall:
Bewa!nder to and daughters lawfully is1.1uing: and for default of 1.1uch issue, then to the use
and behoof of the heirs of the bod,r of him the said John Barker lawfully
the hualw.nd
l.n tall:
issuing : and for default of such helI'll, then to the use and behoof of the said
Remainder to Cecilia, the wife of the said Abraham Barker, and of her heirs and &.'lsign.<1 forthe husband'• ever. .4.nd as to, for, and concerning the term of five hundred year;i herein
mother lo ree.. before limited to the BBid Charles Browne and Richard More, their exerutors,
The truata or
administrators, and assigns, as aforesaid, it is hereby declared and agreed by
the !.,rm deolued;
and between all the said' parties to these presents, that the same is so limited to
them upon the trusts, and to and for the intent.~ and purposes, and under and
subject to the provisoe11 and agreement>!, hereinaf\er mcnt10ned, expres~ed, and
declared, of and concerning the i;ame: that is to Ray, in case there shall be an
to raise por•
tlona ror
eldest or only son and one or more other child or children of the said John
:younger ohll·
Barker on the body of the said Katherine his intended wife to be begotten,
dren,
then upon trust that they, the said Charles Browne and Richard More,
their executors, administrators, and a,_qgigns, by sale or mortgage of the
said term of five hundred years, or by such other ways and means as
they or the survivor of them, or the executors or administrators of such
survivor, shall think fit, shall and do raise and levy, or borrow and take
up at interest, the sum of four thousand pounds of lawful moner. of
Great Britain, for the portion or portions of such other child or children
(besides the eldest or only son) as aforesaid, to be equally divided between
pAyable •t oer- them (if more th&n one) share and share alike; the portion or portions of lluch
of them as shall be a son or l'lons to be paid at his or their respccli>e age or ages
t..ln time•,
of twenty-one years ; &nd the {>!lrtion or portions of such of them as shall be a
daughter or daughters to be paid at her or their respecti.-e age or agct< of twentyone years, or day or days of marriage, which shall first happen. And upon this
with roaintefurther trust, that in the mean time and until the same portions shall berome
ne.nce at the
re.te oftow pd' payaule 88 aforesaid, the said Charles Browne and Richard More, their exL-cnt~m1, admini!trotors, and assign11, shall and do, by and out of the rents, issues,
and profits of the premise3 aforesaid, raise and levy such competent iearly
sum and sums of money for the maintenance and education of such child or
children, as shall not exceed in the whole the interest of their respective porand benetlt of tions af\er the rate of four pound11 in the hundred yearly.
Provided always,
aurvh'onhtp.
that in case any of the same children shall happen to die before his, her or their
portions shall become pByable &11 afore<laid, then the portion or portion11 of ~uch
of them BO dyi~ shall go and be paid unto and be equally divided among the
survivor or aurv1vors of them, when and at such time as the original portion or
portions of such surviving child or childrun shall bceomc payable as afol"C83id.
Ifnoeuehchlld Pro~ aleo, that. in case there shall be no such child or children of the said
'John Barker on the body of the said Katherine bis intonded wifo begotten,
or If an die,
besides an eldest or only son ; or in case all and every such ehild or children
sbn.11 happen to die before all or any of their said portioM shall becomu due aud
or If the JlO•payable as aforesaid; or in case the !laid portions, and also 11uch maintenance
ttoua be ralaed, 88 aforesaid, ahsll by the said Charles Browne and Richard More, their exerutors, administmtors, or 8!!11igns, be raisecl and levied by any of the ways a!ld
means in that beh~f aforementioned ; or in case the same by Ruch person or
er paid,
per11<>ns WI shall for the time being be next in re>en:iion or remainder of the ~l\me
premises expectant upon the Mid term of five hundred years, shall be paid. or
or aeanred by well and du1y BCCnred to be paid, according to the true intent ancl meaning of
th~ penoo next thet1e J.>rl!llonts ; then and in any of the said ca.~el!, and at all times thenceforth,
t~:~':.~~i:i!"~t the Mid term of five hundred years, or ~ much thereof as shall remain unsold
tbe term to
or undisposed or for the purposes afore11&id, shall cease, determine, and be utterly
eeaae.
void to all intents and purposes, any thing herein contained to the contrary
Condition, that thereof in anywise notwithstanding.
Pro-vlded also, and it is hereby further
th" use• au\
declared and ~eed by and between all the said parties to these presents, that
e~':i,1~t::i1 1 in c880 the "aid Abraham Barker or Cecilia his wife, at any time during their
& .,.oidb.oo aet- lives, or the life of the survivor of them, with the approbation of the said David
: 11 u!. ~~ :~na1 Edwards and Francis <rt>lding, or the survivor of them, or the executors and
""'~iu: tn reoom· admlnistratol'll of auch survivor, Rho.ll settle, convey, and assure other lands and
peD118.
tenement.II of au eRtate ot' inheritance in fee·11imple, in posse!lllion, in some conv~nieut place or. plooes within the realm of England, of equal or better value
..,..,=K=o.=IL
.................

=

s

_,_

and behoof of the heirs of the body of him the said John Barker lawfully

issuing: and for default of such heirs, then to the use and behoof of the said

Cecilia, the wife of the said Abraham Barker, and of her heirs and assigns for-

886

ever. And as to, for, and concerning the term of five hundred years herein

before limited to the said Charles Browne and Richard More, their executors,

administrators, and assigns, as aforesaid, it is hereby declared and agreed by

and between all the said' parties to these presents, that the same is so limited to

them upon the trusts, and to and for the intents and purposes, and under and

subject to the provisoes and agreements, hereinafter mentioned, expressed, and

1ze b
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than the said capital messuage, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and premises, NO. n.

hereby granted and released, and in lieu and recompense thereof, unto and for *

Bach and the like uses, intents and purposes, and upon such and the like trusts,

as the said capital messuage, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and premises are

hereby settled and assured nnto and upon, then and in such case, and at all times

from thenceforth, all and every the use and uses, trust and trusts, estate and

estates hereinbefore limited, expressed, and declared of or concerning the same,

shall cease, determine, and be utterly void to all intents and purposes; and the

same capital messuage, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and premises, shall from

thenceforth remain and be to and for the only proper use and behoof of the said

Abraham Barker or Cecilia his wife, or the survivor of them, BO settling, convey-

ing, and assuring such other lands and tenements as aforesaid, and of his or her

heirs and assigns forever; and to and for no other use, intent, or purpose

whatsoever; any thing herein contained to the contrary thereof in any wise not-

withstanding. And, for the considerations aforesaid, and for barring all estates- Covenant to

tail, and all remainders or reversions thereupon expectant or depending, if any y "Uw:

be now subsisting and unbarred or otherwise undetermined, of and in the said

capital messuage, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and premises, hereby granted

and released, or mentioned to be hereby granted and released, or any of them,

or any_ part thereof, the said Abraham Barker for himself and the said Cecilia

his wife, his and her heirs, executors, and administrators, and the said John

Barker for himself, his-heirs, executors, and administrators, do, and each of
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them doth, respectively, covenant, promise, and grant, to and with the said

David Edwards and Francis Golding, their heirs, executors, and administrators,

by these presents, that they, the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife, and

John Barker, shall and will, at the costs and charges of the said Abraham Bar-

ker, before the end of Michaelmas term next ensuing the date hereof, acknowl-

edge and levy, before his majesty's justices of the court of common pleas at West-

minster, one or more fine or fines, fur cognizance de droit, come ceo, fc., with proc-

lamations according to the form of the statutes in that case made and provided,

and the usnal conrse of fines in such cases accustomed, unto the said David

Edwards, and his heirs, of the said capital messuage, lands, tenements, heredita-

ments, and premises, by such apt and convenient names, quantities, qualities, num-

ber of acres and other descriptions to ascertain the same, as shall be thought meet;

which said fine or fines, so as aforesaid, or in any other manner, levied and

acknowledged, or to be levied and acknowledged, shall be and enure, and shall

be adjudged, deemed, constnied, and taken, and so are and were meant and

intended, to be and enure, and are hereby declared by all the said parties to

these presents to be and enure, to the use and behoof of the said David

Edwards, and his heirs and assigns; to the intent and purpose that the said ln ™*« to

David Edwards may, by virtue of the said fine or fines so covenanted and toth^^JSSjjS*

agreed to be levied as aforesaid, be and become perfect tenant of the freehold that a recovery

ot the said capital messuage, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and all other the ™£? ** mffiit-

premises, to the end that one or more good and perfect common recovery or

recoveries may be thereof had and suffered, in such manner as is hereinafter for

that purpose mentioned. And it is hereby declared and agreed by and between

all the said parties to these presents, that it shall and may be lawful to and for

the said Francis Golding. at the costs and charges of the said Abraham Barker,

before the end of Michaelmas term next, ensuing the date hereof, to sue forth

and prosecute out of his majesty's high conrt of chancery, one or more writ ot

writs of entry, sur disseisin en lepost, returnable before his majesty's justices of

the court of common pleas at Westminster, thereby demanding by apt and

convenient names, quantities, qualities, number of acres, and other descriptions,

the said capital messuage, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and premises, against

the said David Edwards; to which said writ, or writs, of entry he the said

David Edwards shall appear gratis, either in his own proper person, or by his

attorney thereto lawfully authorized, and vouch over to warranty the said

Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife, and John Barker; who shall also gratia

appear hi their proper persons, or by their attorney or attomies, thereto lawfully

authorized, and enter into the warranty, and vouch over to warranty the com-

tbo.n tbe Mid capital meS!!tlage, land!!, tenements, hereditamente, and premises,
lfo. tt. ==
herohy granted and relea11ed, and in lieu and recompense thereof, unto and for ==========such and the liko uses, intents and purposes, 11.nd upon suoh and the like trusts,
as the said capital mest11lage, lands, tenementl:!, hereditaments, and dremises are
hereby settled and M1mred unto and npon, then and in such ca..tte, an at all times
from thenceforth, all and every the use and uses, trn11t and trusts, estate aud
e11tates hcreinbefore limited, expressed, and declared of or concerning the eame,
shall ce&'!tl, dctenuine, and be utterly void to all intents and purposes; and the
so.rue capital messuage, lauds, tenements, heredito.ments, and lremises, shall from
thenceforth remain and be to and for the only proper uee an behoof of the said
Abraham Barker or Cecilia his wife, or the imrvivor of them, so settling, conveyin~, and 881TIU'ing such other lands and tenements as aforesaid, and of his or her
helI'8 and assigns forever; and to and for no other use, intent, or purpose
whatsoever; any thing herein contained to the contrary thereof in any WJSe notwithstAnding. A.ml, for the considerations aforesaid, and for barring all estatesto
tail, and all remainders or reverslone thereupon expectant or depending, if any eT7 •
:
be now subsisting and unbarred or otherwise undetermined, of and in the said
capital messuage, lands, tenements, hereditamenu, and premJees, hereby granted
ana released, or mentioned to be hereby gmnted and released, or any of them,
or any part thereof, the said Abraham Barker for himself and the said Ceollia
his wife, his e.nd her heirs, e:xecntors, and administrators, e.nd the said John
Barker for him!!elf, his -heirs, executors, and administratol"B, do, and each of
them doth, respectively, covenant, promise, and grant, to and with the Mid
David Edwards and Francis Golding, their heirs, executors, and administrators1
by these presentsJ that they, the 11&id Abraham Barker and Cecilla his wife, anc1
John Barker, shall and will, at the costs and charges of the t1aid Abraham Barker, before the end of Michaelmas term next ensu1ng the date hereof, acknowledge and levy, before hie me.jesty's justioes of the court of common J;!leas at Westmiilllter, one or more tine or fines, sur cognizance de droit, come ceo, ~o., with ~
lame.tions according to the form of the l'ltatutes in that case made and pronded,
and the usual course of fines in such cases accustomed, unto the said David
Edwards, and his heirs, of the 11&id capital messue.ge, landtt, tenements, hereditaments, and premises, by such apt and convenient names, quantities, qualities, number of acres and other descriptions to ascertain the @e.me, as shall be thought meet;
which said fine or fine11, so as aforesaid, or in any other manner, levied and
acknowledged, or to be levied and acknowledged, shall be and enure, and shall
be adjudged, deemed, constn10d, and te.ken, and so are and were meant and
intended, to be and enure, e.nd are hereby declared by all the said parties to
these presents to be and enure, to the use and behoof of the said David
Edward~, and his heirs and assigns ; to the intent &nd purpose that the @aid In order to
David Edwards may, by virtue of the said fine or tines
covenanted and :"~e..~~:i~t
agreed to be levied as aforesaid, be and become perfect tenant of the freehold that a Nioovel'J'
of the said capital me<18tlage, lands, tenements, bereditaments, and all other the :'da! be IUlferpremises, to the end that one or more good and perfect common recovery or ·
recoveries may be thereof had and suffered, in sneh manner ~ is hereinafter for
that purpose mentioned. And it is hereby declared e.nd agreed by and between
all the said partieB to these presents, that it shall and me.y be le.wful to e.nd for
, the said Francis Golding. at the costs and che.r~es of the suid Abraham Barker,
before the end of .MichaelmM term next, ernmmg the de.te hereof, to 1me forth
and prosecute out of his majesty's high conrt of chancery, one or more writ or
writs of entry, sur disseisin en le post, returnable before his majesty's ju!ltices of
the c-0urt of common plce.s e.t Westminster, thel'l:lby demanding by aJ>t and
convenient ne.mes, quantities, que.litie>l, number of acres, e.nd other de;icnptions,
the l:!aid capital rucssuagc, lands, tcnementtl, hereditaments, and premises, againtJt
the said David Edward11; to which said writ, or writs, of entry he the said
Darid Edwards shall appear uratis, either in his own proper pert!On, or by his
attorney thereto le.wf'ully e.utho1ized, e.nd vouch over to warranty the said
Aura.ham Barker a.nd Cecilia his wifo, and John Barker; who 11hall also gratia
appear in their proper persons, or by their attorney or attomies, thereto lawfully
authorized, and enter into the warranty, e.nd vouch over to warranty the common vonC'hee of the same court; who ~hall appear, and after imparlance shall
make default: so a.~ Judgment shall and may be thereupon bad e.nd gi,-en tor
the said Francis Goldmg, to recover the said capital messuage, lands, tenements,
hereditamenb, e.nd premise!I, against the 11aid David Edwardll, and for him to
reco\"er in valne against the said .Abraham Barker and Oecilie. his wife, and
John Barkcr1 and for them to recover In value age.inst the Mid common
vouehee, e.1111 that execution shall and may be thereupon e.warded and bad
eccorclingl.y, and all and e¥ery other act e.nd thing be done and executed, needful and requisite for the suffering and perfecting of such common recovery or
·
.recoverie~, with vouchers BS af'oreMid.
.And it is hereby further declared to enure
and agreed, by and between all the saicl parties to these presents, that

pav•na.::_

"°

mon vouchee of the same court; who shall appear, and after imparlanpe shall

make default: so as judgment shall and may be thereupon had and given tor

. 687

the said Francis Golding, to recover the said capital messuage, lands, tenements,

hereditaments, and premises, against the said David Edwards, and for him to

recover in value against the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wife, and

John Barker, and for them to recover in value against the said common

vouchee, and that execution shall and may be thereupon awarded and had

accordingly, and all and every other act and thing bo done and executed, need-

ful and requisite for the suffering and perfecting of such common recovery or
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NO. n.

to the preced-

ing UM'B ill tlliB

deed.

Other coTe-

nanU;

r quit

'"I,

tr<-<- from in-

cuiubraiicea,

immediately from and after the suffering and perfecting of the said recovery

or recoveries, so as aforesaid, or in any other manner or at any other time or

times, suffered or to be suffered, as well these presents and the assurance

hereby made, and the said fine or fines so covenanted to be levied as

aforesaid, as also the said recovery or recoveries, and also all aud every other

fine or fines, recovery and recoveries, conveyances, and assurances in the law

whatsoever heretofore had, made, levied, suffered, or executed, or hereafter to

be had, made, levied, suffered, or executed, of the said capital messuage, lauds,

tenements, hereditaments, and premises, or any of them, or any part thereof, by

and between the said parties to these presents, or any of them, or whereunto

they or any of them ore or shall be parties or privies, shall be and enure, and
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shall be adjudged, deemed, construed aud taken, and so are and were meant aud

intended, to be and enure, and the recoveror or recovcrors in the said recovery

or recoveries named or to be named, and his or their heirs, shall stand and be

seised of the said capital messuage, lauds, tenements, hereditaments and

premises, and of every part qnd parcel thereof, to the uses, upon the trusts, and

to aud for the intents and purposes, and under and subject to the provisoes,

limitations, aud agreements, hereinbefore mentioned, expressed and declared,

of and concerning the same. Aiul the said Abraham Barker, party hereunto,

for quiet enjoy- doth hereby, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, further cove-

nant, promise, grant and agree to aud with the said David Edwards and

Francis Golding, their heirs, executors, and administrators, in manner and form

following; that is to soy, that the said capital messuage, lands, tenements,

hereditaments and premises, shall, and may at all times hereafter, remain, con-

tinue, and be, to and for the uses and purposes, upon the trusts, and under and

subject to the provisoes, limitations and agreements, hereinbefore mentioned,

expressed, and declared, of and concerning the same; and shall and may bo

peaceably and quietly had, held, and enjoyed accordingly, without any lawful

let or interruption of or by the said Abraham Barker or Cecilia, his wife, par-

ties hereunto, his or her heirs or assigns, or of or by any other person or per-

sons lawfully claiming or to claim from, by, or under, or in trust for, him, her,

them or any of them; or from, by, or under his or her ancestors, or any of

them; and shall so remain, coutinue, and be, free and clear, and freely" and

clearly acquitted, exonerated aud discharged, or otherwise by the said Abraham

Barker or Cecilia, his wife, parties hereunto, his or her heirs, executors, or

administrators, well and sufficiently saved, defended, kept harmless and indem-

nified, of, from, and against all former aud other gifts, grants bargains, sales,

leases, mortgages, estates, titles, troubles, charges aud iucumbrances, whatso-

ever, had, made, done, committed, occasioned or suffered, or to be had,

made, done, committed, occasioned or suffered, by the said Abraham

Barker or Cecilia, his wife, or by his or her ancestors, or any of them, or by his,

,nd for further her, their, or auy of their, act, means, assent, consent or procurement: And

Murance. moreover, that he the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia, his wife, parties here-

unto, and his or her heirs, and all other persons having, or lawfully claiming,

or which shall or may have, or lawfully claim, any estate, right, title, trust or

interest, at law or in equity, of, in, to, or oat of, the said capital messuage,

lands, tenements, hereditaments and premises, or any of them, or any part

thereof, by or under or in trust for him, her, them, or any of them, or" by or

under his or her ancestors or any of them, shall aud will, from time

to time, and at all times hereafter, upon every reasonable request, aud

·--~-=-~=
- IL==- imruedintel.Y t'rom and after. the s~fl'ering and perfecting o( the Mid recovery
or recovcnes, so a.s aforc~1d, or 1n any other manner or at any other time or
times, suffered or to be suffered, as w11ll thel!e present.'! and the &'ISUrance
hereby made, and the said finti or fin66 so covenanted to be Ie,·icd &iJ
aforusaicl, ag also thti said reco>cry or recoveries, 11.Ild also all and every other
fine or fines, recovery and recornrics. conveyances, nnd a.~;;umnces in tho Io.w
what:;oever heretofore ball, ma.do, levied, suffered, or executed, or hereafter to
be hnd, made. levied, sulfured, or executed, of tho ;;aid cnpitul messunge, lo.uds,
tenements, hereclitament.8, and premises, or any of them, or anr part thereof, by
o.ucl between the said partillll to these presents, or any of them, or whcruunto
they or any of them are or shall be parties or privie.i, 11hall be and enure, and
shall be adjudged, deemed, construed and taken, and so are and were meant and
intended, to be and enure, and the recon~ror or rucovcrors in the said recovery
or reco\'"eries named or to be named, and his or their heirs, shall stand and be
seiz1e1d of . the 11aid capital messuage, Jandto, tenements, hereditaments and
to the preced· premiset1, and of every part l\lld po.reel thereof, to the U:lef.l, upon the tnIBO!, and
~~~d'.84'· lu title to and for the intents and purposes, and under and subject to the prol"isoes,
ou
limitations, aud a!l.'reementil, herciubefore mentioned, expressed and declared,
na~:.coTeof a.nd concerning the so.me. ..4.11d the said Abraham Darker, po.rtv hereunto,
for quiet e~o:r· doth hereby, for himimlf, his heir11, executol's a.nd a.dministrat-0rs, further covemeut,
nant, promi~o, grant and agree to and with tho said David Eclwan:l8 and
Franci11 Golding, their heirs, execut-0rs, and adminbtro.tors, in wanner and form
following; that is to 11&y, that tho said capital messuage, lancls, tenement..~
heredita.ments and premises, llhall, and way at all times hereafter, reml\in, continue, and be, to and for the u;res and purposes, upon the trusts, and under and
subject to the provisoeR, limitations and agreement.a, hcrciubefore mentioned,
e.1pro~110d, and declared, of and conceming the same; and shall and may bG
peRCeably and CJ.Uietly had, held, and enjoyed accordingly, without any lawful
let or interruption of or by the said A brahu.m Barker or Cecilia, his wife, parties hereunto, hii> or her heirs or es~igus, or of or by any other person or persons lawfully claiming or to claim frow, by, or under, or in trust for, him, her,
them or any of them; or from, hy, or under his or her ancestors, or any of
me ttom In·
them; and shall so remain, c1111tinue, and be, froe and clear, and freely and
c11mbrancee,
clearly acquitted, exonerated and dischllrged, or otherwise hy tho said .A.bra.ham
Barker or Cecilia, hiA 'l\·ite, partie;i hereunto, his or her heirs, executors, or
administrators, woll and 1mfficiently 11anid, defended, kept harmless and indemnified, of, from, and again:1t all former and other gift.'i, grant.o;, bargains, sales,
le&>1Cs, mortgages, lll!tatus, title;i, trouble:>, charges and incumbrance~, whatsoever, had, made, done, committed, oece.sioned or suffered, or to be had,
mu.de, done, committed, occasioned or suffered, by the said .Abraham
Barker or Cecilia, his wife, or by hi11 or her nncestonJ, or any of them, or by hill,
and for fllrther her, their, or any of their, act, meMll, as.~ent, consent or procurement : And
nwreQl,er, that he the said Abraham Darker and Cecilia, his wifo, parties hereunto, and his or her heirs, and all 0U1er persons having, or lawfully claiming,
or which shall or may have, or lawfully claim, any oKto.te, right, title, trust or
interest, at law or in equity, of, in, to, or out of, tho said capital messuage,
.lands, tenements, hereditaments and premises, or any of them, or any part
thereof, by or under or in trust for him, her, them, or any of them, or by or
under hh1 or her ancestors or llllY of them, shall and will, from time
to time, and at a.II times hereaner, upon every rel1ll0nnblu roque11t, and
at the 0011ts and charges of the said David Edwards and Franci» Golding,
or either of them, thoir or either of their heirs, executm·s, or administrators,
make, do and execute, or cause to be me.de, done and exe(•.uted, all such further
and other lawful and reasonable acts, dtieds, conveyauces and ~:mrances in t.he
law whatsoever, for the further, better, more perfect, and abiioluto granting,
conveying, settling and assuring of the same capital mossuage, lands, tenement.I, heredito.ment.<1 and premfaes, to and for the uses and purposes, upon the
trusts, aud under and subject to the pn•\'"isoes, limitations and agrotm1ents, hen."inbefore mentionecl, oxpreMed &nd declared, of and concerning the same, a.~ by
the said David Edwards and Francis Golding, or either of them, their or either
of their heirs, executol'll or Bdministratol"ll, or their or any of their coun:l('l
lee.med in the law, shall be roe.sonably advmed, devised or required: so a.~ such
further a.11surances contain in them no further or other warranty or covonlUltd
than against the person or persons, hi11, her, or their heirtl, who i:hall make or do
the same; and eo ae tho party or parties who shall be reqno.<1too to mnko 1.mch
further assnrnnoes, be not compelled or compella.ble, for making or doing
thereof, to go and tnwel above five milos from his, her, or their then respectirn
PowerofreTo- dwellingt or pla.eea of abode. Protnded laatly, and it is hereby further d1..oelarcd
eattou.
and agreed by and between a.II the parties to these prosentd, that it 11hall i.nd
may b8 lawful tc> and for the said Abraham Barker and Cecilia his wil"e, John
Barker and Katherine hi~ intended wife, and David Edwards, at any tiwu or

at the costs and charges of the said David Edwards and Francis Golding,

or either of them, their or either of their heirs, executors, or administrators,
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make, do and execute, or cause to be made, done and executed, all such further

and other lawful and reasonable acts, deeds, conveyances and assurances in the

law whatsoever, for the further, better, more perfect, and absolute granting,

conveying, settling and assuring of the same capital messuage, lands, tene-

ments", hereditaments and premises, to and for the uses aud purposes, upon the

trusts, and under and subject to the provisoes, limitations and agreements, here-

1£.
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times hereafter, during Aeir joint lives, by any writing or writings under their No. n.

respective kinds and seals, and attested by two or more credible witnesses, to '

revoke, make void, alter or change all and every or any the nse and use*, estate

and estates, herein and hereby before limited and declared, or mentioned or

intended to be limited and declared, of and in the capital messuage, lands, tene-

ments. hereditaments and premises aforesaid, or of or in any part or parcel

thereof, and to declare new and other uses of the same, or any part or parcel

thereof, any thing herein contained to the contrary thereof in anywise not-

withstanding. In witness whereof the parties to these presents their hands and Conclusion.

seals have subscribed aud set, the day and year flrst above written.

Sealed and delivered, being first 5 Abraham Barker. (L. S.)

duly stamped, in the pres- S Cecilia Barker. (L- S.)

ence of J David Edwards. (L. S.)

George Carter. Francis Golding. (L. SO

William Browne. Charles Browne. (L. S.)

Richard More. (L. S.)

John Barker. (L. S.)

Katherine Edwards. (L. S.)

No. m. NO. m.

AN OBLIGATION, OR BOND. WITH CONDITION FOR THE PAY-

MENT OF MONET.

KNOW ALL MFS- I iy these presents, that I, David Edwards, of Lincoln's Inn,
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in the county of Middlesex, esquire, am held and firmly bound to Abraham

Barker, of Dale Hall, in the county of Norfolk, esquire, in ten thousand pounds

of lawful money of Great Britain, to be paid to the said Abraham Barker, or

his certain attorney, executors, administrators or assigns; for which payment

well and truly to be made, I bind myself, my heirs, executors and administra-

tors, firmly by these presents, sealed with my seal. Dated the fourth day of

September, in the twenty-first year of the reign of our sovereign lord George

the Second, by the grace of God king of Great Britain, France, and Ireland,

defender of ihu faith, and so forth, and in UK.- year of our Lord one thousand

seven hundred and forty-seven.

The condition of this obligation is such, that it' the above-bounden David

Edwards, his heirs, executors, or administrators, do and shall well and truly-

pay, or <:ause to be paid, unto the above named Abraham Barker, his execntors,

administrators, or assigns, the full :;mn of flve thousand pounds of lawful Brit-

ish money, with lawful interest fur the same, on the fourth day of March next

ensuing the dat« of the above written obligation, then this obligation shall be

void and of none effect, or else shall be and remain in full force and virtue.

Sealed and delivered, being first f

duly stamped, in the pres- > David Edwards. (L. S.)

ence of )

George Carter.

William Browne.

No. IV. No. IV.

A FINE OF LANDS SUR COGNIZANCE DE DROIT, COME CEO, &c.

SCOT. 1. WB.II or COTINAJTT, o«

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, Trance, and

Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Norfolk,

greeting. Command Abraham Barker, esquire, and Cecilia Tils wife, and John

arker, esquire, that justly and without delay they perform to David Edwards,

esquire, the covenant made between them of two messuages, two gardens,

three hundred acres of land, one hundred acres of meadow, two hundred acres

of pasture, and fifty acres of wood, with the appurtenances, in Dalej and unless

they shall so do, and if the said David shall give yon security of prosecuting

his claim, then summon by good summoners the said Abraham, Cecilia,, and

John, that they appear before our justices at Westminster, from the day of St.

Michael in one month, to show wherefore they ha*e not done it : and have you

there the .summoners, and this writ. Witness ourself at Westminster, the ninth

day of October, in the twenty-first year of our reign

Summoners of the "I Sheriff 's re-

Pledges of ) John Doe. within-named A- I John Den. turn.

prosecution. ) Richard Roe. braham, Cecilia, f Richard Fen.

and John. j
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"«•>*• SECT. 2. TUB LICENSE TO AGREE. -i

Norfolk, ) DAVID EDWARDS, esquire, gives to the lord the king ten marks,

to wit. 5 for license to agree with Abraham Barker, esquire, of a plea

of covenant of two messuages, two gardens, three hundred acres of land, one

hundred acres of meadow, two hundred acres of pasture, and fifty acres of wood,

with the appurtenances, in Dale.

SECT. 3. THE CONCORD.

AND the agreement is such, to wit, that the aforesaid Abraham, Cecilia, and

John have acknowledged the aforesaid tenements, with the appurtenances, to

be the right of him the said David, as those which the said David hath of the

gift of the aforesaid Abraham, Cecilia, and John; and those they huve remised

and quitted claim, from them and their heirs, to the aforesaid David, and his

heirs, forever. And further, the same Abraham, Cecilia, and John, have

granted, for themselves and their heirs, that they will warrant to the aforesaid

David, and his heirs, the aforesaid tenements, with the appurtenaneus, against all

men, forever. And for this recognition, remise, quit-claim, warranty, fine, and

agreement, the said David hath given to the said Abraham, Cecilia, and John, two

hundred pounds sterling.

SECT. 4. THE NOTE OR ABSTRACT.

Norfolk, J BETWEEN David Edwards, esquire, complainant, and Abra-

to wit. \ ham Barker, esquire, and Cecilia his wile, and John Barker,

esquire, deforciants, of two messuages, two gardens, three hundred acres of
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land, one hundred acres of meadow, two hundred acres of pasture, and fifty

acres of wood, with the appurtenances, in Dale, whereupon a plea of covenant

was summoned between them : to wit, that the said Abraham, Cecilia, and John,

have acknowledged the aforesaid tenements, with the appurtenances, to be the

right of him the raid David, as those which the said David hath of the gift of

the aforesaid Abraham, Cecilia, and John; and those they have remised and

quitted claim, from them and their heirs, to the aforesaid David and his heirs,

forever. And further, the said Abraham, Cecilia, and John, have granted for

themselves, and their heirs, that they will warrant to the aforesaid David, and his

heirs, the aforesaid tenements, with the appurtenances, against all men, forever.

And for this recognition, remise, quit-claim, warranty, fine, and agreement, the

said David hath given to the said Abraham, Cecilia, and John, two hundred pounds

sterling.

SECT. 5. THE' FOOT, CHIROGRAPH, OR INDENTURES OF THE PINK.

Norfolk, ) THIS is THE FINAL AGREEMENT, made in the court of the lord,

to wit. J the king, at 'Westminster, from the day of Saint Michael in one

month, in the twenty-first year of the reign of the lord George the Second, by

the grace of (.!<«!, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland king, defender of the

faith, and so forth, before John Willes, Thomas Abney, Thomas Bnrnet, and

Thomas Birch, justices, and other faithful subjects of the lord the king then

there present, between David Edwards, esquire, complainant, and Abraham Bar-

ker, esquire, and Cecilia his wife, and John Barker, esquire, deforciants, of two

messuages, two gardens, three hundred acres of land, one hundred acres of

meadow, two hundred acres of pasture, and fifty acres of wood, with the appur-

tenances, in Dale, whereupon a plea of covenant was summoned between them

in the said court; to-wit, that the aforesaid Abraham, Cecilia, and John, have

acknowledged the aforesaid tenements, with the appurtenances, to be the right

of him the said David, as those which the said David hath of the gift of the

aforesaid Abraham, Cecilia, and John; and those they have remised and quitted

claim, from them and their heirs, to the aforesaid David,; and his heirs, forever.

And further, the same Abraham, Cecilia, and John, have granted for them-

selves and their heirs, that they will warrant to the aforesaid David and his

heirs, the aforesaid tenements, with the appurtenances, against all men, forever.

And for this recognition, remise, quit-claim, warranty, fine, and agreement, the

yidd David hath given to the said Abraham, Cecilia, and John, two hundred pounds

sterling.

SECT. 6. PROCLAMATIONS, INDORSED UPON THE FINE, ACCORDING TO THE

STATUTES.

THE FIRST proclamation was made the sixteenth day of November, in the term

of Saint Michael, in the twenty-first year of the king within-written.
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The second proclamation -was made the fourth fay of February, in the term of HO.IV. _,

Saint Hilary, in the twenty-first year of the king within-written.

The third proclamation was made the thirteeutii day of May, in the term of Eas-

ter, in the twenty-first year of the king within-written.

The fourth proclamation was made the twenty-eighth day of June, in the term

of the holy Trinity, in the twenty-second year of the king within-written.

NO. V. N..V._

A COMMON RECOVERY OF LAKDS WITH* DOUBLE VOUCHER.

SBCT. 1. "WBIT OF EITTRT SRTR DISSEISIN IN THE POST, OR PR.SOIPE.

GBORQE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland

king, defender of the faith, and so fort h, to the sheriff of Norfolk, greeting. Com-

mand David Edwards, esquire, that, justly and without delay, he render to Francis

Golding, clerk, two messuages, two gardens, three hundred acres of land, one hun-

dred acres of meadow, two nundred acres of pasture, and fifty acres of wood, with

the appurtenances, in Dale, which he claims to be his right and inheritance,

and into which the said David hath not entry, unless after the disseisin, which

Hugh Hunt thereof unjustly, and without judgment, hath made to the afore-

said Francis, within thirty years now last past, as he saith, and whereupon

he complains that the aforesaid David deforceth him. And unless he shall

go do, and if the said Francis shall give yon security of prosecuting his

claim, then summon by good sumrnoners the said David, that he appear before

our justices at Westminster on the octave of Saint Martin, to show where-
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fore he hath not done it: and have yon there the snmmoners, and this writ. Wit-

ness ourself at Westminster, the twenty-ninth day of October, in the twenty-first

year of our reign.

Pledges of ) John Doe. Snmrnoners of the ) John Den. sheriff's „.

prosecution. 5 Richard Roe. within named David. $ Richard Fen. torn.

SECT. 2. EXEMPLIFICATION OP THK RECOVERY Row,.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire-

land king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to all to whom these our present

letters shall come, greeting. Know ye, that among the pleas of land enrolled

at Westminster, before Sir John Willes, knight, and his fellows, our justices

of the bench, of the term of Saint Michael, in the twenty-first year of our

reign, upon the fifty-second roll, it is thus contained: Entry returnable on the Return,

octave of SI. Martin. Norfolk, to wit: Francis Golding, clerk, in his proper Demand

person, demandeth against David Edwards, esquire, two messuages, two the tenant,

gardens, throe hundred acres of land, one hundred acres of meadow, two hun-

dred acres of pasture, and fifty acres of wood, with the appurtenances, in

Dale, as his right and inheritance, and into which the said David hath not

entry, unless after the disseisin which Hugh Hunt thereof unjustly, and without

judgment, hath made to the aforesaid Francis, within thirty years now last

past. And whereupon he saith, that he himself was seised of the tenements count

aforesaid, with the appurtenances, in his demesne as of fee and right, in time

of peace, in the time of the lord the king that now is, by taking the profits

thereof to the value [tof six shillings and eight pence, and more, in rents, com, Bapiees.

and grass] : and into which [the said David hath not entry, unless as afore-

said]: and thereupon he bringeth suit [and good proof.] And the said David, Defence of the

in his proper person, comes and defendeth his right, when [and where it tenant.

shall behove him], and thereupon voucheth to warranty "John Barker, T^jJ^ty,

esquire, who is present here in court in his proper person, and the tenements

aforesaid, with the appurtenances, to him freely warranteth [and prays that

the said Francis may count against him]. And hereupon the said Francis "Demand

demandeth against the said John, tenant oy his own warranty, the tenements .", "Ju^ee"18

aforesaid, with the appurtenances, in form aforesaid, Ac. And whereupon he

saith, that he himself was seised of the tenements aforesaid, with the appur- "C°"nt.

tenances, in his demesne as of fee and right, in time of peace, in the time of

the lord the king that now is, by taking the profits thereof to the value, <fcc.

•Note, that, if the recovery be had witli single voucher, the parts marked " thus " In sec-

tion 2 arc omitted,

t The clauses between hook* are DO otherwise expressed in the record than by an Ac.
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.And into which, &c. .And thereupon he brinwith l!tlit1 &cl. And the afore11aicl
John, tenant by his own warranty, defends h111 right, when, &c., and thereupon
he fb.rt.her voucheth to warranty " J ooob llorela11d; who is present here in
court in his proper pel"flOn, and the tenement.~ aforesaid, with the appurt.e111wce11,
to him f'tet!ly wonanteth, &c. And hereupon the said Praucis demandet.lt againllt
the said Jacob, tenant by hie own warranty, the tenementa aCores&id, with the
Df'...nd
appurtenances, in form aforesaid, &c. .And whereupon he l!llith, that ha Mmagalnat the
self WM seh•ed of the tenements aforesaid, with the appunenances, in his
~==
demesne as of fee and right, in time of peace, in the time of the lord the
Coallt.
king that now is, by taking the profits thereof to the value, &c. And into
Defenoeof
which, &c. And thereupon he bnngeth suit1 &c. And the aforesaid Jacob,
the common
tenant by hil\ own w&JTe.nty, defendt b.11 ngbt, when, .to. And Mith that
vouchee.
the aforesaid Hugh did not disseise the aforesaid Francis of the tenements
aforesaid, al! the af'oreeaid Francle by hl1 writ and oount amJ'8l.l&id tJ>uve doth
:::..-ZcfU.
suppose: and of this he puts himself upon the country. And the aforelml*!'lanee.
eafd Franda thereupon craveth leave tD impart; and he hath it. A.ad aft.er.Default of the wlU"d.6 the aforef!aid Franci.1 cometh agam here into court, in tb.i4 u.me tel"IJl
common
in hie J??Oper pel'l!OD, and the aforesaid Jacob, though aolemnly called, cometh
vouchee.
not ap.10, out D.ath departed. in oontemp\ or the oomt, &lld maketh defr.ult.
Judgment for
T lterefore it ill ~ed, that the aforesaid Francia do recover his eeillin lg&inat
the demandant. the atoreaaid Darid of the tenement.I aforeeaid, wit.h the a.ppnrtanancee : and
Recovery ln
that the eald David have of the land of the llloreellid "Jolm to the value
value.
[of the tenements af'oresald J : and ftirtber, that the Mid John lutve flf the
.Amercement. f&Dd of the Mid" Jae1~b to the TBl118 (ol the tenements aforesaid.] And the
Mid Jacob in mercy. And hereupon the aaid Freooil prays a writ of the lord
the kin[!', to be directed to the sherlft' oC the oouty lfu:resaid, to cawse him to
ban full eeiein of the tsnemente aloreMoid, with the appurtenimoe11: .-id it. js
Awa.rd of the
granted unto him, returnable here without dela1. A.ftenrards, that ia to
writ of aelsln, the twenty-ei!'htb day of November, in tbi8 B&Dle term, here cometh t.he aaaa
and return.
Pnmcie in his proper person; anll dae lherift', 11&mely, Sir Charles Thompeoo,
knight, now sendeth, that he, by virtue of the writ aforesaid to him directed, on
the twenty-fourth day of the same month, did cause the said Francis to have
full eeisin of the tenement.a aforeeaitt, with the appurten1AC611, 81 he was eouibem llftcatlon manded. All &nd 8'1&1"'4r whiela premiees, at the requ.ellt of the lllliid Frallcis,
eonu!ued.
by the tenor of these presents, we have held good to be exemplified. In testimony whereof we have caused our seal, appointed for sealing writa in the
.
bench aforesaid, to be afthed to tbe11e prese1't1. WUusa Sil' John Willes, knight,
at Westminsl.eJ', the twenty-eighth da1 of November, in the twenty-first year of
our reign.
Jfo. v.
:;D=~=fe~;;~
~~o~i=
··the vouchee.
"Second
"•oncber.

Ho. V.

" Defence of

-1 the vouchee.

"Second

" Toucher.

Warranty.

Ill IINtllll

again*! tlio

eo mm on

Cmml.

Defence of

the common

•vouchee.

Plea, ml <«••

KM*.

Im parlance.

.Default of the

common

•vouchee.

Judgment for

tin- demandant.

value.
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Award of the

writ of Mlrin,

and return.

Exemplification

continued.

Tale.

And into which, £c. And thereupon he bringeth rait, <tc. And the aforesaid

John, tenant by his own warranty, defends his right, when, <fcc., and thereupon

be further vourlieth in warranty" Jacob Horeland; who is present here in

conrt in his proper person, and the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances,

to him freely worranteth, .to. And hereupon the said Francis deuiautleth aguinrt

Elll'D 01' VOX. L

the said Jacob, tenant by his own warranty, the teueincntg aforesaid, with the

appurtenances, in form aforesaid, Ac. And whereupon he saith, that he him-

69~

self was seised of the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances, in his

demesne as of fee and right, in time of peace, in the time of the lord the

king that now is, by taking the profits thereof to the value, <te. And into

•which, Ac. And thereupon he bnngeth suit, <fec. And the aforesaid Jacob,

tenant by his own warranty, defends his right, when, *«. And eaith that

the aforesaid Hugh did not disseise the aforesaid Francis of the tenements

aforesaid, as. the aforesaid Francis by his writ and count aforesaid above doth

suppose: and of this he puts himself npon the country. And the afore-

said Francis thereupon craveth leave to impart; and he hath it. And after-

wards the aforesaid Frum-is cometh again here into court, in this same term

in his proper person, and the aforesaid Jacob, though solemnly called, cometh

not again, bat hath departed in contempt of the court, aud niaketh default.

Therefore it is considered, that the aforesaid Francis do recover big seinin against

the aforesaid David of the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances : and

that the said David have of the land of the aforesaid "John to the value

[of the tenements aforesaid] : and further, that the said John have of the

land of the said" Jacob to the value [of the tenements aforesaid. 1 And the

said Jacob in mercy. And hereupon the said Francis prays a writ of the lord

the king, to be directed to the sheriff of the county aforesaid, to cause him to

have full seism of the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances: and it is

granted unto him, returnable here without delay. Afterwards, that i» to say,

the twenty-eighth day of November, in this same term, here cometh the said

Knuiois in his proper person; and the sheriff, namely, Sir Charles Thompson,

knight, now sendeth, that he, by virtue of the writ aforesaid to him directed, on

the twenty-fourth day of the same month, did cansc the said Francis to have

full seisin of the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances, a» he wag com-

manded. All tnd xinijiiinr which premises, at the request of the said Francis,

by the tenor of these presents, we have held good to be exemplified. In testi-

mony whereof we have caused our seal, appointed for sealing writ* in the

bench aforesaid, to be affixed to these presertts. Witness Sir John Willes, knight,

at "Westminster, the twenty-eighth day of November, in the twenty-first year of
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